People v. Vasquez (G.R. No. 123939) Arts. 16-20: Persons Criminally Liable for Felonies Principals People v.

Batin (GR No. 177223) Facts: Eugenios wife, Josephine Refugio testified she glanced to her left and saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to their compound, looking towards her and her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from inside. She next noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car and shouting: "Huwag!" Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right rear of the car. Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him. When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine heard Castor ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil responded by drawing the gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and firing twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground, the former, backwards, and the latter landing on top of her. Neighbors testified that Neil went out to the street, went between the parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and Josephine who were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay, banatan ko na?"; that Castor replied: "Sige, anak, banatan mo na." Issue: Whether or not the statement made by the father made him liable as principal by inducement? Decision: The Court finds that Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This finding is inexorable because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses that Castor returned the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting: "Sige, banatan mo na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice were credible and sufficed to prove Castors indispensable cooperation in the killing of Eugenio. Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death of Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was. While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing the gun. It was established by credible testimony that he handed back the gun to Neil and urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine Refugio plainly stated on cross-examination that Castor shouted "Huwag" while inside the car grappling for possession of the gun, and not when Neil was aiming the gun at the spouses. As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castors utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same, not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the gun to Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between the Batins in committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun to Neil a crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning the commission of a felony. Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before, during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments. Even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us to, the results would be the same. Castors argument is that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words Sige, banatan mo na cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a principal by inducement. Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We have held that words of command of a father may induce his son to commit a crime. The moral influence of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in cases in which the same words coming from a stranger would make no impression. There is no doubt in our minds that Castors words were the determining cause of the commission of the crime.

Facts: The appellant drove the passenger jeepney with his cohorts on board looking for Luable and Geronimo. When the appellant saw the two going in the opposite direction, the appellant drove the vehicle and sideswiped Geronimo. And when Geronimo fled, the appellant, armed with a bolo, pursued him. When the appellant failed to overtake the victim, he returned to the passenger jeepney and drove it to where his cohorts ganged up on the victim. The appellant urged them on to kill Geronimo. Thereafter, he left the scene along with his cohorts, leaving the hapless Geronimo mortally wounded. After trial, the court rendered judgment acquitting Ramon, but convicting the appellant of murder for the killing of Geronimo, and attempted homicide for attempting to kill Luis. The appellant avers that he and his brother Ramon had no motive to kill Geronimo. The appellant contends that the witnesses for the prosecution were not in agreement as to who killed Geronimo. The appellant noted that according to the testimony of the witness, the appellant stayed in the jeepney and merely yelled to his companions who ganged up on Geronimo, "Sige patayin ninyo, patayin ninyo na, at huwag ninyong iwanang buhay!" The appellant further posits that the prosecution witnesses were not even in accord as to where Geronimo was stabbed to death. The appellant argues that because of the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution, it failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. Hence, he should be acquitted of the said charges. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant when the witnesses testimony didnt confirm who chased and stabbed the victims? Decision: Whether Domingo Vasquez chased the deceased with a bolo was averred by Luis Luable or whether the accused merely incited his companions in the jeepney to kill the deceased as averred by Luisa Abellanosa, is immaterial in the determination of his liability because a conspiracy among the occupants of the jeepney has been established. In order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy." The Supreme Court, likewise, stressed that where there are several accused and conspiracy has been established, the prosecution need not pinpoint who among the accused inflicted the fatal wound. Where conspiracy has been established, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is not necessary. All the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and character of their participation because the act of one is the act of all. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more person agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicting a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.

Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit. When a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them." All the foregoing constitutes evidence beyond cavil of conspiracy between the appellant and the principals by direct participation. The appellant is, thus, criminally liable for the death of the victim, although there is no evidence that he did not actually stab the latter.

conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement and decision to commit the crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. It is well-settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there is conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other pursuant to a common purpose or design.

Accomplices People v. Dacillo (G.R. No. 149368) People v. Roche (G.R. No. 115182)

Facts: Appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of murder for the death of Rosemarie Tallada, with aggravating circumstance of recidivism with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and sentenced to the extreme penalty of death. In his defense, appellant admitted complicity in the crime but minimized his participation. Appellant alleged that he only held down Rosemaries legs to prevent her from struggling and, after the latter was killed by another man he identified as Joselito Pacot, he encased the corpse in cement. He claimed that Pacot, a co-worker at Davao Union Cement Corporation (DUCC), was looking for a house where he and his girlfriend Rosemarie could spend the night. He offered his brothers house which was under his care. In the evening of February 6, 2000, he and Joselito Pacot brought Rosemarie to the house at Purok No. 3, New Society Village, Ilang, Davao City. After accompanying the couple there, he went home to take supper. Later that evening, he returned to the house with the bottle of Sprite Pacot had ordered. When he arrived, Pacot and Rosemarie were already grappling with each other and Pacot was strangling the girl. He told Pacot to stop but instead of heeding him, the latter ordered him to close the door. Pacot told appellant that he was going to be implicated just the same so he closed the door as ordered and helped Pacot "(hold) the feet of the woman" as "her feet kept hitting the walls." The two men stopped only when Rosemarie was already motionless. Pacot wanted to dump the body into the sea but appellant told him it was low tide. Appellant then suggested that they entomb the body in cement for which Pacot gave appellant P500. Pacot left the house at dawn the following day, February 7, 2000. At past 10:00 a.m., appellant brought the concrete mixture and cast the dead body in cement. Issue: Whether or not appellant is liable as a principal? Decision: The rule is that any admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof to hold him liable therefor. Such admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or no such admission was in fact made. There was never any such disclaimer by appellant. Moreover, despite appellants self-serving, exculpatory statement limiting his involvement in the crime, all circumstances pointed to his guilt. Assuming for the sake of argument that Pacot was the mastermind, appellants admission that he participated in its commission by holding Rosemaries legs made him a principal by direct participation. Two or more persons taking part in the commission of a crime are considered principals by direct participation if the following requisites are present: 1.) they participated in the criminal resolution and 2.) they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. Both requisites were met in this case. Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime. To establish

Facts: An information for the murder of Roderick Ferol was filed against accused-appellant Restituto Roche and three others, namely, Marcelino Fallore, Francisco Gregorio, and one John Doe. The Court found that the prosecution evidence has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Restituto Roche for the crime of murder but could not make a pronouncement as to the guilt of accused Dorico Caballes because he remained at large and therefore could not be arraigned.Finding that the prosecution evidence failed to establish the guilt of accused Francisco Gregorio and Marcelino Fallore, both accused were acquitted. Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant should held liable for the killing of Roderick Ferol on the ground of conspiracy? Decision: No. In the case at bar, Rogelio Rossel testified that he did not see Restituto Roche at the time Dorico Caballes was stabbing Roderick Ferol. Apart from Helen Amarille and Rodel Ferol, whose testimonies are highly suspect, no other witness was presented to prove that accused-appellant directly participated in the commission of the offense or performed an act which would show community of purpose with Dorico Caballes. Even if it is assumed as true that accused-appellant was responsible for telling Dorico Caballes it was Roderick Ferol who had tripped him (Restituto), this would not suffice to find accused-appellant in conspiracy with Dorico Caballes. For conspiracy to exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. In People v. Elijorde, Conspiracy must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Hence, conspiracy exists in a situation where at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. In a great majority of cases, complicity was established by proof of acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the reasonable inference that the doers thereof were acting with a common intent or design. Therefore, the task in every case is determining whether the particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof do reasonably yield that inference. Indeed, there is no proof to show accused-appellant, together with Dorico Caballes, had resolved to attack Roderick Ferol. Instead, we think the assault on Roderick Ferol was an impulsive act by Dorico Caballes borne out of the desire to get even with him for the offense committed against his brother. In no way can such act be attributed to accused-appellant. Neither can accused-appellant be held liable as an accomplice for the crime charged. The following requisites must concur in order that a person may be considered an accomplice: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. There is no evidence to show that accused-appellant performed any previous or simultaneous act to assist Dorico Caballes in killing Roderick Ferol. In fact, it has not been proven that he was aware of Dorico

Caballes plan to attack and kill Roderick Ferol. Absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-appellant, we cannot uphold the trial courts finding of guilt. Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even property. The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them. Mark Vergara 2008-0323

People v. Compo (G.R. No. 112990)

Facts: Mauricio Gonzaga and Lemuel Compo were charged conspiring in the murder of Procopio Dales . Based on the statements of Libardo, Gonzaga, PO3 Pedro Wate, and the post mortem findings the the Court held the accused Mauricio Gonzaga and Lemuel Compo guilty of the crime of murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced each one of them to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused Lemuel Compo filed with the trial court a notice of appeal. In this appeal, accusedappellant imputes a single assignment of error to the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the testimony of the witness Librado that he saw Lemuel carrying an Indian Pana is sufficient to establish the latter is an accomplice to the crime? Decision: No. The court held that the prosecution failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Basically, accused-appellant Lemuel was convicted based on the testimony of the conductor of passenger bus Gilberto Libardo who saw Lemuel carrying an Indian Pana and a flashlight. Without any testimony positively identifying accused-appellant as the assailant nor any evidence directly linking him as the author of the crime, Lemuel Compo cannot be convicted of the murder of Dales. The accused-appellant deserves an acquittal and must forthwith be given back his liberty. The testimony of witness Mauricio Gonzaga, states that Lemuel was merely present before the stabbing incident, holding a flashlight. No other overt act was established to prove that Lemuel shared and concurred with the criminal design of Mauricio. The mere presence of Lemuel, who was not shown to be armed, at the scene of the crime does not connote conspiracy. Singularity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish conspiracy. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy transcends companionship. The presence and company of Lemuel were not necessary or essential to the perpetration of the murder. Neither can Lemuel be considered an accomplice. Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code provides that an accomplice is one who, not being a principal, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. To be convicted as such, it is necessary that he be aware of the criminal intent of the principal and then cooperate knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime. The prosecution, however, failed to present convincing evidence establishing that accusedappellant Lemuel knew of the other accused's intent to kill Dales. Again, his mere presence at the scene of the crime and his flight therefrom with the other accused are not proof of his participation in the crime. The quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution to support a conviction has not been reached with regard to accused-appellant Lemuel. The oft-repeated truism that the conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence applies. He must, therefore, be acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Abarquez v. People (G.R. No. 150762)

Facts: The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide alleging in the two informations filed that said accused was conspiring and confederating with one Alberto Almojuela in the killing of Ricardo Quejong Bello, by stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon and hitting him with a gun at the back. The trial court found Abarquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of homicide. Abarquez filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. However the Court of Appeals rejected Abarquezs allegation that he was merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties. Abarquez alleges that the prosecutions evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice. He further alleges that there was a misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures. Abarquez also assails the credibility of the witnesses against him. Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to prove that fact that Abarquez was an accomplice in the killing of Ricardo Bello? Decision: No. Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. Mere commission of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice; that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. The court held in one case that the mere presence of the accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged. In convicting Abarquez in this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Pazs testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuelas criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquezs action as an attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. Abarquezs act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela.

Accessories People v. Tolentino (G.R. No. 139179)

Facts: On February 28, 1996 appellant Jonathan Fabros and his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their house in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City when their neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what it was all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his house located just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather. Wilfredo explained that it was the only way to free Sheila's mother appellant's aunt - of the sufferings being caused by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back to the house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go home and wait for Hernan. Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying. Jonathan together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the living room.Later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in his hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the kitchen. When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo, immediately walloped Hernan on the right side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and falling face down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried Hernan towards the creek, upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped, then Wilfredo successively stabbed Hernan on different parts of the body causing the latter's instant death. After throwing the victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three immediately left. Tolentino called Jonathan, Sheila and Merwin and warned them that if they will tell other people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they just followed whatever Tolentino told them. On 01 March 1996, however, Jonathan was arrested for the death of Hernan Sagario. Accused Jonathan Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to each other as the one who killed Hernan Sagario. Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and the latter also fingered the former as the killer of Sagario. However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision had become final and executory on his part, Wilfredo Tolentino, apparently conscience-stricken, executed an affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the death of Hernan Sagario and retracted his testimony implicating accused-appellant Jonathan Fabros. The trial court held that the prosecution's evidence positively identified Wilfredo Tolentino as the person who had hit the victim with a piece of wood and later stabbed him with a bolo. It also ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of appellant (Jonathan Fabros) manifested his approval of the killing and the concurrence of his acts with those of the other accused. 8 Thus, the RTC concluded that Fabros was a co-conspirator and should be held equally responsible for the murder. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not appellant (Jonathan Fabros) should be convicted as an accessory? Decision: Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of the commission of the crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes. Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the destruction of the body of the crime or of the effects or the instruments thereof must have been done in order to prevent the discovery of the crime. That, precisely, is wanting in the present case. In his testimony, appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-accused would hurt him if he refused, he agreed to assist the latter in carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter likewise indicated his innocence of the charge. Verily, he adequately explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for his own life. It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim if to do so would put the former's life in peril. The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, he must be acquitted.

People v. Cui (G.R. No. 121982)

Facts: In the evening of December 5, 1990, ten (10) armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny and Rose Lim on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City. The Lims, their three (3) children, and the employees of the family-owned business, were able to see the faces of the leader Wilfredo alias "Toto" Garcia and two of his men, Mawe Garcia and a certain Edgar. The other robbers could not be identified as they had flour sacks over their heads. The robbers carted away cash and jewelries worth twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). They also blindfolded and forcibly abducted seventeen (17) year old Stephanie, the youngest daughter of the Lims. They demanded a ransom of one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) for her release.Johnny Lim turned over to Toto Garcia the ransom amount in the afternoon of the next day at an arranged meeting place. Stephanie, in turn, was released to her father. Initially, the Lims kept the crime a secret. But on the third day, they reported the kidnapping to the Philippine National Police Cebu Metropolitan District Command (Cebu Metrodiscom). The Metrodiscom Intelligence Security Team (MIST) conducted an investigation and Johnny Lim identified one of the suspects as Toto Garcia. Toto Garcia was known as the leader of a group of armed robbers called the Baong Gang. The gang's base of operation was pinpointed at Quiot, Pardo, Cebu. When the police learned that Eduardo Basingan, hailed from Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, they decided to interrogate him. Upon Basingan's interrogation, he identified Toto Garcia, Mawe Garcia and Edgar as the three (3) who did not wear masks, Sadam and Rey as the two (2) who held him and the Lims at gunpoint, and Tata Garcia, Yul Alvarez, a certain Benjie, a certain Leos and a certain Laring as the look-outs who stayed outside the Lim compound. He named Toto Garcia as the chief plotter of the crime at bar, and revealed that his neighbor and close family friends, the spouses Leonilo and Beverly Cui, participated in the plan. Basingan said he was asked to join the plot and was assured that he would not be under suspicion because he would be placed at gun point together with the other members of the Lim household when the crime is committed. However, he refused to join the plot during the December 2, 1990 meeting of the group at the residence of the Cuis in Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. Leonilo Cui even invoked their close ties as godfathers of each other's children but he was unmoved. At the meeting were Toto Garcia, Mawi Garcia, Edgar, Rey, Sadam and the Cuis. On December 18, 1990, Basingan executed a sworn statement reiterating these revelations in writing. Johnny and Rose Lim then formalized their complaint by executing a Joint Affidavit. Assistant Prosecutor Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr. filed an information for Kidnapping with Ransom against Basingan, the Cuis, and the members of the group of Toto Garcia as identified by Basingan in his sworn statement.On the same day, Basingan and Leonilo Cui were arrested. On March 14, 1991, Joselito "Tata" Garcia, Hilaria Sarte and her live-in partner, Luis Obeso, referred to by Basingan as "Laring" and "Leos", respectively, were arrested in the neighboring Negros Island. The next day, however, Tata Garcia died due to "hemorrhage, severe, secondary to gunshot wounds." Upon presentation of his death certificate, the trial court ordered his name deleted from the information. After preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Manuel J. Adlawan found that the participation of the Cuis was only that of accomplices amended the Information downgrading the charge against the Cuis as mere accomplices in the kidnapping with ransom of Stephanie Lim. On May 15, 1991, Basingan, the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte were arraigned and they all pleaded not guilty. On June 27, 1991, Basinga escaped from the prison. Trial on the merit ensued against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. Basingan was tried in absentia. On February 13, 1992, Beinvenido Nacario, alias "Rey Nacario", was arrested. On arraignment on April 13, 1992, he pleaded not guilty. However, on May 5, 1991, he, too, escaped from detention and remains at large to this date.

On August 18, 1992, the prosecuting fiscal manifested before the trial court that, per newspaper report, Toto Garcia had been killed in Davao. Thus, on December 6, 1993, the trial court convicted the Cuis, Obeso, Sarte, Basingan and Nacario. Obeso and Sarte filed their Notice of Appeal on May 19, 1994. The Cuis filed theirs on May 31, 1994. Issue: Whether or not the Cuis are liable as accessories? Decision: Art. 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes as accessories to the crime those who, subsequent to its commission, take part therein by profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime, without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices. Conviction of an accused as an accessory requires the following elements: (1) that he has knowledge of the commission of the crime; and (2) that he took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of the three modes enumerated in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. These twin elements are present in the case of the Cuis, and indubitable proof thereof is extant in the records of the case. The Court held that the Cuis profited from the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim and are liable as accessories. People v. Verzola (G.R. No. L-35022)

An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in three (3) ways: (a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery; and (c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Even if she assisted her co-appellant without duress, simply assisting Verzola in bringing the body down the house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for anyone to see, cannot be classified as an attempt to conceal or destroy the body of the crime. The concealing or destroying of the body of the crime, the effects or instruments thereof, must be done to prevent the discovery of the crime. In the case at bar, the body was left at the foot of the stairs at a place where it was easily visible to the public. Under such circumstances there could not have been any attempt on the part of Josefina to conceal or destroy the body of the crime. Thus, Josefina Molina is acquitted.

Accessories Exempt from Criminal Liability People v. Mariano (G.R. No. L-40527)

Facts: That on or about and during the period from May 11 and June 8, 1971, in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, the said accused Hermogenes Mariano, being then appointed as Liaison Officer by the then incumbent Municipal Mayor, Constantino Nolasco, acting for and in behalf of the municipality and authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC for the use and benefit of said municipality, received from the said USAID/NEC the following items with a total value of $717.50 or P4,797.35, involving the duty of making delivery of said items to the said Municipal Mayor, but the said accused Hermogenes Mariano once in possession of the said items and far from complying with his aforesaid obligation and in spite of repeated demands, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the said items valued at $717.50 or P4,797.35, belonging to the said USAID/NEC, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said sum of $717,50 or P4,797.35. On February 19, 1975, Hermogenes Mariano thru his counsel Filed a motion to quash the Information on the following grounds: 1. That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction of the offense charged or of the person of the defendant; 2. That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; 3. That it contains averments which , if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification. In his motion to quash, Mariano claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor Constantino A. Nolasco was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of malversation of public property, and for which Mayor Nolasco had been found guilty and that inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over the case against him. On March 14, 1975 respondent Judge issued an Order granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning as follows: Considering that the Military Commission had already taken cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter in its concurrent jurisdiction with this Court, the case involving the subject properties had already been heard and decided by a competent tribunal, the Military Commission, and as such this Court is without jurisdiction to pass upon anew the same subject matter. (pp. 30-31, rollo, emphasis supplied) Respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but did not rule on the other grounds invoked in the motion to quash. Issue: Whether or not Mariano can be held liable for estafa? Decision: The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent court gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the malversation charge against Mayor

Facts: On September 28, 1969, Bernardo Molina was clubbed to death by Ricardo Verzola in the presence of appellant Josefina Molina inside Molina's house at Barrio Lipcan, Bangued, Abra. The body of the victim was subsequently carried by the two appellee to the ground and left at the foot of the stairs. Appellant Verzola then went to his house, changed his clothes and threw his bloodstained sweater undershirt and underwear, including the piece of wood be used in clubbing the deceased, inside their toilet. Afterwards, he went to the municipal building and reported to the police authorities that Bernardo had died in an accident. The police authorities together with the Municipal Health Officer, the Municipal Judge and a photographer went to Lipcan to conduct the investigation. They found the body of the deceased Bernardo Molina sprawled at the foot of the bamboo ladder. Blood had oozed from the mouth, nose and ears. There were bloodstains on the floor of the bedroom of the house, on the mat, as well as on the beddings of the deceased. The bloodstains led to the bamboo ladder where some of the stains could be found on the steps of the ladder. When questioned by the police, Josefina revealed that the assailant of her husband was Ricardo Verzola. Upon her request, she was brought to the Office of the Chief of Police of Bangued, where at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 29, 1969 she gave a written statement narrating the circumstances surrounding the incident in question and pointing to appellant Verzola as the assailant of her husband. In that extra-judicial statement, she stated that immediately after 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28. 1969, appellant Ricardo Verzola went to their house in Barrio Lipcan, Bangued Abra entered the room where she was sleeping with her husband, Bernardo Molina, woke her up and had carnal knowledge of her; that when Bernardo Molina woke up and attempted to rise from the floor, that was the moment when Verzola clubbed Bernards, hitting him on the head several times that afterwards, she heard the sound of a body being dragged downstairs and the voice of Verzola saying that he was leaving and warning her not to say anything about the incident. She looked out of the door and saw her husband already lying prostrate at the foot of the stairs. This statement was sworn to by her before Municipal Judge Francisco T. Valera. On that same morning, appellant Verzola was picked up by the police and brought to the municipal building, and there he also executed a written statement admitting that he clubbed the victim several times. Both appellants admit that it was appellant Verzola who inflicted the fatal blows on the victim. The trial court convicted Verzola as principal and Josefina Molina as an accessory to the crime of murder. Issue: Whether or not assisting the principal in bringing the body of the deceased to the ground will make one an accessory to the crime? Decision:

Nolasco before the Military Commission. Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case now before the SC the accused in one is different from the accused in the other. The conferment of jurisdiction upon courts or judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the constitution and statutes of the forum. Thus, the question of jurisdiction of respondent Court of First Instance over the case filed before it is to be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. That, We find in the Judiciary Act of 1948 where in its Section 44 (f) it is provided that Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months,or a fine of more than two hundred pesos.The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance. The above of course is not disputed by respondent Judge; what he claims in his Order is that his court exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the military commission and because the latter tribunal was the first to take cognizance of the subject matter, respondent court lost jurisdiction over it .That statement of respondent court is incorrect. In People vs. Fontanilla, this Court speaking through then Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, categorically reiterated the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, it is rightly contended by the Solicitor General that at the time Criminal Case No. SM-649 was filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, that was December 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said court was the Judiciary Act of 1948, the particular provision of which was not affected one way or the other by any Presidential issuances under Martial Law. The Military Commission is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.

Facts: In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. Issue: Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability? Decision: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) . . . e) Quasi-delicts Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

Arts. 89-93: Total Extinction of Criminal Liability Death of the Accused De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 154579)

Facts: On February 8, 1995, in the City of Makati, petitioner De Guzman, stole several pieces of jewelry valued at P4,600,000.00 belonging to one Jasmine Gongora. The trial court rendered its decision finding de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed a penalty of imprisonment, as well as the penalties accessory thereto. The Court further finds the accused De Guzman civilly liable and orders her to pay the private offended party. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction but reduced the award of damages. During the appeal in the Supreme Court, on January 30, 2003, counsel for the petitioner filed a Manifestation informing the Court that the petitioner passed away on January 13, 2003. The death of the petitioner resulted from a vehicular accident, as indicated in the Certificate of Death attached thereto. Issue: Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of the petitioner is extinguished by reason of her death? Decision: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Although both the trial and the appellate courts found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt, she had the right to appeal her case to this Court of last resort and challenge the findings of the two courts below. The judgment of conviction was pending review until her untimely demise. It has, therefore, not yet attained finality. Thus, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, it is incumbent upon the Court to dismiss the instant petition for review. The Court is dismissing the case because there is no longer a need to continue with the review of the appeal. The lower courts decision has thus become ineffectual. Ranvylle Albano 2008-0052

People v. Abungan (G.R. No. 136843) People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007) Facts:

On August 4, 1992, at Capulaan, Villasis, Pangasinan, the accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms, attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death. An Information, dated March 9, 1993, was filed charging appellant Pedro Abungan, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at large), with murder. The trial court rendered a decision finding Abungan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. During appeal, in a letter dated August 7, 2000, however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Issue: Whether or not the criminal and civil liability of the appellant is extinguished by reason of her death? Decision: In the present case, it is clear that, following the case of People vs. Bayotas, the death of appellant extinguished his criminal liability. Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. Brian Bonifacio Dela Cruz 2007-0388

Today, the term proceedings must be understood to mean either executive or judicial proceedings. With this interpretation, any type of investigation may ultimately lead to sufficiently toll prescription. To rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays not under his control. As seen in this case, various conflicting opinions of the DOJ delayed his cause. Aggrieved parties who do not sleep on their right should not be allowed to suffer simply because of circumstances beyond their control.

Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 881)

Facts: Sometime in April 1985, Caridad Dorol mortgaged her property--an agricultural land located in Bacon, Sorsogon to her cousin Recebido. Dorol and Recebido did not execute any mortgage document, but instead, the former gave to the latter a copy of the Deed of Sale dated June 16, 1973 which was done by Juan Dorol (father of Caridad). On September 9, 1990, Caridad Dorol went to the house of Recebido to redeem such property, wherein Recebido refused to allow claiming that Dorol has already sold to him the land on 1979. Dorol, on the other hand, insisted that the transaction between them was not a sale, but a mere mortgage. Caridad Dorol, then, went to the Office of the Assessor in Sorsogon and verified the existence of a file Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 in which she knew that the property was already registered in Recebidos name. A comparison of the specimen signatures of Caridads other documents and that in the questioned Deed of Sale was done, and NBI Document Examiner Antonio Magbojas found out that in the latters signature was falsified. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon filed the information indicting Recebido for Falsification of Public Document with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. The trial court rendered the decision convicting the petitioner of the crime and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment. The defense of prescription was raised only during the motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not the crime charged had already prescribed at the time the information was filed? Decision: No. Prescription, although not invoked in the trial, may, as in this case, be invoked on appeal. Hence, the failure to raise this defense in the motion to quash the information does not give rise to the waiver of the petitioner-accused to raise the same anytime thereafter including during appeal. Nonetheless, we hold that the crime charged has not prescribed. The petitioner is correct in stating that whether or not the offense charged has already prescribed when the information was filed would depend on the penalty imposable therefore, which in this case is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000.00 pesos. Under the Revised Penal Code, said penalty is a correctional penalty in the same way that the fine imposed is categorized as correctional. Both the penalty and fine being correctional, the offense shall prescribe in ten years. The issue that the petitioner has missed, however, is the reckoning point of the prescriptive period. The petitioner is of the impression that the ten-year prescriptive period necessarily started at the time the crime was committed. This is inaccurate. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.

Prescription of Offenses Panaguiton v. DOJ (G.R. No. 167571)

Facts: Cawili and his business associate Tongson borrowed from Panaguiton (petitioner) sums amounting to 1,979,459. They issued checks signed by both of them to Panaguiton but these were dishonored upon presentation. Panaguiton made demands to pay but to no avail. He formally filed a complaint on August 24, 1995 for violating BP 22 before the City Prosecutors Office. Tongson moved to drop his name from the case as his signatures were allegedly falsified. Case against him was dismissed but afterwards upon finding that Tongson might have indeed signed the checks, the chief state prosecutor directed the city prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. Tongson moved for reconsideration but denied. In 1999 assistant prosecutor dismissed the complaint for the action has prescribed pursuant to Act 3326, which provides for the prescriptive periods of statutes without their own (4 years for BP22). She claims that the filing of the complaint on August 24, 1995 did not interrupt the running of the period as the law refers to judicial and not administrative proceedings. Issue: Whether or not the filing of the complaint in the prosecutors office tolled the prescriptive period? Decision: Yes. Filing of the complaint in the prosecutors office tolls the prescriptive period for violations of BP22. When Act 3326 was passed into law, preliminary investigation of cases was done by the justices of peace, and not by agents of the executive department (i.e. prosecutors). Thus, the prevailing rule at that time is that prescription is tolled once filed with the justice of peace (a judicial process). However, since then, the conduction of a preliminary investigation was moved to the function of the executive department.

Caniza v. People (159 SCRA 16)

Facts: On March 20, 1974, Assistant City Fiscal of Manila filed a n In fo rm a t i o n f o r f a l si f i c a t i o n o f p u b l i c d o c u me n t s allegedly committed on Nov. 5, 1968 by Caniza. On May 24, 1974, Caniza filed Motion to Quash saying that allegations in the information did not constitute an offense, and that the information contained averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification. The Trial court granted Motion to Quash, dismissed case against Caniza. Fiscals Motion for Reconsideration of this Order was denied. O n J u n e 1 3 , 1 9 7 9 , a s e c o n d I n f o r ma ti o n was filed charging Caniza with substantially the same offense as that charged under the previous information. Caniza moved to quash this second information on the grounds that 1) the offense charged had already prescribed, 2) quashal of the first Information had been on the merits, 3) the allegations of the second Information did not constitute and offense. T h e j u d g e i s s u e d a n o r d e r d e n yi n g t h e motion to quash. He also denied Canizas motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the offense charged had already prescribed? Decision: No. 5 years, 4 months, and 16 days had elapsed between November 5, 1968 (the date of commission of the alleged offense) and March 20, 1974 (date of filing the first information); 4 years, 2 months and 12days had elapsed between April 3, 1975 (date of denial by the trial court of the Fiscals motion for reconsideration) and June 13, 1979 (date of filing of the second information). A total of 9 years, 6 months and 28 days had been consumed by the time the second Information was filed in court. Under Article 90, in relation with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of falsification of public document committed by a private individual -the offense with which petitioner Caiza is presently charged - prescribes in ten (10) years. In this respect, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further: The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are justifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. Amnesty People v. Patriarcha (G.R. No. 135457)

After a careful verification and evaluation on the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It, thus, recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty. The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve the recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC. In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 on May 17, 1996. Issue: Whether or not the grant of amnesty in favor of Jose Patriarca, Jr. - while the various criminal cases filed against him were pending - shall completely extinguished his criminal liability? Decision: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grant to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given: "Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense." This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accusedappellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.

Facts: On August 16, 1990, an Information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., for killing Alfredo Arevalo. Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. On January 20, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision convicting the herein accused-appellant. Thus, Accused-Appellant filed his appeal. However, while his appeal was pending, he applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.

Arts. 100-103: Civil Liability Nuguid v. Nicdao (G.R. No. 150785)

Facts: Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00. As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner a open dated Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the check. In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums [abovementioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from Samson Ching. The checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the [respondent]. Issue: Whether respondent remains civilly liable to her for the sum ofP1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in the aggregate amount ofP1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid? Decision: From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code. A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged. Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely relieved of civil liability.

Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis but argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears that [petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of interest on a daily basis. In any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her employees, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making further payments when she realized that she had already paid such amount. From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were never rebutted by [petitioner]. Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code]. By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and convincing documentary evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence. Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other Persons Nueva Espana v. People (460 SCRA 547)

Facts: Petitioner Nueva Espana was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting into double homicide when the passenger bus he was driving rammed into a Honda motorcycle driven by Reynard So with Nilo Castro as passenger resulting into the death of both. An aggravating circumstance was also imposed as Espana also left the scene of the crime without lending assistance to the victims.

During trial, the father of So and the mother of Castro were both called on to testify as to the earning capacity of the two. Sos father claimed that his son was earning P80,000 a month while Castros mother said that his son was bringing in P8,000 a month. Sos father additionally testified that the funeral expenses incurred by them was P87,000 while Castros mom stated that they spent P30,000 for the funeral. As a result the trial court, besides imprisonment, awarded the following amounts to the heirs of the victims: TO THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM REYNARD SO 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) P2,997,000.00 indemnity for loss of earning capacity of victim 14,200.00 for expenses of the wake 20,000.00 for funeral parlor 12,000.00 for the tomb 53,000.00 for cost of burial site 30,000.00 for attorneys fees 200,000.00 for moral damages 100,000.00 for exemplary damages

P3,429,200.00 TOTAL AMOUNT

TO THE HEIRS OF VICTIM NILO CASTRO 1) 2) 3) 4) P1,728,000.00 indemnity for loss of earning capacity 20,000.00 for funeral expenses 200,000.00 for moral damages 50,000.00 for exemplary damages

P1,998,000.00 TOTAL AMOUNT

P 253,000 TOTAL The heirs of Nilo Castro are also entitled to the following: P 50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto 50,000 temperate damages 50,000 moral damages 25,000 exemplary damages 30,000 attorneys fees P 205,000 TOTAL The SC meanwhile adopts the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals regarding the subsidiary liability of petitioners employer, Vallacar Transit Inc., under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. An employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employees civil liability in the criminal action if it can be shown that: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) the accused is insolvent. However, subject to prevailing jurisprudence, the subsidiary liability may be enforced only upon a motion for subsidiary writ of execution against Vallacar Transit, Inc. and upon proof that petitioner is insolvent.

The court based the amount of loss of earning capacity based on the formula used by the Supreme Court as illustrated: As to the civil liability, particularly the indemnity for the loss of the earning capacity of the victims, the formula last enunciated by the Supreme Court is: Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross-living expenses annual (50% of gross annual income) Thusly, since the victim Reynard So was earning P80,000 a month at the time of his death when he was thirty (30) years old, his lost earning capacity should be computed as follows: x = 2 (80 30) x [P960,000.00 P480,000.00) 3 x = 33.4 x P480,000.00 x= x P16,032,000.00

Pangonorom v. People (455 SCRA 211)

Facts: Pangonorom was the driver of a passenger bus owned and operated by MMTC which collided with a Gemini Isuzu car driven by Carlos Berba, resulting into the damage of the car and physical injuries obtained by Berba. Pangonorom was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting into damage to property and physical injuries. The trial court awarded damages amounting to P42,000 but was silent as to the subsidiary liability of MMTC. Consequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court and also found MMTC subsidiary liable for the amount notwithstanding the fact that the judgment of the trial court was silent as to said matter. Issue:

With respect to the victim Nilo Castro, he was earning P8,000.00 a month when he died at the age of twenty-six (26). His lost earnings were: x = 2 (80 26) [P96,000.00 P48,000.00] 3

x = 36 x P48,000.00 x = P1,728,000.00 As a result, petitioner appeals to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court regarding the damages, Consequently, the CA declared that Vallacar Transit Inc., should not yet be held subsidiary liable for the liability of the petitioner as its driver. Thus, this petition for review with the SC. Issue: Was the award of damages amounting to P8 million proper? Decision: The SC modifies the award of damages mostly to the fact that loss of earning capacity should be properly adduced and supported by competent evidence to prove the same. This rule also applies to the funeral and burial expenses. In the case at bar, the lower courts based their award for damages solely on the testimony of SOs father and Castros mother, even though both of them never substantiated the amounts claimed with receipts, papers and other evidence. And so the award is modified as follows: To summarize, the heirs of the deceased Reynard So are entitled to the following: P 50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto 73,000 actual damages 25,000 temperate damages 50,000 moral damages 25,000 exemplary damages 30,000 attorneys fees

Did the CA err in not holding MMTC not subsidiary liable despite the fact that the RTC did not mention anything to that effect? Decision: The SC ruled that even when the dispositive portion of an RTC decision does not expressly pronounce subsidiary liability of the employer, they are deemed written into the judgment whenever applicable. But, he subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. In the present case, there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is engaged in the transportation industry, and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. However, there is no proof here of Olimpios insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This being so, no writ of execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of the accused-employees insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced. In short, there is as yet no occasion to speak of enforcing the employers subsidiary civil liability unless it appears that the accused-employees primary liability cannot in the first instance be satisfied because of insolvency. This fact cannot be known until sometime after the verdict of conviction shall have become final. And even if it appears prima facie that execution against the employee cannot be satisfied, execution against the employer will not issue as a matter of course. The procedure for the enforcement of a judgment will have to be followed. Once the judgment of conviction against Olimpio becomes final and executory, and after the writ of execution issued against him is returned unsatisfied because of his insolvency, only then can a subsidiary writ of execution be issued against the MMTC after a hearing set for that precise purpose. It is still too early to hold the MMTC subsidiarily liable with its accused-employee considering that there is no proof yet of Olimpios insolvency.

Whether or not petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation? Decision: NO Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them. That an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of P.D. No. 603, which states that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. The penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable period. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the P.D. No. 603, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. Considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

Quinto v. Andres (453 SCRA 511)

Facts: Petitioner Quinto is the mother of an 11-year old boy named Wilson who died while going inside a drainage with the respondents Andres and Pacheco, who were also of the same age. What was clear according to a witness who was a friend of the victim was that the three of them (Wilson and the respondents) went inside the drainage filled with water. First to emerge was Pacheco who immediately went home, and then next to come out was Andres who was already carrying the dead body of Wilson. After being charged with homicide, the trial court the respondents not guilty and also found the same not civilly liable because of the absence of preponderance of evidence to prove liability. QUinto appealed the civil aspect of the decision which the CA affirmed. Issue: Petitioner comes to the Court and raises the following issues: 1) Does extinction of criminal liability carry with it extinction of the civil liability; and 2) was the prosecution able to establish preponderance of evidence. Decision: The civil action based on delict is not extinguished unless the court itself finds that civil liability did not arise. In the case at bar, the trial court was very clear that the prosecution was not able to establish a preponderance of evidence to find the respondents liable. As to whether preponderance of evidence should have been considered, the trial court and the CA was correct in their findings. Preponderance of evidence should not be based on the fact that the evidence of the defense is weaker. The evidence presented must be strong enough to SUFFICIENTLY SUSTAIN THE CAUSE OF ACTION. In the case at bar, the prosecution single prosecution witness testified that the hematomas on the alleged victim may have been caused by either hitting with a blunt object or slipping and falling on the hard pavement. Even the friend of the deceased testified that the drainage was so dark and this was the reason that he did not come with the other boys inside. And so, the possibility of slippage by Wilson was very much a possibility. Facts: Petitioners were found guilty by the RTC, of violation with Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, for having found in possession of forest products without permit. They appealed the decision to the CA, but it affirmed their conviction, with modifications as to the penalty imposed by the lower court; from 2-8 years to 6 months to 1 year. Petitioners applied for probation but was denied by the trial court, and subsequently affirmed by the CA. Issues: Whether or not petitioner can still apply for probation? NO Whether or not Fransisco v. CA applies in this case? YES Decision: The fact that petitioners put the merits of their conviction in issue on appeal belies their claim that their appeal was prompted by what was admittedly an incorrect penalty. Certainly, the protestations of petitioners connote a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence, and do not simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed.

Lagrosa v. People (G.R. No. 152044)

Probation Law (P.D. No. 968) Francisco v. CA (G.R. No. 108747) Facts: Petitioner, as President and General Manager of the company, humiliated his employees and blurted out invectives against the latter. He was charged with multip[le grave oral defamation by 5 of his employees who were allegedly the recipient of the said invectives. He was found guilty of oral defamation in 4 out of 5 cases filed against him. Petitioner elevated the judgment from the MeTC to the RTC; however, the latter affirmed his conviction, with modification, accrediting to him the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation. His appeal to the CA was to no avail also. Issue:

For sure, petitioners never manifested that they were appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty to reduce it to within probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting their innocence therein, petitioners should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting their appeal, petitioners ipso facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, does not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. Although it has been suggested that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appeal is solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this proposition, especially given the factual circumstances of this case. Had the petitioners appeal from the decision of the trial court raised the impropriety of the penalty imposed upon them as the sole issue, perhaps this Court would have been more sympathetic to their plight. Unfortunately, their misrepresentation has led to their own undoing.

maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter, and to pay the corresponding value of the subject pieces of jewelry. The petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. He avers that the prosecution failed to prove that Pacita stole the jewelry subject of the charge, and that Macario sold the said pieces of jewelry to him. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of the (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the AntiFencing Law? Decision: The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. Macario Linghon testified that he sold the jewelry to petitioner. Although the well-entrenched rule is that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, it is required that such testimony must be credible and reliable. In this case, we find the testimony of Macario to be dubious; hence, barren of probative weight. The Court further held It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a) to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on the value of the property. Tan v. People (313 SCRA 220) Facts:

Vicoy v. People (G.R. No. 138203) Facts: Petitioner was convicted for violation of an ordinance against peddling fish outside of market, as well as for the crime of resisting and disobeying an agent of a person in authority. Petitioner filed an application for probation, but subsequently withdrew it and filed a notice of appeal. MTCC granted the withdrawal of application for probation but denied her notice appeal for being filed out of time. The court ordered petitioner to furnish the City Prosecutors Office a copy of her memorandum and the assailed judgement of conviction. Petitioner failed to do so, and the court dismissed her special civil action for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on ground of petitioners failure to comply with the earlier Order of the same court? Decision: NO The fact that the City Prosecutors Office has not yet entered its appearance is no justification to petitioners adamant and continued insistence not to comply with a lawful order of the court. Every court has the power to enforce and compel obedience to its orders, judgments, and processes in all proceedings pending before it. Section 7, Rule 120, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final when the accused has applied for probation. This is totally in accord with Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, which in part provides that the filing of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Thus, there was no more opportunity for petitioner to exercise her right to appeal, the judgment having become final by the filing of an application for probation. Maria Criselda Fojas 2010-0226

Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries; upon inventory, she found that several pieces of equiptment were missing. Manuelito Mendez was a former employee of Lim, who left her employment before Lim found out that her goods were missing. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainants warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainants forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one another. Tan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him in the sum of P18,000.00. Issue: Whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against petitioner? Decision: Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have shown that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and, (4) there is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another. The Supreme Court stated that there was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property. The theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to

Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) Francisco v. People (434 SCRA 122) Facts: Pacita Linghon was the helper of Jovita Rodriguez. Pacita, through her brother Macarion, sold to petitioner Ernesto Linghon several pieces of jewelry stolen from Rodriguez. The Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, found petitioner Ernesto Francisco guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as

petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.The Court held that accused Tan could not be held guilty because there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him.