';'

SEMANTIC 1~I-IEORY

>

RU'TH M, KEMPSON
In this ierie:
1.I\CT\lltEIt 1'. 11. ~I.\TTIIE\\'S nF.It:-;"1t1l C()~IItIE IIYSOS IN I.INGUI~TICS 01' I.ONIlOI"

'\(",/>'11I1111:.1' .-II/IU/

lJNIV~:ltg\TY

" ~ &
}'

~ ~ t,.

TIlf.OUOIt.\

llistoricul

Linguisics

~:

I~

~~
~(

k~

r:& ~.,

r"'
1
.\

{:~

~'

!~
i~~

I~: I~::
,~: '<~ :.~ ~.: :::

~~
\

\
\
I

~: .~;.~

.~.

~~

:~:

CAMURIDGE
CAM D nr D GE LONDON' NEW

UNIVERSITY
YOHK' fv\l:LDOUTlNE

PRESS

':

~:
.;.

:~;
;::

~:'. :~
.,
':::/"'\.

:~

"

Introduction
Aspects o/ the Theory o/ Synt ax ch. 1, hut Sl'C also C'ltolllsky {,all.t:/wgr Mind (enlarged edition), and Ilach Syntactic TIrt'tJ,y ch. 11. 'I'he prohlelll
(/11I/

01' the nature of linguistic evidence has not hccn :ivt"1l mucl, d('lailnl al/cnlion hy trans(ormational Iinguists hut sce Sampson The '-O'III '1 LfllI.t:/w.t:r ch .. 1, Labov 'Methodology', Fillrnore 'On .;en<:rativity' and I'!ouscholdl'f 'On

2 Explanations of word meaning

bctwcc.i compcrcncc and pcrformance is discussed in Chomsky's Aspects of the Tlreo,y 'if Syntax, ami in more detail in Lyons and Wales [eds.) /'s)'dru/i1lKl/istir l'aper (Sl'C in particular
argumcnts from asterisks'. distinction
.\ r. .

The

f ~

Fodor and Garrctt 'Sorne rellections on cUlllpctelln' and IH:rfllflllanec'). Chomsky's account of this division has hCCTl attuckcd hy 1I yrncs 'On cummunicative cornpetence', and more n'el'ntly hy (;. l.akofT amI nthcr s (scc t lurccommendcd reading for chapter .).

t.$f ,
t ~.

~:
~ ~: ':
r~ ,.

~ ~ :,

IS
.~ p.

~
.~

',:

J ~~;
.

of udcquucy for scmantic theories by which particular theories could be tested, and it rnight seem that we are now in a position to consider the detailed mcchanism of some proposed thcory. llut there was one large and unwarrantcd assumption in the way that thcse cOllllitions wcre spccificd ; it was assumcd that the rclationship hctwcen a word ami what it is uscd to imply and that between a sentence nnd what it is uscd to imply presented no problerns, ano were not a matter for debate. But, quite to the contrary, an explanation of these rclationships - i.e. the problem of what we mean when we rcfer to the rncaning that a word or scntence has - is the classical problem of scmantics, the problem indeed on which scrnantics has traditionally [oundercd. Since any formal representation of sernantics will implicitly present one particular solution to this problem, we cnnnot usefully consider the dctuils of such a theory except in the light of a eoherent account 01 meaning. There are three main ways in which linguists und pliilosophers have attcrnpted to construct explanations of mcaning in naturallanguage: (o) by defining the nature of word rneaning, (h) by defining the nature of sentence meaning, and (e) by explaining thc process of eommunication. In the first wa}:, word meaning is taken as the eonstruet in terms of which sentence meaning and communication can be explained; in the sccond, it is sentence meaning whieh is taken as basic, with words characterised in terms of the systernatic contribution they make to sentenee mcaning; and in the third, both sentence and word meaning are explained in terms of the ways in which sentencs and words are used in the act of communication. It is no coincidence that there are these three types of explanation. In the first place, thcre c1early is a relation between words and objects. We use words lo refer to objccts, and to actions (eonsider such words as ClIP, liorse, tooman, grodllate, cooking, noeeping,
1 suggestcd
SOl/le prcliminury

1n the first chaptcr

conditions

.~
1<:-

~ . ~~

10

11

':~~

-,

!
Explanations

o/ toord

mcaning

Al

Ihinkinc), ami the explun.uion of this n-l.u ion is induhitabf y thc t ask of semantics. Similarly scntcnces are uscd lo dcscr ihc cvenrs, bc licfs, opinions, ami it is unquestionably t he task of scmant ics lo cxplnin thc nature of the rclation betwccn scntcnces ami the statcs of alfairs those sentences describe. Finally, since lunguagc is the vchicl by mcuns of which we effect cornmunication, it is argllahle thut the intcrprct.uion of language should be explaincd in tcrrns 01' its rolc in communication. Moreover these thrce nspects of Illeaning, word mcuning, scntence rneaning, and comrnunication, are reflcctcd in diflercnt uses 01' the word mean, Corrcsponding to cxplanut ion (11) is :

I I
I

2.1

Meaning and rejerence

(1) Supererogatory (2) Spinster means

Corresponding to (11) is :
\

rncans 'supcrfluous'.
'unmurricd woru.ur'.

(3) The

sentenee Ja/lles murdcrrd ,HII,\' mcans t hat somcone called [ames delibcrntely killcd snmeonc called Mnx.

In these two uses, the word mean has a lIleaning approximaling lo indica/f. Butthe word /IIf(lI/ is uscd in a ditlcrcnt scnsc in the [nllowing conversationbetwccn two spcakcrs, A and Il, a sense which corrcspnnds to ~xplanatidn (e): (4) A: Are yOIl going lo bcd soou? D: Whut d'you mcnn? A: 1 rnean that I'm t ircd , and thc sooner yOIl go lo bcd, the sooncr 1 can. In this case, mean is attributable lo speukers und has the sume Illeanillg as the expression intend /0 indicate. 'I'hus we have at least thrce possible starting points from whieh to construct un explanation of meaning - the signification of words, the interprctarion of scntcnces, or what a speaker is intending to convey in ucts of conununicatiou. Of thcse thrce uses, most traditional explanations of mcaning constitutc u n nttcmpt lo cxplnin meaning in terms of the naming rclurion which holds bct wcen a word and its object, and it is this that wv shull hr conccrncd with in this chapter.
2.1

: :.

there is a one-to-one correspondence hctwcen name and object: Ior exarnple the name The j>arllu/I(;ll rcfer s to thc objcct the Parthenon in Athens, the name Ruth Kempsou refcrs lo th~ individual who wrote this book. This rclationship betwccn word and objcct is called the rclationship of reference, and there is a long tradition of equating the problem of meaning with the problem of rcference. According to this view, known as extensionalism beca use of its trcatmcnt of meuning in terms of the objects, callcd extcnsions, to which thc items of the language refer,' the meaning of a word can be explained in tcrms of the relation bctween that word ami ohject or objccts to which it refcrs. J ust as propcr narnes rcfer to individuals, it has hccn suid , common nouns rcfer to scts of individuals, verbs rcfer to aetions, adjcctives rcfer to properties -of individuals, and udverbs refer lo propcr ties of actions. Thus, for exarnplc, it would be said that thc rclation bctwccn the express ion Ruth Kempson and the individual Ruth Kcmpson is directly comparable with the relation betwccn the word mice and the scts of objects which can be referred to by the use of that word; ami moreover both of these relations are said lo be siruilarly comparable lo the relation which holds between, say, the word red and the scts of objects which have the property of redness, and too to the rclation which holds betwccn the word quickly and the sets of actions which liavc the appropriatc propcrty of speed. IIowever, assuming for the momcnt that we can acccpt the clnirn of hornogeneity in connection with thcse difTerent relations, there are a number of reasons to believe that any theory of meaning which attcmpts to explain all aspects of word meaning in terms of rcferenee is mistaken. 1n the first place, there are a nurnbcr of ernbarrassing counter-examplcs: even if the relationship of refcrence can be said to hold between a word such as imagination and sorne cluss of abstract objccts which constitute acts of imagination, therc is no .sense in which words such as and, not, tohether rcfer to anything. And '0111 prepositions present a similar problern, Wliat does o/ rcfer to? What , in this very sentenee, docs the preposition in rcfer to - or indced uery or toltat] NOl only is there a large and non-homogeneous c1ass.i)f:exceptions, but there are a number of anornalies in explaining more straightforward cases. The relationship of reference which holds betwccn expressions and non-cxistcnt objects will be the sarne : it is therefore hard for a theory which explains rneaning in
I

Meaning and refer enc Thc narning rclat ion hct wccu a word ami it~ ohjL'C! is most with proper narnes, thc paradiglll case of nallling. llcre

T'he rnost becn bused

well-knowu.cxposu

ion is Russcll (ef. below).

I ()OZ.

hui chis view has rcccntly 196711) within a trurh-

expounJcJ rheory

1I~lIin hy Duvidson of meunj ng (cf. J,I

Duvidson

transparent
12

13

<

R:~p'lallaliolls

01 uord

I/ltallillg

2.1

Meaning aud reference

terms of rcference to uvuid prnlil'lillg SyllOIl)'lIly betwccn ;111 of the following: the pterodactyl, tlte unicoru tlu: [trs! 10(11I1//1/ 'o ///11/1 (J/I the moon, And, for the sarne reason, 0111 cxprvssion SIIl'h ;IS tlte jirst /IUIII lo land on thc moon will he prcclictcd 10 he quite dilercnt in k ind frorn the expression the first tooman lo 1(/11/1011 1!tf./II1J1J/1, hccuusc only in t lie former case is there a rcferent to which t he cxprcssion cm st.md in a referring relationship. Prohlerns arise cvcn in un .malys is of common nouns which refer to a set of ohjccts. ror in what srnsc can t hc rc be s.rid lo be a ,consistent identifiable rclat ionsh ip of rcfcrcncl' bct wccn t hr wor d igunna and a set of objects to whicl: it rcfcrs in C,) (7r
(5) Iguanas are not very COlll11Il111. (6) Are iguanas cxt inct?

This is not lo dcny that thcre are problema in the nnalysis of refercncc.
On thc contrary. the solution tI; -thc prohlcm of opacity in particular rcmains an opcn OI1C, and sonH:thing of a n issue for philosophers. But it <loes cast doubt on t hc 'assumption thut any solution to the' problerns of reference autnrnnt ically provides a solution to thc problern of meaning. Thc imagc theor y of mcaning Another solut ion to thc prohlcm of cxplaining the naturc of . wurd rncaning, which has an cqunlly long 'tradition, is to cxplain the mcaning of a word in tcrms of rhc iougc in thc spcnkcr's (or hearcr's) bruin. ''he problcm here is to know what form thc imagcs tuke, 'I'hc most obvious point is that these'illlages cannot be visual. For suppose rny image of a triangle is an cquilatcrul: '
2.2

(7) .Professor

11 ncst a \\'1 ra

1I

is looking for igllallas,

In {S), the word might be suid to refcr to a class of objccts, viz. igu.mas ; but in (6), the word either refers to a cluss of objccts or a null class, apparently depending on the unswcr to the qucst iou.i And in (7), the problem is no less acure: for on one intcrprct.uion there lIlay be, say, two specific iguanas that I'rofessor Hruncstuwm is Iuoking Ior, but on another interpretation he lIlay just be looking without thcrc ncccssarily being any such objcct. On this intcrprct.uion, it makes no sensc to question whieh objects does thc word igual/a rcfcr to? This problern arises in a large number of cases (culled 'opaque coutcxts'), following vcrbs such as beliet:e, soan] nnd /1Of>e; ami t hcse present a notor ious problern to anyonc attelllpting tu providc un .m.rlysis of rcfercnce. . Furthermore, iC we return to the paradiglll case of rcferring, propcr names, we fino an important dilcrcncc bctwccn thcse and an)' uther syntacric category. Thollgh in proper n.uncs thcrc is a OIlC-tO-OIlC correspondence betwecn word ami ohjcct , it is 1101 ohvious t h at propcr narncs have any meaning ut all, ror it m.rkcs no se nse lo ask '\Vhat is the meaning of thc expression NIJIIIII C/IIl/lIsII.l'?': nnc can nnly usk '\V11O docs the cxpression NOIIIII C/lIJlIIshy rcfer to?' Th is slIggesls al t hc very lcast that a semantic account of prnpcr n.uncs should not be like that of other words, Ilut if this is so, thcn the original ussumpt iun of homogcneity in the semantie properties of proper nouns uud thc other categories, cornrnon nouns, vcrbs, udjectives, udvcrbs, and so 011, was a mistakc.
I

Fig.

Sentences reference, subjrcl.

such as Ihese pose ,',,,asiderahle prohlcrns as WilllCSS 11,, larg, a"'''"111 of pl.ilosophi<:al

litcr.uu

fnr " rheory of re 011 the

If this is said to constitute Cor me the meanmg oC the word triangle, then eithcr triaugle has to mcan cquilatcrul triangles only, or triangle has tobe said lo be arnbiguous according as the image is cquilateral, isosceles, or scalenc. For cuch of thcse is nuitually exclusive. In a similar vein, an owncr of an alsatian ma)' havc a radically different image of dogs from an owncr of a miniaturc poodlc, but it is not obvious that they thereby' spcak a diffcrent language. Thcrc is no image corrcsponding to what i~. sharcd betwccn dogs, ami none either which has just those fcaturcs shnrcd by all triangles. Ancl this is just one of the m:1I1y problerns Iacing a SImple illlage theory of mcuning. Furthcr problema are prescntcd by the fact that (a) one Illay llave more than ore image for a single expresaion, and (b) two expressions may havc the sarne image. Thus the expression a tlred child may cvoke cithcr an irnage of a child (notice that there is no visual image neutral as between a boy or a girl) curlcd up and nearly aslecp, or an image of a child stamping its Coot and screaming. According to an account of rneaning which cquates the meaning a word has with an image, any word which relates to more than onc image is

;'

If I
Ii

15

",

Explallafons

o/ word

meal/il/g
nnd hencc vucuous.

2,3 Meaning

ami concepts

predicted to be ambiguous. But despitl' t hc prcdict ion, t hc vxprcssinn a tired child is not ambiguous. On the othcr hand, sliould t \\'0 cxpressions bear the same irnagc, the image theory of ll1eanillg prcdicts that they will be synonymous. Dut many cxpressions hnve the same ill1age: (/ tired child, an unliappy child, (/1/ tlngry cluld , (/ [uture tyrant maya" cvoke the identical image of a child stamping its foot und screarning. Yct thcse cxprcssions are by no mc.ins synOIl)'1I10US, /\s I huvc alrc.uly partly indicated, an image thcory of meaning faces the ndclirional problcm of speaker variation. The ill1ages we havc of what might be rcferred to by any word may not only v;lry fmlll occasioll to occ.isiou, hut since they arcdepcndent on our expericnce are certuin to dill'cr in lI1any dctuils, if not radically in substance from those 01' othcr pcople. 'I'akc t hc wor d lecture for example. To those who give lccturcs, t hc wnrd Illight call IIp animage of an audience of bctwccn, S;y, twenty and one hundrcd people staring up at one wretchcd individual who, per haps sclf-consciously, walks up and down in front of t hcm. Ilut ror t hosc who have never lectured, the image is more likcly to be that of one pcrson droning on, often boring, sometimos incomprehensible, with thc accoll1panying sensation ofhaving to fight feclings of dro\\'siness, Such ditlercnt images should, if they correspond to the ll1eaning associatcd with the word , lecture guarantee that cornmunicarinn bct wccn two such grollps of people using the word lecture would be impossible beca use cnch group . , has radically different illlages of Iecturing ami hcnce dilcrcnt concep" tions of the meaning of the word lert ure, Worst of al/, there are lIlany words wit,h whieh it is irnpossible to nssociatc any image at all - and, or, because, therefore, cte. Yet they are by no mcnns rncnninglcss. 23 : Meaning and conccpts The standard retrcat Irm thc extreme [orm of the image view of maning is to say that thc ill1ages are not visual; but, if so, it is not obvious what claim is being m.ulc. Considcr for cxample the suggestion that 'the speech clernent 'housc' is thc symbol, Iirst ami Iorcmost, not of a single perception, rior cven of t hc notion of a particular objcct, but of a 'concept', in other words, of a convenicnt capsuh; of thought that embraces thousands of distinct cxpcr icnccs :11)(1 that is ready to takc in thousands more' [Sapir 1921: IJ), \Vhat is involvcd in this clairn that a word has as its Illeaning a 'eonvcnient eapsule of thought'? If this .is a retraclion from nn im;ge theory nf ll1eaning, as it is. then it is ; retraction fmm a specilic, fnlse clailll to one that is entirely untestable
i6

\t docs no more than substituto Ior the problem opaque tcrm conrept . It dOl'~ not providc un explanation of the rcquircd kind (cf. p, I ubovc), If mcaning is to be explained in terrns of conccpts, it is cssewtial that the term (Ol/tf!>/ itself be given a rigorous dcfiuitiori. ' Sapir's Swiss contcrnporary, de Suussurc, goes sorne \Vay towards providing such a charaeterisat ion, FOI" though, like Sapir, de Saussurc talks freely of conccpts, he strcsscs that the concept (the word he uses is : signiji) an clement .stnnds for is solcly due to its valuc in the systcrn: 'Language is a system of intcrdcpcmlcnt terms in which the valuc of cach terrn results solcly Iron: the simultancous prcscncc of orhcrs'. Oh this basis he would have said thnt thc word bachelor, for exumple, has the mcaning it docs solcly by virtue nf the ol,hl'r itcms in the systcm to which it is rclatcd - spinster, tooman, huslmnd, boy, Similar/y, right across the vocabulary. 'J'hus eaeh of the mcrnbers of the following sets of words stands in a ccrtain rclut ion one to another (Iabclled valeur), which is itself a determinant of the intcrprctution of thc word:
tcrm meaning thc equally

have glve lend borrow rcnt hirc

criticise pralse accuse assess blame

rcprirnand

angry h;ppy calm ' plcascd annoycd

upset

mother uncle
aunt

grandparent nephcw COUSIIl

I~

J ,.

l~ :~ ~:'

It is not of eourse obvious that this observation saves the problem of defining concept from vacuity, for it is not clear how the inter-relationship of value (valeur) ami mcuning (signifi) can itsclf be tcsted, In any case, de Saussure's account is 01)CII to objections similar to those .raiscd against both a refercnce theory of mcaning and an image theory of rneaning. In particular, words such as and, because, or, etc., are counterexarnples lo this vicw, for it is not clear whether their intcrpretation can be analyscd in tenns of conccpts, 1t will not do to suggest that the meaning of and is thc concept of co-ordination, for what is co-ordination other than by joining by and] Sirnilar/y with or: it is meaningless to explain or as having the conccpt of d isjunction for its meaning, when in order to explain disjunction one nCl'ds to rcfer to oro And the general problern remains: to expbin meaning in terms only of concepts is unempirical.
17

. '.

o"

~ ~ .;
"

" ,~

.' ~.

I
1\,
'r:
l'

Exfilallatiol/J

01 toord

/l/eal/il/g al/(/!.IIj'is

2. J

M fa 11 IIC

a/lll

(oIIa!'t,

2.J.1 ,

Componential

L;;

.;

i
I,
': ,.:
"

~ ;'

"

,;;

$ ~ ~

"

.;

~ ~
:::. .',

::

~ ..
" ','

::;

~ , , ~~ :: ~
'

~' 'i

'}

The assuuipt inn 01' SYSll'III;ltit: rdatiollships of Illcalling -betwecn words is however indcpcnch-nt orthe prohlcin of cxplaining the basis ofthese relationships ; ami a considcruhl .unuunt nf dctailcd work on the structure of the vocabulary has hccu done in rcccnt ycars, Many linguists have turned lo what has bccn cullcd componcnt ial unalysis to giye an explicit representation of thc systcmut ic rcL,t ions hct wecn words, 01\ this view the meanings of words are an.rlyscd /lot as un itn rv concepts but as complexes made \11' of componcnr 01' nll':lning wh ich are t hemselves semantic primitives.t In this vvin, ,I/>/",I'/n 11Iight he a/lalysed as a smantic complex rnnde \Ir of t hc Ic.uuns (vquivulent lv callcd components.! or markers) [FEMALE), [!\!E\'I':I{ i'vl,\ IUUED). [A DUL'I'], . [HUMAN). This form of analysis was uscd in par! icular hy anthropologiSts seeking to give an accuunt of kiuship teflni/lology in various cultures. For exarnplc, the distinetion hetwccn mothrr ami aunt in English might be made cxplicit if the tcrms wcre nnalvsed as contrasting cornplexes of the componcnts [rE 1\r\ LE], [1' \ rU~N'I' O F), [Crr [LD OF].) Such componential annlysis is not nI' COIII'$e rcstr ictcd to k inship terms: it can be applied in many arcas 01' thc vocahularv, Fnr cx.unple, the distinction betwccn murder and !lil/ can be stalcd cxplicitly und economically if murder is anulyscd as havillg :1 Illealling which is a cornplex of components rcprcscnring intcntion , cnusution, ami dcath, and kill as having a cornplcx of only t hc COlllpOllents representing causation and death. In a similar \\'ay, g17'r and t alte can be shown 'to be distinct by virtue of their cO/ltrasting coruplcxcs of components representing causation and change of owncrship. By this mcuns, de Saussure's concept of valeur char;cterising the rclationship which a word holds to other words in the svstcm can be stuted cxplicitly in terms of related but distinct componcnt cornplcxcs, ancl indccd thc main value of cornponential analysis lies in t hc econoll1y of st.ucmcnt of thcsc relationships which it allows, " However
1

of more primitive semantic cornponents, one is transferring the burdcn of sernantic cxplanation from word mcaning onto the componcnts which together, in dilfercnt ccmbin.uions, constitute word 'mcnninga. Indccd what rcrnuins to be cxplaincd in such .ornponcntial analyses, as we shall see bclow (6.J.2), is the relationship bctwccn the words of :1 given language and the apparcntly indepcndcnt components. Wc may glibly say that thc word spil/sler has a meaning which is a cornplcx of the sernantic componcnts [FEMALE), [HUMA'N], [ADULT], [NE,VER MARIU ED], bUI the central problcrn is the relationship betwcen the word //11/1/(/1/ and the componcnt [HUMAN], and so on for the rcrnainder of the vocabular y. Unfortunately thc account of the sernantic cornponcnts themsclvcs givcn by linguists using the methodology of componential analysis is often no more substantial than de Saussurc's-or Sapir's charactcr isation of word mcaning. For cxample, it has been clairncd that scmantic fcaturcs are not defined in terms of 'physical properties and rclations outside the human organism' but are symbols 'for the interna] mechanisms by rncuns of which such phcnornena are conceived and conceptualised' [Bierwisch 1970: 181). Katz, one ofthe central exponcnts of scmantics within transforrnational grammar, gives a much more detailcd account, but with little more substnnce: A semnntic murkcr is a thcorcticul cnnstruct which concept that is part of the scnse M morphernes natural languagcs, By a concept in this cnnncction mental ideas or particular thou~hts. Concepts ...
is inrendcd tu rcpf'cscnt a and othcr constitucnts: of,

...

..

we do not mcan irnages or are abstract entities. They do not bclong to the C(J/lSciOIl~cxpcricnce of anyonc, though they' may he thought about , as in our thinki/l~ ahout the concept of a cirelc. Thcy arenot individuatcd by pcrsons : yOIl and '1 Illay think about the same concepto . (Katz 1972: J8)

in so stating the intcr-rclationships

For a more dctuiled diseussioll 01' 111<' sl"IIIS

hel\\'ecll
,,1'
II11'S~

words in terms
(()IllIHlI'~IlIS, cf, 6.2

~
J

" )
below. 2
I shall use rhc rcrm

~
~'

1
t

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

to

menn

rhc

sect

ion

srrnnntic ((JIII!UW,.", wit h syst cmut ir arllhiguity, holh of thc ovcr-u] l grilllul1ar in ",hid. t he scrnunt ic
tlH: (.'Il'flllntary """I,'St's
sl'fl1:mlic

generalisurions are sturccl, :tnd to nll':ln isolalcd hy cOlllponcnl i,,1 '1I\"lysi"

J

units ,,"d

Cf. Lehrcr
olher kinship

1')74 ,,"d Ll'lTt. lennillol,,!:il'S.

"175

1'01' ,kl"iJc.d

"r

En~lish

Ncither characterisation <loes more. than say that the meaning of a word is a (complex) concept, and this wc rejected as. vacuous. Ye,t Katz roundly dismisses this rejcction, inaintaining that 'it is quite unreasonable to insist at the outsct ... on a cl.rrification of the ontological underpinnings of the notions of concept and proposition as a precondirion for accepting the cxplanations of semantic propertics and relations givcn by a theory employing 'semantic markcr' .. .' (Katz 1972: 39). l lowever Katz' mere disrnissal of the attack is not warranted. In the first place, as we have already secn in pnrt, difTering accounts of the nature of rneaning make difTerent claims nbout what constitlltes the proper don,"aiQ of semantics. And the setting up of a formal scmantic theory 'as one 19

...

1'8

-,

;;!:

~
x :' .:

E.\pla1/atiollS o/ uord /l/eol/llIg

component of a gener:Jllinguistic theory, pre:;upposes :J solution to this 'On denoting' (reprinted in Olslicwsky (ed.)

Recommended
l'roblems

rII/iIlC

question: thus any such theory, as indccd beirnplicitly prcsenting sorne clairn as to this c1aim is unfalsifiablc, in defining thcn me:Jning place the theory .Secondly, in tcrrns

t hc one Katz providcs, must t lie nuture of IlIeaning - and ir itsclf hccorncs unclllpirical. Katz' of mental constructs,

o,

'theory has no apparent aword and some object

between .rclations

for nn cxplunation

of the relation

betwecn

that it may be uscd to rcfer

lo, or of thc relatian

~ ~ ~ ~

a sentcncc and the sta te of uluirs it describes. Each of these has.been mcrely reduced to un untcstahle rclnt ion bctwecn an cxpression and a mental construct. And in the case of English worrls there is a one-to-one correspondence between thc repreof and a semantic by [HUMAN). component, wc are given no explanaton al all other

-such as human where

word . than the bald staterncnt

:~

X ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a Q ~~

that the rncnninp unfnlsifiablt,. may which terrns be uscful book), of this

of human is thc conccpt So, while t hc mcthod (and J s!t:J11 indeed a definition such the theoretical

sented
rneaning,

'I'his is not only no! cxplanalory

as an account elllployed

but it is also quite

in componential use of it in later

analysis
chaJlers

be rnaking

S
.;

. provided
components

by an account in conceptual

incorporates are not (hose scicncc,

unclcrpinnings of sernantic
thcory. rnust

of a falsifiablc an account

Jf
be

;11 the I'hilosophy' 01 to he untcnnblc Ior rcasons brought [orward 1>)' Frcgt: seco Frt'gc '01>cr Sin n und Iledcutung' (trunslarcd as 'On sense and r efcrcnce"), and Dummetr's detailcd account of Frcge in fo'rege: I'hiloso,"y 11/ 1.1I11.t:IIII,~I', Russcll's analysis has al so "bccn auacked for indepcndcnt rcasuns hy Strawson : in this connection see the recommendcd rcading for chaptcr 1). 1Iowever the rcduction of the problcm of meaning to the problem of reference has becn re-introduced, both by Davidson (see Davidson "Truth and mcaning') and within possible-world semantics (sce Hintikka 'Scmantics for propositional auitudes' (reprinted in .Linsky (ed.) Reference and Modalily, On rhe prohlems of analysing sentenccs' such as Are iguanas extincti , studunt s should r efer to the lirerature on cxistcnce: sce for exnmplc Moorc 'Is cxistcnce a prcdicatc!', I'car s' and Thomson's articles of thc sume name (rcprinred in Strawson (ed.) I'hilosopltical'Logic), Quine 'On what thcr e is' (in From a.Logical Point o/ Vietu). On the problema prescnted tu theories of rcfcr cnce hy opaq.!e contexts sce Linsky (ed.] Reference and Modality, For a linguislie npprouch to the problcm of opacity, sce Hall-I'artce 'Opacity, corcfer cnce .and pronouns' and 'Opacity and scopc', There is considerahle disagreement ovcr the scmanric propcrties 01' propcr names : [or a representativo set of views sce Searlc .'-)'"eechActs ch. 7, Kripke '. 'Nam.ing and ncccssity', Dummctr's rt'ply to Kr ipke in Frege : I'hi/oso/,/'y o/ Language, and Mates '011 the scmant ics of proper namcs',

1,(/IIg/lage); hut this view was until .reel'.IItl)' thought

.,

'

;,
"

~~ , ~
,\

l.

sernantics is to be part rnade more substantial. In attempting by considering position: planatory, . enter course dismissed,

of an cmpiricnl the conccpt of rneaning, Illeaning

2,2

to unravel the nature

of menning we sccm in tcrrns in terrns :Jnalysis

in naturnllanguagcs lo be in a paradoxicnl of conccpts of rcference solution, This of rcfcrcncc is unexscerns can to

.:

.~
~.,

The classic statcment of an idcuiional thcory of rneaning is glvell. by Lockc, whose exposition is r epr iutcd in Lehrer ano Lchrer (eds.) Theory of Meaning . The twentieth-ccntury linguistic represcntative of this view is Sapir: see Sapir's La I/gI/agt. .
2,3

characterising

merely

e .::;

.' ~ ,.i,

:j

~.

and characterising problerns that to suggest

meaning

into toa many

to be a convincing in thc

is not of be

problema

but merely that the rclationship of reference does not provide 'an adequate basis for an explanation uf word mcaning. We rnust now
turn to the second of tire thrcc lIIain possibilitics anaccount of sentcnce rncaning. that 1 oullined carlicr _

I~

account of semant ics, r,iven in Cours de Linguistique remembered for the emphasis he gave to structural relationships between lexical iterns. Two Iorrns of semantic description can be associated with his work: dcscription in terms of so-called lexioal fields, and, much later, description in terrns of componential analysis. An excellcnt . account of work done on lexical fiells und of componential analysis is 'given in Lehrcr Semantic Fields and Le,\'ica/.~'/TIIrtl/re, and she summariscs the work of Trier who was the mast well-known carly e.xponent of analyses in lcrms of Icxical fields, For a uscful survey ,of work 0'1\ semantic ficlds, se.e Vassilyev, 'Thc theory of sernalllic ficlds: a s\lrvcy'. De Saussurc's

G1/rale, is now mainly

RECOJ\1MENDED

HEADING

..

2.1 THe probJem of iuentifying propcrrics of IlIe~ning \\'itb properties of reference is almost inv~riahly includcd in int roductions to philosophy of language: see for c:-camplc Ihe introduction lo I'~rkinson (ed.) Tlte Tlteory 11 : Mean;ng. and Alslon Philosophy of LOI1:lIogt! ch. I (which ~Iso gives a critical cxposition of both behavioristic thellries 01' lIle~ning :lnd idealional Ibeorics) . Thc most famous attempt to analyse IIlcanin/j in such terms is Hussell's 20

A oetailed introduction to lhe analysis of kinship terms is given in Burling's Mal/'s Mal/y Voires, which incluoes an analysis of the set of English kinship tcrrns, This hook is illciuelltaJl)' an excellent account of componential analysis and the problcrns in its application. Other refcrences inclutle ~9lfn~bury 'The stnlctural 'analysis of kinship semantics', Goodenough 'Componential analy~is ami the study of mcaning', and Conklin 'Lexicographical treatment of folk taxonomics'. For an account of items such as give and /ake and other relateu ilellls sec lIrndix Compol/en/ial Ana/ysis o/ Gel/eral Vocal/2.3.1 21

.(~

..

-L'

Explanations

o/ word

meauing

lar)'. For general problems in thc meth"d"logy of componenrial unalysis see Nida Componential l"alysis (1Mra1/i1/K. 'Th first application of the methods of c.omponential analysis within the frarncwork of transforlllational grammar was Katz and Fodor 'The structure of a semantic theory' (rcprinted in Rosenberg and Travis [eds.] Readings in the Philosopliy 01 La1/guage). The most complete discussion of problems in semantics hy Katz is arguably Semanlic Theory, but for a further detailcd defence of his position that a sernantic marker (equivalenl to a pr imirivc component of mt'aning) necds no characterisation other than a conceptual onc sce Knt z 'Logic and language: an exarnination of recenl criticisrns of intensionalism' s. {o This pos it inn is also defended, against a truth-hascd rhcorv of IIlcaning, by ll ar mnn in 'Meaning and semantics'. For Iurrhcr rcfcr cnccs 011 CO/llpollt'ntial analysis, see the recornmended reading Ior chapt cr (.

3
Meaning and truth

'.

-,

).1

Tarski's truth definition

The attempt to cxplain between

ano scntcnce

rncaning
in terrns of the different

"

'.

(he hasis of meaning Recently however

relationship a long starting

"

a word and the object of mcaning

:t may be used to rcfcr to las a rather

'.'

tradition

in philosophy. a logician

point for a theory

has bcen advocated. of truth

In line with put forwardin .that it is of

Q

work in logic by Tarski, the characterisation sentence sation structed language correctly of word

whosc theory

1933 is now widely held by philosophers, of wht that is the basis for a semantic mcaning. that Tarski by logicians, a definition

it has been suggested thcory, of truth

~ le ~ 'F .'~

we mea n by talking proposed

of the rneaning languages

and not the charactericon- .

'

for formal could

be given .for 'a can predict "

if for each sentence the formula

of the language!

a rule schema

S is true if and only ir p

where which been truth

S is the name
of symbols guarantee

of the sentence making

IIp

(i.e. a mere The

spelling

?ut of the of this it has

,
0., ..:'

sequence suggestion

the sentence) sentence. not our concern

and here.

the conditions However

the truth

of that

significance

for logic is of course

claimed (Davidson can also provide The suggcstion under classic what example,

1967a) that Tarski's the basis of a theory that sentence

formula for a theory ol. of meaning for natural of a sentence-is be true: 1'0 take would

...

languages. to know Tarski's making

is that to know the meaning lo know the meaning

SlIOW

conditions

of the string' of words

up the sentence

is

tohite is to know what conditions-have

'.,

In fact he was referring not to sentences of natural Ianguage- but to staternents fa formal logic. Cf. 3.4.1 below for a discussion of rhe distinction between sentence and statement, 22 23

"

..
"