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Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009

Scholars

1 Hegemony

Hegemony
Hegemony...................................................................................................................................................................1
Hegemony..........................................................................................1 ***Uniqueness***.............................................................................7 ***Uniqueness***.............................................................................7

Uniqueness Readiness Up Troops.........................................................................................................................8


Uniqueness Readiness Up Troops................................................8

Uniqueness Readiness Up Effectiveness .............................................................................................................9


Uniqueness Readiness Up Effectiveness .....................................9

Uniqueness Readiness Up Technology...............................................................................................................10


Uniqueness Readiness Up Technology.......................................10

Uniqueness Readiness Up Funding.....................................................................................................................11


Uniqueness Readiness Up Funding............................................11

Uniqueness Readiness Low Troops....................................................................................................................12


Uniqueness Readiness Low Troops............................................12

Uniqueness Readiness Low Effectiveness..........................................................................................................13


Uniqueness Readiness Low Effectiveness..................................13

Uniqueness Readiness Low Technology/Funding..............................................................................................14


Uniqueness Readiness Low Technology/Funding......................14

Uniqueness Soft Power Up....................................................................................................................................15


Uniqueness Soft Power Up............................................................15

Uniqueness Soft Power Low .................................................................................................................................16


Uniqueness Soft Power Low ........................................................16

Uniqueness Unilateralism Up................................................................................................................................17


Uniqueness Unilateralism Up........................................................17

Uniqueness Unilateralism Low..............................................................................................................................18


Uniqueness Unilateralism Low.....................................................18

Uniqueness Multilateralism Up.............................................................................................................................19


Uniqueness Multilateralism Up.....................................................19

Uniqueness Multilateralism Down.........................................................................................................................20


Uniqueness Multilateralism Down................................................20

Uniqueness Credibility Up.....................................................................................................................................21


Uniqueness Credibility Up............................................................21

Uniqueness Credibility Down ...............................................................................................................................22


Uniqueness Credibility Down ......................................................22

Uniqueness Iraq Hurts Heg....................................................................................................................................23


Uniqueness Iraq Hurts Heg...........................................................23

Uniqueness A2: Iraq Hurts Heg.............................................................................................................................24


Uniqueness A2: Iraq Hurts Heg....................................................24

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Scholars

2 Hegemony

Uniqueness Afghanistan Hurts Heg.......................................................................................................................25


Uniqueness Afghanistan Hurts Heg..............................................25

Uniqueness A2: Afghanistan Hurts Heg................................................................................................................26


Uniqueness A2: Afghanistan Hurts Heg........................................26

Uniqueness Obama Hurts Heg...............................................................................................................................27


Uniqueness Obama Hurts Heg......................................................27

Uniqueness A2: Obama Hurts Heg........................................................................................................................28


Uniqueness A2: Obama Hurts Heg...............................................28

Uniqueness Heg Sustainable..................................................................................................................................29


Uniqueness Heg Sustainable.........................................................29

Uniqueness Heg Unsustainable .............................................................................................................................30


Uniqueness Heg Unsustainable ....................................................30

Uniqueness Rogue Threats Up...............................................................................................................................31


Uniqueness Rogue Threats Up......................................................31

Uniqueness Rogue Threats Down..........................................................................................................................32


Uniqueness Rogue Threats Down.................................................32

Uniqueness Civil Military Relations Up................................................................................................................33


Uniqueness Civil Military Relations Up........................................33

Uniqueness Civil Military Relations Down...........................................................................................................34


Uniqueness Civil Military Relations Down...................................34 ***Links***....................................................................................35 ***Links***....................................................................................35

K2 Heg Social Services .........................................................................................................................................36


K2 Heg Social Services ................................................................36

K2 Heg Domestic Policy........................................................................................................................................37


K2 Heg Domestic Policy...............................................................37

K2 Heg Humanitarianism......................................................................................................................................38
K2 Heg Humanitarianism..............................................................38

K2 Heg Poverty......................................................................................................................................................39
K2 Heg Poverty.............................................................................39

K2 Heg Multilateralism.........................................................................................................................................40
K2 Heg Multilateralism.................................................................40

K2 Heg Hard Power ..............................................................................................................................................41


K2 Heg Hard Power .....................................................................41

Not K2 Heg Social Services...................................................................................................................................42


Not K2 Heg Social Services..........................................................42

Not K2 Heg Domestic Policy.................................................................................................................................43


Not K2 Heg Domestic Policy........................................................43

Not K2 Heg Humanitarianism ..............................................................................................................................44

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Scholars
Not K2 Heg Humanitarianism ......................................................44

3 Hegemony

Not K2 Heg Poverty...............................................................................................................................................45


Not K2 Heg Poverty......................................................................45

Not K2 Heg Multilateralism..................................................................................................................................46


Not K2 Heg Multilateralism..........................................................46

K2 Multilateralism Unilateralism..........................................................................................................................47
K2 Multilateralism Unilateralism..................................................47 ***No Balancing***........................................................................48 ***No Balancing***........................................................................48

Counterbalancing Down...........................................................................................................................................49
Counterbalancing Down...................................................................49

No Balancing Benign Heg.....................................................................................................................................50


No Balancing Benign Heg.............................................................50

No Balancing Russia/EU.......................................................................................................................................51
No Balancing Russia/EU...............................................................51

No Balancing India ...............................................................................................................................................52


No Balancing India ......................................................................52

No Balancing Asia Generic....................................................................................................................................53


No Balancing Asia Generic...........................................................53

No Alternative to U.S. Hegemony............................................................................................................................54


No Alternative to U.S. Hegemony...................................................54

***Yes Balancing***...............................................................................................................................................55
***Yes Balancing***......................................................................55

Counterbalancing Up................................................................................................................................................56
Counterbalancing Up.......................................................................56

Multipolarity Now.....................................................................................................................................................57
Multipolarity Now...........................................................................57

Nonpolarity Now.......................................................................................................................................................58
Nonpolarity Now.............................................................................58

Yes Balancing EU .................................................................................................................................................59


Yes Balancing EU ........................................................................59

Yes Balancing Russia/China..................................................................................................................................60


Yes Balancing Russia/China.........................................................60

AT: Benign Hegemony.............................................................................................................................................61


AT: Benign Hegemony....................................................................61

AT: We Solve Bad Parts of Heg (Multilateralism)...................................................................................................62


AT: We Solve Bad Parts of Heg (Multilateralism)...........................62

***Soft Power Good***...........................................................................................................................................63


***Soft Power Good***..................................................................63

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Scholars

4 Hegemony

Soft Power K2 Heg...................................................................................................................................................64


Soft Power K2 Heg..........................................................................64

Soft Power K2 Heg...................................................................................................................................................65


Soft Power K2 Heg..........................................................................65

Soft Power Solves Terrorism....................................................................................................................................66


Soft Power Solves Terrorism...........................................................66

Soft Power Solves Democracy..................................................................................................................................67


Soft Power Solves Democracy.........................................................67

Soft Power Solves Misc............................................................................................................................................68


Soft Power Solves Misc...................................................................68

***Soft Power Bad***.............................................................................................................................................69


***Soft Power Bad***....................................................................69

Soft Power Not K2 Heg............................................................................................................................................70


Soft Power Not K2 Heg...................................................................70

Soft Power Causes Resentment/Terrorism...............................................................................................................71


Soft Power Causes Resentment/Terrorism.......................................71

Soft Power Causes Prolif/Genocide..........................................................................................................................72


Soft Power Causes Prolif/Genocide.................................................72

***Heg Good***......................................................................................................................................................73
***Heg Good***.............................................................................73

Heg Good Caspian Stability...................................................................................................................................74


Heg Good Caspian Stability..........................................................74

Heg Good Chinese Containment............................................................................................................................75


Heg Good Chinese Containment...................................................75

Heg Good Democracy............................................................................................................................................76


Heg Good Democracy...................................................................76

Heg Good Deter Rogue States...............................................................................................................................77


Heg Good Deter Rogue States.......................................................77

Heg Good East Asian Stability..............................................................................................................................78


Heg Good East Asian Stability......................................................78

Heg Good Global Economy...................................................................................................................................79


Heg Good Global Economy..........................................................79

Heg Good Iraq Stability.........................................................................................................................................80


Heg Good Iraq Stability................................................................80

Heg Good Laundry List.........................................................................................................................................81


Heg Good Laundry List.................................................................81

Heg Good Middle East Stability............................................................................................................................82


Heg Good Middle East Stability....................................................82

Heg Good South China Sea...................................................................................................................................83

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Scholars
Heg Good South China Sea...........................................................83

5 Hegemony

Heg Good Space Dominance.................................................................................................................................84


Heg Good Space Dominance........................................................84

Heg Good Warming ..............................................................................................................................................85


Heg Good Warming .....................................................................85

Heg Good War.......................................................................................................................................................86


Heg Good War..............................................................................86

Unipolarity Good War...........................................................................................................................................87


Unipolarity Good War...................................................................87

AT: Heg Bad Imperialism......................................................................................................................................88


AT: Heg Bad Imperialism.............................................................88

***Heg Bad***.........................................................................................................................................................89
***Heg Bad***...............................................................................89

Heg Bad Blowback ...............................................................................................................................................90


Heg Bad Blowback ......................................................................90

Heg Bad Caspian Sea Stability (1/2)......................................................................................................................91


Heg Bad Caspian Sea Stability (1/2).............................................91

Heg Bad Caspian Sea Stability (2/2)......................................................................................................................92


Heg Bad Caspian Sea Stability (2/2).............................................92

Heg Bad China Relations ......................................................................................................................................93


Heg Bad China Relations .............................................................93

Heg Bad Economy.................................................................................................................................................94


Heg Bad Economy........................................................................94

Heg Bad Iraq Instability.........................................................................................................................................95


Heg Bad Iraq Instability................................................................95

Heg Bad Middle East Prolif...................................................................................................................................96


Heg Bad Middle East Prolif..........................................................96

Heg Bad Nuclear Terrorism...................................................................................................................................97


Heg Bad Nuclear Terrorism..........................................................97

Heg Bad Preemptive Wars.....................................................................................................................................98


Heg Bad Preemptive Wars............................................................98

Heg Bad Prolif ......................................................................................................................................................99


Heg Bad Prolif .............................................................................99

Heg Bad South China Sea ...................................................................................................................................100


Heg Bad South China Sea ..........................................................100

Heg Bad Space ....................................................................................................................................................101


Heg Bad Space ...........................................................................101

Heg Bad Terrorism ..............................................................................................................................................102


Heg Bad Terrorism .....................................................................102

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Scholars

6 Hegemony

Heg Bad Terrorism ..............................................................................................................................................103


Heg Bad Terrorism .....................................................................103

Unipolarity Bad War ...........................................................................................................................................104


Unipolarity Bad War ..................................................................104

AT: Power Vacuum................................................................................................................................................105


AT: Power Vacuum.......................................................................105

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

7 Trade-Off DA

***Uniqueness***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

8 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Readiness Up Troops


Enlistment increasing now Sanchez and Young 7/8 (Christina and Nicole, reporters for The Tennessean, Economy boosts military
recruiting,http://www.tennessean.com/article/20090708/NEWS01/907080395/1006/Economy+boosts+military+recr uiting, 7/8/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC Military recruiters are seeing a lot of Sextons walk into their offices, people looking for stable jobs and paychecks that cannot be found in other industries because of the economy. "My business dropped way off," said Sexton, who will enter basic training Aug. 19 at Fort Knox, Ky. "My desire took a back seat to providing for my family. My wife suggested I join, but the economy contributed to my decision." The average recruiting age remains about 21 years old, but the pool of candidates has become more diverse: mother-daughter teams, new college graduates, lawyers, small-business owners, scientists, among others. Many have college diplomas; some hold master's and doctoral degrees. "We're seeing a nice mix of recent college graduates affected by the economy who can't find a job, and career switchers who find themselves behind a desk after 10 years who don't want to do that any longer," said Maj. Christine Gupton, executive officer for the U.S. Army Nashville Recruiting Battalion. The new brand of recruits keeps the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines replenished nationwide. The Defense Department has missed its combined active-duty recruiting goals only three times since 1980: in 1998, 1999 and 2005. The individual service branches have had scattered off years. Tennessee recruiters in the various branches have met or exceeded their targets. The numbers have increased each year, partly because of a mandate handed down from Congress for all recruiters to bring more people into the service. Quotas have gone up each year.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

9 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Readiness Up Effectiveness


Obama increasing military effectiveness now RTTNews 7/7 (Realtime Financial News, Internet-based business wire service and news aggregator,
Administration Officials Support Military Commission Reforms, Propose Additional Areas Of Focus, http://www.forextv.com/Forex/News/ShowStory.jsp?seq=998572&category=, 7/7/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC (RTTNews) - Top members of the Obama administration told lawmakers Tuesday that the United States is on the right path to improving the effectiveness of military commissions and enhancing national security. Speaking before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, a panel of witnesses applauded the provisions of the committee's Defense Authorization Act for making key adjustments to the Military Commissions Act of 2006. At the hearing, Jeh Johnson, General Counsel for the Department of Defense, expressed confidence that the administration could work with Congress to ensure that "military commissions can emerge from this effort as a fully legitimate forum." Johnson highlighted provisions from the new legislation that suggested rule changes that have also been supported by the Obama administration. These provisions include a ban on the in-court use of statements obtained by cruel interrogation methods. He argued that the ban would "go a long way toward enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of commissions" in the face of criticism that interrogation methods "amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

10 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Readiness Up Technology


Military technology use increasing Fewer casualties Walker 6/16 (Mark, North County Times Staff Writter, MILITARY: Technology cited for low number of Medal
of Honor winners, http://www.northcountytimes.com/articles/2009/06/16/military/z40a54a4775849706882575d7005b1751.txt, 6/16/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC Is high-tech warfare making combat safer and leading to fewer Medal of Honor winners from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? That's the suggestion of a Defense Department official in a letter to Rep. Duncan D. Hunter, R-El Cajon, who says there are more deserving troops from America's current conflicts than the five who have won the honor. Gail McGinn, undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, wrote Hunter a letter earlier this month suggesting electronic warfare may be one reason why only a handful of U.S. troops have been awarded the nation's highest military award for valor in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Technological advancements have dramatically changed battlefield tactics, techniques and procedures," McGinn wrote in the letter released by Hunter's office. "Precision-guided, stand-off weapons allow our forces to destroy known enemy positions with reduced personnel risk." Hunter said Tuesday he was dissatisfied with that reasoning. He wants a congressionally mandated review of how the Medal of Honor award has been bestowed in recent years.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

11 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Readiness Up Funding


Military funding increasing despite cuts Friedman 5/3 (Benjamin, research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute and a
Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cut military spending in half, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/mostread/s_623281.html, 5/3/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC The Defense secretary proposes breaking up the Army's modernization program, the Future Combat Systems and canceling some of the vehicles -- but they will be replaced with others. All told, spending on a national missile defense program would be cut by only about 15 percent. Second, the military's size will barely budge under this plan. Yes, the Army would grow to only 45 brigade combat teams rather than 48, as was planned. But the people who were to fill out the 48 would be stuffed into 45 -- the units will have higher readiness. The Navy is likely to shrink to 10 carrier battle groups instead of 11. But the decline will take decades. The Air Force will shrink only slightly. Gates wants to halt personnel reductions in the Air Force and Navy and continue to expand the Army and Marines by 90,000 servicemen. To understand why that is conservative, consider how much we spend on defense relative to both our purported rivals and our past. Our defense budget is almost half the world's, even leaving out nuclear weapons, the wars, veterans and homeland security. It is also more than we spent at any point during the Cold War. When that struggle ended, we simply gave back the Reagan buildup and kept spending at average Cold War levels. Then we began another buildup in 1998 that nearly doubled non-war defense spending.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

12 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Readiness Low Troops


U.S. cutting troops now Cocks 3/8 (Tim, Reuters, U.S. to cut Iraq troop strength by 12,000,
http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Iraq+troop+strength/1367405/story.html, 3/8/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC BAGHDAD -- The United States will reduce the number of troops in Iraq by around 12,000 in the next six months, the U.S. military said on Sunday, a step in President Barack Obama's plan to end combat operations in August 2010. "Two brigade combat teams who were scheduled to redeploy in the next six months, along with enabling forces such as logistics, engineers and intelligence, will not be replaced," the U.S. military said in a statement. Reducing the number of U.S. combat brigades in Iraq from 14 to 12 will cut the number of American troops, currently around 140,000, by 12,000, said Major-General David Perkins, spokesman for U.S. forces in Iraq.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

13 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Readiness Low Effectiveness


Military worn out now hamstringing readiness Tauscher 2/12 (Ellen, chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee,
Our troops need more time between deployments, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi? f=/c/a/2009/02/12/EDFH15S3HS.DTL&type=printable, 2/12/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC Having fought two wars on two fronts for more than seven years, our troops are tired and our military's equipment is worn out. The demands of multiple deployments in quick succession have taken a toll on our troops, who suffer on a personal level, experiencing higher rates of suicide, divorce and post-traumatic stress disorder. This has hampered the military's ability to respond to another crisis somewhere else in the world to protect America's interests. That's why Congress must pass legislation
making sure the military services guarantee "dwell time," a period of time to rest and regroup, for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. Active-duty troops should have at least a month of rest for every month they were deployed in a combat zone. Reservists and National Guardsman should have at least three months of rest for each month of deployment. The pace of deployments needed to sustain combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has taken a toll on our servicemen and servicewomen, who silently endure emotional fatigue and distress. They have missed their children's births, their parents' funerals and learned of divorces on blogs and Web sites. Take Douglas Del Campo, a 26-year-old former Air Force military policeman, who is now working at Travis Air Force Base in my congressional district. After four tours of duty in Iraq and rushed rest periods between, Douglas is haunted by nightmares of beheadings. He says he is irritable and always on a heightened sense of security even though the battlefields of Iraq are thousands of miles away. These are classic symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and, fortunately, Del Campo is seeking treatment at a local Veterans' Administration hospital. Del Campo and the rest of our men and women in uniform deserve and need more time between deployments to adjust from the intense stress of counter-insurgency warfare, to reconnect with their wives and children, and to pursue educational opportunities and other goals. The situation today, when more than a third of the 1.7 million troops who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan have been deployed more than once, is as dire as it was after the war in Vietnam when our troops were fatigued, our equipment was worn out, and our military leaders said we had a "hollow Army." Last year, senior military officials

determined that there has been an overall decline in military readiness and there remains a significant risk that the U.S. military might not be able to respond effectively if confronted with a new crisis. As dangerous as the world can be, we cannot afford to have a "hollow Army."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

14 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Readiness Low Technology/Funding


Obama cutting military funding for technology now Guardiano 6/24 (John, Marine and member of Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) modernization program,
Modernize the Military Now, http://spectator.org/archives/2009/06/24/modernize-the-military-now/1, 6/24/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC Advocates of military modernization have been largely silent even as the Obama administration pushes through the most significant weapon systems cuts since the Carter administration. This is in part because
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has done a masterful job of public relations. He has wisely depicted himself as a "reformer" who is squaring off against allegedly greedy, Cold War-era defense contractors. The media, moreover, have accepted this narrative hook, line and sinker and made it the analytical framework through which virtually all defense budget stories have been written. In reality, the so-called military-industrial complex is timid, inarticulate, and politically and culturally clueless. The media-academic complex, by contrast, is bold, highly articulate, and politically and culturally savvy. Thus in possession of superior firepower, the media-academic complex has won this engagement without firing a shot. That's a shame because advocates of military modernization have the better argument if only they were able to make it. That would require, however, that they do their homework, jettison old ways of thinking, and embrace new military and strategic realities. Doing their homework means listening to U.S. military leaders and understanding U.S. military requirements in the 21st century. Jettisoning old ways of thinking means acknowledging that the Cold War is over, and that a full-scale conventional conflict involving set-piece battles is extremely unlikely. And embracing new military and strategic realities means recognizing that we are in an era of persistent military engagement which will span the full spectrum of conflict -- from counterinsurgency missions and nation building to traditional warfare and stability operations. Yet too many advocates of military modernization have allowed themselves to be depicted as narrow-minded defenders of parochial interests. They have defended particular military systems that give jobs to their constituents; but they have failed to develop a coherent and persuasive narrative that links these systems into a more comprehensive and overarching 21st Century defense strategy. Secretary Gates is absolutely right when he says that the military must reorient itself to fight and win 21st century conflicts. He also is absolutely right when he says that military engagements of the future will be defined by hybrid threats (which involve the full spectrum of conflict) and irregular tactics. "The threat of the early 21st Century will not be the son of Desert Storm; it will be the stepchild of Chechnya," predicted then Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Charles C. Krulak in 1998 Congressional testimony. "Our opponents," he presciently observed, "will not be doctrinaire or predictable. They will not try to match us tank for tank and plane for plane in an attempt to fight the kind of Industrial Age war to which we are accustomed. "Instead, they will seek to fight us where we are least able to bring our strength to bear." And, Krulak added, "one thing is certain: this 21st Century threat will be far more difficult to manage." The U.S. military absolutely requires new capabilities and new weapon systems to address new

21st century threats At the same time, however, the U.S. military must retain its ability to fight and win conventional wars precisely so that it can prevent such wars from ever happening. Military weakness, after all, is itself a provocation and an invitation to war. This means that the U.S. military requires more money to modernize and more modern defense systems. Yet, for the most part, the Obama administration is subtracting, not adding, to America's military arsenal. And the Army, which is bearing the brunt of the burden in this long war, is being especially hard hit. Indeed, the Army's Fiscal Year 2010 budget request is two percent less than what the service had requested in 2009. Army procurement accounts (which include modernization) are being cut even more dramatically, by some 14 percent or $3.5 billion.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

15 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Soft Power Up


U.S. influence is indispensible Glaser and Morris 7/9 (Bonnie and Lyle, Senior Fellow in the Freeman Chair for China Studies at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and Research Intern in the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and is currently pursuing a Masters degree from Columbia Universitys School of International and Public Affairs, 7/9/09, AD: 7/9/09) JC Echoing this view is Liu Jianfei, professor and associate director of the International Strategy Institute at the Communist Party Central School. In a recent issue of Sousuo yu Zhengming, a periodical published by the Shanghai Social Science Association, Liu presents a comprehensive analysis of the post-financial crisis world and cautions China against coming to premature conclusions about a rapid decline in U.S. overall power. The financial crisis will undoubtedly weaken U.S. hard power, but it might end up affecting the economies of other countries even more, says Liu. The overall negative influence

affecting the power of American hegemonyin military, economic and soft power termswill remain limited [13]. Liu Jianfei sees U.S. influence as indispensable in shaping a new world order and cautions
China about taking too high a profile, or seeking to be a leader of the international system. China still needs more time to develop and open up to the outside world, he says. Many are calling for China to be the new leader in the new world order, but we need to continue down the road of reform and development and not adopt hegemonic tendencies. China also needs the cooperation and trade of the United States and other Western countries in order to succeed [14].

Increased U.S. soft power New Presidency and Jacksons death Hartcher 6/30 (Peter, Heralds International Editor, Soft power: Jackson and a new anthem for American politics,
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/opinion/soft-power-jackson-and-a-new-anthem-for-american-politics-20090629-d2ek.html?page=-1, 6/30/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC

Together with the worldwide outpouring of grief ranging from mass dance tributes in a Philippines prison to an Eiffel Tower moonwalk, the death of Michael Jackson has brought an extraordinary collection of tributes from world political figures. Two of the great heroes of the postwar world's struggle for democracy, Nelson
Mandela of South Africa and Kim Dae-jung of South Korea, issued statements of condolences. "We lost a hero to the world," Kim said. The Japanese Prime Minister, Taro Aso, recalled admiring his tapdancing skills, and Britain's Culture Secretary, Ben Bradshaw, said he had played Jackson's Billie Jean as the first dance at his civil union. Most surprising was that the implacable enemy of all things American, Venezuela's President, Hugo Chavez, although criticising an excess of media coverage, nonetheless called the death "lamentable news". This remarkable moment of worldwide political and popular unity is a reminder of the immensity of American soft power, a dimension of US influence severely damaged by eight years of George Bush. What is soft power? The man who developed the concept, Joe Nye of Harvard University, explains: "Hard power is the ability to coerce others by using carrots or sticks as either bribes or threats. But soft power is the ability to get what we want by attracting others, by getting them to want the things we want. "If I can get what I want because you want it too, it saves me a lot of carrots and sticks," is how Nye put it to the BBC. It includes the power of culture, of values, of example, of desirability. The marketers of designer brands understand the value of the concept because it is the basis of their incomes. It may be soft power, but it is not limp. Nye, who worked as a defence official in the Clinton administration, again: "During the Cold War, military containment prevented Soviet expansion, but the real victory was the transformation of the cultures behind the Iron Curtain by their attraction to Western values. So soft power was essentially the transformative force." Since Nye first wrote about the concept in 1990 it has been embraced by the Chinese regime, which has long pursued ideas of marshalling China's "comprehensive power" to amplify its influence in world affairs. But while the

Chinese launched a campaign offering trade deals and goodwill to its neighbours to build their soft power, the US inflicted terrible damage to its soft power. Nathan Gardels, editor of an international affairs journal,
New Perspectives Quarterly, wrote in 2005: "Since the Iraq invasion and Abu Ghraib, America is nowadays considered guilty until proven innocent. This is new America has lost the protection of its soft power Since World War II this has been the legitimating complement to military might." Kevin Rudd pointedly noted the contrast between China's shrewd pursuit of global credibility and America's reckless squandering of it. When he met Bush in September 2007, Rudd rather cheekily gave him a copy of The Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming The World, by an American journalist, Joshua Kurlantzick. Bush's defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, said he did not understand the concept of soft power. The result was obvious. The gratuitous bellicosity and offensive high-handedness of the Bush team sent world regard for the US to its lowest level since at least the Vietnam War. Rumsfeld's successor, Robert Gates, appointed by Bush and now serving under Obama, is a wiser man. "One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win," he said in a 2007 speech to student officers. "My message today is not about the defence budget or military power. My message is that if we are to meet the myriad challenges around the world in the coming decades, this country must strengthen other important elements of national power. In short, based on my experience serving seven presidents, as a former director of the CIA and now as Secretary of Defence, I am here to make the case for strengthening our capacity to use soft power and for better integrating it with hard power." The advent of Barack Obama restored

tremendous amounts of US soft power because of the global goodwill that greeted his elevation. Reaction to Jackson's death illustrates anew the reservoir of soft power the US commands.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

16 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Soft Power Low


U.S. soft power ineffective Crook 7/6 (Clive, senior editor of The Atlantic Monthly, a columnist for National Journal and a commentator for
the Financial Times, The strength behind Obama's smile, http://www.businessspectator.com.au/bs.nsf/Article/Thestrength-behind-Obamas-smile-pd20090706-TP2JE?OpenDocument&src=sph, 7/6/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC Before the Iranian election, US opinion on Barack Obamas foreign policy divided on predictably partisan lines. Now the picture is more complicated. Mr Obamas supporters admired his desire to restore US standing in the world and his willingness to talk without preconditions to governments his predecessor despised. This would make all the difference, they believed. The new presidents conservative and neoconservative critics rolled their eyes. They attacked Mr Obamas naive overtures to dictators, and his unwarranted apologies for supposed US sins. Those critics see Iran as one more proof they were right. The administration spoke respectfully to Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, seeking not to humiliate but to reach an accommodation. Mr Obamas speech in Cairo on US-Islamic relations was welcomed in much of the Muslim world and had most US liberals swooning in admiration. And see what happened. The Iranian government has hardened its stance on nuclear materials, persisted with its support for Iraqi insurgents, and stamped on its own people when they challenged a rigged election. So much for soft power. Mr Obamas friendly outreach to other states be they hostile, unco-operative or even supposedly friendly has been no more productive, say the critics. China is about as implacable, North Korea just as deranged, Europe just as feckless. Russia, which Mr Obama visits this week, bullies and bribes its near-abroad with as little finesse as usual. What a surprise: the world is not smiling back.

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Uniqueness Unilateralism Up
Obama acting unilaterally now Wittes and Goldsmith 6/29 (Benjamin and Jack, senior fellow at the Broookings Institution and teaches at
Harvard Law School and served as an assistant attorney general in the Bush administration, Will Obama Follow Bush Or FDR?, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/28/AR2009062802288.html? hpid=opinionsbox1, 6/29/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC Today, President Obama faces much the same choice, and he appears sorely tempted to follow the same road, for the same reasons: "White House officials are increasingly worried that reaching quick agreement with Congress on a new detention system may be impossible," The Post reported Saturday, and "Congress may try to assert too much control over the process." Obama is considering creating a longterm detention apparatus by presidential executive order based on essentially the same legal authorities the Bush administration used. Obama, to put it bluntly, seems poised for a nearly wholesale adoption of the Bush administration's unilateral approach to detention. The attraction is simple, seductive and familiar. The legal arguments for unilateralism are strong in theory; past presidents in shorter, traditional wars did not seek specific congressional input on detention. Securing such input for our current war, it turns out, is still hard. The unilateral approach, by contrast, lets the president define the rules in ways that are convenient for him and then dares the courts to say no.

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Uniqueness Unilateralism Low


Obama taking actions opposite from Bushs unilateralism Morris 7/4 (Leo, The News-Sentinel editorial page editor, While we mull others' freedom, let's cherish our own,
http://www.news-sentinel.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090704/EDITORIAL/907040341, 7/4/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC Under George Bush, American unilateralism seemed to be the order of the day. We would topple all the tyrants and chase down any sympathizers to tyrants, no matter what country we had to invade and whether the rest of the world liked it or not. Freedom and democratic values were too important to be left to the slow march of history. We'd impose them with our military might! The result was the quagmire in Iraq, with all those lives lost and all that money spent and a thoroughly disillusioned American public. But President Obama seems to want to lurch too far in the other direction. He makes overtures to the thugs in Iran, then stays too quiet too long when people take to the streets in protest of a rigged election and then get squashed. He snubs Cuban dissidents and hints that talks might be possible with the Castro brothers. But when a would-be dictator is ejected from Honduras, Obama immediately takes the side of the ousted demagogue. Critics say our president is siding with the tyrants, but the simpler truth might be that he just wants to take the easy way of negotiating with whoever is in power. So we had a cowboy leading our national defense, and now we have a weenie. Isn't there some kind of rational way of protecting America's interests somewhere between those two extremes? How much do we want to support democracy everywhere, given that people with the ability to choose might frequently choose to be enemies of the United States? And sometimes nations that aren't free are stable, which can be in the best interests of our own security. Which of those stable nations do we support and which do we not? Tricky stuff.

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19 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Multilateralism Up
Obama administration embracing multilateralism now Xinhua 6/25 (Chinese news agency, U.S. backs multilateral efforts to tackle global financial crisis, envoy says,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-06/25/content_11596392.htm, 6/25/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC UNITED NATIONS, June 24 (Xinhua) -- The United States on Wednesday voiced its support to the multilateral efforts to promote sustainable development worldwide and recognized the unique role of the United Nations to have voices of countries heard. Suan Rice, the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, told a high-level UN conference on world financial crisis that "the United States is here to participate in this important conversation, to listen, to exchange, to work with you in a spirit of cooperation." "The United States supports multilateral efforts to increase the coherence of economic, social, and sustainable development policies across the globe," she said. Several global and regional for a now further this goal, such as the UN General Assembly, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, the UN Commission on the Status of Women, the Annual Ministerial Review of the Economic Community of West African States, the Group of Eight industrialized countries, the Group of 20 largest economies in the world, the Development Committee of the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, all have their own strengths and mandate, and all enjoy representation from both developing and developed countries, she said. "The subject that we are here to address is of deep matter to us all," she said. "We understand that this conference is particularly important for addressing the needs of the world's most vulnerable populations." "It offers a truly global platform to discuss how the financial crisis has affected all countries, and it gives us all a chance to exchange views on how to respond," she said. "We recognize that many countries around the world, especially the poorest and the most vulnerable, are struggling to manage and respond effectively to the crisis, and we are working in many venues to address its causes and its consequences," she said. On the UN role, Rice said, "The UN's universal membership and its well-institutionalized intergovernmental process gives it a unique advantage in responding to many dimensions of the crisis." "Our dialogue here should focus on finding practical ways to mitigate the development consequences of the current crisis and to see the UN perform its crucial development roles with new urgency," she said. The UN is a unique forum where all voices -- small and large countries alike -can be heard," she said. "We also believe that we should use every instrument at our disposal to tackle different dimensions of the crisis." Rice made the statement which once again shows that the Obama administration embraces multilateralism, unlike the Bush administration's adherence to unilateralism, attracting criticism from the world.

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Uniqueness Multilateralism Down


The U.S. is taking unilateral actions now Gvosdev 6/12 (Nikolas, a senior editor at The National Interest, is a professor of national-security studies at the
U.S. Naval War College, The End of Multilateralism, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21600, 6/12/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC The Obama administration entered office pledging a renewed commitment to multilateralism approaching global issues as joint problems requiring joint solutions. This commitment, however, is running up against a growing attitude in many parts of the world that the concerns the United States are identifying as threats to global peace and security are really just problems for America alone. In the
months after 9/11, Amitai Etzioni saw the emerging foundations of what he termed a Global Safety Authority (GSA) as states worked together to pool intelligence on terrorists and collaborated more closely in efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction. If, in the past, nations had focused only on specific threats to their own national security, the GSA would work to eliminate threats to the stability of the international system as a whole. Etzioni saw in this emergent GSA a way for the United States to receive considerable assistance in its drive to deproliferate Iran and North Korea, because there was a growing awareness that these states pose a danger to others. The philosophical basis of the GSA was the belief that a threat to one state posed a threat to the entire system. The lesson of 9/11 was that a successful strike against one state would have negative ramifications for every state, in both economic and security terms. A shared community of interests would bind the key powers of the world together. There is a familiar litany of excuses as to why this consensus has dissipated. The American penchant for unilateralism and

desire to pursue action unhindered by the need to build consensus with other states, beginning with the Iraq War. The blame that many in the rest of the world ascribe to the United States for the current global economic crisisthat U.S. economic irresponsibility has inflicted hardship on other countries by dragging down the worlds economy. But there is another shift that has taken place. And it is to see many of the worlds major threats as problems for the United States alone. Few capitals are losing sleep over the prospect, say, of an Iranian or North Korean nuclear weapon detonating on their territories. Most see whatever capabilities Pyongyang and Tehran are acquiring as meant to deter Washingtonnot to threaten the rest of the world. The feeling seems to be that either there is no threat to the global system, or the threat is containable. We are seeing other countries of the world preparing to live with the realities of a nuclear-armed North Korea and an Iran with a significant nuclear infrastructure at its disposal. And foreign governments are not inclined to take much more decisive measures to ensure the deproliferation of either regime. No other country, therefore, seems prepared to do the heavy
lifting needed to exert significant pressure on either Tehran or Pyongyang. Most countries, for instance, believe that the six-party talks on North Korea have failed. And yet, when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates met with his counterparts at the Shangri-La Dialogue this past week, there was little agreement about the next steps that should be taken. One of Gates party was quoted in the New York Times as saying, Theres no prescription yet on what to do. The GSA, at least as envisioned by Etzioni in the months after the 9/11 attacks, is dead. And the United States is in no position to unilaterally assume upon itself the functions of the GSA. The fact that Gates left Asia to tour U.S. missile defense sitesand proclaimed both that he had good confidence the system in Alaska could deal with a launch from a rogue state such as North Korea and that the way is opened in the future to add to the number of silos and interceptors up heresignals that Washington could easily pull back to a more defensive position to protect American interests. And what happens if the United States were to decide that it is time to end the free-riding of the rest of the world on American efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan? Such a proposal was advanced by Stanley Weiss, of Business Executives for National Security, in the New York Times: It is now clear that the United States alone cannot stabilize the situation in Pakistan

or Afghanistan. As President Obama said, it is a regional problem that demands regional solutions. It is time for America to make China, Saudi Arabia, Iran and India an offer they cant refuse: Either join us or we leave. Drawing back from the world or continuing to act (and expend blood and treasure) while others sit on the
sidelines are not attractive options for the administration. But until the world experiences another 9/11-style shock to the system, there is going to be no decisive multilateral action takenon Iran, North Korea, climate change, trade or a whole host of other issues. No

speech is going to change that reality.

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Uniqueness Credibility Up
Conditions ripe for U.S. credibility now Brooks and Wohlforth 4/24 (Stephen and William, Dartmouth College - Brooks as associate professor of
government, Wohlforth as Daniel Webster professor of government and chair of the Department of Government, Reshaping the World Order, http://www.devex.com/articles/reshaping-the-world-order, 4/24/09, AD: 7/9/09) JC Of course, the ability of the United States to weather such crises of legitimacy in the past hardly guarantees that it can lead the system in the future. But there are reasons for optimism. Some of the apparent damage to U.S. legitimacy might merely be the result of the Bush administration's approach to diplomacy and international institutions. Key underlying conditions remain particularly favorable for sustaining and even enhancing U.S. legitimacy in the years ahead. The United States continues to have a far larger share of the human and material resources for shaping global perceptions than any other state, as well as the unrivaled wherewithal to produce public goods that reinforce the benefits of its global role. No other state has any claim to leadership commensurate with Washington's. And largely because of the power position the United States still occupies, there is no prospect of a counterbalancing coalition emerging anytime soon to challenge it. In the end, the legitimacy of a system's leader hinges on whether the system's members see the leader as acceptable or at least preferable to realistic alternatives. Legitimacy is not necessarily about normative approval: one may dislike the United States but think its leadership is natural under the circumstances or the best that can be expected. Moreover, history provides abundant evidence that past leading states-such as Spain, France, and the United Kingdom-were able to revise the international institutions of their day without the special circumstances Ikenberry and Kagan cite. Spain fashioned both normative and positive laws to legitimize its conquest of indigenous Americans in the early
seventeenth century; France instituted modern concepts of state borders to meet its needs as Europe's preeminent land power in the eighteenth century; and the United Kingdom fostered rules on piracy, neutral shipping, and colonialism to suit its interests as a developing maritime empire in the nineteenth century. As Wilhelm Grewe documents in his magisterial The Epochs of International Law, these states accomplished such feats partly through the unsubtle use of power: bribes, coercion, and the allure of lucrative longterm cooperation. Less obvious but often more important, the bargaining hands of the leading states were often strengthened by the general perception that they could pursue their interests in even less palatable ways-notably, through the naked use of force. Invariably, too, leading states have had the power to set the international agenda, indirectly affecting the development of new rules by defining the problems they were developed to address. Given its naval primacy and global trading interests, the United Kingdom was able to propel the slave trade to the forefront of the world's agenda for several decades after it had itself abolished slavery at home, in 1833. The

bottom line is that the United States today has the necessary legitimacy to shepherd reform of the international system.

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22 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Credibility Down


Failed use of soft power has destroyed US credibility Guess 1/19 (Steven, Writer for the Guardian, The end of empire,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/jan/19/barack-obama-rome-empire, 1/19/09, AD: 7/10/09) By virtue of its economic and military power, as well as a political system extolled for its superiority to all other systems, America has been the leader of the free world for the last 60 years. But from China's rapidly rising status as a global player, to Russia's show of force in Georgia, to rising tensions in South Asia and the Middle East, America is facing a wide array of increasingly troubling threats, while struggling internally to recover from an economic collapse not seen since the Great Depression. American supremacy in a post-cold war environment seems outmatched by a progressively more unstable world. Like Rome, America has spread itself too thin and is unable to respond to new threats as they emerge with either a convincing show of military force or a skilled use of soft power to leverage its credibility in the world. While the dangers we face were once diverse and scattered, the Iraq war pushed many of our enemies to see us as a common threat where religious differences would have otherwise made cooperation impossible. Moreover, in collapsing the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein, America has paved the way for an even less palatable Iranian dominance in the region.

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23 Trade-Off DA

Uniqueness Iraq Hurts Heg


Iraq has destroyed U.S. legitimacy and soft power Glaser and Morris 7/9 (Bonnie and Lyle, Senior Fellow in the Freeman Chair for China Studies at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies and Research Intern in the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and is currently pursuing a Masters degree from Columbia Universitys School of International and Public Affairs, 7/9/09, AD: 7/9/09) JC Scholars such as Wu Xinbo, professor and associate dean of the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University, and Zhang Liping, senior fellow and deputy director of Political Studies Section at the Institute of American Studies in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), highlight a major shift in U.S. soft power and legitimacy after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. According to Wu, the United States lost its lofty sentiments after it invaded Iraq and is feeling more frustrated and lonely which will lead it to seek more cooperation with other big powers [8]. Similarly, Zhang points to a diminution in U.S. soft power, a decrease in its ability to influence its allies, and diminished ability to get countries on board with U.S. foreign policy initiatives after the invasion of Iraqall signs that augur a decline in Americas legitimacy abroad [9].

Failed War in Iraq has drastically decreased U.S. heg Haass 8 (President of Council of Foreign Relations) online: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/683c4bb6-0b4c-11dd8ccf-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 US economic policy has played a role as well. President George W. Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by 8 per cent a year and cut taxes. The US fiscal position declined from a surplus of more than $100bn in 2001 to an estimated deficit of about $250bn in 2007. The ballooning current account deficit is now more than 6 per cent of gross domestic product. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the US mortgage market and the credit crisis it spawned have exacerbated these problems. Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of American primacy. The conflict has proved to be an expensive war of choice - militarily, economically and diplomatically, as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about "imperial overstretch", which posited that the US would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had. Prof Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the US - for all its corrective mechanisms and dynamism - has not proved to be immune.

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Uniqueness A2: Iraq Hurts Heg


Iraq has strengthened U.S. Heg Troop deployments Sheridan 4/26 (Greg, Foreign Editor of the Australian, Esteem for US rises in Asia,
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23599516-25377,00.html, 4/26/09, AD: 7/9/09) JC THE US war in Iraq has strengthened its strategic position, especially in terms of key alliances, and the only way this could be reversed would be if it lost the will to continue the struggle and abandoned Iraq in defeat and disarray. Surely the author of this sentence is on the ganja, you might say. Something a little weird in the coffee? It goes against every aspect of conventional wisdom. But the author of this thesis, stated only marginally less boldly, is one of the US's most brilliant strategic analysts. Mike Green holds the Japan chair at Washington's Centre for Strategic and International Studies and was for several years the Asia director at the National Security Council. He is also one of America's foremost experts on Japan and northeast Asia generally. His thesis, applied strictly to the US position in Asia, is correct. First, Green states and acknowledges the negatives. He writes: "The Iraq war has had one important, pernicious impact on US interests in Asia: it has consumed US attention." This has prevented the US from following up in sufficient detail on some positive developments in Asia. Green also acknowledges that the US's reputation has taken a battering among Muslim populations in Asia. Yet Green's positive thesis is fascinating. The US's three most important Asian alliances - with Australia, Japan and South Korea have in his view been strengthened by the Iraq campaign. Each of these nations sent substantial numbers of troops to help the US in Iraq. They did this because they believed in what the US was doing in Iraq, and also because they wanted to use the Iraq campaign as an opportunity to strengthen their alliances with the US. More generally, in a world supposedly awash in anti-US sentiment, proAmerican leaders keep winning elections. Germany's Angela Merkel is certainly more pro-American than Gerhard Schroeder, whom she replaced. The same is true of France's Nicolas Sarkozy. More importantly in terms of Green's analysis, the same is also true of South Korea's new President. Lee Myung-bak, elected in a landslide in December, is vastly more pro-American than his predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun. Even in majority Islamic societies, their populations allegedly radicalised and polarised by Bush's campaign in Iraq and the global war on terror more generally, election results don't show any evidence of these trends. In the most recent local elections in Indonesia, and in national elections in Pakistan, the Islamist parties with antiAmerican rhetoric fared very poorly. Similarly Kevin Rudd was elected as a very pro-American Labor leader, unlike Mark Latham, with his traces of anti-Americanism, who was heavily defeated. Even with China, the Iraq campaign was not a serious negative for the US. Beijing was far more worried by the earlier US-led NATO intervention into Kosovo because it was based purely on notions of human rights in Kosovo. Such notions could theoretically be used to justify action (not necessarily military action) against China over Taiwan and Tibet. Iraq, on the other hand, was justified on the basis of weapons of mass destruction, a justification with which the Chinese were much more comfortable. Further, the Chinese cooperated closely with the Americans in the war on terror, especially in tackling what they alleged was
extremism among some of the Muslim Uighurs in the vast Xinjiang province. Similarly, at a time when China developed a massive trade surplus with the US, American foreign policy attention was directed at the Middle East, and far less congressional and public hostility was directed at China than might otherwise have been expected. Green argues that the preoccupation with Iraq may have made it easier for the Bush administration to responsibly and effectively manage US public opinion on China. Then again, there is the question of soft power. Green was writing before the controversies surrounding Beijing's actions in Tibet broke out, and before the Olympic torch relay. Yet these have shown the brittleness of China's much-touted soft power. Beijing was shocked, not that there might be demonstrations in Tibet, but rather at just how unpopular they were in international civil society, from Hollywood through to liberal politicians such as Hillary Clinton calling for a boycott of the Olympic opening ceremony, to European leaders that China thought it had in its pockets, to all manner of non-government organisations, through to the Asian middle class, through even to the Mandarin-speaking Rudd, who criticised the Chinese to their faces in Beijing. More generally, it is American

values, or more accurately the universal values of democracy to which the US adheres, that are more popular and receive greater adherence in Asia than before, in the politics and civil societies of Asian nations such as Indonesia, India, Japan and many others. The overall picture is infinitely more complex than the anti-Bush narrative of the Iraq war would suggest.

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Uniqueness Afghanistan Hurts Heg


Afghanistan killing US heg now Avard 7/7 (Christian, staff reporter, US Policies Empower Taliban: Experts,
http://www.opednews.com/articles/US-Policies-Empower-Taliba-by-Christian-Avard-090706-465.html, 7/7/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC Elizabeth Gould: What we've been observing over and over again is that the United States (and its goals and objectives) keeps coming up against a reality check that doesn't add up. One of the concerns, that even though General Stanley McChrystal is making statements that Afghan civilians are his top priority, there are other issues which have been contentious and very difficult for the United States to really incorporate in a meaningful way. What we're dealing with is the follow-up, the actual ability to change the way in which we approach the region, which is still through a military lens and has already been designated as a failure. One of the reasons it's a concern is because it's simply isn't enough to change the military position. Something like 400,000 troops would been needed to stabilize the country. That's one of the experiences we had in 2002. When the Iraq War started, there was absolutely no question [in everyone's mind] that the Taliban was going to return to Kabul. That was a given and in the ensuing years, it built and built. Fitzgerald: The original force structure was 1.6 soldiers per thousand residents. That was the combined force of the United States and NATO and like Elizabeth said, it would have required between 400,000 and 450,000 soldiers [to stabilize the country]. So it was inadequate from the very beginning. What's going on in Helmond is the Obama Administration is trying to establish some credibility for the first time. The United States doesn't have any credibility, militarily or civilly, in terms of backing up the civilian government.

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Uniqueness A2: Afghanistan Hurts Heg


Despite conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is the sole superpower Brooks and Wohlforth 4/24 (Stephen and William, Dartmouth College - Brooks as associate professor of
government, Wohlforth as Daniel Webster professor of government and chair of the Department of Government, Reshaping the world order: how Washington should reform international institutions., http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-10406952/Reshaping-the-world-order-how.html, 3/1/09, AD: 7/9/09) JC So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States' successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower's performance. From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U.S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the United States as the world's leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better. The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its polities in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today.

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Uniqueness Obama Hurts Heg


Obamas policies destroy US Heg Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy 9 (Journal of the International Strategic Studies Association,
Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, p. 2, March 2009, AD: 7/9/09) JC The United States Administration of Pres. Barack Obama, however, appears to have taken a doctrinaire approach to the US' strategic position which -- even apart from the questionable approach to economic recovery -- invites disaster to itself and to the traditional allies of the US and to the West in general. It is an approach which fails to learn anything from history. To begin, the Obama White House appears to believe that its mere appearance as the antithesis of the former Government of Pres. George W. Bush is sufficient to transform the fortunes of, and attitude to, the United States. It is true that many former friends and adversaries of the United States have welcomed the appearance of the Obama Administration, but for many -- such as the governments of Iran, Russia, and the like, and groups such as HAMAS and HizbAllah -- what has been welcomed has been the perception that the US can no longer be a cause of concern for their own security. It is true that the Obama election platform was, in part, to remove the perception globally that the US represented a threat to other states. However, the result in Moscow and Tehran has not been to see the new face of the United States in a more positive light, but to see the US now as a toothless tiger, a power which is now, by its own hand, contemptible.

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Uniqueness A2: Obama Hurts Heg


Obama popularity boosting US credibility globally The Times 6/20 (UK News Service, The Soft Power Moment,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article6539341.ece, 6/20/09, AD: 7/10/09) JC How they approach and deal with people . . . will send a pretty clear signal to the international community about what Iran is and is not. This was a sensible formulation. It makes clear where Americas sympathies lie. And it undercuts the expected claim by Iranian hardliners that the US is meddling. Mr Obama enjoys huge popularity around the world, especially in Iran. He is ideally placed to rekindle faith in the US as a champion of democratic values and uphold the cause of liberty. But there is a difficulty, which he recognises, in throwing his weight behind any of the contenders in Iran. Any such statement would be seized on by the clerical establishment as proof that the US was threatening intervention and that Iran must redouble it vigilance against the Great Satan. Any overt US support for Mr Mousavi himself no pro-Western liberal would be the kiss of death. As Mr Obama said, the United States can be a handy football. The US President is a skilful orator who understands soft power. He has already shown, in his speech in Cairo, how he is able to inspire those yearning for a more democratic and open system without yoking their cause to American policies. Now it is time to do the same over Iran. It is time to speak out on the broader theme of liberty, human rights and respect for democratic process. The US does not need to pick a winner in Iran. But it does need to hold up a light for freedom. The world expects it. And so do millions of Iranians. Nothing sustained Anatoly Shcharansky and other jailed Soviet dissidents as much as President Reagans vocal support. Mr Obama needs to offer that support to a jailed nation.

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Uniqueness Heg Sustainable


US heg sustainable multiple reasons Slaughter 9 (Anne-Marie, of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Foreign
Affairs, January- February 2009, America's Edge Subtitle: Power in the Networked Century, p. 94) Almost 30 years ago, the psychologist Carol Gilligan wrote about differences between the genders in their modes of thinking. She observed that men tend to see the world as made up of hierarchies of power and seek to get to the top, whereas women tend to see the world as containing webs of relationships and seek to move to the center. Gilligan's observations may be a function of nurture rather than nature; regardless, the two lenses she identified capture the differences between the twentieth-century and the twenty-first-century worlds. The twentieth-century world was, at least in terms of geopolitics, a billiard-ball world, described by the political scientist Arnold Wolfers as a system of self-contained states colliding with one another. The results of these collisions were determined by military and economic power. This world still exists today: Russia invades Georgia, Iran seeks nuclear weapons, the United States strengthens its ties with India as a hedge against a rising China. This is what Fareed Zakaria, the editor of Newsweek International, has dubbed "the post-American world," in which the rise of new global powers inevitably means the relative decline of U.S. influence. The emerging networked world of the twenty-first century, however, exists above the state, below the state, and through the state. In this world, the state with the most connections will be the central player, able to set the global agenda and unlock innovation and sustainable growth. Here, the United States has a clear and sustainable edge. THE HORIZON OF HOPE The United States' advantage is rooted in demography, geography, and culture. The United States has a relatively small population, only 20-30 percent of the size of China's or India's. Having fewer people will make it much easier for the United States to develop and profit from new energy technologies. At the same time, the heterogeneity of the U.S. population will allow Washington to extend its global reach. To this end, the United States should see its immigrants as living links back to their home countries and encourage a two-way flow of people, products, and ideas. The United States is the anchor of the Atlantic hemisphere, a broadly defined area that includes Africa, the Americas, and Europe. The leading countries in the Atlantic hemisphere are more peaceful, stable, and economically diversified than those in the Asian hemisphere. At the same time, however, the United States is a pivotal power, able to profit simultaneously from its position in the Atlantic hemisphere and from its deep ties to the Asian hemisphere. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have long protected the United States from invasion and political interference. Soon, they will shield it from conflicts brought about by climate change, just as they are already reducing the amount of pollutants that head its way. The United States has a relatively horizontal social structure -- albeit one that has become more hierarchical with the growth of income inequality -- as well as a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation. These traits are great advantages in a global economy increasingly driven by networked clusters of the world's most creative people. On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama will set about restoring the moral authority of the United States. The networked world provides a hopeful horizon. In this world, with the right policies, immigrants can be a source of jobs rather than a drain on resources, able to link their new home with markets and suppliers in their old homes. Businesses in the United States can orchestrate global networks of producers and suppliers. Consumers can buy locally, from revived local agricultural and customized small-business economies, and at the same time globally, from anywhere that can advertise online. The United States has the potential to be the most innovative and dynamic society anywhere in the world.

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Hegemony is not sustainable current trends show decline in all facets of US power. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest single aggregation of power. It spends more than $500 billion annually on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are included -- and boasts land, air, and naval forces that are the world's most capable. Its economy, with a GDP of some $14 trillion, is the world's largest. The United States is also a major source of culture (through films and television), information, and innovation. But the reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United States' position in the world -- and with this relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and independence. The U.S. share of global imports is already down to 15 percent. Although U.S. GDP accounts for over 25 percent of the world's total, this percentage is sure to decline over time given the actual and projected differential between the United States' growth rate and those of the Asian giants and many other countries, a large number of which are growing at more than two or three times the rate of the United States. GDP growth is hardly the only indication of a move away from U.S. economic dominance. The rise of sovereign wealth funds -- in countries such as China, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates -- is another. These government-controlled pools of wealth, mostly the result of oil and gas exports, now total some $3 trillion. They are growing at a projected rate of $1 trillion a year and are an increasingly important source of liquidity for U.S. firms. High energy prices, fueled mostly by the surge in Chinese and Indian demand, are here to stay for some time, meaning that the size and significance of these funds will continue to grow. Alternative stock exchanges are springing up and drawing away companies from the U.S. exchanges and even launching initial public offerings (IPOs). London, in particular, is competing with New York as the world's financial center and has already surpassed it in terms of the number of IPOs it hosts. The dollar has weakened against the euro and the British pound, and it is likely to decline in value relative to Asian currencies as well. A majority of the world's foreign exchange holdings are now in currencies other than the dollar, and a move to denominate oil in euros or a basket of currencies is possible, a step that would only leave the U.S. economy more vulnerable to inflation as well as currency crises. U.S. primacy is also being challenged in other realms, such as military effectiveness and diplomacy. Measures of military spending are not the same as measures of military capacity. September 11 showed how a small investment by terrorists could cause extraordinary levels of human and physical damage. Many of the most costly pieces of modern weaponry are not particularly useful in modern conflicts in which traditional battlefields are replaced by urban combat zones. In such environments, large numbers of lightly armed soldiers can prove to be more than a match for smaller numbers of highly trained and better-armed U.S. troops. Power and influence are less and less linked in an era of nonpolarity. U.S. calls for others to reform will tend to fall on deaf ears, U.S. assistance programs will buy less, and U.S.-led sanctions will accomplish less. After all, China proved to be the country best able to influence North Korea's nuclear program. Washington's ability to pressure Tehran has been strengthened by the participation of several western European countries -- and weakened by the reluctance of China and Russia to sanction Iran. Both Beijing and Moscow have diluted international efforts to pressure the government in Sudan to end its war in Darfur. Pakistan, meanwhile, has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to resist U.S. entreaties, as have Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The trend also extends to the worlds of culture and information. Bollywood produces more films every year than Hollywood. Alternatives to U.S.-produced and disseminated television are multiplying. Web sites and blogs from other countries provide further competition for U.S.-produced news and commentary. The proliferation of information is as much a cause of nonpolarity as is the proliferation of weaponry.

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Uniqueness Rogue Threats Up


Rogue threats up now New Europe 7/5 (European weekly news, Old Cold War enemies still have a nuclear stake too,
http://www.neurope.eu/articles/95322.php, 7/5/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC With all the nuclear attention these days focused on the burgeoning programmes in Iran and North Korea, which the United States and European Union fear will become rogue threats armed with nuclear bombs, the visit of US President Barack Obama to Moscow, where ramping down nuclear arms is a key part of the agenda, will pit the old foes against one another again, this time at the negotiating table. It will also prove a dilemma, analysts said, because Obama wants to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons at the same time the enemies of the US and the EU are trying to develop them. What to do?

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Uniqueness Rogue Threats Down


The U.S. has an effective defense against rogue threats Reuters 6/17 (U.S. Says Missile Defense Not Finalized,
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/600/42/378820.htm, 6/17/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC "The United States will work to identify new areas where our two countries could advance our missile defense cooperation," Lynn testified. "For example, there are Russian radars near Iran that would provide helpful early warning detection in the case of an Iranian ballistic missile launch." He said the possible use of the radars -- in southern Russian and Azerbaijan -- would be discussed when Obama visits Moscow from July 6 to 8, where he hopes to build on calls from both capitals to reset relations. Lynn said the United States was committed to an effective defense against "rogue" threats, including North Korea and, "if it continues down its current path, Iran." Missile defense cooperation with Russia has been a consistent goal since the 1990s, he said. On April 5, Obama said the United States planned to go forward with a missile defense system that is "cost-effective and proven" as long as a threat from Iran persists.

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Uniqueness Civil Military Relations Up


Civil-military relations up King 3/27 (Will, Fort Leavenworth Lamp, Panel discusses civil-military relations at Fort Leavenworth, http://www.army.mil/news/2009/03/27/18852-panel-discusses-civil-military-relations-at-fort-leavenworth/, 3/27/09, AD: 7/10/09) JC

"The Obama administration has taken dramatic steps to avoid a fight with the military," Kohn said, noting that first lady Michelle Obama's first official visit outside Washington, D.C., was to Fort Bragg, N.C. He highlighted the retention of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and nomination of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen for a second term, both holdovers from former President George W. Bush's administration, as a sign to the rest of the military of respect for the senior military leadership and continuity during difficult wartime conditions. However, Kohn said President Barack Obama purposely sought out other former senior military leaders for his administration, including National Security Advisor retired Marine Corps Gen. James Jones, Secretary of Veterans Affairs retired Gen. Eric Shinseki, and Director of National Intelligence retired Navy Adm. Dennis Blair.

Obama pitch-perfect on civil-military relations now Ackerman 8 (Spencer, Writer for Washington Independent, Productive Obama-Military Relationship Possible,
http://washingtonindependent.com/18335/productive-obama-military-relationship-possible, 11/13/08, AD: 7/10/09) JC

To Peter Feaver, one of the leading scholars of civil-military relations, that comment was auspicious. Obama had it pitch-perfect, said Feaver, a professor of political science at Duke University and a national-security staffer for both Clinton and George W. Bush. Obama was right to signal to the military, I want your military advice, and I will factor it into my strategic decisions, where military advice is one of my concerns. Whether a Commander-in-Chief Obama can continue the tone that Candidate Obama sounded in July remains to be seen. According to interviews with active and retired military officers, Obama and the military can have a productive relationship, provided that Obama operates along some simple principles. Consult, dont steamroll and dont capitulate. Be honest about disagreements, and emphasize areas of agreement. Make Petraeus a partner, not an adversary. Similarly, the uniformed military will have to keep certain principles in mind as well. Theres only one commander in chief, and youre not him. Dont substitute military judgment for strategic judgment.

Obama administration focusing on increasing civil military relations now Barton and Unger 9 (Frederick and Noam , Center for Strategic and International Studies and Brookings
Institute, Civil-military relations, fostering development, and expanding civilian capacity, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090421_brookingscsiscivmil.pdf, April 2009, AD: 7/10/09) JC This is a critical moment for the United States approach to global engagement. Concerns have been rising over an apparent imbalance in American statecraft, principally resulting from too heavy a reliance on the military. As such, the Obama Administration is launching related policy reviews. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly
noted the decisive role reconstruction, development and conflict prevention play, and he has called for greater resources for civilian agencies. Similarly, upon taking office, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton highlighted development as an equal

partner, along with defense and diplomacy, in advancing US national security. She has also announced aims to reverse the migration of the authority and the resources to the Defense Department, and committed to bolster USAID with clear authorities and resources. Her new additional deputy at the State
Department has been charged with boosting the resourcing and effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance. Within this context, on February 11, 2009, more than 40 policy experts and practitioners convened at Brookings to discuss efforts to build civilian stabilization capacity within the U.S. governments international affairs agencies and broader efforts to reform U.S. foreign assistance. The day-long workshop also sought to explore pathways for rebalancing civilian-military roles and to ensure necessary increases in civilian capacity. This event was hosted by Brookings Global Economy and Development and the Center for Strategic and International Studies Post- Conflict Reconstruction Project with the generous support of the Connect US Fund. Workshop participants offered a range of expertise in defense, diplomacy, and development, as well as varying perspectives from the executive branch, Capitol Hill, civil society and the research community.

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Uniqueness Civil Military Relations Down


Civil-military relations down now Bob Woodwarded Feaver 7/1 (Peter, Ph.D. from Harvard in 1990, is the Alexander F. Hehmeyer professor of political science and
public policy at Duke University and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, The White House and Woodward, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/01/the_white_house_and_woodward, 7/1/09, AD:7/8/09) JC The Obama administration has just been Woodwarded, as in Bob Woodwarded. If his Washington Post report is accurate, General Jones, the National Security Advisor committed a serious civil-military relations mistake that could haunt the administration over the coming year. Up until now the administration has been nearly pitch-perfect on the issue of how to talk to the military about securing military advice in high command decision making and how to talk about the military advice they get. But this report, which seems authoritative because it reads like a verbatim transcript of the meeting (is Bob Woodward on the trip?), sounds a very discordant note. The note came during a meeting General Jones had with
U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan. He was talking about the importance of the non-military aspects of the strategy -- we can't win in Afghanistan by force of arms, and that sort of thing. So far so good. Then there is this extraordinary exchange, as reported by Bob Woodward: During the briefing, [Marine Brigadier General] Nicholson had told Jones that he was "a little light," more than hinting that he could use more forces, probably thousands more. "We don't have enough force to go everywhere," Nicholson said. But Jones recalled how Obama had initially decided to deploy additional forces this year. "At a table much like this," Jones said, referring to the polished wood table in the White House Situation Room, "the president's principals met and agreed to recommend 17,000 more troops for Afghanistan." The principals -- Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton; Gates; Mullen; and the director of national intelligence, Dennis C. Blair -- made this recommendation in February during the first full month of the Obama administration. The president approved the deployments, which included Nicholson's Marines. Soon after that, Jones said, the principals told the president, "oops," we need an additional 4,000 to help train the Afghan army. "They then said, 'If you do all that, we think we can turn this around,' " Jones said, reminding the Marines here that the president had quickly approved and publicly announced the additional 4,000. Now suppose you're the president, Jones told them, and the requests come into the White House for yet more force. How do you think Obama might look at this? Jones asked, casting his eyes around the colonels. How do you think he might feel? Jones let the question hang in the airconditioned, fluorescent-lighted room. Nicholson and the colonels said nothing. Well, Jones went on, after all those additional troops, 17,000 plus 4,000 more, if there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have "a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment." Everyone in the room caught the phonetic reference to WTF -- which in the military and elsewhere means "What the [expletive]?" Nicholson and his colonels -- all or nearly all veterans of Iraq -- seemed to blanch at the unambiguous message that this might be all the troops they were going to get." There is nothing wrong from a civil-military relations point of view for President Obama to decide that he is not going to approve any more troop deployments to Afghanistan. That is absolutely within his rights as commander-in-chief and, indeed, he alone has the political-military competence to adjudicate across all of the risk trade-offs that such a decision would entail. It is his right to make that call even if his judgment is wrong about whether the new troops are in fact necessary to carry out the strategy. The president has a right to be wrong about commander-in-chief decisions. But it is wrong for him, or his senior staff, to tell (or signal, or hint, or suggest to) the military that they, the military, should censor their advice and judgments based on what they think the President ultimately will decide. If it is the BGEN Nicolson's military judgment that he needs more troops to execute the mission, he should -- no, he must -- convey that information up his chain of command and the President must be made aware of that piece of military advice. Nicolson's military judgment could be superceded by a more senior military commander (say, General Petraeus) who may have a bigger-picture military perspective. But a wise commander-in-chief wants to at least know about the perspectives of the lower ranking officers. And, above all, a wise commander-in-chief does not want the military

hearing from civilian presidential advisors (and in this context, retired General Jim Jones is a civilian presidential advisor) that they should not be candid in their advice lest it tick off the president or the secretary of defense. If Woodward's (and others) earlier reporting on the Bush years is accurate, the military got that impression, at least from Secretary Rumsfeld, and this had a deleterious effect on civilmilitary relations and on policymaking. In my judgment, the notion that President Bush did not want to hear whether the
battlefield commanders believed they needed more troops was false; he did want to hear that advice and would have been appalled if one of his advisors had told the military, "don't ask for this because it will make the President angry." According to Bob Woodward, that is exactly what happened recently in Afghanistan. I expect the Obama team will have to go into some serious damage control to deal with this story. If accurate, what is needed is an unambiguous statement from the President himself: "Give me your candid military advice, even or especially if you think the advice runs counter to what you think I will decide. Let me make the decisions. I will not always approve every request you send my way, but I will never approve of you trying to hide bad news from me because you think it will make me mad."

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***Links***

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K2 Heg Social Services


Social services key to hegemony Lackey 6 (Jill Florence, PhD in anthropology, Accountability in social services, pg. 55-56, 2006, AD: 7/9/09) JC
Recall the theory of hegemony from Chapter 1 (Gramsci, 1971). According to this theory, dominant groups in capitalist societies rule through special-purpose alliances. The alliances may include subordinate groups who negotiate their limited consent in return for getting some of their interests represented in the power bloc. Those interests might be resources allocated for social services. Hegemony also becomes a process of shaping ideology so the power of dominant groups appears natural and legitimate. Hegemony involves not only political and economic control, but also the ability of the dominant groups to project their own ways of representing the world, such as through the mass media. These representations are manifested as ideologies, or unconscious, taken-for-granted ideas embedded in material practices. The shaping of these ideologies entails both coercion and consent. The mass media play an important role in the shaping of this ideology, and some argue that at least a hint of coercion may be involved. Herbert Gans (1979) studied the way that network news and major news magazines decide what is news. And argued that journalists are by no means free agents (p. 235). News sources are more likely to be the most powerful public officials. Since the news media constitute their major communication outlet to the citizenry and are essential to the performance of their duties and the maintenance of their power, they would almost certainly use that power to pressure the journalists were journalists to rely less upon them. (p. 282)

Social services key to accountability Cheung and Ngai 8 (Chau-kiu and Steven Sek-yum, Department of Applied Social Studies, City University of
Hong Kong and Department of Social Work, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Surviving Hegemony Through Resistance and Identity Articulation Among Outreaching Social Workers, http://www.springerlink.com/content/2wv6445m08718785/fulltext.pdf, 9/30/08, AD: 7/10/09) JC Accountability Accountability was a frame for governmental hegemony or regulation in that it was necessary to avoid wastage in spending public money and provide the bases for political struggles concerning resource acquisition. In essence, the political environment, which the government helped sustain, fueled the validity of accountability as an ideology to justify the governments hegemony. As the outreaching social work service eventually largely depended on funding by public money, it was obliged to avoid wastage of public money. Demonstrating accountability would benefit each social service agency in acquiring resources. The political environment of Hong Kong emphasized democracy, accountability, and transparency. This environment implicitly required social service agencies to be transparent in demonstrating their performance.

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K2 Heg Domestic Policy


Domestic policy key to structure and hegemony Cho 3 (Chansoo, Assistant Professor Division of International Studies Kangnam University, HEGEMONY
AND THE VARIETY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGE, ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2003, pg. 6-7, AD: 7/10/09) JC Pitting Lake against Kindleberger, however, can be more misleading than illuminating in understanding the changes in U.S. foreign economic policy. Doing so would not make clear the linkages between domestic and international politics that constitute the core of foreign economic policy process. Indeed, Lake cannot be categorized as a single-minded structuralist. Rather, he admits that structural theory lacks a conception of process, or an explanation of how the constraints or interests derived from the international economic structure are transformed into decision or political strategies within particular countries.2 He also indicates the importance of the foreign-policy executive in the formulation of trade policy as well as national security issuearea. 3 At the same time, Kindleberger could be seen as an inverted structuralist in that according to him the indispensability of a hegemon derives from the inherently unstable international economy. Structure needs a hegemon. Then should our attention be turned to the problem of structure versus process (or agency) in explaining social and political outcomes? Rather than doing so, it would be more useful to look at the ways in which structure and process interact over the issues under consideration. But structure and process are not interacting directly. There is a wide variety of mediating mechanisms between the two, with domestic institutions standing out as playing a mediating role. They absorb the pressures from the international system, channel such external signs to the concerned domestic groups, and distribute the costs of coping with changes from the outside. In other words, domestic institutions are a semi-permanently organized transmission belt between international structure and domestic policy process. I have used semi-permanently to emphasize that institutions are both subject to and resistant to change. Once institutions are established, they have their own logic of existence and operation. Simultaneously, institutions also change in the course of long-term evolution.

Obamas strong executive power in domestic policy key to hegemony Cho 3 (Chansoo, Assistant Professor Division of International Studies Kangnam University, HEGEMONY AND
THE VARIETY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY CHANGE, ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2003, pg. 6-7, AD: 7/10/09) JC In this section I argue that the shift to executive politics in the domestic policy process facilitated U.S. hegemonic transition during the period of 1945 to 1960. As shown in the discussion on the New Deal institutional changes, the foundation of executive politics was laid during Roosevelts tenure. Executive politics of the FDR years, however, was constrained by party politics and compromised by intragovernmental as well as sectoral conflicts. In contrast, the postwar rise of executive politics accompanied bipartisanship in foreign policy. The term bipartisanship was coined by Arthur H. Vandenberg, the Republican Senator from Michigan, but its spirit found its best expression in the words of Secretary of State Dean Acheson: [Y]ou cannot run this . . . country under the Constitution any other way except by fixing the whole organization so it doesnt work the way it is supposed to work. Now the way to do that is to say politics stops at the seaboard.57

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K2 Heg Humanitarianism
Hegemonic powers must follow humanitarian law Forsythe 4 (David P, University Professor and Charles J. Mach Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Hegemony and the Laws of War: The Politics of Humanitarian Law and Diplomacy, pg. 1, 2004, AD: 7/9/09) JC The International Committee of the Red Cross and International Humanitarian Law David P. Forsythe 1 No century [compared to the twentieth century] has had better norms and worse realities. --David Rieff: A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 70. Much has changed in international relations after the cold war. We now live in a world of one superpower, one hyperpuisance as the French say, in which the United States clearly displays primacy in military power. It is also the most important economic power. Across much of international relations, the United States is a hegemonic power in the Gramscian sense. Where this is not the case, the United States may choose to dominate, to try to impose its view of order by way of coercion, as the invasion of Iraq demonstrates. But some things have not changed, or have not changed all that much. There is still a law of war, most of this law is international humanitarian law designed to protect a zone of human dignity even in the midst of organized killing, and even the United States is obligated to apply this law. Apparently the phrase international humanitarian law (IHL) was first used by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1953. 2 In this essay I will first show that there remains lack of clarity about the precise scope of IHL. Then I will show that there is often confusion about its relation to international human rights law (HRL). Finally I will show that in relation to IHL the ICRC, which is the guardian of this law, exercises three roles by whatever name: helping to develop the law, helping to disseminate the principles and rules of the law, and helping to apply the law. The central point of this essay is not to provide a legal commentary on the specifics IHL, but rather to discuss its practical relevance to victims of conflicts through the efforts of the ICRC. A theme running throughout this chapter is that one can over-emphasize IHL as a technical legal subject compared to humanitarian diplomacy. Just as some authors, including some law professors, believe that much attention to human rights has become legalistic, with too much attention to legal technicalities, 3 so I believe that 1 This essay is drawn from a book project now in progress, the working title of which is The Humanitarians: the International Committee of the Red Cross. 2 Dietrich Schindler, Significance of the Geneva Conventions for the contemporary world, International Review of the Red Cross, no. 836 (December, 1999), pp. 715-729, note 4. 3 Abdullahi A. An-Naim, The Legal Protection of Human Rights in Africa: How to do More with Less, in Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, eds., Human Rights: Concepts, Contests, Contingencies,

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K2 Heg Poverty
Economic superiority key to hegemony Pape 3/8 (Robert A, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, Realities and Obama's diplomacy,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-perspec0308diplomacymar08,0,4785661.story, 3/8/09, AD: 7/9/09) JC From Rome to the United States today, the rise and fall of great nations have been driven primarily by economic strength. At any given moment, a state's power depends on the size and quality of its military forces and other power assets. Over time, however, power is a result of economic strengththe prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces. And so the size of the economy relative to potential rivals ultimately determines the limits of power in international politics. The power position of the U.S. is crucial to the foreign policy aims that it can achieve. Since the Cold War, America has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments, seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood, the Western hemisphere, but also in Europe, Asia and the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources, but American leaders in recent years chose to pursue far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo.

Economic strength key to U.S. heg Fouskas 5 (Vassilis K. , Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Stirling, The New AMERICAN
IMPERIALISM: BUSHS WAR ON TERROR AND BLOOD FOR OIL, 2005, p. 24) Since the United States emerged as the dominant global superpower at the end of World War II, U.S. hegemony has rested on three unchallengeable pillars: overwhelming U.S. military superiority over all its rivals, the superiority of American production methods and the relative strength of the U.S. economy, and control over global economic markets, with the U.S. dollar acting as the reserve currency

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K2 Heg Multilateralism
Working within coalitions and with other governments and NGOs is key to preserve US heg. Khalilzad 95 (Zalmay, US Ambassador to the United Nations. Losing the Moment? The United States and the
World After the Cold War. The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995) Overextension is a mistake that some of the big powers have made in the past. Such a development can occur if the United States is not judicious in its use of force and gets involved in protracted conflicts in non-critical regions, thereby sapping its energies and undermining support for its global role. And when the United States uses force in critical regions, its preference should be to have its allies and friends contribute their fair share. Having the capability to protect U.S. vital interests unilaterally if necessary can facilitate getting friends and allies of the United States to participate -- especially on terms more to its liking. It is quite possible that if the United States cannot protect its interests without significant participation by allies, it might not be able to protect them at all. For example, in the run-up to the Gulf war, several allies did not favor the use of force to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If the military participation of these allies had been indispensable for military success against Iraq, Saddam Hussein's forces might still be in Kuwait and Iraq might now possess nuclear weapons. When it comes to lesser interests the United States should rely on nonmilitary options, especially if the stakes involved do not warrant the military costs. It has many options: arming and training the victims of aggression; providing technical assistance and logistic support for peacekeeping by the United Nations, regional organizations, or other powers; and economic instruments such as sanctions and positive incentives. The effectiveness of these non-military options can be enhanced by skillful diplomacy.

While Multilateralism is effective, the US must be involved Serfaty 3 ("Studies Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership" Simon Serfaty director of European Studies CSIS
May http://www.nato.int/docu/conf/2003/030718_bxl/serfati-transatlpart.pdf) Whatever its inspiration, multilateralism served the United States and its allies well. Indifference to the postwar world was no longer an option for either side of the Atlantic. In most European countries, the imperative of U.S. support for reconstruction, protection, and reconciliation limited any debate on their fading role in the world. Whatever doubts some of these countries harbored were overcome by U.S. policies that were all the more effective as they showed enough flexibility to respond to and alleviate these doubts.

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K2 Heg Hard Power


Hardpower is critical to maintaining US hegemony Lind 7 (Michael, New America Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381) Finally, the global hegemony strategy insists that Americas safety depends not on the absence of a hostile hegemon in Europe, Asia and the Middle East -- the traditional American approach -- but on the permanent presence of the United States itself as the military hegemon of Europe, the military hegemon of Asia and the military hegemon of the Middle East. In each of these areas, the regional powers would consent to perpetual U.S. domination either voluntarily, because the United States assumed their defense burdens (reassurance), or involuntarily, because the superior U.S. military intimidated them into acquiescence (dissuasion). American military hegemony in Europe, Asia and the Middle East depends on the ability of the U.S. military to threaten and, if necessary, to use military force to defeat any regional challenge-but at a relatively low cost. This is because the American public is not prepared to pay the costs necessary if the United States is to be a "hyperpower."

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Not K2 Heg Social Services


Social services dont increase international influence Edgeworth 3 (Brendan, Senior Lecturer, Law, modernity, postmodernity, pg 92, 2003, AD: 7/10/09) JC
The consolidation of the legal sovereignty of the nation state in the form of the welfare state coincided with the emergence of international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Community that pulled in the opposite direction. As institutional mechanisms directed to imposing legal limits on national sovereignty they represent the beginnings of a break with one of the defining features of legal modernity. Yet for all their promise these law-making bodies had little initial effect on the form and content of domestic law, largely because the underlying interventionist philosophy of welfare states is at odds with the volatility and unpredictability of international influence. Accordingly, as long as welfare states jealously guarded their sovereignty, these emergent international institutions were able to exercise very limited influence over domestic affairs at the very time when those states extended their regulatory reach within the confines of national borders.

More evi. Edgeworth 3 (Brendan, Senior Lecturer, Law, modernity, postmodernity, pg 92, 2003, AD: 7/10/09) JC
The new primacy of cognitive over normative considerations, that is, the importance of fitting rules to the changing empirical context in which they are to operate (always typical of legislative activity) imposes analogous demands on the judicial and executive branches of the state. It is reflected in the case of judicial reasoning, for instance, by a keener attention to the purposes lying behind the law to see if they can be effectively carried out by instant decisions in an increasingly volatile social environment. This sovereignty of purpose is reflected in the waning of artificial reason, in the form of the tradition, deontological style of legal interpretation more concerned to look to the formal meanings of terms (Nonet and Selznick, 1978: 78, 83). This development also appears in the growing need for legislators and law reform agencies to make use of other knowledges (economics, sociology, politics) in order to understand the interaction between ,and interdependence of, law and other social domains.

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Not K2 Heg Domestic Policy


Hegemony precludes domestic policy Doyle 86 (International relations scholar, Empires, pg 40, 1986, AD: 7/9/09) JC
A final useful distinction is between imperialism and hegemony. Reflecting important differences in world politics, the analytical separation of foreign policy from domestic policy helps define imperial outcomes. Control of both foreign and domestic policy characterizes empire; control of only foreign policy, hegemony. Thucydides first drew this distinction, noting that Spartas allies, despite their subjection to Spartan hegemony during the Peloponnesian War, exercised a considerable degree of domestic autonomy- unlike the imperialized allies subject to Athens. In sum, the scope of imperial control involves both the process of control and its outcomes. Control is achieved either formally (directly or indirectly) or informally through influence over the peripherys environment, political articulation, aggregation, decision making, adjudication, and implementation, and usually with the collaboration of local peripheral elites. The scope of the outcomes covers both internal and external issues- who rules and what rules. Hegemony, by contrast, denotes control over external policy alone.

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Not K2 Heg Humanitarianism


Humanitarianism irrelevant U.S. maintaining hegemony forcefully now Gibbs 1 (David N, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Arizona, Washington's New
Interventionism: U.S. Hegemony and Inter-Imperialist Rivalries, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1132/is_4_53/ai_78413139/, Sept 2001, AD: 7/9/09) JC A major assumption underpinning this argument is that the post-Cold War era has triggered increased tensions among the capitalist democracies, which in turn require these "humanitarian" military assertions to reaffirm the dominant position of the United States. Some readers may find this argument odd, since it is widely assumed that the western allies have always welcomed U.S. leadership. In his book, American Empire, Geir Lundestad referred to U.S. hegemony over Europe during the Cold War as a case of "empire by invitation," the result of cooperative, mutually beneficial activity between Americans and Europeans. [2] This image of a "benign" American hegemony has more recently been popularized by Irving Kristol, who wrote in 1997: "One of these days, the American people are going to awaken to the fact that we have become an imperial nation...It happened because the world wanted it to happen [emphasis added]...no European nation can have--or really wants to have--its own foreign policy." [3] The problem with such views is that they gloss over two important facts: First, they ignore the ambivalence with which U.S. allies have always viewed their subordinate position. Second, U.S. hegemony has been maintained partly through forceful behavior, which has undercut efforts by U.S. allies to establish independent foreign policies. These challenges to U.S. hegemony were present even during the Gold War, but with the end of the Cold War, they have increased considerably. There has been a concomitant rise in U.S. efforts to resist these challenges. U.S. foreign policy thus entailed a measure of "double containment"--to contain Communism and the capitalist allies of the United States in Europe simultaneously. With the demise of the Soviet Bloc, after 1989, the containment of allies has remained a central U.S. objective. Overwhelmingly, the United States has sought to reassert its power through a revitalization of the Cold War institutional structures, above all, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, widely regarded as the most successful alliance in history. Humanitarian intervention has emerged as NATO's principal mission--and principal justification--in the postCold War world.

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Not K2 Heg Poverty


Poverty not key to heg Petro 71 (Sylvester, Institute of Economic Affairs, The Economic-Power Syndrome, http://oll.libertyfund.org/?
option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1663&chapter=37632&layout=html&Itemid=27, 9/29/71, AD: 7/10/09) JC 3. Economic power is not convertible into political power. The medium of exchange owned by the possessors of economic power is money; the medium of exchange in politics is the vote. Dollars are produced by economic capability; votes flow in accordance with political opinion. Unless the holders of dollars represent interests which coincide with the independently derived opinions of the voters, the interests of the wealthy are doomed.

Economic power doesnt guarantee international power Rusmich and Sachs 4 (Ladislav and Stephen, MD, Lessons from the Failure of the Communist Economic
System, pg 147-148, 2004, AD: 7/10/09) JC Aside from market defects, some additional causes appear that vitiate our idyllic picture of the market mediation of the social usefulness of power agents activity. It is the plain fact that economic power is not the sole force acting in society. In order to draw the picture more realistically, we must take into account political power, which substantially affects economic decision making in a corporate society. Orthodox models of free market and perfect competition premise a historically equal position of the market participants regardless of the type (or ripeness) of the market, as well as among the individual suppliers and consumers as between the two sides of the market as such. The authors of these models traditionally refuse to admit any type of dominance of one economic agent over another as a systemic feature of economy. However, their views cannot be accepted as a realistic look at the present corporate society with all its formal and informal coalitions, alliances, treaties, and agreements between the different actors in economic life and with its typical lobbying. Economic and political powers grow together with, and through, the increase in the mutual influence and dependence of the respective subjects.

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Not K2 Heg Multilateralism


Multilateralism only drags down US hegemony Krauthammer 4 (Charles, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "Democratic
Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World" American Enterprise Institute) But that, you see, is the whole point of the multilateral enterprise: To reduce American freedom of action by making it subservient to, dependent on, constricted by the willand interestsof other nations. To tie down Gulliver with a thousand strings. To domesticate the most undomesticated, most outsized, national interest on the planetours

Multilateralism only drags America down Krauthammer 4(Charles, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "Democratic
Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World" American Enterprise Institute) Historically, multilateralism is a way for weak countries to multiply their power by attaching themselves to stronger ones. But multilateralism imposed on Great Powers, and particularly on a unipolar power, is intended to restrain that power. Which is precisely why France is an ardent multilateralist. But why should America be? Why, in the end, does liberal internationalism want to tie down Gulliver, to blunt the pursuit of American national interests by making them subordinate to a myriad of other interests? In the immediate post-Vietnam era, this aversion to national interest might have been attributed to self-doubt and self-loathing. I dont know. What I do know is that today it is a mistake to see liberal foreign policy as deriving from anti-Americanism or lack of patriotism or a late efflorescence of 1960s radicalism.

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K2 Multilateralism Unilateralism
Unilateralism inevitably leads to multilateralism Krauthammer 4 (Charles, Winner of the Bradley Prize for Promotion of Liberal Democracy, "Democratic
Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World" American Enterprise Institute) Moreover, unilateralism is often the very road to multilateralism. As we learned from the Gulf War, it is the leadership of the United Statesindeed, its willingness to act unilaterally if necessarythat galvanized the Gulf War coalition into existence. Without the president of the United States declaring This will not stand about the invasion of Kuwaitand making it clear that America would go it alone if it had tothere never would have been the great wall-to-wall coalition that is now so retroactively applauded and held up as a model of multilateralism.

US unipolarity encourages states to help the US solve global issues rather than start them Wohlforth 99 (William, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World.") Neither the Beijing-Moscow "strategic partnership" nor the "European troika" of Russia, Germany, and France entailed any costly commitments or serious risks of confrontation with Washington. For many states, the optimal policy is ambiguity: to work closely with the United States on the issues most important to Washington while talking about creating a counterpoise. Such policies generate a paper trail suggesting strong dissatisfaction with the US.- led world order and a legacy of actual behavior that amounts to bandwagoning. These states are seeking the best bargains for themselves given the distribution of power. That process necessitates a degree of politicking that may remind people faintly of the power politics of bygone eras. But until the distribution of power changes substantially, this bargaining will resemble real-politik in form but not content.

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48 Trade-Off DA

***No Balancing***

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Counterbalancing Down
Nations dont have the power to counterbalance global institutions like the United States now Smolchenko 6/13 (Anna, Associated Free Press, Emerging big four economies flaunt power at summit,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ie-Cbti6FYBb4IznPXZ0qCVDCN5w, 6/13/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC MOSCOW (AFP) Brazil, Russia, India and China flaunt their unity against more established powers this week as the four emerging economic giants hold the first summit of their grouping, known as BRIC. But while they will express determination to act together during the current economic crisis and beyond, they are years away from being a counterbalance to established global institutions, analysts say.

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No Balancing Benign Heg


No counterbalancing benign hegemony means other nations dont perceive a threat. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html)
The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior, which has not stimulated such a response. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. Bush has not alienated other nations; it surely has. But it has not, for the most part, acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy are pervasive, but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance.

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No Balancing Russia/EU
Russia cant balance its headed for disappearance. Khanna 8 (Parag, America Strategy Program sr. fellow, 1/27, p. 1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin)
In exploring just a small sample of the second world, we should start perhaps with the hardest case: Russia. Apparently stabilized and resurgent under the Kremlin-Gazprom oligarchy, why is Russia not a superpower but rather the ultimate second-world swing state? For all its muscle flexing, Russia is also disappearing. Its population decline is a staggering half

million citizens per year or more, meaning it will be not much larger than Turkey by 2025 or so spread across a land so vast that it no longer even makes sense as a country. Travel across Russia today, and youll find, as during Soviet times, city after city of crumbling, heatless apartment blocks and neglected elderly citizens whose value to the state diminishes with distance from Moscow. The forced Siberian migrations of the Soviet era are being voluntarily reversed as children move west to more tolerable and modern climes. Filling the vacuum they have left behind are hundreds of thousands of Chinese, literally gobbling up, plundering, outright buying and more or less annexing Russias Far East for its timber and other natural
resources. Already during the cold war it was joked that there were no disturbances on the Sino-Finnish border, a prophecy that seems ever closer to fulfillment. Russia lost its western satellites almost two decades ago, and Europe, while

appearing to be bullied by Russias oil-dependent diplomacy, is staging a long-term buyout of Russia, whose economy remains roughly the size of Frances. The more Europe gets its gas from North Africa and oil from Azerbaijan, the less it will rely on Russia, all the while holding the lever of being by far Russias largest investor. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development provides the kinds of loans that help build an alternative, less corrupt private sector from below, while London and Berlin welcome Russias billionaires, allowing the likes of Boris Berezovsky to openly campaign against Putin. The E.U. and U.S. also finance and train a pugnacious second-world block of Baltic and Balkan nations, whose activists agitate from Belarus to Uzbekistan. Privately, some E.U. officials say that annexing Russia is perfectly doable; its just a matter of time. In the coming decades, far from restoring its Soviet-era might, Russia will have to decide whether it wishes to exist peacefully as an asset to Europe or the alternative becoming a petro-vassal of China.

The EU wont counterbalance the US France proves. Newsweek 8 (6/30, http://www.newsweek.com/id/142565)


The spectacle of Sarkozy's grandstanding as he gets ready for the big parade may be reminiscent of many a French president who struggled to show that he and his country were still relevant players. But unlike his predecessors, Sarkozy has put a lot of new pieces on the board, he's moving them all at once, and he's breaking precedents the French thought were immutable. What they are witnessing may not be a revolution on a par with the storming of the Bastille, but it is about as radical a change in foreign-policy and national-security doctrine as they've seen in decades. Gone

is the geopolitical posturing of French presidents who wanted to act as a counterbalance to American power. Instead, speaking
the week after the Irish voted down the Treaty of Lisbon, Sarkozy promised that France would remain "a great military power," and presented collective defense as the key to greater unity. The clearest outline of Sarkozy's foreign-policy and defense ambitions came in the speech he delivered to the French military elite last week, in which he shifted priorities away from resisting invasion, which ceased to be a threat 15 years ago, and emphasized flexibility in an uncertain world where dangers have become "diverse and ever-changing." By slashing the number of soldiers to 225,000 over the next half-dozen years and focusing on a smaller, lighter military, he hopes to be able to finance better intelligence gathering that anticipates threats, whether from terrorists, failed states, nuclear proliferators, cyberwarriors or climate change. Rather than manning garrisons left over from colonial days in Francophone Africa, France will prepare for action in what Defense Minister Herv Morin has called "an arc of crisis going from Mauritania to Afghanistan." And with more modern equipment, Sarkozy wants to be able to deploy 30,000 combat forces quickly and efficiently to the far corners of the world while dealing effectively with catastrophic events at home. "The French are realizing that not even they are able to go it alone, and he is putting the French military back in the business of dealing with threats that really matter," says Tomas Valasek of the Centre for European Reform.Sarkozy

has also made it clear that next year France will rejoin NATO's integrated command structure for the first time since President Charles De
Gaulle pulled out of it in 1966. As part of his plan for greater EU defense cooperation both inside and outside NATO, Sarkozy proposed a complete restructuring and unification of Europe's defense industries, a vast exchange program for officer training, perhaps even a European military college and unified headquarters. Sarkozy telegraphed his contempt for geopolitical game-

playing in the style of his predecessors well before his election last year. He has praised the United States unabashedly, and embraced Israel enthusiastically, unlike previous French presidents who tended to worry about the sensibilities of rich
Arab tyrants. "All democracies are accountable for Israel's security, which is nonnegotiable," Sarkozy wrote in 2006, and since he took office, relations with Jerusalem have looked like a love-in. "You are a great and positive gush of wind in French politics," Israeli President Shimon Peres told him on a visit in March.

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No Balancing India
India cant balance the US socio-economic problems prevent its ascendence. Nielsen 8 (Jens, poli-sci Ph.D., 2/18, http://kaalhauge.weblogs.asb.dk/2008/02/18/india-will-rise-%E2%80%93but-how-far-can-one-rise-on-clay-feet/) The basic problem is that the current boom doesnt touch on the basic structural fallacies in India. Of these fallacies, there are two, which is most devastating. The first is the deplorable elementary school system in India. The second is that the boom has not triggered any major grow of a low-skilled labour intensive industry in India, which are strongly needed if the huge unskilled masses in India shall find appropriate employment. Generally, India is characterized by low labour-elasticity vis-a-vis its growth rate, which means that India is a very jobless economy. However, in a country, where approximately 13 million is added to the workforce every year, this is a problem of the highest cardinal importance. The relative few jobs, which are created during the current boom, are generally job for higher educated professionals or higher skilled workers. In other words the job-pattern of the current boom has nothing or little to offer the majority of Indian workers, including the wave of the coming generation of lowskilled workers, which multiply every year in alarming numbers. The problem is that there is nothing, which really indicates that India seriously is trying to deal with these two cardinal problems. The much talk about Indias becoming urbanization ignores the fact that the jobs, which should facilitate this process of urbanization is simply not there. It is true that the new financial budget is allocating more money to the elementary school level but the problem of the elementary school system is entangled in cultural attitudes, caste-habits, teacher-privileges and fundamental institutional weaknesses and its solutions is not simply a matter of financing. So before India begin to dream of racing with China, it will be well advised to start solving those basic structural problems, which India so far have ignored for the last 60 years. India will not be able to establish any sustainable growth before it has solved these fundamental problems. Naturally, the current boom in India is real in the sense that a few Indian states and some segments of the population experience real growth. (It is not the growth, which is in question but the issue regarding its institutional and structural functions). But the function of this growth will not be an answer for India as a whole and will increasing split India into two radically separated worlds, which have little other than the noun India in common. Do not believe in the hype of Indias as the next economic superpower; it is a play on empty rhetoric. The current appearance of progress is misleading. The reality is that India cannot find jobs to its rapid growing masses and the majority of these masses is and will remain low-skilled and to a large degree illiterates. The number of main workers out of the total Indian population is constantly falling although the Indian population become younger and younger. Since more and more Indian factories are increasingly automating, then it is clear that the solution to the problem hardly comes from the established industry. Indeed, Stephen Roach of the Morgan Stanley, once, wondered how India would create jobs, when its factories are more heavily populated by robots than human workers. Indeed, from 19912001, the fraction of Indians in the actual workforce is supposed to have fallen from approximately 34 to 30% (so much for the demographic dividend). Especially, the number of women in the workforce in India is record low. Jobless India is also a tale of an increased gender-bias, which again is reflected in the relative few women who take a higher education in India. India is increasingly squeezed between its growing masses of unemployed (and underemployed) and its inability to produce the necessary low-skilled labour intensive industries. In other words, India is marching down the path of major social conflicts, and the lack of a sufficient elementary school-system has make sure that there is no end to the supply of this misery.

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No Balancing Asia Generic


Asia is not countering US leadership Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly. Americas Grand Design in Asia) U.S. policy seeks to build and bind together friendly centers of power in Asia to help maintain a regional balance that preserves U.S. interests and values as China rises. We want to encourage the rise of friendly, independent Asian powers, but we also want to bind their interests to ours, says former National Security Council official Michael Green. The United States is trying to build strength in its Asian partners, not subordinate or contain them in Cold War type alliance structures in which the United States institutionalizes its own dominance. This policy is attractive to Asian leaders who want to build national capabilities and increase their respective countrys room to maneuver in the emerging Asian order and who recognize that cooperation with the United States to strengthen their economic and military capabilities will accelerate this process, enhance their autonomy, and countervail growing Chinese influence. Yet, U.S. policy rekindles traditional wariness in India, Indonesia, and Vietnam about perceived U.S. hegemonic designs. Ironically, although U.S. leaders welcome these countries determination to protect their autonomy as China rises, thereby helping to preserve a pluralistic Asian security order, their very independence also means that they are wary of U.S. dominance. Nonetheless, the United States values its key Asian partners for their growing strength. As former Indian foreign secretary Shyam Saran notes, If there is a greater focus today on India in the [United States], it is not because India is weak but because India is strong. We are being recognized as a country which has [an] array of capabilities and has the potential to emerge as a very important power in the future. Former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi controversially maintained that building Japanese strength within the U.S. alliance would actually improve Tokyos relations with Beijing. Washingtons policy of building new centers of power in Asia is premised on a congruence of interests with states such as India and Japan in strengthening their national capabilities and expanding their security horizons to shape the emerging order of the new century. The United States is not pursuing this design to contain China but to shape its geopolitical options as a country at a strategic crossroads. Washington is limiting Chinas potential strategic choices by strengthening and cultivating friendly Asian powers along its periphery that will constrain and constructively channel Beijings regional and international ambitions. It is very useful to remind China, says one U.S. official, that there are other emerging powerful countries, such as India, who are setting standards we agree with. This is very different from containment; it is more about encouraging or shaping Chinas view of the international system in a constructive way.

Rising Asian influence doesnt constrain the US Twining 7 (Transatlantic Fellow based in Oxford and New Delhi and concurrently the Fulbright/Oxford Scholar
at the University of Oxford. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly. Americas Grand Design in Asia) Accelerating the rise of friendly, independent centers of power in Asia may allow the United States to maintain its privileged position within an asymmetrically multipolar Asian security order characterized by multiple power centersChina, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and ASEANthat makes it naturally resistant to Chinese domination. Nonetheless, the implications for the United States of trends in Asia are inescapable. Relative U.S. power will wane as China and India rise. Its not possible to pretend that [China] is just another player, said Singapores former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, in 1993. This is the biggest player in the history of man. The size of Chinas displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance within a few decades. The United States is pursuing a grand design to shape that new balance in ways that preserve its interests in a pluralistic security order that is dominated by no one regional power and that aligns it increasingly closely with democratic and like-minded centers of strength is a rising Asia.

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No Alternative to U.S. Hegemony


Collapse of U.S. hegemony leads to apolarity Haass 8 (Richard N., President Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs ,
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html?mode=print, June 2008, AD: 7/10/09 ) The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the The twentieth century started out distinctly multipolar. But after almost 50 years, two world wars, and many smaller conflicts, a bipolar system emerged. Then, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, bipolarity gave way to unipolarity -- an international system dominated by one power, in this case the United States. But today power is diffuse, and the onset of nonpolarity raises a number of important questions. How does nonpolarity differ from other forms of international order? How and why did it materialize? What are its likely consequences? And how should the United States respond? NEWER WORLD ORDER In contrast to multipolarity -- which involves several distinct poles or concentrations of power -- a nonpolar international system is characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power. In a multipolar system, no power dominates, or the system will become unipolar. Nor do concentrations of power revolve around two positions, or the system will become bipolar. Multipolar systems can be cooperative, even assuming the form of a concert of powers, in which a few major powers work together on setting the rules of the game and disciplining those who violate them. They can also be more competitive, revolving around a balance of power, or conflictual, when the balance breaks down.

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***Yes Balancing***

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Counterbalancing Up
Russia, China, India and Brazil are counterbalancing the United States now Walberg 6/25 (Eric, Journalist for Al-Ahram Weekly, Reinventing the wheel,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/953/in2.htm, 6/25/09, AD: 7/8/09) JC Yekaterinburg, famous tragically as the spot Lenin chose to have the Tsar and his family executed in 1918, and ironically as the fiefdom of Boris Yeltsin, who finished off the Russian revolution itself in 1991, witnessed something no less remarkable last week when leaders of the so- called BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China) held their first summit, following the yearly meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The BRIC countries comprise 15 per cent of the world economy, 40 per cent of global currency reserves and half the world's population. Brazil, India and China have also weathered the financial crisis better than the world as a whole. Holding the two meetings together meant that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh attended the SCO for the first time. The SCO, Russian and China's Eurasian security organisation, has become a key counterweight to US hegemony in the world, and Russia and China are eager to have India upgrade its position of observer to member. This summit appeared to have coaxed India a step closer, as the SCO security agenda has shifted to emphasise dealing with growing security threats from Afghanistan, which satisfies the more pro- US India. But the headlinestealer was the BRIC summit. While the US plays its tiresome geopolitical games on Russia's eastern borders, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was busy charting a new economic and political reality in the heart of Eurasia. "The artificially maintained unipolar system", he lectured, is based on "one big centre of consumption, financed by a growing deficit and... one formerly strong reserve currency." At the root of the global financial crisis, he concluded, is that the US makes too little and spends too much. Especially upsetting for Russia is its continued military largesse to Georgia, the missile shield in Eastern Europe and the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. "The summit must create the conditions for a fairer world order," he read out, as Presidents Hu Jintao of China, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil and the Indian prime minister looked on approvingly. China backs Russia's two big gripes with the US: "The security of some states cannot be ensured at the expense of others, including the expansion of militarypolitical alliances or the creation of global or regional missile defence systems," the joint Chinese-Russian statement says. Chinese leader Hu Jintao also joined Medvedev in denouncing US plans to militarise outer space: "Russia and China advocate peaceful uses of outer space and oppose the prospect of it being turned into a new area for deploying weapons... The sides will actively facilitate practical work on a draft treaty on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, and of the use of force or threats to use force against space facilities."

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Multipolarity Now
The world is now multipolar. Khanna 8 (Parag, America Strategy Program sr. fellow, 1/27, p. 1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) At best, Americas unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war peace dividend was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing and losing in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the worlds other superpowers: the European Union and China. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules their own rules without any one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this postAmerican world. The more we appreciate the differences among the American, European and Chinese worldviews, the more we will see the
planetary stakes of the new global game. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. The cold war, too, was not truly an East-West struggle; it remained essentially a contest over Europe. What we have today, for the first time in history, is a global,

In Europes capital, Brussels, technocrats, strategists and legislators increasingly see their role as being the global balancer between America and China. Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, a German member of the European Parliament, calls it European patriotism. The
multicivilizational, multipolar battle. Europeans play both sides, and if they do it well, they profit handsomely. Its a trend that will outlast both President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, the selfdescribed friend of America, and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, regardless of her visiting the Crawford ranch. It may comfort American conservatives to point out that Europe still lacks a common army; the only problem is that it doesnt really need one. Europeans use intelligence and the police to apprehend radical Islamists, social policy to try to integrate restive Muslim populations and economic strength to incorporate the former Soviet Union and gradually subdue Russia. Each year European investment in Turkey grows as well, binding it closer to the E.U. even if it never becomes a member. And each year a new pipeline route opens transporting oil and gas from Libya, Algeria or Azerbaijan to Europe. What other superpower grows by an average of one country per year, with others waiting in line and begging to join? Robert Kagan famously said that America hails from Mars and Europe

The E.U.s market is the worlds largest, European technologies more and more set the global standard and European countries give the most development assistance. And if America and China fight, the worlds money will be safely invested in European banks. Many Americans scoffed at the introduction of the euro, claiming it was an overreach that would bring the collapse of the
from Venus, but in reality, Europe is more like Mercury carrying a big wallet. European project. Yet today, Persian Gulf oil exporters are diversifying their currency holdings into euros, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran has proposed that OPEC no longer price its oil in worthless dollars. President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela went on to suggest euros. It doesnt help that Congress revealed its true protectionist colors by essentially blocking the Dubai ports deal in 2006. With London taking over (again) as the worlds financial capital for stock listing, its no surprise that Chinas new state investment fund intends to locate its main Western offices there instead of New York. Meanwhile, Americas share of global exchange reserves has dropped to 65 percent. Gisele Bndchen demands to be paid in euros, while Jay-Z drowns in

American soft power seems on the wane even at home. And Europes influence grows at Americas expense. While America fumbles at nation-building, Europe spends its money and political capital on locking peripheral countries into its orbit. Many poor regions of the world have realized that they want the European dream, not the American dream. Africa wants a real African Union like the E.U.; we offer no equivalent. Activists in the Middle East want parliamentary democracy like Europes, not American-style presidential strongman rule. Many of the foreign students we shunned after 9/11 are now in London and Berlin: twice as many Chinese study in Europe as in the U.S. We didnt educate them, so we have no claims on their brains or loyalties as we have in decades past. More broadly, America controls legacy institutions few seem to want like the International Monetary Fund while Europe excels at building new and sophisticated ones modeled on itself. The U.S.
500 euro notes in a recent video. has a hard time getting its way even when it dominates summit meetings consider the ill-fated Free Trade Area of the Americas let alone when its not even invited, as with the new East Asian Community, the regions answer to Americas Apec. The East Asian Community is but one example of how

China is also too busy restoring its place as the worlds Middle Kingdom to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States. In Americas own hemisphere, from Canada to Cuba to Chvezs Venezuela, China is cutting massive resource and investment deals. Across
the globe, it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers, aid workers, dam-builders and covert military personnel. In Africa, China is not only securing energy supplies; it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. The whole world is abetting Chinas spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war, pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find.

Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.S. now enjoys a diplomatic, economic or strategic lifeline from China, Iran being the most prominent example.

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Nonpolarity Now
The world is nonpolar. Haas 8 (Richard, CFR pres., May/June, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/theage-of-nonpolarity.html) The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past. The twentieth century
started out distinctly multipolar. But after almost 50 years, two world wars, and many smaller conflicts, a bipolar system emerged. Then,

with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, bipolarity gave way to unipolarity -an international system dominated by one power, in this case the United States. But today power is diffuse, and the onset of nonpolarity raises a number of important questions. How does nonpolarity differ from other forms of
international order? How and why did it materialize? What are its likely consequences? And how should the United States respond? NEWER WORLD ORDER In contrast to multipolarity -- which involves several distinct poles or concentrations of power -- a nonpolar international system is characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power. In a multipolar system, no power dominates, or the system will become unipolar. Nor do concentrations of power revolve around two positions, or the system will become bipolar. Multipolar systems can be cooperative, even assuming the form of a concert of powers, in which a few major powers work together on setting the rules of the game and disciplining those who violate them. They can also be more competitive, revolving around a balance of power, or conflictual, when the balance breaks down. At first glance, the world today may appear to be multipolar. The

major powers -- China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States -contain just over half the world's people and account for 75 percent of global GDP and 80 percent of global defense spending. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today's world differs in a fundamental way from one of classic multipolarity: there are many more power centers, and quite a few of these poles are not nation-states. Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well. States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in many places. In addition to the six major world powers, there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania. A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the International
Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health Organization). So, too, would states within nationstates, such as California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, So Paulo, and Shanghai. Then there are the

large global companies, including those that dominate the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace). Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power.

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Yes Balancing EU
The EU is successfully balancing the US. Khanna 8 (Parag, America Strategy Program sr. fellow, 1/27, p. 1,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) In Europes capital, Brussels, technocrats, strategists and legislators increasingly see their role as being the global balancer between America and China. Jorgo Chatzimarkakis, a German member of the European Parliament, calls
it European patriotism. The Europeans play both sides, and if they do it well, they profit handsomely. Its a trend that will outlast both President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, the self-described friend of America, and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, regardless of her visiting the Crawford ranch. It may comfort American conservatives to point out that Europe still lacks a

common army; the only problem is that it doesnt really need one. Europeans use intelligence and the police to apprehend radical Islamists, social policy to try to integrate restive Muslim populations and economic strength to incorporate the former Soviet Union and gradually subdue Russia. Each year European investment in Turkey grows as well, binding it closer to the E.U. even if it never becomes a member. And each year a new pipeline route opens transporting oil and gas from Libya, Algeria or Azerbaijan to Europe. What other superpower grows by an average of one country per year, with others waiting in line and begging to join? Robert Kagan famously said that America hails from Mars and Europe from Venus, but in reality, Europe is more like Mercury carrying a big wallet. The E.U.s market is the worlds largest, European technologies more and more set the global standard and European countries give the most development assistance. And if America and China fight, the worlds money will be safely invested in European banks. Many Americans scoffed at the introduction of the euro, claiming it was an overreach that would bring the collapse of the European project. Yet today, Persian Gulf oil exporters are diversifying their currency holdings into euros, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran has proposed that OPEC no longer price its oil in worthless dollars. President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela went on to suggest euros. It doesnt help that Congress revealed its true protectionist colors by essentially blocking the Dubai ports deal in 2006. With London taking over (again) as the worlds financial capital for stock listing, its no surprise that Chinas new state investment fund intends to locate its main Western offices there instead of New York. Meanwhile, Americas share of global exchange reserves has dropped to 65 percent. Gisele Bndchen demands to be paid in euros, while Jay-Z drowns in 500 euro notes in a recent video. American soft power seems on the wane even at home. And Europes influence grows at Americas expense. While America fumbles at nation-building, Europe spends its money and political capital on locking peripheral countries into its orbit. Many poor regions of the world have realized that they want the European dream, not the American dream. Africa wants a real African Union like the E.U.; we offer no equivalent. Activists in the Middle East want parliamentary democracy like Europes, not American-style presidential strongman rule. Many of the foreign students we shunned after 9/11 are now in London and Berlin: twice as many Chinese study in Europe as in the U.S. We didnt educate them, so we have no claims on their brains or loyalties as we have in decades past. More broadly, America controls legacy institutions few seem to want like the International Monetary Fund while Europe excels at building new and sophisticated ones modeled on itself. The U.S. has a hard time getting its way even when
it dominates summit meetings consider the ill-fated Free Trade Area of the Americas let alone when its not even invited, as with the new East Asian Community, the regions answer to Americas Apec.

The EU is counterbalancing US influence. Al-Ahram 8 (6/4, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/899/re1.htm)


France, which will assume presidency of the European Union next month, Youssef pointed out, wants to create a counter- balance to the American role, which attempts to monopolise influence on developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He stressed that through its communications with European officials, Hamas is trying to make them aware of the reality of the Palestinian cause and limit the effect of Israeli propaganda as much as possible. He said that Hamas wants to break the isolation forced on it by Israel and America since it won the last elections and to try to open up more doors. He holds that the greatest problem facing the European position is its dependency on American politics and its unwillingness to cross lines set by Washington.
Youssef reported a number of European officials he has met in Gaza and several European capitals as saying that they currently cannot overstep US policy, though they are convinced that placing Hamas on the list of terrorist organisations is a "mistake and lacks good judgement and balance". They say this because the isolation the world has imposed on Hamas has brought results opposite to those desired -- in addition to being unethical and unjust. Youssef holds that the EU will continue to place Hamas on the list of terrorist organisations until the current US administration completes its term.

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Yes Balancing Russia/China


Russia and China are counterbalancing the US. CNN 8 (5/23, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/05/23/china.russia.ap/index.html)
BEIJING, China (AP) -- The presidents of China and Russia have condemned U.S. plans for a global missile defense system. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev meeting with Chinese journalists on the eve of his visit to Beijing. In a joint statement signed with Chinese President Hu Jintao, the leaders said a U.S. plan for a global missile defense system "does not help to maintain strategic balance and stability or strengthen international efforts to control nonproliferation." Moscow and Beijing have formed closer ties in recent years as part of their efforts to counterbalance Washington's global dominance. The agreement came after new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev arrived Friday in Beijing on his first overseas trip since his inauguration earlier this month -- a further sign of improving ties between the one-time Cold War rivals. The official Xinhua News Agency said Medvedev's two-day visit will include talks with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. His arrival in Beijing was to come after a stop in neighboring Kazakhstan on Thursday, where he was seeking to preserve his country's clout in the energy-rich Central Asian region. China and Russia have built a relationship intended to serve as a counterweight to U.S. dominance, but continued friction remains -- especially over oil and gas -- in Central Asia.

Sino-Russian relations are high, allowing them to counterbalance the US. MSN News 8 (5/23, http://news.in.msn.com/international/article.aspx?cp-documentid=1414630)
Beijing: Chinese President Hu Jintao thanked Russia's new president Dmitry Medvedev, who is visiting China for offering speedy aid after last week's powerful earthquake, as the two began meetings Friday to bolster their partnership with expanded nuclear cooperation. The trip is Dmitry Medvedev's first since his inauguration earlier this month as the hand-picked successor to Vladimir Putin, underscoring the importance the two countries place on a relationship that both see as a counterbalance to U.S. dominance. But continued friction between the neighboring giants remains _ especially over oil and gas in Central Asia. At the start of their talks, Hu thanked both Medvedev and Putin _ now prime minister _ for assistance offered after the May 12 quake that struck central China. Russia sent rescue crews and a mobile hospital to the disaster area in central Sichuan province. ''Your visit to China is very important and will allow us to not only preserve but to advance all the good undertakings we have had,'' Hu said. ''We are sure that it will give a powerful impulse to the development of strategic partnership and cooperation.'' Medvedev offered his condolences to quake victims and relatives of more than 55,000 dead. "Russia is ready to provide all the necessary assistance and aid to our Chinese friends," he said."You must have no doubt that we will do everything necessary." The two leaders' talks were to conclude later Friday with a series of agreements including a US$1 billion (?630 million) deal on Russian help building a uranium enrichment facility for electricity generation and regular shipments of low-enriched uranium to China. ''We are ready to conduct general dialogue on all aspects of our strategic partnership,'' Medvedev said. Medvedev came to China from a stop in neighboring Kazakhstan, where he was seeking to preserve his country's clout in energy-rich central Asia and send a message to both Beijing and the West that Moscow continues to see the region as its home turf. China already has won a cut of the region's riches, reaching an oil pipeline deal with Kazakhstan and negotiating a gas agreement with Turkmenistan. There is also rich symbolism in Medvedev's choice of China as the main destination of his first foreign trip. When his predecessor Putin went abroad for the first time as president in 2000, he traveled to London _ via Belarus _ with a message Russia wanted closer ties to the West. In recent years, China and Russia have made highly symbolic political overtures to one another, holding joint military maneuvers and engaging in high-level talks on creating a "multi-polar world". They have taken a coordinated stance on several global issues, sharing opposition to Kosovo's independence and U.S. missile defense plans, and taking a similar approach to the Iran nuclear issue. Putin greatly strengthened relations with China, reaching a long-delayed agreement on demarcation of the 2,700 mile (4,300-kilometer) border.

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AT: Benign Hegemony


The US is not perceived as benignunilateralist polices are menacing to other powers. Layne 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006, The Unipolar
Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United StatesUnipolar Moment, International Security 31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) Precisely because unipolarity means that other states must worry primarily [End Page 21] about

the hegemon's capabilities rather than its intentions, the ability of the United States to reassure others is limited by its formidableand uncheckedcapabilities, which always are at least a latent threat to other states. 55
This is not to say that the United States is powerless to shape others' perceptions of whether it is a threat. But doing so is difficult because in a unipolar world, the burden of proof is on the hegemon to demonstrate to others that its power is not threatening. 56 Even in a unipolar world, not all of the other major powers will believe themselves to be threatened (or to be equally threatened) by the hegemon. Eventually, however, some are bound to regard the hegemon's power as menacing. For example, although primacists assert that U.S. hegemony is nonthreatening because U.S. power is "offshore," this manifestly is not the case. On the contrary, in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East, American power is both onshore (or lurking just over the horizon in the case of East Asia) and in the faces of Russia, China, and the Islamic world. Far from being an

offshore balancer that is "stopped by water" from dominating regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, the United States has acquired the means to project massive military power into, and around, Eurasia, and thereby to establish extraregional hegemony in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. 57

There is no such thing as a benevolent hegemon. Layne 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006, The Unipolar
Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United StatesUnipolar Moment, International Security 31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) In international politics there are no benevolent hegemons. In today's world, other states dread

both the overconcentration of geopolitical influence in the United States' favor and the purposes for which it may be used. As Paul Sharp writes, "No great power has a monopoly on virtue and, although some may have a great deal more virtue than others, virtue imposed on others is not seen as such by them. All great powers are capable of exercising a measure of self-restraint, but they are tempted not to and the choice to practice restraint is made easier by the existence of countervailing power and the possibility of it [End Page 27] being exercised." 74 While Washington's self-proclaimed benevolence is inherently ephemeral, the hard fist of U.S. power is tangible.

US democracy doesnt make heg benevolentdemocracy doesnt decrease international fear of US hegemonic power Layne 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U, 2006, The Unipolar
Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United StatesUnipolar Moment, International Security 31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) Many primacists believe that the United States can be a successful, benevolent hegemon because it is a liberal democracy. This argument rests on wobbly reasoning. Certainly, there is a considerable literature purporting to show that the quality of international politics among democracies differs from that between democracies and nondemocracies; that is, democracies cooperate with each other, constitute a "pluralistic security community," accord each other respect, and conduct their affairs based on shared values and norms (transparency, give-and-take, live and let live, compromise, and peaceful dispute resolution). These ideas comport with the Wilsonian ideology that drives U.S. grand strategic behavior, but there is powerful evidence demonstrating that democracies do not behave better toward each other than toward nondemocracies. The mere fact that the United States is a democracy does not negate the possibility that other states will fear its hegemonic power. First, theories that posit a special democratic (or liberal) peace are contradicted by the historical record. When important geopolitical interests are at stake, realpolitiknot regime typedetermines great power policies. 69 Contrary to liberal theory, democracies (and liberal states) have threatened to use military force against each other to resolve diplomatic crises and have even gone to the brink of war. Indeed, democracies have not just teetered on the brink; they have gone over it. The most notable example of a war among democracies occurred in 1914 when democratic Britain and France went to war against democratic Germany. 70 Today, the gross imbalance

of U.S. power means that whenever the United States believes its interests are threatened, it will act like other hegemons typically have acted, notwithstanding that it is a democracy. 71 [End Page 26] Second, the term "democracy" itself is subjective; democracy has many differentcontestedmeanings. 72 To say that two states are democracies may conceal more than it reveals.

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AT: We Solve Bad Parts of Heg (Multilateralism)


Multilateralism is a shamrealism dictates that so long as the US is so preponderant, it will act unilaterally. One instance will not negate the larger trend Layne 2 (Christopher & Ben Schwarz, Assoc. Prof Political Science at the University of Miami A New Grand
Strategy, Atlantic Monthly, Jan 2002, vol. 289, no. 1, p. Proquest) Many American foreign policy analysts have concluded that the Iraq crisis has demonstrated the folly of a unilateralist American grand strategy. To heal the transatlantic breach, they say, the lesson from the Iraq crisis is of the imperative need for the United States to work multilaterally in concert with Europe. The debate about whether the U.S. should act multilaterally or unilaterally rests on a false dichotomy, however. In international politics, great powers always put their self-interest first. And they must do so; international politics is an especially competitive realm. In the jargon of international relations scholars, international politics is an anarchic system because there is no central authority able to make and enforce laws and maintain order. Consequently, international politics is a self-help system in which each actor must rely primarily on its own efforts to ensure its survival and security, and in which each can employ the means of its choiceincluding forceto advance its interests. As University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer says: States operating in a self help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states, or to the interests of the so-called international community. The reason is simple: it pays to be selfish in a self-help world.49 The nature of international politics impels great powers to think of themselves first thus, their natural inclination is to act unilaterally. If Iraq posed a serious and imminent threat to the United States, then Washington need not be constrained by the opposition of NATO Europe (or at least its hard core, centered on France and Germany). The best argument against the Bush administrations Iraq policy was not that the United States needed to placate Paris, Berlin, or London, but rather that there wereand despite the battlefield success, there remainserious questions about the wisdom of the administrations policy. First, as the leading realist scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt recently have pointed out, containment was an effective strategy for dealing with Saddam Hussein.50 Second, the administrations policy toward Iraq is in the memorable phrase of German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg in July 1914a leap into the dark. Although the ultimate success of American forces on the battlefield never was in doubt, wars are fought to attain political objectives. And it is far from clear that the United States is going to be more secure now that Saddam Hussein is removed from power. At best, as the early months of the postwar occupation suggest, the United States faces the prospect of a lengthy and costly period of pacifying and reconstructing Iraq. And if recent acts of violence against American military personnel are indicative, it is far from clear that the people of Iraq are prepared to acquiesce either to the U.S. military occupation or to accept an American-imposed government. At worst, there still is a risk that Iraq will come apart at the seams. What does seem apparent is that the unsettled political situation in Iraq following the war is likely to have crucial ramifications for regional stability. These considerations, not the failure to defer to Paris and Berlin, are the real defects in U.S. policy.

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***Soft Power Good***

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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Soft Power K2 Heg


Soft power is key to sustain hegemony due to alliances and information sharing. Nye 4 (Joseph S, Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 261)
In the global information age, the attractiveness of the United States will be crucial to our ability to achieve the outcomes we want. Rather than having to put together pick-up coalitions of the willing for each new game, we will benefit if we are able to attract others into institutional alliances and eschew weak- ening those we have already created. NATO, for example, not only aggregates the capabilities of advanced nations, but its interminable committees, procedures, and exercises also allow these nations to train together and quickly be- come interoperable when a crisis occurs. As for alliances, if the United States is an attractive source of security and reassurance, other countries will set their expectations in directions that are conducive to our interests. Initially, for ex- ample, the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not very popular in Japan, but polls show that over the decades, it became more attractive to the Japanese public. Once that happened, Japanese politicians began to build it into their approaches to foreign policy. The United States benefits when it is regarded as a constant and trusted source of attraction so that other countries are not obliged continually to re-examine their options in an atmosphere of uncertain coalitions. In the Japan case, broad acceptance of the United States by the Japanese public "contributed to the maintenance of US hegemony" and "served as politi cal constraints compelling the ruling elites to continue cooperation with the United States.'"^ Popularity can contribute to stability. Finally, as the RAND Corporation's John Arquila and David Ronfeldt ar- gue, power in an information age will come not only from strong defenses but also from strong sharing. A traditional realpolitik mind-set makes it difficult to share with others. But in an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so.'' As we share intelligence and capabilities with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power fiows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of at- traction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age. We cannot afford that.

Soft power is key to hegemony avoids backlash and provides staying power. Nye 4 (Joseph S, Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 261)
Ironically, however, the only way to achieve the type of transformation that the neoconservatives seek is by working with others and avoiding the backlash that arises when the United States appears on the world stage as an imperial power acting unilaterally. What is more, because democracy cannot be imposed by force and requires a considerable time to take root, the most likely way to obtain staying power from the American public is through developing interna- tional legitimacy and burden sharing with allies and institutions. For Jacksoni- ans like Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, this may not matter. They would pre- fer to punish the dictator and come home rather than engage in tedious nation building. For example, in September 2003, Rumsfeld said of Iraq, "I don't be- heve it's our job to reconstruct the country."^' But for serious neoconservatives, like Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, their impatience with institutions and allies may undercut their own objectives. They understand the importance of soft power but fail to appreciate all its dimensions and dynamics.

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Soft Power K2 Heg


Soft power is key to US leadership. Nye 8 (Joseph S, Harvard IR prof., p. 7, http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/616/1/94)
Promoting positive images of ones country is not new, but the conditions for projecting soft power have transformed dramatically in recent years. For one thing, nearly half the countries in the world are now democracies. The competi- tive cold war model has become less relevant as a guide for public diplomacy. While there is still a need to provide accurate information to populations in coun- tries like Burma or Syria, where the government controls information, there is a new need to garner favorable public opinion in countries like Mexico and Turkey, where parliaments can now affect decision making. For example, when the United States sought support for the Iraq war, such as Mexicos vote in the UN or Turkeys permission for American troops to cross its territory, the decline of American soft power created a disabling rather than an enabling environment for its policies. Shaping public opinion becomes even more important where author- itarian governments have been replaced. Public support was not so important when the United States successfully sought the use of bases in authoritarian countries, but it turned out to be crucial under the new democratic conditions in Mexico and Turkey. Even when foreign leaders are friendly, their leeway may be limited if their publics and parliaments have a negative image of the United States. In such circumstances, diplomacy aimed at public opinion can become as important to outcomes as the traditional classified diplomatic communications among leaders.

Soft power is key to sustain US hegemony. Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power,
3/22, p. 16-17)

However, it would be in the interests of the United States to create internal mechanisms for a more consistent and stable foreign policy, one that is consis- tent with the long-term policy goals of the State Department. Inconsistent uni- lateral actions, using hard power, by the United States both caused distrust by allies and increased suspicions by many nations who believe that the United States masks evil goals behind the rhetoric of idealism. On May 3, 2007, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated in Washington that in this tumultuous period, America's leadership and purpose has become more critical than ever. I cannot help but fully endorse the sentiments of Prime Minister Lee. There is an urgent need for the US to evolve and develop an overall foreign policy which has coherent principles and acknowledges the merits of soft power.In contrast to hard power that rests on coercion and is derived from military and economic might, soft power rests, not on coercion, but on the ability of a nation to co-opt others to follow its will through the attractiveness of its culture, values, ideas and institutions. When a state can persuade and influ- ence others to aspire to share such values, it can lead by example and foster cooperation. Soft power includes propaganda, but is considerably broader. It is much more than 'image, public relations and ephemeral popularity'. It contains very real power - an ability to gain objectives.

Soft power is increasingly critical to leadership. Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power,
3/22, p. 19)

Soft power has always been an important element of leadership. For example, the Cold War was won with a strategy of containment that used soft power along with hard power. However, in the global information age, we are seeing the increase in the importance of soft power. Communication technology is shrinking the world and creating ideal conditions for projecting soft power through the control of information.

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Soft Power Solves Terrorism


Soft power is key to solve terrorism - hard power is insufficient. Nye 4 (Joseph S, Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 257)
Look again at Afghanistan. Precision bombing and Special Forces defeated the Taliban government, but U.S. forces in Afghanistan wrapped up less than a quarter of al Qaeda, a transnational network with cells in sixty countries. The United States cannot bomb al Qaeda cells in Hamburg, Kuala Lumpur, or Detroit. Success against them depends on close civilian cooperation, whether shar- ing intelligence, coordinating police work across borders, or tracing global fi- nancial flows. America's partners cooperate partly out of self-interest, but the inherent attractiveness of U.S. pohcies can and does influence the degree of co- operation. Equally important, the current struggle against Islamist terrorism is not a clash of civilizations but a contest whose outcome is closely tied to a civil war between moderates and extremists within Islamic civilization. The United States and other advanced democracies will win only if moderate Muslims win, and the ability to attract the moderates is critical to victory. We need to adopt policies that appeal to moderates and to use public diplomacy more effectively to explain our common interests. We need a better strategy for wielding our soft power. We will have to learn better how to combine hard and soft power if we wish to meet the new challenges.

Soft power is key to solve terrorism. Cristo 5 (Danna A, Pace U, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,
http://www.questiaschool.com/read/5012336040?title=Soft%20Power%3A%20The%20Means%20to%20Success %20in%20World%20Politics, 2005,AD: 7/10/09) JC Although worthwhile, the strategy assessment of the US's use of soft power is not a new or novel idea. The management and psychology literature has long touted the benefits of using referent power (soft power) over coercive power (hard power). In their classic article, "The Bases of Social Power," Raven and French (1959), describe the five bases of power: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert. Referent power is based on identification and attraction, and yields the greatest influence in relation to the other bases along as this strong attraction exists. The authors point out that referent power has the broadest range of power. The most negative power is coercion, which decreases attraction, and thus referent power. In relation to the rest of the world, there are some and individuals that are attracted to the US and its culture and others that are not. This is especially true of Islamic fundamentalists who believe that the US's secular culture is evil and corrupt. Moreover, many European countries have long shared feelings that their cultures are far superior to that of the US. The major failure of the Bush administration in gaining broad support for the war against Iraq may in fact be a failure in assessing the strength of the referent power of the US, which had been eroding for many years prior to the administration. Although it would have been best to move ahead with broad support using soft power, the US could not use what they did not have. The fault of the Bush administration could lie in their immediate use of coercive power without the exploration of the other bases of power before declaring war. But it is important to note that France, Germany, and Russia had their own self-interest in mind when they opposed the war against Iraq. These countries had a long history of trying to weaken the containment of Iraq to ensure that they could have good trading relations with it.

Soft power is critical to solve terrorism. Shuja 8 (Sharif, Monash U Global Terrorism Research Unit Honorary Research Associate, Why America Can Not Ignore Soft Power,
3/22, p. 19)

It is argued that both hard and soft power are important in US foreign policy and in the fight against terrorism. The suppression of terrorism, and the achievement of a variety of other objectives including efforts to promote democracy overseas, require the willing assistance of other nations and peo- ples. There are places where the US cannot go in search of terrorist leaders. It needs broad cooperation for intelligence gathering and the restriction of ter- rorist finances. The hard power of military and economic strength is, of course, essential, but the use of 'carrot and stick' alone cannot achieve these objectives. America's neglect of soft power is undermining its ability to persuade and influence others.

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Soft Power Solves Democracy


Soft power is key to democracy. Nye 8 (Joseph S, Harvard IR prof., p. 7, http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/616/1/94)
In addition, there are times when cooperation, including enhancement of the public image of multilateral institutions like NATO or the UN, can make it easier for governments to use such instruments to handle difficult tasks like peacekeeping, promoting democracy, or countering terrorism. For example, during the cold war, American public diplomacy in Czechoslovakia was reinforced by the association of the United States with international conventions that fostered human rights. In 1975, the multilateral Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) legitimized discussion of human rights behind the Iron Curtain and had consequences that were unforeseen by those who signed its Final Act. As former CIA director Robert Gates concluded, despite initial American resistance, the Soviets desperately wanted the CSCE, they got it, and it laid the foundations for the end of their empire (as quoted in Thomas 2003, 257).

Soft power solves terrorism and democracy promotion. Nye 4 (Joseph S, Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 257)
According to the National Security Strategy, the greatest threats the American people face are transnational terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and particularly their combination. Yet, meeting the challenge posed by trans- national military organizations that could acquire weapons of mass destruction requires the cooperation of other countriesand cooperation is strengthened by soft power. Similarly, efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and elsewhere will require the help of others. Reconstruction in Iraq and peacekeeping in failed states are far more likely to succeed and to be less costly if shared with others rather than appearing as American imperial occupation. The fact that the United States squandered its soft power in the way that it went to war meant that the aftermath turned out to be much more costly than it need have been.

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Soft Power Solves Misc


Soft power is key to solve warming, disease, terrorism, and organized crime. Nye 4 (Joseph S, Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 264)
Because of its leading edge in the information revolution and its past investment in military power, the United States will likely remain the world's single most powerful country well into the twenty-first century. French dreams of a multipolar mihtary world are unlikely to be realized anytime soon, and the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has explicitly eschewed such a goal.^^ But not all the important types of power come out of the barrel of a gun. Hard power is relevant to getting the outcomes we want on all three chessboards, but many of the transnational issues, such as climate change, the spread of infec- tious diseases, international crime, and terrorism, cannot be resolved by mili- tary force alone. Representing the dark side of globalization, these issues are inherently multilateral and require cooperation for their solution. Soft power is particularly important in dealing with the issues that arise from the bottom chessboard of transnational relations. To describe such a world as an American empire fails to capture the real nature of the foreign policy tasks that we face.

Soft power is key to solve climate change and terrorism. Khanna 8 (Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow in the American Strategy
Program at the New America Foundation. Council on Foreign Relations: The United States and Shifting Global Power Dynamics) online: http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html To the extent that our grand strategy will involve elements of promoting good governance and democracy, we will have to become far more irresistible as a political partner, offering incentives greater than those of other powers who do not attach any strings to their relationships. Even if you are agnostic on this issue, we are all aware that this is a perennial plank of American diplomacy and if we want to be even remotely effective at it, we have to up our ante in this arena of rising powers. This I believe is part of what you would call non-military spending on national security, a course of action I strongly advocate for the Middle East and Central Asia.
An equally important component of grand strategy will have to be a realistic division of labor with these rising powers, something both of us clearly emphasize. Whether the issue is climate change, public health, poverty reduction, post-conflict reconstruction, or counterterrorism, we do not have the capacity to solve these problems alonenor can any other power. I argue that we need serious issue-based summit diplomacy among concerned powers (and other actors such as corporations and NGOs) to get moving quickly on these questions rather than (or in parallel to) allowing things to drag through their course in cumbersome multilateral fora. This last point is crucial: the missing ingredient to a globalized grand strategy is the U.S. foreign policy community cleverly leveraging the strengths, activities, and global footprint of the U.S. private sector and NGO communities into what I call a diplomatic-industrial complex. It is in changing our foreign policy process, as much as some of the

goals, that our success lies.

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***Soft Power Bad***

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Soft Power Not K2 Heg


Soft power fails to solve hegemony, proliferation or democracy while causing backlash. Philadelphia Inquirer 98 (Political Power is not Susceptible to the Charms of a Big Mac Attack, 6/17, LN)
But what also struck me, as I munched fries in Yogya, was the gap between America's power to shape global culture and its power to influence global affairs. Our domination of the airwaves, soundwaves and Web sites won't bring democracy to Jakarta. Throughout Indonesia's recent political upheavals, America's influence has been almost zilch. This disconnection is important to ponder. After the Cold War ended, many analysts believed the nature of power had changed. "In an age of information-based economies and transnational interdependence, power is becoming ... less tangible and less coercive," wrote Harvard professor Joseph Nye Jr., who held key diplomatic and intelligence posts in the first Clinton administration. The kind of power that matters now, Nye argued - in a phrase that became a buzzword - is "soft power." Soft power means that a country's ideas (democracy, free trade, consumerism) are so attractive that others will imitate them. America's culture (and the hold it has on the global imagination) are supposed to be an important source of soft power. Nye and others thought the importance of soft power would continue to grow relative to that of "hard power" - typified by military strength. Soft power was supposed to be an essential tool of the "world's sole remaining superpower." It was supposed to make "them" want to be like "us." But as I watched events unfold in Indonesia, soft power seemed irrelevant. It hardly served to bolster democracy. What young Indonesians see as the essence of America is consumer goods and media images of sex and violence. They know almost nothing about America's democratic values. Only those Indonesians with deeper knowledge of the United States (from studies abroad or professors) know that America is defined by both consumerism and democracy. Nor does the McWorld syndrome make leaders in other countries saturated by U.S. cultural exports toe the U.S. line. Soft power won't soften up Chinese leaders. McWorld won't make those leaders desist from exporting missile technology; that requires the hardpower technique of sanctions, which the Clinton team has found difficult to apply. The same holds for Japan, where a McDonald's sprouts in every neighborhood and an Elvis look-alike cult dances on Sundays in a downtown park. The veneer of U.S./global culture, despite its omnipresence, does not penetrate the foundation of Japanese-ness. Thus, American pleas for Japan to deregulate its economy and bail out its failing banks so Tokyo can power a new Asian growth spurt fall on deaf ears. Japanese leaders are willing to let the yen's value plummet, even though that drags all Asian economies down with it, because they think cheap exports will get their country out of its recession. No hard-power tools are easily at hand for Washington to pry open the Tokyo mindset. And all the McDonald's in Asia won't change Japanese thinking. Soft power is even less effective in countries that have resisted U.S. consumer products. McDonald's is in India (although it doesn't serve beef, since cows are sacred). But in a country long closed to Western exports and deluged with its own, home-produced movies, the Ameri-global culture has yet to take hold. But even if it had, that wouldn't have stopped India's government from exploding the bomb. The blasts were about hard power. Perhaps therein lies the clue to the relevance of soft power, or its lack. Since the Cold War's end, using hard power is tougher, because the objectives are less clear. A lot of wishful thinking has emerged about the impact of America's global empire of burgers and bytes on the projection of U.S. power. McWorld is great for exports (and for convincing foreign youths that their countries should go, and stay, capitalist). But in real power terms, it is still hard power that matters. The only punch delivered by a burger in Yogya is the bite of the hot chili sauce.

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Soft Power Causes Resentment/Terrorism


Soft power breeds resentment our culture is intrinsically offensive to other peoples. Huffington Post 6 (6/20, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/hollywood-in-the-world-a_b_23412.html)
This vast influence of American culture in the world is what Harvard professor Joseph Nye has called "soft power." Now, however, we are witnessing a mounting resistance, particularly from Asia and the Muslim world, to the American medium's libertarian and secular messages. There is also resistance to the mere fact of America's overwhelming cultural dominance. Josef Joffe, the publisher-editor of the German weekly Die Zeit has put it directly: "Between Vietnam and Iraq, America's cultural presence has expanded into ubiquity, and so has resentment of America. Soft power does not necessarily increase the world's love for America. It is still power, and it still makes enemies. If, as Nye has said, politics in the information age is about whose story wins, America's story, which has won for so long, is losing its universal appeal. Fewer and fewer are buying into the American narrative. Needless to say, that has big implications for America's storyteller -- Hollywood -- as well. America's soft power is losing its luster for several reasons. Though projected through movies and music, that power has been based fundamentally on ideals more or less realized in practice -- individual freedom, the rule of law, social and economic opportunity. In foreign policy it has meant the defense of human rights, the just use of force against fascism and the containment of Soviet power. Certainly the unilateral invasion and occupation of Iraq has fueled intense anger at America, eroding the natural sympathy after 9/11. But perhaps more disturbing to those who once held up America as a model has been not only Guantanamo, the Abu Ghraib prison abuse and the Haditha massacre but the White House defense of torture, its dismissal of the key aspects of the Geneva protocols on treatment of prisoners of war and the government wiretapping of its own citizens. The Katrina catastrophe in New Orleans not only exposed anew unsolved racial issues but revealed to a shocked world the burgeoning inequality that has crept back into American society as the welfare state has withered. The rise of the Christian right has made many, in Europe in particular, doubt whether a majority still shares America's founding commitment to the secular principles of the Enlightenment. Seized by the marketing machine, Hollywood entertainment has, with ever fewer exceptions, hewn to the blockbuster formula of action, violence, sex and special effects. A masterful drama like Orson Welles' "Citizen Kane" would be impossible to make in Hollywood today. In a recent Gallup Poll of 8,000 women in Muslim countries, the overwhelming majority cited "attachment to spiritual and moral values" as the best aspect of their own societies, while the most common answer to the question about what they admired least in the West was "moral decay, promiscuity and pornography" that pollsters called "the Hollywood image."

Hard power is key soft power approaches dont solve terrorism. Hirsh 2 (Michael, former Newsweek foreign editor, Sept./Oct., http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020901faessay9731/michael-hirsh/bush-andthe-world.html)

The hegemonists are right about one thing: hard power is necessary to break the back of radical Islamic groups and to force the Islamic world into fundamental change. Bin Laden said it well himself: "When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature they will like a strong horse." The United States must be seen as the strong horse. The reluctant U.S. interventionism of the 1990s made no headway against this implacable enemy. Clinton's policy of offering his and NATO's credibility to save Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo won Washington little goodwill in the Islamic world.

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Soft Power Causes Prolif/Genocide


Soft power allows proliferation and is complicit with genocide. New York Post 3 (12/8, http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/750)
The Oslo Accords, the most praised fruit of soft power, led to years of intensified conflict in which more Palestinians and Israelis have died than in the whole of the preceding 50 years. (As discussed yesterday, the so-called Geneva Accord can only have similar effect.) Bill Clinton's soft-power approach to North Korea gave Kim Jong-il four years in which to develop his nuclear arsenal and continue to thumb his nose at the world. And will not the compromise negotiated by the European Union with Tehran persuade the mullahs to speed up their plans to develop nuclear weapons? Whenever I hear the term "soft power," I am reminded of one particular scene. It is 1995 Srebrenica, a Bosnian city under U.N. protection. The ethnic Serb army arrives in the mainly Muslim town and begins to round up all Muslim males aged above 12. In four days, some 8,000 men and boys are forced into a makeshift camp held by the Serbs. On the fifth day, the Serbs start killing the captives. It takes them five days to kill everyone. All that time the U.N. protection force, a contingent of Dutch blue berets, is cantoned in its quarters just a mile away, doing nothing. Well, not quite: Some of the Dutch soldiers turned up their radios and cassette players to the maximum to drown the cries of Muslims being massacred by the Serbs. The Dutch blue berets were there on a soft-power mission. When their commander asked the U.N. headquarters in New York what he was supposed to do, the answer was chilling: Observe and report.

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***Heg Good***

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Heg Good Caspian Stability


First, American leadership in the Caspian key to stability: boosts American hegemony, contains Russia and is key to checking terrorism and smuggling Kalicki 1 (Jan, Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Caspian Energy at the Cross-Roads,
Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, p. lexis)

The countries surrounding the Caspian Sea -- Russia to the north, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the east, Iran to the south, and
Azerbaijan to the west -- hold some of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. And together with neighboring Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, they represent important economic, political, and strategic interests for the United States. To advance those interests, Washington should strengthen its policy toward the Caspian by giving the highest level of support to the cooperative development of regional energy reserves and pipelines. In particular, it should encourage the construction of multiple pipelines to ensure diverse and reliable transportation of Caspian energy to regional and international markets.Although the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries will continue to dominate the global energy market for decades to come, oil and gas development in the Caspian basin could help diversify, secure, and stabilize world energy supplies in the future, as resources from the North Sea have done in the past. The proven and possible energy reserves in or adjacent to the Caspian region -- including at least 115 billion barrels of oil -- are in fact many times greater than those of the North Sea and should increase significantly with continuing exploration. Such plentiful resources could generate huge returns for U.S. companies and their shareholders. American firms have already acquired 75 percent of Kazakhstan's mammoth Tengiz oil field, which is now valued at more than $10 billion. Over time, as the capital generated from Caspian energy development spreads to other sectors, U.S. firms in other industries -- from infrastructure to telecommunications to transportation and other

the United States has important political and strategic stakes in the Caspian region -- including a NATO ally in Turkey, a former adversary in Russia, a currently turbulent regime in Iran, and several fragile new states. Located at the crossroads of western Europe, eastern Asia, and the Middle East, the Caspian serves as a trafficking area for weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, and narcotics -- a role enhanced by the weakness of the region's governments.
services -- could also benefit. In addition to these energy-related and commercial interests,

With few exceptions, the fledgling Caspian republics are plagued with pervasive corruption, political repression, and the virtual absence of the rule of law. Even if they can muster the political will to attempt reform themselves, the attempt will

fail so long as they lack the resources to build strong economic and political institutions. And until they build close, substantive relations with the West, they will remain vulnerable to Russia's hegemonic impulses. The cooperative development of regional energy reserves and pipelines -- independent of their huge neighbors to the north and the south -- thus represents not only a boon for the United States and the world at large, but also the surest way to provide for the Caspian nations' own security and prosperity.

Second Failure to contain Russian would destabilize all of Eurasia, spark nuclear wars and put a stranglehold on the west. Cohen 96 (Ariel, PhD, Heritage Foundation, The New Great Game: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Backgrounder, no.
1065, p. lexis)

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russias transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russias IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russias neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15 Domination of the
Caucasus would bring Russia closer to the Balkans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Middle East. Russian imperialists, such as radical nationalist Vladimir

If Russia succeeds in establishing its domination in the south, the threat to Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, and Afganistan will increase. The
Zhirinovsky, have resurrected the old dream of obtaining a warm port on the Indian Ocean.

independence of pro-Western Georgia and Azerbaijan already has been undermined by pressures from the Russian armed forces and covert actions by the intelligence and security services, in addition to which Russian hegemony would make Western political and economic efforts to stave off Islamic militancy more difficult. Eurasian oil resources are pivotal to economic

development in the early 21st century. The supply of Middle Eastern oil would become precarious if Saudi Arabia became unstable, or if Iran or Iraq provoked another military conflict in the area. Eurasian oil is also key to the economic development of the southern NIS. Only with oil revenues can these countries sever their dependence on Moscow and develop modern market economies and free societies. Moreover, if these vast oil reserves were tapped and developed, tens of thousands of U.S. and Western jobs would be created. The U.S. should ensure free access to these reserves for the benefit of both Western and local economies.

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Heg Good Chinese Containment


First, strong American capabilities and the containment of China is critical to prevent aggression and war over Taiwan. Khalilzad 95 (Zalmay, US Ambassador to the United Nations. Losing the Moment? The United States and
the World After the Cold War. The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995) Third, the United States should seek to strengthen its own relative capabilities and those of its friends in East Asia to deter possible Chinese aggression and deal effectively with a more powerful, potentially hostile China. China's military leaders are considering the possibility of a conflict with the United States. They recognize the overall superiority of the U.S. military but believe there are weaknesses that could be exploited while preventing the United States from bringing its full power to bear in case of a conflict over Taiwan. According to the Chinese, U.S. weaknesses include vulnerability of U.S. bases to missile attacks, heavy U.S. reliance on space, America's need to rapidly reinforce the region in times of conflict, susceptibility of U.S. cities to being held hostage, and America's sensitivity to casualties. According to the emerging Chinese doctrine, the local balance of power in the region will be decisive because in this new era wars are short and intense. In a possible Taiwan conflict China would seek to create a fait accompli, forcing the United States to risk major escalation and high levels of violence to reinstate the status quo ante. China might gamble that these risks would constrain the U.S. response. Such an approach by China would be extremely risky and could lead to a major war. Dealing with such possible challenges from China both in the near and long term requires many steps. Burden-sharing and enhanced ties with states in East and Southeast Asia will be important. New formal alliance relationships--which would be the central element of a containment strategy--are neither necessary nor practical at this time, but it would be prudent to take some preparatory steps to facilitate the formation of a new alliance or the establishment of new military bases should that become necessary. They would signal to China that any attempt on their part to seek regional hegemony would be costly. The steps we should take now in the region must include enhancing military-to-military relations between Japan and South Korea, encouraging increased political- military cooperation among the ASEAN states and resolving overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea; fostering a Japanese-Russian rapprochement, including a settlement of the dispute over the "northern territories;" and enhancing military-to-military cooperation between the United States and the ASEAN states. These steps are important in themselves for deterrence and regional stability but they can also assist in shifting to a much tougher policy toward China should that become necessary. Because of the potential for conflict between the United States and China over issues such as Taiwan, the U.S. military posture in general should take this possibility into account. Measures should be taken to correct the Chinese belief that they can confront the world with a fait accompli in Taiwan. The United States needs expanded joint exercises with states in the region. Ensuring access to key facilities in countries such as the Philippines, pre-positioning stocks in the region, and increasing Taiwan's ability to defend itself would also be prudent. The large distances of the East Asian region also suggest that a future U.S. forcemix must emphasize longer-range systems and stand-off weapons. The United States must develop increased capabilities to protect friendly countries and U.S. forces in the region against possible missile attacks.

Second, failure to deter an invasion sparks a global nuclear war. Chicago Tribune 96 (staff, China Prepares New Show of Strength, Feb. 6, p. lexis)
While a peaceful solution remains a priority, both the politburo and the Peoples Liberation Army have pledged to use force if necessary to regain the island on which the Nationalists settled after losing the civil war to Mao Tse-tung in 1949.A PLA analysis--leaked to Western media--suggests that in the event of war with Taiwan, the U.S. would not intervene because U.S. commercial interests in China would be damaged and any intervention could lead to a new Sino-Russian alliance.The document, circulated among officers, concludes that even if the U.S. intervened, Washington could only retard--but not reverse--the defeat of Taiwan, and a Sino-U.S. conflict might lead to a global nuclear holocaust.

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Heg Good Democracy


First, leadership is critical to democratization effects. Albright 97 (Madeleine, Secretary of State, Building a framework for American leadership in the 21st Century
- U.S. Secretary of State Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC. http://findarticles.co m/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_n2_v8/ai_19538680/pg_9) Mr. Chairman, more than seven years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall and five years since the demise of the Soviet Union. Today, America is secure, our economy vibrant, and our ideals ascendant. Across the globe, the movement towards open societies and open markets is wider and deeper than ever before. Democracy's triumph is neither accidental nor irreversible; it is the result of sustained American leadership. It would not have been possible without the power of our example, the strength of our military, or the constancy and creativity of our diplomacy. That is the central lesson of the twentieth century -- and this lesson must continue to guide us if we are to safeguard our interests as we enter the twenty-first. Make no mistake: the interests served by American foreign policy are not the abstract inventions of State Department planners; they are the concrete real, ties of our daily lives. Think about it. Would the American people be as secure if weapons of mass destruction, instead of being controlled, fell into the wrong hands? That is precisely what would have happened if the Administration and Congress had not acted to ensure the dismantling of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, the freezing of North Korea's, and the securing of Russia's.

Second, democratic consolidation is key to preventing nuclear war. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT 95 (staff, Promoting
Democracy in the 1990s, Oct, p. online: http://www.carnegie.org/sub/pubs/deadly/dia95_01.html lexis) This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

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Heg Good Deter Rogue States


First, Strong Hegemony and force projection is the only way to deal with rogue states. HENRIKSON 99 (Thomas, Sr. Fellow at Hoover Institute, Using Power and Diplomacy to Deal with Rogue
States, p. online: http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/publications/epp/94/94a.html //wyo-tjc) In today's globally interconnected world, events on one side of the planet can influence actions on the other side, meaning that how the United States responds to a regional rogue has worldwide implications. Rogue leaders draw conclusions from weak responses to aggression. That Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein,
escaped unpunished for his invasion of Kuwait no doubt emboldened the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, in his campaign to extirpate Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina in pursuit of a greater Serbia. Deterring security threats is a valuable mechanism to maintain peace, as witnessed by the cold war, and it may afford the only realistic option available. But in dealing with rogue states deterrence and containment may not be enough. Before NATO intervened in the Bosnia imbroglio in 1995, to take one example, the ethno-nationalist conflict raised the specter of a wider war, drawing in the neighboring countries of Greece, Turkey, and Russia.

Political inaction creates vacuums, which can suck in states to fill the void. Although the United States does not want to be the world's sheriff, living in a world without law and order is not an auspicious prospect. This said, it must be emphasized that the United States ought not intervene militarily in every conflict or humanitarian crisis. Indeed, it should pick its interventions with great care. Offering
Washington's good offices to mediate disputes in distant corners is one thing; dispatching armed forces to far-flung deserts, jungles, or mountains is quite another. A global doctrine setting forth all-inclusive guidelines is difficult to cast in stone. Containment, the doctrine articulated in response to Soviet global ambitions, offered a realistic guideline for policymakers. A similar response to rogue states cannot be easily cloned for each contingency but may require the United States to corral allies or partners into a unified policy, as circumstances dictate. But watching rogue behavior with complacency or relying on the United Nations courts disaster in the age of weapons of mass destruction. Most incidents of civil turmoil need not engage U.S. military forces. Regrettable as the bloody civil war in Sri Lanka is, it demands no American intervention, for the ethnic conflict between the secessionist Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority is largely an internal affair. Political turmoil in Cambodia is largely a domestic problem. Even the civil war in the Congo, which has drawn in small military forces from Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and Zimbabwe, is a Central African affair. Aside from international prodding, the simmering Congolese fighting is better left to Africans to resolve than to outsiders. In the case of the decades-long slaughter in southern Sudan, the United States can serve a humanitarian cause by calling international attention to Khartoum's genocide of Christian and animist peoples. These types of conflicts, however, do not endanger U.S. strategic interests, undermine regional order, threaten global commercial relationships, or, realistically, call for direct humanitarian intervention. No weapons of mass destruction menace surrounding peoples or allies. Thus, there is no compelling reason for U.S. military deployment.

Terrorist rogue states, in contrast, must be confronted with robust measures, or the world will go down the same path as it did in the 1930s, when Europe and the United States allowed Nazi Germany to propagate its ideology across half a dozen states, to rearm for a war of conquest, and to intimidate the democracies into appeasement. Rogue states push the world toward anarchy and away from stability. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former national security adviser to President Carter, cited preventing global anarchy as one of the two goals of "America's global engagement, namely, that of forging an enduring framework of global geopolitical cooperation." The other key goal is "impeding the emergence of a power rival."(4)

Second, Failure to deter Rogues sparks a nuclear crises and war Boot 4 (Max Boot, Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, Neocons. (Think Again), FOREIGN POLICY,
January/February 2004, n. 140 p. 20 lexis) True. The greatest danger to the United States today is the possibility that some rogue state will develop nuclear weapons and then share them with terrorist groups. Iran and North Korea are the two likeliest culprits. Neither would be willing to negotiate away its nuclear arsenal; no treaty would be any trustworthier than the 1994 Agreed Framework that North Korea violated. Neocons think the only way to ensure U.S. security is to topple the tyrannical regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran. This objective does not mean, however, that neocons are agitating for preemptive war. They do not rule out force if necessary. But their preferred solution is to use political, diplomatic, economic, and military pressure, short of actual war, to bring down these dictators--the same strategy the United States followed with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Iranian and North Korean peoples want to be free; the United States should help them by every means possible, while doing nothing to provide support for their oppressors. Regime change may seem like a radical policy but it is actually the best way to prevent a nuclear crisis that could lead to war. Endless negotiating with these governments--the preferred strategy of self-described pragmatists and moderates--is likely to bring about the very crisis it is meant to avert.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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78 Trade-Off DA

Heg Good East Asian Stability


First, US withdrawal from Asia sparks Japan into rapid nuclear armament, attack on Taiwan and North Korean proliferation. Dao 3 (James, staff , Why Keep US Troops?, The New York Times, Jan. 5, p. l lexis)
Deciding if now is the time depends on how well the United States is able to project power across the Pacific, as well as on its responsibilities as the globe's presumptive supercop. Withdrawing forces in Korea would reverberate powerfully in Tokyo, Beijing, Taipei and beyond, raising questions in an already jittery region about Washington's willingness to maintain stability in Asia. "In the present mood, the Japanese reaction could be quite strong," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to Jimmy Carter. "And under those circumstances, it's hard to say how the Chinese might respond." In the 1970's, Mr. Brzezinski took part in the last major debate over reducing American forces in Korea, when President Carter, motivated by post-Vietnam doubts about American power, proposed withdrawing ground forces from the peninsula. He faced resistance from the South Korean government, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. The arguments against withdrawal then still apply today, Mr. Brzezinski says. A secure Korea makes Japan more confident, he contends. An American withdrawal from Korea could raise questions about the United States' commitment to the 40,000 troops it has in Japan. And that could drive anxious Japanese leaders into a military buildup that could include nuclear weapons, he argues. "If we did it, we would stampede the Japanese into going nuclear," he said. Other Asian leaders would be likely to interpret a troop withdrawal as a reduction of American power, no matter how much the United States asserts its commitment to the region. China might take the opportunity to flex its military muscle in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea. North Korea could feel emboldened to continue its efforts to build nuclear arms. "Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message," said Kurt Campbell, a deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration. "The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term." "Mind-sets in Asia are profoundly traditional," he said. "They calculate political will by the numbers of soldiers, ships and airplanes that they see in the region."

Second, increasing Asian nuclearization runs the risk of wild-fire proliferation and armsracing, leading to miscalculation and nuclear war. Friedburg 94 (Aaron, Professor of International Relations at Princeton University International Security, Winter,
p. 8, p. lexis) Assuming, for the moment that an Asia with more nuclear powers would be more stable than one with fewer, there would still be serious difficulties involved in negotiating the transition to such a world. As in other regions, small, nascent nuclear forces will be especially vulnerable to preemption. In Japan the prevailing nuclear allergy could lead first to delays in acquiring deterrent forces and then to a desperate and dangerous scramble for nuclear weapons. In Asia, the prospects for a peaceful transition may be further complicated by the fact that the present and potential nuclear powers are both numerous and strategically intertwined. The nuclearization of Korea (North, South or, whether through reunification or competitive arms programs, both together) could lead to a similar development in Japan, which might cause China to accelerate and expand its nuclear programs, which could then have an impact on the defense policies of Taiwan, India (and through it, Pakistan) and Russia (which would also be affected by events in Japan and Korea). All of this would influence the behavior of the United States. Similar shockwaves could also travel through the system in different directions (for example, from India to China to Japan to Korea). A rapid, multifaceted expansion in nuclear capabilities could increase the dangers of misperception, miscalculation, and war.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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79 Trade-Off DA

Heg Good Global Economy


First, Hegemony is key to trade and interdependencestability opens conditions necessary for growth. Walt 2 (Stephen, JFKSchool of Government Professor at Harvard Univiversity Naval War College Review,
Spring, www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm) By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence-by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse. Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time. By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests. The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of globalization is itself partly an artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, Without America on duty, there will be no America Online.

Second, A global economic collapse would escalate to full scale conflict and rapid extinction Bearden 2k (Thomas, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis, Free Republic, June 24, lexis)
History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate Chinawhose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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80 Trade-Off DA

Heg Good Iraq Stability


US hegemony in Iraq prevents Iraqi collapse Washington Post 7 (IF Leave, Regional War and Shiastan,
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/leon_krauze/2007/04/keep_foot_on_or_chaos_and_shia.html, April 30, 2007) For a while now, there have been only two possible outcomes in Iraq: the bad and the worse. Which is the latter and how to avoid it? The worst outcome for Iraq would be a full-scale civil war that ends in the countrys partition. There is little question that, once the American forces leave, the country will become a far bloodier and more lawless battleground than it is now. Once that happens, I see no reason why Moqtada al-Sadr and other Shiite strongmen would seek any kind of compromise with Sunni leaders in a pluralist government. Outright Shia domination of Iraq should never be allowed. Given the recent history of both the Middle East and Islam, secularity is a precious asset. In fact, Saddams pragmatic view of religion was perhaps the mans only virtue. It wasnt an insignificant attribute, especially given the aggressive expansionist theocracy next door. America (and the world) should make sure that Iraq remains a diverse multicultural federation rather than become three isolated and weak enclaves. So the bad but not the worst is a state more like India than the former Yugoslavia. But is this even possible? Can this be achieved without a violent, revolutionary period? The stakes are too high to wait and find out. The consequences of an enormous Shiastan right in the heart of the Middle East could prove to be disastrous. Saudi Arabia, Israel and Syria would stretch out their own claws soon enough. Regional conflict would be, literally, around the corner.

Iraqi instablity spills over and causes terrorism. The National Interest 7 (Keeping the Lid On, Lexisnexis, May-June 2007)
THE COLLAPSE of Iraq into all-out civil war would mean more than just a humanitarian tragedy that could easily claim hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives and produce millions of refugees. Such a conflict is unlikely to contain itself. In other similar cases of all-out civil war the resulting spillover has fostered terrorism, created refugee flows that can destabilize the entire neighborhood, radicalized the populations of surrounding states and even sparked civil wars in other, neighboring states or transformed domestic strife into regional war. Terrorists frequently find a home in states in civil war, as Al-Qaeda did in Afghanistan. However, civil wars just as often breed new terrorist groups-Hizballah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of Algeria, and the Tamil Tigers were all born of civil wars. Many such groups start by focusing on local targets but then shift to international attacks-starting with those they believe are aiding their enemies in the civil war.

Terrorism risks extinction Kirkus Reviews, 99 (Book Review on The New Terrorism: Fanatiscism and the Arms of Mass Destruction,
http://www.amazon.com/New-Terrorism-Fanaticism-Arms-Destruction/dp/product-description/0195118162) Today two things have changed that together transform terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terroristsbe they Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible permutationsseem to have changed from organized groups with clear ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of modern civilizations.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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81 Trade-Off DA

Heg Good Laundry List


Heg is necessary to prevent WMD prolif, promote human rights, and promote democracy. Walt 2 (Stephen, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "American
Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls." Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2. pg. 9 (20 pages) Spring 2002. Proquest) Thus, anyone who thinks that the United States should try to discourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction, promote human rights, advance the cause of democracy, or pursue any other positive political goal should recognize that the nation's ability to do so rests primarily upon its power. The United States would accomplish far less if it were weaker, and it would discover that other states were setting the agenda of world politics if its own power were to decline. As Harry Truman put it over fifty years ago, "Peace must be built upon power, as well as upon good will and good deeds."17 The bottom line is clear. Even in a world with nuclear weapons, extensive economic ties, rapid communications, an increasingly vocal chorus of nongovernmental organizations, and other such novel features, power still matters, and primacy is still preferable. People running for president do not declare that their main goal as commander in chief would be to move the United States into the number-two position. They understand, as do most Americans, that being number one is a luxury they should try very hard to keep.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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82 Trade-Off DA

Heg Good Middle East Stability


US leadership is key to Middle Eastern stability and prevent escalation. Frontiers of Freedom 7 (Democrats and Some Republicans Ignore Reality in Iraq,
http://www.opinioneditorials.com/guestcontributors/jbell_20070709.html, 7/9/07) It not only seems contradictory, it is contradictory - indeed, it is delusional

- to believe that a reliance on international cooperation and foreign aid will soothe the ire of Iran, al Qaeda in Iraq and their ideological supporters and pave the way for political and social progress. Absent active and engaged U.S. leadership Iraq will become a longterm failed state and a terrorist sanctuary. With respect to Iraq, the Democrats have always preferred to plow the easy field of
political expediency instead of laboring in the difficult field of policy. Now the party of the donkey is being joined by some Republicans who are prepared to ignore reality in favor of mythical rhetoric. On July 5, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid wrote, As evidence mounts that the surge is failing to make Iraq more secure, we cannot wait until the Administrations September report before we change course. President Bush and the Iraqis must move now to finally accept a measure of accountability for this war transition the mission for our combat troops and start bringing them home from an intractable civil war. First, Reid and his political brethren have spent far too much time trying to make the case that what is transpiring in Iraq is a civil war. However one defines the conflict it is a key battleground and the aftermath of the fighting will dictate what forces sink their roots deep into the Middle Easts future. Second, despite Reids hyperventilating, there is no evidence that the surge is failing. In fact, U.S.

commanders on the ground report

the opposite. On July 6, the day after Reids misguided missive, Army Major General Rick Lynch, commander of Multinational Division Center and the 3rd Army Division said U.S. and Iraqi forces are making significant progress in

destroying insurgent sanctuaries. General Lynch said the surge forces are giving us the capability we have now to take the fight to the enemy. The enemy only responds to force and we now have that force. Lynch explained, We can conduct detailed kinetic strikes, we can do cordon and searches, and we can deny the enemy sanctuaries. If those surge forces go away that capability goes away and the Iraqi security forces arent ready yet to do that (mission). The general said if U.S. forces begin an untimely departure, Youd find the enemy regaining ground, reestablishing sanctuaries, building more IEDs (and) carrying those IEDs to Baghdad, and the violence would escalate.

Middle Eastern instability sky rockets oil prices, causing economic collapse. Islam Online.Net 6 (Frequently Asked Questions About Iraq,
http://www.islamonline.net/english/In_Depth/Iraq_Aftermath/topic_15.shtml, March 21, 2006)

Oil is the lifeblood of the global economy. The Middle East has about 65% of the worlds total oil resources. With this in mind, it becomes clear that any instability in the Middle East would threaten the global oil trade. If the global oil trade were disrupted, it would cause a shortage in supply which would cause oil prices to skyrocket. Skyrocketing oil prices hamper global economic growth and threaten the worlds economies. At worst, it could cause a recession in many of the worlds oil dependent countries.

Economic collapse causes global nuclear war and extinction. Bearden 2k (Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, 2000, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How We Can Solve It, 2000,
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Big-Medicine/message/642) (PDAF0842) Bluntly, we foresee these factors - and others { } not covered - converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in about eight years. As the collapse of the Western economies nears, one may expect catastrophic stress on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat Aspects History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the

stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China - whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States - attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is his side of the MAD coin that is almost never
discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed . The resulting great Armageddon will

destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

83 Trade-Off DA

Heg Good South China Sea


First, forward military presence in the pacific deters China and leads to stabilization allowing a political solution to be brokered. Odgaard 1 (Liselotte, Asst Prof, of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark, Deterrence and Cooperation in the South China Sea, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Aug 1, lexis) The South China Sea constitutes a first line of defence for the littoral states of Southeast Asia. As a consequence, they cannot afford to ignore the worst-case scenario of conflict involving China. The majority of the Southeast Asian states have embarked on a modernization of their naval capabilities, aimed at developing a deterrent force as well as a force capable of engaging in military operations at sea. However, the financial crisis of the late 1990s delayed some of these efforts, making the Southeast Asian states more reliant on bilateral defence arrangements, in particular with the United States. The main countries in the U.S. network of military co-operation agreements are Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. In substitution of the permanent base arrangements during the Cold War, U.S. troops have resumed joint exercises with the Philippines from 2000. In general, the military agreements facilitate training, exercises, and interoperability, permitting the United States to be seen to be engaged in Southeast Asia as a flexible regional balancer. The United States shares the widespread perception within Southeast Asia that China's moves in the South China Sea indicate that it might have expansionist intentions. Thus, the United States has maintained its strategy of forward deployment.
However, China is a power of second rank compared with the United States, and as such, is no immediate threat to the latter. Therefore, Washington prefers that the regional states settle their disputes without its involvement as long as these do not pose a threat to U.S. interests. Although the United States looks at China's Spratly policy as an indication of its possible bid for regional hegemony, it is not prepared to play an active part in the Spratly dispute unless freedom of navigation through Southeast Asian waters is threatened. At the same time, the United States maintains its support for the ASEAN position on the non-use of force concerning dispute settlement in the South China Sea. Thus, the U.S. policy on the Spratlys may be characterized as guarded non-involvement. American reservations about direct involvement in the Spratly dispute do not imply that cordial relations between the United States and China are on the agenda. On the contrary, since 1999, the relationship between the two powers has suffered a downturn because of Chinese opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes in Yugoslavia, the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and accusations of Chinese military espionage in the United States. The Administration of George W. Bush is unlikely to call for a revival of the idea of a strategic partnership with China. Bush describes China as a strategic competitor. [4] In line with this hardening of U.S. policy towards China, Bush has voiced strong support for a theatre missile defence (TMD) system covering Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Technological constraints are likely to force Bush to moderate his position on such defence plans. However, U.S. reassurances that research and development on the TMD will continue only leaves China with the option of proceeding with military modernization to build up its deterrence capabilities. This geostrategic picture suggests that co-operation on managing the

regional balance of power is not on the cards. Instead, a structure of deterrence appears to be in the making. Deterrence is directed at the intentions of opponents: if the existence of deterrent forces are seen to prevent the opponent from achieving gains through aggression, the opponent will refrain from attack. Thus, the power-projection capabilities of the various states are constrained by a mutual display of force between the United States and the Southeast Asian states on the one hand, and China on the other. A structure of deterrence does not operate on the basis of cooperation between opposing powers. Nor can deterrence be equated with violence and volatility. On the contrary, the consolidation of a structure of deterrence in the South China Sea may provide Southeast Asia with the level of military security and reassurance necessary to allow for the development of stronger co-operative ties with China.

Second, conflict in the SCS culminated into a global nuclear war. Strait Times 95 (staff, Choose Your Own Style of Democracy, May 21, p. proquest)
In his speech, Dr Mahathir also painted three scenarios for Asia. In the first -the worst possible scenario -Asian countries would go to war against each other, he said. It might start with clashes between Asian countries over the Spratly Islands because of China's insistence that the South China Sea belonged to it along with all the islands, reefs and seabed minerals. In this scenario, the United States would offer to help and would be welcomed by Asean, he said. The Pacific Fleet begins to patrol the South China Sea. Clashes occur between the Chinese navy and the US Navy. China declares war on the US and a fullscale war breaks out with both sides resorting to nuclear weapons.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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84 Trade-Off DA

Heg Good Space Dominance


First, it is crucial that the United States maintain leadership in Space to deter conflicts and prevent other count Everett 5(Dolman, C. "Strategy Lost: Taking the Middle Road to Nowhere." High Frontier Journal. Vol. 3, No. 1
Winter, 2K5) Common to all hedging strategy proponents is the fear that placing weapons in space will spur a new arms race. Unfortunately, such a strategy increases the likelihood of a space arms race if and when space weapons are ultimately deployed, as the only plausible response by the US would be to at least match the opposing capabilities. This dithering approach blatantly ignores the current real world situation. At present, the US has no peer competitors in space. For the US to refrain from weaponizing until another state proves the capacity to challenge it allows for potential enemies to catch up to American capabilities. At a minimum, there is no risk for potential peer competitors to try. On the other hand, should the US reject the hedging strategy and unilaterally deploy weapons in space, other states may rationally decide not to compete. The cost of entry will simply be too great; the probability of failure palpable. In other words, the fear of an arms race in space, the most powerful argument in favor of the hedging plan, is most likely if the US follows its counsel.

Second, this leads to global nuclear war. Hitchens 3 (Theresa, Editor of Defense News, Director of Center for Defense Information, Former director of
British American Security Information Council -think tank based in Washington and London. October 2. http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1745) The negative consequences of a space arms race are hard to exaggerate, given the inherent offensedominant nature of space warfare. Space weapons, like anything else on orbit, are inherently vulnerable and, therefore, best exploited as first-strike weapons. Thus, as Michael Krepon and Chris Clary argue in their monograph, Space Assurance or Space Dominance, the hair-trigger postures of the nuclear competition between the United States and Russia during the Cold War would be elevated to the ultimate high ground of space. Furthermore, any conflict involving ASAT use is likely to highly escalatory, in particular among nuclear weapons states, as the objective of an attacker would be to eliminate the other sides capabilities to respond either in kind or on the ground by taking out satellites providing surveillance, communications and targeting. Indeed, U.S. Air Force officials participating in space wargames have discovered that war in space rapidly deteriorates into all-out nuclear war, precisely because it quickly becomes impossible to know if the other side has gone nuclear. Aviation Week and Space Technology quoted one gamer as saying simply: [If] I dont know whats going on, I have no choice but to hit everything, using everything I have. This should not be surprising to anyone the United States and the Soviet Union found this out very early in the Cold War, and thus took measures to ensure transparency, such as placing emphasis on early warning radars, developing the hotline and pledging to non-interference with national technical means of verification under arms control treaties.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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85 Trade-Off DA

Heg Good Warming


US military power and leadership is key to solve climate change. Maybee 8 (Sean C, US Navy commander, p. 98, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm)
For the purpose of this essay, national security is defined as the need to maintain the safety, prosperity, and survival of the nation-state through the use of instruments of national power: diplomatic, military, economic, and informational power will be the drivers of GCC responses as they provide the needed resources ideas and technology. It will be through invoking military and diplomatic power that resources are used and new ideas are implemented to overcome any GCC challenges. In addition to fighting and winning the nations wars, the US military has a long history of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, but the potential impacts of GCC should lead national security policymakers to consider how environmental security will play a role in the future.

US leadership is key to solve warming. Maybee 8 (Sean C, US Navy commander, p. 98, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i49.htm)
The national security implications of GCC pose unique challenges for the United States in part because it is best suited to lead counter-GCC efforts. The Nation has the economic and informational power to develop and resource effective methods and the international status to foster global cooperation and implementation. The U.S. military already has a robust capacity to respond and could continue to develop and use it to help other nations to build that capacity. In addition, by addressing environmental security, the United States may foster trust and cooperation while beginning to anticipate some GCC effects.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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86 Trade-Off DA

Heg Good War


Hegemony prevents prolif and global nuclear war. Khalilzad 95 (Zalmay, US Ambassador to the United Nations. Losing the Moment? The United States and
the World After the Cold War. The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2. pg. 84 Spring 1995) Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system. Precluding the rise of a hostile global rival is a good guide for defining what interests the United States should regard as vital and for which of them it should be ready to use force and put American lives at risk. It is a good prism for identifying threats, setting priorities for U.S. policy toward various regions and states, and assessing needs for military capabilities and modernization.

US primacy prevents the outbreak of global hegemonic war. Walt 2 (Stephen, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. "American
Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls." Naval War College Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2. pg. 9 (20 pages) Spring 2002. Proquest) A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.8 The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

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Unipolarity Good War


Unipolarity prevents power balancing wars Wohlforth 99 (William, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World.") Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state's power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance-ofpower politics among the major states. This argument is based on two well-known realist theories: hegemonic theory and
balance-of-power theory. Each is controversial, and the relationship between the two is complex.35 For the purposes of this analysis, however, the key point is that both theories predict that a unipolar system will be peaceful.

Unipolarity, by design, avoids conflict Wohlforth 99 (William, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World.") To appreciate the sources of conflict that unipolarity avoids, consider the two periods already discussed in which leading states scored very highly on aggregate measures of power: the Pax Britannica and the Cold War. Because those concentrations of power were not unipolar, both periods witnessed security competition and hegemonic rivalry. The Crimean War is a case in point. The war unfolded in a system in which two states shared leadership and three states were plausibly capable of bidding for hegemony.41 Partly as a result, neither the statesmen of the time nor
historians over the last century and a half have been able to settle the debate over the origins of the conflict. The problem is that even those who agree that the war arose from a threat to the European balance of power cannot agree on whether the threat emanated from France, Russia, or Britain. Determining which state really did threaten the equilib- rium-or indeed whether

any of them did-is less important than the fact that the power gap among them was small enough to make all three threats seem plausible at the time and in retrospect. No such uncertainty-and hence no such conflict-is remotely possible in a unipolar system.

Unipolarity solves the roots of the worlds issues, security and competition Wohlforth 99 (William, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 19 99. "The Stability of a Unipolar World.") Third, we should not exaggerate the costs. The clearer the underlying distribution of power is, the less likely it is that states will need to test it in arms races or crises. Because the current concentration of power in the United States is unprecedentedly clear and comprehensive, states are likely to share the expectation that counterbalancing would be a costly and probably doomed venture. As a result, they face incentives to keep their military budgets under control until they observe fundamental changes in the capability of the United States to fulfill its role. The whole system can thus be run at comparatively low costs to both the sole pole and the other major powers. Unipolarity can be made to seem expensive and dangerous if it is equated with a global empire demanding U.S. involvement in all issues everywhere. In reality, unipolarity is a distribution of capabilities among the world's great powers. It does not solve all the world's problems. Rather, it minimizes two major problems- security and prestige competition-that confronted the great powers of the past. Maintaining unipolarity does not require limitless commitments. It involves managing the central security regimes in Europe and Asia, and maintaining the expectation on the part of other states that any geopolitical challenge to the United States is futile. As long as that is the expectation, states will likely refrain from trying, and the system can be maintained at little extra cost.

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AT: Heg Bad Imperialism


The US is not an empire. Nye 4 (Joseph S, Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, Harvard IR prof., vol. 119, no. 2, p. 255-256)
In many ways, the metaphor of empire is seductive. The American military has a global reach, with bases around the world, and its regional commanders sometimes act like proconsuls. English is a lingua franca, like Latin. The Ameri- can economy is the largest in the world, and American culture serves as a mag- net. But it is a mistake to confuse the politics of primacy with the politics of empire. Although unequal relationships certainly exist between the United States and weaker powers and can be conducive to exploitation, absent formal political control, the term "imperial" can be misleading. Its acceptance would be a disastrous guide for American foreign policy because it fails to take into account how the world has changed. The United States is certainly not an em- pire in the way we think of the European overseas empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because the core feature of such imperialism was direct political control.^"* The United States has more power resources, compared to other countries, than Britain had at its imperial peak. On the other hand, the United States has less power, in the sense of control over the behavior that occurs inside other countries, than Britain did when it ruled a quarter of the globe. For example, Kenya's schools, taxes, laws, and electionsnot to men- tion external relationswere controlled by British officials. Even where Brit- ain used indirect rule through local potentates, as in Uganda, it exercised far more control than the United States does today. Others try to rescue the meta- phor by referring to "informal empire" or the "imperialism of free trade," but this simply obscures important differences in degrees of control suggested by comparisons with real historical empires. Yes, the Americans have widespread influence, but in 2003, the United States could not even get Mexico and Chile to vote for a second resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council. The British empire did not have that kind of problem with Kenya or India.

US Military too overstretched for empire Economist 8 (3/29, Power and Peril, 00130613, 3/29/2008, Vol. 386, Issue 8573)
These days the word "imperial" is usually followed by "overstretch". The bookshops Nobody doubts America's unparalleled ability to project its military power into every corner of the world, but blowing things up is not the same as establishing an "imperium". Enthusiasm for empire has been replaced by worries about exhaustion and vulnerability. Americans are concerned that the army has been stretched to breaking point, and that their country remains a terrorist target. If George Bush wanted to "fight them over there" so that Americans do not have to "fight them over here", his successor will have to face the possibility that, in fighting them over there, America has overstrained its army while leaving the home front vulnerable.
What a difference a bungled war makes. are full of titles cautioning against the folly of empire (Cullen Murphey's "Are We Rome?", Amy Chua's "Day of Empire").

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***Heg Bad***

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Heg Bad Blowback


Hegemony causes international backlash Maynes 98 (Charles William, President of the Eurasia Foundation, Summer 1998 (The Perils of (and for) an
Imperial America, Foreign Policy Issue: 111, Questia.com) Suppose, despite all of these obstacles, a quest for world hegemony could succeed. We still should not want it. As Henry Adams warned in his autobiography, the effect of power on all men is "the aggravation of self, a sort of tumor that ends by killing the victim's sympathies." Already the surplus of power that America enjoys is beginning to metastasize into an arrogance toward others that is bound to backfire. Since 1993, the United States has imposed new unilateral economic sanctions, or threatened legislation that would allow it do so, 60 times on 35 countries that represent over 40 percent of the world's population. Increasingly, in its relations even with friends, the United States, as a result of the interplay between administration and Congress, has begun to command more and listen less. It demands to have its way in one international forum after another. It imperiously imposes trade sanctions that violate international understandings; presumptuously demands national legal protection for its citizens, diplomats, and soldiers who are subject to criminal prosecution, while insisting other states forego that right; and unilaterally dictates its view on UN reforms or the selection of a new secretary general. To date, the United States has been able to get away with these tactics. Nevertheless, the patience of others is shortening. The difficulty the United States had in rounding up support, even from its allies, in the recent confrontation with Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was an early sign of the growing pique of others with America's new preemptive arrogance. So was the manner in which the entire membership of the European Union immediately rallied behind the French in the controversy over a possible French, Malaysian, and Russian joint investment in the Iranian oil industry that would violate America's unilaterally announced sanctions policy against Iran. In March 1998, while reflecting on President Bill Clinton's visit to South Africa, President Nelson Mandela strongly rejected a trade agreement with the United States that would limit transactions with any third country, declaring that "we resist any attempt by any country to impose conditions on our freedom of trade."

The link between hegemony and terrorism is air-tight. Johnson 4 (Chalmers, President of Japan Policy Research Institute, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of
American Empire, 2K4, p. xvi-xvii, lexis) If drug blowback is hard to trace to its source, bomb attacks, whether on U.S. embassies in Africa, the World Trade Center in New York City, or an apartment complex in Saudi Arabia that housed U.S. servicemen, are another matter. One man's terrorist is, of course, another man's free- dom fighter, and what U.S. officials
denounce as unprovoked terrorist attacks on its innocent citizens are often meant as retaliation for previ- ous American imperial actions.

Terrorists attack innocent and unde- fended American targets precisely because American soldiers and sailors firing cruise missiles from ships at sea or sitting in B-52 bombers at extremely high altitudes or supporting brutal and repressive regimes from Washington seem invulnerable. As members of the Defense Science Board wrote in a 1997 report to the undersecretary of defense for acqui- sition and technology, "Historical data show a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States. In addition, the military asymmetry that denies nation states the ability to engage in overt attacks against the United States drives the use of transnational actors [that is, terrorists from one country attacking in another."

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Heg Bad Caspian Sea Stability (1/2)


Increased US power would be directed towards the Caspian Sea in order to secure both oil and strategic placement near Iran, which would anger the Russians even more. Riemer 4 (Mathew, power and interest news, jan 12, caspian region likely to remain critical for foreseeable future,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/natres/oil/2004/0112caspian.htm) It is these countries that the United States and Russia will attempt to woo and intimidate over the coming decade in their competition for political influence in the region that will lead to long-term energy security. Beginning in the west, the two flashpoints at the moment are Georgia's and Russia's own never ending -- at least so far -- "war on terrorism" in Chechnya and other neighboring republics. The Caucasus are perhaps the region in which unbridled U.S. influence most irks Moscow. Within the Soviet realm, this area of the country was closer to home so to
speak, being nearer to Moscow and St. Petersburg and more culturally similar than many of the frontier territories to the far east. Because of this, Moscow has always attempted to keep a tight hand on the reigns of power here; during the Second World War, Joseph Stalin -- himself a Georgian -- deported hundreds of thousands of Chechens to Kazakhstan because he believed they were Nazi sympathizers. Boris Yeltsin commenced the bombing of Grozny, Chechnya a mere three years after the breakup of the Soviet Union and launched a decade-long war just because a tiny, mountainous republic on the border of Georgia wanted its independence. As much as Moscow is truly offended by U.S. presence in the area, Washington wants to be there. Neighboring Azerbaijan is the point of departure for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline -- one of the most prominent, new energy projects in the entirety of Asia, and one in which Western interests are heavily invested.

Azerbaijan also borders Iran, which has the possibility of becoming a flashpoint in the coming year because of questions concerning Tehran's nuclear weapons program. At this point, Moscow must understand that
the U.S. has no intention of limiting or even leveling its presence in the region and will no doubt be reacting to this inevitability.

US Influence cannot prevent conflict over the Caspian Sea Aras 2K (BLENT, Professor Political Science Faith University Istanbul, www.bulentaras.com/files/caspian.pdf)
The patterns of development pursued by the Caspian states seem to follow an analogous line. The reliance on the prospective fruits of natural resources, rather than on socio-political reform and institution-building, recalls the historical experiences of the Middle Eastern countries, further confirming the fateful alignment of these two regions in strategic thinking. Most of the countries in the Middle East acquired their statehood following the colonial period, a fact evidenced by the artificial boundaries separating them. Their state-building experiences were driven largely by their oil-centered socio-economic structure. The recurring instabilities in the region stem from this over-dependence on oil revenues without a genuine industrial production base and from the lack of a firm legacy of state tradition. Similar processes might be experienced in the Caspian region, though in no worse conditions. The Caspian states emerged from the formal disintegration of the Soviet empire in a manner analogous to the end of colonial rule in the Middle East. In dealing with the state-building problems, the Caspian states are also oriented more toward the promises of natural riches than toward institutionalized reform. Given the diminishing returns of a volatile oil market and the declining oil prices predicted for the following decades, this kind of attitude and policy can easily result in chronic internal tensions within the Caspian states as well as in the Gulf. Furthermore, neither these indigenous countries nor the United States, which is the prime security manager in the region, are prepared for these growing internal instabilities. In handling inter-state clashes in these regions the United States proved itself well, but as the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the bloody conflicts in the Balkansespecially in Bosniaindicate, U.S. initiative cannot resolve mature internal instabilities easily.18 In this sense, the Caspians wealth in natural resources may turn into a self-destructive possession.

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Heg Bad Caspian Sea Stability (2/2)


US Russian relations are on the brink. Russia doesnt like our unilateralist policies because it sees them as destabilizing. We can still salvage relations, but only through multilateral action, a failure to do so will result in counterbalancing wars Sutherland 7 (Well published author on geopolitics and international relations, rebuilding the u.s.-russia
relationship, http://ezinearticles.com/?Rebuilding-the-U.S.-Russia-Relationship&id=568610) Russia was humiliated. At the same time, it was constrained by its major weakness. Emboldened by the march of world events, Neoconservative thinkers believed that the new Unipolar world made U.S. consideration of the major interests of the worlds other great powers relatively less important than in it was past. Under such an assumption, they advocated an increasingly assertive unilateral approach to U.S. foreign policy toward creating a safer world. In stark contrast, Russia saw unilateralism as hazardous to international peace and security. Today, Russia continues to believe that single-power hegemony and a unilateralist approach to foreign policy are dangerous and destabilizing. Consequently, it views U.S. unilateralism as posing a threat to its critical interests and wellbeing. Toward that end, Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently spoken out on those issues. On May 8, 2001, he declared that claims to world dominationstill are the cause of many wars and that these sorts of claims still linger on today and this is very dangerous. A day later, he added, Our entire postwar [post-World War II] history teaches us that no country can build a safer world for itself alone, and even more so, cannot build its security to the detriment of others. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a wholly
Neoconservative approach to foreign policy blossomed in the U.S. Unilateralism became arguably the major means by which the U.S. conducted its relations with the international community. Regime Change replaced Containment and proactive war replaced preemption. In June 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty. In March 2003, it invaded Iraq in the face

of strong Russian opposition and in the absence of a United Nations Security Council resolution.
Currently, it is pursuing plans to place 10 missile interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic to construct a limited missile defense shield against countries such as Iran. Russian alarm grew. On February 10, 2007, President Putin made a

seminal speech that detailed his objections to the Neoconservatives Unipolar vision and U.S. uniltateralism. Excerpts from Putins speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy detail his views and follow: The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasnt happened in world history? However, what is a unipolar world? It is [a] world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in todays world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in todaysand precisely in todaysworld, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization. Along with this, what is happening in todays worldis a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world. And with which results? Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of forcemilitary forcein international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible. Putin explicitly blamed the United States for such developments. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way, he charged, This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. A full-fledged rupture in U.S.-Russia relations is still avoidable. In fact, the relationship can still be repaired fairly easily, as unilateralism, and not a clash of critical interests between the two nations, is at the root of the worsening relationship. A pragmatic, interest-driven U.S. foreign policy that restores primacy to diplomacy, eliminates idealistic Regime Change, and returns emphasis to relations between allies and great powers can overturn the unilateralism that is currently harming the relationship.

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Heg Bad China Relations


US hegemony in East Asia hurts US-China relations Xinbo 2k (Wu, Visiting Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, September 2000 (U.S. Security
Policy in Asia: Implications for China-U.S. Relations, http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/2000_wu.htm) Three major factors have constantly troubled Sino-U.S. relations in the post-Cold War era: human rights, trade, and security. With the de-linking of China's human rights record from its MFN treatment in 1994 and the closing of Beijing-Washington marathon negotiations on China's WTO membership in 1999, human rights and trade may subside as major sources of tension on the bilateral agenda. Security issues, emerging in the mid-1990s, now appear to be the most important factor affecting bilateral relations. Due primarily to differences in their worldviews, historical experiences and capabilities, China and the U.S. have diverging conceptions of security, which in turn has led to their different security practices. Chinese and U.S. security interests in Asia both converge and diverge, and as the U.S. begins to contemplate China as a latent adversary, such divergence will become even more conspicuous. While both sides will continue to pursue their own security interests in Asia, each country also has to adapt itself to the changing political, economic and security landscape in this region. To enable durable, peaceful coexistence, both sides will have to make certain shifts in their current security policies. To address these questions more directly, this paper first considers some of the U.S. misperceptions about China's policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific and certain important conceptual differences on security practices between Beijing and Washington. Then, the study explores how China perceives the U.S. impact on its security interests. Finally, the paper concludes with a few policy recommendations as to how China and the United States could manage the bilateral relationship more effectively. Misperceptions and Conceptual Differences One popular perception in the U.S. about China's long-term policy objectives in Asia is that Beijing aspires to be the regional hegemon and would like to restore a Sino-centric order in this part of the world. This observation is wrong. First, Beijing believes in the trend of multipolarization rather than unipolarization at both global and regional levels, and predicts that with continued economic development and growing intra-regional political consultation in Asia, influence on regional affairs will be more diversified and more evenly distributed. Secondly, even though China expects some relative increase in its influence in Asia, it understands that because of the limits of its hard power and especially its soft power, China can never achieve a position comparable to its role in the ancient past or to the U.S. role in the region at present. Another misperception is that in the long run China will endeavor to drive the U.S. out of East Asia. Again this is not a correct assumption. From Beijing's perspective, the United States is an AsiaPacific power, although not an Asian power, and its political, economic and security interests in the region are deep-rooted, as are its commitments to regional stability and prosperity. In fact, Beijing has always welcomed a constructive U.S. role in regional affairs. At the same time however, Beijing also feels uneasy with certain aspects of U.S. policy. As a superpower, the United States has been too dominant and intrusive in managing regional affairs. It fails to pay due respect to the voices of other regional players, and sometimes gets too involved in the internal affairs of other states, lacking an understanding of their culture, history and values. While there is no danger of the U.S. being driven out of East Asia, its current policy may result in the U.S. wearing out its welcome in the region, thus undermining its contributions to stability and prosperity. In addition to the above misperceptions about China's regional intentions, the United States and China also hold diverging conceptions of national and regional security. Hegemonic stability vs. security cooperation In the post-Cold War era, Washington has been advocating an Asia-Pacific security structure with the U.S. as the sole leader and with U.S.-led bilateral alliances as the backbone. This is in essence hegemonic stability. Beijing believes, however, that regional security rests on the cooperation of regional members and a blend of various useful approaches (unilateral, bilateral and multilateral, institutional and non-institutional, track I and track II, etc.), not just on one single country and a set of bilateral security alliances.

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Heg Bad Economy


US hegemony destroys the economy Eland 2 (Ivan, Director of defense policy studies Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and
Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf) Most of all, the strategy of empire is likely to overstretch

and bleed Americas economy and its military and federal budgets, and the overextension could hasten the decline of the United States as a superpower, as it did the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The strategy could also have the opposite effect from what its proponents claim it would have; that is, it would alarm other nations and peoples and thus provoke counterbalancing behavior and create incentives for other nations to acquire weapons of mass destruction as an insurance policy against American military might.

US spending to maintain hegemonic power is huge Eland 2 (Ivan, Director of defense policy studies Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism
and Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf)

The United States accounts for about 40 percent of total worldwide defense spending, up from 28 percent in
the mid-1980s, the height of the Reagan military buildup. Thats two and a half times the combined spending of all its potential rivals.79 But, as an indication of its overextension, the United States accounts for only 29 percent of the worlds GDP. Another comparison indicates that U.S. allies are free riding: although the U.S. economy is larger than the next three largest economies on the planetthose of Japan, Germany, and the United KingdomU.S. defense

spending is larger than that of the next 15 highest defense spending nations, most of which are rich U.S. allies.

US spending on security is increasing Eland 2 (Ivan, Director of defense policy studies Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 459- The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and
Its Fatal Flaws, November 26, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf) With the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has already requested an additional $45.5 billion for bringing the total to $396 billion, an increase of 13 percent. In all, the administration plans to spend $2.1 trillion

2003, on the military over the next five years, which will raise annual U.S defense spending 15 percent above the Cold War average. How much more the strategy of empire will cost is unclear. Also, foreign aid, nation building, and other activities related to the strategy are not free. The Bush administration recently pledged to
substantially increase Americas core development assistance by 50 percent. And American efforts at nation building in tiny Bosnia and Kosovo have cost U.S. taxpayers an estimated $21 billion so far. The more dependents and protectorates Washington takes on, the greater the burden on the U.S. economy will be.

Hegemony will bankrupt the US Hoke 6 (Zlatica, Voice Of America News, June 8, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-06/AmericasRole2006-06-08-voa60.cfm?
CFID=31442881&CFTOKEN=75492258) But U.S. services to the rest of

the world are not cheap. According to the Congressional Research Service, for example, the U.S. cost of war and reconstruction in Iraq is approaching 200 billion dollars. The United States gave
more than 16 billion dollars in aid to developing countries in 2003, almost twice as much as the next biggest donor, Japan. And in 2004, the U.S. budget deficit exceeded 400 billion dollars, reaching an all-time high. So the question for many observers is whether America can continue to afford its leadership role in world affairs. Robert Guest, Washington Bureau Chief for The Economist magazine, suspects it may not. "There is nothing unforeseen about this whatsoever.

When empires run out of money, they either run out of the will to fight or they tend to retreat into themselves. And the looming gap that you see with the retirement of the 'baby boomers' [i.e., Americans born between 1946 and 1964], bringing Medicare, Social Security and, to a lesser degree, Medicaid fairly rapidly into bankruptcy is the single greatest threat to American global hegemony," says Guest.

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Heg Bad Iraq Instability


US hegemony causes Iraqi Instability Selden 4 (Mark, coordinator of Japan Focus, an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific, June
30, 2004 (Discusson of Notes From Ground Zero: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion.html)
What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration?

What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American domination of Iraq
through the permanent stationing of 138,000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries, and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region. This, together with the dismantling of much of the previous

Iraq administrative structure, the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government, and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms, has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq, including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases, coupled with a stronger international presence, including the United Nations and European nations, both governments and NGOs, might create more hopeful conditions for relief, reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged. It
seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military, the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met. Whatever the changes, we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States. The Bush administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its

flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire.

Iraqi instablity spills over and causes terrorism. The National Interest 7 (Keeping the Lid On, Lexisnexis, May-June 2007)
THE COLLAPSE of Iraq into all-out civil war would mean more than just a humanitarian tragedy that could easily claim hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives and produce millions of refugees. Such a conflict is unlikely to contain itself. In other similar cases of all-out civil war the resulting spillover has fostered terrorism, created refugee flows that can destabilize the entire neighborhood, radicalized the populations of surrounding states and even sparked civil wars in other, neighboring states or transformed domestic strife into regional war. Terrorists frequently find a home in states in civil war, as Al-Qaeda did in Afghanistan. However, civil wars just as often breed new terrorist groups-Hizballah, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of Algeria, and the Tamil Tigers were all born of civil wars. Many such groups start by focusing on local targets but then shift to international attacks-starting with those they believe are aiding their enemies in the civil war.

Terrorism risks extinction Kirkus Reviews, 99 (Book Review on The New Terrorism: Fanatiscism and the Arms of Mass Destruction,
http://www.amazon.com/New-Terrorism-Fanaticism-Arms-Destruction/dp/product-description/0195118162) Today two things have changed that together transform terrorism from a ``nuisance'' to ``one of the gravest dangers facing mankind.'' First terroristsbe they Islamic extremists in the Middle East, ultranationalists in the US, or any number of other possible
permutationsseem to have changed from organized groups with clear ideological motives to small clusters of the paranoid and hateful bent on vengeance and destruction for their own sake. There are no longer any moral limitations on what terrorists are willing to do, who and how many they are willing to kill. Second, these unhinged collectivities now have ready access to weapons of mass destruction. The technological skills are not that complex and the resources needed not too rare for terrorists to employ nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons where and when they wish. The consequences of such weapons in the hands of ruthless, rootless fanatics are not difficult to imagine. In addition to the destruction of countless lives, panic can grip any targeted society, unleashing retaliatory action which in turn can lead to conflagrations perhaps on a world scale. To combat such terrorist activities, states may come to rely more and more on dictatorial and authoritarian measures. In short, terrorism in the future may threaten the very foundations of

modern civilizations

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

96 Trade-Off DA

Heg Bad Middle East Prolif


First, US hegemony in the Middle East is would encourage the development of nuclear weapons in the region undermining Yale Global 4(Gulf Security in a Globalizing World: Going Beyond US Hegemony,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4154, June 29, 2004) Under a hegemonic approach, Gulf relations would be exclusionary, with US friends and allies on one side, and US enemies such as Iran on the other. The United States would make a decision on who is excluded, and this decision would be based on factors such as internal regime structure, support of terrorism, and WMD aspirations. Confidence-building measures in the military realm (such as arms limitations, cooperative military exercises, or transparency on arms buildups) would only apply to friends and allies. The ultimate goal would be to target those rogue states outside the established order, isolate them, and bring about a regime conversion or regime change. WMD would not be viewed as bad in and of themselves; rather, the character of the state obtaining WMD would be the primary criterion for counter-proliferation efforts. Implicitly, Israel, Pakistan, and India would not be pressured to moderate their nuclear behavior, despite the potentially negative effects of their nuclear activities on Gulf states security. Arab friends and allies would not base security on their own indigenous capabilities but rather on continued bilateral dependence on the United States as an outside power. Finally, the United States would probably treat Iraq as a base for US economic, diplomatic, and military power projection throughout the region, including against Syria and Iran.

Second, Nuclear weapons in the Middle East would lead to regional nuclear war. Military Review 6 (Military Planning for a Middle East Stockpiled With Nuclear Weapons,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-155824168.html, November 1, 2K6) The bad news is that these experts probably are dead wrong. The theory is appealing, but theory rarely, if ever, conforms to reality. States armed with nuclear weapons in the Middle East might well wage war against one another under a variety of strategic circumstances. Iran might undertake conventional military operations against neighboring states calculating that its nuclear deterrent would prevent a retaliatory American or Arab Gulf state response. Saudi Arabia, in turn, fearing its conventional forces are inferior, could resort to the tactical use of nuclear weapons to blunt Iranian conventional assaults in the Gulf, much as NATO had planned to do against Warsaw Pact forces in cold-war Europe. Egypt had no nuclear
weapons in 1973, but this did not stop it from attacking Israeli forces in the Sinai. Along with other Arab states, Egypt could use conventional forces in saber rattling against Israel, and conventional clashes could erupt into a general war. Right now, American forces cannot deter a Syria without nuclear weapons from sponsoring jihadist operations against U.S. forces in Iraq. A Syria armed with

a nuclear deterrent might be emboldened to undertake even more aggressive sponsorship of guerrilla war against U.S. and Israeli forces, and this could tip a crisis into open warfare. Sitting on hair triggers in the narrow geographic confines of the Middle East, states armed with nuclear weapons would be under strong incentives to use them or lose them and to fire nuclear ballistic missiles in a crisis. At the height of a regional crisis, Iran, for example, might launch huge salvos of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons against Israel in order to overwhelm Israeli ballistic missile defenses, decapitate the Israeli civilian
and military leadership, and reduce the chances of Israeli nuclear retaliation. During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union had about 30 minutes of breathing time from the launch of intercontinental ballistic missiles to their impact. That was 30 potential minutes of precious time to determine whether warnings of launches were real. In the Middle East, there would be only a handful of such warning minutes, and regimes would feel even more vulnerable than the United States and the Soviet Union did during the cold war. Many nation-states in the Middle East resemble city-states more than industrialized nations; they have much less time to hide their leaders from enemy attack and fewer places to hide them. Nuclear-armed states in the Middle East could also transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups. Iran is the top concern on this score. Over the past two decades, Tehran has nurtured Hezbollah with arms, training, logistics, ideological support, and money to enable it to serve as an appendage of Iranian foreign policy. Iranian support helped Hezbollah destroy the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in the early 1980s and kill about 250 Marines. (4) According to a former director of the FBI, senior Iranian government officials ordered Saudi Hezbollah to bomb Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1996. (5) The explosion killed 19 U.S. airmen. Iran has used Hezbollah to do its dirty work and maintained "plausible deniability" to reduce the chances of American retaliatory actions. The strategy worked because the United States has yet to retaliate militarily against Iran. Calculating that its nuclear weapons would deter conventional retaliation against it, a nuclear-

armed Iran would be emboldened to sponsor even more aggressive and devastating attacks to push American forces out of the Middle East.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

97 Trade-Off DA

Heg Bad Nuclear Terrorism


Hegemony increases the risk of nuclear terrorism which will lead to extinction. Fischer 5 (Dietrich, Academic Director of The European University Center for Peace Studies, July 10, 2005 (The
Real Threat is Nuclear Terrorism, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2005/07/10_fischer_real-threat-nuclearterrorism.htm)) As long as the big powers insist on maintaining nuclear weapons, claiming they need them to protect their security, they cannot expect to prevent other countries and terrorist organizations from acquiring such weapons--and using them. The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed over 200,000 people. Today's nuclear bombs are vastly more powerful. If even one nuclear device had been detonated in a parked car or a sailboat on the Thames, the Center of London would be strewn with smoking, radioactive rubble and over a million people might have been killed outright, and scores more would die slowly from radiation disease. The double standard, "Nuclear weapons are good for us, but bad for you",
is stupid and unconvincing. Believing that nuclear weapons technology can be kept secret forever is naive. Those who still believe in the fairy-tale of "deterrence theory" better wake up to the age of suicide bombers. Anyone convinced to go straight to heaven if blown up cannot be "deterred" by the threat of horrendous retaliation. Governments that order tons of bombs to be rained on Iraq and Afghanistan should not be surprised if they plant ideas in the minds of eager imitators. Osama bin Laden once benefitted from support and training financed by the CIA. Richard Falk, long a Professor of International Law at Princeton University, rightly pointed out: "The greatest utopians are those who call themselves 'realists,' because they falsely believe that we can survive the nuclear age with politics as usual. The true realists are those who recognize the need for change." What changes must we make if we want humanity to

survive? [1] We must stop believing that problems can be solved by applying offensive military force. That only encourages others to pay back in kind. Policing to stop criminals and defense against a foreign attack are justified, but not military interventions abroad. [2] Thirty-seven years after signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is time for the nuclear powers to fulfill their commitment to nuclear disarmament. We also need a vastly more open world, where all nuclear weapons are verifiably destroyed, and the manufacturing of
new ones cannot be hidden. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can now inspect only sites that member countries voluntarily place under its supervision. If a suspected weapons smuggler could tell a border guard, "You may check under my seat, but don't open the trunk," such an "inspection" would be meaningless. The IAEA must have the power to inspect any suspected nuclear facilities, anywhere in the world, without advance warning, otherwise it is impossible to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The governments that now possess nuclear weapons object to such intrusive inspections as a "violation of their sovereignty." Yet many airline passengers also protested at first against having their luggage searched for guns or explosives, when such searches were introduced after a series of fatal hijackings. Today, passengers realize that such inspections protect their own security. Those who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear. Sooner or later, governments will reach the same conclusion. The question is only

whether this will happen before or after the first terrorist nuclear bomb explodes. [3] We need to address the root causes of terrorism: long festering unresolved conflicts. Peaceful conflict transformation is a skill that can be taught and learned. Johan Galtung, widely regarded as founder of the field of
peace research, was able to help end a longstanding border conflict between Ecuador and Peru over which they had fought four wars by suggesting to make the disputed territory into a "binational zone with a natural park", jointly administered. This peaceful intervention cost nearly nothing compared with a military peacekeeping operation. We need a UN Organization for Mediation, with several hundred trained mediators who can help prevent conflicts from erupting into violence. This is a very inexpensive, worthwhile investment in human survival, compared with the trillion dollars the world spends each year to arm millions of troops, which only make the world collectively less secure. If we cling to obsolete ways of thinking--that threatening others will make us safe--

we face extinction as a human species, like other species that failed to adapt to new conditions.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

98 Trade-Off DA

Heg Bad Preemptive Wars


Hegemony leads to preemptive wars because of proliferation of WMDs Lind 7 (Michael, New America Foundation, Beyond American Hegemony,
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2007/beyond_american_hegemony_5381) Given this premise, the obsession with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) makes perfect sense. WMD are defensive weapons that offer poor states a possible defensive shield against the sword of unexcelled U.S. conventional military superiority. The success of the United States in using superior conventional force to defeat Serbia and Iraq (twice) may have accelerated the efforts of India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran to obtain nuclear deterrents. As an Indian admiral observed after the Gulf War, "The lesson is that you should not go to war with the United States unless you have nuclear weapons." Moreover, it is clear that the United States treats countries that possess WMD quite differently from those that do not. So proliferation undermines American regional hegemony in two ways. First, it forces the U.S. military to adopt costly and awkward strategies in wartime. Second, it discourages intimidated neighbors of the nuclear state from allowing American bases and military build-ups on its soil. With this in mind, proponents of the hegemony strategy often advocate a policy of preventive war to keep countries deemed to be hostile to the United States from obtaining nuclear weapons or WMD. Preventive war (as distinguished from preemptive attack to avert an impending strike) is not only a violation of international law but also a repudiation of Americas own traditions. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all ruled out preventive wars against the Soviet Union and China to cripple or destroy their nuclear programs, and President Ronald Reagan, along with Britains Margaret Thatcher, denounced Israels 1981 attack on Iraqs nuclear reactor at Osirak. Yet, by 2002, a bipartisan majority in the Congress authorized President George W. Bush to wage the first -- and to date the only -- preventive war in American history against Iraq. Although it turned out to be a disaster, it was perfectly consistent with the radical neoconservative variant of U.S. global hegemony strategy.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

99 Trade-Off DA

Heg Bad Prolif


Fear of US hegemony leads to nuclear proliferation Wilson Center 5 (The Global Response to U.S. Primacy: Implications for Nonproliferation,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?event_id=110376&fuseaction=events.event_summary, March 4, 2005) Professor Walt discussed the main themes of his forthcoming book, Taming America: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (Norton, 2005). He focused, in particular, on how American global preeminence affects the proliferation choices of other countries. Walt argued that the adverse perception of American power reflected in opinion polls (e.g., the Pew Global Attitudes Project) stems from three sources: first, the sheer magnitude of American power relative to other states; second, opposition to specific U.S. policies (such as the preventive war in Iraq), and third, Washingtons perceived double standard (e.g., tolerating nuclear proliferation in Israel while opposing it in Iran). Walt stated that states are either accommodating or resisting American power in this so-called era of unipolarity. The strategies of accommodation include: (1) bandwagoning, or deflecting U.S. power through appeasement or acquiescence; (2) enlisting the United States to address regional security problems (e.g., Qatar); and (3) bonding or aligning with the United States to shape U.S. policy and gain concessions or prestige (e.g., British Prime Tony Blairs approach toward both the Clinton and Bush administrations). The strategies of resistance include: (1) balancing (as pursued diplomatically by the French, German and Russian governments in the United Nations during the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War); (2) asymmetric responses such as the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states in an effort to level the playing field with the United States; (3) blackmail (as North Korea is trying to do with its nuclear weapons program); (4) balking just saying no (e.g., Russias continuing nuclear relationship with Iran despite U.S. objections); and (5) delegitimation attempting to portray U.S. actions as self-interested and illegitimate. Walt concluded that international concerns about U.S. power are undermining Washingtons nonproliferation efforts.

Nuclear proliferation leads to nuclear warsomeone will pull the trigger Seaquist 3 (Larry, former US Navy warship captain, has been the custodian of nuclear weapons at sea and a
contributor to nuclear deterrence strategy in the Pentagon, April 3, 2003 (Listen to the Nuclear Chatter, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0403/p11s02-coop.html) The pattern of nuclear proliferation is shifting, and with it the dynamics of deterrence. Formerly we worried about countries like Iraq and Iran making their weapons from scratch. But in the future, we'll deal also with shadowy networks of terrorists who buy their weapons on the underground market. Where does a superpower fly a squadron of bombers if it wants to grab the attention of a covert terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, with scattered cells all over the globe? At heart, nuclear signaling is much more than just writing diplomatic notes on a warhead. By threatening catastrophe, each party hopes to extract a measure of safety from the mutual standoff. That's the theory. But instead of calming the situation, nuclear threats ricocheting among today's players may lead one of the smaller, inexperienced parties to panic and shoot. Regardless of who pulls the trigger or why, a nuclear detonation would be a disaster. A mushroom cloud rising over the dead in any city could thrust civilization into an era of unlimited violence just when bio-weapons are creeping into our mass-killing capabilities. Clearly, humankind must steer in the other direction, toward managing disagreements with less deadly methods.

US primacy fails to protect against the proliferation of WMDs Krepon 2 (Michael, Founding President Henry L. Stimson Center, arms control and asymmetric warfare,
disarmament.un.org/rcpd/pdf/5cnfkrepon.pdf) This is not a good time to adhere to Cold War formulations for and against arms control. The incoming Bush administration took office with fixed views about the efficacy of treaties, nuclear weapons, and missile defenses and with many questions about the efficacy of CTR programs. The administrations reassessment has wisely led to a reaffirmation of the value of these programs, but its approach remains unbalanced in significant respects. US primacy is insufficient to reduce the dangers associated with proliferation, asymmetric warfare, and terrorism. When primacy is accompanied by the unraveling of treaty regimes, security is weakened.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

100 Trade-Off DA

Heg Bad South China Sea


First, the desire for leadership is the root cause of conflict in the South China Sea Vuving 5. Alexander, research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard.
"Vietnam's Geopolitical Resources." The Saigon Times Weekly (15 October 2005) http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=article&item_id=1300 Chinas expansion of its control in the South China Sea and its influence in Southeast Asia occurs in the context of its rise to the status of world power and regional leader. All this has led the United States, Japan, and India to direct attention toward Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, and seek measures to cope with this new development. With its desire for world leadership, the United States regards the rise of China as a threat at the grand strategic level. Although Japan and India have no global ambition, the two do want to become Asias regional powers. Naturally, they would not tolerate Chinas ascent to regional leadership. Japan has opted for a strategic alliance with the United States, thus taking shelter under Americas global hegemony in order to oppose Chinas regional leadership. India has sought a freer position, but basically it is also a strategic alignment with the United States. A conflict over regional leadership has emerged in Asia between China on one side and the United States, Japan, and India on the other. This constellation has made Southeast Asia and the South China Sea a strategic theater in the playing field of great power rivalry. The South China Sea is of vital interest for both China and Japan. 90 per cent of oil supplies for Japan, 80 per cent of oil supplies for China, and most of the goods exchanged between the two countries and the Middle East and Europe flow through the Sea. Although the South China Sea is not that important to the United States, Washington has strategic interests in it. Control of the Sea means control of the major sea lane of communication between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and a lifeline of East Asian economy.

Second, conflict in the SCS culminated into a global nuclear war. Strait Times 95 (staff, Choose Your Own Style of Democracy, May 21, p. proquest)
In his speech, Dr Mahathir also painted three scenarios for Asia. In the first -the worst possible scenario -Asian countries would go to war against each other, he said. It might start with clashes between Asian countries over the Spratly Islands because of China's insistence that the South China Sea belonged to it along with all the islands, reefs and seabed minerals. In this scenario, the United States would offer to help and would be welcomed by Asean, he said. The Pacific Fleet begins to patrol the South China Sea. Clashes occur between the Chinese navy and the US Navy. China declares war on the US and a fullscale war breaks out with both sides resorting to nuclear weapons.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

101 Trade-Off DA

Heg Bad Space


US space dominance leads to proliferation of weapons in space. Hyman and Krepon 3 (Katz, Michael and Michael, Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against
Weaponizing Space. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 2003. The likely consequences of a dynamic, but uneven, space warfare competition are not hard to envision. Potential adversaries are likely to perceive American initiatives to weaponize space as adjuncts to a U.S. military doctrine of preemption and preventive war. Depending on the scope and nature of U.S. space warfare preparations, they could also add to Chinese and Russian concerns over the viability of their nuclear deterrents. U.S. initiatives to extend military dominance into space are therefore likely to raise tensions and impact negatively on U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations at a time when bilateral relations have some promising, but tenuous, elements. Cooperative relations with both countries will be needed to successfully combat proliferation, but Moscow and Beijing are unlikely to tender such cooperation if they perceive that U.S. strategic objectives include the negation of their deterrents. Under these circumstances, proliferation of weapons in space would be accompanied by terrestrial proliferation.

US space weaponization leads to WWIII Reynolds 89 (Glenn Harlan. Outer Space: Problems of Law and Policy. New York, NY: Westview Press, 1989.)
Not only does the proliferation of space debris pose a threat to space activities, but it could pose an even greater threat to those of us on earth. The United States and the Soviet Union (together with, increasingly, other powers) depend greatly on space resources to support military intelligence, early-warning, communications, and other functions. If, in a crisis, a key satellite were to be accidentally lost, that loss could be blamed on an adversary and could lead to a potentially disastrous response. As space analyst Daniel Deudney has said, "The Archduke Francis Ferdinand of World War III may well be a critical U.S. or Soviet reconnaissance satellite hit by a piece of space junk during time of crisis."

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

102 Trade-Off DA

Heg Bad Terrorism


First, US hegemony fuels terrorism Tehran Times 5 (Iranian Daily Says Al-Quaidah Angered by US Hegemony Not Western democracy,
Lexisnexis, July 20, 2005) While Al-Qa'idah and its allies (if this is the network that is guilty of 7/7) may be opposed to various aspects of Western civilization, it is apparent from their strategies and their pronouncements that what has angered and incensed them is not Western democracy or Western freedoms as such, but Washington's hegemony, reinforced by its close allies, and its adverse impact upon the Arab and Muslim world. Even before the 9/11 episode, Al-Qa'idah's bombings in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in 1996; in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and in Yemen in 2000 were all targeted against US interests. Indeed, it was the establishment of US military bases in Saudi Arabia in 1991- the most tangible manifestation of hegemonic power - which prompted Al-Qa'idah leader Usamah Bin-Laden to create his own shadowy network. Since 9/11, Usamah has highlighted other long-standing grievances to justify his operations. He has cited the colonial dismemberment of the Arab nation in the early part of the twentieth century and the Western imposition of Zionist Israel upon the Arab heartland a few decades later as traumatic events which have resulted in the humiliation and subjugation of his people. It is in this context that he has also chosen to defend the rights of the oppressed Palestinian people: the cause celebrate of the Arab and Muslim world. The hegemonic control that Washington exercises over Arab oil through what Al-Qa'idah regards as US client states is yet another issue which the network focuses upon. It is an issue which resonates with the masses. And since the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq beginning in March 2003, the truncated sovereignty of both states has become an important item in the Usamah agenda. Besides, the death and destruction that occupation has wreaked upon Iraq in particular has galvanized Arab and Muslim sentiment right across the globe.

Second, Terrorism leads to nuclear war Thompson 4 (John, President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism, March
8, 2004 (More Reasons to Fear the Bomb, http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2004/terror030204.htm) Sometime, possibly very soon, some terrorist group is going to use a nuclear bomb. When that day comes, there will be much more to worry about than merely the damage of the attack; fear that inevitable day for three reasons. Making a nuke is no great trick - the Americans constructed the first weapons sixty years ago, and the science isnt complicated. Making a big hydrogen bomb rather than an atomic bomb is somewhat trickier, and shrinking the whole package down to a manageable size requires really expensive engineering and really costly machinery; but North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran are showing that bomb building 101 isnt too difficult. Between these three of states, and some of the more blurred records for the old Soviet inventory, a nuclear weapon will someday trickle down into the hands of some non-state actor who is prepared to use them. Al Qaeda will probably be the first to use an atomic weapon in an act of terrorism, and it need not be complicated or large. The emerging nuclear states know that fissionable materials are too expensive to let too much out of their hands, and a 20 kiloton package would be adequate for terrorism anyway.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


Lab

103 Trade-Off DA

Heg Bad Terrorism


US hegemony causes backlash and terrorism Layne 2 (Christopher, Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, Spring
2002 (The Washington Quarterly 25.2, pp 233-248, http://www.twq.com/02spring/layne.pdf) U.S. role in the Gulf has rendered it vulnerable to a hegemonic backlash on several levels. First, some important states in the region (including Iran and Iraq) aligned against the United States because they resented its intrusion into regional affairs. Second, in the Gulf and the Middle East, the self-perception among both elites and the general public that the region has Offshore Balancing Revisited l long been a victim of Western imperialism is widespread. In this vein, the United States is viewed as just the latest extraregional power whose imperial aspirations weigh on the region, which brings a third factor into play. Because of its interest in oil, the United States is supporting regimesSaudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf emirateswhose domestic political legitimacy is contested. Whatever strategic considerations dictate that Washington prop up these regimes, that it does so makes the United States a lightning rod for those within these countries who are politically disaffected. Moreover, these regimes are not blind to the domestic challenges to their grip on power. Because they are concerned about inflaming public opinion (the much talked about street), both their loyalty and utility as U.S. allies are, to put it charitably, suspect. Finally, although U.S. hegemony is manifested primarily in its overwhelming economic and military muscle, the cultural dimension to U.S. preeminence is also important. The events of September 11 have brought into sharp focus the enormous cultural clash, which inescapably has overtones of a clash of civilizations, between Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. liberal ideology. The terrorism of Osama bin Laden results in part from this cultural chasm, as well as from more traditional geopolitical grievances. In a real sense, bin Ladens brand of terrorismthe most dramatic illustration of U.S. vulnerability to the kind of asymmetric warfare of which some defense experts have warnedis the counterhegemonic balancing of the very weak. For all of these reasons, the hegemonic role that the strategy of preponderance assigns to the United States as the Gulfs stabilizer was bound to provoke a multilayered backlash against U.S. predominance in the region. Indeed, as Richard K. Betts, an acknowledged expert on strategy, presciently observed several years ago, It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.15 (Betts was referring to the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.)

US hegemony provoked the social context for radical Muslims to embrace fundamentalism vented in terrorism. Segell 5 (Glen M., Director of the Institute of Security Policy, Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society, March
2005 (Wahabism/Hegemony and Agenic Man/Heroic Masculinity, Strategic Insights, Issue 4.3, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/segellMar05.asp#author) Explicitly the decline of Islamic hegemony and the rise of Western hegemony provoked the socialhistorical context for an Islamic minority to embrace fundamentalism vented in terrorism. A Senate Judiciary subcommittee on terrorism has taken evidence that the 9/11 attacks were an expression of anger and rage expressing sentiments that embraced martyrdom rooted in an especially strict austere minority Islamism traced back to the fanatical Puritanism of the Bedouin zealots known as the Wahabis.[5] This article takes Wahabism through hegemony showing it as the systemic context key to unlocking 9/11 as acceptance by the perpetrators that the ultimate sacrifice of a soldier is to give his life for a cause. The cause was perceived to have been fueled by Wahabi fundamentalist sentiments, where jihad or holy war, became a compensatory, default position. The Al-Quaeda terrorist network found this tolerable given the historical Islamic suicide wars of AfIt. This gave substance to justify terrorism as a means where a warrior legacy of heroic masculinity was resurrected within a framework of an anti-modern and anti-Western holy war. The choice of America as the target is indicative of its hegemonic role expressing military asymmetrysmall players can harm the powerful easily.[6]

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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104 Trade-Off DA

Unipolarity Bad War


The US attempt to hold on to its unipolarity will cause wars Layne 6 (Christopher, Associate Professor of Bush School of Government and Public Service @ Texas A&M U,
2006 (The Unipolar Illusion Revisted: The Coming of the United StatesUnipolar Moment, International Security 31.2, 7-41, Project Muse) If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2009


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105 Trade-Off DA

AT: Power Vacuum


The idea that the world will suddenly collapse without American hegemony is delusional US hegemony can only go down, and attempting to sustain it only breeds backlash. Khanna 8 (Parag, expert on geopolitics and global governance, Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow in
the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony". http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604, January 27)

The self-deluding universalism of the American imperium -- that the world inherently needs a single leader and that American liberal ideology must be accepted as the basis of global order -- has paradoxically resulted in America quickly becoming an ever-lonelier superpower. Just as there is a geopolitical marketplace, there is a marketplace of models of success for the second world to emulate, not least the Chinese model of economic growth without political liberalization (itself an affront to Western modernization theory). As the historian Arnold Toynbee observed half a century ago, Western imperialism united the globe, but it did not assure that the West would dominate forever -- materially or morally. Despite the "mirage of immortality" that afflicts global empires, the only reliable rule of history is its cycles of imperial rise and decline, and as Toynbee also pithily noted, the only direction to go from the apogee of power is down.

EU, china, and US will balance each other in the event of declined US supremacy Khanna 8 (Parag, expert on geopolitics and global governance, Director of the Global Governance Initiative and Senior Research Fellow in
the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation, "Waving Goodbye to Hegemony". http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/waving_goodbye_hegemony_6604, January 27)

Would the world not be more stable if America could be reaccepted as its organizing principle and leader? It's very much too late to be asking, because the answer is unfolding before our eyes. Neither China nor the E.U. will replace the U.S. as the world's sole leader; rather all three will constantly struggle to gain influence on their own and balance one another. Europe will promote its supranational integration model as a path to resolving Mideast disputes and organizing Africa, while China will push a Beijing consensus based on respect for sovereignty and mutual economic benefit. America must make itself irresistible to stay in the game.

Vacuum after US falls will be filled by multipolarity Haass 8 (Richard N, 4/16, President of Council on Foreign Relations, Financial Times.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/16026/what_follows_american_dominion.html) All of this raises a critical question: if unipolarity is gone, what will take its place? Some predict a return to the bipolarity that characterised international relations during the cold war. This is unlikely. Chinas military strength does not approximate that of the US; more important, its focus will remain on economic growth, a choice that leads it to seek economic integration and avoid conflict. Russia may be more inclined towards re-creating a bipolar world, but it too has a stake in cooperation and, in any event, lacks the capacity to challenge the US. Still others predict the emergence of a modern multipolar world, one in which China, Europe, India, Japan and Russia join the US as dominant influences. This view ignores how the world has changed. There are literally dozens of meaningful power centres, including regional powers, international organisations, companies, media outlets, religious movements, terrorist organisations, drug cartels and non-governmental organisations. Todays world is
increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power. The successor to unipolarity is neither bipolarity or multipolarity. It is non-polarity. Those who welcome Americas comeuppance and unipolaritys replacement by non-polarity should hold their applause. Forging collective responses to global problems and making institutions work will be more

Relationships will be more difficult to build and sustain. The US will no longer have the luxury of a Youre either with us or against us foreign policy. But neither will anyone else. Only diplomacy that is more focused, creative and collective will prevent a non-polar world from becoming more disorderly anddangerous.
difficult. Threats will multiply.

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