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Recommendation on the Strategic Direction the Government of Australia Should Implement in Relation to Pakistan.

This report is fictional and is produced for study purposes only, it has been written within the context of the Intelligence Report titled The Collapse of Pakistan. Focussing on Pakistan and the politics of the Indian subcontinent, this report paints a disturbing narrative. Central to the presentation, is the theme of Islamic extremists, regional conflicts and economic disaster. The net result of these themes is the threat of nuclear conflict. While the U.S. role in is described in great depth, including their capacity to intervene, our analysis indicates that this is a distraction that should not be overplayed.1 The same can be said for China, Israel and an Anglo-UN response. The collapse of Pakistan is the result of regional and religious tensions, and solutions will need to be found internally before the threat of nuclear war subsides. This report describes a complex system-of-systems that has been examined previously using various diagrammatic representations. Considerable insights have been gained and these form the basis of the work described below. This report described four scenarios that should be the basis for strategic planning. One scenario is a continuation of the situation as it currently stands. Two scenarios are quite different examples of a most likely situation and the final represent a most dangerous condition. The analysis contained in this report has resulted in three options for Government of Australia (GOA) to consider. The analysis would indicate that the any strategy employed must include a high degree of diplomatic negotiations. Economic sanctions will only impact negatively on the local population increasing the likelihood of social unrest, violence and support for radical Jihadists groups. Offensive military actions should not be considered unless the loyalist military is in danger of collapse and Nuclear War is simply not a viable option. Indications are that a strong military presence would be counter productive in winning over the local population, reducing support for terrorist groups and increasing Government stability. A military presence conducting stability operations would be beneficial as it would provide a conduit towards dominating the complex human terrain. In the event of a shift towards State conflict it would provide a military presence that could be ramped up at short notice. Option 1: Diplomatic Negotiations alone. Often thought of as the easiest strategy, diplomatic negotiations is by far the most difficult and requires skilled practitioners. Option 1 provides the best long term solution for the region; however it could be scuttled by cultural insensitivities, rogue players (on both sides) and the strategic goals of other nations in the region. This option requires considerably time, critical inputs from Other Government Agencies (OGA) and lacks flexibility if the situation changes quickly. If for instance, violence increased this option would not be able to deal directly with the problem and extremist groups would capitalise on the perceived inaction. Option 2: Diplomatic Negotiations, with a Military presence conducting Stability Operations. This option offers all the benefits of option 1 with the additional flexibility of a military presence. Working with the local people (including the military/police), this presence can prove the difference between winning over a hostile population and feeding the propaganda of extremist groups. To be successful this strategy requires careful negotiations with the government, a well developed Information Operations (IO) campaign and extreme restraint when conducting operations. The greatest risk for this strategy is never obtaining legitimacy, or loosing it. This strategy has the flexibility to provide the GOA with an adaptive approach that can cope with all four developed scenarios. Critically this option provides a security aspect that provides the GOA with considerable diplomatic leverage. Option 3: Offensive Military Operations combined with a strong Diplomatic presence. An offensive military operation, while not highly successful on its own, could prove a viable option when linked with a strong diplomatic presence. The obvious risks to this option include legitimacy, capacity to maintain a long-term operation and critically the GOAs will to sustain the operation. In any offensive operation casualties will occur (on both sides) as will collateral damage. This will be a critical aspect for success and controlling the media through a strong IO campaign is essential. .

The authors make to following recommendations: 1. The GOA should adopt option 2 as its strategy for dealing with the Pakistan situation. This option has the least level of risk associated with it, while offering the greatest flexibility should the current situation change for the worst. The option is considered to have a high chance of success across all 4 scenarios. 2. The GOA could consider option 1 as its strategy for dealing with the Pakistan situation. While this option offers a high chance of success should the current situation be maintained or improve, it carries considerable risk should the situation deteriorate. 3. The GOA should not consider option 3 unless intelligence assessments indicate that there is an eminent threat of Nuclear attack. The analysis indicates that high tempo offensive military operations will result in a severe backlash amongst the local population and that this will only enhance the reputation of the Jihadists groups.

Appendix A: Scenario Development The scenario development exercise was based on a morphological study utalising the Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) technique. The brainstorming activities used to identify the uncertainty in assignment 2 was discussed with colleagues and simplified into the following sectors. Pakistani Population Global Outlook Pakistani Military International Response Terrorist Dimension The highlighted letters then formed the acronym POMIT. Based on the work in Assignment 2 the sectors could be further broken down into the following factors detailed in table 1. With a total of 1024 combinations the number of possible worlds is far to large and for us to consider. This requires software to remove all anomalous worlds and combine similar worlds, thus reducing the number of worlds to a manageable level. International Response O1 Secure M1 Passive I1 Diplomatic Democratic Control Resolution P2 Discontented O2 Vulnerable M2 Stable Military I2 Small-scale Control Stability Operations P3 Belligerent O3 Dreadful M3 Unstable I3 Military Military Control Occupation P4 Openly Violent O4 Devastating M4 Aggressive I4 Aggressive Radical Control Warlike Table 1: Sector/Factor Array: Whole Field Descriptors of all possible Configurations Pakistani Population P1 Predictable Global Outlook Pakistani Military Terrorist Dimension T1 Non-violent T2 Sporadic hostility T3 Regional violence T4 Mass bloodshed

Due to a lack of time and resources (essentially SMEs this is the world according to me) I was unable to apply the traditional FAR process outlined in the literature.2,3,4 Instead, a simplified FAR process was used,2 that uses the sector/factor array to construct a baseline scenario and 2 to 3 others. The baseline scenario is essentially the one described in the collapse of Pakistan, while the 3 other scenarios must be believable, but different. I chose to develop one most dangerous and two most likely scenarios. Briefly described below these will form the basis of the rest of this assignment.

Scenario 1: Baseline, The Collapse of Pakistan P2O2M3I1T3 The Pakistani population is disgruntled and restless, particularly the youth who, through modern media, desire the trappings of modern societies. The global outlook is on the precipice of collapse. Still recovering from the Global Financial Crisis the world has not adequately prepared for the effects of Global Warming and developing countries have been hardest hit from reductions in fossil fuel usage. The Pakistani Military is divided between loyalists and radical Islamist who are in open conflict. The international community is reluctant to intervene directly and a diplomatic response has been employed. Terrorists are thriving in the political uncertainty and regional violence is the norm.
+ve R eligious T heocracy B lurring of R eligion &S tate +ve +ve F undam ental Islam S ic tate Islam ic P olitical M ovem ent +ve +ve Jihadist E ents lem adicalised +ve R Islam ic P opulous +ve +ve N uclear proliferation am ongst Islam states ic +ve A ttack on Israel /India +ve P -em re ptive S trike +ve E xtrem V s ist iew +ve -ve P opular S upport -ve +ve C ollapse of P akistan -ve -ve +ve R eligious T ensions +ve F ragile N ational Identity C ultural C petition om w India ith -ve Q uality of the E ducation S ystem +ve S kills & A cadem ic S tandards -ve +ve P oor P opulation

+ve

+ve P olitical U nrest

+ve

E conom ic C ollapse

E cono M anag ism +ve -ve G overnm ent S tability +ve +ve Islam ist M ilitary P er ow -ve G overnm ent Incom petence +ve +ve +ve

U nsecured N uclear A rsenal -ve International Intervention +ve

+ve

T hreat of N uclear W ar

M ilitary S tability

Figure 1: Influence diagram representing Scenario 1

Scenario 2: Most Dangerous, All out War P4O4M4I4T4 The Pakistani population is openly violent towards the international community, regional aggressors (in particular India) and within local conflicts. The Global Outlook is disastrous. The great economies of the past 100 years are in tatters and the environment is on the verge of collapse. Global Warming was far worse than was predicted and the use of fossil fuels is tightly regulated. Extreme Islamic ideologies are heightening already deep set religious tensions. Jihadists are now dominating the military and their violent activities have accelerated a total economic collapse. Thriving in an impoverished population and one desperately seeking leadership these extremist views have infiltrated the countries mainstream politics resulting in a Totalitarian theocracy that has seen the birth of the first nuclear capable radicalised Islamic Republic. The line between State military and terrorists has been blurred and mass deaths due to state organised terrorism are common. The United Nations has demanded restraint but India, Israel and the United States (all have born the brunt of attacks) have declared a state of war.

E ffects of G lobal W ing arm

E Loyalist M ilitary P er ow G overnm ent S tability +ve +ve Islam ist M ilitary P er ow M ilitary S tability S ocial Instability +ve -ve

-ve

P opulation U nreast

R C +ve

International R esponse M ilitary A ctions D iplom atic E fforts

Level of V iolence

+ve

Figure 1: Influence diagram representing Scenario 2

Scenario 3: Most Likely-1, Long term Occupation P4O3M3I3T3 Extreme Islamic ideologies are heightening already deep set religious tensions. The Pakistani population is openly violent towards the international community and regional aggressors (in particular India). The Global Outlook is dreadful with Greece, Spain and Ireland all bankrupt and many other European economies on the verge of collapse. Global Warming has resulted in numerous natural disasters and the world has not reached a consensus on how to deal with this impending disaster. The Pakistani military is in a state of flux with neither the loyalists nor Jihadists holding a dominant power. Diplomatic efforts have failed and a US lead coalition has forcibly occupied the entire country. Jihadists are now dominating the provenances and their violent activities have increased exponentially. Thriving in an impoverished population and one desperately seeking leadership after decades of incompetent corrupt Governments, these extremist views have infiltrated the countries mainstream politics as well as its Military.

E ffects of G lobal W ing arm

E Loyalist M ilitary P er ow G overnm ent S tability +ve +ve Islam ist M ilitary P er ow M ilitary S tability S ocial Instability +ve -ve

-ve

P opulation U nreast

R C +ve

International R esponse M ilitary A ctions D iplom atic E fforts

Level of V iolence

+ve

Figure 3: Influence diagram representing Scenario 3

Scenario 4: Most Likely-2, The Diplomat Saves the Day P2O2M2I1T2 The Pakistani population is disgruntled and restless, particularly the youth who, through modern media, desire the trappings of modern societies. The global outlook is teetering on collapse and the Pakistan population has born the brunt of regional economic mismanagement. Still recovering from the Global Financial Crisis the world has not adequately prepared for the effects of Global Warming and developing countries like Pakistan have been hardest hit from reductions in fossil fuel usage. The loyalist groups within the Pakistani military have regained control of critical infrastructure (including its nuclear capability), pushing the Jihadists into the Northern provinces. Sporadic terrorist activities occur but these tend to be small scale attacks using opportunistic methods. State based conflict has been avoided and diplomatic efforts are gaining traction in diffusing the conflict with India.

E ffects of G lobal W ing arm

E Loyalist M ilitary P er ow G overnm ent S tability +ve +ve Islam ist M ilitary P er ow M ilitary S tability S ocial Instability +ve -ve

-ve

P opulation U nreast

R C +ve

International R esponse M ilitary A ctions D iplom atic E fforts

Level of V iolence

+ve

Figure 4: Influence diagram representing Scenario 4

Appendix B: Simulation Studies. A series of simulation studies were conducted in an effort to gain insights into the complex systems detailed above. Using a software package called Powersim was utilised to develop the model described in figure 5 below. This model was used to test all 4 scenarios and investigate a series of what if questions.

Figure5: Diagram outlining Powersim Model. When testing scenario 1 (the baseline scenario) figure 6, it was obvious that the system was not achieving a satisfactory result. Government stability is in a steady state of decline and even though this simulation ran for only 52 weeks longer simulations indicated that this trend would continue.

Figure 6: Powersim Model indicating results for Scenario 1

Scenario 2 (all out war,) as with scenario 1 is unsatisfactory, with the Pakistani Governments stability in freefall (figure 7). Interestingly, while the rate of international response has doubled the population unrest has also increased 3 fold. Its probably not that surprising that a population would be uneasy during a time of war!

Figure7: Powersim Model indicating results for Scenario 2 Scenario 3 long-term occupation is the first of our scenarios to show some hope of a satisfactory result (figure 8). While the government stability index is dropping it is doing so at a significantly reduced rate (50X less than scenario 1 and 200X less than 2). Its also worth noting that there are a few positive rises, notably at 15 weeks and 33. This is very promising and it is this scenario that will form the basis of our what if study below.

Figure 8: Powersim Model indicating results for Scenario 3

With scenario 4 the diplomats save the day, we see our first positive result for our government stability index (figure 9). Not only do we see a 2500 fold increase in this index, but we see vast reductions in violence (factor of 10) & social instability (50%). This is defiantly a scenario that we need to build a strategy to move towards it. A summary of the results for all 4 scenarios can be found in Table 2.

Figure 9: Powersim Model indicating results for Scenario 4

Government -1738 -83 2542 -441 -618 Stability Military 45 51 53 72 53 32 Stability Social 51 84 58 23 64 58 Instability Level of 71 77 55 7 66 55 Violence International 34 86 64 52 64 64 Response Population 32 92 61 39 61 61 Unrest Table 2: Demonstrates the differences between the four scenarios as well as the what ifs used in scenario 3.

Scenario 1: The Collapse of Pakistan -381

Scenarios Scenario 2: Scenario 3: All Out Long term War Occupation

Scenario 4: The Diplomat Saves the Day

Level of Violence

Scenario 3 what ifs Islamic Regional Military Conflict Power -430 53 71 83 64 61

Diplomatic Effort 181 66 58 55 90 61

ZITE8411 Strategic Decision Making


Appendix B2: What if Questions.

Paul Lancaster (3172799)

What if the Level of Violence changes dramatically? In the baseline simulation (figure 8), the Jihadists activities are represented by a random number in the range of 50-100%. For this simulation we started the Jihadists activities at 50% and then progressively stepped it up to 100% before holding it at this level for 20 weeks (figure 10). What is immediately apparent is that the Government stability is increasing until the 20th week. At this point the Jihadists activities increase from 70 to 90 % and the Government stability drops away.

Figure10: Simulation varying Level of Violence

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ZITE8411 Strategic Decision Making

Paul Lancaster (3172799)

What if the Islamic Military power increases rather than decreases? In the baseline simulation the Islamic Military Power (IMP) is a random number between 40-60% (i.e. the split between them and the loyalist is roughly 50-50. In this simulation we stepped the IMP value up 25% each 10 weeks, starting at 25%. This effect was to reduce the military stability value and ultimately the Government stability fell away as well (figure 11). Again the Government Stability is rising while the IMP is 50% or less, but it falls away after that, quite quickly once it reaches 100%.

Figure11: Simulation varying Islamic Military Power

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ZITE8411 Strategic Decision Making

Paul Lancaster (3172799)

What if there is significant regional conflict? In the basic simulation the level of Regional Conflict (LRC) is represented by a random number between 5075%. In this simulation we started the LRC value at 50% increasing it by 20 % at 10 & 20 weeks and finally up to 100% at 30 weeks, holding it at this level for the remaining 22 weeks (figure 12). The impact of this is minimal up to 70%, but considerable after that point.

Figure12: Simulation varying the Level of Regional Conflict

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ZITE8411 Strategic Decision Making

Paul Lancaster (3172799)

What if the Diplomatic efforts increase significantly? In the basic simulation the diplomatic effort was random number between 20-60%. In this experiment we started the diplomatic effort at 20%, increasing it by 20% every 10 weeks (figure 13). Interestingly the Government Stability drops at 20%, stabilises at 40% and then increases after that.

Figure13: Simulation varying the Level of Diplomatic Effort

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ZITE8411 Strategic Decision Making

Paul Lancaster (3172799)

Appendix C: Option Analysis: Scenarios Scenario 2: Scenario 3: State on Increased State Jihadists Conflict Activities +++ +++ + --++

Diplomatic Negotiations Economic -Restrictions Military ++ Presence (stability operations) Military Action -(offensive operations) Nuclear War --Table 3: Simple strategic action matrix

Scenario 1: Increase instability in Pakistani Government +++

Scenario 4: Social Uprising +++ --+++

+++ -

----

-----

As indicated in table 2 the scenario analysis would indicate that the any strategy employed must include a high degree of diplomatic negotiations. Economic sanctions will only impact negatively on the local population increasing the likelihood of social unrest, violence and support for radical Jihadists groups. Offensive military actions should not be considered unless the loyalist military is in danger of collapse and Nuclear War is simply not a viable option. Indications are that a strong military presence would be counter productive in winning over the local population, reducing support for terrorist groups and increasing Government stability. A military presence conducting stability operations would be beneficial as it would provide a conduit towards dominating the complex human terrain. In the event of a shift towards scenario 2 it would provide a military presence that could be ramped up at short notice. Option 1: Diplomatic Negotiations alone. Often thought of as the easiest strategy, diplomatic negotiations is by far the most difficult and it requires skilled practitioners. Option 1 provides the best long term solution for the region; however it could be scuttled by cultural insensitivities, rogue players (on both sides) and the strategic goals of other nations in the region. This option requires considerably time, requires critical inputs from Other Government Agencies (OGA) and lacks flexibility if the situation changes quickly. If for instance, violence increased this option would not be able to deal directly with the problem and extremist groups would capitalise on the perceived inaction. From To Attractiveness from the perspective of: GOA Dept of Defence Population of Pakistan + -+++ ++ +++ + +++ ++ +++ --+

P2:A discontented P2:A discontented population population O2: A vulnerable O2: A vulnerable global outlook global outlook M3: Unstable M3: Stable Military Military Control Control I1: A diplomatic I1: A diplomatic response response. T3: Regional T2: Sporadic Hostility Violence Table 4: Congruence analysis for option 1

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ZITE8411 Strategic Decision Making

Paul Lancaster (3172799)

Option 2: Diplomatic Negotiations, with a Military presence conducting Stability Operations. This option offers all the benefits of option 1 with the additional flexibility of a military presence. Working with the local people (including the military/police), this presence can prove the difference between winning over a hostile population and feeding the propaganda of extremist groups. To be successful this strategy requires careful negotiations with the government, a well developed Information Operations (IO) campaign and extreme restraint when conducting operations. The legitimacy of a military presence can take years to build and only minutes to destroy. The greatest risk for this strategy is never obtaining legitimacy, or loosing it. This strategy has the flexibility to provide the GOA with an adaptive approach that can cope with all 4 scenarios. Critically this option provides a security aspect that provides the GOA with considerable diplomatic leverage. From To Attractiveness from the perspective of: GOA Dept of Defence Population of Pakistan + +++ + +++ + +++ ++ ++ +++ +++ +

P2:A discontented population O2: A vulnerable global outlook M3: Unstable Military Control I1: A diplomatic response

T3: Regional Violence Table 5: Congruence analysis for option 2

P2: A discontented population O2: A vulnerable global outlook M3: Stable Military Control I1/2: A diplomatic response combined with Stability Ops. T2: Sporadic Hostility

Option 3: Offensive Military Operations combined with a strong Diplomatic presence. An offensive military operation, while not highly successful on its own, could prove a viable option when linked with a strong diplomatic presence. As can be seen in table ?, when you include a diplomatic what if with the long-term military occupation scenario you get a viable option. The obvious risks to this option include legitimacy, capacity to maintain a long-term operation and critically the GOAs will to sustain the operation. In any offensive operation casualties will occur (on both sides) as will collateral damage. This will be a critical aspect for success and controlling the media through a strong IO campaign is essential. As can be seen from the congruence table below this option is probably not that attractive for our major stakeholders. From To Attractiveness from the perspective of: GOA Dept of Defence Population of Pakistan --------------

P2:A discontented population O2: A vulnerable global outlook

M3: Unstable Military Control I1: A diplomatic response T3: Regional T3: Regional Violence Violence Table 6: Congruence analysis for option 3

P3/4: A belligerent/openly violent population O2/3: A vulnerable/dreadful global outlook M3: Unstable Military Control I3: A military operation

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ZITE8411 Strategic Decision Making


References:

Paul Lancaster (3172799)

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1 2

Lancaster PA. (2010) 2nd Assignment ZITE8411: Strategic Decision Making. Geoff Coyle (1st ed.), Practical Strategy: Structured tools and techniques, Prentice Hall, ISBN 0-273-68220-2, 336 pages, 2004. 3 Rhyne, R. (1981). Whole-pattern futures projection, Using Field Anomaly Relaxation. Technological Forecasting and Social Change. 19, 331-360. 4 Rhyne, R. (1995). Field Anomaly Relaxation, the Arts of usage, Futures, 27, 6 pp. 657- 674

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