The Concept of Death in the Phaedo1

Michael Okyere Asante

CLAS 623: Plato Lecturer: Dr. Kofi Ackah 26/09/2011

The concept of death in the Phaedo is one which is discussed using myths and logical reasoning. This article seeks to critically examine the logical, not the mythological, aspects of the concept of death in the Phaedo. Socrates question, ... do we suppose that death is something? and Simmias affirmative answer imply that death exists or that there is something called death, which is the separation of the soul from the body. (64c4) The use of death at 64c2 and its corresponding definition, the separation of the soul from the body (64c4), and the use of being dead at 64c5 and its corresponding definition, the bodys having come to be apart, separated from the soul, alone by itself, and the souls being apart, alone by itself, separated from the body (64c5-7), indicate that death is used, in this sense, to mean an event, and being dead is used to mean a state or condition. Could there be a relationship between Socrates definition of death and Parmenides thesis that it is and that it cannot not be?2 If Socrates and Parmenides were to meet and discourse on death, this is how their conversation might go: Parmenides: Its been a long time since I heard from our good friend, Baba. Socrates: Parmenides, why are you always the last person to hear news concerning what happens to our friends? Have you not heard that Baba is dead? Parmenides: Socrates, what you say seems to me confusing. How can you say that something is and at the same time say it is not? For example, when you say Baba is dead and so does not exist3, you have at the same time said Baba is living, because the

1 2

This article uses David Gallops translation of the Phaedo. Curd, Patricia, "Presocratic Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/presocratics/>. 3 We normally think of death as the end of ordinary life. For many centuries, for instance, it was only when a patients heart stopped beating and the lungs stopped expanding and contracting that he or she was pronounced dead. It would be proved later in this article that our popular definition of death as the end of life is wrong. For more discussion on our popular definition of death in relation to Socrates definition, see Gareth B. Matthews,

mention of the name Baba implies his existence. In other words, by mentioning Babas name youve acknowledged the existence of Baba. It is and it is not possible for it not to be. Socrates: What you say interests me a lot, my good friend, Parmenides, but I am using dead not in the sense in which you define it, but in this sense: the separation of the soul from the body. So, when I say Baba is dead, what I mean is that Babas body has been separated from his soul. I have in no way said that Baba has ceased to exist, for after his soul and body have separated, his soul continues to exist, since it is deathless. So, my good friend, your thesis will only hold if my definition of dead is to cease to exist. Parmenides: Youve made a good point, Socrates. Ill refine my thesis, and maybe the next time we meet we could have more discussions on this subject of death. Do well to inform me of the date of Babas burial. Socrates: I surely will. It is clear from the above dialogue that our popular definition of death as the end of existence is inconsistent with Parmenidean principle of being. It would thus be proper for us to adopt Socrates definition of death: ... do we suppose that death is something? ... And that it is nothing but the separation (apallagen)4 of the soul from the body? And that being dead is this: the bodys having come to be apart from the soul, alone by itself, and the souls being apart, alone by itself, separated from the body? (64c1-7) It is obvious from the above definition that the soul, as well as the body, exists by itself at death. It is this separate existence of body and soul that is known as death. If this is the case, what does Socrates refer to as the dead when he says (1) living people are born from the dead (72a5, 72d8, emphasis mine); and (2) the souls of the dead must exist somewhere (72a7, 72d8-9, emphasis mine)? The dead in (1) may refer to the condition or state from which living people are born. This is further discussed under the argument from opposites (69e6-72e1) where the move from death to life is necessary for existence in general to continue, and is possibly only through the soul being immortal.5 The dead in (2) refers to those whose souls have separated from their bodies. This is implied in the use of the possessive of. In the same way, we could

Life and Death as the Arrival and Departure of the Psyche, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), pp. 151-157. 4 Ferit Guven suggests that apallagen can also mean deliverance, release, or departure. See Madness and Death in Philosophy, State Univ. of New York Press, 2005, pp. 16, 25. See also David Gallops translation of Platos Phaedo, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 76, n. 2.1; p. 266, n. 1. 5 Ferit Guven, Madness and Death in Philosophy, p. 18.

say the bodies of the dead and this would refer to those whose souls have separated from their bodies. Socrates definition of death implies that there are two levels of existence: (1) the physical, where (a) the body and soul are conjoined and (b) the body is alone by itself at death; and (2) the spiritual, where the soul is alone by itself at death. Thus, even in death there is existence. This is further proof that our definition of death as the end of life is wrong.

References
Primary Source in Translation Gallop, D., 1975, Plato: Phaedo, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted with corrections, 1986.

Secondary Sources Curd, Patricia, "Presocratic Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <http://plato.stanford/edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ presocratics/>. Guven, F., 2005, Madness and Death in Philosophy, New York: SUNY Press. Matthews, G. B., 1979, Life and Death as the Arrival and Departure of the Psyche, American Philosophical Quaterly, 16(2): 151-157. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20009752. Accessed: 21/09/2011