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Survey FindingS:

Syria 2011 Public Opinion Survey


Angela Hawken, PhD Jonathan Kulick, PhD Matthew Leighty, MPP Jillian Kissee, MPP

September 20, 2011


Report Prepared for The Democracy Council of California

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Table of Contents 1. 2. 3. Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 2 Introduction........................................................................................................................................... 3 Background ........................................................................................................................................... 3 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 4. Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 3 Recent History .............................................................................................................................. 4 2011 Unrest................................................................................................................................... 4 Assessment.................................................................................................................................... 6

Methodology ......................................................................................................................................... 6 4.1. 4.2. Survey Methods ............................................................................................................................ 6 Analytic Methods.......................................................................................................................... 7

5.

Survey Results ...................................................................................................................................... 8 5.1. 5.2. Personal Situation ......................................................................................................................... 8 Political and Economic Situation................................................................................................ 11 Background ......................................................................................................................... 11 Key Findings from 2011 Survey ......................................................................................... 13 Political Situation................................................................................................................ 13 Economic Situation ............................................................................................................. 19

5.2.1. 5.2.2. 5.2.3. 5.2.4. 5.3. 5.4.

Capability of Government........................................................................................................... 21 Bashar al-Assad and Anti-Government Protests......................................................................... 25 President Assad and Protestors ........................................................................................... 25 Reforms............................................................................................................................... 29 Foreign Relations ................................................................................................................ 32

5.4.1. 5.4.2. 5.4.3. 5.5.

Access to Communications and Media....................................................................................... 34 Background ......................................................................................................................... 34 Key Findings from 2011 Survey ......................................................................................... 37

5.5.1. 5.5.2. 6. 7.

Conclusions......................................................................................................................................... 40 Appendix............................................................................................................................................. 42

1.

Executive Summary

In 2011 the Democracy Council conducted a second wave of in-person surveys to determine Syrians views on governance, the economy, politics, and their personal situations, and to assess their use of media. The first wave was collected from January 16 to February 6, 2010 and provides data from 1,046 adults. The second wave was collected from August 24 to September 2, 2011 from 551 respondents, and includes perceptions of the Syrian protestors and preferences for alternative governance. (Women were underrepresented in the survey sample due to their greater reluctance to participate, from several possible concerns; the data analysis compensates for the imbalance in survey respondents.) 2011 has seen unprecedented unrest and social ferment in Syria. Influenced by ongoing protests and changes of government elsewhere in the Arab world, and reflecting decades of disaffection with the ruling regime and a stagnant economy, thousands of Syrians have engaged in demonstrations against the Assad government. Participation continues to grow and the governments response, from the military, police, and allied paramilitary groups, has become increasingly violent, with at least 2,000 civilians and a smaller number of security forces killed; tens of thousands more have been beaten or imprisoned. Anti-government protestors appear to have a variety of motivations and demands, including greater political freedoms and an end to the security state. They do not appear to be centrally organized, and social media play a critical day-to-day role in organizing the protests and in networking communities. The self-defined leadership of the opposition is disparate, comprising mostly exiled human-rights activists, youth-led coordinating committees, traditional opposition parties, and sectarian or religious groups. The results of a renewed effort to unite the opposition under a single national council in September 2011 have yet to be seen. Comparatively, little is known about how ordinary Syrians understand the protest movement and how or why they decide whether to participate in anti-government activity. The government contends that the protests are being driven by religious radicals and foreign agitators. Less frequent pro-government demonstrations appear to be organized by the government, but many participants join voluntarily. As world opinion, including in Syrias neighboring states, hardens against the Assad regime, the regime has stiffened its resolve to put down the demonstrations. It has announced and implemented some substantial changes, but not enough to satisfy its opponents or critics inside or outside the country. This report presents an analysis of the Democracy Councils 2011 survey results, with five key findings on popular sentiments and perceptions of current events. The public has very little confidence in the Assad regime and the government in general. 86.1% of respondents judge President Assads performance negatively, and 88.2% do not think the current government is capable of solving the countrys problems (up from 62.5% in early 2010). The anti-government protestors are popular, and most people perceive them as popular. 71.1% have positive views of the protestors and 5.5% have negative views, while 88.0% think that the majority of the population shares the protestors concerns. Reforms will not placate. 11.5% prefer the regime to remain power and make reforms, while 81.7% want regime change; and 87.9% think that reforms will not satisfy the protestors.

Despite thoroughly negative views of the current circumstances (or perhaps reflecting a sense that things could not get any worse), optimism prevails. 92% expect that the political situation will improve, 91.0% expect the economy to improve, and 78.3% feel more hopeful about the prospect for reforms in Syria in light of popular movements elsewhere in the Arab world. Men and women had substantially different views on many issues, with women generally more optimistic and less critical of the government, and women are less well-informed.

2.

Introduction

Very little is known about how Syrians perceive their government institutions and their political and economic situations. In 2010, the Democracy Council set out to capture Syrians views by conducting a first-of-its-kind survey, since only government-approved surveys are allowed under Syrian law. A cadre of specifically trained field staff was able to collect in-person surveys from 1,046 Syrian adults over a three-week period (January 16 to February 6, 2010). Attempts were made to ensure proportional representation by province, age group, sex, education level, and religion. Pepperdine University conducted an independent analysis of the survey responses and prepared a report on the results. The final report, published in August 2010, had four major findings. First, a majority of Syrians believed that the political and economic condition of Syria is poor, and worse than it was five years prior. Second, a majority had little faith in the governments ability to confront the countrys problems. Third, a substantial majority believed that corruption is widespread. And fourth, a substantial majority believed that the State of Emergency should be lifted. A subgroup analysis of survey results found differences by age and sex. Women were significantly more optimistic about their personal circumstances and less critical of the performance of the government. Those over 40 were significantly more pessimistic about their personal circumstances and more critical of the performance of the government. Given the initial success at performing a survey of this nature and the ongoing unrest, the Democracy Council set out to conduct a second-round of in-person interviews. As before, attempts were made to ensure proportional representation by province, age group, sex, education level, and religion. In-person surveys were collected from 551 Syrian adults over a 10-day period (August 24 to September 2, 2011). Pepperdine University was asked to conduct an independent analysis of the survey responses and prepare a report on the 2011 results. This report summarizes the methods used for collecting and analyzing the survey data and presents findings.

3. 3.1.

Background Summary

2011 has seen unprecedented unrest and social ferment in Syria. Influenced by ongoing protests and changes of government elsewhere in the Arab world, and reflecting decades of disaffection with the ruling regime and a stagnant economy, thousands of Syrians have engaged in demonstrations against the Assad government. Participation continues to grow and the governments response, from the military, police, and allied paramilitary groups, has become increasingly violent, with at least 2,000 civilians and a smaller number of security forces killed; tens of thousands more have been beaten or imprisoned.

Anti-government protestors appear to have a variety of motivations and demands, including greater political freedoms and an end to the security state. They do not appear to be centrally organized, and social media plays a critical day-to-day role in organizing the protests and in networking communities. The self-defined leadership of the opposition is disparate, comprising mostly exiled human-rights activists, youth-led coordinating committees, traditional opposition parties, and sectarian or religious groups. Comparatively, little is known about how ordinary Syrians understand the protest movement or why they decide whether to participate in anti-government activity. The government contends that the protests are being driven by religious radicals and foreign agitators. Less frequent pro-government demonstrations appear to be organized by the government, but many participants join voluntarily. As world opinion, including in Syrias neighboring states, hardens against the Assad regime, it has stiffened its resolve to put down the demonstrations. It has announced and implemented some substantial changes, but not enough to satisfy its opponents or critics inside or outside the country.

3.2.

Recent History

The Baath Party has been the sole locus of power in Syria since 1963. The Party was led by Hafez alAssad from 1970 until 2000, when his son, Bashar, assumed power. The Assad family and most senior members of the government and military are from the Alawite minority; a majority of Syrians are Sunni Arabs, Christians and other minority groups have historically been seen as favoring the ruling regime. Syria was under an Emergency Law from 1962 until earlier this year. Security forces acting under the Emergency Law have maintained calm, for the most part. A low-level Sunni-led insurgency began in the mid-1970s, and culminated in a Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama in 1982; the government put down the revolt, killing some tens of thousands of civilians. In 1999, a dispute over succession between Bashar al-Assad and his brother Rifaat led to clashes between security forces and Rifaats supporters in Latakia. In 2004, clashes between Kurdish activists and security forces in al-Qamishli killed dozens of people.

3.3.

2011 Unrest

The protest movement in Syria began quietly in January, with individual actions in solidarity with activists in Tunisia and Egypt. A campaign for a day of rage on February 5 emerged on social-media sites, including the Facebook group Syrian Revolution 2011; several hundred people demonstrated in al-Hasakah, calling for Assads departure, and dozens were arrested. On February 22, several hundred people demonstrated outside the Libyan Embassy in Damascus, in solidarity with rebels in Libya. On March 12, thousands of Kurds demonstrated on the anniversary of the al-Qamishli uprising. March 15 saw larger crowds of demonstrators, in cities across Syria, which grew further on March 18, answering an online call for a Friday of dignity. The most common protest chant was God, Syria, freedom. Online, organizers demanded the release of political prisoners, prosecution of security forces who attacked protestors, lifting of the Emergency Law, and an end to pervasive corruption. The government variously denied that any demonstrations were taking place and blamed them on outside provocateurs. Daraa saw the most acute conflict between protestors and security forces, which continued for more than a week, with dozens of protestors killed.

The government made some efforts to respond to protestors demands, while continuing to crack down on the protests. On March 24, the Presidents spokesperson said that the Emergency Law would be lifted (but did not specify when), and pledged to reduce corruption and limits on press freedom. On March 26, President Assad ordered the release of more than a hundred political prisoners. On March 29 the first large-scale pro-regime demonstrations were staged across the country, and the cabinet resigned. The President gave a televised speech on March 30, blaming the protests on foreign conspirators, including Israel and Sunni clerics, and saying only that lifting the Emergency Law would be given further consideration. On March 31, the government announced a committee to address protestors concerns and investigate reprisals. On April 6, the government offered concessions to Sunni religious activists, lifting the ban on schoolteachers wearing the niqab and closing the countrys only casino, and announced that tens of thousands of Kurds would receive Syrian citizenship. These actions did little to mollify demonstrators, and protests continued and grew every Friday, with a mounting death toll among protestors and security forces. Frequent telephone and internet outages were seen as attempts to frustrate organizers, and foreign reporters were expelled from the country. On April 16, President Assad gave two speeches, in which he acknowledged that the state had failed to meet all of the citizens aspirations, called for dialogue and cooperation, and announced some specific reforms. On April 19, the Emergency Law was lifted, but security forces have only escalated their crackdown on protestors since. In May and June, protests spread to other cities and suburbs of Damascus, with some besieged as protestors established control over districts. On June 20, President Assad delivered another address promising a national dialogue; he also offered amnesty to protestors who had fled to Turkey, blaming the uprising on vandals. International pressure on the Syrian government increased in June, as the UK and France prepared a UN Security Council resolution condemning the crackdown, with similar expressions from the Prime Minister of Turkey. Several weeks later US Secretary of State Clinton said that President Assad had lost legitimacy and that the United States had nothing invested in him remaining in power, but did not go so far as calling for his resignation. And on June 19 opposition activists in Turkey announced the formation of a National Council to coordinate the effort against the Assad government; after two months of meetings it announced its launching on August 22. A renewed effort to further unite and legitimize the National Council took place in mid-September, and is ongoing at the time of this writing. Demonstrations and violent responses have continued through the summer. The bloodiest episode to date was in Hama at the end of July and beginning of August, with more than one hundred killed as tanks and artillery came into use. In mid-August the Syrian Navy bombarded the coastal city of Latakia. These events have brought broader condemnation of the Syrian government, with several Gulf Cooperation Council member states withdrawing their ambassadors, and the United States and EU member states calling on President Assad to step down. On August 21 he gave an interview in which he warned against foreign military intervention, said that the unrest had become more militant but the government had it under control, and spoke about political reforms and holding parliamentary elections in February 2012. President Assads efforts have not appeased his critics. On September 2 the EU adopted a ban on the importation of Syrian oil. On September 9, as the weekly Friday protests turned towards a call for international intervention, President Ahmadinejad of Iran, Syrias closest ally, offered to host a summit

for the government and protestors to talk, and cautioned that a military solution is untenable. And on September 12, the Secretary General of the Arab League visited Damascus and presented President Assad with a plan to implement reforms and end the civil unrest, while President Medvedev of Russia pledged to block any further UN Security Council sanctions.

3.4.

Assessment

At the time of this writing the eventual outcome of the unrest in Syria is unclear, as indeed are many of the particulars of current events. The country is locked in a weekly spiral of demonstrations and reprisals, followed by demonstrations elsewhere in solidarity with the victims, and so another round of reprisals (two dozen protestors were killed on September 11, mostly in Homs). The international response seems to reinforce President Assads determination not to face the same fate as President Mubarak of Egypt, who gave in to popular pressures, and to embolden Syrian activists who expect that the perception that the Assad regime is doomed will sway more Syrians to actively oppose it. And after the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in Libya in late August, Syrian opposition activists are hotly debating whether to move to an armed rebellion and seek foreign intervention. While the regime is increasingly isolated, there has been only one high-level defection from the government (the Attorney General of Hama resigned in early September) and none from the military. The opposition has no clear leaders or succession plan; ad hoc local coordination committees have formed to document protests and disseminate anti-government messages. The makeup of the protestors remains uncertain, as is the extent of armed militants among them. As international news media have been banned from Syria, reporting is largely limited to official sources, opposition media, and to amateur Syrian journalists using social media. None allows for a systematic assessment of the perceptions and sentiments of the Syrian public.

4. 4.1.

Methodology Survey Methods

All respondents are Syrians over the age of 18. Results described in this report reflect the responses of 551 Syrian nationals who were residing in Syria at the time of data collection. In-person surveys were conducted in Arabic by trained data collectors. For the 2010 survey, sixty data collectors were hired, organized by province (governorate) according to population. In 2011, circumstances complicated training and recruitment and forced the field coordinators to identify, vet, and train a new group of Syrian data collectors. Two trainers were trained outside the country on the datacollection manual, developed by the Democracy Council and outside expert pollsters for the 2010 survey. These trainers then trained eight additional data collectors inside Syria by secure VOIP communications and in person. Due to sensitivities surrounding data collection in Syria, field staff were required to strictly adhere to an oral script. This survey was not approved by the Syrian government. Any data collected outside the auspices of the Syrian government is prohibited under Syrian law. Concerns for the safety of data collectors and survey respondents meant that a truly nationally representative sample based on random selection was not possible. Data collectors were trained in how to select respondents with the aim of collecting data

representative of the Syrian population (with respect to region, rural/urban, sex, age, religion, and education). The deteriorating security situation in Syria created a number of significant logistical problems. The intermittency of broadband internet in protest areas drastically slowed down the initial set-up process (the survey was originally planned for June 2011). In some cases, training and follow-on communications with data collectors in those areas were restricted to in-person conversations only. The sample size (n = 551) was smaller than originally intended (n = 1000). Finally, we recognize that those agreeing to participate in such an exercise, without host government approval, would be inherently more likely to express anti-government sentiments. Women were underrepresented in the survey sample (only 11% of respondents). To address this imbalance, womens responses were up-weighted (i.e., given greater influence on statistics) to ensure that they have an equal voice. Women might have been less inclined to participate for several possible reasons: 1. Our analysis finds that women tended to be less well informed (less likely to consume news and less likely to be familiar with key political events), and so may be less interested in participating in a survey focused on political issues. 2. Women may be warier about participating in a secret survey in violation of Syrian law. 3. There was only one female field worker, and women may be less inclined to respond to a male survey taker. 4. In the ongoing civil unrest, fewer women might be out and about, and so they are less accessible to survey takers. Each survey was completed in-person between August 24 and September 2, 2011. Survey forms were scanned and delivered to a transfer location in Turkey, from which the data were sent to the Democracy Council in Los Angeles. The Council inputted the raw data in the Los Angeles office.

4.2.

Analytic Methods

Post-fact statistical adjustments to the collected data use a series of constructed survey weights. The primary purpose of the weights is to improve the generalizability of the survey findings. This entails up weighting cases that, for whatever reason, are underrepresented in the sample, and down-weighting cases that are overrepresented in the sample. Table 1 describes the survey sample. Table 1. Characteristics of the Survey Sample (unweighted). Gender Percent Male 89 Female 11 Age 1824 42 2534 49 35+ 9 Religion Muslim-Sunni 57 Muslim-Alawi 6 Muslim-Druze 6 Muslim-Other 18 Christian 5 Other 8

Education No education First or secondary High school Some university Bachelors degree Masters degree Doctoral, law, or medical degree Governorate (province) of Birthplace al-Hasakah Aleppo ar-Raqqah as-Suwayda Damascus Daraa Deir ez Zor Hama Homs Idlib Latakia Quneitra Rif Damascus Tartus Sample Size

9 8 30 33 16 3 1 13 2 12 2 26 1 1 7 9 11 2 1 16 <1 n = 551

As an example, women are underrepresented in the sample. The Syrian male/female sex ratio is 1.05:1, while in the survey sample the sex ratio is 8.3:1 (women were more reluctant to participate in the survey). Survey weights allow for correction of these discrepancies, which was especially important given the underrepresentation of women and the elderly in the sample. Weights are calculated based on the demographic characteristics of the survey sample, compared with those of the Syrian population. The variables used to generate the post-fact weights were age, sex, and province. All statistics provided in the main body of the report are adjusted using the constructed weights. In the Appendix, we provide two sets of results for survey questions: (1) weighted responses, and (2) unweighted responses.

5. 5.1.

Survey Results Personal Situation

Syrians expressed dissatisfaction with their personal situations and we found marked differences between the 2010 and 2011 responses (see Figure 1). In the 2011 survey, 10.9% gave a positive appraisal of their personal and family situations (compared with 39.2% in 2010), 27.5% considered their situation to be neither good nor bad, and 61.6% gave a negative appraisal (compared with 25.2% in 2010). When asked whether their personal and family situation is better or worse compared with five years ago (see Figure 2), only 3.1% indicated that it had improved (down from 33.4% in 2010), 19% thought it had stayed the same, and 77.8% thought that it had deteriorated (compared with 32.5% in 2010).

Figure 1. How do you appraise, in general, your personal and your familys situation today? Is it good or bad?
50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Very good Good Neither good nor bad 2011 2010 Bad Very bad 1.8% 9.4% 9.1% 29.8% 27.5% 18.6% 17.7% 6.6% 35.7% 43.9%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 547. 99.3% of survey participants responded to this question. For the 2010 survey, n = 1036. 99.0% of participants responded to this question. Figure 2. Do you feel that your personal and familys situation is better or worse than it was five years ago?
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0.0% 0% Much better Better The same/No change 2011 2010 Worse Much worse 5.5% 3.1% 27.9% 19.0% 34.1% 25.8% 19.8% 6.7% 58.2%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question. For the 2010 survey, n = 1035. 98.9% of participants responded to this question. While Syrians expressed despondence over their current situation, they were overwhelmingly optimistic about the prospects for their future (see Figure 3). 92.8% responded that they expected their personal and family situation to improve in the future (compared with 44.7% in 2010), 6.9% thought it would remain

the same, and less than 1% thought their personal and family situation was likely to deteriorate in the future (down from 29.1% in 2010). Figure 3. What about your future? Would you expect any improvement in your personal and familys situation, or is it going to deteriorate?
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Will improve Will remain the same 2011 2010 Will deteriorate 6.9% 0.3% 26.2% 44.7% 29.1% 92.8%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question. For the 2010 survey, n = 1030. 98.5% of participants responded to this question. There are significant differences by sex and age. 1 Men are significantly more pessimistic about their personal situation than women (p = 0.06). Respondents over 25 are significantly more pessimistic about their personal situations than those under 25 (p = 0.05). Similar differences by sex and age were found in 2010. One measure of confidence in personal circumstances is interest in emigration (see Figure 4). 45.8% feel inclined to leave Syria, down slightly from 51.9% in 2010. This is consistent with the other questions about personal circumstances: although assessments of the current situation have worsened, expectations for the future have improved. Women have considerably less interest in emigrating than men do; 25.7% feel inclined compared with 61.1% for men (p = 0.000). Among those who feel inclined to emigrate, Europe is the favored destination (see Figure 5); the preferences for destination country are similar to those from the 2010 survey.

Cross-group demographic comparisons use a Pearson (Rao-Scott correction F-statistic) chi-square test.

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Figure 4. Do life, work, or other circumstances encourage you to emigrate?


60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Yes No 45.8% 54.2%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 545. 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question. Figure 5. If yes, to which country do you most wish to emigrate?
50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Saudi Arabia Lebanon or another Gulf country USA or Canada A Latin A European American country country An Asian country 8.6% 4.0% 4.3% 19.0% 20.5% 43.6%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 287. 52.1% of survey participants responded to this question.

5.2.

Political and Economic Situation

5.2.1. Background Although Syria is formally a multiparty republic, continuous one-party control of the government has been justified for nearly half a century by the State of Emergency declared shortly after the Baathist seizure of power in 1963. The State of Emergency granted the government extensive powers; it was lifted in April 2011, although the government continues to exercise similar powers and security forces have faced few constraints in putting down the uprising.

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An evaluation of political freedom in Syria is provided by the Polity IV Project, 2 which classifies countries governmental characteristics. On a scale of 10 to 10, countries that score between 10 and 6 are classified as autocracies, 5 to 0 as closed anocracies, 1 to 5 as open anocracies, and 6 to 10 as democracies. 3 The most recent data from the Polity IV Project give a polity score of 7 (highly authoritarian) for Syria in 2010, which has remained the same since 2001.4 Freedom House, a non-profit organization that advocates for democracy and human rights, publishes the Freedom in the World survey, which rates political and civil liberties on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being most free and 7 being least. In 2009, Syria was rated 7 for political liberties and 6 for civil liberties; its status remains not free for 2010.5 The World Bank calculated unemployment at 8.4% in 2007, down from 10.2% in 2003 (20042006 data were unavailable). However, one in two jobs in the country is of poor quality and youth unemployment exceeds 30%.6 While GDP per capita has steadily increased since 1994 (see Table 2), these gains accrued mostly to the top income bracket and wealth inequality has been on the rise.7 Since the uprising began, the Syrian government has faced economic sanctions from the United Nations, European Union, and the United States that have likely impacted GDP. Table 2. GDP Per Capita, 20002010 (2010 USD). 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1171 1244 1238 1248 1351 1509 Source: World Bank, 2011.

2006 1701

2007 2012

2008 2555

2009 2557

2010 2734

A survey conducted in Damascus and published in 2008 found that 70 percent of respondents believed that their financial situation had deteriorated seriously in the previous two years.8 Changes in poverty differ strongly by region,9 but some estimate that one in three Syrians lives below the poverty line.10 In the 2010 survey, respondents were asked about the political and economic situation of the country as one combined category; the 2011 survey distinguishes between political and economic issues, so it is not possible to compare the 2011 and 2010 survey responses on these items.

Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2009. Authority trends, 1946-2009. Polity IV Project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 18002009. Fairfax, VA: Center for Systemic Peace. systemicpeace.org/polity/syr2.htm (accessed April 18, 2011). 3 Marshall, Monty G. and Benjamin R. Cole. 2009. Global Report 2009: Conflict, governance, and state stability. Fairfax, VA: Center for Systemic Peace. systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf (accessed April 20, 2010). 4 Marshall and Jaggers, op. cit. 5 Freedom House. 2011. Freedom in the World (2011). Washington: Freedom House. freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2011&country=8143 (accessed July 28, 2011). 6 Achy, Lachen. 2011. Syria: Economic hardship feeds social unrest. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=43355 (accessed March 11, 2011). 7 No author. 2008. Syria: Wealth gap widening as inflation hits poor. Teheran: IRIN. February 7. 8 No author, op. cit. 9 El Laithy, Heba and Khalid Abu-Ismail. 2005. Poverty in Syria: 19962004: Diagnosis and pro-poor policy considerations. New York: United Nations Development Programme. 10 Achy, op. cit.

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5.2.2. Key Findings from 2011 Survey A broad range of issues preoccupies Syrians (see Figure 6). 96.3% are concerned or very concerned about the (general) poor quality of life; of the more specific contributors to quality of life, 88.1% are concerned or very concerned about the absence of political freedom, 82.4% about the prevalence of corruption, and 71.4% about the cost of living. The only issue about which a majority is relatively unconcerned is Iraqi refugees (23.9%). This question was posed differently in 2010, when respondents were asked to identify the one issue of greatest concern. The top three responses were political freedom (22.9%), corruption (20.3%), and quality of life (15.7%). While a direct comparison between the two surveys is not possible, the rank ordering in 2010 corresponds fairly closely with the ordering of very concerned responses in 2010, so relative concerns do not appear to have shifted much in the last year. Figure 6. How concerned are you about the following issues?
Absence of political freedom Poor quality of life Prevalence of corruption Possibility of war with a neighbor Rise in cost of living Lack of employment opportunities Poor education Poor health services 28.0% 15.4% 10.0% 10.0% 22.6% 10% 20% 30% 40% 43.3% 49.1% 50.5% 47.6% 50% 60% 70% 58.7% 49.2% 47.0% 46.9% 43.4% 29.6% 39.3% 38.3% 28.5% 80% 90% 100% 29.4% 47.3% 35.4% 22.7% 9.6% 2.3% 2.2% 1.3% 17.5% 0.0% 27.1% 24.5% 3.3% 4.2% 11.6% 1.7% 1.3%

Iraqi refugees 1.3% 0% Very concerned

Concerned

Neither concerned nor unconcerned

Unconcerned

Note: Response rates for these items ranged from 93% to 99%. 5.2.3. Political Situation Respondents hold a dim view of the political situation (see Figure 7). 80.2% regard it as bad or very bad, and only 2.5% as good (zero respondents regard it as very good). These responses correspond fairly closely with those to a question about changes from five years ago (see Figure 8); 87.7% regard it as worse or much worse, and only 2.8% as better.

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Figure 7. How would you rate the political situation in the country today?
70% 61.7% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0.0% 0% Very good Good Neither good nor bad Bad Very bad 2.5% 17.3% 18.5%

Note: n = 547. 99.3% of survey participants responded to this question. Figure 8. How is the countrys political situation compared to five years ago?
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0.0% 0% Much better Better No changes Worse Much worse 9.6% 2.8% 15.2% 72.5%

Note: n = 545. 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question. But Syrians remain optimistic (or dont see how things could get any worse) (see Figure 9). An overwhelming 92.0% expect the political situation to improve, and none expect it to worsen.

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Figure 9. How do you expect the countrys political situation will be in the future?
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Much better Better No changes Worse Much worse 7.8% 0.0% 0.0% 34.1% 57.9%

Note: n = 544. 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question. Political situation is a deliberately vague formulation, to allow respondents to interpret how they wish. A key element of the political situation is the state of democracy (which term also allows for various interpretations, especially in a citizenry with little direct experience of it) (see Figure 10); however interpreted, respondents hold a dim view, with 81.8% saying that it is bad or very bad, only 3.2% good, and zero saying very good. Figure 10. How do you judge democracy in Syria?

70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0.0% 0% Very good Good Neither good nor bad 3.2% 15.0%

63.0%

18.8%

Bad

Very bad

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.0% of survey participants responded to this question.

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To help interpret this judgment, respondents were asked about their views of democracy in principle (see Figure 11). A majority (67.4%) favor democracy over any other form of government, and a sizeable minority (22.4%) are unsure or indifferent. Figure 11. Which of the following best describes your views of democracy?
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Democracy is In some I don't think it preferable to any circumstances a matters what type other form of non-democratic of government we government government can be have preferable I don't know 16.7% 10.2% 5.7% 67.4%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 545. 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question. On a related measure (see Figure 12), 85.3% consider the human-rights situation to be bad or very bad, and only 2.9% good. The 2010 survey asked one question combining democracy and human rights; 60.5% responded bad or very bad, so it appears that views on both have deteriorated in the last year. Figure 12. How do you judge human rights in Syria?

70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0.0% 0% Very good Good Neither good nor bad Bad Very bad 2.9% 11.9% 25.4% 59.9%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 544. 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question.

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Awareness of and support for principles of democracy appear to be increasing. The 2005 Damascus Declaration called for greater freedom of speech and an end to the state of emergency in place since 1962. Under this law, the constitution can be superseded by the President at any time. 274 activists, intellectuals, and reformers signed the Declaration and soon thereafter created the National Council of the Damascus Declaration; many of the people involved were arrested between 2006 and 2008.11 70% of respondents are familiar with the Declaration (see Figure 13), up slightly from 62.5% in 2010. Of those (see Figure 14), 64.1% view it positively (compared with 54.1% in 2010) and only 3.6% negatively (10.6% in 2010). Women are less well informed than men; 56.8% are familiar with the Declaration, compared with 80.2% of men (p = 0.000). Figure 13. Have you read the Damascus Declaration or heard about it?
80% 70.0% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30.0% 30% 20% 10% 0% Yes 2011 2010 No 37.5% 62.5%

Note: For the 2010 survey, n = 1028. 98.3% of survey participants responded to this question. For the 2011 survey, n = 543. 98.5% of survey participants responded to this question.

11

Sharp, Jeremy. 2009. Syria: Background and U.S. relations. Washington: Congressional Research Service.

17

Figure 14. If yes, what is your opinion concerning the Damascus Declaration?
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10.6% 10% 0% Positive Neutral 2011 2010 Negative 3.6% 32.3% 35.3% 64.1% 54.1%

Note: This calculation was limited to those respondents who reported having knowledge of the Damascus Declaration. The decades-long state of hostilities with Israel is a central feature of Syrian politics and public life, and June 2011 saw the deadliest clashes in years on the Golan Heights border.12 Respondents were about evenly split on the prospects for a renewed war with Israel in the near future (see Figure 15), with 52.5% considering it likely or very likely (this question was not asked in 2010); men (58.7%) are more likely than women (42.9%) to expect a war (p = 0.07)

12

Rabinovitch, Ari. 2011. Israel sees Syrian hand in Golan clashes, 23 dead. reuters.com/article/2011/06/06/us palestinians-israel-idUSTRE7541PF20110606 (accessed September 11, 2011).

18

Figure 15. How likely is a war with Israel in the near future?
40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Very likely Likely Unlikely Very unlikely 19.0% 24.1% 23.4% 33.5%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 542. 98.4% of survey participants responded to this question. 5.2.4. Economic Situation Perceptions of the economic situation mirror those of the political (see Figure 16). 81.5% of respondents regard it as bad or very bad, 3.9% as good, andagainzero as very good. Similarly, 93.4% consider it worse or much worse than five years ago, and only 3.2% think it is better (see Figure 17). Women are less pessimistic than men; 75.2% rate the economic situation bad or very bad compared with 85.2% for men (p = 0.09). Figure 16. How would you rate the economic situation in the country today?
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0.0% 0% Very good Good Neither good nor bad Bad Very bad 3.9% 14.6% 12.9% 68.6%

Note: n = 546. 99.0% of survey participants responded to this question.

19

Figure 17. How is the countrys economic situation compared with five years ago?
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0.0% 0% Much better Better No changes Worse Much worse 3.2% 13.2% 15.3% 68.1%

Note: n = 546. 99.0% of survey participants responded to this question. Optimism prevails concerning the economic future (see Figure 18), with 89.5% expecting it to be better or much better, and a scant 1.2% expecting it to be worse. Figure 18. How do you expect the countrys economic situation to be in the future?
70% 60% 50% 40% 32.0% 30% 20% 10% 0% Much better Better No changes Worse Much worse 9.3% 1.2% 0.0% 57.5%

Note: n = 546. 99.0% of survey participants responded to this question. While, as noted previously, we cannot directly compare these responses with the aggregated questions in the 2010 survey, we can note that in 2010 60.5% thought the political/economic situation was bad or very bad and 9.4% thought it good, so perceptions have worsened markedly in the past year. On the other hand, in 2010 47.4% expected the political/economic situation to be worse or much worse in the (unspecified) future, so their expectations were met.

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5.3.

Capability of Government

Respondents have little confidence in the government (see Figure 19). 88.2% do not think the government is capable of solving the problems that the country is confronting, up from 59.4% in 2010. It is not clear to what extent they think that the problems have worsened or the governments capabilities have declined, but Figure 20 shows that 84.2% think that government institutions perform poorly, compared with 52.7% in 2010. Women are less pessimistic than men; 80.1% rate the government as incapable compared with 94.4% for men (p = 0.000). Figure 19. Do you believe that the current government is capable of solving the countrys problems?
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 1.9% 0% Strongly yes Yes 2011 2010 No Strongly no 8.8% 10.0% 28.6% 39.7% 35.6% 26.9% 48.5%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 544. 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question. For the 2010 survey, n = 1015. 97% of participants responded to this question. In 2010 4.9% responded with no comment to this question. In the 2011 survey, no comment was not a response option. For comparability with 2011, the 2010 percentages reported here exclude respondents who responded with no comment.

21

Figure 20. How would you rate the performance of the governments institutions?
70% 60% 50% 40.2% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Very good Good Neither good nor bad 2011 2010 Bad Very bad 9.0% 0.0% 1.0% 6.3% 6.8% 31.3% 25.1% 21.4% 59.1%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.0% of survey participants responded to this question. For the 2010 survey, n = 984. 94.1% of survey participants responded to this question. In 2010, Syria scored 2.5 (on a 010 worstbest scale) on the Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International, which ranked it at 127 out of 178 countries.13 Respondents share the tenor of this assessment (see Figure 21), with 91.3% judging the government at least moderately corrupt. This question was posed slightly differently in 2010, when 86.9% thought that public-sector corruption is widespread. Of those who think that there is at least some corruption, 86.1% think that it is worse than five years ago, whereas in 2010 56.9% thought that it was worse than in the (unspecified) past (see Figure 22). As with other shortcomings, the public is confident that matters will improve, with 92.2% expecting less corruption in the future (see Figure 23).

13

Transparency International 2011. Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Results. Berlin: Transparency International. transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed July 28, 2011)

22

Figure 21. How corrupt are the government ministries and public administrations?
45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Extremely corrupt Very corrupt Moderately Neither Not corrupt corrupt corrupt not not corrupt 4.2% 4.5% 13.9% 42.0% 35.4%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.0% of survey participants responded to this question. Figure 22. If you believe that corruption exists, how does it compare with five years ago?
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 21.6% 20% 11.4% 10% 1.2% 0% Much better Better No changes Worse Much worse 1.3% 64.5%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 536. 97.3% of survey participants responded to this question.

23

Figure 23. If you believe that corruption exists, how do you think it will be in the future, compared to today?
80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Much better Better No changes Worse Much worse 7.5% 0.3% 0.0% 24.8% 67.4%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 538. 97.6% of survey participants responded to this question. On a more specific aspect of corruption, nepotism or cronyism (see Figure 24), respondents are similarly negative, with 85.6% saying that a common citizen needs an inside connection to get a government job; in 2010 74.8% held the same view. Figure 24. Can a simple citizen get a government job without an intermediary (connection)?
60% 50% 40% 30.5% 30% 20.9% 20% 10% 0% Strongly yes Yes 2011 2010 No Strongly no 2.1% 1.4% 12.3% 45.8% 31.9% 55.1%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.0% of survey participants responded to this question. For the 2010 survey, n = 1018, and 3.8% responded with no comment to this question. In the 2011 survey, no comment was not a response option. For comparability with 2011, the 2010 percentages reported here exclude respondents who responded with no comment.

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5.4.

Bashar al-Assad and Anti-Government Protests

5.4.1. President Assad and Protestors Turning more specifically to views about President Assad and demonstrations directed against him and the ruling regime, we find that the President is held in low regard (see Figure 25); 82.6% consider his job performance poor or very poor, and only 8.7% good. (These questions were not asked in 2010.) Figure 25. How would you rate President Assads job performance?
50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Very good Good Fair Poor Very poor 0.2% 8.7% 8.5% 37.0% 45.6%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.0% of survey participants responded to this question. In its simplest formulation (see Figure 26), the survey finds that 82.0% of respondents support the anti government demonstrations and 9.6% oppose them. Figure 26. Do you support the peaceful revolution that began on March 15, 2011 in Syria?
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Yes No I don't know 9.6% 8.4% 82.0%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 544. 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question. The anti-government demonstrators (see Figure 27), are viewed positively or very positively by 71.1%, with 23.4% holding neutral views and only 5.5% negative. Men have a higher opinion (77.8% positive) of the anti-government demonstrators than women do (59.7% positive) (p = 0.02).

25

Figure 27. How do you regard the anti-government demonstrators in Syria?


45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Very positively Positively Neither positively nor negatively Negatively Very negatively 2.9% 2.6% 23.4% 30.0% 41.1%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 543. 98.5% of survey participants responded to this question. Choosing whether to actively support or engage in anti-government demonstrations depends not only on an individuals attitudes about the demonstrators, but also on perceptions of how other citizens view themthat is, people are likelier to participate if they see the movement as popular. (It is not so clear that anyone who opposes the demonstrators would join simply because they appear to be popular.) In this instance, respondents have a fairly accurate assessment of popular sentiments (see Figure 28), with 84.4% thinking that the majority view is positive and only 4.8% thinking that it is negative.14

Questions of the sort, What do you think most other people think? can be difficult for some people to consider and answer. As a check on this question, the survey posed a more concrete hypothetical situation: Imagine that the total number of adult people living in Syria today is 100 and you have to give your opinion of how many of these 100 people share the concerns of the anti-government protestors. How many would you say? (Please give an answer between 0 and 100.) 88% gave an answer larger than 50 (i.e., these respondents thought that a majority supports the demonstrators), which is consistent with the responses to the first question.

14

26

Figure 28. How do you think most Syrians regard the anti-government demonstrators?
60% 52.2% 50% 40% 32.2% 30% 20% 10.8% 10% 0% Very positively Positively Neither positively nor negatively Negatively Very negatively 3.3% 1.5%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 545. 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question. Respondents assessments of their neighbors views mirror their assessments of the general population (see Figure 29); 90.2% think that most of their neighbors view the demonstrators positively. Men (95.7%) are more likely to think so than women (82.8%) are (p = 0.000). Figure 29. Do most of your neighbors support the anti-government demonstrators?
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Yes No 9.8% 90.2%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 542. 98.4% of survey participants responded to this question. Spokesmen for the anti-government demonstrators and most international observers have sharply divergent views from those of the Assad regime on the demonstrators motivations. Survey respondents mostly share the former perceptions, but may give some credence to the governments position (see Figure 30). 92.5% think that lack of political freedom is an important issue to the demonstrators, 91.3% that freedom of information is, and 92.0% think that poor quality of life is. However, 74.3% also think that religion and 39.0% that outside agitators play important rolesrecall that the Assad regime contends that the unrest is led by (mainly foreign) religious extremists; it is not clear whether respondents regard these outside agitators as the same parties that the regime cites, nor is it evident how respondents think that religion is important to the demonstrators.

27

Of the foreign-policy issues, Syrias relationship with Iran and Hezbollahits closest alliesis held to be the most important to the demonstrators. Overall, we see that all of the eleven issues proffered are thought to be important to the demonstrators; this might reflect some uncertainty about the demonstrators motivations, or perhaps a sense that it is a broad-based movement concerned with the full range of issues confronting the country. Figure 30. How important are the following issues to the anti-government demonstrators?
Syria's relationship with Iran and Hezbollah Freedom of information Lack of political freedom The Emergency Law Syria's relationship with Israel Government corruption Religion Syria's relationship with the United States Economic issues Quality of life International relations 59.0% 51.5% 50.7% 44.5% 43.5% 39.6% 35.5% 21.6% 19.1% 14.4% 9.2% 0% Very important 14.1% 29.4% 41.9% 38.8% 53.0% 51.5% 54.1% 43.1% 34.7% 39.8% 41.8% 32.4% 21.2% 15.7% 21.0% 20.7% 27.1% 29.4% 39.5% 6.3% 6.6% 5.8%

10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Neither important nor unimportant

Important

Note: response rates for these items ranged from 87% to 99%.

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The Muslim Brotherhood is a significant force in Syrian public life, and their role in the protest movement is disputed. Respondents views (in general) of the Muslim Brotherhood are mixed (see Figure 31); 34.9% are positive, 23.7% neutral, 36.1% negative, and 5.3% do not know what the Muslim Brotherhood is. Women (46.0%) have a more positive view than men (30.0%) do (p = 0.05). Figure 31. What is your view of the Muslim Brotherhood?
25% 20% 15.6% 15% 10% 5.3% 5% 0% Very positive Positive Neither positive nor negative Negative Very negative Do not know what the Muslim Brotherhood is 12.0% 22.9% 23.7% 20.5%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question. 5.4.2. Reforms When the survey was designed, the state of emergency had not yet been lifted; survey implementation was delayed, and in the meantime the state of emergency was lifted (but with little attendant change in the practices of the security forces). What was to have been a prospective question then became a question about the current situation (see Figure 32); 58.7% are positive about lifting the state of emergency and 41.0% are neutral, likely reflecting the sentiment that it is a positive development in principle but has made no practical difference (only 0.2% disapprove). Men (63.9%) are more positive than women (50.6%) are (p = 0.10). In 2010 (when the prospect was not openly discussed by the government), 79.7% supported lifting the state of emergency, with 5.5% opposed.

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Figure 32. How do you feel about the lifting of the state of emergency?
50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Very positively Positively Neither positively nor negatively Negatively Very negatively 0.0% 0.2% 13.0% 45.7% 41.0%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.0% of survey participants responded to this question. In aggregate, respondents assess their neighbors preferences for reform or regime change (see Figure 34) as slightly more extreme than their own (see Figure 33); 81.7% want the Assad regime to leave power and 6.8% want to maintain the status quo, compared with a perception that 88.3% of their neighbors want regime change and 9.4% the status quo. Women (70.3%) are much less likely than men (90.3%) are to want regime change (p = 0.001). Figure 33. What would you like the current regime to do?
90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Maintain the current Remain in power but situation make some reforms Leave power 6.8% 11.5% 81.7%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question.

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Figure 34. What do you think your neighbors would you like the current regime to do?
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 88.3%

9.4%

2.4% Leave power

Maintain the current Remain in power situation but make some reforms

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 545. 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question. In the event of regime change, two-thirds of respondents think that (unspecified) democratically elected leaders would be most qualified to assume power (see Figure 35) as against 13.6% for the Muslim Brotherhood or religious leaders (of course, nothing precludes religious figures coming to power by democratic means). While respondents overwhelmingly support the protestors aims, few (7.3%) think theyre best positioned to assume power. Women (58.4%) are less impressed than men (72.5%) are with the capability of democratically elected leaders (p = 0.08). On the different matter of preferences for future leadership (see Figure 36), 77.3% think that their neighbors would most prefer democratically elected leaders versus only 4.1% for religious figures. Figure 35. If the current regime leaves power, who do you think is the most qualified to assume power?
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Democratically Muslim elected leaders Brotherhood Military leaders Religious leaders Protest leaders 9.7% 12.8% 3.9% 7.3% 66.4%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 544. 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question.

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Figure 36. If the current regime leaves power, whom do you think your neighbors would like to assume power?
90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Democratically Muslim elected leaders Brotherhood Military leaders Religious leaders Protest leaders 2.9% 9.9% 1.2% 8.6% 77.3%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 545. 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question. In any event, few (12.1%) think that even (unspecified) reforms, along with lifting the state of emergency, will mollify the demonstrators (see Figure 37). Women (17.2%) are much more likely than men (7.7%) are to think so (p = 0.03). Figure 37. Do you think that the reforms by the state and the lifting of the Emergency Law will satisfy the protesters?
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 87.9%

12.1%

Yes

No

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 544. 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question. 5.4.3. Foreign Relations All parties to the unrest in Syria are closely watching developments elsewhere in the Arab world. Respondents are encouraged by protests elsewhere (see Figure 38); 78.3% feel more hopeful in their light, and only 5.9% feel less hopeful.

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Figure 38. How do the protests in other Arab countries make you feel about reforms in Syria?
70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 1.1% 0% Much more hopeful More hopeful Neither more Less hopeful nor less hopeful Much less hopeful 19.7% 15.7% 4.8% 58.6%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question. And a clear majority (see Figure 39) thinks that Tunisia and Egypt are better off after their revolutions. (The survey was conducted before Septembers unrest in Cairo.) Figure 39. After revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, how is their situation?
90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Better Neither better nor worse Worse 10.3% 8.6% 81.1%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 546. 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question. Syrias neighbors and the international community have taken active positions on the ongoing unrest, and Syrias relations with many stakeholders have suffered. To gauge popular views on Syrias relations with four influential parties, the survey asked respondents about their neighbors perceptions (see Figure 40). (This question is asking the respondent to describe or assess the regime's current conduct, not for the respondent to suggest what his or her neighbors prefer.) Respondents think that their neighbors expect the government to reinforce its relations with its most reliable partners of recent years, Hezbollah (88.0% for strengthening relations) and Iran (78.7%). At the same time, respondents think that most (68.8%) of their neighbors expect the government to maintain its (very poor) relations with the United States.

33

Mens and womens views differ on popular expectations for ties with the United States and with the Muslim Brotherhood. 19.1% of women and 7.5% of men perceive an expectation to strengthen ties with the United States (p = 0.02), while 19.0% of women and 31.5% of men see the same with respect to the Muslim Brotherhood. Figure 40. In facing ongoing developments in the Middle East, how do most of your neighbors see the current regime treating ties with the following?

Muslim Brotherhood

26.2%

31.9%

41.8%

Iran

78.7%

21.1%

0.2%

United States

12.5%

68.8%

18.7%

Hezbollah 0% 10% 20% 30%

88.0% 40% Maintain 50% 60% Weaken 70% 80%

11.9%0.1% 90% 100%

Strengthen

Note: Response rates for these items ranged from 97% to 99%.

5.5.
5.5.1.

Access to Communications and Media


Background

Press Freedom Since the uprising began, the Syrian government has expelled almost all foreign journalists; press access was not assured even prior to these events. Syria has consistently performed poorly on Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Survey, which measures the degree of freedom experienced by journalists and the countrys commitment to protecting and ensuring this freedom.15 Indicators include violations directly affecting journalists and news media such as murder, threats, censorship, or searches and harassment; ability of media to investigate and criticize; financial pressure put on media; the countrys legal framework; and the free flow of information on the internet. 16 According to the 2010 survey (which covered September 2009 to September 2010), Syria has joined Burma and North Korea in the group of

15

Reporters Without Borders. 2010. Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2010: How the index was compiled. Paris: Reporters Without Borders. en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/methodology.pdf (accessed April 26, 2011). 16 Ibid.

34

the worlds most repressive countries towards journalists. As shown in Table 3, Syria fell from 165th out of 175 countries in 2009 to 173rd out of 178 countries in 2010. Table 3. Syria in Press Freedom Index, 20022010.

17

Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Rank 126 155 155 145 153 154 159 165 173

Rank from the Bottom 13 11 12 22 15 15 14 10 5

Source: Reporters Without Borders, 2011. Global rankings of the degree to which each country permits the free flow of news and information provided by Freedom House shows Syrias performance declining from 2009 to 2010. Freedom House scores press freedom on 23 methodology questions in three categories: legal environment, political environment, and economic environment.18 They investigate print, broadcast, and internet freedom as well as analyzing the events of each calendar year. In 2009, Syria ranked 178th out of 196 countries and in 2010 Syria dropped to 181st out of 196 countries (see Table 4). With consistently high scores (0 is best, 100 is worst), Syrias press sector has been considered not free since at least 2002.19 Freedom House cites Syria as among the countries of longstanding concern where journalists and bloggers face harsh punishments such as banishment from the 20 21 country, large fines, arrest, detention, and torture for expressing divisive views. , In the Middle East and North Africa, Syria places 16th out of 19 countries.22 Syrian officials continue to incarcerate cyber-dissidents and block such networking sites as Blogger, Twitter, and Facebook.23 As of the March 2011 Reporters Without Borders report of Internet Enemies,

Reporters Without Borders. 2010. Press Freedom Index 2010. Paris: Reporters Without Borders. en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2010,1034.html (accessed April 14, 2011). 18 Freedom House. 2010. Freedom of the Press 2010 Methodology. Washington: Freedom House. freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop10/Global_Table_2010.pdf (accessed June 6, 2011). 19 Freedom House. 2010. Freedom of the Press 2010 table of global press freedom rankings. Washington: Freedom House. freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop10/Global_Table_2010.pdf (accessed April 14, 2011). 20 Freedom House. 2010. Freedom of the Press Syria (2010). Washington: Freedom House. freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7928&year=2010 (accessed June 6, 2011). 21 Karlekar, Karin Deutsch. 2010. Press Freedom in 2010: Signs of change amid repression. Washington: Freedom House, p. 9. 22 Freedom House. 2011. Freedom of the Press Syria (2011). Washington: Freedom House. freedomhouse.org/images/File/fop/2011/FOTP2011GlobalRegionalTables.pdf (accessed July 28, 2011) 23 Freedom House. 2010. Freedom of the Press Syria (2010). op. cit.

17

35

at least three dissidents are behind bars, one of whom is the youngest female blogger in custody in the world.24 Table 4. Syria in Survey of Press Freedom, 20012010.

Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Score 78 80 80 83 84 83 83 83 83 84

Rank from the Bottom


b b

16 13 13 16 15 17 16 13

Source: Freedom House, 2011 a Scores of 61100 are considered not free. b No rank available. Internet Access Reporters Without Borders included Syria with nine other countries on the 2011 list of enemies of the internet. 25 The Syrian Information Organization monitors discussions on the internet and targets banned words.26 Police raids on internet cafes are common and those who are caught doing excessive surfing are strongly encouraged to make themselves available for questioning by Syrian officials. Website managers must also keep track of the personal data produced by internet users and maintain a list of visited websites and inform authorities of any illegal activities.27 As of March 2011, 240 websites were blocked that were related to issues such as political criticism, religion, obscenity, and the Kurdish minority, as well as certain Lebanese newspapers and sites based in Israel. 28 Internet censorship has tightened since the uprising began. Syria has experienced significant growth in internet access in the last decade but with little improvement in infrastructure, causing connection slowdowns and frequent outages. The best estimates show massive growth from 30,000 internet users in 2000 to 3.4 million in 2010, about 18% of the population.29,30 The

Karlekar, Karin Deutsch. 2009. Press Freedom in 2009: Broad setbacks to global media freedom. Washington: Freedom House. freedomhouse.org/images/File/fop/2010/OverviewEssayFOTP2010finallaid-out.pdf (accessed April 17, 2011). 25 Reporters Without Borders. 2011. Internet enemies. Paris: Reporters Without Borders. march12.rsf.org/i/Internet_Enemies.pdf (accessed April 17, 2011). 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Internet World Stats. 2010. Middle East internet usage and population statistics. Miniwatts Marketing Group. www.internetworldstats.com (accessed April 19, 2011).

24

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average cost for one hour of internet connection at an internet caf is one to two U.S. dollars whereas the average monthly salary in Syria is US$200.31 The internet in Syria is essentially controlled by one source, the state-owned Syrian Telecommunications Establishment, and concerns remain that the government can block all internet access. On June 3, nearly two-thirds of the Syrian network went down for a few hours, leading to speculation that it was a government action.32 Satellite Television 33 In contrast to the internet, satellite television is relatively easy to access, with many channels available. Syria Satellite TV is operated by the Ministry of Information; its programming is varied and includes sports, scripted shows, news, and music. Those with access to satellite dishes can view programming from around the Arab world. In the 2010 Democracy Council survey, respondents were asked to name their favorite television programs and actors in a free-response question. More than 200 TV programs were named, illustrating the diversity of programming available to Syrians, with both Syrian and panArabic programs in the top ranks. 5.5.2. Key Findings from 2011 Survey Newspapers remain the principal source of news information for half the respondents (see Figure 41), with 27.9% receiving most of their news from the internet. 72.9% read a newspaper at least weekly (see Figure 42), up considerably from 42.1% in 2010, likely reflecting an increased interest in current events. Women consume less news than men across all media, with 37.3% (vs. 51.9%) reading a newspaper almost daily (p = 0.07).

30

The data produced by Internet World Stats are compiled from sources including the Nielsen Company, International Telecommunications Union, GfK Group, Computer Industry Almanac, and CIA Fact Book, among other agencies. 31 Reporters Without Borders. 2011. op. cit. 32 Cowie, James. 2011. Syria internet shutdown. renesys.com/blog/2011/06/syrian-internet-shutdown.shtml. 33 It is common for Syrian households to share a satellite dish.

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Figure 41. Where do you receive most of your news?


60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 2.2% 0% Newspapers Radio Television Internet All of these None of these 2.1% 0.5% 17.6% 27.9% 49.9%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 540. 98.0% of survey participants responded to this question. Figure 42. Do you read a daily paper?
50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Almost every day Once or more weekly Rarely I do not read a daily newspaper 5.9% 26.9% 21.1% 46.0%

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 547. 99.3% of survey participants responded to this question. The internet is, however, the most trusted news source (see Figure 43), with 87.1% finding it at least mostly trustworthy; state-run television is trusted by only 10.%. Women are more trusting than men of all news sources except for the internet; 17.2% of women and 4.5% of men find state-run television at least mostly trustworthy (p = 0.000), versus 80.8% of women and 89.8% of men trusting the internet (p = 0.08)

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Figure 43. How trustworthy do you find your news outlets?

Internet

55%

32%

9%

2% 1%

Satellite television

22%

58%

20%

0%

Syrian State-run television

7% 3%

11%

25%

53%

Radio

5%

48%

45%

1% 1%

Newspapers

16%

56%

28%

0%

0% Trustworthy

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Mostly trustworthy Mostly untrustworthy

Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy Untrustworthy

Note: Response rates for this question ranged from 98.0% and 98.9%. Those who watch news on satellite TV (see Figure 44) most prefer Al-Jazeera (58.7% as first or second favorite), Al-Arabia (44.7%), and Barada (36.2%).34

The figure shows preferences for networks named in the survey question. Respondents were allowed to name networks other than those offered in the survey question; 15.2% named another network, with Roj and Al-Wesa the top picks.

34

39

Figure 44. If you watch the news on satellite television, which are your favorite networks? Please list your top two, in order. Mark only one network as your first choice. Mark only one network as your second choice.
Al-Manar CNN Orient TV Barada TV Network BBC Al-Souria Al-Arabia Al-Jazeera 0.0% 10.0% First choice 1.6% 0.0% 3.0% 4.6% 1.6% 6.1% 9.0% 9.9% 15.8% 20.2% 20.0% 30.0% 28.9% 38.5% 40.0% 50.0% 14.0% 30.1% 8.0% 9.0%

Second choice

Note: For the 2011 survey, n = 535 (97.1%) specified their first choice of network, and 523 (94.9%) specified their second choice.

6.

Conclusions

The 2011 Syria Public Opinion poll reveals a Syrian public that has very little confidence in the capacity, performance, and legitimacy of the Assad regime. The majority rate President Assads performance negatively (88%), support the anti-government demonstrations that began on March 15, 2011 (82%), and regard the anti-government demonstrators positively (71%). And people perceive that this support is widespread: 84% respond that most Syrians regard the demonstrators positively. Respondents hold mixed views on the Muslim Brotherhood. Women are less critical of the Assad regime than men, and somewhat less supportive of the anti-government demonstrators, they are also more likely to express positive views of the Muslim Brotherhood. But women, in general, are less well informed and less likely to closely follow political events. Womens underrepresentation in the survey sample may be due to bothor otherconsiderations. There is growing pessimism about the ability of the government to solve the countrys problems: 88.2% believe it is incapable of doing so (up from 62.5% in 2010). When presented with a list of issues facing the country, absence of political freedom is the dominant concern, and a vast majority (85%) feels that the human-rights situation is poor. Syrians hold a dim view of the political situation, with 80.2% regarding it as bad or very bad, and 87% report that it has gotten worse in the past five years. Syrians express general discontent with the countrys economic situation, with 82% reporting that the economic situation is bad and 83% that it has deteriorated over the last five years. However, they express surprising optimism about the future (or perhaps a sense that matters cannot get worse), reporting that they expect the political situation (92%) and economic situation (90%) will improve.

40

The opinions expressed in this survey suggest that reforms by the Assad government would not placate the Syrian people: 82% want regime change irrespective of plans for reform. The majority (66%) would prefer democratically elected leaders to assume power and a majority (78%) report that the protests in other Arab countries make them feel more hopeful about reforms in Syria. And just as they oppose the government and demand domestic reforms, Syrians expect little change in the current regimes securityrelations posture: a majority thinks their neighbors expect the government to strengthen ties with Hezbollah (88%) and Iran (79%), with many fewer perceiving an expectation of strengthening ties with the Muslim Brotherhood (26%) or the United States (13%).

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7.

Appendix

Table 5. Do you participate in unions, clubs, charitable organizations, or cultural activities? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Do you participate in Often 16.8 13.3 unions, clubs, charitable Sometimes 17.0 17.5 organizations, or Rarely 24.0 25.9 cultural activities? Never 42.2 43.3 Note: 99.6% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 549). Table 6. Do you have a landline phone? Question Response Weighted (percent) Do you have a landline? Yes 63.0 No 37.0 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 7. Do you have a mobile phone? Question Response Weighted (percent) Do you have a mobile Yes 89.8 phone? No 10.2 Note: 99.3% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 547). Table 8. Do you have a television? Question Response Weighted (percent) Do you have a Yes 68.4 television? No 31.6 Note: 99.3% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 547). Table 9. Do you have a satellite dish at home? Question Response Weighted (percent) Do you have a satellite Yes 88.5 dish at home? No 11.5 Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544). Table 10. How often do you watch the news on the satellite channels? Question Response Weighted (percent) How often do you watch Almost every day 46.0 the news on the satellite Once or more weekly 32.4 channels? Rarely 19.7 I do not watch the news 1.9 on satellite channels Note: 99.5% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 548). Table 11. Do you have Internet access at home or at work? Question Response Weighted (percent) Do you have Internet Yes 76.8 access at home or at No 23.2 work? Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544).

Unweighted (percent) 74.0 26.0

Unweighted (percent) 92.1 7.9

Unweighted (percent) 64.5 35.5

Unweighted (percent) 90.1 9.9

Unweighted (percent) 53.7 28.7 16.6 1.1

Unweighted (percent) 83.5 16.5

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Table 12. Do you use the Internet for news? Question Response Weighted (percent) Do you use the Internet Yes 76.9 for news? No 23.1 Note: 98.5% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 543). Table 13. Do you use the Internet for social networking sites? Question Response Weighted (percent) Do you use the Internet Yes 65.1 for social networking No 34.9 sites? Note: 98.0% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 540). Table 14. From where do you receive most of your news? Question Response Weighted (percent) From where do you Newspapers 49.9 receive most of your Radio 2.2 news? Television 17.6 Internet 27.9 All of these 2.1 None of these 0.5 Note: 97.8% of survey participants responded to this question (n=539). Table 15. Do you read a daily paper? Question Response Weighted (percent) Do you read a daily Almost every day 46.0 paper? Once or more weekly 26.9 Rarely 21.1 I do not read a daily 5.9 newspaper Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Table 16. How trustworthy do you find the newspapers? Question Response Weighted (percent) How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 15.6 find the newspapers? Mostly trustworthy 56.3 Neither trustworthy nor 27.7 untrustworthy Mostly untrustworthy 0.2 Untrustworthy 0.3 Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544).

Unweighted (percent) 83.4 16.6

Unweighted (percent) 68.9 31.1

Unweighted (percent) 59.3 1.5 10.4 27.2 1.3 0.4

Unweighted (percent) 51.0 29.2 16.5 3.3

Unweighted (percent) 15.3 53.1 30.2 0.4 1.1

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Table 17. How trustworthy do you find the radio? Question Response Weighted (percent) How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 5.0 find the radio? Mostly trustworthy 48.3 Neither trustworthy nor 44.7 untrustworthy Mostly untrustworthy 0.8 Untrustworthy 1.2 Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544). Table 18. How trustworthy do you find Syrian state-run TV? Question Response Weighted (percent) How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 7.0 find Syrian state-run Mostly trustworthy 3.0 TV? Neither trustworthy nor 11.5 untrustworthy Mostly untrustworthy 25.1 Untrustworthy 53.4 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Table 19. How trustworthy do you find satellite television? Question Response Weighted (percent) How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 21.8 find satellite television? Mostly trustworthy 58.5 Neither trustworthy nor 19.7 untrustworthy Mostly untrustworthy 0.1 Untrustworthy 0.0 Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544). Table 20. How trustworthy do you find the Internet? Question Response Weighted (percent) How trustworthy do you Trustworthy 55.4 find the Internet? Mostly trustworthy 31.7 Neither trustworthy nor 9.4 untrustworthy Mostly untrustworthy 2.2 Untrustworthy 1.4 Note: 98.0% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 540).

Unweighted (percent) 4.0 43.6 49.5 1.8 1.1

Unweighted (percent) 5.9 1.3 10.3 27.9 54.7

Unweighted (percent) 23.7 56.6 19.5 0.2 0.0

Unweighted (percent) 59.1 31.3 7.4 1.7 0.6

Table 21. How would you rate the quality of the public education system in our country? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How would you rate the Very good 0.7 0.6 quality of the public Good 13.1 8.1 education system in our Neither good nor bad 32.1 26.7 country? Bad 36.9 44.5 Very bad 17.3 20.2 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546).

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Table 22. How do you rate, in general, your personal situation today? Question Response Weighted (percent) How do you rate, in Very good 1.8 general, your personal Good 9.1 situation today? Neither good nor bad 27.5 Bad 43.9 Very bad 17.7 Note: 99.3% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 547).

Unweighted (percent) 1.5 9.7 25.4 44.6 18.8

Table 23. Do you feel that your personal situation is better or worse than it was five years ago? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Do you feel that your Much better 0.0 0.0 personal situation is Better 3.1 3.9 better or worse than it No change 19.0 16.3 was five years ago? Worse 58.2 53.7 Much worse 19.8 26.2 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 24. How do you expect your personal situation will be in the future? Question Response Weighted (percent) How do you expect your Much better 33.2 personal situation will Better 59.6 be in the future? No change 6.9 Worse 0.3 Much worse 0.0 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545).

Unweighted (percent) 37.7 56.2 5.0 1.1 0.0

Table 25. How would you rate, in general, your neighbors and neighborhoods situation today? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How would you rate, in Very good 0.0 0.0 general, your neighbors Good 8.9 6.4 and neighborhoods Neither good nor bad 15.4 13.9 situation today? Bad 54.2 58.6 Very bad 21.5 21.1 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 26. How would you rate the political situation in the country today? Question Response Weighted (percent) How would you rate the Very good 0.0 political situation in the Good 2.5 country today? Neither good nor bad 17.3 Bad 61.7 Very bad 18.5 Note: 99.3% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 547).

Unweighted (percent) 0.0 1.5 14.3 63.4 20.8

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Table 27. How is the countrys political situation compared to five years ago? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How is the countrys Much better 0.0 0.0 political situation Better 2.8 2.4 compared to five years No changes 9.6 9.9 ago? Worse 72.5 70.5 Much worse 15.2 17.3 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Table 28. How do you expect the countrys political situation will be in the future? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How do you expect the Much better 34.1 38.1 countrys political Better 57.9 54.2 situation will be in the No changes 7.8 7.4 future? Worse 0.1 0.2 Much worse 0.0 0.2 Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544). Table 29. How would you rate the countrys economic situation today? Question Response Weighted (percent) How would you rate the Very good 0.0 countrys economic Good 3.9 situation today? Neither good nor bad 14.6 Bad 68.6 Very bad 12.9 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546).

Unweighted (percent) 0.0 3.3 13.6 69.4 13.7

Table 30. How is the countrys economic situation compared with five years ago? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How is the countrys Much better 0.1 0.2 economic situation Better 3.2 1.8 compared with five No changes 13.2 12.1 years ago? Worse 68.1 73.4 Much worse 15.3 12.5 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 31. How do you expect the countrys economic situation to be in the future? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How do you expect the Much better 32.0 35.7 countrys economic Better 57.5 55.3 situation to be in the No changes 9.3 7.5 future? Worse 1.2 1.5 Much worse 0.0 0.0 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546).

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Table 32. How concerned are you about the following issues? Issue Response Weighted (percent) Poor quality of life Very concerned 49.2 Concerned 47.3 Neither concerned nor 2.2 unconcerned Unconcerned 1.3 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Issue Poor education Response Weighted (percent) Very concerned 10.0 Concerned 49.1 Neither concerned nor 39.3 unconcerned Unconcerned 1.7 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Issue Poor health services Response Weighted (percent) Very concerned 10.0 Concerned 50.5 Neither concerned nor 38.3 unconcerned Unconcerned 1.3 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Issue Possibility of war with a neighbor Response Weighted (percent) Very concerned 46.9 Concerned 22.7 Neither concerned nor 27.1 unconcerned Unconcerned 3.3 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Issue Absence of political freedom Response Weighted (percent) Very concerned 58.7 Concerned 29.4 Neither concerned nor 9.6 unconcerned Unconcerned 2.3 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Issue Response Weighted (percent) Prevalence of corruption Very concerned 47.0 Concerned 35.4 Neither concerned nor 17.5 unconcerned Unconcerned 0.2 Note: 93.4% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 513).

Unweighted (percent) 39.4 57.1 3.1 0.4

Unweighted (percent) 8.2 49.8 40.3 1.7

Unweighted (percent) 15.0 53.1 30.2 1.7

Unweighted (percent) 64.8 17.6 15.2 2.4

Unweighted (percent) 65.9 26.9 5.7 1.3

Unweighted (percent) 48.2 32.4 19.1 0.4

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Issue A rise in the cost of living

Response Weighted (percent) Very concerned 28.0 Concerned 43.4 Neither concerned nor 24.5 unconcerned Unconcerned 4.2 Note: 92.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 510). Issue Iraqi refugees Response Weighted (percent) Very concerned 1.3 Concerned 22.6 Neither concerned nor 47.6 unconcerned Unconcerned 28.5 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Issue Lack of employment opportunities Response Weighted (percent) Very concerned 15.4 Concerned 43.3 Neither concerned nor 29.6 unconcerned Unconcerned 11.6 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546).

Unweighted (percent) 26.1 45.9 23.3 4.7

Unweighted (percent) 2.6 22.9 51.9 22.6

Unweighted (percent) 10.4 54.0 28.2 7.0

Table 33. Do you believe that the current government is capable of solving the countrys problems? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Do you believe that the Strongly yes 1.9 2.75 current government is Yes 9.9 5.3 capable of solving the No 39.6 37.6 countrys problems? Strongly no 48.4 54.1 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 34. How would you rate the performance of the governments institutions? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How would you rate the Very good 0.0 0.0 performance of the Good 9.0 6.2 governments Neither bad nor good 6.8 7.9 institutions? Bad 59.1 55.5 Very bad 25.1 30.4 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546).

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Table 35. How corrupt are the government ministries and public administrations? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How corrupt are the government ministries and public administrations? Extremely corrupt 42.0 Very corrupt 35.4 Moderately corrupt 13.9 Neither corrupt nor not 4.2 corrupt Not corrupt 4.5 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). 47.6 30.6 14.3 5.7 1.8

Table 36. If you believe that corruption exists, how does it compare with five years ago? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) If you believe that Much better 1.2 0.2 corruption exists, how Better 1.3 1.9 does it compare with No changes 11.4 7.7 five years ago? Worse 64.5 69.4 Much worse 21.6 20.9 Note: 97.3% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 536). Table 37. If you believe that corruption exists, how do you think it will be in the future, compared to today? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) If you believe that Much better 24.8 28.1 corruption exists, how Better 67.4 63.8 do you think it will be in No changes 7.5 7.4 the future, compared to Worse 0.3 0.6 today? Much worse 0.1 0.2 Note: 97.6% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 538). Table 38. Can a simple citizen can get a government job without an intermediary (connection)? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Can a simple citizen can Strongly Yes 2.1 3.1 get a government job Yes 12.3 5.7 without an intermediary No 30.5 38.1 (connection)? Strongly no 55.1 53.1 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 39. Do life, work, or other circumstances encourage you to emigrate? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Do life, work, or other Yes 45.8 51.9 circumstances No 54.2 48.1 encourage you to emigrate? Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545).

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Table 40. If yes, to which country do you most wish to emigrate? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) If yes, to which country Saudi Arabia or another 19.0 17.4 do you most wish to Gulf Country emigrate? Lebanon 4.0 3.8 USA or Canada 20.5 20.2 A Latin American 4.3 6.6 country A European country 43.6 44.6 An Asian country 8.6 7.3 Note: 99% of those answering yes to the previous question responded (n = 287). Table 41. How do you judge democracy in Syria? Question Response Weighted (percent) How do you judge Very good 0.0 democracy in Syria? Good 3.2 Neither good nor bad 15.0 Bad 63.0 Very bad 18.8 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 42. How do you judge human rights in Syria? Question Response Weighted (percent) How do you judge Very good 0.0 human rights in Syria? Good 2.9 Neither good nor bad 11.9 Bad 59.9 Very bad 25.6 Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544). Table 43. Have you read the Damascus Declaration or heard about it? Question Response Weighted (percent) Have you read the Yes 70.1 Damascus Declaration No 29.9 or heard about it? Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544).

Unweighted (percent) 0.0 4.0 11.5 64.3 20.2

Unweighted (percent) 0.0 2.8 9.6 57.5 30.2

Unweighted (percent) 80.5 19.3

Table 44. If yes, what is your opinion concerning the Damascus Declaration? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) If yes, what is your Positive 64.1 61.4 opinion concerning the Neutral 32.3 34.5 Damascus Declaration? Negative 3.6 4.1 Note: 100% of survey participants who answered yes to Question 46 (n = 438) responded to this question.

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Table 45. How likely is a war with Israel in the near future? Question Response Weighted (percent) How likely is a war with Very likely 19.0 Israel in the near future? Likely 33.5 Unlikely 24.1 Very unlikely 23.4 Note: 98.4% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 542). Table 46. How would you rate President Assads job performance? Question Response Weighted (percent) How would you rate Very good 0.2 President Assads job Good 8.7 performance? Neither good nor bad 8.4 Bad 37.0 Very bad 45.6 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 47. How do you regard the anti-government demonstrators in Syria? Question Response Weighted (percent) How do you regard the Very positively 41.1 anti-government Positively 30.0 demonstrators in Syria? Neither positively nor 23.4 negatively Negatively 2.9 Very negatively 2.6 Note: 98.5% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 543).

Unweighted (percent) 24.0 30.1 27.1 18.8

Unweighted (percent) 0.4 6.4 7.1 43.2 42.9

Unweighted (percent) 38.9 40.0 15.1 2.8 3.3

Table 48. How do you think most Syrians regard the anti-government demonstrators? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How do you think most Very positively 32.2 36.3 Syrians regard the antiPositively 52.2 48.4 government Neither positively nor 10.8 10.5 demonstrators? negatively Negatively 3.3 2.8 Very negatively 1.5 2.0 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Table 49. Imagine that the total number of adult people living in Syria today is 100 and you have to give your opinion of how many of these 100 people share the concerns of the anti-government protestors. How many would you say? (Please give an answer between 0-100) Question Weighted Unweighted (number) (number) Imagine that the total number of adult people living in Syria today 63.3 64.9 is 100 and you have to give your opinion of how many of these 100 people share the concerns of the anti-government protestors. How many would you say? (Please give an answer between 0-100) Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545).

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Table 50. What do most of the anti-government demonstrators want the current government to do? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) What do most of the Stay in power but make 0.0 0.0 anti-government minor reforms demonstrators want the Stay in power but make 0.0 0.0 current government to major reforms do? Leave power completely 79.1 80.9 I dont know what they 20.0 19.1 want Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544). Table 51. How important do you feel the following issues are to anti-government demonstrators? Issue Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Freedom of information Very important 51.5 51.9 Important 39.8 42.3 Neither important nor 6.6 4.4 unimportant Unimportant 2.2 1.3 Note: 98.2% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 541). Issue Lack of political freedom Response Weighted (percent) Very important 50.7 Important 41.8 Neither important nor 5.8 unimportant Unimportant 1.7 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Issue Quality of life Response Weighted (percent) Very important 14.4 Important 54.1 Neither important nor 29.4 unimportant Unimportant 2.1 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Issue Economic issues Response Weighted (percent) Very important 19.1 Important 51.5 Neither important nor 27.1 unimportant Unimportant 2.4 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Unweighted (percent) 59.5 32.4 7.3 0.7

Unweighted (percent) 15.8 48.8 32.7 2.8

Unweighted (percent) 24.4 47.3 26.7 1.7

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Issue Government corruption

Response Weighted (percent) Very important 39.6 Important 41.9 Neither important nor 15.7 unimportant Unimportant 2.8 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Issue Religion Response Weighted (percent) Very important 35.5 Important 38.8 Neither important nor 21.0 unimportant Unimportant 4.6 Note: 98.5% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 543). Issue The Emergency Law Response Weighted (percent) Very important 44.5 Important 14.1 Neither important nor 32.4 unimportant Unimportant 9.0 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Issue Response Weighted (percent) Syrias relationship with Very important 59.0 Iran and Hezbollah Important 34.7 Neither important nor 6.3 unimportant Unimportant 0.1 Note: 96.6% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 532). Issue Response Weighted (percent) Syrias relationship with Very important 21.6 the United States Important 53.0 Neither important nor 20.7 unimportant Unimportant 4.7 Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544). Issue Response Weighted (percent) Syrias relationship with Very important 43.5 Israel Important 29.4 Neither important nor 21.2 unimportant Unimportant 5.9 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545).

Unweighted (percent) 42.3 42.9 13.4 1.5

Unweighted (percent) 31.9 37.8 26.9 3.5

Unweighted (percent) 61.5 18.1 17.0 3.3

Unweighted (percent) 71.6 23.5 4.5 0.4

Unweighted (percent) 19.3 56.6 22.4 1.7

Unweighted (percent) 39.1 34.3 21.5 5.1

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Issue International relations

Response Weighted (percent) Very important 9.2 Important 43.1 Neither important nor 39.5 unimportant Unimportant 8.2 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545).

Unweighted (percent) 7.5 45.1 41.7 5.7

Table 52. Do most of your neighbors support the anti-government demonstrators? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Do most of your Yes 90.2 93.2 neighbors support the No 9.8 6.8 anti-government demonstrators? Note: 98.4% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 542). Table 53. Will the demonstrations continue even if President Assad makes reforms? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Will the demonstrations Yes 89.9 92.3 continue even if No 10.1 7.7 President Assad makes reforms? Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Table 54. How do you feel about the lifting of the state of emergency? Question Response Weighted (percent) How do you feel about Very positively 13.0 the lifting of the state of Positively 45.7 emergency? Neither positively nor 41.0 negatively Negatively 0.1 Very negatively 0.2 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546).

Unweighted (percent) 13.6 45.4 39.9 0.2 0.9

Table 55. Do you think that the reforms by the state and the lifting of the emergency law will satisfy the protesters? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Do you think that the Yes 12.1 9.2 reforms by the state and No 87.8 90.6 the lifting of the emergency law will satisfy the protesters? Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545).

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Table 56. How do the protests in other Arab countries make you feel about reforms in Syria? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) How do the protests in Much more hopeful 58.6 64.1 other Arab countries More hopeful 19.7 20.7 make you feel about Neither more or less 15.7 9.2 reforms in Syria? hopeful Less hopeful 1.2 0.9 Much less hopeful 4.8 5.1 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 57. After revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, how is their situation? Question Response Weighted (percent) After revolutions in Better 81.1 Tunisia and Egypt, how Neither better nor worse 10.3 is their situation? Worse 8.6 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546). Table 58. Which of the following best describes your views of democracy? Question Response Weighted (percent) Which of the following Democracy is preferable 67.4 best describes your to any other form of views of democracy? government In some circumstances a 10.2 non-democratic government can be preferable I dont think it matters 5.7 what type of government we have I dont know 16.7 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Table 59. What is your view of the Muslim Brotherhood? Question Response Weighted (percent) What is your view of Very positive 12.0 the Muslim Positive 22.9 Brotherhood? Neither positive nor 23.7 negative Negative 15.6 Very negative 20.5 Do not know what the 5.3 Muslim Brotherhood is Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546).

Unweighted (percent) 84.3 9.3 6.4

Unweighted (percent) 69.2

9.5

6.1

15.2

Unweighted (percent) 12.1 19.6 24.9 16.9 20.9 5.7

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Table 60. In facing ongoing developments in the Middle East, how do most of your neighbors see the Syrian government treating its ties with: Party Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Hezbollah Strengthen 88.0 89.4 Maintain 11.9 10.3 Weaken 0.1 0.4 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Party United States Response Weighted (percent) Strengthen 12.5 Maintain 68.8 Weaken 18.7 Note: 98.5% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 543). Party Iran Response Weighted (percent) Strengthen 78.7 Maintain 21.1 Weaken 0.2 Note: 97.2% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 535). Party Muslim Brotherhood Response Weighted (percent) Strengthen 26.2 Maintain 31.9 Weaken 41.8 Note: 98.2% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 541). Unweighted (percent) 9.6 67.4 23.0

Unweighted (percent) 78.9 20.6 0.6

Unweighted (percent) 31.4 38.8 29.8

Table 61. What do you think your neighbors would you like the current regime to do? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) What do you think your Maintain the current 9.4 6.4 neighbors would you situation like the current regime Remain in power but 2.4 1.8 to do? make some reforms Leave power 88.3 91.7 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Table 62. What would you like the current regime to do? Question Response Weighted (percent) What would you like the Maintain the current 6.8 current regime to do? situation Remain in power but 11.5 make some reforms Leave power 81.7 Note: 99.1% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 546).

Unweighted (percent) 4.6 6.2 89.2

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Table 63. If the current regime leaves power, whom do you think your assume power? Question Response Weighted (percent) If the current regime Democratically elected 77.3 leaves power, whom do leaders you think your Muslim Brotherhood 2.9 neighbors would like to Military leaders 9.9 assume power? Religious leaders 1.2 Protest leaders 8.6 Note: 98.9% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 545). Table 64. If the current power? Question If the current regime leaves power, whom would like to assume power?

neighbors would like to Unweighted (percent) 83.3 1.5 8.3 1.9 5.7

regime leaves power, who do you think is the most qualified to assume Unweighted (percent) 71.7 8.5 9.2 3.3 7.4

Response Weighted (percent) Democratically elected 66.4 leaders Muslim Brotherhood 9.5 Military leaders 12.8 Religious leaders 3.9 Protest leaders 7.3 Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544).

Table 65. Do you support the peaceful revolution that began on March 15, 2011 in Syria? Question Response Weighted (percent) Unweighted (percent) Do you support the Yes 82.0 90.1 peaceful revolution that No 9.6 7.0 began on March 15, I dont know 8.4 2.9 2011 in Syria? Note: 98.7% of survey participants responded to this question (n = 544).

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