Cognitive Relativism for the Analytic Soul

J. Adam Matuszewski Prof. Westacott Relativism December 18, 2003

Cognitive Relativism for the Analytic Soul

Reason is a means of organizing and sorting the world. There are many ways reason can be used to do this. Cognitive relativism is one of these ways. If one wishes to speak pragmatically, there are other ways that are just as valid. If one wishes to speak analytically, one cannot be without error unless one is a cognitive relativist.

Cognitive Relativism It is by no means clear what cognitive relativism is and as a consequence, the majority of essays attempting to refute it hit on inaccurate or inconsistent variations of it. Building on the premises of Emrys Westacott1, cognitive relativism in this paper will rest on the following argument. iThe truth value of any judgement is relative to some particular standpoint.2 ii All standpoints are based on unjustifiable values. iii No value is metaphysically privileged over any other. iv Therefore, No standpoint is metaphysically privileged over any other.3 Concerning the first premise, the existence of truth only Westacott, Emrys. Relativism, Truth and Implicit Commitments Westacott, Emrys Relativism, Truth and Implicit Commitments, p. 99 3 Ibid.
1 2

makes sense within the context of a standpoint. That apples are red can be neither true nor false if one does not see color. That god is dead holds no weight without a conception of god. Any call to truth independent of a standpoint is impossible because truth requires a standpoint for verification, not to mention conception. Objectivity, religion, mysticism, science and pragmatism are all standpoints and as such each may have their own conception of truth, but there is no ultimate truth that we might know for what standpoint could we take to know it? In considering the second premise, one needs only to know the definition of standpoint. A standpoint is the qualification of a line of reasoning by certain values held by the subject of that standpoint. Let us examine it in a hypothetical dialogue. RALPH: Why do you believe in science as the only source of true knowledge? IGOR: Because it is the only way of discovering the way things really are. RALPH: How do you know that what science tells you is the way things really are? IGOR: Because its observations are consistent. RALPH: Why is consistency an indication of truth? IGOR: Because it makes things predictable RALPH: Why is predictability desirable? IGOR: Because it enables a greater level of control.

RALPH: What good is control? IGOR: Control is just something we want. This is not meant to be the standpoint of the scientist or any scientist for that matter. Indeed one might take such an argument several steps farther and point to something desired beyond control, but the degeneration of the argument from rational justification to justifications based on value should be obvious; it does illustrate the point that beneath all standpoints lie a set of unjustifiable values. The values must be unjustified because as soon as you try to justify a value, you create a new standpoint for which there will be at its heart another value. Of course, there should be nothing preventing one from justifying a value in order to find a more fundamental value, but at the base is always going to be a value and if it is the base, it is unjustifiable. If values are unjustifiable, it is impossible to have any that are metaphysically privileged over any other. Consider peace. Is there any reason why we should desire peace over say, prosperity? It is often the case that those who are not prosperous fail to maintain peace, but it is more often the case that prosperity leads to change which leads to conflict. Of course, each person, group and society has a set of values that they deem the most important, but there in no metaphysical position that may say that any one set of values is better than another set.

As to the conclusion, if there are no metaphysically privileged values, and all standpoints are founded on values, then there can be no metaphysically privileged standpoints.

A Representative Chart of Standpoints

Values

Curiosity

Understanding

Beauty

Health

Autonomy

Community

A priori synthetic truths Reason

Sensation Values

Standpoint Truth

The values expressed in this chart are variable and are meant only to be examples of some of the values that combined with reason create a certain standpoint.

Values It might be argued that there is a transcendental notion of truth which rests on that standpoint that embraces all the values of humanity. In this scenario, problems arise when people stubbornly cling on to a single value when it is within their best interests to create a peaceful equilibrium where no value is more preferred over any other. The real problem with values however, is not so much that we

hold some to be more important than others, that different people have chosen different values or that individuals and societies are so vastly unique that they have dissimilar values. The real problem with values is that people desire conflicting values and as long as values conflict, there can be no single standpoint that embraces the full extent of any of them. Autonomy is not compatible with community nor is stability with progress, faith with understanding or homogeny with heterogeny. Each individual, culture and society must choose between these and other conflicting values. To some extent there are circumstantial factors that make such decisions easier or a at least make a culture or society more prone to choosing one over the other. For example, an economic system dependent on trade may be more likely to encourage heterogeny over homogeny. However, choice between conflicting values is, as far as anyone can tell, largely arbitrary or at the very least highly variable and unpredictable. In the Fifteenth century, the Chinese embarked on a series of voyages that took them to as far as the tip of Africa, and some say farther. Shortly thereafter, a new emperor took the throne, stopped all exploration and shut China off to the rest of the world. Such is one instance where an unexpected shift in values has changed the history of the world and gone against all notions of necessary historical development; there are many more. It is generally the case that an individual, group, culture or

society will try to create an equilibrium between conflicting values, doing its utmost to balance between the two as best as possible. This does not mean however, that there is a single appropriate ratio of stability to progress or autonomy to community. It must now be considered the case that there is no correct source of values and that the only way to compare two cultures is through the limited consensus that might exist in the values of each.

Reason As it has already been said, reason is a means of organizing and sorting the world. It is a tool and as a tool it is a means to an end and there are as many different types of reasons as there are ends. The end of course is the values of, an individual, culture or society. A Zandi looking to maintain social cohesion is just as unlikely to come to the same conclusions as a scientist searching for objectivity is with a mystic seeking nirvana. This is not because one is more or less rational than the other, but rather because reason is contingent on the values of the reasoner and conclusions can only be drawn in accordance with those values. There have been a great many arguments set into motion by the religious sceptics who have tried to prove that the faiths of believers are irrational. This however, is the wrong way to go about things entirely because reason can neither prove nor disprove the

values it rests on. Thus, the sceptic is acting in as absurd of a fashion as a believer would be in trying to rationally prove that space or time doesn't exist to the religious sceptic. Reason cannot critique its own values. It can critique the values of others, but never its own. It may be disheartening to some to think of reason as something so contingent on unjustifiable values. Indeed, there are those who would ardently oppose what has been said in favor of a standpoint that paints reason as something much more fixedly objective. In an effort to alleviate some of this fret, may it be remembered that reason itself does not change. Whether it be the material world or God, the way in which values are processed and dealt with are all the same. In this sense, reason is more of a formatter than a collection of variant systems of thought. It takes in the given assumptions and empirical data and makes as much sense of them as it can in the same way it would for the opposite assumptions and empirical data. This said, let us now see how the standpoint of the analytic is necessarily relativistic.

The Analytic Philosopher a.k.a. the Relativist Analytic philosophy has its own sets of values and based on these values its own sets of a priori synthetic truths on which it bases its reason. Kuhn determined science to have five such values: accuracy, consistency, broad scope, simplicity and potential. To these,

I add understanding, curiosity and control. As Kuhn did not, I will not attempt to claim that this list of values is exhaustive. Thus, while there may be a value of analytic philosophy that has been neglected which may refute my claim, given the listed values, an analytic philosopher must be a relativist. This is because a relativistic standpoint does a better job fulfilling the named values than a nonrelativistic standpoint. Indeed, this whole paper has been devoted to showing just how much better cognitive relativism is at applying the values of analytic philosophy in the search for truth than other methods of thinking. It may be argued that I am begging the question in that I am using the format of what I want to prove to prove my format. An analytic might, retort this value mumbo jumbo means nothing. Analytic philosophy is about finding truth with a capital 'T'. This is fair enough. What I have tried to show however, was that analytic reason has an origin and place in a relativistic mindset which is not to say that it is relativistic but rather that it should and must be if it is to continue what it has started. This is so because if there is a universal truth, it is that truth is not universal. Although this may seem contradictory, such a circumstance is not uncommon in the development of analytic philosophy. Newtonian physics succumbed to Einstein's physics largely because Newtonian physics proved itself wrong; as Kuhn would say, it created a crisis it could not overcome. Similarly, the path set by the

belief in ultimate truth leads us into a crisis for which relativism is the only way out.

Conclusion As a relativist, one can not say that one standpoint is better than any other for no standpoints are metaphysically privileged over any other . Relativism is a standpoint and as such is no more or less valid than any other standpoint. However, a standpoint that may be better or worse when their values are the same but their lines of reasoning are different. If one line of reasoning fulfills the values of a given standpoint better than another line of reasoning, we may rightly say that the first standpoint is indeed better than the second. This is the case in comparing analytic philosophy with relativism, a point made quite clear in On Motivations for Relativism. Accepting all the values of analytic philosophy, cognitive relativism seems to be the only viable choice. In regards to the possibility that values themselves have an ultimate right way of being applied, so that all values will be optimally fulfilled, there is no indication that this is at all possible and much indication that it is not. It is often the case that two values are both highly desired and contradictory and as such one must choose between the two. Furthermore, the choice between two values is highly variable and as far as can be seen largely arbitrary.