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Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcialla vs. Salvador Mison and Guillermo Carague No.

L-79974 December 17, 1987 En Banc


FACTS: When Salvador Mison was appointed to the Office of the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, this petition for prohibition filed by taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional was filed on the grounds that said appointment is in violation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for it was not approved by the Commission on Appointments. ISSUE: Whether said appointment is indeed unconstitutional basing on Section 16, Article VII. RULING: Misons appointment is constitutional. Sec. 16, Article VII states that: Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x It is clear that the first group shall need the confirmation of the CoA. Also, it can be seen from reviewing the records of deliberation of the 1986 Constitutional Commission that it has been clearly stated that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the confirmation of the CoA. In the issue at hand, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the CoA is required. Furthermore, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs under Sec. 601 of R.A. 1937 which states that Sec. 601. x x x The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.

Appointment Cannot Be Expanded by Law


FACTS: In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation. Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA. HELD: It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. T he SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to

Calderon vs Carale G.R. No. 91636: Calderon vs Carale

those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required. "Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase "and other officers required by law" at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, "with the consent of the Commission on Appointments" at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions. Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution 1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election). 2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the officers are considered as among those whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.

limit alienated by the fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such unconstitutionality.

ATTY . ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBENLISTA, ET AL. G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003
Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners promotion by the President was unconstitutional. Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power. Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the Department of National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).

Manalo vs Sistoza 312 scra 239 Appointments


FACTS: Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. The said police officers tool their Oath of Offices and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments. The petitioner brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to assail the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. HELD: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the

Rufino vs. Endriga


Facts: Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure. First case, GR No. 139554, represented by the Solicitor General, collectively known as the RUFINO group seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Resolution denying the motion for the reconsideration. CA's decision (to be set aside) 1.Declaring petitioners, ENDRIGA group to have a clear right to their respective offices elected by the CCP board up to expiration of 4-year term 2.Ousting respondents, Rufino group, except respondent Tantoco, from their respective offices and excluding them therefrom 3.Dismissing case against Tantoco.

Second case, GR No. 139565, the Endriga group, seeks to assail the Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in same case insofar as it denied their Motion for Immediate Execution of the Decision. History of PD 15: Marcos - In 1966, Marcos created EO 30 "Creation of the Cultural Center of the Philippines" as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of 7 members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees were all pointed by Pres. Marcos 1972, after declaration of Martial Law- Pres. Marcos issued PD 15 which converted CCP into a non-municipal public corporation free from "the pressure or influence of politics" and increased 7 members to 9. EO 1058 issued in 1985 increased 9 to 11. Aquino - 1986, after People Power Resolution, Aquino asked incumbent CCP trustees for courtesy resignation and appointed new trustees to the Board. Ramos - started Endriga group Estrada 0 appointed 7 new trustees to CCP board with term of 4 years to replace the Endriga group, except for Tantoco. Thus Rufino group took respective oaths of office and assumed performance of their duties in 1999. Endriga vs. Estrada Endriga group files Petition for Quo Warranto questioning Pres. Estrada's appointment of 7 new member of CCP board. Alleged that under Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 -"vacancies of the CCP Board shall be filled byelection by majority vote of trustees held at next regular meeting" -only when the board is entirely vacant may the President of the Phil. fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with ranking officers of CCP. In the case at bar, only one seat was vacant due to Ma Osa's expiration term. 4-year term: Endriga group maintained that under CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed 4-year term can only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause" thus Pres.' action was unnecessary because 10 incumbent trustees had the statutory power to fill up by election any vacancy of the board. Sec. 3 of PD 15 - Endriga refuses to accept CCP is under the supervision and control of the President as Sec. 3 states -"shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation" CA's decision: declared Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees and ousting Rufino group from board. Sec. 6 (b) of PD 15 is free from ambiquity.

Nor may the President's constitutional statutory power of supervision and control over government corporations restrict or modify application of CCP Charter.

Rufino's Motion for Recon: asserted, by Section 16 of Article 7 of the 1987 Consti,that the law could only delegate to the CCP board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than trustees of Board which is in conflict with Sec. 6 of PD 15 "CCP trustees has the authority to appoint or elect fellow officers of equal rank not of lower" CA: denied Rufino's Motion and also denied Endriga's motion for immediate execution of decision. Hence the consolidated petitions. MAIN ISSUE OF 1st case: Whether or not Section 6 paragraph B of PD 15 in which gives authority to CCP trustees to elect or appoint fellow officers of equal rank, is unconstitutional (as it is against Sec.16 of Article 7, that only the President has the appointing powers of appointing heads of executive departments) Important Issues related to lesson: 1.Invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Consti 2.Deprives President's constitutional power of control and supervision over CCP MAIN ISSUE OF 2nd case: whether or not a writ of quo warranto involving public office such as CCP should be declared a self-executing judgment and deemed immediately executor under Rule 39, Section 4 of the rules of court. Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15: Board of trustees - has the power and authority of the corporation. Vacancies shall be filled by election of majority vote by the trustees. Only can the President exercise his/her power to appoint if the board becomes entirely vacant. Intent -to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the Pres. Makes CCP a self- perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the Pres.SUCH CANNOT EXISTS UNDER CONSTI. Sec. 3's provision of Board initiating and formulating plocies and activities are still subject to Pres.' power of control. Section 16 of Article 7 of Consti: source of president's power to appoint gives President legislature authority to delegate power to appoint However, Congress may, by law, vest upon the appointment of other officers lower in rank (as contended in Rufino's MOC) President appoints 5 groups of officers: 1.Heads of Executive department (with consent from Commission of Appointments) 2.Those whom President may be authorized by law to appoint (and 3. without consent of Comm of App)

3.Officers of the Government (if the law is silent or head appointing declared unconsti) 4.Lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may, by the law, vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards. 5.Appointments vested by Consti in Supreme Court and Constitutional Commission Appointment of Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions, and Boards: Appointing powers belong to President, with: Congress - share such authority as to appointing inferior or "lower in rank than those vested by law" Batasang Pambansa can also appoint inferior officers Power to appoint to heads is a matter of legislative grace. President's power is self-executing vested by Consti thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. Others such power are the Supreme Court en banc and Consti Com Sec. 8 PD 15 - Chairperson of CCP Board is Head of CCP: Chairperson, with confirmation from the Board, has the power to appoint all officers, staff and personnel of the Center The CCP may elect membership in Gov t Service Insurance System (GSIS) those elected will have same rights and privileges and obligations as gov't service Exempted from coverage of Civil Service Law and Rules Sec. 3 - Duties of Chairperson: Appoint, remove, discipline all officers and personnel Perform duties until Board, by majority vote, shall elect another Chairperson Thus, under COnsti, CCP "head" is Chairperson and has power to appoint lower ranked officers Under PD 15, CCP is a public corporation governed by the Board thus not an agency Sec. 6 (b) (c) vs. Sec. 16 of Article 7: HOLDING: Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 are unconstitutional. While Sec. 6 empowers remaining trustees to fill vacancies of Board, allowing them to elect fellow trustees... Sec. 16 allows only the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards to appoint only officers lower in rank. Sec. 6 talks about independent appointing powers which conflicts with the President's power to appoint - the two system of appointing powers are recurring anomalies and controversies in appointment every time new President assumed office. What is the CCP?

CCP is under the Executive branch, as stated in Revised Admin Code of 1987 -"any agency, not placed or order creating them under specific department falls under Office of Pres." President controls CCP Sec. 17 of Art. 7 -CCP perform executive and not legislative, judicial or quasi-judicial functions. President's Power to Control: Applies to acts or decision of all officers in the Executive Branch Power to control - the power to revise or reverse acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving exercise of discretion Supervision and Control -includes authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation of subordinate Executive branch is unitary thus only the Presindet had executive power exercising control over entire Executive Branch. Legislature can't validly enact law outside control of President. Limitations: Doesn't extend to qyaus-judicial bodies, since proceedings and decisions are judicial in nature and subject to judicial review, only admin power of Pres. Local government units - only general supervision HOLDING: Wherefore, we grant the petition of the 1st case wherein we find Sec. 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it authorizes remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies of the Board. And we find it unnecessary to rule 2nd case.

MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA vs. SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989
FACTS: Pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint and Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippinesdesignated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as"Acting Chairman, Commission on Human Rights." Subsequently, on 17 December 1988, extended the petitioner to a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission submitting such appointment (more accurately, nomination) to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. On 20 January 1989, or even before the respondent Commission on Appointments had acted on her "ad interim appointment as Chairman of the

Commission on Human Rights" petitioner Bautista filed with this Court the present petition forcertiorari with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any action of the Commission on Appointments as well as of the Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully extended appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the ground that they have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment." ISSUE: Whether or not the president's appointment of the petitioner's ad interim appointment needs confirmation by the CA. HELD: Under the Constitutional design, an ad interim appointment does not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on Appointments, can not be ad interim appointments. The Court holds that petitioner Bautista is the lawful incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof, is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right to due process properly safeguarded. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said office. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against respondent Mallillin enjoining him from dismissing or terminating personnel of the Commission on Human Rights is made permanent.

Delegation of Control Power to the Executive Secretary


FACTS: Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to LMC of which he is a co-owner. Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Exec Sec Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter. ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Exec Sec and may it be further delegated by the Exec Sec. HELD: The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.

Lacson-Magallanes Co. vs Pano & Exec Sec Pajo G.R. No. L-27811

De Leon vs. Carpio 178 SCRA 457 (1989)


"Alter-ego" Doctrine FACTS:Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the said body declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil Service Commission. The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board ordered their reinstatement. However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by the Secretary of Justice to CSC without action, claiming that they were null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and direct order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice HELD: It is an elementary principle of our republican government, enshrined in the Constitution and honored not in the breach but in the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines. The Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of his Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place, they are at all times under the disposition of the President as their immediate superior. Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior) In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the President. His acts should therefore have been respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate in

this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretarys directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President of the Philippines.

Bermudez vs Torres
Facts: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the Secretary. Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit Held: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.

The phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.

Constantino & the Freedom From Debt Coalition vs Gov. Cuisia of BSP

Qualified Political Agency when not applied

FACTS: During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme. ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents. HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the

President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional. Exception There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy). There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

HELD: The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of RA 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint . There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that `the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.

Control Power Removal Power Appointees


FACTS: Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. The Exec Sec suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that she be removed. The president then issued an AO removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him. ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the president.

Ruben Villaluz vs Calixto Zaldivar G.R. No. L-22754