The Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone The treaty does not prohibit the transit of nuclear

weapons. Transit was considered a problem distinct from proliferation by a number of initial states parties, including Mexico, Chile and Panama. During the Preparatory Conferences, it was determined that verifying a transit prohibition was impossible by existing means and that to implement it would require consent of the territorial or flag state and a capacity for interdiction. In recent years, reductions in funding by member states and consequent decreases in staff have left OPANAL reliant on the IAEA to perform its verification role. This was exacerbated by a 1992 concession to Argentina and Brazil whereby socalled special inspections (otherwise known as challenge inspections) would thenceforth be conducted by the IAEA instead of OPANAL. Despite this, OPANAL continues to play a perfunctory role as the secretariat and as host of review conferences. A final difficulty for the treaty is that its second Protocol recognizes only the nuclear weapon states later given official NWS status by the 1968 Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). States that have since acquired nuclear weapons are ineligible to accede to Protocol II. The Tlatelolco parties are unlikely to be willing to amend the treaty to deal with this difficulty, as it would validate the possession of nuclear weapons by such states and be contrary to the NPT and the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. The South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone The Treaty of Rarotonga possesses some of the same lacunae as its Latin American predecessor. The transit of nuclear weapons remains permitted by the treaty. During negotiations, Vanuatu proposed a total ban; however, even ardent nuclearfree supporters like New Zealand insisted it should remain the decision of each state to permit passage. This was important, as otherwise Australia would have likely never have signed, and Britain and the US would not have signed the protocols. A further lacuna is that only the formal NWS were invited to ratify and adhere to the protocols. New nuclear weaponpossessing states not sanctioned by the NPT regime cannot do so, and this is unlikely to be amended by the states parties themselves, as it would contravene the nonproliferation principles of the treaty. The Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone The greatest weakness of the SEANWFZ is a lack of commitment from the NWS. These states have cited two factors in their reluctance to sign the protocol. The first factor is the encompassing definition of the treaty to include the EEZ and continental shelves of each state party. In this respect, the South East Asian and the Latin American zones are similar. They both delineate a zone boundary beyond the territory of individual member states, though each treaty still permits the transit of nuclear weapons through the zone. The second contributor to NWS recalcitrance is the uncertainty regarding the demarcation of the zone perimeter; since much of the South China Sea is subject to dispute especially among the states parties the NWS claim they are uncertain of their obligations under the protocol. The Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Some of the wording in the treaty was deliberately crafted to appease Russia: the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty requires its parties to provide all necessary assistance, including military assistance in response to aggression against any other party. Russia interprets this to include the transit and deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in the territory of the Tashkent parties. Thus, although the

CANWFZ treaty forbids the parties to allow in their territory any form of possession of or control over any nuclear explosive device, it later states that the parties are free to resolve issues related to transit through [their] territory by air, land or water. The other NWS expressed their concerns to the Central Asian states over these contradictory provisions, but their concerns went unaddressed; this has resulted in their continued unwillingness to adopt the protocol.