CASE NO.

1 CIR VS FISHER
Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of British parents, married in Manila to another British subject, Beatrice. He died in 1951 in California where he and his wife moved to. In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real and personal properties, among which are 210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode Mines (Mines). Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his estate filed an estate and inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to secure the waiver of the CIR on the inheritance of the Mines shares of stock. In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses Fisher. Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, one of which is the estate and inheritance tax on the Mines shares of stock pursuant to a reciprocity proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a refund from what he initially paid. The collector denied the claim. He then filed in the CFI of Manila for the said amount. CFI ruled that (a) the share of Beatrice should be deducted from the net estate of Walter, (b) the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of Walter is exempt from inheritance tax pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.

unborn child to give her support plus moral and exemplary damages of P100,000. The CFI dismissed the complaint for no cause of action. The CA set aside the CFI decision. ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth in Art 21. HELD: No. In Art 21, the essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than sexual intercourse or breach of promise to marry, but connoting essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. The facts stand out that for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion. If she had been deceived, she would not have again yield to his embraces, much less for one year. Besides, she is old enough to know better. Hence no case is made under Art 21. Decision of CA reversed; that of CFI affirmed

CASE NO. 2 Bellis vs Bellis Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.

CASE NO. 4 BELTRAN VS PEOPLE Article 40 FACTS: In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at bar. HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the

CASE NO. 3 TANJANCO v. CA 8 SCRA 994 (1966) FACTS: Arceli Santos and Apolinario Tanjanco are sweethearts. Because of the mans promise to marry the woman, they continually had sexual relationship with each other for a span of one year with the womans consent. When she got pregnant, he refused to marry her. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the

suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. CASE NO. 5 Manzano vs. SanchezA.M. No. MTJ00-1329 March 8, 2001 Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, A r a n e t a A v e n u e , C a l o o c a n C i t y . Four children were born out of that marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated." R e s p o n d e n t J u d g e , o n t h e other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the

latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him. After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely. Issues: 1 ) W h e t h e r o r n o t c o n v a l i d a t i o n o f t h e s e c o n d u n i o n o f t h e respondent falls under the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code. 2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Ruling: For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated." Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. CASE NO. 6 DEDEL VS CA Art 46 compared with PI

FACTS: In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had four children since then. David then found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that Sharon is psychologically incapacitated and David submitted the findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven. HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to the most serious cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of performing the essential marital obligations. Sharons sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one of those contemplated in law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage. CASE NO. 7 REPUBLIC VS MOLINA CASE NO. 8 TING VS VILLARIN CASE NO. 9 Valdes vs. RTC 260 SCRA 221 FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are

placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. CASE NO. 10 Manacop vs. CA GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992 FACTS: Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment. ISSUE: WON the subject exempted from attachment. property is indeed

HELD: The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt from attachment. The petition was dismissed by SC.

CASE 15 ESLAO VS CA, CORDERO CASE NO. 11 Macadangdang vs. CA108 SCRA 314 Facts: Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband b e i n g C r i s p i n Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. She gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites. Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner, then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, now petitioner, Macadangdang filed his answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal. The lower court in a pretrial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed. Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an amended complaint was filed by plaintiff. In its decision rendered, the l o w e r court dismissed the complaint. The d e c i s i o n i n v o k e d p o s i t i v e provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities. Issue: W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e w i f e m a y i n s t i t u t e a n a c t i o n t h a t w o u l d bastardize her child without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard. Ruling: SC find no merit in petitioners submission that the questioned decision had not become final and executory since the law explicitly and c l e a r l y p r o v i d e s f o r t h e dissolution and liquidation of the c o n j u g a l partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality. CASE 12 MENDOZA VS CA CASE 13 GAN VS REYES CASE 14 LAXAMANA VS LAXAMANA PARENTAL AUTHORITY Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be t r a n s f e r r e d o r renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, beingp u r e l y p e r s o n a l , the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of a d o p t i o n , guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entruststhe custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is givenis merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation of parental authority is manifest, the law still disallows the same. Thefather and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty- bound andentitled to keep them in their custody and company. (Sagala-Eslao vs. CA, 266 SCRA 317 CASE 16 Tamargo vs CA GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992 FACTS: In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the time of the tragic incident. In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident. ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents. HELD: Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar, during the shooting incident, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil code. SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactivity may be

essential if it permits accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. Under Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident. Hence, actual custody was then with the natural parents of Adelberto. Petition for review was hereby granted. CASE NO 17 St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002 Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted a n e n r o l l m e n t d r i v e for the school year 1995-1996. A facet o f t h e enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other highschool students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in areckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, JamesDaniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the RTC of D i p o l o g C i t y a n d c l a i m e d f o r damages. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Marys Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Ruling: GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school. The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. CASE NO 18 REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar. ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the lower court. RULING: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of

intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male. CASE NO. 19 Llaneta vs. Agrava G.R. No. L32504 May 15, 1974 Facts: Teresita's mother, one Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child named Victoriano Ferrer. In1942 Serafin Ferrer died, and about four years later Atanacia had relations with another man out of which Teresita was born. Shortly after Teresita's birth, Atanacia brought her and Victoriano to Manila where all of them lived with Atanacia's mother-in-law, Victoria vda. de Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon, where she w a s b o r n , a s she was required to present it in c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a scholarship granted to her by the Catholic Charities. It was then that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta

not Ferrer and that she is the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. On the ground that her use thenceforth of the surname Llaneta, instead of Ferrer which she had been using since she acquired reason, would cause untold difficulties and confusion, Teresita petitioned the court for change of her name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to change her surname basedon her alleged facts. Ruling: The petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer is hereby granted. The petitioner has established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember. A sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name Teresita Llaneta in order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate would result in c o n f u s i o n a m o n g the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. CASE 20 REPUBLIC VS VALENCIA Carlos vs. Abelardo G.R. No. 146504 April 4, 2002 Facts: Honorio Carlos averred in his complaint that in October 1989,respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him a n d r e q u e s t e d h i m t o advance the amount of US$25,000.00 f o r t h e purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, petitioner issued a check i n t h e n a m e o f a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof. The amount was in full payment of the property. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in as to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation b u t p l e a d e d t h a t t h e y were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed v i o l e n t resistance to petitioners inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. Petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the RTC of Valenzuela. As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner. S h e c l a i m e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when p e t i t i o n e r d e m a n d e d immediate payment of the full amount.

Issue: Whether or not the amount of US$25,000.00 was a loan obtained by private respondent and his wife from petitioner. Ruling: Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall n o t b e c h a r g e d t o t h e c o n j u g a l partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendantwife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan. Defendanthusband does not appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation, H. L. Carlos C o n s t r u c t i o n , I n c . S i n c e h e i s n o t a stockholder, he has no right to participate in the income or profits thereof

Reliance on Article 148 is misplaced. There must be proof of actual joint contribution by the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. Otherwise, there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing.

ABING V. WAEYAN (Coownership) 497 SCRA 202 July 31, 2006 Facts: In 1986, petitioner and respondent cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a house erected on a lot owned by Dino in Benguet. The tax declaration was thereafter transferred to respondents name. In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as their relationship soured. Eventually, petitioner demanded respondent to vacate the annex structure when respondent failed to pay petitioners share in their properties. Petitioner alleged that he alone paid for the construction of the annex structure. Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner.

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals A & B (Eusebia and Nicolas) were validly married in 1926. In 1945, A cohabited with C and since then, no longer lived with his legitimate family. In 1998, B, the wife, sought reconveyance of several properties, claiming that they were conjugal properties with A. C (Pacita), the concubine, contends that Article 148 of the Family Code applies to those properties. LESSONS: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between A & B even if they married before the effectivity of the Family Code. Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal property. The burden of proof is on the party claiming otherwise. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even period a subsisting for a long period, does not sever the tie of previous marriage. Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral.

Held: Any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules on coownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in common in equal shares. Being herself a co-owner of the structure in question, respondent, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.