Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights

Protecting Rights in a Climate-Constrained World

Summary and Recommendations

AbouT THe ICHRP

The International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) was established in Geneva in 1998 to conduct applied research into current human rights issues. Its research is designed to be of practical relevance to policy-makers in international and regional organisations, in governments and inter-governmental agencies, and in voluntary organisations of all kinds. The ICHRP is independent, international in its membership, and participatory in its approach. It is registered as a non-profit foundation under Swiss law. www.ichrp.org

MeMbers of the international council Devendra Raj Panday (Nepal) Fateh Azzam* (Palestine) Marco Sassoli* (Switzerland) Hina Jilani (Pakistan) Jelena Pejic (Serbia) Fouad Abdelmoumni* (Morocco) Juan E. Mendez (Argentina) Chidi Anselm Odinkalu* (Nigeria) Maggie Beirne* (United Kingdom) Usha Ramanathan (India) Cynthia Brown (United States) Ghanim Al-Najjar (Kuwait) Emma Playfair* (United Kingdom)
*Board Member

Monica Aleman (Nicaragua) Magda M A Ali (Sudan) Radhika Balakrishnan (India) Santiago A. Canton (Argentina) Pablo de Greiff (Colombia) Dina Haynes (United States) Sara Hossain (Bangladesh) Douglas Mendes (Trinidad & Tobago) Tessa Morris-Suzuki (Australia) Sorpong Peou (Canada/Cambodia) Abbas Rashid (Pakistan) Joseph Schechla (United States) Tamar Tomashvili (Georgia)

Cover Illustration The Trustees of the British Museum. Turning a Deep Chasm into a Thoroughfare by Wei Zixi. www.britishmuseum.org

ISBN: 2-940259-99-2 2011 International Council on Human Rights Policy. Most rights reserved. This material may be freely copied and distributed subject to inclusion of this copyright notice and our World Wide Web URL: www.ichrp.org. Design and layout by Benjamin D. Peltier at the International Council on Human Rights Policy.

Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights

Protecting Rights in a Climate-Constrained World

Summary and Recommendations

2011 International Council on Human Rights Policy, Most Rights Reserved.

NoTe oN THe TexT

In June 2008, the International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) published Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide, tracking the main human rights concerns raised by climate change and exploring possible areas of synergy in law and policy. As a first attempt to broach a topic of growing policy importance, the report met a broad need and has been in high demand since publication. As a follow-up to this initial research, the ICHRP launched a second project, choosing technology transfer as the theme for further research because of its evident and far-reaching human rights implications that have so far not been examined or fully articulated. The means by which technology moves between states takes us into the heart of international legal and commercial processes that are not, for the most part, constructed in a way conducive to reducing the impact of climate change. Technology transfer is needed both to help poorer and more vulnerable countries and communities adapt to the now inevitable consequences of climate change in the short term, and to assist them in moving on to low-carbon development pathways in the longer term. Human rights are relevant to the technology questions that arise in both these policy areas: adaptation policies in the short term and mitigation measures over the long term. Highlighting the human rights benefits of technological interventions may create a space for re-framing and circumventing the unsustainable dynamic that has largely characterised debate of this subject to date. In this regard, human rights offer a strong ethical and legal basis from which technology transfer might be approached. Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights: Protecting Rights in a Climate-Constrained World, addresses issues that are central to technology policy at a critical time and aims to explain the concerns of environmental activists and of human rights advocates so that common principles might be found and a common position forged. Technology transfer has generally been conceived of as a means to address a central injustice associated with climate change that activities that have primarily benefited the denizens of the worlds richest states will disproportionally affect those living in the worlds poorest states. It has long been recognised as an indispensable element of a stable future and a global deal. The ICHRP report shows that it is more than that, however: it is also a principal means by which basic human rights standards might still be attainable for the worlds most vulnerable people in a climate-constrained future. This Summary and Recommendations is a supplement to the full report, condensing the key themes discussed in the report into a broad overview and providing a concise list of the reports recommendations for further action.

ACRoNymS
UNFCCC ICHRP IP OHCHR EGTT TNAs NTPs LDCs IPCC COP United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change International Council on Human Rights Policy intellectual property Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights Expert Group on Technology Transfer Technology Needs Assessments National Technology Plans Least Developed Countries Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Conference of the Parties

CoNTeNTS
1. ExEcutivE Summary ....................................................................... 1 .
Technology transfer is essential to any long-term climate settlement Climate change raises human rights concerns that must inform technology policy 1

2. rEcommEndationS .......................................................................... 5
To All Governments To Annex 2 Country Governments To non-Annex 1 Country Governments To Civil Society Organisations To UN and Other International Agencies and Bodies 5 5 6 6 6

1.

exeCuTIve SummARy
with climate change to develop technologies capable of addressing the problem: these technologies must also be available where they are needed. In the original UNFCCC negotiations, wealthier countries recognised their greater contribution to climate change and greater capacity to deal with it and so agreed to make technologies available to assist poorer countries in managing the impacts of climate change and in transitioning to low-carbon economies. Until technology transfer is effective, poorer countries are not required to accept greenhouse gas emissions targets. The report provides a normative argument, besed upon human rights, for the mobilisation of technologies to these countries. It is the right thing to do, but the reasons are as much political, economic and legal as they are ethical. The UNFCC technology directives actively prioritise transfer to the worlds developing countries, as not to do so would ultimately be to invite chaos. It is becoming gradually apparent that, sooner or later, something like a wartime mobilisation of global technological capacities will be required if the fallout from climate change is not to become catastrophic. The report also suggests that early steps in that mobilisation can be undertaken right away, drawing on both the moral and legal authority of human rights and the longstanding technology provisions of the climate change regime to push things forward. Yet, despite decades of debate, there has been virtually no practical movement on technology transfer. Indeed, the term itself has often appeared more as a source of disagreement than a cure for climate-related harms. This is in part because technology transfer has a long and divisive history as a term of art. Always politically charged, it has been shorthand for a set of contested positions since the 1960s. In particular, it provided a stage for profound disagreements over the appropriate extent of international intellectual property (IP) rights. Protagonists in this dispute may disagree on everything from the benefits of free trade to the proper role of the market in ordering public goods as well as the legitimate degree of government intervention on behalf of vulnerable populations. Whatever the symbolic significance of these entrenched positions historically, they miss the point today. The key issue is not found in the fraught debate about the extent to which IP rights do in fact constitute a barrier to the transfer of technology. Rather, despite clear directions in the UNFCCC, there is no policy of technology transfer in place today. What we have, instead, is a range of documents and preparatory initiatives circling around the theme without ever really settling it. Furthermore, technology transfer is increasingly a life-ordeath issue. This is literally true for individuals in parts of the world most vulnerable to the devastating effects of climate change, who urgently require solutions to their local problems as well as action at a global level. It is also true symbolically for the negotiations themselves. Without movement on this issue, the negotiations cannot progress for reasons as much practical as ethical, and the time has come to move forward. This set of arguments and developments provides the context for this report. The report does not aim to take sides in the longstanding disputes over technology transfer and IP, although it does hold that debate up to scrutiny. Rather, the report identifies fundamental and unavoidable issues that climate change technology policy raises for human rights and, by corollary, that human rights raise for the implementation of climate technology policies. The report indicates how human rights law and practice can be beneficial in two ways:

Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights: Protecting Rights in a Climate-Constrained World1 argues that international climate change technology policy must take human rights concerns into account if it is to function justly and effectively. The report starts from two premises, each of which is now widely shared. The first is that any solution to climate change depends upon robust technology policies. The second is that climate change has profound human rights implications, and that solutions to climate change will only be effective if they integrate human rights concerns. The report identifies how human rights considerations are relevant to climate technology policies and how human rights tools might usefully be mobilised and integrated into such policies.

clear directions the Despitehave,ofinstead, is ainrange UNFCCC, there is no policy technology transfer in place today. What we of documents and preparatory initiatives circling around the theme without ever really settling it.

Human rights can provide a minimal platform of agreement on initial policy steps regarding technology at an international level. They can do so in the context of both mitigation and adaption policies. Such a platform is vital in a domain that has long been effectively stalled. There has been practically no movement on the international implementation of technology transfer in response to climate change despite it being a key principle of the climate change regime for two decades. The report diagnoses some of the causes of the persistent immobility on technology transfer and provides concrete examples of how a human rights lens may help transcend the deadlock. Further, it aims to demonstrate that basic human rights protections provide an appropriate minimal threshold for prioritising areas for policy action in the area of technology. It is now clear that technology is central to any solution to the specific consequences of climate change. As there are no quick technological fixes and as agreement over technology is inseparable from broader political and policy agreement technological development and diffusion is an indispensable element in all available scenarios for addressing climate change. On one hand, climate change mitigation is unthinkable without a robust shift towards lowcarbon technologies in every walk of life a shift that must ultimately take place globally, not merely in the rich world. On the other hand, climate change adaptation which is of greatest urgency in the developing world will rely to an important degree on access to technologies. While not all adaptation challenges are primarily technological, policies seeking to stabilise or adjust to new climatic conditions necessarily include technology as a key component. This is particularly true where the effects of climate change will be most devastating.

technology

transfer is essential to any long-terM

cliMate settleMent

The centrality of technology to international efforts to address climate change has consistently been expressed through the notion of technology transfer. This term, enshrined in the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and reappearing in every major document since, signals that it is not enough when dealing
1 The detailed report is available from the International Council on Human Rights Policy, October 2011. This workbook provides a short summary and specific recommendations gleaned from the information in the full report.

Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights: Summary and Recommendations 1

It is now clear that technology is central to any solution to the phenomenon of climate change.

(1) Highlighting the urgency of putting a policy in place to initiate the transfer of technologies; (2) Helping set the parameters for such a technology policy. In doing so, the report aims to provide a means to move beyond the deadlock on technology policy. The report also suggests that a failure to make climate mitigation and adaptation technologies available to the most vulnerable will not only sustain the recurrent impasse within climate negotiations, it will ultimately engender wider political instability and insecurity stemming from climate change. The key missing link in climate negotiations on technology transfer to date has been the lack of proactive leadership and good faith in creating such a policy from the countries duty-bound to do so under the UNFCCC the comparatively wealthy states referred to in the text as developed countries and other Annex 2 Parties. Some explanations for this failure are frequently raised and bear consideration. One is that the stark categorical distinctions in the UNFCCC between developed and developing countries no longer describe contemporary realities. Annexes to the original treaty list the OECD countries in Annex 2 and then reinclude them in a longer list also comprising the transitional, mainly East European states (Annex 1). Annex 2 countries carry the strongest obligations. Developing countries are not listed in either annex, and are thus known as non-Annex 1 countries. However, as the global economy has transformed over the past two decades, these lines have somewhat blurred. Some non-Annex 1 parties are now wealthier than some Annex 1 countries, and although the vast majority of global wealth still resides in the North, the majority of emissions now arise in the South. At the same time, amidst this geopolitical transformation, the evolving UNFCCC approach to technology has not clarified nor emphasised what the actions of developed country and other Annex 2 parties should be. Although an insistence on the duties of these countries (or the rights of non-Annex 1 countries) is unlikely to encourage consensus today, a number of factors are nevertheless clear: (1) The (universally acknowledged) greater responsibility for climate change, both historical and current, of the per capita wealthiest (i.e., Annex 2) countries provides a practical and moral basis for the technology transfer provisions in the UNFCCC.

(2) It would not be in keeping with the object and purpose of the UNFCCC framework to read its technology transfer provisions as imposing no obligation on these countries. But even if read as merely exhortative, there is little evidence of implementation. (3) Without concerted action from the same (Annex 2) countries, climate change will wreak havoc that might otherwise be avoided particularly with regard to least developed countries (LDCs). (4) None of this entails that technology transfer be regarded as a passive process between North and South. The fundamental human rights principle of participation dictates significant recipient-country input into and ownership over the process.

cliMate change raises huMan rights concerns that Must

inforM technology policy

Human rights have emerged as a very recent consideration in the climate change negotiations, but there is now an emerging consensus that climate change threatens numerous human rights, including rights to food, housing, water, health and even life. Climate change is likely to cause mass migration and may contribute to conflict, each of which brings further human rights risks in its train. The importance of taking human rights into account when addressing climate change policy is increasingly recognised. A 2008 report on climate change and human rights produced by the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) was followed by a series of Resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council as well as countless investigations (of varying rigour) by NGOs, research institutions and independent scholars. Most recently and importantly, the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC meeting at Cancun in 2010 formally recognised the importance of fully respect[ing] human rights in all climate change-related actions.

have emerged as a very recent Human isrights an emerging consensusnegotiations, consideration in the climate change but there now that climate change threatens numerous human rights, including rights to food, housing, water, health and even life.

As one of the four pillars of the Bali Action Plan and a key theme from Rio through Cancun, technology transfer is clearly one of the principal climate changerelated actions

2 Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights: Summary and Recommendations

to which human rights considerations are therefore relevant. What does this mean? At first glance, it involves recognising the degree to which human rights are impacted by a failure to move on technology transfer. The same is true, of course, for the failures in other areas of climate change. Lack of progress on both mitigation and adaptation are beginning to produce quantifiable human rights harms. Technology transfer is a special case, however, as it constitutes a key aspect of both mitigation and adaptation policy. The best available means to initiate a policy of technology transfer will likely involve some form of multilateral pooling of technologies, of funding and of patents. It will also likely rest upon various publicprivate partnership arrangements, both nationally and internationally. This much is already clear from current strategic thinking about technology transfer within the UNFCCC, undertaken by the recently disbanded Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT). An effective policy of technology transfer will also involve targeted prioritisation of technology needs. At country level, mitigation and adaptation needs have been identified through Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs). While the compilation of TNAs has been an immensely valuable process in numerous countries and begins to set a compass for technology policy internationally, TNAs have not provided and, on their own, cannot provide, the impetus for policy priorities or drivers among Annex 2 countries. If it is to be meaningful and effective, technology transfer policy must be initiated in Annex 2 countries, individually or collectively.

II. Human rights can help international coordination of technology policy.

If properly coordinated, TNAs can identify common human rights concerns across many countries. This, in turn, can provide an invaluable spur to international coordination in identifying and disseminating key technologies to the countries and locations most in need of them. Again, the fact that human rights embody already-shared standards is key: persons vulnerable to human rights threats constitute, in principle, a priority for international as well as domestic policy. The report suggests some tools that already exist to help in this process the Food and Agricultural Organisations Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS) indicator, for example, monitors food security and identifies current and future risk of food scarcity. Such tools, where they exist, will need to be refined in order to target the specificity of climate change risks. In addition, the availability of human rights indicators would be helpful for climate change technology policy, among numerous other purposes. What might such policies involve? Working from national level NTPs (or TNAs), international policy would presumably need to identify priority technologies, establish the extent of needs across countries and conduct analyses of costs, availability, distribution, affordability, risks to human rights or the environment, and proprietorial barriers, if any, of the selected technologies. Moreover, It would seek economies of scale across countries, establish patent pools or exemptions, if needed, and suggest state or multilateral incentives, subsidies and sanctions to facilitate private sector assistance and appropriate mechanisms for facilitating international transfers as warranted. Publicprivate coordination, at both national and international levels, is almost certainly needed to make technologies accessible on the appropriate scale and to deliver them into the appropriate hands. The technology that is transferred in such cases includes: inclusive technology innovation involving end-users and other stakeholders; hardware delivery through arrangements to ensure licensing and know-how; the provision of training in maintaining, operating and constructing technologies; and to the localisation of technologies to facilitate integration into new environments in a manner that does not compromise livelihoods.
III. making clean energy universally available is vital to protect human rights as climate change encroaches.

coordination, at and Publicprivate levels, is almosttheboth nationalscale international certainly needed to make technologies available on appropriate and to deliver them into the appropriate hands.

It is in the identification of policy priorities and drivers to orient technology transfer that the report aims to contribute. The report proposes that human rights provide an appropriate way to organise and orient technology policy and to prioritise needs and objectives in both adaptation and mitigation. Among the many points raised by the report, six key issues bear mentioning:
I. A focus on human rights can help decide on which technologies to concentrate national policies.

Chapter 5 of the full report notes that the identification of particular human rights threats occasioned by climate change provides a sound basis for prioritising the delivery of those technologies best suited to meeting specific threats in particular places. A next round of TNAs, possibly in the form of National Technology Plans (NTPs), will benefit from a human rights focus on the vulnerability of particular persons in certain sectors (healthcare, food security, water availability, housing security, cultural integrity, and so on). To do so would not involve a dramatic reorientation of TNAs, which are currently sector-focused, but it would ensure that different states TNAs are minimally consistent and that all incorporate a set of standards and priorities that are shared by and across the worlds countries at large. Vulnerable states already have obligations to fulfil human rights at home, but these obligations are compromised by changes to the local climate over which they have no control. Their human rights obligations provide vulnerable states with a strong lever in negotiations with development donors on the prioritisation, delivery and orientation of aid and technology. Such an emphasis would essentially entail a reorientation of development policy priorities in many states.

The report follows recent calls from the International Energy Agency and a special advisory group to the UN SecretaryGeneral for universalising access to modern clean energies. As existing analyses make clear, such a policy goal is affordable, manageable and urgent. It is indispensible if the worlds LDCs are to adapt to climate change in the near-term and to contribute to global mitigation efforts over the longer term. It will ensure that development priorities do not have to be sacrificed to climate change exigencies. It will also supply a vital precondition for basic human rights fulfilment in much of the world. The longer this goal is delayed, however, the more likely that its achievement will be both costly and compromised by future climate change pressures.
Iv. Least developed countries must constitute a priority for technology transfer policy with regard to both adaptation and mitigation.

As the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the COPs have recognised, these countries are most vulnerable to climate change harms and least equipped to

Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights: Summary and Recommendations 3

Human rights can provide a minimal platform of agreement on initial policy steps regarding technology at an international level.

address those harms. At the same time, they are vulnerable to a freeze in development capacity due to climate constraints. If global mitigation measures are even partially successful, carbon-based energy and transport will become increasingly expensive, but renewable sources of energy and transport are likely to remain expensive through the mid-term. In every scenario, LDCs will not be obliged to bear substantial costs for mitigation for a long time to come, and this is as it should be. But it will be necessary nonetheless to ensure that these countries do not find themselves stranded with high-carbon infrastructure producing uncompetitive goods in a global market increasingly inhospitable to nonlowcarbon goods. This is all the more true where these countries begin to experience human rights deterioration and resource pressures caused by climate change.
v. The human rights principles of participation, consultation, accountability and access to justice provide a key resource in the construction of international policy.

side claiming that strong IP rights are crucial to support technological and investment in developing countries, while the other side claims that internationally protected IP rights actually pose an immense obstacle to public policy steps in this domain. Neither side has proved its case, and the evidence is inconclusive. The present report does not take sides in this argument. It does, however, suggest that IP rights have taken on a symbolic importance far beyond their practical significance to this subject and that it is time to refocus on the pragmatics of making technologies available where needed. There are a number of reasons to encourage a change of gears on this subject: (1) Policy on technology need not pivot entirely on IP rights many of the technologies in question do not involve significant patent royalties. (2) The combination of climate change and human rights concerns are sufficiently pressing that they must encourage state-led coordination on technology development and diffusion, involving incentives and subsidies. In return, the inclusion of patent pooling or open licensing requirements will not only be appropriate, it will also be efficient and will fit well within existing IP protections. (3) Where climate change results in emergencies, compulsory licensing will in any case be permissible under international law, as a last resort. (4) There is scope within the UNFCCC negotiations to tackle this problem head on and to ensure the international legal context is prepared for IP rights reform. Should it be thought helpful to do so, human rights concerns provide an appropriate impetus.

These principles are best articulated at international level in the Aarhus Convention on public participation in decisionmaking on environmental matters, which, although it lacks universal ratification, is nevertheless signed by a majority of the Annex 2 states. Abiding by these principles will help avoid many of the pitfalls associated with technology transfer in the past, where in some cases technologies were delivered without attention to local capacity to absorb or use them, leading to disuse or misuse, and giving the principle itself a bad reputation.
vI. A human rights focus can help the technology transfer debate transcend old arguments about intellectual property.

Technology transfer has long stalled on the issue of IP rights, which has been unproductively polarized: one

4 Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights: Summary and Recommendations

2.

ReCommeNdATIoNS
ii) Governments can move forward proactively with incentives and subsidies to promote patent pools and open licensing in the development of technologies for both adaptation and mitigation. iii) Multilateral agreements and programmes, including publicprivate partnerships and partnering between developed and developing countries, will be increasingly vital. iv) In extreme cases, where human rights emergencies arise due to climate change, states can lawfully turn to compulsory licensing to ensure that technologies reach those most in need, should IP rights pose an obstacle.

to all governMents
Despite almost 20 years of negotiation and accumulating evidence of climate harms, there is as yet no actionable international policy on technology transfer. Without access to a variety of technologies, the human rights of hundreds of millions are at risk from climate change. Mobilising technology transfer policy is therefore crucial to the future security of human rights and, more broadly, to global security generally. Agreement on an international technology regime is of fundamental importance to the success of climate change policy and must be prioritised. It need not wait for prior agreement on binding targets. Future rounds of negotiations must attend to the construction of a robust technology regime, drawing on the considerable work carried out by the EGTT and others. _____ The decision at Cancun to create a Technology Mechanism, consisting of a technology executive board and technology centre and network, is an important step in actualising technology policy. The Mechanism must build on the work of the EGTT, but it will nevertheless be uniquely positioned to bypass the long-running obstacles in this area and focus on a vision of technology transfer that will do justice to the longstanding hope invested in it. _____ A working and coherent definition of technology transfer is vital. The definition must recognise that technology is not limited to hardware, but also involves know-how and intellectual property, and that transfer is not limited to facilitation of trade and markets but involves proactive public policy measures to ensure technologies move between countries to those who need them most and are deployed in a manner that does not pose undue risks to human rights, security, the environment or livelihoods. _____ Human rights standards can fulfil a number of roles in moving climate technology policy forward: i) They can serve as indicators for identifying technologies needed in specific locations. ii) They can provide a means of coordinating international policy on priority technologies, priority destinations and technological risks. iii) They can serve as a basis for guiding and monitoring the manner in which technologies are transferred and deployed in practice. iv) They can provide an effective moral, legal and rhetorical impetus for more clearly defining the rights and obligations with respect to technology transfer. _____ IP rights have long posed a significant obstacle to progress in technology transfer. It is time to move on from this debate, as the increasingly pressing human rights concerns make clear: i) IP rights may not pose a practical obstacle for all relevant technologies. Policy can move forward swiftly, for example, on the transfer of energy-efficiency techniques, established adaptation measures, and some renewable energy technologies that do not incur prohibitive royalties.

to annex 2 country governMents

In its provisions on technology transfer, the UNFCCC speaks of Annex 2 and other developed country parties. Although this does not constitute a clearly defined duty-bearer, the specific countries named in Annex 2 nevertheless have legal obligations in this domain. The following recommendations are directed at Annex 2 and other developed countries, individually and collectively. _____ Annex 2 countries are explicitly obliged under the UNFCCC to facilitate, finance and promote the transfer of environmentally sound technologies to non-Annex I and developing countries. Annex 2 country governments are also well-placed to mobilise technology transfer and generate economies of scale for technology developers and producers worldwide. To date, however, Annex 2 countries have done little to fulfil this obligation. It is now urgent that they take the lead. _____ Given the threat climate change poses to human rights in vulnerable countries, Annex 2 country Governments must now take proactive steps to mobilise climate-relevant technologies between countries. A constructive approach will resist casting technology transfer solely in narrow terms of open markets, IP rights and enabling environments. It will recognise that without decisive action by and agreement among states, technology movements will be too few and too late. _____ Annex 2 Governments are well-placed to contribute technological expertise and financial support, including through multilateral mechanisms for the effective transfer of technologies. The creation of mechanisms such as technology pools, including patent pools, will involve agreements on subsidies, investment incentives, research and development, IP rights, open licensing and technology dissemination. _____ All Annex 2 measures must necessarily be responsive to the goals outlined in recipient country TNAs, National Adaptation Plans of Action and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Activities, as well as to the instructions of the COPs to the UNFCCC and to the human rights obligations of all parties. _____ Annex 2 countries should incorporate their UNFCCC technology obligations into their development policies and into those of the international financial institutions. Human rights provide a means of assessing and orienting development policy with regard to climate technologies for adaptation and mitigation. The Aarhus Convention is among the relevant treaties in this regard.

Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights: Summary and Recommendations 5

to non-annex 1 country governMents

Although named in the UNFCCC as the beneficiaries of its provisions on technology transfer, non-Annex 1 countries do not constitute a bloc or shared set of interests, economically, legally or politically. The following recommendations are thus aimed at the various groupings that comprise nonAnnex 1 countries, and in particular the LDCs. _____ Non-Annex 1 Governments would benefit from an assessment of the degree to which expected climate harms will have human rights impacts in their countries. These evaluations should inform the identification of technologies in country TNAs, NAPAs, NAMAs and NTPs, with a view to providing clear recommendations to the international community, and to donors and financial institutions, on the prioritisation of adaptation and mitigation technologies for addressing climate change. _____ SouthSouth technology transfer, as practiced notably by Brazil, is an invaluable resource and may have a demonstration effect in showing how best to construct successful models of technology transfer. It is not, however, a substitute for the technology transfer provisions of the UNFCCC. _____ LDCs and other recipients of development aid are well-placed to negotiate the deployment of aid towards the fulfilment of human rights by virtue of Article 2.1 of the ICESCR. Climate change-related aid in particular will be well targeted where it is oriented towards current or predicted human rights threats to food, water, health, housing and livelihoods, in particular, or to ward off forced migration. _____ Non-Annex 1 countries that are not LDCs may be well placed to take the lead on demonstrating climate-constrained developmental paths that can successfully incorporate human rights obligations, in part through investment in and research and development of indigenous technologies.

to un and other international agencies and bodies

_____ The UNFCC Secretariat should consider the creation of a working group on human rights and climate change with a view to informing the construction of the Technology Mechanism and other relevant bodies. It should further empower the existing human rights liaison at the Secretariat. _____ The UN Human Rights Council should continue to remain apprised of developments at the UNFCCC, to undertake its own investigations in this area, and to ensure that the human rights consequences of climate change are closely monitored and addressed. The Council should consider the appointment of a Special Procedure on climate change and human rights. _____ As the principal formal locus of research into the human rights effects of climate change, it is vital that the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights retain a presence in this research domain and continue to influence policy. _____ A number of UN Special Procedures have been following climate change developments, integrating it into their mandates and making valuable recommendations. These include the Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Adequate Food; on the Right to Housing; on the Right to Health; on Human Rights and Extreme Poverty; and the Independent Expert on the Right to Water and Sanitation. In each of these areas, and where other Special Procedures are touched by climate change, it would be valuable to undertake investigations into the role of technology in exacerbating or addressing the human rights harms of climate change and recommending policy orientations to governments. _____ The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is ideally placed to seek from countries information on the degree to which their technology policies meet their human rights obligations with regard to the impacts of climate change or the manner in which the inappropriate deployment of risky technologies might compromise human rights. _____ Other UN bodies principal among them UNEP, UNDP, UNCTAD and the WHO will find it fruitful to integrate the technologyhuman rights nexus into their work. Studies might be undertaken within each agency with a view to making recommendations on the optimal mode of integrating climate technology exigencies with their particular mandates. _____ Technologies relevant to disaster preparation and early warning systems will be vital to humanitarian agencies such as the ICRC, IFRC and UNHCR. In each case, human rights language may provide a useful motivator for mobilising funding and energy towards creating the technological infrastructure to manage climate harms before they become catastrophic. _____ There is a role for agencies dealing with trade and intellectual property, notably at the WTO and WIPO, to investigate the existing legal architecture in order to determine whether it helps or hinders the transfer of technologies necessary to mitigate the human rights impacts of climate change. Given its mandate, WIPO is particularly well-placed to explore multilateral approaches to options of patent pooling and open licensing in the climate technology domain.

to civil society organisations

_____ Legal advocacy groups dealing with human rights or environmental law (or both) could explore the degree to which obligations undertaken through the UNFCCC, human rights treaties, or elsewhere may leave states or private entities liable for actions that have blocked or failed to facilitate technological transfer with human rights consequences. _____ Environmental organisations and especially climate change groups may benefit from incorporating human rights goals and standards into their work on climate change technology. _____ Human rights organisations must take seriously the threat of climate change and show an openness to public policy positions that might not fit easily within classical human rights discourse. _____ Social science and research institutions must forge a road ahead for technology transfer, by demonstrating where technologies can most usefully be adapted to different contexts and how they can most efficiently contribute to the twin goals of furthering human rights and development in the face of climate change. Research must also be undertaken into the legal and practical obstacles to climate change technology transfer.

6 Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights: Summary and Recommendations

HoW To oRdeR ICHRP PubLICATIoNS

All ICHRP publications can be ordered through the Secretariat at: ICHRP 17 rue Ferdinand-Hodler CH-1207 Geneva Switzerland Phone: +41 (0) 22 775 33 00 Fax: +41 (0) 22 775 33 03 Email: orderichrp.org All our publications can also be ordered through our website at www.ichrp.org where they can be accessed in PDF format. For more information about the ICHRP and its work, please contact us at info@ichrp.org.

As a follow-up to its June 2008 report, Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide, the International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) launched a second research project that has now resulted in its latest report, Climate Technology Policy and Human Rights: Protecting Rights in a Climate-Constrained World. Coming at a critical time in the negotiations, this new report addresses issues that are central to technology policy. The report aims to translate between the language and concerns of environmental activists and those of human rights advocates, so that common principles might be found and a common position forged. Climate technology policy has generally been conceived as a means to address a central injustice associated with climate change that activities that have primarily benefited the inhabitants of the worlds richest states will disproportionately affect those living in the worlds poorest states. As a result, technology transfer has long been recognised as an indispensable element of a stable future and a global deal, both practically and politically. The ICHRP report shows that technology transfer is more than this, however: it is also a principal means by which basic human rights standards can be reached for the worlds most vulnerable people in a climateconstrained future. This Summary and Recommendations is a supplement to the full report, condensing the key themes discussed in the report into a broad overview and providing a concise list of the reports recommendations for further action.