Hours of Work, Holiday Pay and SIL

Clientlogic Phils., Inc vs Castro, 11 April 2011 Penaranda vs Baranga Plywood Corp, 03 May 2006 Fareast Agricultural Supply Inc vs Lebatique, 12 February 2007 Pulp and Paper, Inc vs NLRC, 24 September 1997 Supreme Steel Corp vs Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Supreme Independent Union, 28 March 2011 Re Request of Muslin Employees in the Different Parts of Iligan City, 14 December 2005 San Juan de Dios Hospital Employees Association vs NLRC, 28 November 1997 Daor vs UST, 31 August 2006

and further, he is not entitled to overtime pay, rest day pay, night shift differential, holiday pay, and service incentive leave pay because he was a supervisor, hence, a member of the managerial staff. DECISION: LA ruled in favor of respondent by declaring him illegally dismissed and ordering petitioners to pay his full backwages and, in lieu of reinstatement, his separation pay. The LA further awarded respondents money claims upon finding that he was not occupying a managerial position. NLRC: Reversed and set aside the decision of the LA by dismissing the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that respondents employment was terminated for a just cause. The NLRC failed to discuss the money claims. CA: Affirmed the NLRCs finding that there was no illegal dismissal. Anent the money claims, the CA concurred with the LAs ruling. Petitioners and respondent respectively moved for partial reconsideration, but their motions were denied in the CA Resolution dated January 7, 2009. SC:

No. 186070, April 11 : 2011] CLIENTLOGIC PHILPPINES, INC. (NOW KNOWN AS SITEL), JOSEPH VELASQUEZ, IRENE ROA AND RODNEY SPIRES, PETITIONERS, VS. BENEDICT CASTRO, RESPONDENT.

[G.R.

Respondent was employed by petitioner as a call center agent for its Bell South Account. After six (6) months, he was promoted to the Mentor position, and thereafter to the Coach position. In June 2006, he was transferred to the Green Dot Account. During respondents stint at the Dot Green Account, respondent noticed that some of the call center agents under his helm would often make excuses to leave their work stations. Their most common excuse was that they would visit the companys medical clinic. To verify that they were not using the clinic as an alibi to cut their work hours, respondent sent an e-mail to the clinics personnel requesting for the details of the agents who sought medical consultation. His request was denied on the ground that medical records of employees are highly confidential and can only be disclosed in cases of health issues, and not to be used to build any disciplinary case against them. On October 11, 2006, respondent received a notice requiring him to explain why he should not be penalized for: (1) violating Green Dot Companys Policy and Procedure for Direct Deposit Bank Info Request when he accessed a customers online account and then gave the latters routing and reference numbers for direct deposit; and (2) gravely abusing his discretion when he requested for the medical records of his team members. Respondent did not deny the infractions imputed against him. He, however, justified his actuations by explaining that the customer begged him to access the account because she did not have a computer or an internet access and that he merely requested for a patient tracker, not medical records. In November 2006, a poster showing SITELs organizational chart was posted on the companys bulletin board, but respondents name and picture were conspicuously missing, and the name and photo of another employee appeared in the position which respondent was supposedly occupying. On January 22, 2007, SITEL posted a notice of vacancy for respondents position, and on February 12, 2007, he received a Notice of Termination. These events prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal; non-payment of overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay; full backwages; damages; and attorneys fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA) against herein petitioners SITEL and its officers. LA: PETITIONER: Respondent acted with serious misconduct which breached the trust and confidence reposed in him by the company. He was duly furnished with the twin notices required by the Labor Code

From the said denial, only petitioners resorted to this Court through the petition at bar. Respondents failure to partially appeal the CAs Decision finding him not illegally dismissed has now rendered the same final and executory; hence, the instant petition shall traverse only the issue on money claims. PETITIONERS: As a team supervisor, respondent was a member of the managerial staff; hence, he is not entitled to overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, and service incentive leave pay. DECISION: We deny the petition. ISSUE: Whether the duties and responsibilities performed by respondent qualify him as a member of petitioners managerial staff. This is clearly a question of fact, the determination of which entails an evaluation of the evidence on record. HELD: Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor Code on working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial employees. Generally, managerial employees are not entitled to overtime pay for services rendered in excess of eight hours a day. Article 212(m) of the Labor Code defines a managerial employee as one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. A coach is a team supervisor who is in charge of dealing with customer complaints which could not be dealt with by call center agents, and if a call center agent could not meet the needs of a customer, he passes the customers call to the coach. Clearly, [respondent] is not a managerial employee as defined by law. Thus, he is entitled to [his] money claims.

As correctly found by Executive Labor Arbiter Bose: Employees are considered occupying managerial positions if they meet all of the following conditions, namely: 1) Their primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof; 2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein; 3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight. They are considered as officers or members of a managerial staff if they perform the following duties and responsibilities: 1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of their employer; 2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment; 3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute, under general supervision, special assignment and tasks x x x. [Respondents] duties do not fall under any of the categories enumerated above. His work is not directly related to management policies. Even the circumstances shown by the instant case reveal that [respondent] does not regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment. [Petitioners] submitted a list of the responsibilities of HR Manager/Supervisor and Division Manager/Department Manager/Supervisors but these do not pertain to [respondent] who does not have any of the said positions. He was just a team Supervisor and not [an] HR or Department Supervisor. The test of supervisory or managerial status depends on whether a person possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer and whether such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. The position held by respondent and its concomitant duties failed to hurdle this test. As a coach or team supervisor respondents main duty was to deal with customer complaints which could not be handled or solved by call center agents. If the members of his team could not meet the needs of a customer, they passed the customers call to respondent. This job description does not indicate that respondent can exercise the powers and prerogatives to effectively recommend such managerial actions which require the customary use of independent judgment. There is no showing that he was actually conferred or actually exercising the following duties attributable to a member of the managerial staff, viz.: 1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management of policies of their employer; 2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;

3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute, under general supervision, special assignment and tasks; and 4) Who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a work week to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above.[17] According to petitioners, respondent also performed the following duties, as shown in the companys Statement of Policy of Discipline: a. b. c. d. e. Know and understand in full the Policy on Discipline including their underlying reasons. Implement strictly and consistently the Policy on Discipline. Ensure that the said Policy on Discipline is communicated to and understood by all employees. Monitor compliance by employees with the said Policy. Advise HR Manager on the state of discipline in their respective departments; problems, if any, and recommend solution(s) and corrective action(s).

As correctly observed by the CA and the LA, these duties clearly pertained to Division Managers/Department Managers/ Supervisors, which respondent was not as he was merely a team supervisor. Petitioners themselves described respondent as the superior of a call center agent; he heads and guides a specific number of agents, who form a team. From the foregoing, respondent is thus entitled to his claims.

CHARLITO PEARANDA, Petitioner, - versus - BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORPORATION and HUDSON CHUA, Respondents. G.R. No. 159577 May 3, 2006
Pearanda was employed by respondent on March 15, 1999 with a monthly salary of P5,000.00 as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer until he was illegally terminated on December 19, 2000. His services [were] terminated without the benefit of due process and valid grounds in accordance with law. Furthermore, he was not paid his overtime pay, premium pay for working during holidays/rest days, night shift differentials and finally claims for payment of damages and attorney's fees having been forced to litigate the present complaint. Upon the other hand, respondent is represented herein by its General Manager HUDSON CHUA, individual respondent. Respondents thru counsel allege that complainant's separation from service was done pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor Code. The respondent was on temporary closure due to repair and general maintenance and it applied for clearance with the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI to shut down and to dismiss employees (par. 2 position paper).And due to the insistence of herein complainant he was paid his separation benefits. Consequently, when respondent [BPC] partially reopened in January 2001, [Pearanda] failed to reapply. Hence, he was not terminated from employment much less illegally. He opted to severe employment when he insisted payment of his separation benefits. Furthermore, being a managerial employee he is not entitled to overtime pay and if ever he rendered services beyond the normal hours of work, [there] was no office order/or authorization for him to do so. Finally, respondents allege that the claim for damages has no legal and factual basis and that the instant complaint must necessarily fail for lack of merit. LA:

There was no illegal dismissal and that petitioner's Complaint was premature because he was still employed by BPC. The temporary closure of BPC's plant did not terminate his employment, hence, he need not reapply when the plant reopened. According to the labor arbiter, petitioner's money claims for illegal dismissal was also weakened by his quitclaim and admission during the clarificatory conference that he accepted separation benefits, sick and vacation leave conversions and thirteenth month pay. Nevertheless, the labor arbiter found petitioner entitled to overtime pay, premium pay for working on rest days, and attorney's fees in the total amount of P21,257.98. NLRC: Deleted the award of overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days. According to the Commission, petitioner was not entitled to these awards because he was a managerial employee. CA: Dismissed Pearanda's Petition for Certiorari. ISSUE: Wheter or CA erred in ruling that petitioner is a managerial employee. SC: The Petition is not meritorious. Nature of Employment Petitioner claims that he was not a managerial employee, and therefore, entitled to the award granted by the labor arbiter. Article 82 of the Labor Code exempts managerial employees from the coverage of labor standards .Labor standards provide the working conditions of employees, including entitlement to overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days. Under this provision, managerial employees are 'those whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code state that managerial employees are those who meet the following conditions: (1) Their primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof; (2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees therein; (3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.

The Court disagrees with the NLRC's finding that petitioner was a managerial employee. However, petitioner was a member of the managerial staff, which also takes him out of the coverage of labor standards. Like managerial employees, officers and members of the managerial staff are not entitled to the provisions of law on labor standards. The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code define members of a managerial staff as those with the following duties and responsibilities: (1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of the employer; (2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment; (3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute under general supervision special assignments and tasks; and (4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above. As shift engineer, petitioner's duties and responsibilities were as follows: 1. To supply the required and continuous steam to all consuming units at minimum cost. 2. To supervise, check and monitor manpower workmanship as well as operation of boiler and accessories. 3.To evaluate performance of machinery and manpower. 4. To follow-up supply of waste and other materials for fuel. 5. To train new employees for effective and safety while working. 6. Recommend parts and supplies purchases. 7. To recommend personnel actions such as: promotion, or disciplinary action. 8. To check water from the boiler, feedwater and softener, regenerate softener if beyond hardness limit. 9. Implement Chemical Dosing. 10. Perform other task as required by the superior from time to time. The foregoing enumeration, particularly items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 illustrates that petitioner was a member of the managerial staff. His duties and responsibilities conform to the definition of a member of a managerial staff under the Implementing Rules. Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His work involved overseeing the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. This work necessarily required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. As supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial staff. Noteworthy, even petitioner admitted that he was a supervisor. In his Position Paper, he stated that he was the foreman responsible for the operation of the boiler. The term foreman implies that he was the representative of management over the workers and the operation of the department. Petitioner's evidence also showed that he was the supervisor of the steam plant. His classification as supervisor is further evident from the manner his salary was paid. He belonged to the 10% of respondent's 354 employees who were paid on a monthly basis; the others were paid only on a daily basis.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no justification to award overtime pay and premium pay for rest days to petitioner.

Petitioners: (1) Lebatique was not dismissed from service but merely suspended for a day due to violation of company rules; (2) Lebatique was not barred from entering the company premises since he never reported back to work; and (3) Lebatique is estopped from claiming that he was illegally dismissed since his complaint before the DOLE was only on the nonpayment of his overtime pay. Also, petitioners maintain that Lebatique, as a driver, is not entitled to overtime pay since he is a field personnel whose time outside the company premises cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. According to petitioners, the drivers do not observe regular working hours unlike the other office employees. The drivers may report early in the morning to make their deliveries or in the afternoon, depending on the production of animal feeds and the traffic conditions. Petitioners also aver that Lebatique worked for less than eight hours a day. Lebatique for his part insists that he was illegally dismissed and was not merely suspended. He argues that he neither refused to work nor abandoned his job. He further contends that abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. He also claims that he is not a field personnel, thus, he is entitled to overtime pay and service incentive leave pay. DECISION: Petition lacks merit.

FAR EAST AGRICULTURAL SUPPLY, INC. and/or ALEXANDER UY - versus JIMMY LEBATIQUE and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS. G.R. No. 162813 Feb 12, 2007
Petitioner Far East Agricultural Supply, Inc. (Far East) hired on March 4, 1996 private respondent Jimmy Lebatique as truck driver with a daily wage of P223.50. He delivered animal feeds to the companys clients. On January 24, 2000, Lebatique complained of nonpayment of overtime work particularly on January 22, 2000, when he was required to make a second delivery in Novaliches, Quezon City. That same day, Manuel Uy, brother of Far Easts General Manager and petitioner Alexander Uy, suspended Lebatique apparently for illegal use of company vehicle. Even so, Lebatique reported for work the next day but he was prohibited from entering the company premises. On January 26, 2000, Lebatique sought the assistance of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Public Assistance and Complaints Unit concerning the nonpayment of his overtime pay. According to Lebatique, two days later, he received a telegram from petitioners requiring him to report for work. When he did the next day, January 29, 2000, Alexander asked him why he was claiming overtime pay. Lebatique explained that he had never been paid for overtime work since he started working for the company. He also told Alexander that Manuel had fired him. After talking to Manuel, Alexander terminated Lebatique and told him to look for another job. LA: Lebatique was illegally dismissed, and ordered his reinstatement and the payment of his full back wages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and overtime pay. NLRC: Found that Lebatique was a field personnel, hence, not entitled to overtime pay and service incentive leave pay. CA: Reversed the NLRC decision, reasoned that Lebatique was suspended on January 24, 2000 but was illegally dismissed on January 29, 2000 when Alexander told him to look for a nother job. It also found that Lebatique was not a field personnel and therefore entitled to payment of overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13 th month pay. SC: ISSUES: (1) whether Lebatique was illegally dismissed; and (2) whether Lebatique was a field personnel, not entitled to overtime pay.

To constitute abandonment as a just cause for dismissal, there must be: (a) absence without justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee relationship. The records show that petitioners failed to prove that Lebatique abandoned his job. Nor was there a showing of a clear intention on the part of Lebatique to sever the employer-employee relationship.When Lebatique was verbally told by Alexander Uy, the companys General Manager, to look for another job, Lebatique was in effect dismissed.Even assuming earlier he was merely suspended for illegal use of company vehicle, the records do not show that he was afforded the opportunity to explain his side.It is clear also from the sequence of the events leading to Lebatiques dismissal that it was Lebatiques complaint for nonpayment of his overtime pay that provoked the management to dismiss him, on the erroneous premise that a truck driver is a field personnel not entitled to overtime pay. An employee who takes steps to protest his layoff cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to have abandoned his work and the filing of the complaint is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.A contrary notion would not only be illogical but also absurd. It is immaterial that Lebatique had filed a complaint for nonpayment of overtime pay the day he was suspended by managements unilateral act. What matters is that he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on March 20, 2000, after he was told not to report for work, and his filing was well within the prescriptive period allowed under the law. On the second issue, Article 82 of the Labor Code is decisive on the question of who are referred to by the term field personnel. Field personnel shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. In Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista, this Court emphasized that the definition of a field personnel is not merely concerned with the location where the employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that the employees performance is unsupervised by the employer. We held that field personnel are those who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to determine whether an employee is a field employee, it is also

necessary to ascertain if actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employees time and performance are constantly supervised by the employer. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, Lebatique is not a field personnel as defined above for the following reasons: (1) company drivers, including Lebatique, are directed to deliver the goods at a specified time and place; (2) they are not given the discretion to solicit, select and contact prospective clients; and (3) Far East issued a directive that company drivers should stay at the clients premises during truck-ban hours which is from 5:00 to 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 to 9:00 p.m.Even petitioners admit that the drivers can report early in the morning, to make their deliveries, or in the afternoon, depending on the production of animal feeds.Drivers, like Lebatique, are under the control and supervision of management officers.Lebatique, therefore, is a regular employee whose tasks are usually necessary and desirable to the usual trade and business of the company.Thus, he is entitled to the benefits accorded to regular employees of Far East, including overtime pay and service incentive leave pay.

the same considering the fact that complainant herein being paid by results, it is not in a proper position to determine whether the complainant was underpaid or not. The Issues: Did the Public Respondent NLRC act correctly in affirming in toto the decision rendered by the labor arbitration branch a quo in NLRC NCR Case no. 00-01-00494-92? While it expressly admits that private respondent is entitled to separation pay, petitioner raises nonetheless the following queries: (a) Are the factors in determining the amount of separation pay for a piece-rate worker the same as that of a time-worker? (b) Is a worker, who was terminated for lack of work, entitled to separation pay at the rate of one-months pay for every year of service? The petition is based on the following grounds: I Public Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and serious reversible error when it affirmed in toto the award of separation pay in favor of private respondent, without bases in fact and in law. II Public Respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and serious reversible error when it affirmed in toto the award of underpayment in favor of private respondent, without bases in fact and in law. Decision: Dismissed petitioners appeal. It is true that all the above circumstances cited by the [herein petitioner] are not present in the case at bar, hence, separation pay based on those circumstances is not owing to the [herein private respondent]. However, it is quite obvious that [petitioner] missed the legal and factual basis why separation pay was awarded by the Labor Arbiter. In the first place, the [petitioner] admits that the complainant-appellee was temporarily laid off on June 29, 1991. This means that there was a temporary suspension of employeremployee relationship between the appellant and the appellee. Lay-off is a temporary termination initiated by the employer, but without prejudice to the reinstatement or recall of the workers who have been temporarily separated. The reasons for laying off employees are varied: lack of work, shutdown for repairs, business reverses, and the like. Always, however, there is the expectation that the employees who have been laid off will be recalled or rehired. This situation is governed by Rule I, Section 12, of Book VI of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, which provides: Sec. 12. Suspension of Relationship. -- The employer-employee relationship shall be deemed suspended in case of suspension of operation of the business or undertaking of the employer for a period not exceeding six (6) months x x x. From June 29, 1991 up to the time the complainant-appellee filed her complaint on January 21, 1992, there was more than six (6) months that already elapse (sic) and yet, the appellant failed to recall the appellee to let her resume working. If the appellant was not yet in a possession to recall or reinstate the appellee after six (6) months, up to when shall appellant let her keep in waiting. Of course, she cannot be allowed to wait interminably. That is the reason why the law imposes a period of six (6) months within which the resumption of employer-employee relationship must be resumed in temporary lay-offs. Otherwise, any employer can, in the guise of a temporary lay-off, close its doors to an employee for more than six months and their claim that the lay-off has ripened into termination and try to get away from any liability. The award of separation pay is hereby declared in order. On the second issue raised by the (petitioner) on appeal, We are also for the Labor Arbiters ruling upholding the appellees right to salary differential in the amount computed.

[G.R. No. 116593. September 24, 1997] PULP AND PAPER, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND EPIFANIA ANTONIO, Respondents. A case of illegal dismissal and underpayment of wages [was] filed by MS. EPIFANIA ANTONIO [private respondent herein] against PULP AND PAPER DISTRIBUTORS INC., [petitioner herein] x x x. In filing the present complaint, complainant in her position paper alleges that she was a regular employee of the x x x corporation having served thereat as Wrapper sometime in September 1975. On November 29, 1991, for unknown reasons, she was advised verbally of her termination and was given a prepared form of Quitclaim and Release which she refused to sign. Instead she brought the present complaint for illegal dismissal. In charging the [herein petitioner] of underpayment of wages, complainant in the same position paper alleges that, rarely during her employment with the respondent she received her salary, a salary which was in accordance with the minimum wage law. She was not paid overtime pay, holiday pay and five-day service incentive leave pay, hence she is claiming for payments thereof by instituting the present case. Respondent: Denied having terminated the services of the complainant and alleges inter alia that starting 1989 the orders from customers became fewer and dwindled to the point that it is no longer practical to maintain the present number of packer/wrappers. Maintaining the same number of packers/wrappers would mean less pay because the work allocation is no longer the same as it was. Such being the case, the respondent has to reduce temporarily the number of packers/wrappers. Complainant was among those who were temporarily laid-off from work. Complainant last worked with the company on June 29, 1991. As regards complainants allegation that on November 29, 1991, she was forced to sign a quitclaim and release by the respondent, the latter clarified that considering that five months from the time the complainant last worked with the company, the management decided to release the complainant and give her a chance to look for another job in the meantime that no job is available for her with the company. In other words, complainant was given the option and considering that she did not sign the documents referred to as the Quitclaim and Release, the respondent did not insist, and did not terminate the services of the complainant. It was just surprise [sic] to receive the present complaint. In fact, respondent added that the reason why the complainant was called on November 29, 1991 was not to work but to receive her 13th month pay of P636.70 as shown by the voucher she signed (Annex-A, Respondent). As regards the claim of the complainant for underpayment, respondent did not actually denied (sic) the same but give [sic] the reservation that should the same be determined by this Office it is willing to settle

Petitioner: Based on Art. 101 of the Labor Code, in relation to Rule VII, Section (8), Book III of the Omnibus Implementing Rule and Regulations, will not lie in the case at bar. In the first place, pursuant to the provision of law cited by the [petitioner], all time and motion studies, or any other schemes or devices to determine whether the employees paid by results are being compensated in accordance with the minimum wage requirements, shall only be approved on petition of the interested employer. Thus, it is the fault of the [petitioner] on whose initiative, a time and motion study or any other similar scheme is not yet available in its establishment. The Courts Ruling The appeal is not meritorious. First Issue: Computation of Minimum Wage Petitioner argues that private respondent was a piece-rate worker and not a time-worker. Since private respondents employment as (p)acker/(w)rapper in 1975 until her separation on June 29, 1991, (h)er salary depended upon the number of reams of bond paper she packed per day. Petitioner contends that private respondents work depended upon the number and availability of purchase orders from customers. Petitioner adds that, oftentimes, packers/wrappers only work three to four hours a day. Thus, her separation pay must be based on her latest actual compensation per piece or on the minimum wage per piece as determined by Article 101 of the Labor Code, whichever is higher, and not on the daily minimum wage applicable to time-workers. Compensation of Pieceworkers In the absence of wage rates based on time and motion studies determined by the labor secretary or submitted by the employer to the labor secretary for his approval, wage rates of piece-rate workers must be based on the applicable daily minimum wage determined by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Commission. To ensure the payment of fair and reasonable wage rates, Article 101 12 of the Labor Code provides that the Secretary of Labor shall regulate the payment of wages by results, including pakyao, piecework and other nontime work. The same statutory provision also states that the wage rates should be based, preferably, on time and motion studies, or those arrived at in consultation with representatives of workers and employers organizations. In the absence of such prescribed wage rates for piece-rate workers, the ordinary minimum wage rates prescribed by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards should apply. This is in compliance with Section 8 of the Rules Implementing Wage Order Nos. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A -- the prevailing wage order at the time of dismissal of private respondent, viz.:13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary SEC. 8. Workers Paid by Results. -- a) All workers paid by results including those who are paid on piece work, takay, pakyaw, or task basis, shall receive not less than the applicable minimum wage rates prescribed under the Order for the normal working hours which shall not exceed eight (8) hours work a day, or a proportion thereof for work of less than the normal working hours. The adjusted minimum wage rates for workers paid by results shall be computed in accordance with the following steps: 1) Amount of increase in AMW x 100 = % increase Previous AMW 2) Existing rate/piece x % increase = increase in rate/piece;

3) Existing rate/piece + increase in rate/piece = adjusted rate/piece. b) The wage rates of workers who are paid by results shall continue to be established in accordance with Art. 101 of the Labor Code, as amended and its implementing regulations. (Underscoring supplied.) On November 29, 1991, private respondent was orally informed of the termination of her employment. Wage Order No. NCR-02, in effect at the time, set the minimum daily wage for non-agricultural workers like private respondent at P118.00. This was the rate used by the labor arbiter in computing the separation pay of private respondent. We cannot find any abuse of discretion, let alone grave abuse, in the order of the labor arbiter which was later affirmed by the NLRC. Moreover, since petitioner employed piece-rate workers, it should have inquired from the secretary of labor about their prescribed specific wage rates. In any event, there being no such prescribed rates, Petitioner, after consultation with its workers, should have submitted for the labor secretarys approval time and motion studies as basis for the wage rates of its employees. This responsibility of the employer is clear under Section 8, Rule VII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code: Section 8. Payment by result. (a) On petition of any interested party, or upon its initiative, the Department of Labor shall use all available devices, including the use of time and motion studies and consultations with representatives of employers and workers organizations, to determine whether the employees in any industry or enterprise are being compensated in accordance with the minimum wage requirements of this Rule. (b) The basis for the establishment of rates for piece, output or contract work shall be the performance of an ordinary worker of minimum skill or ability. (c) An ordinary worker of minimum skill or ability is the average worker of the lowest producing group representing 50% of the total number of employees engaged in similar employment in a particular establishment, excluding learners, apprentices and handicapped workers employed therein. (d) Where the output rates established by the employer do not conform with the standards prescribed herein, or with the rates prescribed by the Department of Labor in an appropriate order, the employees shall be entitled to the difference between the amount to which they are entitled to receive under such prescribed standards or rates and that actually paid them by employer. In the present case, petitioner as the employer unquestionably failed to discharge the foregoing responsibility. Petitioner did not submit to the secretary of labor a proposed wage rate -- based on time and motion studies and reached after consultation with the representatives from both workers and employers organization -- which would have applied to its piece-rate workers. Without those submissions, the labor arbiter had the duty to use the daily minimum wage rate for non-agricultural workers prevailing at the time of private respondents dismissal, as prescribed by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Boards. Put differently, petitioner did not take the initiative of proposing an appropriate wage rate for its piece-rate workers. In the absence of such wage rate, the labor arbiter cannot be faulted for applying the prescribed minimum wage rate in the computation of private respondents separation pay. In fact, it acted and ruled correctly and legally in the premises. It is clear, therefore, that the applicable minimum wage for an eight-hour working day is the basis for the computation of the separation pay of piece-rate workers like private respondent. The computed daily wage should not be reduced on the basis of unsubstantiated claims that her daily working hours were less than eight. Aside from its bare assertion, petitioner presented no clear proof that private respondents regular working day was less than eight hours. Thus, the labor arbiter correctly used the full amount of P118.00 per day in computing private respondents separation pay. We agree with the following computation.

Considering therefore that complainant had been laid-off for more than six (6) months now, we strongly feel that it is already reasonable for the respondent to pay the complainant her separation pay of one month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months to be considered as one whole year. Separation pay should be computed based on her minimum salary as will be determined hereunder. Separation pay 1 month = 16 years P118.00 x 26 x 16 years = P49,088.00 The amount P118.00 represents the applicable daily minimum wage per Wage Order Nos. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A; 26, the number of working days in a month after excluding the four Sundays which are deemed rest days; 16, the total number of years spent by private respondent in the employ of petitioner.

Out of the eleven issues raised by respondent, eight were decided in its favor; two (denial of paternity leave benefit and discrimination of union members) were decided in favor of petitioner; while the issue on visitor's free access to company premises was deemed settled during the mandatory conference. CA: Forthwith, petitioner elevated the case to the CA, reiterating its arguments on the eight issues resolved by the NLRC in respondent's favor. Decision: Dismissed the petition. According to the CA, petitioner failed to show that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that it violated certain provisions of the CBA. The NLRC correctly held that every employee is entitled to the wage increase under the CBA despite receipt of an anniversary increase. The CA concluded that, based on the wording of the CBA, which uses the words "general increase" and "over and above," it cannot be said that the parties have intended the anniversary increase to be given in lieu of the CBA wage increase. The CA declared that the withdrawal of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 from the employees who were not minimum wage earners amounted to a diminution of benefits because such grant has already ripened into a company practice. It pointed out that there was no ambiguity or doubt as to who were covered by the wage order. Petitioner, therefore, may not invoke error or mistake in extending the COLA to all employees and such act can only be construed as "as a voluntary act on the part of the employer." The CA sustained the NLRC's interpretation of Art. VIII, Section 4 of the CBA as including the expenses for first aid medicine and transportation cost in going to the hospital. The CA stressed that the CBA should be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it was negotiated and the purpose which it intended to serve. Based on the principle of liberal construction of the CBA, the CA likewise sustained the NLRC's rulings on the issues pertaining to the shuttle service, time-off for attendance in grievance meetings/hearings, and time-off due to brownouts. The CA further held that management prerogative is not unlimited: it is subject to limitations found in law, a CBA, or the general principles of fair play and justice. It stressed that the CBA provided such limitation on management prerogative to contract-out labor, and compliance with the CBA is mandated by the express policy of the law. Finally, the CA affirmed the NLRC's finding that Madayag's dismissal was illegal. It emphasized that the burden to prove that the employee's disease is of such nature or at such stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months rests on the employer. Petitioner failed to submit a certification from a competent public authority attesting to such fact; hence, Madayag's dismissal is illegal. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the CA's decision. On December 4, 2008, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit. SC: The petition is partly meritorious. It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. If the terms of a CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall prevail. Moreover, the CBA must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically and the Court must place a practical and realistic construction upon it. [55] Any doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor should be resolved in favor of labor. [56]

[G.R. No. 185556, March 28 : 2011] SUPREME STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG SUPREME INDEPENDENT UNION (NMS-IND-APL), RESPONDENT.

On July 27, 2005, respondent filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground that petitioner violated certain provisions of the CBA. The parties failed to settle their dispute. Consequently, the Secretary of Labor certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. Respondent alleged eleven CBA violations, delineated as follows: A. Denial to four employees of the CBA- provided wage increase B. Contracting-out labor Respondent claimed that, contrary to this provision, petitioner hired temporary workers for five months based on uniformly worded employment contracts, renewable for five months, and assigned them to almost all of the departments in the company. It pointed out that, under the CBA, temporary workers are allowed only in the Warehouse and Packing Section. C. Failure to provide shuttle service Petitioner has allegedly reneged on its obligation to provide shuttle service for its employees pursuant to Article XIV, Section 7 of the CBA. D. Refusal to answer for the medical expenses incurred by three employees Respondent asserted that petitioner is liable for the expenses incurred by three employees who were injured while in the company premises. E. Failure to comply with the time-off with pay provision F. Visitors' free access to company premises G. Failure to comply with reporting time-off provision H. Dismissal of Diosdado Madayag No certification about his Diabetes Melitus type 2. I. Denial of paternity leave benefit to two employees J. Discrimination and harassment According to respondent, petitioner was contemptuous over union officers for protecting the rights of union members. In an affidavit executed by Chito Guadaa, union secretary, he narrated that Alfred Navarro, Officer-in-Charge of the Packing Department, had been harsh in dealing with his fellow employees and would even challenge some workers to a fight. K. Non-implementation of COLA in Wage Order Nos. RBIII-10 and 11 NLRC:

Upon these well-established precepts, we sustain the CA's findings and conclusions on all the issues, except the issue pertaining to the denial of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 and 11 to the employees who are not minimum wage earners. The wording of the CBA on general wage increase cannot be interpreted any other way: The CBA increase should be given to all employees "over and above" the amount they are receiving, even if that amount already includes an anniversary increase. Stipulations in a contract must be read together, not in isolation from one another.[57] Consideration of Article XIII, Section 2 (non-crediting provision), bolsters such interpretation. Section 2 states that "[a]ll salary increase granted by the company shall not be credited to any future contractual or legislated wage increases." Clearly then, even if petitioner had already awarded an anniversary increase to its employees, such increase cannot be credited to the "contractual" increase as provided in the CBA, which is considered "separate and distinct." Petitioner claims that it has been the company practice to offset the anniversary increase with the CBA increase. It however failed to prove such material fact. Company practice, just like any other fact, habits, customs, usage or patterns of conduct must be proven. The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit, or company practice. Evidently, the pay slips of the four employees do not serve as sufficient proof. Petitioner's excuse in not providing a shuttle service to its employees is unacceptable. In fact, it can hardly be considered as an excuse. Petitioner simply says that it is difficult to implement the provision. It relies on the fact that "no time element [is] explicitly stated [in the CBA] within which to fulfill the undertaking." We cannot allow petitioner to dillydally in complying with its obligation and take undue advantage of the fact that no period is provided in the CBA. Petitioner should recondition the company vehicle at once, lest it be charged with and found guilty of unfair labor practice. Petitioner gave a narrow construction to the wording of the CBA when it denied (a) reimbursement for the first-aid medicines taken by Rodrigo Solitario when he was injured during the company sportsfest and the transportation cost incurred by Alberto Guevara and Job Canizares in going to the hospital, (b) payment of the wages of certain employees during the time they spent at the grievance meetings, and (c) payment of the employees' wages during the brownout that occurred on July 25, 2002. As previously stated, the CBA must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically. It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon the CBA, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve. Absurd and illogical interpretations should be avoided.[59] A CBA, like any other contract, must be interpreted according to the intention of the parties. [60] The CA was correct in pointing out that the concerned employees were not seeking hospitalization benefits under Article VIII, Section 1 of the CBA, but under Section 4 thereof; hence, confinement in a hospital is not a prerequisite for the claim. Petitioner should reimburse Solitario for the first aid medicines; after all, it is the duty of the employer to maintain first- aid medicines in its premises.[61] Similarly, Guevara and Canizares should also be reimbursed for the transportation cost incurred in going to the hospital. The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that, where the employer does not have an emergency hospital in its premises, the employer is obliged to transport an employee to the nearest hospital or clinic in case of emergency.[62] We likewise agree with the CA on the issue of nonpayment of the time-off for attending grievance meetings. The intention of the parties is obviously to compensate the employees for the time that they spend in a grievance meeting as the CBA provision categorically states that the company will pay the employee "a paid time-off for handling of grievances, investigations, labor-management conferences." It does not make a qualification that such meeting should be held during office hours or within the company premises. The employees should also be compensated for the time they were prevented from working due to the brownout. The CBA enumerates some of the instances considered as "emergencies" and these are "typhoons, flood earthquake, transportation strike." As correctly argued by respondent, the CBA does not exclusively enumerate the situations which are considered "emergencies." Obviously, the key element of the provision is that employees "who have reported for work are unable to continue working"

because of the incident. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that brownout or power outage is considered an "emergency" situation. Again, on the issue of contracting-out labor, we sustain the CA. Petitioner, in effect, admits having hired "temporary" employees, but it maintains that it was an exercise of management prerogative, necessitated by the increase in demand for its product. Indeed, jurisprudence recognizes the right to exercise management prerogative. Labor laws also discourage interference with an employer's judgment in the conduct of its business. For this reason, the Court often declines to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. The law must protect not only the welfare of employees, but also the right of employers.[63] However, the exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. Managerial prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice.[64] The CBA is the norm of conduct between the parties and, as previously stated, compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.[65] The CBA is clear in providing that temporary employees will no longer be allowed in the company except in the Warehouse and Packing Section. Petitioner is bound by this provision. It cannot exempt itself from compliance by invoking management prerogative. Management prerogative must take a backseat when faced with a CBA provision. If petitioner needed additional personnel to meet the increase in demand, it could have taken measures without violating the CBA. Respondent claims that the temporary employees were hired on five-month contracts, renewable for another five months. After the expiration of the contracts, petitioner would hire other persons for the same work, with the same employment status. Plainly, petitioner's scheme seeks to prevent employees from acquiring the status of regular employees. But the Court has already held that, where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods of employment have been imposed to preclude acquisition of security of tenure by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and morals.[66] The primary standard to determine a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of that activity to the business of the employer. Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. [67] We also uphold the CA's finding that Madayag's dismissal was illegal. It is already settled that the burden to prove the validity of the dismissal rests upon the employer. Dismissal based on Article 284 of the Labor Code is no different, thus: The law is unequivocal: the employer, before it can legally dismiss its employee on the ground of disease, must adduce a certification from a competent public authority that the disease of which its employee is suffering is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper treatment. xxxx In Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court explains why the submission of the requisite medical certificate is for the employer's compliance, thus: The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee's illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. x x x x[68] However, with respect to the issue of whether the COLA under Wage Order Nos. RBIII-10 and 11 should

be implemented across the board, we hold a different view from that of the CA. No diminution of benefits would result if the wage orders are not implemented across the board, as no such company practice has been established. Diminution of benefits is the unilateral withdrawal by the employer of benefits already enjoyed by the employees. There is diminution of benefits when it is shown that: (1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time; (2) the practice is consistent and deliberate; (3) the practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law; and (4) the diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer. [69] To recall, the CA arrived at its ruling by relying on the fact that there was no ambiguity in the wording of the wage order as to the employees covered by it. From this, the CA concluded that petitioner actually made no error or mistake, but acted voluntarily, in granting the COLA to all its employees. It therefore took exception to the Globe Mackay case which, according to it, applies only when there is a doubtful or difficult question involved. The CA failed to note that Globe Mackay primarily emphasized that, for the grant of the benefit to be considered voluntary, "it should have been practiced over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate."[70] The fact that the practice must not have been due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law is a distinct requirement. The implementation of the COLA under Wage Order No. RBIII-10 across the board, which only lasted for less than a year, cannot be considered as having been practiced "over a long period of time." While it is true that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years in order for a practice to be considered as a voluntary act of the employer, under existing jurisprudence on this matter, an act carried out within less than a year would certainly not qualify as such. Hence, the withdrawal of the COLA Wage Order No. RBIII-10 from the salaries of non-minimum wage earners did not amount to a "diminution of benefits" under the law. There is also no basis in enjoining petitioner to implement Wage Order No. RBIII-11 across the board. Similarly, no proof was presented showing that the implementation of wage orders across the board has ripened into a company practice. In the same way that we required petitioner to prove the existence of a company practice when it alleged the same as defense, at this instance, we also require respondent to show proof of the company practice as it is now the party claiming its existence. Absent any proof of specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of the practice, we cannot give credence to respondent's claim. The isolated act of implementing a wage order across the board can hardly be considered a company practice,[71] more so when such implementation was erroneously made.

Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request. However, he expressed some misgivings about the second request. In support of their requests, the Muslim employees invoke Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 291[1] as amended by P.D. No. 322[2] enacted by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The avowed purpose of P.D. No. 291 was to reinforce national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays and making them part of our national holidays. Section 2 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 322, provides that the following are recognized Muslim holidays. XXX Muslims employees in the government are excused from reporting to office during these holidays in order that they may be able to properly observe them. Section 3 of the same law, as amended by P.D. No. 322, further provides that: Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution of salary or wages, provided, that the employee who is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this provision. (b) Regulations for the implementation of this section shall be issued together with the implementing directives on Muslim holidays. Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277 dated November 13, 1981 which states in part: 2. During 'Ramadan the Fasting month (30 days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service official time of 8 oclock to 12 oclock and 1 oclock to 5 oclock is hereby modified to 7:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. without noon break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as undertime; 3. During Friday, the Muslim pray day, Muslims are excused from work from 10 oclock in the morning to 2 oclock in the afternoon. Moreover, in its Resolution No. 00-0227 dated January 26, 2000, the CSC clarified that the term 'Friday in the above resolution is not limited to the Fridays during the month of Ramadan, but refers to 'all Fridays of the calendar year. However, in order not to run afoul of Section 5,[3] Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292[4] which enjoins civil servants to render public service not less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week, the CSC prescribes the adoption of a flexible working schedule to accommodate the Muslims' Friday Prayer Day subject to certain conditions, e.g., the flexible working hours shall not start earlier than 7:00 a.m. and end not later than 7:00 p.m.[5] In the Resolution dated October 1, 2002, the Court required the Court Administrator to study the matter. In compliance therewith, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that the Muslim employees in the Judiciary be allowed to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan. Further, that they be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day. However, to compensate for the lost hours, they should be required to observe flexible working schedule which should start from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from 2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. every Friday. In that way, the working hours mandated by the civil service rules is complied with.

A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC

December 14, 2005

RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY (RE: OFFICE HOURS) In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city request that they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges: 1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan; 2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator with respect to the matter of allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan is well taken. The same has statutory basis in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, which categorically states that '[d]uring the fasting season in the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution of salary or wages ... The Court, however, is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the request of the Muslim employees to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day. As correctly observed by Atty. Edna Dio, Chief, Office of the Court Attorney, in her Report dated May 13, 2005, the CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it declared in Resolution No. 81-1277 and Resolution No. 00-0227 that Muslim employees are excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday subject to certain conditions. CSC Resolution No. 81-1277 was purportedly issued pursuant to Sections 2 and 5 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No 322, but neither of the two decrees mention 'Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day as one of the recognized holidays. The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5, Article III of the Constitution: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights. This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise clause. The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free exercise clause) embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that: The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.[6] Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two concepts in this wise: (1) Freedom to Believe The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul ' in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. 'Men may believe what they cannot prove. Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes. (2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the

Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law. Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma.[7] The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year. On the other hand, the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded. Underlying Section 5,[8] Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 is the interest of the general public to be assured of continuous government service during office hours every Monday through Friday. The said rule enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render public service of no less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week. To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the civil service rules for each month. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for similar treatment. The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws. In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year, is legislative, which is to ask Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them from compliance with the prescribed government working hours.

G.R. No. 126383. November 28, 1997 SAN JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW/MA. CONSUELO MAQUILING, LEONARDO MARTINEZ, DOMINGO ELA, JR., RODOLFO CALUCIN, JR., PERLA MENDOZA, REX RAPHAEL REYES, ROGELIO BELMONTE, AND 375 OTHER EMPLOYEE-UNION MEMBERS, Petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, AND SAN JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL, Respondents. Petitioners, the rank-and-file employee-union officers and members of San Juan De Dios Hospital Employees Association, sent on July 08, 1991, a four (4)-page letter with attached support signatures x x x

requesting and pleading for the expeditious implementation and payment by respondent Juan De Dios Hospital "of the 40 HOURS/5-DAY WORKWEEK with compensable weekly two (2) days off provided for by Republic Act 5901 as clarified for enforcement by the Secretary of Labors Policy Instructions No. 54 dated April 12, 1988.1 Respondent hospital failed to give a favorable response; thus, petitioners filed a complaint regarding their claims for statutory benefits under the above-cited law and policy issuance2, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-04815-91. LA: Dismissed the complaint. NLRC: Affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC in concluding that Policy Instructions No. 54 proceeds from a wrong interpretation of RA 59015 and Article 83 of the Labor Code. SC: Issue: Whether Policy Instructions No. 54 issued by then Labor Secretary (now Senator) Franklin M. Drilon is valid or not. The policy instruction in question provides in full as follows: Policy Instruction No. 54 To: All Concerned Subject: Working Hours and Compensation of Hospital/Clinic Personnel This issuance clarifies the enforcement policy of this Department on the working hours and compensation of personnel employed by hospital/clinics with a bed capacity of 100 or more and those located in cities and municipalities with a population of one million or more. Republic Act 5901 took effect on 21 June 1969 prescribes a 40-hour/5 day work week for hospital/clinic personnel. At the same time, the Act prohibits the diminution of the compensation of these workers who would suffer a reduction in their weekly wage by reason of the shortened workweek prescribed by the Act. In effect, RA 5901 requires that the covered hospital workers who used to work seven (7) days a week should be paid for such number of days for working only 5 days or 40 hours a week. The evident intention of RA 5901 is to reduce the number of hospital personnel, considering the nature of their work, and at the same time guarantee the payment to them of a full weekly wage for seven (7) days. This is quite clear in the Exemplary Note of RA 5901 which states: As compared with the other employees and laborers, these hospital and health clinic personnel are overworked despite the fact that their duties are more delicate in nature. If we offer them better working conditions, it is believed that the brain drain, that our country suffers nowadays as far as these personnel are concerned will be considerably lessened. The fact that these hospitals and health clinics personnel perform duties which are directly concerned with the health and lives of our people does not mean that they should work for a longer period than most employees and laborers. They are also entitled to as much rest as other workers. Making them work longer than is necessary may endanger, rather than protect the health of their patients. Besides, they are not receiving better pay than the other workers. Therefore, it is just and fair that they may be made to enjoy the privileges of equal working hours with other workers except those excepted by law. (Sixth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, Third Session, House of Representatives, H. No. 16630)

The Labor Code in its Article 83 adopts and incorporates the basic provisions of RA 5901 and retains its spirit and intent which is to shorten the workweek of covered hospital personnel and at the same time assure them of a full weekly wage. Consistent with such spirit and intent, it is the position of the Department that personnel in subject hospital and clinics are entitled to a full weekly wage for seven (7) days it they have completed the 40-hours/5-day workweek in any given workweek. All enforcement and adjudicatory agencies of this Department shall be guided by this issuance in the disposition of cases involving the personnel of covered hospitals and clinics. Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of April, 1988. (Sgd.) FRANKLIN M. DRILON We note that Policy Instruction No. 54 relies and purports to implement Republic Act No. 5901, otherwise known as An Act Prescribing Forty Hours A Week Of Labor For Government and Private Hospitals Or Clinic Personnel, enacted on June 21, 1969. Reliance on Republic Act No. 5901, however, is misplaced for the said statute, as correctly ruled by respondent NLRC, has long been repealed with the passage of the Labor Code on May 1, 1974, Article 302 of which explicitly provides: All labor laws not adopted as part of this Code either directly or by reference are hereby repealed. All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations inconsistent herewith are likewise repealed. Accordingly, only Article 83 of the Labor Code which appears to have substantially incorporated or reproduced the basic provisions of Republic Act No. 5901 may support Policy Instructions No. 54 on which the latters validity may be gauged. Article 83 of the Labor Code states: Art. 83. Normal Hours of Work. -- The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day. Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article, health personnel shall include: resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dietitians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel. (Underscoring supplied) A cursory reading of Article 83 of the Labor Code betrays petitioners position that hospital employees are entitled to a full weekly salary with paid two (2) days off if they have completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek.6 What Article 83 merely provides are: (1) the regular office hour of eight hours a day, five days per week for health personnel, and (2) where the exigencies of service require that health personnel work for six days or forty-eight hours then such health personnel shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty percent of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. There is nothing in the law that supports then Secretary of Labors assertion that personnel in subject hospitals and clinics are entitled to a full weekly wage for seven (7) days if they have completed the 40hour/5-day workweek in any given workweek. Needless to say, the Secretary of Labor exceeded his authority by including a two days off with pay in contravention of the clear mandate of the statute. Such act the Court shall not countenance. Administrative interpretation of the law, we reiterate, is at best merely advisory,7 and the Court will not hesitate to strike down an administrative interpretation that deviates from the provision of the statute.

Indeed, even if we were to subscribe with petitioners erroneous assertion that Republic Act No. 5901 has neither been amended nor repealed by the Labor Code, we nevertheless find Policy Instructions No. 54 invalid. A perusal of Republic Act No. 59018 reveals nothing therein that gives two days off with pay for health personnel who complete a 40-hour work or 5-day workweek. In fact, the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 16630 (later passed into law as Republic Act No. 5901) explicitly states that the bills sole purpose is to shorten the working hours of health personnel and not to dole out a two days off with pay. Hence: The accompanying bill seeks to grant resident physicians, staff nurses, nutritionists, midwives, attendants and other hospital and health clinic personnel of public and private hospitals and clinics, the privilege of enjoying the eight hours a week exclusive of time for lunch granted by law to all government employees and workers except those employed in schools and in courts. At present those hospitals and health clinic personnel including those employed in private hospitals and clinics, work six days a week, 8 hours a day or 48 hours a week. As compared with the other employees and laborers, these hospital and health clinic personnel are overworked despite the fact that their duties are more delicate in nature. If we offer them better working conditions, it is believed that the brain drain, that our country suffers nowadays as far as these personnel are concerned will be considerably lessened. The fact that these hospitals and health clinic personnel perform duties which are directly concerned with the health and lives of our people does not mean that they should work for a longer period than most employees and laborers. They are also entitled to as much rest as other workers. Making them work longer than is necessary may endanger, rather than protect, the health of their patients. Besides, they are not receiving better pay than the other workers. Therefore, it is just and fair that they be made to enjoy the privileges of equal working hours with other workers except those excepted by law. In the light of the foregoing, approval of this bill is strongly recommended. (SGD.) SERGIO H. LOYOLA Further, petitioners' position is also negated by the very rules and regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Labor Standards which implement Republic Act No. 5901. Pertinent portions of the implementing rules provide: RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5901 By virtue of Section 79 of the Revised Administrative Code, as modified by section 18 of Implementation Report for Reorganization Plan No. 20-A on Labor, vesting in the Bureau of Labor Standards the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement wage and hour laws, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued for the implementation of Republic Act No. 5901. CHAPTER I Coverage Section 1. General Statement on Coverage. Republic Act No. 5901, hereinafter referred to as the Act, shall apply to: (a) All hospitals and clinics, including those with a bed capacity of less than one hundred, which are situated in cities or municipalities with a population of one million or more; and to (b) All hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred, irrespective of the size of population of the city or municipality where they may be situated.

xxx xxx xxx Section 7. Regular Working Day. The regular working days of covered employees shall be not more than five days in a workweek. The workweek may begin at any hour and on any day, including Saturday or Sunday, designated by the employer. Employers are not precluded from changing the time at which the workday or workweek begins, provided that the change is not intended to evade the requirements of these regulations on the payment of additional compensation. xxx xxx xxx Section 15. Additional Pay Under the Act and C.A. No. 444. (a) Employees of covered hospitals and clinics who are entitled to the benefits provided under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, as amended, shall be paid an additional compensation equivalent to their regular rate plus at least twenty-five percent thereof for work performed on Sunday and Holidays, not exceeding eight hours, such employees shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least 25% of their regular rate. (b) For work performed in excess of forty hours a week, excluding those rendered in excess of eight hours a day during the week, employees covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law shall be entitled to an additional straight-time pay which must be equivalent at least to their regular rate. If petitioners are entitled to two days off with pay, then there appears to be no sense at all why Section 15 of the implementing rules grants additional compensation equivalent to the regular rate plus at least twenty-five percent thereof for work performed on Sunday to health personnel, or an additional straighttime pay which must be equivalent at least to the regular rate [f]or work performed in excess of forty hours a week xxx. Policy Instructions No. 54 to our mind unduly extended the statute. The Secretary of Labor moreover erred in invoking the spirit and intent of Republic Act No. 5901 and Article 83 of the Labor Code for it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 9 No additions or revisions may be permitted. Policy Instructions No. 54 being inconsistent with and repugnant to the provision of Article 83 of the Labor Code, as well as to Republic Act No. 5901, should be, as it is hereby, declared void.

G.R. No. 169464 August 31, 2006 ROQUE D.A. DATOR, Petitioner, vs. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, REV. FR. TAMERLANE LANA and REV. FR. RODEL ALIGAN, Respondents. Petitioner Roque D.A. Dator was hired by respondent University of Santo Tomas (UST) in June 1983 as Instructor I of the Institute of Religion with a maximum teaching load of 24 units. On December 15, 1995, petitioner was also hired as Graft Investigation Officer II with the Office of the Ombudsman but he failed to disclose such other employment to respondents, who discovered the same only during the first semester of School Year 2000-2001. Thus, on June 16, 2000, petitioner was informed that his teaching load would be reduced to 12 hours per week, pursuant to Section 5, Article III of the UST Faculty Code. Petitioner asked for reconsideration of the reduction in his teaching load which was granted. He was given an additional load of three teaching hours.

On June 15, 2001, petitioner again requested for an additional load of three units but his request was denied by respondent Rev. Fr. Aligan. Petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit 8 to the Chairperson of the Grievance Committee, Dr. Gil Gamila, President of the University of Sto. Tomas Faculty Union, but the complaint was dismissed. Petitioner appealed to respondent Rev. Fr. Tamerlane Lana, Rector of respondent UST 9 but the appeal was denied.
10

a) length of service; b) number of semesters of handling the particular subject; and c) efficiency rating. Section 7. Notice of deloading. Faculty members who shall be affected by a process of deloading should be given a written notice thereof, at least two (2) weekes before the start of every semester; conversely, faculty members who, for one reason or another, are not available to teach for the succeeding semester, should inform the dean of such fact at least two (2) weeks before the start of the semester. On the other hand, respondents maintained that petitioners teaching load was reduced in accordance with Sections 5 and 6 of Article III of the Faculty Code which provide: SEC. 5 Faculty members who have a full time outside employment other than teaching may not be given a teaching load in excess of 12 hours per week. The maximum load of part time employees should be arranged in accordance with the following table: Hours of Weekly Work Load 40-48 12 Units 30-39 15 Units 20-29 18 Units 10-19 21 Units SEC. 6 All faculty members shall submit each semester in writing to their respective Deans a statement of the number of teaching hours per week to be rendered in other institutions and/or daily hours of work or employment, inside or outside the University. Decision: Ruled in favor of respondents holding that the situation contemplated in Section 5, Article III of the Faculty Code, when evaluated together with the provisions of the CBA, constitutes a ground for teaching load reduction. 11 NLRC: Ordered the restoration of petitioners faculty member status to full-time. Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioners partial motion for reconsideration with regard to the award for backwages and damages was likewise denied. CA: Sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter. SC: Petitioner: Contends that he is a tenured faculty member thus he is entitled to the same teaching load as he had in the previous semesters; that he was not accorded due process when respondents unilaterally reduced his teaching load; that Section 5, Article III of the Faculty Code has no application in this case; and that respondents acted in bad faith. Respondents: Maintain that petitioners teaching load was reduced in accordance with Section 5, Article III of the Faculty Code; that they did not violate petitioners right to due process and that he was given an

LA: Petitioner thus filed a complaint for Illegal Reduction of Teaching Load and Illegal Change of Employment Status, Damages, Unpaid Benefits and Attorneys Fees and illegal constructive dismissal before the Labor Arbiter on February 19, 2002. Petitioner claimed that his arbitrary demotion from full-time to part-time faculty member violated the provisions of the CBA, as well as his right to security of tenure. Likewise, he argued that the UST Faculty Code which respondents relied upon to reduce his teaching load has been superseded by the CBA. In support of his contentions, petitioner cited the following sections of Article IV of the CBA: Section 3. Normal Teaching Load. Every faculty member with a permanent appointment shall be entitled to no less than the same teaching load or assignment as he had in the previous semesters, excluding the overloads and substitute load except in justified deloading as herein provided. xxxx Section 5. Reduction of Teaching Load. XXX Section 6. Procedure for the Reduction of Load. In case of deloading that affects permanent faculty members, the following rules shall be observed, to wit: a) The available subject shall first be given to the faculty members who have been teaching the particular subject; b) Seniority as to the number of years of handling the particular subject shall be used as basis in the distribution of the available particular subject; c) In case the faculty member concerned shall have taught the particular subject for an equal length of time priority shall be given to the faculty member having a higher rank; d) In case the faculty member concerned shall have taught the particular subject for an equal length of time and holding the same rank, preference shall be given to the faculty member who has a higher efficiency rating; e) In case the matter cannot be settled by the use of the foregoing data, the particular available subjects shall be distributed to the faculty members concerned in proportion to the faculty members average teaching assignment in the immediately preceding school year. In the case of non-tenured faculty members, priority in the distribution of available subjects among them in the event of a bona-fide deloading shall be in accordance with the following criteria that are to be applied in the order of mention to wit:

opportunity to be heard; that petitioner falsified at least 13 written statements where he deliberately failed to mention his full time employment with the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition lacks merit. The issues for resolution are: 1) whether the reduction of petitioners teaching load was justified; and 2) whether petitioner was denied due process. Decision: While the CBA provides grounds for reduction of teaching load, the question of whether a faculty member is considered full-time or part-time is addressed by the Faculty Code which provides that where the full-time faculty member is at the same time working as a full-time employee elsewhere, the faculty member is considered part-time and a 12-hour teaching load limitation is imposed. There is no dispute that petitioner was holding a full-time position with the Office of the Ombudsman while working as a faculty member in UST. Accordingly, Section 5, Article III of the Faculty Code applies. We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals, to wit: We completely disagree with the NLRCs conclusions as it applied the wrong rules and misappreciated the evidence on record. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion on this point for its complete disregard of the Faculty Code. While the NLRC correctly viewed the CBA as the primary instrument that governs the relationship between UST and its unionized faculty members, it disregarded Article XX of this CBA which reconciles the CBA with the Faculty Code. Article XX states: "ARTICLE XX FACULTY CODE The provisions of the Faculty Code of 1981, as amended, which are not otherwise incorporated in the CBA and which are not in conflict with any provisions of the latter shall remain in full force and effect. In the event of conflict between a faculty code provision and the CBA, the provision of the latter shall prevail." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, contrary to the NLRCs conclusion, the UST Faculty Code continues to exist and to apply to UST faculty members, but must give way if its terms are in conflict with what the CBA provides. The standard in determining the applicable rule and the one that the NLRC completely missed is whether a conflict exists between the provisions the parties cited. We see no conflict between the provisions the parties respectively cited as these provisions apply to different situations. Article IV of the CBA are the rules on the teaching loads that faculty members may normally expect to carry; it provides as well the grounds or reasons for giving a tenured faculty member less than his normal teaching load. These provisions do not address the question of when a faculty member is to be considered a full-time or a part-time faculty member. Whether a faculty member should only be on part-time basis is governed by Section 5 Article III of the UST Faculty Code we have quoted above. Thus, the provisions Dator cited regarding deloading and the authorized grounds therefore do not apply because what is involved is a change of status from full-time faculty member to a part-time one due to the faculty members full-time employment elsewhere.

In contrast with the "authorized" causes for deloading under the CBA, the change of status from full-time faculty member with a 24-unit load to a part-time one with a 12-unit load in effect involves a "disqualification" to be a full-time faculty member because of the very practical reason that he or she is already a full-time employee elsewhere. In the present case, this "disqualification" is compounded by Dators repeated misrepresentations about his employment status outside UST. The present case therefore is closer to being a disqualification situation coupled with a disciplinary cause, rather than one involving a purely "authorized" deloading under the CBA. 14 Petitioner argues that he was under no obligation to disclose his employment with the Office of the Ombudsman. He claims that the only information required of him pertained to 1) other colleges where he is teaching, 2) teaching loads outside the university, and 3) a business firm he is employed with. He argues that the Office of the Ombudsman, being a government agency, does not fall under any of the foregoing categories. 15 Petitioners argument is flimsy and deserves scant consideration. Section 6, Article III of the Faculty Code states that all faculty members must submit each semester a statement of the number of teaching hours per week to be rendered in other institutions and/or daily hours of work or employment, inside or outside the University. The rationale behind the rule is unmistakable. As pointed out by respondents, there is a need to maintain USTs quality of education as well as to ensure that government service is not jeopardized. 16 Petitioner admitted in his letter-request dated July 15, 2001 that "with the implementation of a CHED Circular, the teaching load assignment of government employees was limited to only 12 units per semester x x x so as not to prejudice the interests of both the government and the University and/or college concerned." 17 It is clear therefore that petitioner was aware of the limitation. Moreover, we find that petitioner was not denied due process. It is settled that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. 18 In this case, respondents informed petitioner that his teaching load would be reduced as he was working full-time with the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner asked for reconsideration twice. His first request was granted and he was given an additional load of three units for School Year 2000-2001. For School Year 2001-2002, petitioner again requested an additional load of three units but was denied. Upon denial of his second request, petitioner availed of the grievance procedure provided in the CBA. 19 Yet again, after his complaint was dismissed, petitioner appealed directly to respondent Fr. Lana. As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioner exhausted the internal mechanism of seeking redress within USTs administrative machinery. 20 Contrary to petitioners claims, he was accorded due process. We likewise reject petitioners claim that respondents acted in bad faith. A review of the record reveals that respondents merely implemented the Faculty Code which clearly sets a 12-hour load limitation to faculty members who are also full-time employees elsewhere. And while petitioner decries an alleged discrimination against him, he failed to prove his allegations with substantial evidence which is that amount of evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 21 All told, petitioners complaint cannot be sustained. An employees bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence. 22 As aptly held by the Court of Appeals: A constructive dismissal occurs when the law deems that there is effectively a termination of employment or "a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, such as in an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay." Where, as in the present case, the employer was fully justified in giving a faculty member a lesser load because the latter is disqualified under applicable rules from handling a full load, and where the faculty member committed repeated

misrepresentations in his bid to maintain his full load, we cannot see any legal or factual basis to conclude that the faculty member had been constructively dismissed. We conclude from all these that UST committed no illegality when it ordered the reduction of Dators load from twenty-four (24) units to twelve (12) units per semester. Substantively, there was factual basis for deloading. Procedurally, Dator had been given full opportunity to be heard. He was even accommodated for one school year with an extra three-unit load that he accepted. After this acceptance and the express recognition that indeed he could only handle a twelve-unit load, private respondent Dator can no longer claim that he should after all been given a full twenty-four unit load. Thus, the NLRC"s conclusions - based on a skewed reading of the facts and the application of the wrong rules - cannot but be attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 23