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Bui Thi Thu Sang 11407063

Research Proposal
1. Title The Status and Future Direction of the Fight against Transnational Corruption Crime under International Law and Soft Law: Vietnam as a case study 2. Research Objectives The objective of the research is to evaluate the legal framework and its enforcement on the regulation of transnational corruption crime under international law and soft law, to look for the future direction to fight against transnational corruption crime and to address Vietnam as a case study 3. Research Questions i. ii. iii. iv. v. What are the pros and cons of international law approach to control transnational corruption crime? What are the pros and cons of soft law approach to control transnational corruption crime? What should be the future direction to fight against transnational corruption crime? What are the pros and cons of Vietnamese jurisdiction over transnational corruption crime? How should Vietnamese jurisdiction over transnational corruption crime be?

4. Outlines Transnational corruption Definition: Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gain; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence (Nye, 1967) Corruption involves a transaction where a government official abuses a position of trust for personal gain (Ouzounov, 2004) The study of transnational corruption deals in particular with transnational corporations (TNCs), and their interactions with foreign officials. Bribery is the dominant form of transnational corruption but it is grand bribery which should not be mistaken for gift-giving Increase in the incidence of transnational bribery A 1997 World Bank estimate placed the total corruption involved in international trade at about $80 billion per year A more recent estimate by the World Bank of the amount of bribes paid suggested a figure of more than $1 trillion dollars (US$1,000 billion) each year Another survey conducted by the World Bank of 3600 firms in sixty-nine countries found that 40% of the surveyed businesses pay bribes Consequences: (Ouzounov, 2004) Diminished economic development and growth Increased societal inequalities A discredited government and rule of law Causes: International regulation of business in focus (Delaney, 2005)

Demand-side corruption, on the one hand, occurs through solicitation (a government official insists on a bribe before he will award a contract) Supply-side corruption, on the other hand, occurs through proposition (a company may offer to pay a bribe in order to secure an advantage over its competitors) Criminalization Article 16 of United Nations Convention against Corruption ( 2005) (UNCAC) Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business. Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official or an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties. Multilateral legal frameworks on transnational corruption crime OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) Enter into force in 1999 and has been implemented in all 31 OECD Member countries as well as in seven non-member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Estonia, Israel, Slovenia and South Africa) The first legally binding international instrument that aims at combating bribery and through this, protecting fair competitiveness in international transactions Focuses exclusively on the supply-side of the bribery of public foreign officials and sanctions for such activity Criminalize bribery of a foreign public official as well as complicity in bribery, including incitement, aiding and abetting, or authorization of a bribery act Effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, even by additional civil or administrative sanctions In case of legal persons not subject to criminal penalties, monetary sanctions can take place Mutual Legal Assistance among party states Implementation: monitoring and surveillance procedures by the OECD Working Group on Bribery Assessments: the adequacy of countries legislation to implement the Convention, the effectiveness of the application of the legislation by country visits, a permanent cycle of peer review involving systematic on-site visits Evaluation: self-evaluation by a questionnaire and mutual evaluation by the Working Group which are made up by all Parties Pros & Cons High compliance because the convention only deals with the supply side of bribery (Obidairo, 2008) Enact the necessary implementing legislation (The OECD Working Group on Bribery conducted a review of the implementing legislation of all the signatories to the Convention and in most cases only suggested slight improvements to the existing national laws) Have a comprehensive process for monitoring the implementation of the Convention Not adequately deal with the issue of transnational bribery(Obidairo, 2008) There were still inconsistencies with respect to the application of different national regulations to the same set of facts, even in countries that had implemented one of the major multilateral initiatives Not address both the policy and procedural concerns that would effectively mediate the conflicts between states in the regulation of transnational bribery UNCAC Come into force in 2005 with 140 signatories and 94 ratifications (2007) Prevent corruption by model preventive policies that are directed at both the public and private sectors

Cover detection and sanctioning and promote transparency and technical assistance Cover a wide range of offences including bribery, domestic and foreign; embezzlement; trading in influence; concealment and laundering in the proceeds of corruption Criminalize bribery in the private sector and calls for measures to improve business integrity Recognize the need for shared responsibilities between law enforcement agencies of countries in cases of cross-border corruption activities by joint investigation, the transfer of criminal proceedings and special investigative techniques Asset-recovery as a fundamental principle A mixture of mandatory and discretionary provisions Implementation by the auspices of the Conference of Parties to the Convention Require cooperation with relevant international and regional organizations and mechanisms and nongovernmental organizations Address the need for enhanced financial and material assistance to developing countries to help them implement the Convention Pros & Cons Low levels of compliance because of the broad mandate and the lack of an effective process for monitoring compliance (Obidairo, 2008) Not a strategy for fighting corruption but a series of important instruments that every nation needs to apply to its own jurisdiction (Girodo) Not address a need to build/earn trust, primarily through personal contacts for joint investigations (Girodo) Not adequately address legal systems and the difficulties in the conduct of covert operations when joint investigations are required by countries with different systems (Girodo) Not address the need for training such as conducting undercover operations which is fundamental to success (Girodo) Provide little detail on the nature of such a prohibition or the mechanisms for enforcement (Delaney, 2005) Inter- American Convention against Corruption (IACC) Come in force in March 6, 1997, and ratified by 22 OAS countries Focus primarily on bribery and its variations Preventive Measures: Article III bounds the State Parties to adopt, inter alia, codes of conduct, conflict of interests rules, financial disclosure systems for public officials, public procurement norms, State encouragement of civil society initiatives, the creation of Anticorruption Agencies Criminal Offences: In addition to passive and active bribery, the Convention also applies to any acts or omissions done by the person or official for the purpose of illicitly obtaining any benefits; and the fraudulent use or concealment of property derived from corruption. States Parties are required to adopt these acts or omissions, as well as transnational bribery and illicit enrichment as domestic offences Mutual Legal Assistance: The Convention foresees that the State Parties will foster among them cooperation in technical assistance matters, as well as in extradition, bank secrecy and asset recovery issues Council of Europe Conventions The Criminal Law Convention against corruption A binding legal instrument Contain provisions criminalising a list of specific forms of corruption, and extending to both active and passive forms of corruption, and to both private-sector and public sector cases Bribery of foreign public officials and members of foreign public assemblies is expressly included, and offences established pursuant to the private-sector criminalisation provisions would generally

apply in transnational cases in any State Party where a sufficient portion of the offence to trigger domestic jurisdictional rules had taken place Not deal with any of the other forms of corruption, such as extortion, embezzlement, nepotism, or insider trading, and not seek to define or criminalise corruption in general Open for signature and ratification by other, nonmember States that participated in its negotiation Other States can also join by accession once the instrument is in force, provided certain preconditions The Civil Law Convention against corruption The first attempt to define common international rules for civil litigation in corruption cases Require States Parties to ensure that those affected by corruption can sue the perpetrators civilly, effectively drawing the victims of corruption into the Council's anti-corruption strategy Ensure that anyone who has suffered damage resulting from corruption can recover "material damage, loss of profits and non-pecuniary loss." Damages can be recovered against anyone who has committed a corrupt act, authorised someone else to do so, or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the act, including the State itself, provided that a causal link between the act and the damages claimed can be proved Courts have the power to declare contractual obligations resulting from corruption to be null and void, where the consent of any party to the contract has been "undermined" by corruption Apply only to bribery and similar acts, but apply to such acts in both private- and public-sector circumstances Not yet come into force African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption Adopted by the heads of state at the African Union Summit to held in Maputo in July 2003 To facilitate international co-operation and mutual assistance in investigating crime and tracking down, seizing and confiscating the proceeds thereof To assist States in attaining a similar degree of efficiency even in the absence of full legislative harmony To criminalise the laundering of the proceeds of crime To confiscate instrumentalities and proceeds (or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds) Forms of investigative assistance (for example, assistance in procuring evidence, transfer of information to another State without a request, adoption of common investigative techniques, lifting of bank secrecy etc.) Provisional measures: freezing of bank accounts, seizure of property to prevent its removal Measures to confiscate the proceeds of crime: enforcement by the requested State of a confiscation order made abroad, institution by the requested State, of domestic proceedings leading to confiscation at the request of another State World Bank Anti-Corruption Strategies Aim at reducing the opportunities for corruption while increasing the expected cost, i.e. the risk of being caught and severely punished Enhance state capacity and public sector management, strengthen political accountability, enable civil society, and increase economic competition The enforcement of the international anti-bribery laws by trans-governmental network Trans-governmental network Definition: a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the domestic from the international sphere (Slaughter, 2004) The driving force behind the development of trans-governmental networks is the disaggregation of the state (Slaughter, 2004) Evaluation: The anti-corruption network is unlikely to ever be sufficiently effective to control corporate behavior without additional supporting measures. While networks may encourage transnational cooperation, they cannot overcome all the challenges of the international system. Moreover, the very concept of a network raises serious issues of legitimacy. (Delaney, 2005)

Trans-governmental networks may encourage trans-boundary cooperation, but they cannot erase borders altogether Where the relevant circumstances occur in multiple jurisdictions, with differing laws regarding accounting provisions and bank secrecy, maintaining an effective investigation continues to be difficult even in a cooperative network It is difficult to enforce legislation against powerful corporations in purely domestic situations, let alone across national borders, and regulators persistently suffer from information asymmetries While cooperation through a network will most likely improve enforcement mechanisms, it is unlikely to do so sufficiently to alter corporate behavior When the benefits of bribery are so great, and the likelihood of detection and conviction so low, rational corporations will continue to bribe even where the potential punishments are severe The resources of TNCs are such that they are able to absorb legal costs and adverse judgments as part of their operating costs Given that regulatory officials will be making substantive decisions regarding corruption and bribery including what actually constitutes bribery, their democratic accountability remains an issue because the definitions of bribery provided in the leadings conventions are not always definitive A disjuncture exists between those who exercise the material power to regulate, and those who are subject to it. Regulators in the developed world, where most TNCs make their homes, engage in regulation with a tangible effect in the developing world, where much bribery occurs. If one views the citizens of the developing world as subjects of such regulation, as well as corporations, this does not simply stretch the chain of accountability between the regulators and their subjects, it may break it entirely Soft Law: Non-state mechanisms of regulation by Regulatory Webs (Delaney, 2005) Epistemic Communities and Business Regulation Epistemic communities: Networks of individuals with shared beliefs and expertise on a given issue (Haas 1992) Include professionals from government, civil society and corporations themselves, united by a shared interest in the process of regulation Involve the recognition of corruption as a problem and collective understandings of how to approach it The International Chamber of Commerce: set standards for its members Transparency International: not only promulgate codes of behavior, but also attempt to use publicity to hold corporations reputationally accountable for breaches of expected standards of behavior the resurgence of interest in corruption, and the growing number of voluntarily-signed corporate codes on corruption Pros & Cons Successfully communicate norms because they emphasize dialogue with corporations, which can foster internal norms of compliance Reputation as a Restraint on Behavior Acts as a restraint on corporate behavior in situations of complex interdependence Transparency International: bring public pressure to bear against those who fail to meet the standards The World Economic Forum: provide a vehicle for the praise or reprimand of executives by other executives Pros & Cons It is only effective insofar as corporations value their reputation It contributes another strand to the web of regulatory influences Intellectual Resources for Corporations The International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conduct A general nature constituting what is considered good commercial practice in the matters to which they relate but without direct legal effect Prohibit extortion and bribery for any purpose, call for independent and thorough auditing techniques, and establish a Standing Committee to promote their adoption

i. ii.

Promote individual codes within companies Exist since 1977, and their latest incarnation in 1999 The Partnering Against Corruption Initiative launched by the World Economic Forum Sullivan and McBrides Combating Corruption principles, Hess and Dunfees Combating Corruption principles Transparency International Integrity Pact and Business Principles Integrity Pact: require any bidders for a government contract to sign a tender document which provides undertakings not to engage in bribery, supported by a code of conduct and a compliance program; reintroduce expectations of honesty in tendering processes tainted by expectations of bribery; instituted in a limited number of projects, though a growing number of nations have expressed support for them Business Principles: assist corporations in the development of internal compliance mechanisms, and were composed following the OECD Convention, in order to help ensure compliance with that convention Cons Insufficient means of controlling corporate behavior because there are significant aspects of corporate practice which remain uncontrolled Face problems of legitimacy Future Direction: Combining State and Non-State Regulation (Delaney, 2005) Focus on a multiplicity of actors and methods, instead of remaining conceptually wedded to the state International conventions is supported by networked regulatory agencies, and is combined with regulatory webs through enforced self-regulation I will try to work in this part for more discoveries Vietnam as a case study Background Corruption index (Transparency International) Viet Nam's corruption perceptions index (CPI) scored in 2009 was 2.7, ranking 120th out of 180 surveyed countries and territories. Bribe payers index (BPI) is a ranking of 22 of the world's wealthiest and most economically influential countries according to the likelihood of their firms to use bribery abroad. Legal frameworks to regulate transnational corruption in line with the international conventions Vietnam domestic law on the regulation of corruption 1999 Penal Code ( from article 289 to article 291, articles 40 and 41) 2003 Criminal Procedure Code, chapter 36 and chapter 37 ( from article 340 to article 346) 2004 Law on Inspection 2005 Law on Practicing Thrift and Fighting Waste 2005 Law on Anti-Corruption The government signed the UN Convention Against Corruption in December 2003, and ratification was in 2009 Article 44 on Extradition of the UNCAC The person who is the subject of the extradition request is present in the territory of the requested State Party, in case of the offence requested to extradite is punishable under the domestic law of both the requesting and requested party A State Party whose law permits may grant the extradition of a person for any of the offence covered by the Convention that is not punishable under its domestic law In case that the extradition request includes several separate offences and at least one of them is extraditable under Article 44 and some of them are not able to extradite by reason of their imprisonment period but related to the offences covered by the Convention, the requested State Party may apply the Article 44 to these offences If a State Party, which considers the extradition have to be based on a treaty, receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the Convention can be considered the legal basis for extradition of offences covered by the Article 44

If a State Party does not make the extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty, it is obliged to recognize the offences established in accordance with the Convention as extraditable offences The Convention states that the extradition conditions shall be in accordance with domestic law of the requested State Party or applicable treaties, including conditions of minimum punishment requirement for extradition and the grounds upon which the requested State Party may refuse extradition If the State Party whose territory an alleged offender is found refuse to extradite the person in respect of an offence covered by the Convention upon only one ground that this person is one of its citizens, this State Party shall, at the request of the requesting State Party, has the obligation to promptly submit the case to competent agencies for the purpose of prosecution The concerning State Parties shall cooperate with each other for ensuring the effectiveness of the prosecution, particularly, on evidentiary and procedural aspects If this person is not investigated, prosecuted or adjudicated by the requesting State Party, he/she must be resolved by the requested State Party, which has not granted the extradition if the requesting and requested State Party agree to extradite or surrender the alleged person upon sole condition that the extradited or surrendered person will be returned to the requested State Party for exercising a sentence made by the competent authorities of the requesting State Party, the extradition of surrender will be exempted from the obligation set forth in Paragraph 11, Article 44 If an extradition requested for exercising a sentence is refused upon the ground that the requested person is a citizen of the request State Party, this Party shall, in accordance with its domestic law, consider exercising a sentence made by the requesting State Party Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connection with any of the offences covered by the Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including all the rights and guarantees provided by domestic law of the State Party whose territory that person is present The extradition request may be refused if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his sex, race, religion, ethnic origin or political opinions 2003 Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), chapter 36 and chapter 37 ( from article 340 to article 346) Legal framework for extradition, MLA and recovery of proceeds of corruption The CPC does not prescribe evidentiary tests for extradition or MLA, nor does it expressly require specialty or use limitation The CPC does not allow the extradition of Vietnamese nationals unless the applicable treaty or agreement provides Extradition is also refused if the person sought has been convicted or is being prosecuted in Vietnam for the same crime Under the CPC, Vietnam may also refuse to refuse a request for assistance from a foreign country if the application threatens its sovereignty, security or other important interests 1999 Penal Code, articles 40 and 41 Cover confiscation Instrumentalities of a crime and objects or money acquired through the commission of a crime may be confiscated upon the conviction of a person The conviction must relate to a crime that causes great harm to society and which is punishable by at least seven years imprisonment The CPC requires confiscated property to be deposited into the State fund Pros and Cons of the Vietnamese legal frameworks (Nguyen) Vietnamese authorities grant extradition provided that the offence subjected to the extradition is offence and punishable under Vietnamese law The Criminal proceedings Code is in compliance with requirements that the Convention states for State Parties that make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty and State Parties who do not require this condition

In the Criminal proceedings Code, the competent authorities shall refuse extradition request upon reasons which are mostly similar to the aforesaid reasons except the reasons of sex and origin but added the reason of social class The Criminal proceedings Code provides only that the Vietnamese competent authorities shall refuse to grant extradition if the person subjected to the extradition request is Vietnamese citizen The Criminal proceedings Code has not regulated the basic rights of extradited person that this person shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings Suggestion (ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, 2007) Vietnam could amend the CPC to ensure that cases are submitted to its competent authorities for prosecution whenever extradition is denied solely because of nationality Ensuring that there is jurisdiction to prosecute all such cases could also be beneficial Expressly prohibiting the use of bank secrecy as a ground for denying MLA would bring the law in line with recent international instruments Designating a single body as the central authority for all extradition and MLA requests could result in economies of scale, concentration of expertise, better coordination among law enforcement agencies, and less duplication Allowing the central authority to directly send and receive extradition and MLA requests could eliminate delays caused by transmission through the diplomatic channel The authorities in requesting states could benefit from a Web page in English that is dedicated to international cooperation and which contains a description of the Vietnamese extradition and MLA process, copies of relevant legislation and treaties, contact information for the central authority, and sample documents Procedures for urgent requests, such as allowing Vietnamese nationals to be provisionally arrested, could be useful Potential delays could also be reduced by accepting urgent requests for MLA or provisional arrest that are made outside the diplomatic channel, such as by facsimile or Interpol Vietnam could also consider accepting urgent MLA requests made orally with subsequent written confirmation Treaties and legislation on MLA relating to proceeds of crime could greatly improve Vietnams ability to seek and provide cooperation Cooperation could also be strengthened by reducing some threshold requirements Allowing property to be restrained before a charge has been laid could enhance the preservation of assets for later confiscation Permitting foreign confiscation orders to be enforced without a conviction would bring the regime in line with Article 54(1)(c) of the UNCAC Procedural changes could also enhance cooperation, such as allowing the enforcement of foreign restraining, confiscation and pecuniary penalty orders by direct registration in a Vietnamese court Procedural changes could also enhance cooperation, such as allowing the enforcement of foreign restraining, confiscation and pecuniary penalty orders by direct registration in a Vietnamese court. Registration of faxed orders in urgent cases could also be useful Express provisions on the repatriation of proceeds of corruption could provide greater certainty and accountability. Particular consideration could be given to the factors referred to in Article 57 of the UNCAC iii. It joined the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific in June 2004 Anti-Corruption Action Plan which encompasses three pillars: developing effective and transparent systems for public service, strengthening Anti-Bribery Actions and promoting Integrity in Business Operations, supporting Active Public Involvement Vietnam anti-corruption reform in the framework of the Action Plan Comprehensive strengthening the capacity of the inspectorate system to 2010 Priorities: reforming institutions, reinforcing organization, upholding qualification and competence of public employees, blocking and repelling corruption and bureaucrats Implementing Institutions: departments, agencies of the Government Inspectorate, inspectorates at administrative levels and inspectorates of branches or sectors

International donors have provided seed capital for the Program (Sweden has USD 3.2 million for the programs implementation) The Government Inspectorate implements in cooperation with STAR, the Asia Development Bank (ADB), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and the UNDP Supporting the implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption Priority: monitoring and evaluating the UN Convention Against Corruption Implementing Institutions : Government Inspectorate Research Institute (GIRI), Government Inspectorate of Vietnam GIRI is cooperating with UNDP Evaluation (American Chamber of Commerce) Vietnamese authorities and Vietnamese media have made commendable improvements in 'Supporting Active Public Involvement' by exposing and condemning cases of corruption The government has taken various measures in relation to 'Strengthening Anti-Bribery Actions and Promoting Integrity in Business Operation' by removing and punishing corrupt official iv. Implementation The Office of the Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption (OSCAC) Headed by the Prime Minister Coordinate, examine and supervise the fight against corruption Suspend deputy ministers and officials holding equivalent posts Pros & Cons The lack of impartiality within the OSCAC, since it consists of members who are full-time officials in other agencies some corruption cases involving state officials or members of the Communist Party Vietnam ( CPV) are not being investigated properly The lack of a truly independent anti-corruption agency overlapping mandates and functions of other institutions that are related to the fight against corruption Government Inspectorate (GI) Function as an Ombudsman which receives citizen complaints and denunciations Investigate cases of corruption Not have powers to prosecute Conduct a study of Vietnamese anti-corruption legislation Pros & Cons Corruption within the GI (U4 Anti-Corruption Research Centre 2008) A lack of independence (Global Integrity 2006) People's Procuracy Prosecute cases of corruption Initiate public prosecution following investigations and to ensure implementation of the law by all levels of government, ministries, economic bodies, social organizations, the army and citizens Organize into the Supreme People's Procuracy at the national level, with lower-level bodies at the provincial and district levels The Prosecutor-General is elected and removed by the National Assembly at the proposal of the President Pros & Cons Corruption fuelled by people trying to prevent cases from going to court is frequent in the People's Procuracy (U4 Anti-Corruption Research Centre 2008) Prosecutions of corrupt public servants are nearly always successful (U4 Anti-Corruption Research Centre 2008) State Audit of Vietnam (SAV) An independent organization in 2004 Certify the accuracy and legality of the state budget at all levels of government Pros & Cons

The SAV still suffers from inadequate resources and overlapping mandates with the Government Inspectorate (GI), seriously hampering its efficiency (Transparency International 2006) The SAV has a weak capacity to enforce auditing recommendations, and there is little evidence that the government acts on the SAV's reports Evaluation The mechanisms to tackle corruption are both poorly enforced and monitored, and Vietnam still faces a huge implementation gap in relation to its anti-corruption framework (Transparency International 2006 and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Implementation Assessment of the Anti-Corruption Law 2008) The lack of a systematic approach by the Vietnamese government, politicization of mechanisms and institutions, overlapping mandates of institutions, lack of an independent anti-corruption agency, nepotism, state institutions characterized by secrecy, and the lack of whistleblower protection as the main obstacles to progress in the fight against corruption(Transparency International 2006) Private sector corruption is hugely underestimated in Vietnam and not properly addressed by the AntiCorruption Law 2005 (the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Implementation Assessment of the Anti-Corruption Law 2008) Suggestion Anti-corruption plan under UN convention (Sai Gon Giai Phong) Phase 1, from now to 2011, will see Vietnam implement the Convention on a broad scale; improve its legal system on anti-corruption in line with the UNCAC requirements and its national strategy on anticorruption by 2020 In phase 2, from 2011-2016, the country will assess initial outcomes of the implementation of the UNCAC and further perfect its anti-corruption laws In the last phase, 2016-2020, the country will comprehensively assess the implementation of the UNCAC; better anti-corruption organizations; and enhance effectiveness and quality of anticorruption activities 5. Expected Outcomes The existing conventions have lots of shortcomings The enforcement of these legal frameworks is still a problem Soft law should be promoted as an important pillar to regulate transnational corruption Future direction should be a comprehensive approach which links all international actors to regulate the behavior of both the demand party and supply party 6. Research Principles QAP method Case study References

ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific (2007), Framework and practice for MLA and extradition Vietnam Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (1999) Nikolay A Ouzounov (2004), Facing the Challenge: Corruption, State Capture and the Role of Multinational Business, John Marshall Law Review, pp. 1181- 1186 Global Integrity 2006 Joseph S Nye (1967) Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, American Political Science Review, pp. 417- 419

Oran Young (1979), Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Implications Patrick Delaney (2005), Transnational Corruption: regulation cross-borders, The Policy and Governance Program at the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government Peter M Haas (1992), Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, International Organization Sai Gon Giai Phong, Vietnam adopts anti-corruption plan under UN convention, from http://www.saigongpdaily.com.vn/National/2010/4/81081/ (August 13, 2010) Simeon Obidairo (2008), A Fragile Consensus on Regulating Transnational Corruption, from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295903 Slaughter, Anne-Marie (2004), a New World Order Thanh V.Nguyen, Vietnamese law on extradition in comparison with Article 44 of the UN Convention Against Corruption, American Bar AssociationAsia: www.abanet.org/abaasia/docs/aba_asia_thanh_nguyen.pdf Transparency International Transparency International 2006 United Nations Convention against Corruption (2005) U4 Anti-Corruption Research Centre 2008 The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Implementation Assessment of the Anti-Corruption Law 2008