GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak AIR 1988 SC 1531: (1988) 2 SCC 602

(Project: Constitution- I)

Submitted to:Ms. S. Mukherjee

Submitted by:10A020 10B144

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are extremely obliged to our Constitution teacher Ms. S. Mukherjee, who gave us the opportunity to make this project and to increase my knowledge. We would like to thank her for her constant support and motivation throughout the making of this project.

We would further like to thank the library staff, other staff members of our university and our parents for their much needed assistance without which the completion of this project would not have been possible.

INTRODUCTION:The present case involves many questions ranging from violation of fundamental rights to the interpretation of powers given by the Constitution to the Supreme Court. Two main fundamental rights of the appellant violated were those enshrined under Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 14 talks about equality before law and equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. It was alleged in the present case that the Appellant was denied equal protection of the laws. The phrase equal protection of the laws postulates the application of same laws alike and without discrimination to all persons similarly situated.1 It was alleged that the appellant was singled out for trial by the High Court in violation of the procedure established by law and that too without any rationale. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution lays down that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. It was alleged that the Supreme Court in the present case in its anxiety to facilitate the parties to have a speedy trial gave directions without conscious awareness of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and that being the only procedure established by law, infringed appellants personal liberty and thus violated the mandate under Article 21.

M. P. Jain Indian Constitutional Law 5th Edn. New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company Nagpur 2008

Facts of the Case:1. The appellant was the Chief Minister of Maharashtra between June 9, 1980 and January 12, 1982, when he resigned that office in deference to the judgment of High Court in a writ petition filed against him, but continued as an MLA. 2. On August 9, 1982, respondent No. 1, a member of a political party, filed a complaint before a Special Judge against the appellant and others for offences under ss. 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code; s 6 of the Preventionof Corruption Act, 1947 and s. 5 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and also under ss. 384 and 420 read with ss. 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The Special Judge issued process to the appellant. Later, the Special Judge overruled the appellant's objection to his jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences and to issue process, in the absence of notification under s. 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, specifying as to which of the three special Judges of the area should try such cases. Against this, the appellant filed a revision application in the High Court, which dismissed it subsequently. The appellants Special Leave Petition against this was dismissed by the Supreme Court which held that the complaint filed by respondent No. 1 was clearly maintainable and cognizance was properly taken of it. During the pendency of the revision application in the High Court, the State Government notified the Special Judge to try the offences specified under s. 6(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and appointed another Special Judge, who discharged the appellant, holding that a member of the Legislative Assembly was a public servant and there was no

valid sanction for prosecuting the appellant. Against this order of discharge, respondent No. 1 filed a Criminal Revision Application in the High Court, which was subsequently withdrawn to this Court. 4. On an appeal filed by respondent No. 1 directly under Article 136 of the Constitution against the order of discharge, the Supreme Court held on 16.2.1984, that a member of the Legislative Assembly was not a public servant, and set aside the order of the Special judge. The Court observed that even after 2 1\2 years the case didnt move an inch further and that an expeditious trial was primarily in the interest of the accused and mandate of Article 21 of The Constitution of India. The Court therefore, suo motu withdrew this special case and another one filed against the appellant by another person and transferred them to the High Court, with the request to the Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a sitting Judge of the High Court, who should proceed to expeditiously dispose of the cases, preferably by holding trial from day to day. 5. This direction was challenged after four years before the Supreme Court on the grounds of non-perception of certain provisions and certain authorities which would amount to derogation of the constitutional rights of the citizen.

JUDGEMENT AND REASONS FOR THE SAME:I. THE MAJORITY DECISION- Sabyasachi Mukherji,J: G.L.Oza,J: S.Natrajan,J; Ranganath Mishra, J; 1. The question regarding the right to try a case and transferability of cases: The law provides that the Supreme Court may direct that any particular case or appeal be transferred from one High Court to another High Court or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to another Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court. The jurisdiction to entertain and try cases is conferred either by the Constitution or by the laws made by Parliament. There was no jurisdiction or power to transfer a case from the Court of the Special Judge to any High Court. Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code only permitted transfer of cases from one High Court to another High Court or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to a Criminal Court subordinate to another High Court. It is apparent that the impugned directions could not have been given under S. 406 of the Code as the Court has no such power to order the transfer from the Court of the Special Judge to the High Court of Bombay.

2.Act of the Court vis a vis Doctrine of Separation of Powers: The Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to transfer the case to itself. The power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character, so also the power to confer a right of appeal or to take away a right of appeal. Parliament alone can do it by law and no Court, whether superior or inferior or both combined can enlarge the jurisdiction of a court or divest a person of his rights of revision and appeal.

3. Observance of principles of Natural Justice: The Supreme Court is not debarred from re-opening this question and giving proper directions and correcting the error in the present appeal, when the said directions on 16th February, 1984, were violative of the limits of jurisdiction and the directions have resulted in deprivation of the fundamental rights of the appellant, guaranteed by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The appellant has been treated differently from other offenders; accused of a similar offence in view of the provisions of the Act of 1952 and the High Court was not a Court competent to try the offence. It was directed to try the appellant under the directions of this Court, which was in derogation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The directions have been issued without observing the principle of audi alteram partem.

4. Constitutional Rights of the Appellant were violated by SC and through further proceedings; It was emphasised that an order which this Court could make in order to do complete justice between the parties, must, not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws. The judges agreed that the appellant had a further right under Article 21 of the Constitution a right to trial by a Special Judge under section 7(l) of the 1952 Act which is the procedure established by law made by the Parliament, and a further right to move the High Court by way of revision or first appeal under Section 9 of the said Act. He had also a right not to suffer any order passed behind his back by a Court in violation of the basic principles of natural justice. The judges agreed that the directions given in this case were without hearing the appellant, though it

appears from the circumstances that the order was passed in the prescence of the counsel for the appellant, were bad.

5. The Supreme Court can review its decision if it violates a citizens constitutional rights:Once it is found that the order of transfer by this Court dated 16th of February, 1984 (reported in AIR 1984 SC 684) was not within jurisdiction, by the direction of the transfer of the proceedings made by this Court, the appellant should not suffer. What remains to be decided is the procedure by which the direction of the 16th of February, 1984, could be recalled or altered. There can be no doubt that certiorari shall not lie to quash a judicial order of this Court. If a mistake is detected and the apex Court is not able to correct it, with a view to doing Justice for fear of being misunderstood, the cause of justice is bound to suffer and for the apex Court the apprehension would not be a valid consideration.

II. Minority judgment given by- Venkatachaliah, Ranganathan J.J. 1. Regarding the power of transferability of cases:The expression jurisdiction or the power to determine is, it is said, a verbal cast of many colours. Jurisdiction is a legal shelter- a power to bind despite a possible error in the decision. The existence of jurisdiction does not depend on the correctness of the exercise. The authority to decide embodies a privilege to bind despite error a privilege which is inherent in and indispensable to every judicial function .Lord Doplock said in a case2 : There is in my view, however, also an obvious distinction between jurisdiction conferred by a statute on a court of law of limited jurisdiction to decide a defined question finally and conclusively or unappeasably, and a similar jurisdiction conferred on the High Court or a judge of the High Court acting in his judicial capacity. The High Court is not a court of limited jurisdiction and its constitutional role includes the interpretation of written laws. This observation of his largely influenced most of the judges. In Daryao v. State of U.P3: it was held: "It is in the interest of the public at large that finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article 32."

2 3

(1980)2All ER 634 AIR 1986 SC 1457

2. For complete justice, the powers of the Court: No one would think of holding a judgment of the court of last resort void if its jurisdiction were debatable or even colorable, the same rule must be applied to the judgments of all judicial tribunals. This is the true theory of judicial action when viewed collaterally. If any jurisdictional question is debatable or colorable, the tribunal must decide it; and an erroneous conclusion can only be corrected by some proceeding provided by law for so doing, commonly called a Direct Attack. It is only where it can be shown lawfully, that some matter or thing essential to jurisdiction wants, that the proceeding is void, collaterally. It is the duty of the courts to set their faces against all collateral assaults on judicial proceedings for two reasons, namely Not one case in a hundred has any merits in it. Courts should reduce the chances for a successful collateral attack to the lowest minimum is that they bring the courts themselves into disrepute. Since in this case it was neither a case of misrepresented facts nor a case of fraud, so this principle of overrule ruling its judgment cant be considered. Such things tend to weaken law and order and to cause men to settle their rights by violence. For these reasons, when the judgment rendered did not exceed the possible power of the court, and the notice was sufficient to put the defendant upon inquiry, a court should hesitate long before holding the proceedings void collaterally.

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3. Arts 14 & 21 and principles of natural justice: As regarding the contention of the violation of Fundamental right Art.14 and 21 it is said that these rights are subject to certain limitations and these limitations by a procedure established by law which need to be reasonable fair and just. And the validity of its reasonableness is to be checked by the court. If the law permits the withdrawal of the trial to the High Court from a Special Judge, such a law enabling withdrawal would not, prima facie, be bad as violation of Article 14. The five Judge bench in the earlier case has held that such a transfer is permissible under law. If appellant says that he is singled out for a hostile treatment on the ground alone that he is exposed to a trial before a Judge of the High Court then the submission has a touch of irony. Indeed that a trial by a Judge of the High Court makes for added re-assurance of justice, has been recognised in a number of judicial pronouncement. In the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, it was held that speedier trail of such offences or class of offences the special court can be setup. Following this rule the minority held that since the case was pending for a long time and justice was delayed which is an essential as stated by the Court in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India. 4 So singling out the appellant case and referring it to the High Court did not violate of Art.14. As regarding the violation of principles of natural justice is seen, It cannot be said that after the directions were pronounced and before the order was signed there was no opportunity for the appellant's learned counsel to make any submissions in regard to the alleged illegality or impropriety of the directions. Appellant did not utilise the opportunity. That apart, even after being told by two judicial orders that appellant, if aggrieved, may seek a review, he did not do so.
4

AIR 1978 SC 597

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And more over, "the rules of natural justice must not be stretched too far. Only too often the people who have done wrong seek to invoke the rules of natural justice so as to avoid the consequences."5 So this contention was also not agreed to, by the two judges

R. v Secretary of States for the home dept ex parte (1973)3 All ER 796

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS REFFERED:1. V.N.Shukla, Constitution of India, Tenth Edition, Eastern Book Company, 2001. 2. M.P.Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Fifth Edition, Wadhwa & Company Nagpur, 2008. 3. H.M.Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Vol-1, Fourth Edition, Universa Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2006. 4. D.D.Basu, The Constitution of India, Fifth Edition, Wadhwa & Company Nagpur, 2008.

ELECTRONIC SOURCES REFFERED:1. http://www.google.co.in/ 2. http://www.yahoo.com/ 3. http://www.maupatra.com/

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