UNDP

Definition of good governance: UNDP describe good governance to be participatory, transparent, accountable, effective and equitable. It should promote the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources. UNDP means that there are some core characteristics for good governance. They are Participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, strategic vision of the government/long term visions and broad consensus orientation. Good governance can be divided into three categories; administrative, economic, and political. Administrative governance is how to implement policies, the system. Economic is the decision making that effects a countrys economic activities. The political governance is the process of formulating policies. Governance tcker staten men det verskrider ocks staten genom att ven innefatta den privata sektorn och civil society organisations. The governance in the state, private sector and civil society must be planed so that it contributes to sustainable human development. Good governance should create jobs, reduce poverty, protect the environment and empower women. To achieve this the government have to establish the right political, economic, legal and social circumstances. The core characteristics for good governance are many and no country has them all. Its the ideal. But UNDP means that countries should aim to achieve the characteristics that are most important to them. They also points out that the characteristics reinforce one another and cannot stand alone.

Each domain of governance has a role in promoting sustainable development: The state: the state can create laws to protect the vulnerable, protect the environment, maintain macro stability, maintain standards of public health and so on. The state can also empower its citizens through providing equal opportunities. People can only be empowered if electoral process, legal and juridical system work as they should. There must be elected members in the parliament and they should come from different parties to ensure popular participation and government accountability. The private sector: Also important for development. The private sector is now seen as the primary source of opportunity for creating jobs to improve living standards through income. States can help create a good environment for the private sector development through creating a stable macroeconomic stability, maintaining competitive markets, nurture enterprises that creates jobs, enforcing rule of law and so on. Civil society: Civil society organizations channel people's participation in economic and social activities and organize them into more powerful groups to influence public policies and gain access to public resources, especially for the poor. They create opportunities for people to improve their standards of living by monitoring the environment and assisting the disadvantages. Like private enterprises, civil society organizations need adequate capacities to fulfill their potential. They also need an enabling environment, including a legislative and regulatory framework that guarantees the right of association, incentives to facilitate support and ways for civil society organizations to be involved in public policy-making and implementation. The global context. There have been a lot of global breakthroughs. Like communications, transport, medicine, agriculture, engineering and green technology. But it also creates uncertainties and

challenges like pollution of rivers and the atmosphere and degradation of plant and animal life and higher unemployment. Governance can no longer be considered to be a closed system. The state's task is to find a balance between taking advantage of globalisation and providing a secure and stable social and economic domestic environment, particularly for the most vulnerable. Globalisation is also placing governments under greater scrutiny, leading to improved state conduct and more responsible economic policies. Developing countries must ensure that everyone can participate in economic and social development and take advantage of globalisation. They must build a political system that encourages government, political, business and civic leaders to articulate and pursue objectives that are centered around people and a system that promotes public consensus on these objectives.

Good governance should be the primary way to alleviate poverty. Lots of the UNDP resources are devoted to governance. The UNDP mission is to promote sustainable human development. We define human development as expanding the choices for all people in society. This means that men and women - particularly the poor and vulnerable - are at the centre of the development process.

Lily Tsai
Formella institutioners accountability r ofta svag I fattiga lnder. Dessa stater saknar ofta byrkratin fr att kontrollera fr korruption och att officials p lgre niver gr sitt jobb. Val som gr att man kan hlla lokala politiker accountable kanske inte existerar eller r svaga. Hur effektivt politiker kan tillhandahlla public goods som vatten och vgar har stor pverkan p deras legitimitet. Mnga utvecklande lnder i Asien och Afrika har svrt att leverera dessa public goods och r ocks de som kmpar mest med att bygga en stabil stat och effektiv. Teorier om socialt kapital och socialt samhlle menar att intressegrupper, volontrorganisationer kan frbttra government preformance i demokratier. Intresse grupper kan hjlpa individer att hja rsten mer effektivt. Infr en modell om infromal government accountability. Fr ven nr accountability r svag s kan officials ha incitament att provide public goods nr befolkningen ger dem moral standings fr att gra det. som respekt eller approval. Ju mer gruppen tror att officialn delar deras obligations och ju mer de tror att han kommer handla utefter det ju troligare r det att den moraliska standingen belnas. Hon menar att det r mer troligt att moral standing uppstr nr det finns lokala solidaritets grupper, grupper som delar samma moral obligations liksom intressen. Fr att kunna skapa informella institutioner och hlla lokala officials ansvariga s behver grupperna ha tv karaktristiska: de mste vara encompassing, eller vlkomnande mot alla som r frn den lokala regeringen. De mste ocks vara embedding och genom att de incorporate lokala officials in i grupperna som medlemmar. Om solidaritetsgruppen verlappar med de administrativa grnserna i den lokala regeringen s kommer de officials som r embedded knna starka sociala obligations att bidra till gruppen. Exempel r kyrkgrupper. ven tempelgrupper i Kina. En annan typ av solidaritetsgrupp r lineage grupper. Finns en knsla av obligations till gruppen men hr handlar det inte om tro utan p familjekonceptet.

I staden Li settlement s finns en bybred grupp lineage som har moral auktoritet ver hela samhllet. Officials dr hjlpa till att renovera byggnader och vgar och valde att jobba hemifrn istllet fr att bygga ett dyrt official house. Officials demonstrerar sitt committment till lineage genom att deltaga i lineage ritualer och organisera publica projekts. Slutsatsen hon drar r att nr de formella institutionerna r svaga och misslyckas med att ge folket public goods s kan dessa varor tillhandahllas nd genom sociala grupper. Hon drar slutsatsen att ekonomisk utveckling inte ndvndigtvis r frknippad med politisk och institutionell utveckling. Good governance kan skapa ekonomisk utveckling men det r inte skert att det omvnda stmmer. Nackdelen med solidaritetsgrupper r att de r svra att skala upp till strre skala och kanske bara funkar p lokal niv. P hgre niver r det troligt att de r mindre relevanta och har mindre sannolikhet att lyckas. Hjlper att f public goods men kanske inte lika mycket som med formella system, men dessa informella system kanske leder till press p staten och sen ocks till formella system.

Leftwich Democracy and Development: Is There Institutional Incompatibility?

Sen kalla kriget har tv utlandspolicys dominerat vstregeringarnas politik. ena sidan. Ett r att minska fattigdomen har dominerat utvecklingstnkandet. Pro poor grotwth r ndvndigt fr att mta dessa ml. sdan tillvxt och utveckling r ndvndig fr att minska politisk instabilitet, oskerhet och konflikt genom att frdjupa ekonomiska och politiska ties mellan lnder. andra sidan r demokratisering fortfarande en politisk prioritering inte bara av moraliska skl utan ocks fr att consolidated demokratier ses som mer stabila och mindre troliga att hamna i konflikt med varandra. Det r dock vldigt kompromissande strukturella spnningar mellan institutioner som krvs fr strkta demokratier och de som krvs fr snabb, hllbar ekonomisk tillvxt och utveckling. Dessa dual objectives fr att stdja ekonomisk utveckling och demokratisering r essensen av post kalla kriget policys frn de flesta regeringar i vst och internationella institutioner som WB och IMF. Menar att oron fr lginkomstlnderna, fragile states, r driven frmst av politiska skl snarare n ekonomiska eller moraliska. Institutional icompatibility?( the relation between propositions that cannot both be true at the same Time) Men r institutionen av development och institutionen av demokratisering kompatibel? Kan de bara samexistera i spnning med varandra? Om detta r sant s gr det processen att de ska utvecklas samtidigt vldigt svr! Syftet hr r inte att promota en av dem framfr den andra utan att ta reda p varfr. Challanges for the state Tv utmaningar har facat moderna stater sen 1800 talet, den frsta r utveckling eller hur man ska promota snabb ekonomisk tillvxt. Den andra utmaningen var att folket skulle f mer att sga till om och strre delaktighet. Institution of development Joseph stiglizt: Tranformation av ett samhlle. Kommer ske ver alla sfrer: sociala, ekonomiska och juridiska s Amarta Sen: argue that development entails the expansion of freedom and choice involving political and social aspects

First, it needs to be understood as a process, a transformative process, involving (at least initially in relatively low income, or highly unequal, economies) quite radical and rapid change in the social, economic and political institutions and, inevitably, in the social structure and in the underlying distributions of wealth and power which they express. Second, what crucially distinguishes development from growth is the issue of the distribution of thebenefits of growth. Rapid growth is possible without development, as occurred in Brazil in its miracle years after 1965 and in South Africa during and after the Second World War. Development has also inevitably required often radical transformations in the political institutions of a country, directly reflecting (and helping to bring about) a changed distribution of power of a more or less radical kind. The fundamental point here, which all these examples illustrate, is that economic growth and development is a turbulent and transformative process, challenging (and often defeating) old interests and creating new ones. The institutional changes which it requires and generates, both in the economic and political spheres (especially where attempts are made to make growth into development) have commonly been radical and far-reaching, bringing with them cognate changes in social, cultural and ideological institutions (notably in the class structures and in the general trend to secularism). These changes, at their inception, have seldom been achieved consensually (as amply demonstrated in the course of the industrial revolution in Britain), and have most commonly been associated with opposition, conflict and violence which may take religious, regional, ethnic or class-based forms. sustained growth and development has almost everywhere required a coherent, consistent and continuous policy path which has normally only been achieved by strong states through either nondemocratic authoritarian rule or dominant-party democracy. The processes of development have both required and engendered radical, transformative and pervasive change in the formal and informal socio-political and economic institutions of societies, but these changes are very different to those required for democracy. The institution of democracy Taking the Freedom House approach, these formal institutional characteristics of electoral democracy, in essence, are: (1) a competitive (and multiparty) political system; (2) universal adult suffrage for all citizens; (3) regularly contested, free and fair elections with secret ballots; and (4) effective public access by political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning. In a liberal democracy, these electoral characteristics are supplemented, in general, by a wide range of institutionalized civil rights and liberties for citizens, including freedom of expression, association and religion; the rule of law; individual rights and autonomy (including, significantly, property rights) Detailed comparative research has consistently shown that for these formal institutions of electoral and liberal democracy to survive and prosper, it is necessary for there to be a strong state, a rechtsstaat, capable of applying the rules, and an independent legal system that enforces the laws predictably and fairly. For just as development requires an effective state, so too does democracy. But the problem is that the types of effective state required are different. An effective state for democracy, that is one which is capable of maintaining the institutions of competitive democracy, presupposes a particular kind of consensual competitive politics that generates and sustains the legitimacy of the state. It must allow and encourage the fullest possible range of interests and preferences (whether

economic, political or social) to jostle and argue for advantage, to strike deals, form coalitions and accept compromises, within the formal rules of the game and in relation to the state. Without such a state, the formal institutional requirements for democracy will not be sustained and will be quickly corrupted. The kind of state required for development, on the other hand, as argued earlier, requires the power and authority to be able to take on some of such sectional interests at various times (whether landlords or trades unions), and to favour some and sideline others, if it is effectively to promote and achieve its national developmental objectives. Informal institutions of democracy Det finns tv informella instiutioner som r ndvndiga fr en stabil och stark demokrati. Och det r dessa tv som gr det skert att demokratin r ett konservativt system. The first, as a rule, is simply that losers must accept the outcome of the political game, knowing that they have the right to participate again, within a given and constitutionally stipulated period of time. democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty, no group or interest would participate in democratic institutions if it believed or feared that one possible outcome of the uncertainties of electoral defeat would result in its effective elimination, politically or otherwise. In short, where the stakes for winning or losing are high, who wouldwant to risk such uncertainty? This second rule means that sustained and sustainable democratic politics therefore depends on victorious parties exercising restraint when in power, although the temptation (and sometimes the developmental or egalitarian need) may often be to re-write the policy book. That is to say, new or born-again democracies are more likely to consolidate and prosper if their new governments do not pursue highly contentious policies too far or too fast, especially where these policies seriously threaten other major interests, whether such policies are economic (such as land reform, expropriation or nationalization), distributional (such taxation and social expenditure), social (perhaps with regard to issues of religion, language or gender).

One thing should now be clear. Without the formal institutions, and a strong state to enforce them, there will be no democracy. But where such a state is established which can maintain the formal democratic institutions, the informal rules which underpin these acceptance of loss by losers and restraint by winners will undermine the possibility of active developmental initiative by the state, precisely because if the state were to act transformatively, it would almost certainly damage some of the interests involved, thereby possibly provoking withdrawal from the democratic process, or worse.
Slutsats Menar att det nu r tydligt att se varfr han tycker att demokrati r ett konservativt system av makt. Demokratier r bra fr att de har established principer och praktiker av mnga personliga friheter liksom civila och politiska rttigheter. Men menar att demokrati r konservativ i en mer fundamental mening, at least from a developing point of view. Detta fr att institutioner och system of power vilket demokratisk politik bde krver och representerar promotar sllar den radikala politiska ndring som krvs i kontrollen, distributionen, accumulation eller anvndningen av rikedomar vilket normalt r vitalt fr att skapa developing momentum. Utveckling krver institutioner som promotar mer eller mindra radikal accumulation, nding och tranformering, s mste institutionerna som ska upprtthlla och strka demokrati vara de som promotar politics of accomodation, compromise and the centre. Den politiska logiken av demokrati r drfr generellt stt konservativ och stegvis i ndringen demokratin brings about.

Suisheng Zhao the china model

Kinas framgng under ett auktoritrt politiskt system har hjt frgan om chinas model kommer att erstta den vsterliga modellen of modernization. Denna uppsats frsker ta reda p till vilken grad Kina erbjuder en distinkt modell av ekonomisk och politisk utveckling och om modellen representerar en coexistens av fria marknader och en auktoritr stat fr att upprtthlla ekonomisk tillvxt och politisk stabilitet. Liksom att diskutera vilka tilldragande delar och begrnsningar Kinamodellen har. Kina har upplevt stor ekonomisk tillvxt de senaste 30 ren. Den s kallade Kinamodellen har tv komponenter. Det frsta r att kopiera framgngsrika element hos liberala ekonomiska policies genom att ppna fr utlndsk och inhemsk investering, tillta flexibel arbetskraft, bygga ut infrastrukturen, lg skatt och regulary burden. Den andra komponenten r att lta det styrande partiet ha ett fast grepp om regeringen, domstolen, armn, skerhetsapparaten och fldet av information. Mnga undrar om den hr modellen kommer erstta vstmodellen d Kina har haft s snabb tillvxt. En observerare menar att Kinas ideologi r den strsta utmanaren till liberal demokratisk kapitalism sen slutet av kommunismen. Kina har uppnt snabb ekonomisk tillvxt utan att ndra frn den auktoritra styret vilket r emot vstmodellen av modernisering som krver att fria marknadssystem gr hand i hand med liberal demokrati. Beijing consensus har lagts fram som ett alternativ till Washington consensus. Washington consensus r neoliberala policys. Frmst marknadsinriktade policys fr att uppn makroekonomisk stabilitet. Kom senare ocks att inkludera liberal demokrati och fria marknader detta blev destinationen av modernisering och basen fr chockterapin som utfrdes i Sovjet och steuropa. Har ftt mycket kritik och de som adapterade washinton consensus har det inte gtt s bra fr. Beijing bestr av tre delar: a commitment to innovation and constant experimentation in reforms; an emphasis on sustainability and equality instead of per capita GDP as the only measure of progress; and a commitment to self-determination. Ses som en opposition till USA och den allmnt accepterade status quo d Kina lyckats s bra genom Beijing consensus. Kritiker kritiserar trovrdigheten i Beijing fr att Kina inte har fljt den fullt ut enligt dem. Menar att Kina inte r innovativa ledare och inte innovativa i teknologi eller policys. Bevisen att Kina utfr hllbar och jmn utveckling r begrnsade. Ojmlikheterna i Kina vxer. Enligt demo inte mer Beijing consensus n vad det r washinton consensus. Den kinesiska ekonomin r bara delvis fri. Staten har fortfarande kontroll ver strategiska sektorer och krnindustrier. Kinas marknadsekonomi r p mnga stt lik till stasiens nyligen industrialiserade lnder som Singapore, S Korea och Hong Kong dr neoliberal ekonomi och auktoritrt politiskt styre sammanfll med stora mjligheter fr exportledd utveckling vilket ledde till snabb modernisering. Sett p det hr sttet r Kinamodellen en variant av st asienmodellen i dagens tappning. Gllande fljande tre features: 1) First, Chinas modernization is driven not by any ideological doctrine or principles but by pragmatism, vividly expressed by the famous Chinese saying, a cat, whether it is white or black, is a good one as long as it is able to catch mice The Chinese leadership has worked through the existing economic and political institutions while

gradually reforming them and reorienting them to serve the modernization goals. 2) Second, Chinasmodernization is led by a strong and pro-development state, capable of shaping national consensus and ensuring overall political and macroeconomic stability in which to pursue wide-ranging reforms 3) Third, Chinas approach toward modernization has involved selective learning from the liberal Western models, including the American model. In particular, while the Chinese state has adopted most of the basic principles of the Washington Consensus, especially its emphasis on the role of the market, entrepreneurship, globalization and international trade, it rejected or modified the liberal aspects that would greatly reduce the role of the state. For example, while the state gradually opened the domestic economy to international competition, it has maintained protection to key sectors and infant industries. Ruling out Western-style democracy as not a fit to Chinas particular circumstances, political reform in China has thus been undertaken mostly in the following four aspects, which have defined the political part of the China model: institutionalization of the leadership system; the effort to make the government more responsive to an increasingly plural society; the improvement to citizens constitutional rights; and transformation of the CCP from a revolutionary party to a ruling party. Fr att gra officials mer accountable s har man infrt mnga reformer som vervakningskommiter och parti disciplins kommiteer. Viktigaste var ett s kallat cadre responsibility system dr officials kunde hllas ansvariga och straffas om de begtt allvarliga fel. Utlstes av att officials ljg om omfattningen av en epidemi. Har lett till stora ndringar nu p senare tid har bird flu och mine explosions visats i media. De som var ansvariga fr mjlkskandalen straffades. Constitutional reforms var att bygga ett legal system som p kinesiska bde r rule of law and rule by law. Har adpoted fyra konstitutioner. The appeals and limitations of the China model Appeals: Den r tilldragande fr mnga ledare I utvecklingslnder d den r non ideological, pragmatiskt och experimentell approach. Men ocks fr fljande tre orsaker: 1) har vxt snabbast under ett one party rule. Ses som ett snabb track fr ekonomisk tillvxt. 2) det andra r en minskande attraktivitet hos vstmodeller pga US politiska, ekonomiska och utlandspolitiska failiors. Genom USAs frsk att sprida demokrati med vld s har de underminerat stdet fr demokrati. 3) den r value free. Och stter inte massa vrden som den vsterlndska modellen gr som good governance, democracy, rule of law. Chinamodellen handlar mest om ekonomiska strategiska intressen. P grund av ovanstende som Kinamodellen har blivit ett alternativ av default. Limitations: The China model, however, has some clear fault lines. First, it lacks moral appeal because it is guided entirely by pragmatism, which, by definition, is behavior disciplined by neither a set of values nor established principle. Second, the Beijing Consensus has not been effective in dealing with many important dimensions of human development at home and abroad. Chinese economic growth, while undeniably impressive, is widely associated in the West with political oppression and environmental pollution. Third, the success of the Chinese model is very short. It is hard to claim the universality of their model because no economy keeps growing at the same pace forever. Chinas economic growth, just like other emerging economies in history, could come to a pause or even a setback or crisis. In addition, the gap between rich and poor in China has been growing in the past decade and this trend has become a serious threat to the political stability that has helped maintain economic growth and the legitimacy of the CCP. In this case, although the China

model has sustained the economic growth and the regime legitimacy so far, how long that will persist is still anybodys guess.

Oscar Almn local elections in China

Although elections in authoritarian states have a different meaning from elections in democracies, they nonetheless have important political functions. They serve as a means of communicating with and educating the masses, creating a feeling of participation in governmental affairs, and enhancing the legitimacy of the regime. Furthermore, elections provide a lens through which it is possible to analyse governments.1 Sen 79 har local elections expanded. Mnga ledare har promotat demokratiska reformer fr de har varit indstrumentella i att lsa andra problem ocks. Ledare i national peoples congress har promotat val som ett stt att utka sin egen makt. Valen har anvnts fr att strka den inhemska och internationella legitimiteten av regimen. Genom att skapa stabilitet i rural areas genom att f bort korrupta, inkompetenta ledare och lsa administrativa problem. Allts har val aldrig anvnts fr att f demokrati eller utka valen sjlva utan av andra sjl. Men genom att institutionalisera val s lgger kanske regimen grunden fr mer dramatisk politisk ndring n vad de kanske tnkt. By institutionalizing and legitimising the electoral mechanism and providing a platform for civil society to emerge, local elections can, like in the case of Taiwan, facilitate change towards democracy. The article does, however, argue that the political changes which have already taken place, in the form of local elections, have created a situation which could make a transformation towards a more democratic political system smoother than had they not taken place. Den centrala ledning promotar villages elections men de lokala ledarna gillar det inte eftersom de ser sin makt bli underminerad. Sen 80 talet nr landreformen ndrades frn att staten samlade upp allt som odlades och sen delade ut det mellan byborna till att bnderna sjlva fick farma sin plot och staten bara samlade in skatt. Gjorde att situationen ndrades till en dr staten gick frn tagare och givare till bara tagare. Mnniskor blev mindre beroende av staten fr verlevnaden och brjade att krva sina rttigheter. Och brjade krva sina rttigheter mer nr det visste hur mycket de betalade till staten. Contradictions between the elected village head and the appointed party secretary has proven to be one of the main problems of the village self-administration system. The reform of local elections has been supported morally and financially by the EU, and bilaterally through for example Danida and Sida. Hur kan lokala val uppst I en auktoritr stat som Kina? According to some researchers, this has been a long process driven by certain individuals in the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA), some top politicians, notably the then National Peoples Congress chairman Peng Zhen, and by middle level bureaucrats that have been persuaded by the reformists within MOCA to see the advantages of village elections. Furthermore, the process has been incremental and the reformers have used the institutions of the regime in order to push their own agenda of democratic reforms (Kelliher 1997; Shi 1999). Once the village elections have proven successful, conservative opposition to them has been neutralised and it has been easier to argue for further democratic reforms. Implementerandet av lagen r dock ett problem. Det r stora skillnader mellan regioner och byar i regioner in the actual conduct of elections and the work of the villagers committees. Visa byar inte alls konkurrenade val och parti sekreteraren har behllit all makt medan andra mycket bra val. A majority of village heads are party members and a large part of those have been recruited after they have been elected as village leaders. This way, the

party maintains control of grass root politics and simultaneously rejuvenates the party with competent members that have popular support. Valen har accpeteras av Kinas centralregering och har funkat bra genom att stabiliserat landsbygden. Importantly, they have not created the chaos predicted by the opponents to the elections and thereby one argument against further democratic reform has been removed. The villages however, are not directly a part of the state administration; hence the village elections effect on the state institutions is limited. It should be noted, that in some villages elected village heads have used their authority as village leaders to put pressure on the township government and even sometimes lead the villagers in protest against the township leaders. This has put pressure for the expansion of elections to higher levels. Nr lokala val blivit mer insitutionaliserade har mnniskor lrt sig att de kan anvnda lagen fr att kmpa fr sina egna rttigheter. Det stter press p politiska system att bli mer ppna och demokratiska. The community elections in urban areas have so far not been hailed in the same way as the village elections. One reason is that many urban residents do not have much interest in the residents committees since the community has little influence on the daily life of many urban residents and they are not dependent on the community for work and resources in the way that most villagers are dependent on the village. Yet, the elections are far from being free and competitive. Factors emanating from the political structure as well as the election laws, rules, and procedures severely constrain the freedom of elections. Restrictions of political rights in China directly affect the elections in several ways. First, the limit on campaigning is essentially a restriction on the freedom of speech. Although the freedom of speech in practice has been expanded these last few years and political discussions are frequent in for example academic writings, this freedom is more strictly restricted in elections. Second, the freedom of organisation is even more restrained. Only the Communist Party or organisations that are controlled by the Communist Party are allowed to form.There are little or no opportunities to organise groups within the peoples congress based on structural issues. In the same way, voters cannot group together in organised ways in order to support certain candidates. This restricts the voters chances of building alliances across their work units. Instead the voters usually vote for the candidates of their own work unit or village in competition with candidates for other work units or villages. Third, as if the above restrictions on the political rights were not enough for the authorities to control the elections, the whole election procedure is controlled in order to produce results that are satisfactory for the authorities. The election is administered and controlled by the election committee consisting of members of the local party committee as well as the peoples congress standing committee. The election committee must make sure that the important cadres are elected to the peoples congress, that no troublemakers are elected, and that the result represents a suitable distribution of social categories. Consequences of local elections Local elections concern local issues. When two villagers compete for the position as village head it is a question of who shall lead the village in deciding collective projects such as the building of a road or a school. When electing county peoples congress deputies the issues involved are to what extent the candidate can speak for the locality and forward problems such as the local sanitation situation to the local government. Even when the election concerns the executive leaders in townships, their

authority only regard that particular township. Yet, local matters are those that concern the daily life of many citizens. As the voters realise that contacting the local peoples deputy can result in improvements of the local environment problems or that changing the residents committee chair can improve the social services of the neighbourhood, the elections also become more important. As the legal system gets strengthened, the popularly elected assemblies step up their powers in relation to the local government or the local party committee. This process leads to the institutionalisation of legal procedures for political decision-making and to increasing accountability of decision-makers towards the voters. The goal of the reforms has always been to make China rich and strong but also to maintain social and political stability. Since local elections can be a means to achieve these goals, they formed a part of the reform package. Some might come to the conclusion that if local elections can handle local corruption, then why not try out national elections to solve high level corruption? Yet, the top leadership considers the power monopoly of the Communist Party to be a requirement for this stability and elections can only be accepted as long as they do not threaten the leadership of the party. Although political democracy is not the goal of local elections the consequences of the elections could be the opening up of the political system.

Fukuyama the imperative of state building

State building skapandet av nya institutioner och strkandet av existerande, r en crucial issue fr vrldssamhllet idag. Weak or failed states r det som r roten till mnga av vrldens problem idag som fattigdom och aids. Vi vet mycket om state buildning men vi skulle behva veta mer fr att kunna transferera starka institutioner till utvecklingslnder. Att state buildning ska vara p toppen p prioritetslistan ses som udda av mnga. Men att tillexempel bota eller skjuta upp aids krver starka vlfungerande institutioner. D medicineringen r krnglig och om den inte tas rtt kan viruset muteras och bli resistent. Att minska den statliga sektor var det dominanta temat under 1980 och tidigt 90-tal nr mnga olika lnder i den forna kommunistvrlden i Latin Amerika och Afrika gick frn auktoritrt styre. I samma veva s brjade IMF och WB trycka p att man br minska state intervention i ekonomiska affrer. Ingick ocks i Washington konsensusen. Fukuyama menar att det inte var ngot fel p washinton konsesusen per se: mnga utvecklande lnders states var faktiskt ett hinder till tillvxt och p lng sikt kunde liberalisering fixa detta. Problemet var mer att ven om staten behvde lgga sig i mindre p vissa omrden s behvde den samtidigt strkas p andra. The state buildning agenda som var lika viktig som the reducing one fick inte mycket uppmrksamhet under denna tid. Resultatet var att liberaliserade ekonomier kunde inte ge de resultat som fre utlovats. Misslyckandet enligt fukayama r konceptuellt och att man mste se alla dimensioner av stateness och hur de r relaterade till ekonomisk utveckling. Measuring the state scope vs strenght It therefore makes sense to distinguish between the scope of state activities, which refers to the different functions and goals taken on by governments, and the strength of state power, which has to do with the ability of states to plan and execute policies, and to enforce laws cleanly and transparentlywhat is now commonly referred to as state or institutional capacity. Strength the ability to enact statutes and to frame and execute policies; to administer the public business with relative efficiency; to control graft, corruption, and bribery; to maintain high levels of transparency and accountability in governmental institutions; and most importantly, to enforce laws.

Distinguishing between these two dimensions of stateness allows us to create a matrix that will help us to differentiate the degrees of stateness in a variety of countries around the world. We can array the scope of state activities along a continuum that stretches from necessary and important to merely desirable to optional and in certain cases counterproductive or even destructive. Different countries of course fall at different points along the minimal- to-activist continuum depending on how ambitious they are in terms of what their governments seek to accomplish. There are countries that attempt complex governance tasks like running parastatal business enterprises or allocating investment credits, while at the same time failing to provide such basic public goods as law and order or public infrastructure. It is best to array countries along the continuum according to the most ambitious functions they seek to perform, even if they fail at or do not care much about more basic ones. Kan ocks mta strength p ett continuum.Finns inget precist allmnt accepterat mtt p styrka. Moreover s kan staterna prestera p olika niver.

strenght

I USA

II France

III Sierra Lione IV Turkey/ Brazil Scope Det bsta enligt en ekonom skulle vara att befinna sig dr USA r i ruta 1 som kombinerar ett begrnsat scope med stark institutionell effektivitet. Antagandet r att ekonomisk tillvxt kommer att minska ju mer staten lgger sig i. Ju lngre till hger p skalan. Den vrsta platsen att vara r IV dr en ineffektiv stat tar p sig massor aktiviteter som de inte kan utfra bra. Tyvrr r det hr mnga av de utvecklade lnderna befinner sig. lnder kan flytta sig i matrisen. Ryssland flyttade frn II till III. I bde Ryssland och Japan s har statens scope och styrka minskat. Scope strength and development Development agendan har ndras mycket sen 90-talet. D skulle mnga fredra III dr marknaden skter det mesta. Washington consensus var ekonomiska policy mtt som var designade fr att minska state scope genom lgre tariffer och privatisering bland annat. Den optimala vgen under denna tid fr dessa lnder borde har varit att minska scopet och ka strenghen men i stllet s minskade bda. I stllet fr att hamna i ruta I s hamnade de i ruta III. Strenght borde prioriteras fre scope och det r problemet med washington consensus. Rule of law mer basic n privatisering. Svrt att generalisera men fr tillvxt ekonomiskt s r strength viktigare n scope.

The new conventional visdom The development-policy community thus finds itself in an ironic position. The postCold War era began under the intellectual dominance of economists, who pushed strongly for liberalization and a minimal state. Ten years later, many economists have concluded that some of the most important variables affecting development are not economic but institutional and political in nature. There was an entire missing dimension of statenessthat of state-buildingand hence of development studies that had been ignored amid all the talk about state scope. Unfortunately, the problem of how to get to Denmark is one that probably cannot be solved for quite a few countries. The obstacle is not a cognitive one: We know by and large how they differ from Denmark,and what a Denmark-like solution would be; the problem is that we do not have the political means of arriving there because there is insufficient local demand for reform. Well-meaning developed countries have tried a variety of strategies for stimulating such local demand, from loan conditionality to outright military occupation. The record, however, if we look at it honestly, is not an impressive one, and in many cases our interventions have actually made things worse.