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AVOIDING INTELLIGENCE IRRELEVANCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

JEREMY J. SIEMINSKI

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA JUNE 2011

DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA

AVOIDING INTELLIGENCE IRRELEVANCE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE

Submitted by: JEREMY J. SIEMINSKI Certificate of Approval: ________________________________ David J. Grabelski Assistant Professor Department of Intelligence Studies

________________________________ Timothy Lauger Assistant Professor Department of Criminal Justice

________________________________ Phillip J. Belfiore Vice President Office of Academic Affairs

June 2011

Copyright 2011 by Jeremy J. Sieminski All rights reserved.

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DEDICATION This thesis is lovingly dedicated to my fiance, Brandi, who has always supported and believed in me.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to thank David Grabelski, my thesis advisor and primary reader, for his assistance in the development of this study. I would like to thank Dr. Tim Lauger, my secondary reader, for his continued analytical guidance and encouragement throughout the course of this work. I owe thanks to Lieutenant John Denk, Dallas Police Department - North Texas HIDTA RISC Co-Program Manager, for the idea that inspired the direction of this thesis. Lastly, I would like to thank Lance Sumpter, North Texas HIDTA Director, for his vital assistance in the data collection phase of this study.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS Avoiding Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement A Critical Examination By Jeremy Sieminski Master of Science in Applied Intelligence Mercyhurst College, 2011 Assistant Professor David J. Grabelski, Chair

The purpose of this study was to determine the level to which intelligence irrelevance has translated from military and national security settings to law enforcement. Furthermore, determining the likely causes of exposed irrelevance permitted the development of prescriptive framework to mitigate or eliminate such events. This was accomplished through contextuallyfocused survey analysis of HIDTA-wide analyst and policymaker populations directly addressing intelligence-policy relations, intelligence irrelevance, and the ten scholarly-identified causes of intelligence irrelevance. The results of this study demonstrate that general or estimative intelligence is modestly irrelevant to law enforcement policymakers primarily due to low levels of intelligence marketing, low quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication, a high level of cognitive bias, and likely high organizational inertia (strong indicators of high inertia). Additionally, study results suggest one of two conclusions regarding the relevance of strategic intelligence in law enforcement policymaking: 1) the level of strategic law enforcement intelligence irrelevance is unknown because of disparity between this studys concept of strategic intelligence and the law enforcement conception of strategic intelligence and the lack of the

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former in law enforcement, or 2) strategic intelligence is irrelevant to law enforcement policymakers because of a demonstrated policy preference for intelligence products that are not strategic (by the definition accepted for this study). The latter conclusion appears more reasonable than the former.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES.. LIST OF FIGURES..... LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS......... CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.. Key Terms..... Intelligence Irrelevance. Gaps and Tensions: A Loosely Coupled Intelligence-Policy System Intelligence as a Causal Locus. Intelligence Analysts as a Causal Locus... Policymakers as a Causal Locus... CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY Survey Sample...... Demographics... Data Collection Instruments, Variables, and Materials Measures....... Data Analysis........ CHAPTER 4: RESULTS.. Intelligence Irrelevance... viii xi xiii xiv 1 6 7 10 13 20 25 31 38 42 43 44 44 50 53 53

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Cognitive Bias... Cognitive Dissonance... Security............................. Filtering............................. Organizational Inertia....... Marketing......................... Volition............................. Communication................. Time.................................. Confidence........................ Summary........................... CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS... Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement... Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement.. Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Estimative Intelligence Irrelevance. Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Strategic Intelligence Irrelevance. Limitations and Future Research.. REFERENCES...... APPENDICES...... Appendix A... Appendix B.......................

56 58 60 62 64 66 68 69 71 74 76 83 83 85

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89 91 95 103 103 106

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Appendix C... Appendix D... Appendix E... Appendix F.... Appendix G............................... Appendix H............................... Appendix I......... Appendix J............................ Appendix K............................... Appendix L................... Appendix M.................................. Appendix N........................... Appendix O...........................

115 124 127 129 130 134 135 143 147 157 159 173 177

LIST OF TABLES Page Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 3.1 Intelligence Difficulties and Limitations Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance by Source HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations Matrix: Negative Correlations Table 3.2 HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations Matrix: Positive Correlations Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5 Table 4.6 Table 4.7 Table 4.8 Table 4.9 Table 4.10 Table 4. 11 Cognitive Bias Results Cognitive Dissonance Results Security Results Filtering Results Organizational Inertia Results Marketing Results Volition Results Communication Results Time Results Confidence Results 58 59 62 64 66 68 69 71 74 76 52 25 35 51

Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: 79 Negative Correlations

Table 4.12

Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: 80 Positive Correlations

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Table 4.13

SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations

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Table 4.14

SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations

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LIST OF FIGURES Page Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2 Figure 3.1 Figure 3.2 Bifurcated Intelligence-Policy Relations Intelligence Environment of Opposing Forces HIDTA Program Counties 2010 HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Process 10 16 40 42

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACH Analysis of Competing Hypotheses A-SR/I Analyst reporting intelligence as Somewhat Relevant/Irrelevant CIA Central Intelligence Agency COMINT Communications Intelligence DCI Director of Central Intelligence FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area HUMINT Human Intelligence IA Intelligence Analyst LEI Law Enforcement Intelligence MCIIS Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies NDIC National Drug Intelligence Center ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy PM Policymaker P-SR/I Policymaker reporting intelligence as Somewhat Relevant/Irrelevant SI Strategic Intelligence US United States

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INTRODUCTION
The post-9/11 environment and global war on terror have provided a fresh focus for foreign policy as well as justification for considerable expansion of intelligence programs. A recent outgrowth of traditional military and national security intelligence efforts has been the introduction of intelligence-led policing. While crime prevention and deterrence is a relatively new application for the ancient craft of intelligence, the effective implementation of this effort is likely to confront many of the same obstacles as those confronted by traditional applications. This thesis aims to assist law enforcement intelligence and policy professionals avoid one such obstacle, intelligence irrelevance. Intelligence is a craft essentially as old as man. Historians and scholars recognize, the desire for advance information is no doubt rooted in the instinct for survival (Dulles, 1985, p.9). Intelligence sources have transformed over millennia from prophets, seers, oracles, soothsayers and astrologers of Greek mythology to the postal workers and families of the Roman, Persian, Byzantine and Mongol Empires to the secret police of the 18th and 19th centuries to modern spies and professional agents (Dulles, 1985, p.9-28). Thus, the craft of intelligence transformed from a superstitious and supernatural institution to one that is human and secular. Sun Tzu is credited as creating the first organized intelligence service in the fifth century BC. He prescribed the use of five categories of spies to obtain foreknowledge, rather than through the elicitation of spirits, inductively or analogously through experience, or deductively through calculation (Tzu, Connors, & Giles, 2009). Although his analysis continues to be widely embraced, modern intelligence and policy often operate inductively and deductively as well. Yet just as the employment of intelligence is a timeless phenomenon, so is incident of its disregard. At its best, intelligence provides policymakers with the greatest amount of relevant

reality that can be achieved by filling gaps in knowledge and expertise crucial to tactical and strategic success. At its worst, intelligence is ignored and becomes irrelevant to policy considerations. Troy ignored Cassandras warning regarding their fall and the Trojan Horse (Dulles, 1985). Xerxes ignored his advisors intelligence estimate stating King Leonidas and his three-hundred men were preparing for war prior to the Battle at Thermopylae, ultimately losing large numbers from his force (Dulles, 1985). Stalin ignored as many as eighty-seven separate and credible warning of a German invasion prior to Operation Barbarossa (Steury, 2005). And, more recently, President Nixon largely ignored the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the point where he stopped reading his daily intelligence summary and rarely met with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) (Rovner, 2011). Intelligence irrelevance is an issue arising with the first efforts towards foreknowledge and which pervades numerous areas in which intelligence operates. This thesis aims to determine if it pervades one of the latest applications of intelligence, law enforcement intelligence. Law enforcement intelligence (LEI) is recently constructed intelligence architecture. An outgrowth of military and national security intelligence, LEI applies traditional communications intelligence (COMINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) methodologies to the law enforcement context to exploit telephone records and confidential informants or sources (Peterson, 2005). Advocacy for intelligence-led policing processes originated from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States (US) Department of Justice (Peterson, 2005). LEI functions began to be instituted in the 1970s with little success. Many were shut down voluntarily, by court order, or from political pressure due to the lack of governance over their practices (Peterson, 2005). LEI failed to gain real traction until after September 11, 2001. September 11th, considered a focusing event, reinforced the need to enhance

intelligence operations. This reinforced LEI initiatives such as the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program. Thus, currently, instituting efficacious LEI initiatives is a top priority (U.S. Department of, 2003). Yet effectively integrating intelligence into the investigative and enforcement culture continues to be a struggle. Law enforcement professionals continue to misuse the words intelligence, analysis, tactical, operational, and strategic and confuse intelligence missions and values (Peterson, 2005). A recent study conducted on the HIDTA program found that they erroneously considered some of their reports as strategic intelligence documents when, in fact, they performed little to no strategic intelligence analysis, suggesting intelligence irrelevance is already occurring to some level (Assessment of HIDTA, 2009). Also, as there is no common definition of intelligence in military and national security spheres, there is no common definition for intelligence-led policing within the law enforcement community (McGarrell, Freihlich, and Chermak, 2007). Federal law enforcement agencies define LEI differently than State, Local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies because of difference is sources and missions (Carter, 2004). Nor is there agreement on its practical implications for police agencies mission, structure or processes (McGarrell, Freihlich, and Chermak, 2007). Regardless of definition, however, intelligence must be embraced across the entirety of an organization to be effective, rather than viewed as the responsibility of an intelligence unit. But before a law enforcement agency can become intelligence-led, it must first understand what intelligence is, how it functions at different levels, and how it is advantageous to law enforcement efforts. Thus far this appears to be more natural for tactical and operational intelligence than for strategic intelligence.

Irrelevance to policy considerations is a significant fear of intelligence analysts and yet also a pathology of intelligence-policy relations that is not well understood. Among causes of failed intelligence-policy relations, politicization has drawn the most attention (Rovner, 2011). Politicization involves the corruption of objective intelligence processes and products through manipulation by policymakers, politically biased analysts, or both. Politicization of intelligence occurs, however, because that intelligence is considered important by policymakers (Rovner, 2011). Intelligence irrelevance, ignoring that which is intended to objectively improve the soundness of policy logic, can be just as or more damaging for intelligence stakeholders who have a vested interest in the success of their policies. Thus, in order to prevent intelligence irrelevance in the law enforcement intelligence setting one must understand the nature of the developing law enforcement intelligence-policy relationship and relate this dynamic to likely causes of intelligence irrelevance outlined in previous scholarship. In employing this strategy, this thesis will seek to illuminate and outline a preemptive plan intended to avoid strategic intelligence irrelevance in the law enforcement context. Survey analysis of High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) employees, both on the analysis side and the policymaking side, will be conducted through a set of questionnaires that will gauge the intelligence-policy relationship and the relevance of intelligence at HIDTA at the strategic level. The questions in each questionnaire will gauge the major variables discussed in the literature review. These include: intelligence irrelevance, level of volition (act of willing), inertia (preference or not to modifying strategy), level of confidence in intelligence (strategic), current level of or potential for cognitive dissonance and bias, level of security, level of filtering, level of intelligence marketing, quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication, and available time to devote to strategic intelligence. After exploring the relationship and strategic intelligence dynamics, a plan can be

developed that mitigates or, more favorably, prevents the potential causes of intelligence irrelevance for HIDTAs. Unfortunately, there are a couple limitations to this study. This study focuses on the relationships between intelligence, strategic analysts, and intelligence consumers rather than the bureaucratic environments in which intelligence operates. Although study analysis will be inclusive of organizational forces such as inertia, security and filtering, we assume that the most significant causes of irrelevance as well as the greatest potential for their displacement arise from intelligence-policy relations rather than bureaucratic idiosyncrasies. Further research is needed to validate this assumption. Additionally, study representativeness and generalizability were directly dependent upon survey participation and the level of response that was elicited. The study sampling plan aimed to gain maximum participation as all relevant members of the study organization could have been potentially sampled. These limitations, though, need not undermine the development of a preemptive framework to mitigate or avoid intelligence irrelevance. The nature and order of this study will be as such: First, the researcher will review the current body of relevant scholarly literature including those works addressing the nonuse of intelligence, largely supported by works addressing the issue of strategic surprise, to identify the key causes of intelligence irrelevance. Next, the researcher will explain the research methodology and subsequent results. Finally, the researcher will objectively interpret the study results and deduce their implications for avoiding future incidents of intelligence irrelevance in law enforcement.

LITERATURE REVIEW As mentioned above, this study aims to facilitate the preemption of strategic intelligence irrelevance in law enforcement by investigating the current and developing relationship between law enforcement intelligence analysts and their decision-making counterparts. To achieve this objective, however, it is necessary to review the concepts and debates relevant to the phenomena of intelligence irrelevance. While resolving the debate by illuminating some sort of perfect functioning intelligence-policy machine is outside the scope of this study, augmenting the debate by introducing a new application for scholarly findings related to intelligence-policy relations and intelligence irrelevance is not. Intelligence-policy relations in the law enforcement setting are currently developing parallel to the progression of intelligence-led policing efforts. It is here we find a new and particularly useful application for scholarly findings from a particularly mature debate. This chapter will begin by defining and discussing key terms to be employed throughout the study including: information, intelligence, strategic intelligence, strategic intelligence irrelevance and intelligence-policy relations. Next, the phenomena of intelligence irrelevance will be discussed generally as well as in the context in the loosely coupled system in which it occurs. This section will largely be supported by contributions from the debate between two key schools of thought, the orthodox and revisionist schools. Next, this chapter will discuss the likely causal sources of intelligence irrelevance: intelligence work itself, imperfect analysis, and imperfect policymaking. The result of all this investigation and debate leaves the reader without denouement, but rather with this studys hypotheses.

Key Terms This study employs key terms that are conceptually complex in nature. The context of their application, however, typically dictates the specific meaning intended to be expressed. With this understanding, definitions for these key terms are delineated here in the context and for the purposes of this study, namely, understanding the phenomena of intelligence irrelevance through intelligence-policy relations. The concept of information is both elusive and central to debate in numerous fields of study. It is elusive precisely because it is broad enough to apply to so many fields of study.1 The standard, and intuitive, definition of information described as data that has been processed into a form that is meaningful to the recipient and data.that is processed and refined will be used for this study (Davis & Olson, 1985, p.200; Silver & Silver, 1989, p.6). Opting for this definition not only avoids unnecessary obstacles but also allows the study to focus on the research questions outlined below. Just as the practice of processing and refining is central to the creation of information, so is it central to the creation of intelligence. While the ingredients in the recipe for information are data and meaning, the ingredients in the intelligence recipe are information and meaning, created through analysis. Lowenthal (2006) describes intelligence trichotomically as a process, product and organization. He asserts intelligence can be thought of as the means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated, the product of these processes, and as the units that carry out its various functions (2006, p.9).While highly accurate, Lowenthals definition of intelligence is missing a central aspect, reducing uncertainty. Clark notes this (reducing uncertainty) as the central aspect in his definition of

See Floridi (2005) for various definitions of information, some that include elements that only complicate its understanding in the context of intelligence.

intelligence and explains intelligence reduces uncertainty by collecting and exploiting information that the opponent prefers to (2007). The Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies (MCIIS) introduces two additional aspects to the concept of intelligence: a process that is focused externally and that considers information derived from all sources (Chido & Seward, 2006). This study will employ a concept of intelligence that incorporates all these attributes. For this study intelligence will be described as the process of acquiring, processing, analyzing and disseminating externally focused information that reduces uncertainty for decision makers, as the final product of that process, and as the organizations that engage in that process. This definition integrates all aspects of intelligence that have been acknowledged by scholars and intelligence professionals. Moving forward, strategic intelligence then exemplifies a certain classification of intelligence. Clark describes strategic intelligence similarly for both government and business sectors as dealing with long-range issues such as strategy and policy for senior leadership with greater complexity due to the longer predictive time frame (2007). Strategic intelligence has elsewhere been described as the aggregation of all other types of intelligentsia to provide valueadded information and knowledge toward making organizational strategic decisions (Liebowitz, 2006, p.22). Both Clark and Liebowitz describe the central tenet of strategic intelligence as intelligence produced to support strategy. Although strategy is often associated with long-term measures, its intelligence support need not furnish long-term prediction. Intelligence may be both current and have significant strategic implications; however, most or all current intelligence is not strategic. The Pentagon defines strategic intelligence as intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels (Joint publication 102:, 2001, p.456). To effectively support strategy, strategic intelligence must be actionable and

multi-disciplinary (Heidenrich, 2007). This sort of support allows for maximum comprehensive advantage. Strategic intelligence thus provides a framework for lower decision levels, is time and resource intensive, far reaching in nature, infrequently produced, and often includes too many variables for the strategist to understand and anticipate alone (Fleisher & Bensoussan, 2007; Heidenrich, 2007). Cumulatively, then, strategic intelligence is both the intelligence process creating strategic intelligence and ultimate product of that process that provides multidisciplinary, actionable and forward-looking support for an organizational or national strategy. This is the definition that will be employed for this study. The concept that is most important to clarify as well as central to this study is that of strategic intelligence irrelevance. Strategic intelligence irrelevance will be understood as the tragic phenomena of intelligence that does not perceivably satisfy the requirements necessary for efficacy, the prerequisites of which are timely, actionable, multi-disciplinary, and value-added properties. Reflecting the tendency for policymakers to ignore intelligence, Walter Laqueur (1993) states: [A]fter much research and discussion with the leading consumers of intelligence, I have concluded that, far from being an invisible government, far from wielding great influence in the councils of state, intelligence has frequently been disregarded or ignored by decision makers. No one claims that intelligence has been of major importance in the conduct of affairs of state. (p.3) Handel, a well-respected intelligence scholar, parallels Laqueurs sentiments in stating, Let this, then, be the first axiom; fighting commanders, technical experts, and politicians are liable to ignore, despise, or undernote intelligence (1987, p.24). These scholarly perspectives support Rovners argument that policymakers ignore intelligence for psychological and political reasons

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and that the incentives to ignore intelligence are real, as are the frustrations of ana analysts whose work is disregarded (2011). Regardless of cause, however, strategic intelligence irrelevanc irrelevance occurs when strategic intelligence is requested, produced and disseminated to relevant policy parties, but is not incorporated into policy discussions or policy formation. Intelligence-policy relations will provide the context within which this study will examine the phenomena of intelligence irrelevance. For the purposes of this study, intelligence-policy relations are understood as bifurcated policy bifurcated, where the intelligence node may signify eith intelligence either products or intelligence analysts (See Figure 2.1 for a graphic display of this relationship) The discussion of relationship). previous scholastic contribution to intelligence Figure 2.1: Bifurcated IntelligenceIntelligence Policy Relations

irrelevance will highlight how each node, policy, intelligence analysts and intelligence products, analysts, ntelligence potentially possess the ability to cause intelligence irrelevance particularly at their nexus. irrelevance,

Intelligence Irrelevance Intelligence exists to provide accurate, timely and meaningful products to policymakers policymakers. If it fails to complete this basic, but interminable, mission then it fails altogether. Not only is a altogether. great deal of collection, processing and analysis effort wasted, but the failure also amounts to fiscal waste in terms of billions of dollars Intelligence has clearly demonstrated value dollars. ce throughout history, especially so in supporting military operations Intelligence efforts outside operations. the military operations support arena, however, serve consumers that are more jaundiced to intelligence products. This includes intelligence efforts to: support American diplomacy, support des

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monitoring of treaties and other agreements, support defense planning, economic intelligence, counter activities abroad that threaten U.S. interests, support criminal justice and regulatory agencies, environmental intelligence, and to support world health problems (Preparing for the, 1996). Maintaining relevance in support of these intelligence missions requires a great deal of careful thought and constant effort (Davis, 2002). Much of the difficulty in maintaining intelligence relevance relates to the quality of intelligence products. Conscious of this issue, numerous scholars have promoting standards by which to make intelligence useful to policy. Kovacs describes the ingredients of usability for intelligence as, timeliness, suitable level of detail and aggregation, mode of presentation and in particular the perceived reliability and accuracy of the information (1997, p.147). Lowenthal puts forth a somewhat parallel recipe for acceptable, useful intelligence: timely, tailored, digestible and clear regarding what is known and unknown (2006). Both of these recipes highlight the significance of policymaker preferences and likely perceptions. Analysts, therefore, must become just as knowledgeable about their policymaking consumers as they are of their intelligence subject matter. Yet, intelligence that meets these standards is not guaranteed to be used in the policymaking process, not guaranteed to be relevant. To maintain its usefulness and acceptance into policymaking, then, intelligence must strive toward greater standards. Policymakers are quick to point out additional shortcomings of intelligence products. Politicians and senior executives, acclimated to and informed of political environments and discussions, naturally notice when intelligence products fail to introduce anything new and valuable to the policy table. Intelligence may simply regurgitate what is already known by policymakers through their own arsenal of resources. This was the case for intelligence prior to the Iranian revolution (MacEachin & Nolan, 2004). Intelligence became irrelevant in this case

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because it did not truly question basic assumptions upon which U.S. policy rested, at least until, many agreed, it was too late (MacEachin & Nolan, 2004, p.12). In essence, then, intelligence must become a vehicle for detailed consideration of policy options (Best, 2007; Davis, 1996). This type of intelligence has been referred to as opportunity analysis, value-added analysis, and targeted tactical analysis (Davis, 1995). One policymaker suggests analysts give them something they will really miss if they do not get it (Davis, 1995, p.11). This concept of valueadding intelligence has been clearly described in scholarly debate and has gained traction in recent years. Yet, even value-adding intelligence efforts can fall between the policymaking cracks if policymakers are not aware of them. To maintain relevance, then, intelligence analysts are required to also increase the quality of intelligence processes. More specifically, policymakers and scholars suggest intelligence professionals significantly increase their efforts to market their products. One policymaker goes as far as to suggest analysts should spend a third of their time assuring they impact the policymaking process or enough time establishing and maintaining an effective intelligencepolicy relationship that they begin to feel guilty about not having enough time for their other duties (Davis, 1995). Another suggests a rule of thumb he dubs the Riedel Rule, after Bruce Riedel, a CIA analyst, whom felt he was not doing his job of marketing his analyses unless he got at least two parking tickets a month outside policymakers offices (Haass, 2007). Haass insists that intelligence analysts: Understand that to devote 99 percent of their effort to conducting and writing a study and only 1 percent to marketing it is both foolish and a disservice to policymakers. To produce results, they have to market their work relentlessly. If

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analysts have something to say, they should not only say it, but press to say it directly to the policymakers most involved in the issue. (p.13) Time, however, is a limited commodity. A significant increase in effort on the part of intelligence analysts to market their products detracts from their ability to increase the quality of those products. Thus analysts are faced with a tradeoff between increasing the quality of intelligence products and increasing the quality of intelligence processes, a tradeoff that appears to essentially ensure intelligence irrelevance to some level. Aside from highlighting the difficulty of avoiding intelligence irrelevance these discussions highlight the significance of the relationship between intelligence analysts and their policymaking consumers to the phenomena. To avoid intelligence irrelevance analysts must meet or exceed the expectations their jaundiced customers have for their products. Additionally, analysts must force policymakers to digest intelligence appraisals: seemingly against their will. Quality intelligence products and processes thus require a synergy between the two parties. We are beginning to see intelligence-policy synergy does not occur naturally. Gaps and Tensions: A Loosely Coupled Intelligence-Policy System Since the first employment of intelligence-type faculties, their relations with their customers have been riddled with gaps and tensions. It seems intelligence consumers have always been skeptical of its utility, opting to use it selectively. Sun Tzu noted in the fifth century BC that although intelligence officers are often of critical importance to an armys ability to move and achieve success, they are also potential threats to those same ends and thus must be managed with a certain intuitive sagacity (Tzu, Connors, & Giles, 2009). This practice involved controlling the flow of information to intelligence, rewarding intelligence efforts liberally as a means of preventing treason, and harsh punishment for any intelligence behavior that

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undermined or threatened policy or strategy. For better or worse, intelligence had become a crux between success and defeat. This double-edged sword conceptualization of intelligence has been maintained through today as intelligence consumers continue to engage intelligence producers skeptically, and interestingly also use their products as both tools and weapons. That skepticism is reciprocated by analysts who guard their analytical integrity against potential political pollution. The relationship between modern intelligence and policy is noteworthy precisely because of its significant influence on and consequence for both policy and strategy. Policymakers note that successful policy depends upon bridging the intellectual gap between imperatives of the present and the potential of the future. In turn, this often depends on bridging the gap between policymakers and the Intelligence Community (Haass, 2002, p.1). In other words, if intelligence is a crux between strategic success and defeat then deductively it is politically advantageous to maintain close relations with intelligence professionals, or at least when success or defeat depends on it. As intelligence analysts learned, policy can exist and function without support from the intelligence community (if only temporarily), but the opposite is not true (Lowenthal, 2006). This policymaker stance forces the weight of the relationship nearly exclusively on the analysts shoulders. After all, this crucial relationship for both policymakers and analysts does not fall naturally in place, but requires careful thought to set right and constant efforts to keep effective (Davis, 2002). The discovery that intelligence is not always a strategic necessity or threat allowed policymakers to take the drivers seat, however, both policymakers and intelligence analysts are active participants in the relationship. Thus both parties are responsible for and highly influence not only the success or demise of policy and strategy but the efficacy of the relationship.

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Yet a central challenge for analysts to maintain effective ties has been a historical, conscious, artificial separation between intelligence and policy parties. This separation has been motivated by analysts efforts to balance the seemingly intrinsic and endured trade-off between analytical integrity and policy relevance - separation despite advice from both analysts and policymakers to not merely produce literature, but strategic and politically relevant results (Haass, 2002; Davis, 2002; Davis, 1995; Kent, 1949; Goldman, 2006). To produce results, analysts are required to close the gap between themselves and their policymaking counterparts, which is an uncomfortable proposition for many. Historically analysts have avoided the politics of policymaking by consciously positioning themselves in positions of limited utility to policy as prescribed by the red line, or a demarcation between intelligence and policy prohibiting intelligence officers from advocating policy options (Steiner, 2003). This school of thought, attributed to Sherman Kent, warns of the danger of intimate intelligence-policy relations as having the strong potential to fall prey to aggressive policymakers who may wish to slant or distort intelligence work in their political favor. Policymakers and scholars can and have applied the same logic, however, to suggest analysts are wishfully biased in perceiving the appropriateness, reliability, relevance and accuracy of their own work and project these biases to intelligence consumers (Davis, 1995; Levite, 1987; Betts, 2004; Kam, 2004). As Crocker notes, American leaders, it should be acknowledged, are by no means the only ones susceptible to linear thinking about world affairs. Nor are they alone in imagining that their own norms and benchmarks have universal validity (Crocker). In this sense, analysts pollute their own analyses by distancing themselves from the politics of policymaking. In fact, analysts who distanced themselves from the policymaking process learned to their sorrow that their policymaking counterparts judged their intelligence products as less or not useful for policymaking (Davis,

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2002). Thus analysts continue to be challenged to find the appropriate balance between both appropriate hazards as neither objectivity without relevance nor relevance without objectivity satisfies the mission of intelligence (Davis, 2002; Goldman, 2006). Thus the operating environment for intelligence is one of opposing threats. Intelligence threats that is too greatly separated from policy is susceptible to irrelevance, but intelligence that is too close to policy is susceptible to politicization and/or excessive harmony (Rovner, 2 2011). (See Figure 2.2) In this sense not only do gaps and tensions within intelligence policy relations lead ) intelligence-policy to dysfunction, but the lack of gaps and tension also lead to dysfunction. The excessive harmony pathology embodies instances of complacent tunnel vision shared by both intelligence and policy in which both sides fail to challenge basic assumptions the lack of Figure 2.2: Intelligence Environment of Opposing Forces
Too close: Politicization Excessive Harmony To great a distance: Irrelevance

tension creates ineffective relations (Rovner, 20 2011). Politicization involves post hoc n rationalizations for policymaker decisions in which policymakers employ intelligence to support, rather than shape, pre-fabricated policy and political strategy (Rovner, 20 fabricated 2011). Politicization can occur in numerous ways including: direct manipulation, indirect manipulation, embedded assumptions, intelligence subverts policy, intelligence parochialism, bureaucratic parochialism, partisan intelligence and intelligence as a scapegoat As Rovner points out, though, intelligence scapegoat. is politicized because it is considered important (2011). Analysts thus struggle to produce d perceivably important intelligence that avoids threats of political pollution. Effective intelligence-policy relations require and appropriate amount of tension and it has beco the policy become analysts duty to achieve such a calibration.

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Despite recent assertions that the red line has either faded or disappeared, metaphorically lifting all or some of the weight off the analysts shoulders, this separation continues to be concept-driven. During a 2004 Roundtable, intelligence and policy discussants expressed frustration with regard to artificially imposing a red line and agreed communication failures between parties was a more significant threat than violations of the red line concept (Intelligence and policy:, 2004). In fact, these sentiments parallel Kents argument that too great a distance was the more harmful hazard to the analyst and national security (Kent, 1949). Others have recently found the line, at minimum, to be blurred (Steiner, 2003). This is motivating considering, as Paul Wolfowitz has pointed out, both the policy and intelligence sides suffer, as does the national interest, whenever principals or practices are allowed to interfere with close professional cooperation (Davis, 1996, p.35). Red line, gray line or no line, however, the true foundation for integrity is not an intelligence-policy separation, but a high level of professionalism, combined with high standards of intellectual integrity generated by education, and nurtured by the ambient culture of the organization (Kovacs, 1997, p.406). The fact that irrelevance still plagues intelligence-policy relations illustrates that such concepts do not saturate intelligence and policy cultures. Organizational cultures, in fact, significantly contribute to gaps and tensions in intelligence-policy relations. Tensions plague intelligence-policy relations originating from differences in their organizational, or tribal, mindsets (Lowenthal, 1992). One example arises from their professional attitudes toward odds. Analysts naturally focus their efforts on phenomena judged to be likely, highly likely or all but certain, and hopefully also high-impact low-probability phenomena, while policymakers focus their efforts on what is optimistically

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possible, a much lower standard (Davis, 2003). This disparity would seem to facilitate, if not promote, analysts to ignore numerous hot-button issues for policymakers. Additionally, what issues analysts address that are on policymakers substantive schedule are not likely to be communicated effectively. While analysts are inclined towards words and complexities, their decision making clientele tend to prefer short, short-term, simplified, valueadding reports inclusive of raw data (Westerfield, 1995; Rovner, 2011). These preferences effectively devalue intelligences core competency. In fact, many, if not most, policymakers view themselves as top-level analysts with a wider point of view than intelligence producers. They view themselves as more than capable of developing not only their own conclusions, but superior ones at that (Betts, 1978; Best, 2007). With this view, then, what policymakers desire from intelligence is customized, current support providing explanation rather than prediction, evidence rather than opinion, and reduction of uncertainty rather than ambivalent, although reflective, interpretation (Davis, 1996, p.1; Davis, 1995). Former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates suggests analysts: [Provide] a frank, evenhanded discussion on the issues. If [analysts] know that a policymaker holds a certain viewpoint on an issue that is different from [their] analysis, [they] ought not lightly dismiss that view but rather address its strengths and weaknesses and then provide the evidence and reasoning behind [their] own judgment. (Goldman, 2006, p.174) These preferences remain even if the message to be delivered is negative (Davis, 1995). Analysts are forced to continue to risk being ignored, however, in recognition of the alternative risks associated with oversimplifying reality and desensitizing policymakers to the ambiguities and forecast motility the greater the ambiguity the greater the impact of preconceptions and

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wishfulness (Jervis, 1970, p.132). Latent cognitive, behavioral and communicative tensions between decisive, aggressive and confident policymakers and reflective, introspective and cautious analysts seemingly naturally inhibit efficacious relations by frustrating professionally and personally disparate parties. Mutual ignorance about the each partys role and capabilities, induced by artificial separation and communicative failures, also undercut effective relations. Gates (1989) has noted that: [I]ntelligence collection and assessment are black arts for most presidents and their key advisors, neither adequately understood nor adequately exploited. For intelligence officers, presidents and senior level views of the intelligence they receive and how they use it (or not) are just as unfamiliar. (p.36) This gap depreciates intelligence as it provokes mutual mistrust between the intelligence and policy factions. Tensions are further frustrated when the void creates unrealistic expectations. Intelligence practitioners expect their products to be consumed and appreciated regardless of whether their endeavors were at the direction of policymakers. Conversely, policymakers expect intelligence to serve their substantive policy needs in a timely and calibrated fashion regardless of whether they posed appropriate questions to proper intelligence capabilities. Treverton speaks to this gap when observing that questions that go unasked by policy are not likely to be answered by intelligence. If intelligence does provide the answers without being asked, those answers are not likely to be heard by policy (2001, p.192). Unfortunately, however, intelligence staffs do little to replace unrealistic expectations of their policymaking consumers whom serve a public so attentive to the performance of the Intelligence Community (Kovacs,

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1997; Intelligence and Policy:, 2004). Policymakers, on the other hand, continue to fail to effectively engage intelligence capabilities too often. This intelligence operating environment, a loosely coupled intelligence-policy system, significantly influences the utility of intelligence products, processes and organizations and sets the tone for intelligence-policy success or failure. Intelligence and intelligence-policy relations are only effective when calibrated correctly. Thus the relevance of intelligence depends on such a calibration. Intelligence analysts must actively manage both the quality of their products and the quality of their strained relationship with policymakers to avoid irrelevance. Mismanagement of either will breed irrelevance. Intelligence as a Causal Locus Yet there are real and concrete limitations to what intelligence can provide. These will be discussed below in terms of their severity within two categories: intelligence difficulties and intrinsic limitations. Intelligence difficulties are problematic properties of intelligence that exacerbate the process of serving policy. Intrinsic limitations, on the other hand, are realities of human interaction that are inherently impossible for intelligence to unveil. The combination of these two properties of intelligence work contributes to numerous instances of intelligence irrelevance. Most difficulties inherent in intelligence work relate to the operating environment that is rampant with uncertainty, nonlinearity and complexity. These properties also translate into the nature of intelligence information. Generally, intelligence collects ambiguous and inconsistent data. Stein notes that information collected by intelligence is often open to several plausible and conflicting interpretations (1982). These chaotic dynamics are not conducive to intelligence forecasting or probabilistic reasoning as distinguishing a priori between signals and misleading

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noise is exceedingly difficult (Wohlstetter, 1965). In fact, it has been argued that patterns arising in such complex systems only show retrospective coherence they can be identified ex-post, but not predicted (Fruhling, 2007). It has been asserted that paradoxical logic also pervades such systems, compounding the friction, by opposing ordinary, linear logic in favor of choices that are aimed at deceiving an enemy (Luttwak, 2001). As Luttwak notes, surprise in waris not merely one advantage among many but rather the suspension, if only brief, if only partial, of an entire predicament of strategy (Luttwak, 2001, p.4). If true, such a configuration, paralleling Clausewitzs concept of general friction, would not lend itself to pattern- and trendbased forecasting. Yet logic for strategic reversals and historical discontinuities exists. As do political opportunities to stabilize beneficial patterns and destabilize those that are antithetical to preferred futures (Fruhling, 2007). This is precisely because strategy-context paradoxical propositions, although intellectually appealing, suffocate under rigorous logical analysis what appears a paradox is truly irony (Echevarria II, 2010). It is ironic (rather than paradoxical) that the competent general must both protect his soldiery and endanger them by use, and that he cannot do one without forgoing the other, similarly, it is ironic (rather than paradoxical) that the individual soldier cannot pursue glory without putting his life at risk (Echevarria II, 2010, p.vii) Thus, the logic of war is precisely linear and intelligence possesses the ability, and hopefully the resources, to inform policy of strategically constructive opportunities to manipulate political levers, despite extreme difficulty. Central to the identification of these opportunities is a crucial distinction between uncertainty and risk where, conditions of risk are those that prevail in casinos or the stock market, where future outcomes are unknown, but probabilities can be estimated. Conditions of uncertainty, by contrast, are those where there is no basis even for

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estimating probabilities (Fitzsimmons, 2006, p.5-6). Within the first environment intelligence enjoys the freedom to act. While in the latter, it cannot do so usefully. Jervis asserts that intelligence, given these conditions, ought only offer estimated probabilities of several plausible scenarios to policymakers (1986, p.29). Such a halt in efforts, however, is not likely to be praised by intelligence consumers who demand more than calculated risk (Lowenthal, 2008). Intelligence analysts tread into dangerous waters, however, when advancing their analyses with ironic logic to meet these policymaker demands in an effort to ensure their products are relevant to political and strategic discussion. Several tools and mechanisms are at intelligence analysts disposal, however, to assist them both in differentiating between signals and noise and managing uncertainty and risk. Richards Heuer is arguably at the forefront of this school of thought insisting that analysts develop the capability to extract relevant data patterns through their training and experience (1999). To assist in diagnosing an issue, managing a large amount of information, and recognizing pattern analysts also naturally develop schemas, a collection of stored knowledge associated with a concept (Honig, 2007). Yet developing schemas creates another difficulty, consciously managing the interplay between top-down (schema driven) and bottom-up (datadriven) information processing and analysis (Khong, 1992). Quality analysts, critical of their analyses, will alter schemas in the face of new and strongly incongruent information to maintain analytical relevance to political reality. Others may fall prey to uncertainty and ambiguity. Thus the quality of the analyst is central to successful prediction in recognition that intelligence involves subjective judgment and knowing how to utilize ones experience (Honig, 2008). Relating this to the medical field, Honig notes that diagnosing a rare disease requires both the appearance of unique symptoms as well as the availability of excellent doctors (2008, p.4).

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Ultimately, however, analysts tools for achieving methodological professionalism are wrought with paradoxes and barriers to analytical accuracy or, in other words, difficulties. Skills and common sense gained through experience, rather than marginal reforms, remain pivotal to successful intelligence appraisal, and therefore to the relevance of intelligence that is produced (Betts, 1978). Additionally, there are two less attractive but equally pervasive difficulties inherent in the intelligence process security and filtering. Security and intelligence, in fact, go hand in hand so much that secrecy is viewed as one of the most notable characteristics of intelligence (Shulsky, 2002; Warner, 2007). Security impedes useful intelligence in numerous way including: limiting use due to the need to protect sources, limiting use by requiring the use of data links that reduce timeliness and availability, security considerations limiting connectivity between information systems, encouraging group-think and inertia by limiting availability to a select few, providing shelter to mediocrity, hindering accountability, and finally, limiting the visibility of capabilities to decision makers (Kovacs, 1997). Security is but one example, though, of a more comprehensive difficulty facing analysts, filtering. Filtering is inherent in the intelligence process and is a more subtle means of limiting availability and impeding intelligence relevance. Filters color information that reaches the decision-maker and often affect its timeliness (Kovacs, 1997). Beyond security, additional filters include: the mere act of processing raw information into intelligence, privatizing intelligence as a means of furthering an organizations own interest, the narrowing of the policy and intelligence vision by focusing on perceived areas of strategic interest (which creates blind-spots), the reluctance to accept or bear bad news, and the cry-wolf syndrome (Kovacs, 1997). Unfortunately, stress and time pressures, often present in intelligence,

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escalate the negative effects of these difficulties exponentially, significantly increasing chances of intelligence irrelevance and strategic surprise. If the scene is not daunting enough, intelligence also suffers from intrinsic limitations. While intelligence difficulties arise from epistemic uncertainty (lack of knowledge), intelligences intrinsic limitations arise from the combination of aleatory uncertainty, also known as randomness, and uncertainty arising from the enemy (or human subject) (Fruhling, 2007).(See Figure 3) In essence, the intelligence community is expected to function as societys soothsayer, or, to be able to foretell and predict future events regardless of the commonsensical impossibility of this feat (Kovacs, 1997). As Lowenthal notes, We ask intelligence analysts to describe the actions of people who are geographically distant and culturally remote. Worse yet, they are people. They react to emotions, to stress, to miscalculation and they sometimes make profoundly bad decisions (2008, p.313). These unrealistic expectations have been likened to expecting the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to stop bank robberies before they occur (Intelligence and policy, 2004). In truth, the intelligence community is on par cognitively with their policymaking consumers, the media, and the general public. Cognitive skills necessary for successful careers are not innate to intelligence work, but are developed and employed better and worse in all professional contexts. If we accept that not every patient will survive admission into the emergency room then we must accept the fallibility of intelligence. To expect any more of intelligence professionals would submit them to unnecessary abuse. Ultimately, some obstacles of intelligence work are insurmountable and cause intelligence irrelevance, the intrinsic limitations of intelligence work. As Lowenthal argues, we will suffer losses on occasion not because intelligence is flawed but because it is human and it is difficult (2008, p.315). We must therefore focus our efforts on those causes of intelligence

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irrelevance that are rectifiable, those attributed to intelligence analysts and policymakers and the degree to which they effectively manage the quality of intelligence products and intelligencepolicy relations.

Table 2.1: Intelligence Difficulties and Limitations

Intelligence Analysts as a Causal Locus The fundamental function of the intelligence analyst, again, is to reduce uncertainty for decision makers. They must actualize this function within an environment in which intrinsic limitations prevent complete success and intelligence difficulties further antagonize efforts to meet professional expectations. Intelligence analysts thus become causal loci for intelligence irrelevance when they fail to overcome intelligence difficulties due to avoidable mistakes, most often due to psychological or professional pathologies. These occurrences were likely maintained by the fact that intelligence had traditionally been understood and described as more an art than a science (Marrin, 2005). Progress in professionalizing intelligence, however, began with efforts of Sherman Kent to create an analytic code, the CIAs intelligence journal and the CIA Center for Study of Intelligence (Marrin, 2005). More recently, a CIA study found that although intelligence operations may be appropriately conceptualized as tradecraft, intelligence

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analysis is and should be part of a scientific process (Johnston, 2005). Increasing the quality and efficacy of intelligence thus requires that it be reconstructed in the context of some scientific method, alloyed with intelligences traditional arts (Kerbel, 2008). Intelligence analysts ought to be conscious of this transition on two planes in particular: information-processing skills and maintenance of professional norms. Both scholars and their customers surely are. Information-processing Skills Information-processing skills are needed to generate comprehensive assessments based on voluminous, specific, reliable and factual information (Honig, 2007). Limitations in human intuitive cognition, however, undercut analysts ability to process such large quantities of information into concise, coherent and comprehensive intelligence products. While speed and efficiency are strengths of intuitive human cognition, inherent limitations in human cognition provoke bias in intelligence analysis (Brasfield, 2009). Cognitive mindsets have been identified as a major cause of intelligence and policy failures for decades (Feder, 2002). Humans have a limited mental capacity. The complexity of the world, however, requires us to adopt and employ a simplified mental model of reality within which to work. We behave rationally within the constructs of our model; however, the models we construct are not always adapted to the requirements of the real world (Heuer, 1999; Simon, 1957). When disparate from reality, analysts falls prey to cognitive dissonance. As mentioned above, quality analysts alter their mindsets in the face in strongly incongruent evidence. Under these circumstances, however, analysts are required to employ cognitive shortcuts to cope with the volume of information, shortcuts that inevitably lead to mistakes in judgment (Wohlstetter, 1962). These shortcuts also produce a number of cognitive biases that include, but are not limited to, the following:

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1. tendencies to allow perceptions to be influenced by expectations, 2. tendencies to maintain initial perceptions despite strongly incongruent information, 3. tendencies to allow available evidence, memory or imaginable scenarios to drive an analysts estimate of probabilities, 4. tendencies to establish cognitive anchors and then adjust estimated probabilities from that initial anchor point as new evidence is collected, 5. tendencies to achieve more confidence in a small body of consistent data than a large body of inconsistent data, 6. tendencies to process less-than-perfectly-reliable evidence as if it were wholly reliable, 7. tendencies to ignore the absence of evidence in judgments, 8. tendencies to favor causality over randomness, accident or error explanations, and 9. tendencies to fall prey to deceptive tactics (Heuer, 1981). Intelligence analysis ought to be a neutral process that does not slant the raw information. Analysts who are not mindful of these cognitive pitfalls are likely to have their analyses ignored as they filter information into intelligence. The value of information processing skills really surfaces when the analyst needs to decipher and differentiate vital incoming information from superfluous noise, which can be exceedingly complicated (Wohlstetter, 1962). Analysts that have developed sufficient and realistically accurate mindsets, however, can employ them to recognize patterns in voluminous data without being distracted by contradictory noise (Heuer, 1999). Such mindsets are developed through training and experience so that one should expect a positive relationship between the seniority of intelligence professionals and pattern recognition skills. This, of course, assumes that such accretionary mindsets adapt to transformations within an enemy or target. As Betts notes,

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experience can cause greater error than ignorance when the enemy does not follow the patterns of past behavior (2007). Analysts therefore must remain aware of scenarios and hypotheses that have proven historically inconsistent with their schemas as changes within a target may cause them to become more likely. These considerations increase the time needed to produce intelligence and, therefore, potentially eliminate the usefulness of the product. To analysts and policys detriment, however, biases pervade additional elements of intelligence work as well. Not only do analysts have the daunting task of assessing the reliability and relevance of information that has been collected, but they also must assess the reliability of human sources behind information. HUMINT sources are masked from intelligence analysts as a means of preserving the extremely fragile relationship between case officer and agent (Lowenthal, 2006). While reports supplied to analysts may include information on the access of the source or the past reliability of the source, the ultimate lack of details regarding the human source of the information is likely to bias the interpretation of the information (Lowenthal, 2006). For example, information consistent with previous perceptions or expectations will tend to be valued more than information that discredits previous perceptions or expectations. These security measures ultimately deny the analyst the opportunity to compare and contrast reliability between human and other sources of intelligence information. This causes them to intuitively apply some analytical rubric based on skill and common sense to their collection of evidence (Honig, 2008). The cautious and critical analyst cannot assume perfect reliability; however, analysts must ensure the same attributes prevent them from miscalculating the value of HUMINT. The final critical element of the analysts information-process skill is temporal. In order for intelligence to do any good it needs to be in the right hands at the right time. Intelligence

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analysis, production and dissemination, therefore, ought to conclude at a point when the product is still relevant to policy considerations remember, timeliness is a prerequisite to usable intelligence. Rapidly shifting and changing situations, such as war, decrease this window of opportunity. Ultimately, analysts must ensure the appropriate consumers of intelligence have access and availability to their products before their perishable date. Thus, again, the quality of the analyst becomes central to the ability of intelligence to process information. Quality analysts, mindful and self-critical of potential perceptual distortions, employ evidence in judgment based on its balanced and fair diagnostic value in a timely manner. Newly developed scientific methods for intelligence analysis, such as Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), are assisting this effort (Brasfield, 2009). Additionally, quality analysts have developed cognitive tools (schemas) through their training and experience that are representative of the real world, flexible enough to adapt to evolution within targets, and that allow analysts to accurately detect significant patterns within volumes of information. These skills thus become central to producing intelligence that is useful and relevant to policy. Maintaining Professional Norms In addition to the methodological quality, analytical integrity becomes central to the maintenance of intelligence relevance. To maintain analytical integrity, intelligence analysts need to insulate themselves from societys prejudices and resist tendencies toward common perceptions and toward parochialism. Doing so improves estimation in that it avoids unnecessary, additional distortion. Analysts can avoid these negative cultural and organizational influences through independence of mind, nonconformity, and curiosity. Although, as Nesbitt and Ross point out, there is a natural tendency to form images upon first impressions and on the basis of relatively

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little information, analysts cognizant of such pressures can significantly reduce their effects (1980, p.172). They can also make parallel efforts to combat pressures to conform to organizational cultures by adopting common assumptions and to unnecessarily restrict intelligence to protect their unit. Analysts ought not to submit to pressures to conform or rivalry encouraged by specialization of intelligence units. As Bar-Joseph suggests, curiosity within responsible, professional analysts will lead them to look for the bigger picture in order to fully understand a research subject (2001). Analysts should strive for the courage to challenge organizational and societal pressures in the name of truth. Efforts to do so are efforts that avoid the pitfall of cognitive dissonance. The ultimate assessment of quality information processing and maintenance of analytical integrity should come from the intelligence consumer. The intelligence must justifiably motivate a perception of accuracy and relevance in the policymaker that instills a level of confidence sufficient to base political action. Communicating the intelligence appraisal appropriately, including its underlying facts and assumptions, is critical to inspiring such confidence. A product that withstands an intelligence-policy dialogue is much more likely to be employed. Ultimately, to create confidence the intelligence ought to ease policymaker fears of ambiguity and deception, thus reducing uncertainty. While analysts have long strived for political objectiveness in their assessments, analytical objectivity has only recently spawned great attention. Maintaining analytical objectivity through quality information processing and maintenance of analytical integrity requires as much careful attention and constant effort as required to maintain effective intelligence-policy relations. The product of such efforts is the elimination of intelligence

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analysts as a causal locus of intelligence irrelevance. Anything less than careful attention and constant effort begs intelligence consumers to ignore intelligence products. Policymakers as a Causal Locus Intelligence consumers, however, have the ultimate say in the employment or rejection of intelligence. As Amos Kovacs noted, it is in the mental steps of the decision-making process where the die is cast to use or not to use (1997, p.394). This decision may arise for various reasons, some proper, some improper and rectifiable. The latter causes will be discussed here. Policymakers may not employ intelligence due to inertia. Often, there is a distinct flow within political organizations, militaries and governments. As Kovacs points out, As a rule, people and organizations prefer not to act rather than to act. And they prefer to act according to previously decided plans rather than modify them (1997, p.398). Intelligence can embody all the prerequisites of usability and easily build confidence in decision-makers (if read) and still be ignored. Andrew S. Grove (1999) notes that: Senior managers got to where they are by having been good at what they do. And over time they have learned to lead with their strengths. So its not surprising that they will keep implementing the same strategic and tactical moves that work for them during the course of their careers especially [at critical moments]. I call this phenomenon the inertia of success. It is extremely dangerous and can reinforce denial. (p.127) Kirkpatrick (1969) notes parallels in the military sphere. He asserts that military decisionmakers ignore intelligence for many reasons, including because they simply do not care what the enemy is doing or can do. They have decided on an objective and are determined to accomplish it, regardless of what others might do (1969, p.15). This phenomenon is

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synonymous with incidents in which intelligence analysts cognitively block newly acquired information in maintenance of initial perceptions. Both phenomena are the effects of perceptual biases and both are potentially highly consequential. Deductively, therefore, a will to act, is a prerequisite for intelligence use. Also deductively, though, the act of willing is also a prerequisite for intelligence use. Policymakers must have already decided that action is necessary and that inaction is unacceptable. Only then does intelligence have a decision to support of which action to take. More personally, inertia within a policymakers mind may cause intelligence irrelevance. Intelligence may be ignored simply because it is not congruent with a policymakers preconceptions, dogmas or ideologies (Kovacs, 1999, p.400). Perceptions and appraisals of reality that are incongruent with their ideology are naturally denied as objective analysis [takes] a second seat to personal and emotional reactions (Grove, 1999, p.124). We have come to know this phenomenon as cognitive or strategic dissonance. A clear example is Stalins ignorance of a yearlong military buildup in Eastern Europe and eighty-seven separate, credible intelligence warnings prior to Operation Barbarossa and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The fundamental reason those warnings were ignored was because of Stalin preconceptions (Steury, 2006). Grove asserts that dissonance is an automatic reaction to strategic inflection (1999). If so, policymakers fail both intelligence and national, or organizational, security at the most pivotal moments - perceivably counterfactual strategic shifts. Indeed, as BarJoseph and Kruglanski (2003) point out, regarding the lead up to the Yom Kippur war, key figures with strong needs for cognitive closure: (1) placed an unusually high premium on clarity and coherence of their assessments (2) exhibited a high self-assured manner and an autocratic style of

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decision-making, and (3) tended to suppress, ignore, and reinterpret information inconsistent with their preconception until the very last hours before the outbreak of the war [which accounted] forthe general adherence to the tragically mistaken notion that war with Egypt and with Syria was unlikely. (p.92) Thus analysts who develop the courage to speak truthfully to powerful decision-makers do so at their own peril. As Johnson notes, speaking truth to power is notoriously difficult, because power often refuses to listen (2003, p.12). These phenomena are synonymous with incidents in which intelligence analysts allow the aggregation of evidence, memories and reasonable scenarios correlated with their long-held, but mal-adjusted, mindsets drive their estimate of probabilities, despite Betts warning. As discussed before, many decision-makers see themselves as their best intelligence analysts; however, they must recognize that they too are susceptible to the same cognitive and perceptual biases. Cognitive dissonance, though, is but one form of a larger issue, filtering. There are several forms of filtering sourced to the intelligence consumer. Intelligence that challenges inertia, mentioned above, is often filtered precisely because it bears bad news. Policymakers dislike hearing bad news as much or more than intelligence analysts dislike sharing it (Davis, 1995). Kovacs notes that narrowing ones field of vision and concentrating on those events perceived to be the most crucial is yet another self-imposed filter (1997). Yet the imperatives of daily decision-making, which limit the time available to read and digest intelligence, requires a consolidation of effort (Betts, 1978). Rationed vision, however, creates blind spots in policy, and, therefore, in intelligence, which compounds uncertainty. Lastly, some scholars assert that policymakers filter out intelligence analyses that are antithetical to their policy preferences. These scholars assert policymakers purposely select intelligence analyses that provide support

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for their preferences (Rovner, 2011; Lowenthal, 2008; Betts, 1978). In these cases, policymakers do not use intelligence as a tool to serve policy, but as a weapon to defend their standpoint and attack their political counterpart. Regardless, each form of filtering prematurely limits policy options and responses on the table. Of course, though, filters exist because of some inherent utility. They function similarly to mindsets and relate to temporal concerns and constraints. Policymakers often assert that they simply do not have sufficient time to read the volumes of intelligence reports that flood their desks (Davis, 1995; Davis, 1996; Haass, 2007). As one policymaker bluntly stated: I could not afford to read intelligence papers because this or that intelligence agency was entitled to produce them. It did not matter to me how much work the Agency had put into its products, or how polished they were in scholarly terms. In fact, I could not afford the time to read intelligence papers written by personal friends and colleagues. I could only read intelligence products tailored to help me get through my substantive schedule. There was no other rational choice. (Davis, 1995, p.5) Another recommended that analytical products not extend beyond two pages as he only had five minutes each day to dedicate to intelligence (Johnson, 2002, p.193-194).For policymakers, anything other than concise, tailored intelligence instinctively fails their needs. Intelligence should suit policymakers preferred format, however, it would be tragic if the US needlessly suffered a surprise attack because a policymaker simply could not make time to read a three-page report. Arrogance and inflexibility can be just as dangerous and cognitive biases.

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Moving Forward by Managing Intelligence Difficulties The above literature demonstrates that effective intelligence-policy relations and, by default, the relevance of intelligence are dependent upon an unnatural synergy between disparate parties. Although the nature of intelligence work ensures and reinforces the natural tensions inherent in intelligence-policy relations, often both analysts and policymakers needlessly aggravate those tensions by failing to overcome cognitive intelligence difficulties. (See Table 2.2) Such failures are highly consequential not only for national or organizational security, but also consequential for future intelligence-policy interaction. Thus the quality of intelligence analysts and policymakers highly influences the development of such a synergy. Additionally, calibrating relations early is likely to increase odds of efficacy for the long term, assuming continued careful thought and constant effort.

Table 2.2: Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance by Source

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Although there are significant structural and functional disparities between the intelligence and policy tribes, relations between the two do not need to be tense and intelligence does not ever need to be irrelevant. The key to accomplishing these goals has already been recognized by the scholarship, careful thought and constant effort. Within law enforcement, such thought and effort may already be in place. Thus, we must understand the current state of the relationship to be able to recommend any methods for improvement. Towards this aim, this study will investigate the status of current intelligence-policy relations in the law enforcement context. The data collected will be used to deduce appropriate actions to improve relations and reduce intelligence irrelevance. Given these goals, this exploratory and explanatory study investigates the following research questions: 1. Are law enforcement intelligence-policy relations frustrated by tribal disparities? 2. Do law enforcement policymakers ignore law enforcement strategic intelligence? 3. How can law enforcement intelligence-policy relations be improved to reduce incidence of intelligence irrelevance? Assumption of frustrated relations and a higher-than-negligible incidence of intelligence irrelevance, along with the concepts and assertions highlighted in this chapter, lead to the following hypotheses: 1. The prevalence of cognitive biases or dissonance in analysts or policymakers, as well as the level of security, filtering and inertia in the organization are all positively correlated to intelligence irrelevance (as they increase, intelligence irrelevance increases). 2. The level of intelligence marketing by analysts, level of policymaker volition, level of communication between analysts and policymakers, the amount of time available to devote to strategic intelligence and the level of confidence in strategic intelligence by

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analysts and policymakers are all negatively correlated to intelligence irrelevance (as they increase, intelligence irrelevance decreases). 3. Incidence of intelligence irrelevance can be reduced and intelligence-policy relations improved most effectively in the law enforcement context by focusing efforts on measurably reducing the variables positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance and measurably increasing those variables negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance. I anticipate support not only for the above hypotheses, but also for the data to support the appropriateness of the independent variables summarized by the literature.

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METHODOLOGY
In order to address the research questions and test the stated hypotheses, I conducted survey research that examines intelligence-policy relations at HIDTA programs both from the perspective of HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts as well as from HIDTA policymakers. This survey research will determine if, in fact, intelligence and policy are disconnected in law enforcement and if that disconnection causes frustration for either party. Data was also collected to determine the relevance of strategic intelligence within HIDTA. The survey research will also determine the level of synergy that currently exists between HIDTA intelligence analysts and their policymakers. This will be accomplished by evaluating the quantitative and qualitative survey data that directly reflect the level of intelligence marketing present, the level of analyst and policymaker submission to intelligence difficulties including cognitive biases, cognitive dissonance, security, filtering, time constraints, and the level of organizational inertia present in HIDTA programs. We can then deduce from the details of the present synergy, or lack thereof, appropriate measures that can reduce incidents of strategic intelligence irrelevance in law enforcement. The following methodology section will provide the details of this research. Survey Setting As stated above, the survey research conducted for this study was completed at HIDTA programs, programs key to counter-narcotic efforts. These programs are ideal for measuring law enforcement intelligence-policy relations and intelligence irrelevance as the national HIDTA program provides thirty-two individually managed HIDTA offices that assist federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement partners. Each HIDTA is responsible for producing its own strategy and its policymakers and analysts are employed by and representative of federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement levels. No other single population source is likely to be as generalizable

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as the HIDTA population. The generalizability of the study to the larger law enforcement community is also supported by the fact that the studys approach is not dependent upon the HIDTA mission or strategy. Rather, sampling the HIDTA program provides thirty-two potential case studies to verify whether intelligence irrelevance has translated over from the national security sector. The verification, then, highlights the high likelihood that law enforcement agencies and organizations other than the HIDTA program are afflicted by unnatural intelligence-policy relations and intelligence irrelevance. The HIDTA program functions to consolidate drug enforcement personnel and resources to more effectively combat drug trafficking in areas of the country considered to be major drug distribution channels. The first offices were opened in 1990, when the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) established five HIDTAs in New York City, Los Angeles, South Florida, Houston, and the Southwest Border. Today, thirty-two HIDTAs with representation from fifteen percent of US counties, covering fifty-eight percent of the US population, as well as all major federal, state, local and tribal drug enforcement organizations continue this mission in thirty-two targeted areas. (See Figure 3 for a map of HIDTA counties nation-wide) They fulfill this mission through 670 current initiatives throughout the country including: Enforcement initiatives comprising multi-agency investigative, interdiction, and prosecution activities; Intelligence and information-sharing initiatives; Support for programs that provide assistance beyond the core enforcement and intelligence and information-sharing initiatives; and

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Drug use prevention and drug treatment initiatives (High intensity drug, 2010)

Figure 3.1: HIDTA Program Counties 2010

The HIDTA intelligence initiatives specifically assist participating agencies develop a coordinated HIDTA strategy, identify new target and trends, develop threat assessments and drug market analyses, de-conflict targets and events, and manage cases. As described above, one of the four core missions of the national program is to enhance law enforcement intelligence sharing among Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies (High intensity drug, 2010). Towards this end, HIDTAs develop intelligence-driven initiatives to combat local drug threats (HIDTA program policy, 2009). Common initiatives include those directed towards identified drug trafficking corridors or areas, drug trafficking conveyances, drug finance methodologies, and drug-related crime (generally violent) threats.

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Tactical HIDTA intelligence analysts support multi-agency criminal investigators and task force officers within these initiatives with intelligence that directly supports areas of uncertainty within their investigations, particular attention given to investigative direction and focus (HIDTA program policy, 2009). Strategic HIDTA intelligence analysts work drug threats that are not investigation-specific, including intelligence related to the structure and movement of organized criminal elements, pattern of criminal activity, activity of criminal elements, projection of criminal trends, or projective planning (HIDTA program policy, 2009). Within many HIDTAs there is a large degree of cross-over between the roles of tactical and strategic analysts. It is not clear from the program policy, however, if the intelligence functions within the HIDTA program address the basic assumptions of counter-narcotic and HIDTA strategies, a role traditionally and commonly associated with strategic intelligence analysis. Rather, HIDTA program policy suggests intelligence analysts do not produce intelligence or strategic intelligence (HIDTA program policy, 2009). According to program policy, the drug threat assessment is the strategic intelligence product of each HIDTA; HIDTAs develop their strategy annually based on their annual drug threat assessment. Developing a strategy that can respond quickly to the current drug threat, though, is not an intelligence function. Intelligence functions to permit policymakers to preempt what will be, not to respond to what is. Thus, HIDTA threat assessments are overwhelmingly retrospective and operationally-focused. Nonetheless, HIDTA initiatives reside at the nexus of HIDTA strategic intelligence and HIDTA policymaking. (See Figure 4 for the intelligence-policy process) Each HIDTA possesses an executive board comprised of representatives from all federal, state, and local law enforcement participants. Initiatives are created and proposed for ONDCP approval through each HIDTAs executive board, their policymaking component. The Director of the ONDCP also

42

receives advice directly from the participating federal law enforcement agencies before making irectly federal the executive decision to fund a new HIDTA initiative (strategic element), whether a HIDTAecutive HIDTA specific or HIDTA-wide initiative Activity between the first two links in this process, the nexus wide initiative. of strategic intelligence and HIDTA policymaking, is the setting for thi study. The survey will this be disseminated through the HIDTA domain for voluntary participation by both HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts and HIDTA executive board members.

HIDTA Strategic Intelligence


Identify strategic threats and intelligence gaps

Propose initatives for funding to address threats and gaps

HIDTA Executive HIDTA Board

Federal Law Enforcement Agency Representatives


Advise on which initiatives to fund

Grants funding for HIDTA initiatives

Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy

New HIDTA Initiative

Figure 3.2 HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Process 3.2:

Survey Sample The sampling procedure to be used by the researcher will be purposive sampling The sampling. research questions further dictate a sampling focus on HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts and their policymakers. Thus sampling will be restricted to professionals with those roles within HIDTA programs. Intelligence analysts are easily discerned through their professional titles; however, participation will be limited to those HIDTA analysts that are involved in the production of strategic intelligence HIDTA policymakers, by contrast, hold numerous titles. intelligence. , titles Policymaking functions are executed within HIDTA executive boards. HIDTA executive boards executed generally include representation from all federal, state, local and tribal participants of that

43

HIDTA. Members of HIDTA executive boards, therefore, will be invited to participate in the policymaking sample. All members of both survey samples can potentially be sampled. Demographics The data collection phase of this study yielded 72 total responses, 40 policymaker responses and 32 strategic intelligence analyst responses. Of the 72 respondents who started the survey, 46 completed it, yielding a 63.9% completion rate. The 40 policymaker responses are estimated to represent 6.25% of the HIDTA policymaker population. The 32 strategic intelligence analyst responses are significantly more representative of the HIDTA strategic intelligence analyst population at an estimated 50%. Although the rate of questionnaire participation is not a variable of this study, it nonetheless is the first indicator of intelligencepolicy relations at HIDTA. The initial questions posed by the study questionnaires aimed to confirm respondents role at their HIDTA as well as collect demographic data reflecting the respondents HIDTA and level of law enforcement representation. Aggregate study data represents 21 of the 32 HIDTAs 5 HIDTAs fall under the Southwest Border HIDTA but are individually managed (See Appendix D for Study Demographics Figures). Of the twenty-one HIDTAs represented, ten include representation in both the policymaker and strategic intelligence analyst population. As expected, both the policymaker and analyst study participants represent several levels of law enforcement including federal, state, and local law enforcement. Such inclusion, coupled with the response rates, permit study findings to be suggestive of intelligence-policy relations at HIDTA as well as in law enforcement in general, but not generalizable.

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Data Collection Instruments, Variables, and Materials Given the large geographic disparity between HIDTA locations, this study relied on electronic surveys. A set of questionnaires were developed and distributed online utilizing the services of web-based survey site surveymonkey.com. The HIDTA email domain served as the primary distribution channel for data collection. Thus respondents were able to participate from natural, non-manipulative settings of their choice within the limits of locations in which they had access to the Internet. Two distinct surveys were developed and distributed separately to their corresponding sample. The two distinct samples represent the two nodes in the relationship: strategic intelligence analysts and intelligence customers/policymakers. The data collection process took place over the period of four weeks. Reminder invitations for the survey were distributed to increase respondent participation. Survey protocol was as follows: Day 1 Invitation to online survey instrument sent by e-mail, data collection began Day 14 Thank you/Reminder letter sent by e-mail Day 27 Additional thank you/reminder letter sent by e-mail Day 28 Data collection concluded Measures To determine if intelligence irrelevance is or is likely to become an obstacle for HIDTA strategic intelligence the questionnaire sought responses to questions relating to the existence of a relational disconnect and any resulting frustration, the relevance of intelligence to their organization, and specific measures of the causes of intelligence irrelevance asserted by the scholarship in the literature review. These variables were operationalized as follows:

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Intelligence Irrelevance To discern whether or not law enforcement intelligence-policy relations were plagued by tribal tensions and gaps the questionnaires asked respondents whether or not they believed they are connected to their intelligence-policy counterpart. If not, respondents were asked to report whether that disconnect causes them frustration. Follow-up questions aimed to measure whether or not law enforcement policymakers ignored strategic intelligence. Questions asked respondents to report the frequency of strategic intelligence production with the frequency of policymaker discussion of strategic intelligence products. Respondents were also asked directly to assess the relevance of strategic intelligence to HIDTA success and how to improve the utilization of strategic intelligence. The last question highlights the level to which participants are aware of the causes of reported intelligence-policy disconnection. Any recommendations outside of the ten independent variables included in this study provide opportunities for further research. These questions aimed to determine the level of intelligence-policy disconnection, the level of strategic intelligence irrelevance, and to validate the latter measure by asking indirect questions about strategic intelligence production and consumption. Cognitive Bias Cognitive bias has been asserted to be a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as bias reduces the policymaking value of intelligence products. Biased policymaking can undermine intelligence just the same. Respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to report the steps they take to remain objective in their strategic intelligence production or policymaking, respectively, as a measure of their susceptibility to cognitive bias in their given tasks. Thirteen potential steps were offered as well as an opportunity to list any other steps taken by the

46

respondent. This question aimed to measure HIDTA susceptibility to bias and to determine the correlation between cognitive bias and intelligence irrelevance. Cognitive Dissonance Cognitive dissonance is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as it leads policymakers to deny appraisals of reality (strategic intelligence assessments) that are inconsistent with their ideology or schema in favor of preserving that ideology or schema. Both study populations were asked to report the frequency of strategic intelligence production that is inconsistent or conflicts with policymaker beliefs or attitudes, the frequency of policymaker rejection or disbelief of those assessments, and the frequency of policymaker rationalization of those assessments. These questions aimed to measure the presence of cognitive dissonance in HIDTA policymakers and determine how they alleviate the resulting tension. Additionally, these questions aimed to determine the correlation between cognitive dissonance and irrelevance. Security. Security is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as security considerations limit the availability and accessibility of strategic intelligence to potential users, thus undermining the intelligence-policy process. Security measures can also limit the availability and accessibility of critical sources necessary for the production of valuable strategic intelligence. This undermines the intelligence process directly and the intelligence-policy process indirectly. To determine the level to which security impacts intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with intelligence irrelevance in HIDTA, analysts were asked to report the availability of critical sources of strategic intelligence/information as well as the frequency that security policies restrict their access to critical strategic intelligence sources, impede the production of useful intelligence, and delay the production of useful intelligence. Policymakers were asked to report the availability of strategic intelligence products as well as the frequency that security

47

policies restrict their access to critical strategic intelligence, impede their use of strategic intelligence, and delay their use of strategic intelligence. Filtering Filtering is asserted as a cause for intelligence irrelevance, as filters color the information that reaches a policymaker and often adversely impact its timeliness. In effort to determine the level to which filters impact intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with intelligence irrelevance, respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to report the number of personnel/parties that must approve strategic intelligence products before they reach the policymakers, report the frequency that these approvals/revisions delay the production of useful strategic intelligence, and report how these measures affect the utility of the product. Organizational Inertia Organizational inertia is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance when policymakers prefer not to act rather than act, and to act in accordance with previous decisions rather than alter them. The logic follows, policymakers simply may not care about what is going on, but have decided on an objective and/or strategy and intend to achieve or implement it. To determine the level to which organizational inertia impacts intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with intelligence irrelevance the questionnaire asked respondents to describe their strategy, to report the length of time their strategy has largely remained the same, the level of success of their strategy, and to judge whether or not strategic intelligence can improve their strategy. Marketing Insufficient marketing of intelligence is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as policymakers are consumed by their substantive schedules and cannot innately know which

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information and assessments are most deserving of their limited time. Policymakers often devote their time to the people, issues, and information that most press for it. To measure the level to which HIDTA marketing impacts intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with intelligence irrelevance respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to report the amount of time spent marketing strategic intelligence products to policymakers. Volition Volition is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance, as policymakers must be willing and have decided to act for intelligence to be relevant to its organization. If policymakers have not decided to act then they are not likely to value intelligence assessments. To measure the level to which volition impacts intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with irrelevance respondents, both analysts and policymakers, were asked to judge the likelihood that their Executive Board would be willing to do what is necessary to modify their strategies and plans. Respondents should have been asked whether or not they have decided policy or strategy change (action) is necessary, however, the researcher misinterpreted the concept of volition. Communication Insufficient frequency or low quality communication between intelligence analysts and policymakers is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance as low professional cooperation intensifies natural gaps and tensions within intelligence-policy relations. To measure the level to which communication impacts intelligence-policy and is correlated with intelligence irrelevance, respondents were asked to report the frequency in which intelligence produced is easily digestible (a measure of quality), the frequency in which intelligence produced includes assessments of source reliability and analytical confidence, their general satisfaction with the timeliness, format, content, communication, and responsiveness of/with strategic intelligence, the

49

frequency in which policymakers and strategic intelligence analysts directly communicate, and whether or not analysts normally attend their Executive Board meetings. Time Producing valuable strategic intelligence requires a significant investment of time, both in terms of production and marketing. Employing strategic intelligence also generally requires a significant temporal investment. Strategic intelligence is apt to become irrelevant if either side, intelligence or policymakers, devote insufficient amounts of time to these efforts. To measure the level to which temporal attributes impact HIDTA intelligence-policy relations and correlate with intelligence irrelevance respondents were asked to report the frequency in which they produce/utilize strategic intelligence, the percentage of their time they devote to strategic intelligence, to qualify their temporal investment, and to report their overall satisfaction with the timeliness of strategic intelligence. Confidence For policymakers to base political action on intelligence, intelligence products must overcome ambiguity, avert deception, and motivate a perception of accuracy and relevance in policymakers that is sufficient to justify action. To this end, confidence must be achieved by both analysts and policymakers in intelligence products as well as intelligence processes. To measure the level to which confidence impacts HIDTA intelligence-policy relations and is correlated with intelligence irrelevance respondents were asked to report the relevance of strategic intelligence to their HIDTA, their level of belief that their strategy can be improved through strategic intelligence, to general confidence in their strategic intelligence processes and products, and whether or not analytical confidence was normally included in strategic products.

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Data Analysis As mentioned previously, the study collected quantitative and qualitative data to address the research questions. Descriptive statistical analysis was conducted on collected quantitative data. Quantitative and qualitative data representative of the dependent and ten independent variables were analyzed for statistical significance in terms of central tendency and variance for both aggregate data as well as data representative of intelligence irrelevance. Surveymonkey.com automatically extracted quantitative data from the questionnaires for construction of that data into a Microsoft Excel sheet for manipulation and analysis. Furthermore, a set of matrices were constructed by the researcher to assist in data analysis. The matrices categorized responses offered by each question into one of three options: low, moderate, or high (See Tables 3& 4). Response options were assigned to matrix categories logically according to the researcher. The subjective nature of the development of these tools need not undermine the study findings since the statistical correlation between aggregate results and those representative of intelligence irrelevance are the primary sources for this studys findings and conclusions. The matrices only serve to assist in data analysis and to graphically display summarized data results. Analyzing the results in this manner permits the production of a prescriptive methodology for HIDTAs to mitigate, or more favorably, eliminate strategic intelligence irrelevance. All survey questions were also analyzed thematically in context of the three research questions and hypotheses.

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Marketing Volition Communication
- All Intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence normally included in SI products - % of time devoted is 20% - PMs judged/self proclaim to be likely or highly likely to be willing to modify strategy - Direct communication between IAs & PMs: Weekly, Monthly or Quarterly - IAs/PMs very satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IAs normally attend Executive Board meetings - PMs judged/self proclaim that chances are even that they are willing to modify strategy -% of time devoted is 1020% - Disparity between judgment and self proclaimed willingness to modify strategy (one high, one low; one moderate, one high or low)

Time
- Yearly or more frequent intelligence production/use - Analyst - +50% of time devoted - PM - >5% of time devoted - Self judgment of time more than enough or much more than enough for IAs and PMs -IAs/PMs very satisfied with timeliness of SI - Analyst 30-50% of time devoted - PM 2-5% devoted - Self judgment of time about right for IAs and PMs - IAs/PMs somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI

Confidence
- SI judged relevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy can be improved through SI - IAs judged/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - PMs judgment/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence included in products

Higher

- Many intelligence productions are easily digestible - Direct communication between IAs & PMs: Every 6 months or yearly -- IAs/PMs somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart

- SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IAs judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI - PMs judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI

Lower

- Few or no intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence not normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IAs &PMs: Less than Yearly - IAs/PMs somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IAs do not know how often SI products are inconsistent with PM beliefs or attitudes, or how often PMs reject/disbelieve or rationalize SI to relieve tension caused by dissonance - IAs normally do not attend Executive Board meetings - Less than annual intelligence production/use - Analyst 0-30% of time devoted - PM 0-1% of time devoted - Self judgment of time not enough or not nearly enough for IAs and PMs - IAs/PMs somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI - SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy cannot be improved through SI - IAs judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - PMs judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence not included in products

- % of time devoted is <10%

- PMs judged/self proclaim to be unlikely or highly unlikely to be willing to modify strategy

Table 3.1: HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations


IA Intelligence Analyst, PM Policymaker, SI Strategic Intelligence

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Cognitive Bias Cognitive Dissonance
- Incidence of PMs rejection or disbelief in SI consistent or greater than incidence of SI products that are inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PMs rationalization of SI findings consistent or greater than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

Security
- Critical SI sources unavailable or generally unavailable to IAs - SI unavailable or generally unavailable to PMs - Security policies routinely restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies routinely impede SI production/use - Security policies routinely delay use of SI - Critical SI sources occasionally available to IAs

Filtering
- # of revisions/approvals more than 5 before use by PM - Revisions routinely delay production/use - Level of revision judged to remove all SI product utility

Inertia
- Strategy largely unchanged for 4+ years - Unfamiliar with current strategy - Do not believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat unsuccessful or unsuccessful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission - Strategy largely unchanged for 2-3 years - Vague sense of current strategy - SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission

-Average of 0-4 steps (listed on survey) taken by IAs and PMs to reduce bias

Higher

- Average of 5-9 steps (listed on survey) taken by IAs and PMs to reduce bias

- Incidence of PMs rejection or disbelief in SI 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PMs rationalization of SI findings 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

- SI occasionally available to PMs - Security policies occasionally restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies occasionally impede SI production/use - Security policies occasionally delay use of SI - Critical SI sources generally or readily available to IAs

- # of revisions/approvals 2-5 before use by PM - Revisions occasionally delay production/use - Level of revision judged to take away from SI product utility

Lower

-Average of 10 or more steps (listed on survey) taken by IAs and PMs to reduce bias

- No incidence of PMs rejection or disbelief in SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - No incidence of PMs rationalization of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

- SI generally or readily available to PMs - Security policies rarely or never restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies rarely or never impede SI production/use - Security policies rarely or never delay use of SI

- # of revisions/approvals 0-2 before use by PM - Revision rarely or never delays production/use - Level of revision judged to be about right, not enough or not nearly enough

- Strategy largely unchanged for less than 2 years - Familiar with current strategy - Believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged relevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission

Table 3.2: HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations


IA Intelligence Analyst, PM Policymaker, SI Strategic Intelligence

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RESULTS
The study questionnaire posed a total of 36 questions. Demographic inquiries aside, each question will be discussed as it relates to the 11 total variables measured in this thesis: 1 dependent variable (intelligence irrelevance) and 10 independent variables (causes of intelligence irrelevance). Intelligence Irrelevance Study results suggest that law enforcement intelligence-policy relations are moderately plagued by tribal disparities and that law enforcement policymakers do ignore strategic intelligence. The number of respondents reporting to believe they are disconnected from their intelligence-policy counterpart was lower than expected, but still notable. Eleven of thirty analysts, or 36.7%, report disconnection while seven of thirty-two policymakers, or 21.9%, report the same in their intelligence-policy relations. Interestingly, ten of the twenty-one HIDTAs represented, or 47.6%, report a disconnection by an analyst, policymaker or both. Out of the ten HIDTAs represented by the data on both the analyst and policymaker side only the North Texas HIDTA had a respondent from both populations report disconnection. This result demonstrates the level of inconsistency in intelligence-policy relations and thus emphasizes the level of relational disconnection in HIDTA. Most respondents are not even aware that their counterpart believes they are disconnected. While these results confirm that natural gaps and tensions plague intelligence-policy relations, the level of frustration caused by intelligence-policy disconnection was also less than anticipated, but still notable. One of six policymakers, or 16.7%, and three of ten analysts, or 30%, reporting disconnection also reported frustration caused by that disconnection (See Appendix E for Intelligence-Policy Disconnection Figures). Although the reasons for this result

54 are unclear, the greater level of frustration among analysts appears to support the assertion that policymakers can succeed without intelligence analysts, but the opposite is not true. This result suggests that even though analysts and policymakers are active participants in the relationship, the weight of ensuring effective intelligence-policy relations rests nearly exclusively on the HIDTA analysts shoulders. This can easily lead to ineffective relations as HIDTA analysts are not in a position to compel their policymakers to pay attention to their estimates. Study responses reflecting the frequencies of strategic intelligence production and executive discussion of those products confirm this relational weakness. Over four-fifths of analysts, or 82.2%, report that strategic intelligence is produced weekly, monthly, or quarterly, however, less than half report that it these products are discussed by executives as frequently. Most are not sure how frequently their products are discussed by policymakers. Less than half of policymakers, however, report that strategic intelligence is produced weekly, monthly or quarterly. Most report it is produce yearly, however, discussed at board meetings quarterly. Nearly one-fourth of policymakers, however, or 23.3%, do not know how often strategic intelligence is produced at their HIDTA. The substantial level of relational opacity and inconsistency demonstrated by these results not only confirms HIDTA intelligence-policy disconnection, but suggests it was under-reported. Ironically, when asked directly, an encouraging number of analysts and policymakers report that strategic intelligence is relevant to their success. Specifically, 82.1% of HIDTA analysts and 66.7% of HIDTA policymakers report that strategic intelligence is relevant (See Appendix F for Intelligence Irrelevance Figures). This result confirms that HIDTA analysts see their work as more relevant to HIDTA success than their policymakers. Again, the disconnection in these results supports the assertion that policymakers can succeed without intelligence

55 analysts. A third of policymakers (N=10) believe they can successfully fulfill their mission without strategic intelligence. Half as many analysts feel the same way. Although no respondent, analyst or policymaker, reported strategic intelligence as irrelevant to HIDTA success, the number reporting the function as somewhat relevant or irrelevant suggests law enforcement policymakers do ignore strategic intelligence. If it was never ignored, strategic intelligence would be reported as relevant by all analysts and policymakers. Furthermore, intelligence-policy disconnection and intelligence irrelevance are positively correlated. HIDTAs with at least one respondent reporting strategic intelligence as somewhat relevant/irrelevant account for 83.3% of reports of intelligence-policy disconnection. Thus, less than one-fifth of reported disconnection is associated with relevant intelligence. This high correlation demonstrated between intelligence-policy disconnection and intelligence irrelevance supports scholarly assertions that intelligence-policy relations are riddled with natural tensions and gaps, and that they often lead to intelligence-irrelevance. This correlation also raises the question as to whether HIDTA policymakers are managing intelligence professionals with an intuitive sagacity, as Sun Tzu recommended so many years ago. The notable levels of intelligence-policy disconnection and intelligence irrelevance would suggest that HIDTA policymakers are doing so only if they sincerely view intelligence as more of a threat than an asset to HIDTA strategy and policy. Regardless, it appears clear that the reciprocative skepticism that has largely and historically characterized intelligence-policy relations has translated to the law enforcement environment. The last question posed to respondents regarding the relevance of intelligence asked how to improve the use of strategic intelligence at HIDTA. Content Analysis (or text analysis) of the responses suggests analysts and policymakers are most concerned with communication,

56 organizational inertia, time, and marketing. Of the responses collected, 45.5% related to issues in communications, 18.2% related to organizational inertia, 15.2% related to time, 12.1% related to marketing, 6.1% related to policymaker volition and security, 3.0% related to confidence. Respondents did not answer that cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance or filtering were problems. Recommendations outside of this studys variables included the following: improving the general quality of strategic intelligence products, increasing resources and analysts, expanding the role of strategic intelligence analysts, increasing training, and prioritizing intelligence projects. While policymaker recommendations focused heavily on improving communication and the need for more analysts and marketing, analyst recommendations focused on communication and organizational inertia. These responses demonstrate that both HIDTA analysts and policymakers see significant opportunities to improve the relevance of strategic intelligence. Analysis of responses measuring the independent variables of this study will highlight if these recommendations are on target. Cognitive Bias As stated above, cognitive bias causes intelligence irrelevance by undermining its objectivity, a central pillar of intelligence function. The aggregate results measuring the level of cognitive bias indicate that there are significant opportunities for HIDTA analysts and policymakers to decrease bias in their assignments. While analysts report a mean number of 7.2 steps taken to remain objective in their assessments, policymakers report a mean number of 4.9 steps taken to remain objective (See Appendix G for Cognitive Bias Figures). Analysts are most likely to employ creative thinking or brainstorming (95.2%, N=20), and they frequently critically assess the reliability of sources (81%, N=17). They are least likely to modify perceptions in the face of incongruent evidence (28.6%, N=6), or employ efforts to detect deception (33.3%, N=7).

57 Policymaker responses suggest they are more biased than analysts. Policymakers are most likely to employ creative thinking or brainstorming (87%, N=20), and resist tendencies toward common perceptions (60.9%, N=14). They are least likely to consciously avoid cognitive anchors (13%, N=3), or seek to disconfirm, rather than confirm, hypotheses (17.4%, N=4). These results demonstrate that HIDTA policymakers are likely more biased in their decision-making that HIDTA analysts are in producing strategic intelligence. Cognitive bias increases, though, when filtering out those responses representative of intelligence irrelevance. Analysts who report strategic intelligence as somewhat relevant/irrelevant (A-SR/Is) and policymakers who reported strategic intelligence as somewhat relevant/irrelevant (P-SR/Is) report they take fewer steps to avoid cognitive bias than the mean analyst and policymaker respondent. A-SR/Is report a mean number of 5.7 steps taken to remain objective in producing intelligence. However, no A-SR/Is report they consciously prohibit their expectations from influencing their analyses, consciously avoid cognitive anchors, or insulate themselves from societal prejudices. Furthermore, only a third (N=1) report they seek to disconfirm, rather than confirm, hypotheses; equally consider causality, randomness, accident and error; employ efforts to detect deception; or modify perceptions in face of incongruent evidence. P-SR/Is report a mean number of 3.75 steps taken to remain objective in policymaking, suggesting they are the most biased population sampled. No P-SR/Is report they seek to disconfirm, rather than confirm, hypotheses or employ efforts to detect deception. Furthermore, only 12.5% (N=1) report they consciously avoid cognitive anchors; equally consider causality, randomness, accident and error; modify perceptions in the face of incongruent evidence; use words of estimative probability; or insulate themselves from societal prejudices. These results demonstrate an unnerving level of bias in HIDTA intelligence and policymaking

58 processes and products. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that cognitive bias is positively correlated with intelligence, as hypothesized. Aggregate Central Tendency
Method # Steps Mean Measure 6.00

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Std Dev Measure 4.65

SR/I Central Tendency


Method Mean Measure 4.20

SR/I Variability
Method Std Dev Measure 1.61

Table 4.1: Cognitive Bias Results

Cognitive Dissonance Cognitive dissonance causes intelligence irrelevance when policymakers relieve the tension caused by incongruence or confliction between objective reality and their cognitive schema by rejecting analyses reflective of objective reality, or in other words, they ignore intelligence. Measures of cognitive dissonance were overwhelmingly unfamiliar to both analyst and policymaker respondents, however, both populations reported these phenomena occur (See Appendix H for Cognitive Dissonance Figures). Most analysts (73%) report they do not know the frequency of: strategic intelligence being inconsistent with or contradictory to policymaker beliefs or attitudes, policymakers rejecting or disbelieving inconsistent strategic intelligence, or policymakers rationalizing inconsistent strategic intelligence as agreeable with their beliefs or attitudes. Additionally, most policymakers (58.7%) report they do not know the frequency of these phenomena. Analysts reporting otherwise, however, report that policymakers rationalize strategic intelligence findings as agreeable with their beliefs or attitudes more frequently than they report them to be inconsistent with their beliefs and attitudes. Policymaker responses report the same results. Policymakers also report they reject or disbelieve strategic intelligence findings when they are inconsistent or conflict with their beliefs or attitudes nearly as frequently as they are inconsistent or conflict with their beliefs and attitudes. These results suggest cognitive

59 dissonance is likely an issue in HIDTA intelligence-policy relations and that it likely causes some level of intelligence irrelevance. However, more data is necessary to confirm these assertions. Reporting from P-SR/Is and A-SR/Is closely parallels these results, thus preventing a confident deduction of correlation between cognitive dissonance and intelligence irrelevance. ASR/Is and P-SR/Is report that rejection, disbelief and rationalization occur, but occur slightly less frequently than incidence of intelligence inconsistency with policy schemas. A none or never answer was not offered. Respondents wishing to communicate that answer may explain the large number of I dont know responses. These results demonstrate that further research is needed to confirm the level of cognitive dissonance present in law enforcement and its correlation to intelligence irrelevance. Nonetheless, the data available suggests that cognitive dissonance occurs within HIDTA, both when intelligence is relevant and when it is less than relevant. Aggregate Central Tendency
Method Incidence of Inconsistency v. Incidence of Rejection/Disbe lief Incidence of Inconsistency v. Incidence of Rejection/Disbe lief Measure

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Measure Quarterl y-Less than Yearly

SR/I Central Tendency


Method Measure

SR/I Variability
Method Measure Quarterl y-Less than Yearly

Mode

I Don't Know

Range

Mode

I Don't Know

Range

Mode

I Don't Know

Range

Quarterl y-Less than Yearly

Mode

I Don't Know

Range

Quarterl y-Less than Yearly

Table 4.2: Cognitive Dissonance Results

60 Security Security is an aspect central to understanding intelligence irrelevance. Security can undermine intelligence-policy relations and processes by limiting the availability and accessibility of intelligence and its sources. The aggregate results collected measuring security demonstrates that HIDTA security measures do not substantially impact intelligence-policy relations. Policymakers and analysts report that strategic intelligence and its critical sources are generally available (See Appendix I for Security Figures). Most policymakers (72%, N=18) report security measures never or rarely restrict their access to strategic intelligence. Most policymakers also report security measures never or rarely impede or delay their use of strategic intelligence, 84% (N=21) and 80% (N=20) respectively. Analysts, however, report security measures impacting intelligence-policy relations to a greater degree. Many analysts (42.9%, N=9) report security measures occasionally restrict their access to critical sources of strategic intelligence. Two thirds of analysts (N=14), however, report security measures never or rarely impede or delay their production of strategic intelligence. Thus, security measures in HIDTA are unlikely to significantly and adversely impact intelligence-policy relations as they do not substantially impact the availability or accessibility of strategic intelligence or its critical sources. A-SR/I and P-SR/I results suggest that security measures may be related to intelligence irrelevance, though further exploration is needed. A-SR/I reporting, particularly, demonstrates a notable association between security measures and intelligence irrelevance. Two of three ASR/Is report that critical sources of strategic information/intelligence are generally unavailable. Additionally, one A-SR/I (33.3%) reports security measures routinely restrict access to critical strategic intelligence sources and one A-SR/I (33.3%) reports security measures routinely delaying the production of useful intelligence. Furthermore, two of three A-SR/Is report that

61 security policies occasionally impede the production of useful strategic intelligence. Of P-SR/I responses, one of eight reports security measures routinely impacting intelligence-policy relations. One P-SR/I also reports security measures routinely impeding the use of strategic intelligence. Most P-SR/Is (75%, N=6) report security measures rarely or never restrict their access to strategic intelligence. Additionally, most P-SR/Is (87.5%, N=7) report security measures rarely or never impede or delay their use of strategic intelligence. Nonetheless, SR/I responses demonstrate an increase in adverse impacts of security measures. Cumulatively, these results demonstrate that security, particularly measuring adversely impacting the availability and accessibility of resources analysts need, is likely positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

62 Aggregate Central Tendency


Method Measure

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Measure Generall y Unavaila bleReadily Availabl e; I Don't Know Generall y Unavaila bleReadily Availabl e; I Don't Know NeverRoutinel y; I Don't Know NeverRoutinel y; I Don't Know NeverRoutinel y; I Don't Know

SR/I Central Tendency


Method Measure

SR/I Variability
Method Measure Generall y Unavail ableOccasio nally Availabl e Generall y Unavail ableReadily Availabl e; I Don't Know NeverRoutinel y NeverRoutinel y NeverRoutinel y

Availability of SI Sources

Mode

Generall y Availabl e

Range

Mode

Generall y Unavaila ble

Range

Availability of SI

Mode

Multimo dal: Occasion ally, Generall y, Readily Availabl e Rarely

Range

Mode

Occasion ally Availabl e

Range

Frequency of Restricting Access Frequency of Impeding Production/ Use Frequency of Delaying Production/ Use

Mode

Range

Mode

Never

Range

Mode

Rarely

Range

Mode

Rarely

Range

Mode

Rarely

Range

Mode

Rarely

Range

Table 4.3: Security Results

Filtering Filters impact the relevance of intelligence by coloring the information that reaches intelligence producers and consumers, thus undermining the comprehensive objectivity of intelligence. The results of aggregate data collected relating to the impact of filtering demonstrates that filters have little impact on HIDTA intelligence-policy relations. Twenty-one analyst responses report a total of sixty-four revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 3.05, mode of 3, and median of 3 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA

63 policymakers (See Appendix J for Filtering Figures). The analyst-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 1.69. Additionally, most analysts report these measures rarely delay the production of useful strategic intelligence and are about right to make the product useful. Policymaker responses generally parallel those of provided by HIDTA analysts. Twenty-two policymaker responses report a total of forty-six revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 2.09, mode of 3, and median of 2 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA policymakers. The policymaker-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 1.54. Additionally, policymakers report these measures rarely delay the production of useful strategic intelligence and are about right to make the product useful. These results demonstrate that HIDTA filters do not substantially impact intelligence-policy relations. SR/I reporting demonstrates, however, that filters are positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance. A-SR/Is report a total of thirteen revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 4.33 and median of 3 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA policymakers. A-SR/I-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 3.21. Two of three ASR/Is report these measures take away from the utility of their product. A-SR/Is and P-SR/Is both report that these measures occasionally delay the use of strategic intelligence. P-SR/Is report a total of twenty revisions/approvals yielding a mean of 2.86, mode of 2 and median of 3 revisions/approvals before strategic intelligence products reach HIDTA policymakers. The PSR/I-reported numbers possess a standard deviation of 0.90. P-SR/I reporting concurs with aggregate policymaker and aggregate analyst reporting that these measures are about right to make the products useful. Cumulatively, though, these results demonstrate that filters are positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

64 Aggregate Central Tendency


Method # Revisions/ Approvals Delay of Production/Us e Caused Mean Measure 2.56

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Std Dev Measure 1.67 NeverRoutinel y; I Don't Know; NA Takes AwayNot Enough

SR/I Central Tendency


Method Mean Measure 3.3

SR/I Variability
Method Std Dev Measure 1.83

Mode

Rarely

Range

Mode

Occasio nally

Range

NeverRoutinel y Takes AwayNot Enough

Judgment of Revisions/ Approvals

Mode

About Right

Range

Mode

About Right

Range

Table 4.4: Filtering Results

Organizational Inertia Organizational inertia is asserted as a cause of intelligence irrelevance when policymakers prefer not to act rather than act, and to act in accordance with previous decisions rather than alter them. Study responses suggest HIDTAs likely suffer from substantial organizational inertia. The key elements of the HIDTA strategy include: enforcement, prosecution, intelligence, information technology (IT), training, de-confliction, information sharing, administration (management and coordination), and prevention. Analysts and policymakers nearly across the board confuse their strategy with their mission, and their descriptions of their strategy largely ignore all the elements listed above aside from enforcement (See Appendix K for Organizational Inertia Figures and Tables). Content analysis of study responses demonstrates analysts conveyed an average (mean) knowledge of 16% of their strategy. Policymakers conveyed a mean knowledge of 18.3% of their strategy. These results suggest analysts and policymakers are either overwhelmingly unfamiliar with their HIDTA strategy or that the stated strategy, although conceptually appropriate, is institutionally an

65 illusion. If analysts and policymakers are overwhelmingly unfamiliar with their strategy this is a strong indicator that HIDTAs prefer to act in accordance with the current inertia of their enforcement activity, regardless of the stated strategy or current objective reality. An illusory HIDTA strategy would result from the same cognitive process. The following results measuring organizational inertia must then be taken with a grain of salt. Both analysts and policymakers report their strategy has been largely the same for more than 5 years. Both analysts and policymakers also judge their strategy as successful in achieving the HIDTA mission. Ironically, though, both analysts and policymakers believe their strategy can be improved through strategic intelligence. Thus, although analysts and policymakers are substantially unfamiliar with their largely unchanged and reportedly successful strategy, they think it can be improved through strategic intelligence. It is unclear how much they believe the strategy can be improved; however, the results suggest they do not believe it can be improved substantially. Nonetheless, even discounting the inherent difference in views of the relevance of strategic intelligence, SR/I reporting still demonstrates that organizational inertia is positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance. Most SR/I responses match aggregate reporting that their strategy has remained largely the same for more than five years, but responses are less variable. SR/I respondents are even less familiar with their strategy, though, demonstrating a mean knowledge of 12.95%. Obviously, SR/I respondents view strategic intelligence as less than relevant somewhat relevant/irrelevant. Most SR/I respondents see their strategy as somewhat successful; however, they believe it can be improved through strategic intelligence. Cumulatively, these results demonstrate that organizational inertia is positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

66 Aggregate Central Tendency


Method Years Strategy Largely Unchanged Familiarity with Strategy Level of Belief SI Can Improve Strategy Mode Measure More than 5 Years 17.10%

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Range Measure < 1 Year ->5 Years 26.60%

SR/I Central Tendency


Method Mode Measure More than 5 Years 12.95%

SR/I Variability
Method Range Measure 1-2 Years - > 5 Years 7.97%

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std Dev

Mode

Yes

Range

No-Yes

Mode

Yes

Range

Yes

Relevance of SI

Mode

Relevant

Range

Somewh at Irrelevan tRelevant Somewh at Unsucce ssfulSuccessf ul; I Don't Know

Mode

Somewh at Relevant

Range

Somewh at Irrelevan tSomewh at Relevant Somewh at Unsucce ssfulSuccessf ul

Judgment of Strategy Success

Mode

Successf ul

Range

Mode

Somewh at Successf ul

Range

Table 4.5: Organizational Inertia Results

Marketing Not all politically useful intelligence is naturally employed. Intelligence often requires marketing effort to achieve relevance. The aggregate results demonstrate sparse marketing by HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts. Twenty-four analyst responses yielded a mean of 4.8, mode of 0, and median 4 percent of their time devoted to marketing their products. Analyst responses demonstrated a standard deviation of 5.36. Twenty-two policymaker responses yielded a mean of 5.8%, mode of 0, and median of 3 percent of their strategic intelligence analysts time is devoted to marketing to them. Policymaker responses demonstrated a standard deviation of

67 8.15. These results demonstrate that HIDTA analysts spend nowhere near a third of their time marketing their products, as recommended by policymakers in Chapter 2. Those policymakers would consider the level of HIDTA strategic intelligence marketing foolish and a disservice to HIDTA policymakers. Undoubtedly, these results suggest marketing is a significant opportunity to improve intelligence-policy relations. The marketing results are worse when filtering for responses representative of irrelevance. While analysts that report their products are less than relevant to their HIDTA also report they spend more time marketing their products, policymakers reporting that strategic intelligence is less than relevant to their HIDTA report their analysts spend nearly no time marketing their products. The five A-SR/I responses yielded a mean of 8.20, mode of 5, and median 5 percent of their time devoted marketing their products. A-SR/I reported yielded a standard deviation of 7.3 percent. A-SR/I results were skewed by one analysts reporting they spend 20% of their time marketing their products, the most reported by any analyst participating in the study. Conversely, the seven P-SR/I responses yielded a mean 2.14, mode of 0, and median 0 percent of their strategic intelligence analysts time devoted to marketing analytical products to them. P-SR/I reporting yielded a standard deviation of 3.9 percent. Five of the seven P-SR/I respondents reported their analysts devote 0 percent of their time marketing their products. Combined, aggregate analyst and policymaker reporting, however, yields a mean of 5.26 percent of time devote to marketing while combined SR/I reporting yields a mean 4.67 percent of time devote to marketing. Intelligence marketing, thus, is demonstrably negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

68 Aggregate Central Tendency


Method % of Time Spent Mean Measure 5.26%

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Std Dev Measure 6.77%

SR/I Central Tendency


Method Mean Measure 4.67%

SR/I Variability
Method Std Dev Measure 6.14%

Table 4.6: Marketing Results

Volition For intelligence to be relevant to any policymaker he or she must be willing and have decided to act where the subsequent decision on which action to take requires intelligence support. The collected data do not directly measure HIDTA policymaker volition due to a misinterpretation by the researcher. The collected data do, however, form a foundation for significant HIDTA policymaker volition (See Appendix L for Volition Figures). Analyst responses demonstrate that 80% (N=20) of HIDTA analysts believe their Executive Board is likely or highly likely to be willing to do what is necessary to modify their strategies and plans. Policymaker responses demonstrate that 92% (N=23) of HIDTA policymakers feel the same way. These results are encouraging as a policymaker will to act is a prerequisite of a decision to act, and therefore of intelligence relevance. Only one policymaker communicated an overt action to support strategic policymaking the hiring of a strategic intelligence analyst. This highlights the difference between the willingness to act and the act of willing action, of deciding action is necessary. Further data is needed to assess policymaker volition in HIDTA and the law enforcement context. Nonetheless, reporting representative of intelligence irrelevance demonstrate a decrease in policymaker willingness to act. Most A-SR/Is, 60% (N=3), report they believe their executive board is less than likely to modify its strategy and plans 40% reporting chances are even and

69 20% reporting such change is highly unlikely. While most P-SR/Is, 75% (N=6) report their boards are likely or highly likely to be willing to modify its strategy or plans, 25% (N=2), report those chances are even, more than reported in aggregate policymakers report. These results suggest volition may be negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance. Aggregate Central Tendency
Method PM Proclamation of Willingness to Modify Strategy IA Judgment of PM Willingness to Modify Strategy Disparity Between the Two Measure

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Measure Chances are EvenHighly Likely Highly UnlikelyHighly Likely

SR/I Central Tendency


Method Measure Multimodal: Likely, Highly Likely Multimodal: Chances are Even, Likely

SR/I Variability
Method Measure Chances are EvenHighly Likely Highly UnlikelyLikely

Mode

Likely

Range

Mode

Range

Mode

Likely

Range

Mode

Range

None

Minimal

Moderate

Moderate

Table 4.7: Volition Results

Communication As stated above, suboptimal communication, in terms of frequency or quality, intensifies the natural gaps and tension in intelligence-policy relations, thereby causing intelligence irrelevance. Aggregate results demonstrate that the frequency of intelligence-policy communication is a significant area to improve relations. Most analysts and policymakers, or 44.9%, report that many strategic intelligence products are easily digestible (See Appendix M for Communication Figures). Most analysts and policymakers, or 58.4%, also confirm that source reliability and analytical confidence are normally included in strategic intelligence products. Most analysts, however, 54.2% (N=13), report they directly communicate with their executive

70 board less than yearly. Policymaker responses are multimodal with 32% reporting they directly communicate with their strategic intelligence analysts weekly and 32% claiming to do so less than yearly. Additionally, only 25% of analysts and 24% of policymakers report they/their strategic intelligence analysts normally attend Executive Board meetings. Analyst and policymakers report they are satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the timeliness, format, content, communication and responsiveness of/with strategic intelligence analysts, though. These results demonstrate that the quality of HIDTA intelligence-policy communication is generally good; however, the quantity of direct communication can be substantially improved. Both the quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication decrease, though, when evaluating SR/I reporting. Most SR/I respondents, or 55%, report few strategic intelligence products are easily digestible. Most SR/I respondents, or 42.5%, also report that direct intelligence-policy communication occurs less than yearly (P-SR/I results are multimodal). SR/I satisfaction ratings skewed right (towards dissatisfaction). Most A-SR/Is report they are somewhat dissatisfied with the timeliness, format and content of strategic intelligence products. Aggregate SR/I reporting, however, demonstrates that these respondents are somewhat satisfied with the timeliness, format and content of strategic intelligence. A mean 66.7% of A-SR/Is do not know how often strategic intelligence products are inconsistent with policymaker beliefs or attitudes, or how often policymakers reject/disbelieve or rationalize strategic intelligence. A slightly larger percentage of SR/I respondents, or 76.9%, report strategic intelligence analysts do not normally attend their HIDTA Executive Board meetings. A lower percentage of SR/I responses, or 53.8%, confirm the inclusion of analytical confidence and source reliability in strategic intelligence. Cumulatively, SR/I reporting demonstrates a notable decrease in the

71 quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication. These results confirm that communication is negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized. Aggregate Central Tendency
Method Digestibility of SI Products Inclusion of Analytical Confidence and Source Reliability Frequency of Direct PM-IA Communication PM-IA Satisfaction with Timeliness, Format and Content of SI Normal IA Executive Board Attendance Mode Measure Many

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Range Measure None-All

SR/I Central Tendency


Metho d Mode Measure Few

SR/I Variability
Method Range Measure None-All

Mode

Yes

Range

No-Yes; I Don't Know

Mode

Yes

Range

No-Yes; I Don't Know WeeklyLess than Yearly Very Dissatisfie d -Very Satisfied

Mode

Less than Yearly Multimodal: Very Satisfied, Somewhat Satisfied

Range

WeeklyLess than Yearly Very DissatisfiedVery Satisfied

Mode

Less than Yearly Multimodal: Somewhat Satisfied, Somewhat Dissatisfied

Range

Mode

Range

Mode

Range

Mode

No

Range

No-Yes

Mode

No

Range

No-Yes

Table 4.8: Communication Results Time Effectively producing and consuming strategic intelligence requires significant investments of time by analysts and policymakers. If either party devote insufficient time to these projects then intelligence is liable to become irrelevant. Aggregate results relating to temporal attributes raise serious questions about what the study responses are measuring. Nonetheless, these results demonstrate that analysts and policymakers do not devote a sufficient amount of time to producing or employing non-investigation-specific intelligence. Most analyst and policymaker responses report intelligence production and policymaker discussion at least

72 yearly (See Appendix N for Time Figures). Most analyst respondents, or 96.4%, report at least yearly strategic intelligence production. Most policymaker respondents, or 76.7%, report at least yearly strategic intelligence production. Additionally, most policymaker respondents, or 93.3%, report yearly or more frequent executive discussion of strategic intelligence. So far the results seem promising. Discouragingly, however, most analyst respondents, or 62.5%, report thirty percent or less of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence. Only 25% of analysts report over fifty percent of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence. Additionally, most analysts, or 50%, report their time investment is not enough or not nearly enough. These results raise serious doubts about quality of strategic intelligence that is produced. These doubts increase exponentially when we relate this time investment to the analyst and policymaker reports that strategic intelligence is produced weekly, monthly or quarterly 82.2% of analysts and 46.7% of policymakers report strategic intelligence product with this frequency. It is all but certain that the products they are referring to do not qualify as strategic intelligence. Moving on, though, policymaker responses yield a mode 2-5% of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence. Most, or 52%, reporting their time investment is not enough or not nearly enough time. Policymaker assessment of the timeliness of strategic intelligence is multimodal, 44% of policymaker respondents are very satisfied and 44% are somewhat satisfied with its timeliness. Most analysts, or 50%, are somewhat satisfied with the timeliness of strategic intelligence. These results suggest that many of the study respondents are not referring to strategic intelligence if most believe it is being produced weekly, monthly, or quarterly by analysts spending thirty percent or less of their time producing it. Strategic intelligence production, as stated in Chapter 2, is infrequently produced, resource and time intensive, multi-disciplinary, and far-reaching in nature. Thus, these results confirm that HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts are highly

73 unlikely addressing the basic assumptions of their HIDTAs strategy. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers still believe they do not invest enough time into these non-investigation-specific tasks. Thus the quality of this intelligence production, likely general or estimative intelligence, and resulting policymaking are substantial opportunities to improve relations and decrease intelligence irrelevance. Simply stated, HIDTA analysts and policymakers spend less than a sufficient amount of time producing and employing non-investigation-specific intelligence. The amount of time devoted by HIDTA analysts and policymakers decreases, though, when evaluating SR/I reporting. A lower percentage of SR/I responses, or 85%, report at least yearly strategic intelligence production, the other 3 P-SR/I respondents do not know. Also fewer SR/I responses, or 65%, report strategic intelligence discussion by policymakers at least yearly. A larger percentage of A-SR/Is, or 80%, reports that less than 30% of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence. A larger percentage of P-SR/Is, or 75% (compared to 64% total policymakers), reports that 5% or less of their time is available to devote to strategic intelligence. All SR/I respondents report their time available to strategic intelligence is not enough or not nearly enough. Most A-SR/Is (66.7% N=2) and more P-SR/Is (25% N=2) than policymakers are somewhat dissatisfied with the timeliness of strategic intelligence. Most P-SR/Is, though, or 50%, are somewhat satisfied with its timeliness. These results suggest that analysts and policymakers in HIDTAs where non-investigation-specific intelligence is irrelevant spend less than an insufficient amount of time producing and employing those products. Furthermore, these results confirm that time is negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance, as hypothesized.

74 Aggregate Central Tendency


Method Frequency of Intelligence Production/ Use IA % Time Investment PM % Time Investment IA-PM Judgment of Time Investment IA-PM Satisfaction with SI Timeliness Measure

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Measure WeeklyLess than Yearly; I Don't Know 0% - More than 50% 0-1% More than 20% Not Nearly Enough Much More than Enough Very Dissatisfied -Very Satisfied

SR/I Central Tendency


Method Measure

SR/I Variability
Method Measure WeeklyLess than Yearly; I Don't Know 0% - More than 50% 2-5% - 1020% Not Nearly Enough Not Enough Very Dissatisfied -Very Satisfied

Mode

Quarterly

Range

Mode

Quarterly

Range

Mode Mode

1-10% 2-5%

Range Range

Mode Mode

1-10% 2-5%

Range Range

Mode

About the Right Amount

Range

Mode

Not Enough

Range

Mode

Somewhat Satisfied

Range

Mode

Somewhat Satisfied

Range

Table 4.9: Time Results

Confidence Confidence in intelligence processes and products must be achieved by both analysts and policymakers to justify intelligence influencing political action. Aggregate results relating to the confidence HIDTA analysts and policymakers have in strategic intelligence demonstrates substantial confidence by both populations. As reported above, analysts and policymakers agree that source reliability and analytical confidence are normally included in strategic intelligence products. Inclusion of these measures only serves to increase policymaker confidence in the product. Furthermore, most analysts, or 82.1%, report strategic intelligence is relevant to their HIDTA (See Appendix O for Confidence Figures). Most policymakers, or 66.7%, report the same. Nearly all respondents, or 98% of analysts and policymakers, believe their strategy can be improved through strategic intelligence. One disconnected policymaker does not. Interestingly,

75 though, only 40% of analyst respondents claim to be confident in their HIDTAs intelligence processes and products, while 56% claim to be somewhat confident/unconfident. Most policymakers, or 52%, are confident in their strategic intelligence processes and products, while 48% are somewhat confident/unconfident. These results suggest there may be some disparity between what intelligence processes and products should be and what they are. Almost all respondents believe their strategy can be improved, far fewer are confident it will be. Furthermore, these results demonstrate that strategic intelligence products likely only occasionally motivate a sense of accuracy and relevance in HIDTA policymakers sufficient to base political action. Confidence in intelligence processes and products decreases, though, when evaluating SR/I results. Inherently, all respondents report strategic intelligence is less than relevant, somewhat relevant/irrelevant. No A-SR/Is report they are confident in their strategic intelligence processes and products. Rather, most, or 80%, report they are somewhat confident/unconfident. Twenty percent report they are unconfident. Only 25% (N=2) of P-SR/Is report they are confident in their strategic intelligence processes or products. The other 75% report they are somewhat confident/unconfident. A-SR/Is and P-SR/Is do, however, agree with aggregate reporting that analytical confidence and source reliability are normally included in strategic intelligence products and that their strategy/policy can be improved through strategic intelligence. Nonetheless, these results demonstrate a marked decrease in confidence affirming that confidence is negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance.

76 Aggregate Central Tendency


Method Relevance of SI Level of Belief SI Can Improve Strategy IA Confidence in SI Measure

Indicator

Aggregate Variability
Method Measure Somewhat IrrelevantRelevant

SR/I Central Tendency


Method Measure Somewhat Relevant

SR/I Variability
Method Measure Somewhat IrrelevantSomewhat Relevant

Mode

Relevant

Range

Mode

Range

Mode

Yes

Range

No-Yes

Mode

Yes

Range

Yes

Mode

Multimodal: Somewhat Confident, Confident

Range

Unconfident -Confident

Mode

Multimodal: Somewhat Unconfident , Somewhat Confident Somewhat Confident

Range

Unconfident -Somewhat Confident

PM Confidence in SI Inclusion of Analytical Confidence in SI

Mode

Confident

Range

Somewhat Unconfident -Confident

Mode

Range

Somewhat Unconfident -Confident

Mode

Yes

Range

No-Yes; I Don't Know

Mode

Yes

Range

No-Yes; I Don't Know

Table 4.10: Confidence Results

Summary Analysis of the data yielded from the strategic intelligence analyst and executive board (policymaker) questionnaires has revealed findings within the areas of the research questions. Analyst and policymaker responses to the questionnaires were grouped to correspond to the research questions and then categorized within the studys independent variables to validate the hypotheses. Here they will be discussed in summary. The findings discussed in this chapter highlight the relevance of the studys research questions. The data reveal that HIDTA intelligence-policy relations are notably disconnected and some frustrations arise as a result, as expected, primarily among analysts. The data further

77 confirm that intelligence irrelevance is an obstacle in law enforcement, that it is likely underreported, and that there are a significant number of policy opportunities to increase the relevance of law enforcement strategic intelligence. Two matrices below categorically summarize study data pertaining to the third research question. The matrices graphically illustrate noteworthy confirmation of hypotheses one and two. Cognitive dissonance, security and volition are exceptions to the previous statement as the data collected was not sufficient to confidently correlate these variables with intelligence irrelevance. The matrices also graphically illustrate noteworthy confirmation of hypothesis three. Cognitive bias, filtering, organizational inertia, marketing, communication, and time elements of HIDTA intelligence-policy relations present significant opportunities for improvement in context of reducing intelligence irrelevance. Confidence, not addressed in hypothesis three, is also highly relevant to any HIDTA effort to decrease intelligence irrelevance. Among the proposed causes of intelligence irrelevance for which this study collected data, only security measures presented distinctly fewer policy opportunities for reducing intelligence irrelevance. The data, nonetheless, suggest a correlation between security and volition and intelligence irrelevance as hypothesized. The data also confirm a correlation between all independent variables and intelligence irrelevance as hypothesized, apart from the two listed above and cognitive dissonance. Thus, these data and findings offer a foundation for the development of a prescriptive policy to reduce intelligence irrelevance in law enforcement. Research questions and hypotheses aside, analysis of the study data suggests a strong possibility strategic intelligence is politically irrelevant within HIDTA simply because it is not produced. As stated in Chapter 1, strategic intelligence is distinct from other forms of intelligence in that it must inherently be multi-disciplinary, comprehensive, and contextually

78 adapted to a grand (organizational or national) strategy. Thus, strategic intelligence is immensely time and resource intensive. The number of study respondents reporting the production of strategic intelligence on a weekly, monthly, or quarterly basis (82.2% of analysts and 46.7% of policymakers) suggests a high likelihood that the products they refer to do not meet the qualifications of strategic intelligence. Additionally, the number of respondents overwhelmingly associating their day-to-day enforcement and intelligence efforts with their HIDTA strategy solidifies this assertion as it demonstrates an analytical inability to address that which is comprehensively unknown or does not institutionally exist beyond paper. Discussion in Chapter 1 reveals this would not be the first study to come to this conclusion. Rather, study data likely more accurately measures general or estimative intelligence, and its irrelevance.

79
Marketing Volition Communication
- All Intelligence products are easily digestible - PMs judged/self proclaim to be likely or highly likely to be willing to modify strategy (a foundation for policymaker volition but not a direct measure of policymaker volition) - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IAs & PMs: Weekly, Monthly or Quarterly - IAs/PMs very satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IAs normally attend Executive Board meetings

Time
- Yearly or more frequent intelligence production/use - Analyst - +50% of time devoted - PM - >5% of time devoted - Self judgment of time more than enough or much more than enough for IAs and PMs -IAs/PMs very satisfied with timeliness of SI

Confidence
- SI judged relevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy can be improved through SI - IAs judged/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - PMs judgment/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence included in products

- % of time devoted is 20%

Higher

- PMs judged/self proclaim that chances are even that they are willing to modify strategy -% of time devoted is 1020% - Disparity between judgment and self proclaimed willingness to modify strategy (one high, one low; one moderate, one high or low)

- Many intelligence productions are easily digestible - Direct communication between IAs & PMs: Every 6 months or yearly -- IAs/PMs somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart

- Analyst 30-50% of time devoted - PM 2-5% devoted - Self judgment of time about right for IAs and PMs - IAs/PMs somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI

- SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IAs judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI - PMs judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI

Lower

- Few or no intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence not normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IAs &PMs: Less than Yearly - IAs/PMs somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IAs do not know how often SI products are inconsistent with PM beliefs or attitudes, or how often PMs reject/disbelieve or rationalize SI to relieve tension caused by dissonance - IAs normally do not attend Executive Board meetings - Less than annual intelligence production/use - Analyst 0-30% of time devoted - PM 0-1% of time devoted - Self judgment of time not enough or not nearly enough for IAs and PMs - IAs/PMs somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI - SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy cannot be improved through SI - IAs judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - PMs judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence not included in products

- % of time devoted is <10%

- PMs judged/self proclaim to be unlikely or highly unlikely to be willing to modify strategy

Table 4.11: Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance Central Tendency

80
Cognitive Bias Cognitive Dissonance
- Incidence of PMs rejection or disbelief in SI consistent or greater than incidence of SI products that are inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PMs rationalization of SI findings consistent or greater than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

Security
- Critical SI sources unavailable or generally unavailable to IAs - SI unavailable or generally unavailable to PMs - Security policies routinely restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies routinely impede SI production/use - Security policies routinely delay use of SI - Critical SI sources occasionally available to IAs

Filtering

Inertia
- Strategy largely unchanged for 4+ years

- # of revisions/approvals more than 5 before use by PM - Revisions routinely delay production/use - Level of revision judged to remove all SI product utility

- Unfamiliar with current strategy - Do not believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat unsuccessful or unsuccessful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission - Strategy largely unchanged for 2-3 years - Vague sense of current strategy - SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission

-Average of 0-4 steps (listed on survey) taken by IAs and PMs to reduce bias

Higher

- Average of 5-9 steps (listed on survey) taken by IAs and PMs to reduce bias

- Incidence of PMs rejection or disbelief in SI 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PMs rationalization of SI findings 1 less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

- SI occasionally available to PMs - Security policies occasionally restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies occasionally impede SI production/use - Security policies occasionally delay use of SI - Critical SI sources generally or readily available to IAs

- # of revisions/approvals 2-5 before use by PM - Revisions occasionally delay production/use - Level of revision judged to take away from SI product utility

Lower

-Average of 10 or more steps (listed on survey) taken by IAs and PMs to reduce bias

- No incidence of PMs rejection or disbelief in SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - No incidence of PMs rationalization of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

- SI generally or readily available to PMs - Security policies rarely or never restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies rarely or never impede SI production/use - Security policies rarely or never delay use of SI

- # of revisions/approvals 0-2 before use by PM - Revision rarely or never delays production/use - Level of revision judged to be about right, not enough or not nearly enough

- Strategy largely unchanged for less than 2 years - Familiar with current strategy - Believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged relevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission

Table 4.12: Aggregate HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance Central Tendency

81
Marketing Volition Communication
- All Intelligence products are easily digestible - PMs judged/self proclaim to be likely or highly likely to be willing to modify strategy (a foundation for policymaker volition but not a direct measure of policymaker volition) - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IAs & PMs: Weekly, Monthly or Quarterly - IAs/PMs very satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IAs normally attend Executive Board meetings - PMs judged/self proclaim that chances are even that they are willing to modify strategy -% of time devoted is 1020% - Disparity between judgment and self proclaimed willingness to modify strategy (one high, one low; one moderate, one high or low)

Time
- Yearly or more frequent intelligence production/use - Analyst - +50% of time devoted - PM - >5% of time devoted - Self judgment of time more than enough or much more than enough for IAs and PMs -IAs/PMs very satisfied with timeliness of SI - Analyst 30-50% of time devoted - PM 2-5% devoted - Self judgment of time about right for IAs and PMs - IAs/PMs somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI

Confidence
- SI judged relevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy can be improved through SI - IAs judged/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - PMs judgment/self proclaimed confident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence included in products

- % of time devoted is 20%

Higher

- Many intelligence productions are easily digestible - Direct communication between IAs & PMs: Every 6 months or yearly -- IAs/PMs somewhat satisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart

- SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IAs judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI - PMs judged/self proclaimed somewhat confident or somewhat unconfident in ability of SI

Lower

- Few or no intelligence products are easily digestible - Assessment of source reliability and analytical confidence not normally included in SI products - Direct communication between IAs &PMs: Less than Yearly - IAs/PMs somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI/format of SI/content of SI/communication with counterpart/responsiveness of counterpart - IAs do not know how often SI products are inconsistent with PM beliefs or attitudes, or how often PMs reject/disbelieve or rationalize SI to relieve tension caused by dissonance - IAs normally do not attend Executive Board meetings - Less than annual intelligence production/use - Analyst 0-30% of time devoted - PM 0-1% of time devoted - Self judgment of time not enough or not nearly enough for IAs and PMs - IAs/PMs somewhat or very dissatisfied with timeliness of SI

- SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA mission - IA/PM belief strategy cannot be improved through SI - IAs judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - PMs judged/self proclaimed unconfident in ability of SI - Analytical confidence not included in products

- % of time devoted is <10%

- PMs judged/self proclaim to be unlikely or highly unlikely to be willing to modify strategy

Table 4.13: SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Negative Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance Central Tendency

82
Cognitive Bias Cognitive Dissonance
- Incidence of PMs rejection or disbelief in SI consistent or greater than incidence of SI products that are inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PMs rationalization of SI findings consistent or greater than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

Security
- Critical SI sources unavailable or generally unavailable to IAs - SI unavailable or generally unavailable to PMs - Security policies routinely restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies routinely impede SI production/use - Security policies routinely delay use of SI - Critical SI sources occasionally available to IAs

Filtering

Inertia
- Strategy largely unchanged for 4+ years

- # of revisions/approvals more than 5 before use by PM - Revisions routinely delay production/use - Level of revision judged to remove all SI product utility

- Unfamiliar with current strategy - Do not believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat unsuccessful or unsuccessful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission - Strategy largely unchanged for 2-3 years - Vague sense of current strategy - SI judged somewhat relevant or somewhat irrelevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged somewhat successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission

-Average of 0-5 steps (listed on survey) taken by IAs and PMs to reduce bias

Higher

- Average of 5-9 steps (listed on survey) taken by IAs and PMs to reduce bias

- Incidence of PMs rejection or disbelief in SI less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - Incidence of PMs rationalization of SI findings less than incidence of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

- SI occasionally available to PMs - Security policies occasionally restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies occasionally impede SI production/use - Security policies occasionally delay use of SI - Critical SI sources generally or readily available to IAs

- # of revisions/approvals 2-5 before use by PM - Revisions occasionally delay production/use - Level of revision judged to take away from SI product utility

Lower

-Average of 10 or more steps (listed on survey) taken by IAs and PMs to reduce bias

- No incidence of PMs rejection or disbelief in SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes - No incidence of PMs rationalization of SI products inconsistent with their beliefs or attitudes

- SI generally or readily available to PMs - Security policies rarely or never restrict access to sources or SI - Security policies rarely or never impede SI production/use - Security policies rarely or never delay use of SI

- # of revisions/approvals 0-2 before use by PM - Revision rarely or never delays production/use - Level of revision judged to be about right, not enough or not nearly enough

- Strategy largely unchanged for less than 2 years - Familiar with current strategy - Believe strategy/plans can be improved through SI - SI judged relevant to HIDTA - Strategy is judged successful in fulfilling the HIDTA mission

Table 4.14: SR/I HIDTA Intelligence-Policy Relations: Positive Correlations to Intelligence Irrelevance Central Tendency

83

CONCLUSION
As previously stated, the purpose of this study was to determine the level to which intelligence irrelevance has translated from military and national security settings to law enforcement. Furthermore, determining the likely causes of exposed irrelevance permits the development of prescriptive policy to mitigate or eliminate such events. This was accomplished through contextually-focused survey analysis of the HIDTA-wide analyst and policymaker populations. The surveys directly and indirectly addressed intelligence-policy relations, intelligence irrelevance, and the ten scholarly-identified causes of intelligence irrelevance. While aggregate respondent results demonstrate a noteworthy level of intelligence irrelevance, respondents reporting less than relevant intelligence demonstrate that seven of the ten scholarly identified causes of irrelevance are correlated with intelligence irrelevance as previously asserted data collected was not sufficient to confidently draw a correlation between cognitive dissonance, security, and volition; and intelligence irrelevance. Furthermore, these ten irrelevance-correlated topics all present HIDTA with policy opportunities to improve intelligence-policy relations and reduce incidents of intelligence irrelevance. Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement As stated above, study results demonstrate a noteworthy level of intelligence irrelevance. An encouraging 82.1% of HIDTA analysts and 66.7% of HIDTA policymakers report strategic intelligence is relevant to the success in the HIDTA mission. Conversely, however, 17.9% of analysts and 33.3% of policymakers consider strategic intelligence less than relevant to the success of their HIDTA, somewhat relevant/ irrelevant. These results demonstrate that intelligence irrelevance has translated from military and national security settings to law enforcement and that intelligence has failed to successfully integrate into the enforcement and

84 investigative culture. These conclusions are also supported by results demonstrating 36.7% of analysts and 21.9% of policymakers feel disconnected from their intelligence-policy counterpart. Additional results, however, likely more accurately demonstrate the level of strategic intelligence irrelevance in law enforcement. Study results emerging from measurement of the independent variables (causes of irrelevance) provide valuable insight into HIDTA intelligence irrelevance. 82.2% of analysts and 46.7% of policymakers report strategic intelligence production on a weekly, monthly or quarterly basis. Any products produced at these rates are all but certain not to qualify as strategic intelligence given the depth of analysis, number of variables, time, and resource prerequisites of strategic intelligence production. An additional 3.6% of analyst responses and 10% of policymaker responses reporting strategic intelligence production every 6 months also unlikely qualify. Furthermore, the results demonstrating a mean 16% analyst familiarity and 18.3% policymaker familiarity with the HIDTA strategy suggests an analytical and policymaking inability to address that which is comprehensively unknown or does not institutionally exist beyond paper. These results permit two logical conclusions about law enforcement intelligence irrelevance: 1) the level of strategic law enforcement intelligence irrelevance is unknown because of disparity between this studys concept of strategic intelligence and the law enforcement conception of strategic intelligence and the lack of the former in law enforcement, or 2) strategic intelligence is irrelevant to law enforcement policymakers because of a demonstrated policy preference for intelligence products that are not strategic (by the definition accepted for this study). Accepting the latter conclusion seems more reasonable than the accepting the former. This conclusion, however, need not undermine study research and analysis pertaining to research question three or any of the three study hypotheses. Rather, given these

85 conclusions regarding strategic law enforcement intelligence irrelevance, findings regarding the causes of law enforcement intelligence irrelevance are all but certainly more accurately interpreted as reflective of general or estimative intelligence-policy relations and causes of general or estimative intelligence irrelevance. This interpretation is consistent with the role of strategic analysts outlined in Chapter 3 as focusing on non-investigation-specific and projective analyses. Causes of Intelligence Irrelevance in Law Enforcement Scholarship outlined in Chapter 2 presents ten elements of intelligence-policy relations that are asserted to account for incidence of intelligence irrelevance. With the exception of cognitive dissonance, security, and volition, this study finds a correlation between each element and intelligence irrelevance consistent with scholarly-asserted correlations, positive and negative. Specifically, this study confirm that marketing, communication, time and confidence are all negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance a decrease in any of these elements correlates to, if not causes, an increase in intelligence irrelevance. Conversely, cognitive bias, filtering, and organizational inertia are all positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance an increase in any of these elements corresponds to, if not causes, intelligence irrelevance. This study affirms that volition is likely negatively correlated with intelligence irrelevance; however, the data collected was not sufficient to confirm this. Similarly, this study affirms that security is likely positively correlated with intelligence irrelevance; however, the data collected was not sufficient to confirm this. Nonetheless, increasing those variables negatively correlated (or likely negatively correlated) with irrelevance as well as decreasing those variables positively correlated (or likely positively correlated) with irrelevance should serve to improve HIDTA intelligencepolicy relations and decrease incidence of intelligence irrelevance.

86 Considering the HIDTA program, the study results offer the most likely causes of general or estimative intelligence irrelevance (see the Results summary in Chapter 4). Analyst and policymaker recommendations for improving communication, marketing, time, and organizational inertia were on point. Lower levels of intelligence marketing, lower quality and quantity of intelligence-policy communication, increases in cognitive bias, and higher organizational inertia are the intelligence-policy attributes most likely causing intelligence irrelevance in HIDTA. Additionally, lower levels of confidence in intelligence, lower levels of time invested in intelligence, and higher levels of filtering and security likely moderately cause intelligence irrelevance in HIDTA. Of all ten attributes, the levels of intelligence marketing, cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, and organizational inertia were the most concerning. These deficiencies in intelligence-policy relations, however, provide opportunities for improvement, both for intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of intelligence. Before outlining a prescriptive policy to improve intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of intelligence, however, it is critical to address one additional likely cause of law enforcement intelligence irrelevance. Chapter 1 demonstrates that intelligence is an ancient craft and one that is rooted in the instinct for survival. This logic keeps with that which likely provoked early intelligence users to do so within the realm of military campaigns. What does not seem apparent, though, is that law enforcement policymakers are at all concerned with their survival within their executive positions or with the survival of their organizations. It is also unclear that the performance of rigorous strategy or policy analysis is a prerequisite of executive or institutional stability within certain law enforcement missions. Rather, despite political and public frustration with counternarcotic enforcement efforts, funding for them represents the stable majority of the national drug

87 control budget (Executive Office of, 2010). It also seems to be that some law enforcement goals, such as those to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, are unlikely to require a strategy, rather than tactical and operational planning. Logic would seem to dictate that a strategy only becomes relevant when paralleled by requirements for achieving ambitious levels of efficiency and effectiveness, arguably peripheral law enforcement goals. Thus, at least some law enforcement strategy is more likely abstract theory than sound logic. This is highly likely the case in the HIDTA programs. Nonetheless, for the purposes of improving the relevance of non-strategic law enforcement intelligence, a prescriptive framework aimed at improving intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of general or estimative law enforcement intelligence is offered. A framework aimed at making strategic intelligence relevant is also offered. Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Estimative Intelligence Irrelevance Assessment of the ten independent variables of this study illuminates numerous opportunities to stabilize or improve the relevance of HIDTA intelligence. First, there are several indicators of positive intelligence-policy relations that ought to be reinforced and stabilized. Security policies within HIDTA appear to successfully balance the competing interests of enforcement operational integrity and efficiency. Security considerations also demonstrate a lower level of access restriction, production delay or impediment, and consumption delay or impediment. With regard to filters, most HIDTA members judge the level of intelligence revision and approval about right to make to maximize the value of their products. Reinforcing the substantial level of intelligence relevance and substantial level of analyst and policymaker belief in intelligence is also beneficial to the stated aims. And lastly, analysts should be encouraged to continue to include their analytical confidence and source reliability in

88 assessments. Such inclusion can only improve policymaker confidence in the product. These efforts, in sum, ought to stabilize the elements of intelligence-policy relations already closely calibrated for optimal intelligence-policy relations and intelligence relevance. Conversely, however, there are several elements of intelligence-policy relations that can be improved upon to increase the relevance of intelligence. Study results demonstrate a substantial level of bias among SR/I reporting, worse than the already substantially biased aggregate HIDTA intelligence and policy. HIDTA members can exploit advanced analytical techniques to increase the rigor in their analysis and policymaking as well as decrease analytical bias. HIDTAs ought also seek means to increase the availability of critical sources of estimative intelligence to analysts and estimative intelligence to policymakers. Members would also benefit from familiarizing themselves HIDTAs comprehensive strategy and ensuring its relevance to current and developing drug threats. HIDTA analysts ought to significantly increase their efforts to market their products, spending as much as a third of their time or enough to feel guilty about avoiding other tasks, as policymakers recommend. Essentially, if they have something worth saying they should ensure those who need to hear it actually do. Analysts ought to also consider reformatting their products to increase their digestibility. If policymakers cannot easily withdraw their conclusions and their logic then they are not likely to see value in their product. Additionally, analysts and policymakers would both benefit from more frequent direct communication. Intelligence ought to function at the direction of policymakers. Regular attendance by analysts to executive board meetings is one method to improve intelligence-policy communication. Increased direction from policymakers will also likely increase the time analysts invest in general and estimative products as well as increase the timeliness of those products. Increasing direction communication would also reinforce some of the variables mention here

89 including increasing marketing and ensuring the digestibility and relevance of intelligence products and processes. And lastly, cognitive dissonance, from the little data that was provided was substantial. Policymakers who accept that their conceptions of their operating environment may need to be calibrated from time to time are likely to produce better policy and possess better relations with their intelligence analysts. In sum, decreasing cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, and organizational inertia as well as increasing the availability of critical sources of intelligence and policymaking, intelligence marketing, and the frequency and quality of intelligence-policy communication are the primary elements of the framework to improve law enforcement intelligence-policy relations and the relevance of general or estimative law enforcement intelligence. Additional opportunistic recommendations at the institutional level are a significant resource provided elsewhere (See: The national criminal, 2003; and Peterson, 2005). In addition to the recommendations arising from measurement of the ten causes of irrelevance, HIDTA analysts and policymakers recommend expanding the role of intelligence analysts, providing training opportunities, and prioritizing intelligence projects. Analysts also recommend HIDTAs perform tactical analysis (rather than research and information processing) and extract strategic value which can be exploited. It is unclear whether these recommendations are aimed at reducing strategic or estimative intelligence irrelevance. To improve either, however, HIDTAs must shift away from intelligence research initiatives towards intelligence analysis initiatives. HIDTAs are unlikely to achieve sound strategic logic by collecting data exclusively in the context of individual investigations. Prescriptive Framework for Reducing Strategic Intelligence Irrelevance First, for strategic intelligence to be relevant to HIDTA policymakers it must be requested and produced; or, in other words, it must be valued. This requires that both

90 policymakers and analysts understand what strategic intelligence is and how it can add value to their program. Contrary to what ONDCP suggests, strategic intelligence is not intelligence related to the structure and movement of organized criminal elements, patterns of criminal activity, activities of criminal elements, projections of criminal trends, or projective planning (HIDTA program policy, 2009). The association of strategic intelligence strictly with analysis that is big picture and long-term is a legacy of Cold War-era thinking and highly inaccurate (Heidenrich, 2007). Rather, it is all that ONDCP suggests and more combined and analyzed for the strict purpose of impacting a HIDTA strategy. Strategic intelligence products, therefore, must either: 1) analyze all variables necessary to reasonably optimize the soundness of the logic employed to achieve a grand (national or organizational) goal, or 2) analyze one or more variables in relation to previous strategic intelligence analysis of all reasonable variables and demonstrate how previous logic fails to reflect the current reality (or will likely fail to reflect reality in the future) as a means of calibrating the logic employed to achieve a grand (national or organizational) goal, or 3) analyze all relevant information necessary to reasonably validate an assumption within the logic employed to achieve a grand (national or organizational) goal (turning an assumption into a truth). Simply stated, strategic intelligence must comprehensively support a strategy; a strategy is not a plan, and certainly not an operational plan, but the logic driving a plan to achieve a grand goal. Additionally, strategic intelligence requires that analysts not attempt to identify independent variables in the dynamic environment, but rather accept that the environment is made up of innumerable dependent variables. In the case of HIDTA, this means that drug trafficking simply cannot be managed strictly through enforcement activity. Drug trafficking is a product of many other forces including social, economic, political, and philosophical variables, among others. A strategy that ignores these is all but certain to fail. And

91 lastly, it is crucial that HIDTAs distinguish this process and these products from operational intelligence and operational planning. Both operational and strategic intelligence are non-casespecific. Secondly, HIDTA strategic intelligence analysts and policymakers must optimize their relations for strategic intelligence to be relevant to HIDTA policymaking. This requires that they calibrate the ten independent variables of this study within strategic processes. They need to ensure high levels of strategic intelligence marketing, policymaker volition, strategic intelligence-policy communication, time invested and confidence in strategic intelligence products and processes. Additionally, they need to ensure low levels of cognitive bias, cognitive dissonance, security, filtering, and organizational inertia. This is no different from the process required for the relevance of intelligence at any level. And as asserted, it takes careful thought and constant effort. Limitations and Future Research As with any research, there were inherent limitations within this study. Limited resources forcing this study to employ survey research rather than interviews resulted in insufficient data to correlate cognitive dissonance with intelligence irrelevance. This study was also limited by a misinterpretation of the concept of volition. The data collected for the purposes of measuring this variable did not in fact measure it. Additionally, data collected from HIDTA policymakers was minimal, estimated to represent 6.25% of the population. Interviewing HIDTA members would have possibly resulted in more collected data and more depth of data collection regarding analyst and policymaker familiarity with their strategy. Although careful thought was employed in the development of study questionnaires, face-to-face interviews permit the researcher to clarify the questions posed to participants, thus increasing the accuracy of data collected. Additionally, in

92 order to improve the accuracy of data analysis, future researchers utilizing questionnaires ought to benchmark the categorical assignment of measures (low, moderate, high) of the independent variables. Categorical assignment of the independent variables, as provided in Chapter 4, is vulnerable to contest. Future research can also draw more distinct correlations between intelligence irrelevance and its asserted causes by comparing and contrasting data representative of relevant intelligence with that of irrelevant intelligence rather than aggregate with irrelevant. Nonetheless, this study illuminates a couple opportunities for future research. First, this study highlights the possibility that strategic objectivity is decreasingly or simply not valued. As stated above, collected data was insufficient for statistically significant correlation between cognitive dissonance and intelligence irrelevance. Study responses, nonetheless, reflect the relevance of this attribute to understanding intelligence-policy relations and intelligence irrelevance. Truly strategic intelligence represents somewhat of a departure from traditionally externally-focused intelligence towards an externally and internally-focused effort. While in the former, the product focuses on the weaknesses of a them for the purposes of highlighting opportunities to gain competitive advantage for us, in the latter the product focuses on weaknesses of them and the potential weaknesses of us to calibrate our logic of achieving or maintaining a competitive advantage. Simply stated, intelligence normally highlights advantageous opportunity to leverage our current strengths whereas strategic intelligence normally recommends a calibration of our logic; the result potentially causes internal reform or change. Thus, strategic intelligence seems to inherently possess the potential for internal conflict as it inherently opposes those within the organization who have a vested interest in the status quo. This presents a unique opportunity for future research to isolate the roles of objectivity and

93 cognitive or organizational dissonance in strategic intelligence-policy relations. It would be interesting to read analytical conclusions arising from research that leverages interviews with law enforcement or national security policymakers aimed to address this topic in appropriate depth. Secondly, this study posits that law enforcement intelligence irrelevance is likely caused by the absences of any threat to executive and institutional survival that causes of intelligence irrelevance can lie outside the realm of information processing, quality analysis and assessment, and maintenance of professional norms. Future research that investigates and clarifies the presence or absence of measurable levels of accountability present in law enforcement, their relation to intelligence irrelevance, and their implications for the necessity of strategy would be particularly intellectually profitable in understanding law enforcement strategic intelligencepolicy relations. It can confirm that the adoption of the framework posed here will actually permit law enforcement intelligence to be relevant. The hypothesis here is: intelligence is doomed to irrelevance when it aims to support organizations/nations and policymakers whose survival is not threatened. Secondly, this research would hypothesize that in these cases the ten independent variables of this study no longer represent the causal factors of intelligence irrelevance. Research confirming these hypotheses would have significant implications for intelligence processes in many environments and of many organizations. Lastly, the data collected highlight the strong possibility that irrelevance is not the only pathology of intelligence-policy relations present in the law enforcement arena. The data demonstrate notable support for the possibility that excessive harmony is the most prominent pathology present in the HIDTA program. Again, excessive harmony occurs when intelligence and policy officials share the same complacent tunnel vision neither party seriously addresses or challenges the assumptions inherent in the policy or strategy currently driving organizational

94 action. In these cases, it is the lack of tension between intelligence and policy parties that creates ineffective relations. ONDCPs definition of strategic intelligence sets the stage for organizational logic to be ignored. The data collected on cognitive dissonance suggest that HIDTA intelligence may rarely be inconsistent with or contradictory to policymaker beliefs and attitudes. Data collected on organizational inertia demonstrate that HIDTA analysts and policymakers are generally unaware of their strategy and that intelligence products are highly unlikely applicable to HIDTA strategy. And some of the most crucial efforts to avoid cognitive biases that would permit excessive harmony, such as consciously avoiding cognitive anchors and modifying perceptions in the face of incongruent evidence, were rarely taken. These findings present a highly valuable opportunity for future research to explore and substantiate the level to which law enforcement intelligence-policy relations are plagued by excessive harmony. The likely absence of any risk to law enforcement organizational or executive survival would logically seem to reinforce the high likelihood that law enforcement intelligence-policy relations are plagued by substantial excessive harmony.

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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Blank Copy of IRB Proposal Form

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106 Appendix B: HIDTA Strategic Intelligence Analyst Measurement Instrument

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115 Appendix C: HIDTA Policymaker Measurement Instrument

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124 Appendix D: Study Demographics Figures :

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127 Appendix E: Intelligence-Policy Disconnection Data Figures Policy

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129 Appendix F: Intelligence Irrelevance Figures

130 Appendix G: Cognitive Bias Figures

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134 Appendix H: Cognitive Dissonance Figures

135 Appendix I: Security Figures

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143 Appendix J: Filtering Figures

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147 Appendix K: Organizational Inertia Figures, Tables, and Lists

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Strategy Descriptions by HIDTA Strategic Intelligence Analysts Administration (Management Enforcement Prosecution Intelligence IT Training DeconflictionInformation Sharing Prevention None and Coordination) Number of Responses 18 Eluding to Topic Percentage of Responses 72.0% Eluding to Topic Mean 16.0% Number of Responses 17 Eluding to Topic Percentage of Responses 85.0% Eluding to Topic Mean 18.30% 0 11 0 1 0 6 0 0 3

0.0%

44.0%

0.0% 4.0%

0.0%

24.0%

0.0%

0.0%

12.0%

Strategy Descriptions by HIDTA Executive Board Members 2 8 1 1 1 0 0 3 3

100.0%

40.0%

5.0% 5.0%

5.0%

0.0%

0.0%

15.0%

15.0%

150 Please describe your current strategy at HIDTA. Analyst Responses: Quarterly trends in trafficking Our strategy uses a number of task forces to address the threats identified throughout the year. Their focus is intelligence driven investigations. The task force concept allows agencies to leverage resources and be more effective. Proactive Its unclear Monthly newsletters Participating agencies incorporate intelligence with enforcement activities to address the threat. Intelligence led policing is key. We have a HIDTA Intelligence Support System (ISS) made up of 3 intel centers Dismantle DTOs Dismantle DTOs through investigative means TO DEVELOP NEW INTELLIGENCE PROTOCOLS THAT WILL IDENTIFY DRUG IMPORTATION-TRANSPORTATION-DISTRIBUTION METHODS AND MONEY LAUNDERING INFRASTRUCTURES RESULTING IN ARRESTS OF HIGH-LEVEL TRAFFICKERS AND SEIZURES OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES OF DRUGS AND MONEY AND DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO BORDER DRUG TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES More tactical. Assisting law enforcement agencies To provide/share information and intelligence among all the agencies in this area and beyond as necessary. Identifying threats and addressing in efforts of mitigating it To disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations. As far as Intel, we are here to support HIDTA Initiatives and other State/Local Police agencies on ongoing criminal investigations. Should we see a developing trend, we produce strategic documents and disseminate them in our AOR. To pursue the drug traffickers and organizations Participation by Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies; the collocation and commingling, at one central facility, of most investigative initiatives; targeting the most significant drug trafficking, money laundering, and drug-related violent crime organizations Identify drug threats as documented in the annual Threat Assessment then provide specific direction on threat elements to be addressed and deployment of resources thru the funding of initiatives. To combat the DTOs and provide training to LE members to help in the fight against drugs Improving public safety, assist law enforcement in disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies

151 To assist Law Enforcement in dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies Provide officer safety and analytical support to initiatives through intel gathering and dissemination To assist Law Enforcement in dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies To assist Law Enforcement in disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking and money laundering organizations, increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement, and improving communication and information sharing among participating agencies Give money to task forces and let them incorporate that money into their existing programs however they see fit Policymaker Responses: Identify Threat and develop enforcement strategies to deal with threat through unity of effort Interdiction, Investigation, and Prosecution of drug shipments smuggled and/or transshipped into and through the State of NM Evaluate past performance, determine the threat, align resources into task forces and initiatives to counter the threat , evaluate success. Detect, investigate and disrupt/dismantle DTO and MLO Our current strategy is based on the Drug Market Analysis produced by NDIC. The Strategy has not changed significantly over the past few years, but changes have been made to reflect the Executive Board and Directors view of the drug market and threat. A MIX OF INVESTIGATIVE/INTELLIGENCE/TRAINING/SUPPORT AND PREVENTION INITIATIVES To target large DTOs and MLOs. Disrupt flow of drugs to community. Reduce availability of illicit drugs, effectively use Intel, detect-disrupt-dismantle DTOs & MLOs Reduce availability of illicit drugs; effectively use intelligence; detect, disrupt, dismantle DTOs; reduce drug-related violence; support demand reduction efforts I dont think we have one for executives Intelligence and enforcement Based on our strategic intelligence we design our task forces to attack our specific threats DTOs that traffic in Meth and Marijuana are our priorities along with cross border trafficking Task Force approach based on specialties Develop operational objectives that reflect strategic threats as identified by the Threat Assessment The Lake County HIDTA will aggressively pursue drug and firearms trafficking gangs/organizations in order to disrupt, dismantle, and reduce the supply of drugs and firearms to help meet the National Drug Control Strategy goals. Narcotics from the DR and the Caribbean, Money Laundering, parcel interdiction See our Strategy and Threat Assessment Published annually

152 The Northwest HIDTA Executive Board has implemented and administered programs that meet the National Drug Control Strategy by forming partnerships and dedicating HIDTA resources to law enforcement, intelligence, prosecution, prevention, treatment, and education efforts. The Northwest HIDTA Executive Boards strategy is to develop programs and initiatives that meet the ONDCP program requirements and that reduce the drug threat in this region. Through the successful investigation of violent drug trafficking organizations, reduce the trafficking of drugs and the occurrence of drug-related violent crime within the HIDTA region

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157 Appendix L: Volition Figures

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159 Appendix M: Communication Figures

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173 Appendix N: Time Figures

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177 Appendix O: Confidence Figures

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