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CHAPTER I EVOLUTION OF INDIAS NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAMME Introduction The plans for producing nuclear power began to take concrete shape about fifty years ago when the administrative organisation was established. In 1944 with the help of late J R D Tata, Dr. Bhabha suggesting the setting up of an institute devoted to basic scientific research which later became platform for Bhabha Nuclear Research i.e. Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. It had started from 1946 onwards by Prime Minister Nehru and Dr. Homi Bhaba, began drawing up plans for a self-sustaining programme of nuclear research in India. Bhabha believed that he had made strong case for nuclear power. That is why Indias nuclear policy is calling as personalized Policy, because it has identified as prominent interest of the Nehru, and Bhaba and certain high bureaucratic enclaves. According to Jaswant Sngh in these initial years it was the close intellectual relationship between Bhabha and the first Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, that laid the foundation of subsequent self sufficiency in diverse scientific fields including nuclear energy (Singh 1998: 308). Regarding nuclear policy and setting up of research reactors justified in terms of need for generating electricity and raising the level of scientific skill within the county early periods. In such a way both Nehru and Bhabha were largely responsible for organizing the research and development of nuclear energy within India after independence on a serious and long term basis (Bhatia 1979: 70). For this it is to understand these key components of Indias nuclear policy, they are (1) not to make nuclear weapons ; (2) to work for and support nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control measures; (3) to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purpose; and (4) not to

accept discriminatory international inspection and safeguards in respect of national nuclear facilities. Thus Indias nuclear policy clearly stated strong commitment to nuclear disarmament and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purpose. In the international forum India had all along advocated the elimination and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and emphasised the need for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As early as 1948, speaking in the UN General Assembly, the Indian representative, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, gave vent to these aspirations when she said that atomic energy could be expected to play an important role in the future economy of an underdeveloped and underpowered country.1 The need to develop atomic energy itself was justified by the prime Minister in terms of historical and scientific necessity. He stressed his personal preference for its peaceful uses. on 6 April 1948.2
Consider the past hundred years of history, the world developed a new source of power that is steam- the steam engine and the likeand the industrial age came in. India with all her many virtues did not develop that source of power. It became a backward country in that sense, it became a slave country because of that... now we are facing the atomic age. We are on the verge of it... The point I should like the House to consider is this, that if we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation with keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy quiet apart from war. Indeed I think we must develop it for peaceful purpose. Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possible no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way. But I do hope that our outlook in regards to this atomic energy is going to be a peaceful development of human life and not one of war and hatred.

Nehru

analysis came at the end of the debate on the Atomic Energy Bill

In 1947, when India emerged as a free country, its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru took leadership for Indias gigantic step towards scientific and Technological leap. Although, our country was not aligned with both powers namely US lead capitalist and USSR led socialist club and chosen non-alignment. However, the leadership initiated tapping of national talent in various field including science and technology. The initiative on nuclear energy put up also because of country was not sufficiently endowed with resources of conventional fuel and major part (around 65% of them were importing as petroleum and other products ) it contribute enormously desperately need nuclear energy for will demands for energy. That is why the power production as in future the economic development

new government of India passed Atomic Energy Act on 15 April 1948, leading to the establishment of Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). In the initial years, United States of America, Canada supported Indias quest for nuclear energy and building up of reactors. Early Developments In India, the atomic energy programme is the most important undertaking in the public sector and it is also the oldest. The plan for producing nuclear power began to take concrete shape about fifty years ago when the administrative organisation was established. As mentioned in the beginning, Bhabha was a management genius who inspired people to work for his ideas. Plans for the construction of nuclear reactors began in earnest after the UN Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in Geneva in 1955; Bhabha was elected president of the conference. He utilised the opportunity to persuade Canada, France and United Kingdom to assist India in its power programme (Sarma&Banerjee 2008).

The preliminary steps precede the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act and the constitution of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. In April 1948, while framing the Indian constitution, the Constituent Assembly passed the Indian Atomic Energy Act of 1948, modelled on the British Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (Perkovich 1999). The Commission enlarged its programme and had the following as its objectives: i. ii. iii. iv. to survey the country for essential raw materials, to take steps to develop these materials industrially, to set up a nuclear reactor for experimental purposes within five years, and to promote fundamental research in its laboratories.

On the other hand, as India lacked trained nuclear physicists and engineers as well as the required materials and design capability, Bhabha took the obvious step of asking for assistance from those nations which had already built and operated such units. But there are obvious oppositions from various sides on Bhabha ideas. One of them was M. N. Saha, who insisted that the country should first address problems such as dearth of good mechanics and laboratory men, as well as the lack of engineering and manufacturing firms for the production of machinery, electrical goods, scientific instruments or chemicals. Finally in 1954, the United Kingdom offered to help India to build a reactor of the swimming pool type that would be fuelled with enriched uranium. The first research reactor in Asia, APSARA, was built in India. The U.K. Atomic Energy Authority supplied the engineering drawings as well as the fuel elements of enriched uranium (Abraham 1998). In a new development in the year of 1953, President Eisenhower announced the Atoms for Peace programme in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly.

He proposed that an international atomic energy agency to formed under the aegis of the United Nations. Followed by these, the relaxation in terms of nuclear cooperation and Atoms for Peace programme prompted the Canadian authorities to offer to build a research reactor in India as part of the aid programme under the Colombo Plan. The Canadian government offered to build an NRX 40 megawatt thermal reactor that was fuelled with natural uranium and used heavy water moderator. At the same time the United States agreed to sell twenty tonnes of heavy water to India that was required as moderator for the reactor. In short, the tripartite cooperation that is Canada-India-Reactor-US gave the reactor name CIRUS. The construction of CIRUS started in 1956 and it attained full power four years later. Since then it has proved to be a very useful source of neutrons for research and the production of isotopes. Three Stage Indian Nuclear Programmes It is important to understand Indias nuclear programme forwarded by Bhabha (Father of Indias nuclear programme). Convinced of the future of nuclear power however, an undeterred Bhabha drew up his ambitious plans for the development of atomic energy in the country even before commercial nuclear power stations had started operating anywhere in the world. However, Bhabhas arguments in favour of using nuclear power were not particularly original concept. In the global level the enthusiasm about atomic power started in the period immediately after the end of the Second World War. Many of Bhabhas arguments had been intensively discussed in Western Countries since the end of Second World War. Indias nuclear energy policy formulated in first Atomic Energy Conference (26-27 November, 1954) in this conference Bhabha outlined his proposed three stage reactor programme. The first

stage reactors working with natural uranium fuelled Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs). In the second stage, the advanced Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) utilising plutonium based fuel and in the Final stage more advanced than second stage reactors generating nuclear power by utilising thorium converting into Uranium. The intention behind this three stage nuclear power programme to meet the fast growing demand. Also, India is having modest thorium reserve which is seen in the Kerala cost. So, the larger growth in nuclear power capacity can be realised only through efficient conversion of fertile materials into fissile materials and utilising the latter to produce energy. In short, thorium utilisation for large scale energy production has remained an important goal of our nuclear power program. Bhabha estimated that a combination of the above three types of reactors could have an installed capacity to produce 102 million kilowatts of electricity by the year 2000 (Bhabha 1965). Based on this, India developed its first stage indigenous uranium cycle PHWRs power plant at Trombay in 1957, popularly known as Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). The expansion of research and development activities at Trombay was matched by rise in government expenditure on nuclear energy, which rose from an insignificant annual grant of Rs. 3 lakh in 1948 to nearly Rs. 10 crores in 1959. However, presently the range and volume R&D support for currently operating and future PHWRs at BARC is likely to progressively reduce. In short, BARC was considered a nursery where new development would be continually nurtured and other sites in the country were identified where knowhow and process could be commercially established (Sharma 1983: 14). Thus, in the first phase it consisted mostly of policy formulation and it laid emphasis on mobilization of human and material resources on a large scale to tame the atom to ensure for the

masses of India. A fullness of life and freedom want which they have never known in the past. In the second stage, India started the Fast Breeder Reactor (FBRs) programme. It has been commercially launched with the construction of 500Mwe Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam near Chennai. However, the commercial nuclear power program started in 1969 with the operation of Tarapur I&II. The third stage system is under developing stage. However, it will take appreciable time. The technology pertaining the third stage is utilisation of thorium have been under development, mainly at BARC, right since the inception of our nuclear programme. The third stage nuclear program has following goals... Utilisation of thorium as fuel on a commercial use Large scale of deployment of nuclear power in the country Achieving good economic performance as compared to alternative option for energy generation Utilising the proliferation resistant potential of thorium fuel cycle to the full extant Attaining higher levels of transparent and passive safety measures Providing for adaptability to non-electrical applications, in particular, desalination and high temperature processing applications, including those for generation of non-fossil fuel Indian Nuclear Policies after 1954 Indian nuclear policies after 1954 were continued to prominent in two trends namely demands for wider representation at international disarmament negotiations and the second was concerned with proposals for a ban on nuclear tests. pool reactor (APSARA) at Trombay he said This was repeatedly pronounced by Nehru by inaugurating the swimming

Non man cans prophecy the future. But I should like to say on behalf of my government and I think I can say with some assurance on behalf of my future government of India that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never us this atomic energy for evil purposes. There is no condition attached to this assurance, because once a condition is attached, the value of such an assurance does not go very far.3

During this period India got foreign assistance in 1953, the United States of America supplied non-military nuclear technology to India under its Atoms for Peace Programme, and in 1959 it offered training in reprocessing the handling plutonium to Indian Scientists (Jones et al, 1998: 112). In 1963, the United States also approved Indias purchase of two 210-MW boiling water reactors from General Electric for its Tarapur Atomic Power station and agreed to supply fuel for this plant for 30 years in return for Indias promise not to use the plutonium generated in these reactors for military purpose (Ibid). Canada was another major country that assisted Indias Nuclear energy program. It extended its assistance to India includes the building of 40-MW research reactors called CIRUS (Canadian-Indian Reactors United States) for which the United States supplied heavy water.4 In addition to these a handful of other Western European countries such as West Germany, France and Norway, have also contributed to Indias nuclear projects. Germany built a small heavy-Water production Plant in 1962 (Moshaver 1991: 84). In 1969, France agreed to help India to develop breeder reactors (Associated Press, Nuclear History) and co-operated in the construction of Fast Breeder Test Reactors in Kalpakkam, which became operational in 1985(Moshaver 1991; 88) and Norway has supplied heavy water to India overtime (Barnaby 1993: 71). Looking at the building up of nuclear reactors will give a brief outlook to the various stages of Indias nuclear energy

programme. Among them Tarapur Atomic Power Stations (TAPS) was a turn key project, almost all equipment and components were imported. Construction work commenced in 1964, but could be completed only in 1969, a year later than was scheduled. The supply of fuel to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) has had a chequered history. In 1963, the American government signed an agreement to supply low enriched uranium fuel for thirty years, the nominal life a reactor. In return, India agreed to maintain accounting checks-termed safeguards to make sure that no spent fuel was diverted to make nuclear explosive. After India exploded a nuclear device in May 1974 however, the supply of fuel became irregular, and four years later, the US Congress passed non proliferation Act (NPT) which completely stopped the fuel supply to India. As a result of these France in 1993 and China in 1998 terminated the agreement with India to provide fuel. It was Russia which finally came to rescue. An agreement was signed with Russia in August 2000 for supply of enriched fuel. The agreement was renewed in 2006 and Russia agreed to supply sixty tonnes of three percent enriched uranium for two reactors TAPS-1 and TAPS-2. Second among them is Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS). The original plan that Bhabha had formulated had not been forgotten and the DAE decided to build nuclear power stations with reactors fuelled with natural uranium, a reactor that was operational only in Canada. Canada signed an agreement with India in April 1964 and extended a loan of $ 35 million, of which eighty per cent was to be used to purchase Canadian equipment. The supply of heavy water heavy water posed serious problem. The Canadians, who had initially agreed to provide the 230 tonnes of heavy water needed to start the reactor, could spare only 130 tonnes of this scares material due to some fault in the heavy water plant. This was covered with Russian help, who

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agreed to cover the deficit and RAPS-1, the first reactor of the station, started operation in August 1972. In spite of these initial mishaps, an agreement to build a second power reactor at the same location was signed in 1966. But again in 1974, the Indian nuclear test in Pokhran worsened situation as far as cooperation with Canada and the United States. Consequently, construction of the RAPS-2 reactor had to be finished with material procured from other sources. Since then both RAPS-1 and RAPS-2 have suffered frequent component failure, so much so that a former chairman of the AEC labelled RAPS-1 as the eternal problem child (Srinivasan 2002). Another important Atomic Power Station in this line is Madras Atomic Power Station. The Madras Atomic Power Station near Kalpakkam commissioned in the mid 1980s, after an unusually long gestation period of nearly fifteen years. Actually the project was approved in 1965 and cost of reactor was estimated to be Rs 600 million. But soon after the commissioning the rector reported technical problem of frequent heavy water leakage. As a result of this, the reactor de-rated from proposed 235 MWe to 175 MWe for security reasons. In the same line the Narora Atomic Power Station was consisting of two reactors established with power level equals to Chennai reactors. The project was sanctioned in 1974 at a cost of Rs 2098.9 million, but the two reactors were commissioned only in 1989 and 1991 respectively against proposed commissioned date of 1982. However, Narora Atomic Power Station was remembered as the worst accident in the history of nuclear power in this country. On 31 March 1993, two blades of the turbine generator snapped and these pieces broke off several more blades. Thirty-five years after the start of the nuclear power programme that began with the commissioning of the Tarapur station, fifteen power reactors are operating in the country, generating a total

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electric power of 3310 MWe. Besides the two light water enriched fuel reactors at Tarapur, the others are pressurised heavy water reactors of the CANDU type. Six more reactors are under construction, two in Tarapur of 540 MWe each, two in Rajasthan of 220 MWe each, and two in Kaiga of 220 MWe each. In addition to these, two PWR of 1000 MWe each, are being built in Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu with Russian assistance. On the other hand, the situation of inadequate funding and bureaucratic hurdles continue to hamper the establishment of nuclear power stations considerably but, of late, realising the conventional energy resources are limited in India, funding for the nuclear power programme has increased substantially. The government has also been convinced that the security of the country requires a defensive nuclear arsenal. On the other hand, a section of scientists within the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and some people outside the establishment know that national security does not need nuclear weapons, but they remain silent as they feel that weapons development would increase government support for the power programme. Non-proliferation Regime and Indias Shift in Nuclear policy The real challenge came in front of India in the beginning of 1960s when leading countries in the world such as United States, the Soviet Union and Britain, began negotiations in October 1958 for a permanent Test Ban Treaty, although, there are serious differences existed over the certain issues between US and U.S.S.R. The main underlying notion of such treaty was that it will prevent proliferation of nuclear weapon outside the existing nuclear powers and ban Test in every environment, except those underground and with a seismic reading of under 4.75 (Bhatia: 66). However the negotiation were not got its result, but it made

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a consensus on formulate a Partial Test Ban Treaty by January 1963. As far as India is considered, which stood for complete nuclear disarmaments, when the Partial Test Ban Treaty was made, India was one of the Signatory Country. But, in ground reality the after effects are not favoured to India. Because, the regional security environment in South Asia (China also comes into security fulcrum) was deteriorised and subsequent border conflicts between China and India intensified due to forward Policy of India. In addition to these, host of other political issues between the two countries ultimately resulted in war with China in 1962 and India was defeated by peoples Liberation Army. Regarding the Indian military failure in 1962 war, so far there are no specific reasons are not sited publicly. Since, they are highly secret in strategic enclaves. After the war with china in 1962, the security environment had radically changed but still then Nehru and Krishna Menon (Defence Minister) were not favoured to alter the Indias Nuclear Policy from nuclear energy from Nuclear weapons programme. But the situation was even deteriorised when China had experimented nuclear weapon in 16 October 1964 at the top north most test site in Xijiang. K. Subramanyam wrote that October 16, 1964 was one of the defining moments in the narration of Indian nuclear Policy. This event had cited here because of when Indias nuclear Policy was discussed starting from 1946, it only thought of atom for peaceful purposes. But the 1964 event rethinked Indian Policy makers that it became imperative for Indian Policy makes to give serious consideration for the country acquire nuclear weapons. It is also marked a paradigm shift in Indias nuclear Policy towards weaponisations.

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In a very brief, the developments which have had a bearing on Indias nuclear policy here: 1) changes in the leadership since 1964 2) Waxing and Waning of the strength of the Congress Party in Parliament, especially after the math of the General Election of the 1967.3) emergence of a bomb lobby in the sixties 4) change in Indias security environment as a result of the Sino- Indian conflict of 1962 and detonation of an atomic device by China in October 1964, 5) NPT, which held the centre of the stage in disarmament negotiation during 1964-68 and 6) continued efforts by the major powers to establish an anti- proliferation regime (Malik1978). Moreover, a year before the Chinese nuclear test India had signed the PTBT, as already discussed but China was not a signatory, Therefore, China test a nuclear device in 1964, India could not follow suit because it was constrained by the terms of the PTBT. At the same time negotiation were going on for a treaty which has the proliferation of nuclear weapons outside existing nuclear power. In 1969 major power came into consensus on making of Non- proliferation Treaty (NPT). It came into force on 1970. However, the treaty granted the right to the member states to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purpose without discrimination. It was accepted as a mechanism to prevent nuclear proliferation by most of the countries except India, Pakistan and Israel. India cited in that It could not join the treaty, because and the treaty India could not be accepted as nuclear weapon power. If India had conducted a nuclear test before the treaty was gratified, it would have automatically become a nuclear weapon power like china. Haring failed to test in time India had no option but to stay out if it wanted to preserve its nuclear weapon option (Mohan 2006: 220).

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In short, for what Indias desire to acquire and develop nuclear technology and higher technologies for peaceful purpose, the ultimate objective being to become self-reliant in this important sphere of productive scientific and technological activity which was vital interest for Indias development and economic wellbeing (Dixit 1998: 281). It was forced to push to the wall, to exercise its nuclear option. When it become clear to India that in spite of the NPT, the nuclear weaponisations was being undertaken in its immediate neighbourhood, India could not sacrifice its national security (Khana 2000: 43). From this it can infer that for a period of some time Indias nuclear energy programme was halted by its security situation. Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (1974) and Indias Nuclear Programme India legitimized its weaponsiation programme in the context of it growing threat from Nuclear China and its nexus with Pakistani nuclear development programme simultaneous. This had made impetus to the Indias first nuclear explosion in May, 1974. As J.N. Dixit rightly observed that;
Mrs Gandhi faced the challenge of expanded nuclear weapons development around India and the progressive nuclear weaponisations of China and Pakistan.. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had forces armed with nuclear weapons deployed in the Indian Ocean and the Asia Pacific region, from Hawaii to Deiego Garcia. The Chinese had moved on from their conventional weapons capacities to the thermonuclear weapons capacities with matching, acquisition of delivery systems. Equally significantly, Pakistan had commenced its clandestine nuclear weaponisations programme immediately after its military defeat by India in 1971 (Dixit 1998: 286).

This policy shift namely intention to change from peaceful to join the nuclear club quiet clear. This has resulted in the cut off foreign assistance for Indias peaceful nuclear energy program.

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Indian efforts to ally western fears by describing it as testing a nuclear device or peaceful nuclear explosion did not meet success. Indias position that the nuclear device which is experimented in 1974 constitute an experimental basis for a nuclear weaponsiation programme, at the same time serving the purpose of technology demonstration experiment for the peaceful uses of atomic energy( Dixit 1998: 208). Aftermaths of its, Canada suspended supply of nuclear fuel to India; it formally halted nuclear co-operation in 1976(Kaushik 1976). It is important to note that at the time of peaceful nuclear explosion as Indian Government is described, it had only two reactors, one at Trombay which is running with Canadian assistance and second one is BARC (Bhabha Atomic Research Centre). It is estimated that scientist gather all data necessary to design a nuclear device from the BARC (Subramanyam 1998: 2930). International level reactions to the Indian Peaceful; Nuclear Explosions were mixed United States response to the Indian Test was conflicted; it was only a matter of Indian leaders making their moods and devoting the necessary resources (Ibid: 26). On the other hand Indian nuclear test in 1974 brought new challenges to non-proliferation regime. At the same time it showed Indias aspiration towards making nuclear weapons. Domestically the 1974 explosion created mixed response from different sides those who are supporting and those who are against the nuclear option for the country. On the question of 1974 nuclear explosion Raja Ramanna, who was one of the Principal participants in the PNE of 1974, who later become a minister of state for defence, suggested that 1974 nuclear explosion was a weapon that was tested rather the a peaceful nuclear device (Ramanna 1971: 86). However, from this it is clear that Indias development of nuclear programmes for peaceful or energy level became standstill. There

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are mainly two reason cited for this, one is domestic political change that stanch occurred during 1977 general election, in which from the Indira Gandhi was defeated by Morargi Desai who is known as opponent of nuclear weapons. Secondly, international side, United States and Canada tightened the nonproliferation squeeze after the Pokhran I explosion. Moreover, till 1978, India had supported the idea of nuclear weapon free zones in various parts of the world. Yet India opposed Pakistani resolution on Nuclearfree zone for South Asia. According to J. N Dixit, India has convinced regional and subregional free zones being established was irrelevant in terms of the objectives of non proliferation especially , when the nuclear weapon had a global reach and more so where most of the regions had at least one nuclear weapons power within the region itself (Dixit 1998: 422). From this, India was convinced of it existential threat to its national security, especially at the time of Indias war with Pakistan in 1971. During this period US sent Enterprise a nuclear weapon equipped US naval ship which was sent into Bay of Bengal in December 1971, to terrorize India, as a part of Gunboat Diplomacy. This is cited as one of the reason for giving green signal to the Atomic Energy Department to go a head with the test in 1974. So, in short, Indira Gandhi idea of committed intent in the nuclear policy, would then deemphasized the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and emphasis the dynamics of the international situation as an influence on the decision to go for the weapons option (Parnajpe 1987: 90). After all, in the wake of Indias 1974 nuclear test, the refusal of foreign suppliers to supply fuel, spare parts, equipment, and facilities further motivated the Indians to develop their own nuclear industry. Despite its short comings and technological limits, the Indian nuclear industry is advanced enough to give the Indians a degree of self-sufficiency in meeting their basic needs

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and enable them to pursue their peaceful and military objectives (Peiman 2000: 11). The Indians view their nuclear program- and in particular their nuclear weapon program as a clear technological demonstrator and an example of their abilities. A large chunk of peoples in the society believes that major impediment in the way of progress of India are at least six major categories they are; 1) economic weakness 2) limited energy resources, 3) inadequate infrastructure 4) large and growing populations 5) lack of internal cohesion 6) military weakness(ibid). Considering energy as a potential driven, a major handicap of India lies in the limited energy resources, which is related to a) Political and economic vulnerability attached to imports of strategic products b) the heavy financial burden of imported oil and gas, However, Indias attempt to decrease their dependence on imported energy by substituting nuclear energy have not been very successful in these years. Because, of the unique strategic threats posed by India inorder to divert its peaceful nuclear program into weaponsiation in all these years. Indias nuclear policy underwent a change under Janatha Government (1977-79) which abandoned the policy of peaceful nuclear explosion. However, the government official stand on the NPT was unchanged as it was a discriminatory. It is justified its decision by asserting that the treaty sought to limit Indias sovereign rights without providing for any international treaty for disarmament or nuclear disarmament. Nuclear energy and Nuclear Weapons Unlike Israel, Pakistan or earlier South Africa under its apartheid regime, all sought for nuclear weapon, Indias nuclear weapons program is mainly an offshoot of its nuclear energy program. The two major events of 1974, namely oil pricing shocks and the Indian atomic test heightened some of the leakage of energy, security and development policies in India. India is depended

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upon energy for fossil fuel that petroleum products which is imported from Gulf regions. During 1970, the Middle Eastern crisis paved the way for the rethink Indias policy on energy security. Moreover, the proximity of Middle Eastern oil exporting states with Pakistan carried strategic implication for India. This pushed India to tap domestic oil resources. Especially in the offshore Bombay High Oil fields on the Western cost. For along term depending upon fossil fuel is not practicable, so it is revive its interest in other sources like nuclear energy, is one of the important viable option. The pro-nuclear Power lobby in India suggests that these sources of energy may have a cost advantage over coal- fired thermal plants. Nuclear energy has legitimised in the contexts of it fill the critical gaps in total energy needs of its rapidly growing industrial and agricultural sectors that are obtained mainly from coal fired thermal plants and hydroelectric power? The pro-nuclear power lobby put forward example of France. The nations electricity is now 80 percent nuclear, with five times less air pollution and with carbon dioxide emissions 10 times lower than Germany is and 13 times lower than Denmarks (Rhodes 2001). The following statement in 1980 by Raja Ramanna then Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy commission is elective of the views of many members of the nuclear scientific community in India. Looking at it (the future of nuclear energy) with the experience of the post and the terrifying energy problems of the future, can think of no other source of energy, which can solve the energy problems of this country during the next 25 years and beyond. If I do not make the case now and point out to the urgency of accepting its inevitability, I will have done great disservice (Ramanna: 221) Moreover, there has been no western assistance for Indias nuclear energy and weapons programs since India tested its first atomic device in May 1974. The denial of external technology

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assistance has prevented India from fulfilling its nuclear energy goals. However, India has shown ability to develop indigenous technology to develop fast Breeder Reactors. The notable achievement of this period was Dhruv Atomic Plant for production of Plutonium 232. But on the other hand Indias continued in ability to produced promised capacity of energy, it provides only less than 3 percent of Indias power from nuclear energy. Indias Nuclear Policy During 1980s With the return of India Gandhi to power in 1980, the new government reiterated its commitment to pursue policy of peaceful use of nuclear energy. It stepped up nuclear research in nuclear fuel reprocessing technology, alternative technology fuel for atomic plants, Reactors technology, Fast Breeder reactor technology and other related areas of research. The DAE (Department of Atomic Energy) expected to achieve reprocessing technology which can give independence from uranium rich advanced countries and it was economical in the long run. Until then, Indians nuclear technology and reactor research in India has been mainly focused on construction and design improvement of natural uranium fuelled heavy water moderated and cooled at CANDU reactor system (Sharma 1983:102). However, in 1982-83 India Gandhi, under whose leadership India conducted the first nuclear test in 1974, had given orders for further test, but it was back pressure from U.S. (Iyengar 1988: 34). The context in which India was tried for an another test is that both China and Pakistan had acquired considerable edge over India in the nuclear weapon arena while Indian approach was ambiguous and shrouded in mystery (Sodhi 2000: 132). At the same time U.S. Sources increasingly provided evidence of Pakistans quest for nuclear weapons and the Chinese supply of a nuclear weapons design to Pakistan (Subramanyam 1986: 5). Moreover, Pakistans nuclear motives were first demonstrated by its failed attempt in the 1970

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under the leadership of Munir Khan to acquire reprocessing plant from France to be set up at Chasma. This was followed by its successful attempt in the 1980s under the leadership of Abdul Qadir Khan to set up a Uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta (Thomas 2002). During 1980s Indias bomb making capabilities also expanded, specifically in February 1983 reports surfaced Indias ability to reprocess plutonium to weapons grade (Farnsworth 1983: 7). However, the shocking incident of Indira Gandhis assassination in October 1984, made a stumbling block on Indias nuclear programme. Her son Rajiv Gandhi assumes the Prime Ministership. During his time India practiced a realism in domestic and idealism at the international forum on the nuclear question. Because, Rajiv Gandhi proposed a comprehensive plan for the gradual elimination of Nuclear weapons, popularly referred to as the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, called for the elimination of all nuclear arsenal by the year 2010. At the same time, he was keen to restarting Indias nuclear programme, as India had developed a missile based delivery system for As covert arsenal of nuclear weapons and started to adopt a deterrent policy, without actually deploying nuclear weapons. (Singh 1993: 66). This is in response to Pakistans success in the acquisition of uranium enrichment capability and subsequently the failure of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi action plan aimed at convincing the nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament in a time bound fashion (Paul 2002: 93).

Paradigm Shift The decade and a half that followed the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union has been a momentum one for India. It is a period in which India rapidly adapted to a new global

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circumstances and reacasted its economic and foreign policies. On the other side despite rising concern over Pakistans ongoing nuclear isolation, fresh reports of Chinese nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan, the loss of the valuable Soviet cad and increasing isolation amidst intensifying non proliferation pressure, Indias nuclear posture continued to be characterized by restraint (Busrur 2001: 4). At the same time, the extension of the NPT and the passage of the Brown amendment, which led to a renewal of up to $368 million of US military assistance to Pakistan, inevitably provoked Indian security concern (Sciolino 1995:4). On the other hand Indian government began a series of economic reforms in the mid 1990s to relax restrictions on foreign ownership in some sectors, and privatization of some industrial enterprises. However, nuclear power remains beyond the scope of the current ownership regulation (Herbst & Hopley 2007). India has a large and growing nuclear power programme and expects to have 20,000 Mew of nuclear generating capacity on line by 2020 (ibid) in order to overcome the energy deficiency which is cited as one of the important impediments of development. The Indians new their nuclear programmes as a clear technological demonstrator and a example of their abilities. On the nuclear question Indias marginalization on the global scene and its growing nuclear isolation raised some fundamental challenges to Indian nuclear policy by the mid-1990s (Mohan 2007). The two important things among them they are indefinite extension of NPT of Indias withdrawal of support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Changing Dimension of Nuclear Policy in the Context of NPT & CTBT

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After the indefinite extension of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995, India is one of the only three defacto nuclear weapon states which have not signed NPT. Thus for many, India remains not only key to denuclearizing South Asia, but the principal obstacle in the way of firmly establishing nonproliferation as a n International norm (Matto 1996: 41-57). On the question of CTBT, in 1993 India and United States cosponsored a resolution in United National calling for an early completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) In the early 1990s India had found that supporting the CTBT and the Fissile Material cut of Treat (FMCT), talks gave it a way out of the American pressure to accept arms control in bilateral framework with Pakistan. When it found that the CTBT was taking away Indias option to test nuclear weapon forever. Accusing the treaty was not envisaged to be a time bound disarmament treat and it was not convened as a measure towards universal nuclear disarmament. In such a situation, it is not in Indias national security interest to support the treaty in its present form i.e. it chose to oppose it in 1996. More visibly, India legitimized its point in terms of India were actually concerned about the entry into force. Means it is under enormous pressure that as a state with ongoing but largely untested nuclear weapons program, if India enter to CTBT at that point of time, it is not possible to test its weapon. CTBT (Ganguly 1999: 148-177). Secondly, China tested nuclear weapons just prior to its accession to the Moreover, it is in this politicostrategic context that Prime Minister Narashimha Rao permitted the preparation for carrying out a nuclear test in December 1995 (Ibid). The test was stymied when United States reconnaissance satellites picked up signs of activity at the test side. In short, the range of options for India had, by then narrowed critically. As. J.N. Dixit concludes, deteriorating regional security environment

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compelled India to mover from ambiguity to definiteness, from potentialities to operational realisation, in the sphere of nuclear and missile weaponisation (Dixit 1998: 427). Pokhran II: Nuclear Turning Point The national political scene in India had changed when right wing BJP government took over the in the central Government and Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the Prime Minister in 1998. The Party is known its ultra nationalist and nuclear hawk policies that had for a series of nuclear test in May in the same year simultaneously Pakistan also conducted nuclear test. The nuclear tests conducted in May 1998 have radically changed the strategic landscape in South Asia. Moreover, India nuclear experiment may be perceived as a spin-off from its nuclear energy program, specifically form its capacity to generate plutonium from existing reprocessing facilities at the Kalpakkam power plant near Chennai, and the Dhruva research reactor at Mumbai (Thomas 2002). In the wake of Indian tests, the reaction towards test was primarily from China. It described that Indian Government attempt to dominate the South Asian region and also wants to provoke a nuclear arms race in the region. It then went on to state that the international community should adopt a common policy position in strongly demanding India to immediately stop its nuclear development programme (Nayar and Paul 2004: 23637). In return India justified it position by refereeing to Chinas own behaviour. If China with a large nuclear arsenal built with experience of over four tests, felt compelled to test again in July 1996 When the CTBT was in the final stage for its own security, then it should be possible to understand the rationale of India conducting a limited number of tests after a twenty four years long period of voluntary restraint (Katyal 1998). In short, Indias proliferation tendency can be analysed in the context of its

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nuclear energy program. That is from peaceful nuclear energy programme to a nuclear weapon programme. It was the initiative and persistence of a single person, Homi Jehangir Bhabha that gave birth to the Indian nuclear power programme. More than fifty years after his death however, Indian policy makers and Scientists are still attempting to implement his vision of three stage nuclear energy programme that would provide a substantial share of the electricity demanded by the country. Bearing in mind the need to generate more fuel for the power reactors, and the fact that no large deposits of uranium have been located in the country, Indian engineers have been attempting to develop reactors of a different kind the Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) that breed more fissile material than they consume. The effort to build a fast breeder reactor began after the second Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1959, when France increased cooperation in nuclear technology with India. More than half country after Bhabha proposed the use of thorium in power generation, the Department of Atomic Energy embarked on the construction of a new concept that would utilise the vast thorium resources in the country. The Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) is moderated by heavy water at low pressure and is designed to generate 300 MWe. The fuel is a collection of fuel pins made of a mix of Thorium-Uranuim-233 oxide and Plutoniumthorium oxide. It is designed to be self sustaining in relation to U233 oxide and plutonium-thorium oxide. However, over the last half century, nuclear power appeared to be less attractive than previously thought. Problems of operation and accidents led to the closure of nuclear power stations all over the world, with exception of France. In India Nuclear Power contributes a meagre three percent; the rest is made up of other sources. On the other hand, gas and oil reserves are so far limited

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in the country and around seventy percent has to be imported. In this context, nuclear power could provide an important alternative and avoid the disasters following profound climatic changes. The Post-Pokhran Nuclear Energy Debate in India The nuclear debates in India till the end of the 20th addressed in the context of more or less the question national security. The immediate effects of 1998 nuclear test brought sanctions from U.S. and criticism from various corner. However, this has changed with the dawn of 21st century as India entered into a new millennium. It also projects as one of the global powers in the new era. The reason is for that, ranging from consistent economic growth marking 7 to 8% of GDP growth even though by persistent inequality. India is considered as largest democratic country in the world in a troubled region. India has had uninterrupted democratic governance longer than Germany, Italy or Japan. It also emerging as a responsible nuclear power, India has also had a credible record of nuclear non-proliferation since it started its nuclear program long back in 1950s. And after a gap of thirty years India has managed to start a new chapter in the IndoU.S. relations and U.S. has waived almost all sanctions which were imposed after the Pokhran-II. U.S. has appeared to be recognising Indias status as nuclear armed state by opening up the possibility of nuclear cooperation. The nuclear cooperation between India and U.S. in the field of civilian nuclear energy field can be called as a turning point in history of Indias nuclear energy programme. It also has been seen in the context of renewed interest in nuclear energy as a source of clean and green energy. Indo-U.S. strategic partnership as a part of wider agreements between Indias foreign minister Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbot from the U.S. side in 2000. It is called Next Step Strategic Partnership (NSSP). The strategic

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partnership between two countries resulted in the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreements signed in July 18, 2005 by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush. The deal will provide India to get nuclear reactors, and certain high end technology which had not accessible early.
Notes

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3

General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), Session 3, Plen, Mtg. 156, 4 th November 1948, pp.422-23. Constituent Assembly Debate, Vol.15, 2nd session, 6 April 1948, pp.3326-28. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 27, 2nd session , 16 March 1959, col. 6384 Govt. of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Publications Division, Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches, 1953-57 Delhi: 1958 p. 507. South Asian Nuclear crisis: Time line of Nuclear Weapons development in South Asia, IEER: Energy and Security, 6 October 1998.

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