History 1

Peace Operations Training Institute
THE HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR: 1945 TO 1987
Course Author Sunil Ram (Canadian Forces Retired) American Military University Series Editor Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
Based in part on the original course by F.T. Liu Special Adviser to the International Peace Academy Former United Nations Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Externally reviewed by Dr. Tim Mau University of Guelph, Canada
2008 Peace Operations Training Institute
THE HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR: 1945 TO 1987
Course Author Sunil Ram (Canadian Forces Retired) American Military University Series Editor Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.
Based in part on the original course by F.T. Liu Special Adviser to the International Peace Academy Former United Nations Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs Externally reviewed by Dr. Tim Mau University of Guelph, Canada
2008 Peace Operations Training Institute Peace Operations Training Institute 1309 Jamestown Road, Suite 202 Williamsburg, VA 23185 USA www.peaceopstraining.org
First edition: 1997 by F.T. Liu Second edition: August 2006 by Sunil Ram Cover: UN Photo #122816 by John Isaac This course was developed and updated under a generous grant from the United States Institute of Peace. The material contained herein does not necessarily reflect the views of the Peace Operations Training Institute, the Course Author(s), or any United Nations organs or affiliated organizations. Although every effort has been made to verify the contents of this course, the Peace Operations Training Institute and the Course Author(s) disclaim any and all responsibility for facts and opinions contained in the text, which have been assimilated largely from open media and other independent sources. This course was written to be a pedagogical and teaching document, consistent with existing UN policy and doctrine, but this course does not establish or promulgate doctrine. Only officially vetted and approved UN documents may establish or promulgate UN policy or doctrine. Information with diametrically opposing views is sometimes provided on given topics, in order to stimulate scholarly interest, and is in keeping with the norms of pure and free academic pursuit.
History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 1945 to 1987
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII FORMAT OF STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII METHOD OF STUDY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .IX
LESSON 1 THE GENESIS OF PEACEKEEPING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 1.1 Genesis of UN Peacekeeping Operations 1.2 UN Collective Security System 1.3 The Korean Crisis and Its Aftermath 1.4 Increasing the Role of the General Assembly 1.5 Summary
LESSON 2 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2.1 The First UN Military Observer Mission 2.2 Background on the First UN Peacekeeping Operation 2.3 Major Contribution of Ralph Bunche 2.4 Mandate of UNTSO 2.5 Responsibilities of the Parties Involved 2.6 The Second Truce 2.7 The General Armistice Agreements 2.8 Observation Operations Between 1967 and 1973 2.9 The 1973 War (Yom Kippur War) 2.10 UNTSO After 1973 2.11 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 2.12 Impact of UNTSO on Other Early Military Observer Missions
LESSON 3 THE FIRST UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3.1 Differences Between Military Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Missions 3.2 Background of the Suez Canal Crisis 3.3 UN Peace Initiatives for the Suez Canal Crisis 3.4 The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) 3.5 Principles Upon Which UNEF was Based 3.6 Advisory Committee 3.7 The Early Phase of UNEF 3.8 The Status of the Force Agreement 3.9 UNEFs Composition
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3.10 3.11 3.12
The Weaknesses and Strengths of UNEF The Egyptian-Israeli War and the Withdrawal of UNEF Consequences of the Withdrawal of UNEF
LESSON 4 UN OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 4.1 Background on the UN Operation in the Congo 4.2 The Post-Independence Crisis (1960-61) 4.3 The Withdrawal of Belgian Forces 4.4 The Constitutional Crisis 4.5 The Secession of Katanga 4.6 Fighting Between Katangan and ONUC Forces 4.7 The Re-establishment of the Central Government 4.8 Personnel and Logistics Issues 4.9 Lack of Intelligence Gathering Capability 4.10 The Outcome of the ONUC Mission 4.11 Effects of ONUC on the United Nations 4.12 The Role of ONUC in the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations LESSON 5 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE EARLY 1960s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 5.1 What Precipitated the Financial Crisis at the United Nations 5.2 The Financial Background of UNEF and ONUC 5.3 Steps Taken by the UN to Resolve Its Financial Crisis 5.4 The Stand Taken by the United States Regarding Article 19 5.5 The Report of the Special Committee and Resolution of the Financial Crisis 5.6 Impact of the Financial Crisis LESSON 6 UNTEA, UNYOM, AND DOMREP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73
UN TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY (UNTEA) IN WEST NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN)
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13
Background on UNTEA Establishment of UNSF Establishment of UNTEA Indonesia Takes Over UNTEAs Impact Background on UNYOM Establishment of UNYOM Organisation of UNYOM Operations and Termination Background on DOMREP The Inter-American Peace Force Role of DOMREP DOMREPs Impact
UN YEMEN OBSERVER MISSION (UNYOM)
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP)
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LESSON 7 UNOGIL AND UNMOGIP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91

UN OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON (UNOGIL)
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14
Background on UNOGIL Deployment of UNOGIL Role of UNOGIL Presence of U.S. Military Forces in Lebanon Events in Jordan General Assembly Emergency Session Termination of UNOGIL Background on UNMOGIP Role of UNMOGIP Establishment of UNIPOM The Tashkent Agreement The Continuation of UNMOGIP The 1999 Kargil Conflict Ongoing Issues
UN MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP)
LESSON 8 UNEF II AND UNDOF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107

THE SECOND UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF II)
8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 8.14
Background on the Six-Day War of 1967 The October 1973 War and the UNs Response Establishment of UNEF II Composition and Strength of UNEF II Mission Mandate Renewals UNEF Command and the Status of the Force Phases of UNEF II Significance and Innovations of UNEF II Background on UNDOF Establishment of UNDOF Organisation of UNDOF Force Modernisation The Area of Separation Role and Activities of UNDOF
DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF)
LESSON 9 UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127 9.1 Background on UNFICYP 9.2 Establishment and Organisation of UNFICYP 9.3 Guiding Principles for UNFICYP 9.4 Liaison Arrangements and Freedom of Movement 9.5 Ceasefire Supervision and Normalisation Efforts 9.6 The 1967 Crisis 9.7 Arms Imports
9.8 9.9 9.10 9.11 9.12 9.13
Force Reductions Between 1965-1974 The 1974 Coup dtat The 1974 de facto Ceasefire Secretary-Generals Good Offices Mission The Financial Problems and Subsequent Restructuring of UNFICYP UNFICYP to the End of 2005
LESSON 10 UN INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 10.1 Background and Establishment of UNIFIL 10.2 Organisation of UNIFIL to April 1982 10.3 Ceasefire and Israeli Withdrawal 10.4 The Imperfect Buffer Zone 10.5 Limited Lebanese Government Control Over Southern Lebanon 10.6 The 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 10.7 Withdrawal of the IDF 10.8 The Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) 10.9 Landmine and UXO Clearance 10.10 Role of UNIFIL from 1985 to April 2000 10.11 The Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon 10.12 UNIFIL from July 2000 to January 2006 10.13 UNIFILs Deficiencies and Shortcomings 10.14 The Aftermath of UNIFILs Failure
LESSON 11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169 11.1 Summary 11.2 Evaluating the Performance of UN Peacekeeping During the Cold War 11.3 General Criticisms of Peacekeeping 11.4 Conclusion
APPENDIX A LIST OF ACRONYMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178 APPENDIX B LIST OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 APPENDIX C MISSION DATA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
END-OF-COURSE EXAMINATION INSTRUCTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
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FOREWORD
Given the resurgence of peacekeeping in the early 21st Century, it is relevant to deepen the knowledge and understanding of United Nations peacekeeping missions in the context of their origins and evolution. With the expanding size, scope, and complexity of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations in the immediate post-Cold War era, it is highly pertinent to review how peacekeeping was conducted during the Cold War, as these missions were fundamentally different to the way operations are conducted today. This review is even more relevant as a number of key Cold War missions are still ongoing as of 2006, three of which (the United Nations Disengagement Observer ForceUNDOF; the United Nations Interim Force in LebanonUNIFIL; and the United Nations Truce Supervision OrganisationUNTSO) were directly in the path of the 2006 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. One other Cold War mission, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), was at the periphery of unfolding events in the region. Peacekeeping obviously did not occur in a vacuum and, thus, non-UN and UN-related activities that went on during the Cold War must also be considered in relation to actual UN peacekeeping operations to gain a full understanding of events. It is important to gain a conceptual foundation and background in the history of UN Peacekeeping Operations by reviewing the historical, political, and diplomatic background that contributed to the evolution of peacekeeping operations in a general chronological order. Therefore, this course package begins with the genesis of peacekeeping and moves on to the Korean War. From there, the first Arab-Israeli war is discussed, in which the first true UN peacekeeping and observer missions were established. The course then goes on to discuss the missions in the late 1950s in Egypt and Congo (1960) and the resulting financial crisis they created that nearly led to the collapse of the UN. Subsequent lessons discuss the smaller missions conducted in Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean. The course then refocuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1967 War, then stepping back briefly in time to 1964 and the inception of the mission in Cyprus. The course then returns to the Arab-Israeli conflict in Lebanon, which is the final mission of the Cold War era and offers a summary and conclusion of the effectiveness of peacekeeping during the first 45 years of peacekeeping. Overall, the study guide will familiarise the student with the significance of individual UN Peacekeeping Missions and the overall evolution and functioning of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations during the Cold War. At the time of this writing, some of the missions were still ongoing. However, lessons have been written in the past tense, as mission mandates could be terminated by the time this course comes to print. I hope that the student will find this updated and enhanced course informative and interesting and that the knowledge gained will be of use in dealing with issues that face peacekeepers throughout the world. Prof. Sunil V. Ram July 2006
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FORMAT OF STUDY
This course is designed for independent study at a pace determined by the student.
Course format and materials permit: MODULAR STUDY EASE OF REVIEW INCREMENTAL LEARNING
STUDENTS RESPONSIBILITY
The student is responsible for: Learning course material Completing the End-of-Course Examination Submitting the End-of-Course Examination
Please consult your enrolment confirmation email or the end of this course for examination submission instructions.
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METHOD OF STUDY
The following are suggestions for how to proceed with this course. Though the student may have alternate approaches that are effective, the following hints have worked for many.
Before you begin actual studies, first browse through the overall course material. Notice the lesson outlines, which give you an idea of what will be involved as you proceed. The material should be logical and straightforward. Instead of memorizing individual details, strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system. Set up guidelines regarding how you want to schedule your time. Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson, orient yourself to the main points. If you are able to, read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings. When you finish a lesson, take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. For any error, go back to the lesson section and re-read it. Before you go on, be aware of the discrepancy in your understanding that led to the error. After you complete all of the lessons, take time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, while the material is fresh in your mind, take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting. Your exam will be scored, and if you achieve a passing grade of 75 percent or higher, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 percent, you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination. One note about spelling is in order. This course was written in English as it is used in the United Kingdom.
Note: The appendices located in the back of this course contain reference materials that may be useful to the student, including a list of acronyms used in this text, an acronym list of all peacekeeping operations, and mission data profiles of the missions discussed in this text, including basic facts, maps, and medals.
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LESSON 1 THE GENESIS OF PEACEKEEPING

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Genesis of UN Peacekeeping Operations UN Collective Security System The Korean Crisis and Its Aftermath Increasing the Role of the General Assembly Summary
Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping
LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 1 provides a look at what the term peacekeeping meant in the original Charter, and how that definition evolved with changing circumstances. It discusses the original system of UN collective security and why it became inoperable. Lesson 1 also takes a look at the nature of the period known as the Cold War, a term reflecting the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The student becomes familiar with the impact of this rivalry on the operation of the United Nations and the subsequent evolution of peacekeeping missions and military observer missions. The lesson examines an initial regional conflict in Korea, how it played a major role in the re-evaluation of peacekeeping by the United Nations, and how it led to the increased role of the General Assembly in initiating peacekeeping measures. The lesson describes the characteristics of peacekeeping missions, their chain of command, and their implementation, as well as the nature, duties, and roles of the countries and the forces that participate in these missions.
By the end of Lesson 1, the student should be able to meet the following objectives:
Explain the original UN system of collective security as outlined in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter; Understand the impact of superpower rivalry in the evolution of peacekeeping operations; Explain what overall steps are taken to establish a mission, as well as the chain of responsibilities related to each step; and Identify and explain the early predecessor of peacekeeping operations, namely, the UN intervention in Korea and how it impacted UN policy towards international peacekeeping.
1.1
Genesis of UN Peacekeeping Operations
It has been argued by some historians that the origins of peacekeeping go as far back as the Delian League of ancient Greece in the fifth century, BCE. But, like the Delian League, on closer examination these examples of proto peacekeeping were clearly ordinary alliances that had little to do with ethical issues surrounding peace. From a western perspective, the closest example from history that first tried to personify what we see today as peacekeeping was initiated by the early medieval Catholic Church through its initiatives (the Peace of God and Truce of God) in the late tenth century to try and limit the spread of war. However, these ideals and some early attempts at arms control (i.e., the Second Lateran Council of 1139) were also initiated to allow the fury of interstate war in Europe to be directed at the Muslim-dominated Middle East. A new and radical idea was offered in 1623 by Emeric Cruc. He argued that all the worlds leaders, including all those outside of traditional Europe, should be included in an alliance that tried to resolve international disputes through mediation at a world council held in a neutral location. Over the next few centuries, more substantive European attempts were made to peace-orientated agreements included the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, Utrecht in 1713, Paris in 1763, and in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars the Concert of Europe in 1815-18. There were other attempts, but the first truly substantial system came into being after the horrors of World War I (1914-18). The League of Nations was the child of American President Woodrow Wilson, and it was an attempt at collective diplomacy and peace enforcement. It ultimately failed, but after the Second World War, the United Nations Organisation (UNO) became the mechanism to implement collective diplomacy and peace. The founders of the United Nations had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in peacekeeping operations (PKOs); thus, PKOs are not mentioned at all in the original UN Charter. By definition, peacekeeping operations are essentially a practical mechanism used by the United Nations to contain international conflicts and to facilitate their settlement by peaceful means. However, tensions between the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union (USSR) emerged after World War II and significantly affected the operation of the UN. This was known as the Cold War. What we now call peacekeeping came about out of necessity and was essentially an improvisation to respond to the growing tensions between the superpowers (the U.S. and the USSR). Under Article 25 of the Charter, Member States of the UN have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council (SC). Therefore, under the Charter, the SC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As a result of the increasing disagreement between the two superpowers, the original collective security system, which was based on peace enforcement by the SC and consensus by major powers, became unworkable. This led to the conception of PKOs. Early peacekeeping was a response to inter-state conflict, and ideally it was conceived as a non-violent use of military force in an effort to preserve peace between warring state actors. Peacekeeping fell between Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter, and in the future it would be euphemistically referred to as Chapter VI operations.
1.2
UN Collective Security System
The original system devised by the United Nations to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security is outlined in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. It was intended to provide a collective security system for Member Nations. Briefly, the original system was meant to function in the following manner:
CHAPTER VI: PEACEFUL RESOLUTION When a dispute arises between two governments, the parties concerned are obligated under Chapter VI of the Charter to seek a solution by peaceful means, mainly by: (a) Negotiation (b) Conciliation (c) Mediation (d) Arbitration (e) Peaceful settlement (f) Resort to regional agencies or arrangements.
CHAPTER VII: ENFORCEMENT MEASURES If the peaceful means fail and the dispute escalates into an armed conflict, then Chapter VII comes into play. Chapter VII constitutes the core of the UN Collective Security System. It provides that in the case of: (a) A threat to the peace (b) A breach of the peace (c) An act of aggression the Security Council may take enforcement measures to restore the situation. These enforcement measures are essentially: (a) Arms embargoes (b) Economic sanctions and, in the last resort, (c) The use of force. Plans for the use of force must be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the UN Military Staff Committee.
The five major powers, which played a key role in the creation of the United Nations, are Permanent Members of the SC, and each are endowed with the right of veto. These nations are China, France, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (now Russia), The United Kingdom, and the United States. The same major powers also make up the Military Staff Committee. Thus, the Charter provisions on the collective use of force can be applied effectively only with their consent and with their continued co-operation. But because the Cold War broke out shortly after the establishment of the United Nations, these conditions could not be met due to the fact that the relations among the major powers, and especially between the two superpowers, became marred by mistrust and disagreement. This resulted in the SC having to resort to other means in which to preserve peace and stability. Thus, the mediation, conciliation, good offices of the SecretaryGeneral, and ultimately peacekeeping became these other means during the Cold War. U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had envisioned the SCs Permanent Members as a team of world policemen; however, this never came to be. Instead, as peacekeeping evolved, peacekeeping troops were drawn on a voluntary basis from Member States. Peacekeeping began with unarmed observers and then evolved into missions that had both armed peacekeepers and unarmed military observers. The classical model of Cold War peacekeeping evolved over the 1950s, when consent from the protagonists was required for peacekeeping intervention, impartiality was required from the deployed UN forces, and UN forces were only to resort to the use of arms in self-defence. There was only one instance during the Cold War in which the collective use of force was initiated under the Charter; this was the Korean Crisis in 1950.
1.3
The Korean Crisis and Its Aftermath
The Charter provisions on the collective use of force in Korea were invoked in a roundabout way. This occurred at the outset of the Korean crisis. When the North Korean army invaded South Korea in June 1950, the United States immediately brought the matter before the Security Council and proposed a series of draft resolutions. It asked the Council to: (a) Determine that the armed attack by North Korea was a breach of the peace; (b) Call upon North Korea to withdraw its forces forthwith to the 38th parallel; (c) Request Member States to provide military assistance to South Korea and make their military units available to a unified command under the United States; and (d) Authorise the unified command to fly the United Nations flag.
"The official flag of the United Nations, now flying with national banners over the U.N. armed forces in action to restore the peace in Korea, is shown in this photograph. The background colour of the flag is the light blue associated with the U.N. since its early days, while the official United Nations seal in its centre is in white." (Quote from the original caption), New York, 1950.
These draft resolutions did not mention Chapter VII of the Charter. At the time, the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council because of the question of the representation of China at the UN. In the absence of the Soviet Union, the United States draft resolutions were adopted and provided the basis to establish the United Nations Forces in Korea. When the Soviet Union realised the consequences of its boycott, it resumed its seat in the Security Council at the beginning of August 1950; after it returned, the Council could no longer take any action on the Korean crisis. The UN Forces in Korea were not a peacekeeping operation in the way that a PKO is normally defined because: the forces there were not directed by the SecretaryGeneral; and they used force. Nor was it considered an enforcement operation under Chapter VII of the Charter, because: it was not under the control of the Security Council; and the Councils enabling resolutions had not specifically invoked that Chapter. It was a unique case made possible by the astonishing decision of the Soviet Union to stay away from the SC for six crucial weeks. The Soviet Union had boycotted the SC because the anti-communist government of Taiwan occupied the permanent SC seat held by China, instead of the mainland communist government. Why the Soviet Union waited that long to return to its seat on the SC remains one of the unresolved mysteries of the United Nations history.
The Korean Operation was established between 1950 to 1954. The medal was officially renamed the United Nations Korean Medal on November 22, 1961. Personnel were eligible to receive the medal after a period of 30 days service in the Mission. (Source: UNDPKO)
1.4
Increasing the Role of the General Assembly
The repercussions of the Korean crisis led to a re-evaluation of the UNs role in peacekeeping. It was undoubtedly the Korean experience that prompted the United States to seek to enhance the role of the General Assembly to maintain international peace and security. At the 1950 session of the General Assembly, the U.S. proposed a draft resolution to empower the Assembly to deal with matters in this field on an emergency basis. It proposed that if the Security Council failed to act because of the lack of unanimity among its Permanent Members, the General Assembly could then vote to take action. Despite the strong objection of the Soviet Union, the Assembly adopted this proposal, known as the Uniting for Peace Resolution, on 3 November 1950.
1.5
Summary
The Korean crisis and its aftermath highlighted the fact that the Charter provisions on the collective use of force, which were based solely on agreement between the five superpowers on the Security Council, were not applicable. It brought out the necessity for the United Nations to devise an alternative mechanism to restore peace in case of an outbreak of armed conflict. The United Nations peacekeeping operations were conceived and developed as this alternative mechanism. As further reading will show, PKOs were developed progressively and pragmatically, thanks to the vision and efforts of the successive Secretaries-General and other prominent internationalists, such as Ralph Bunche, Lester B. Pearson, and Brian Urquhart.
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Chain of Command

Source: Sunil Ram
UN HQ New York
SECRETARY GENERAL
Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA)

Force Commander (FC)/ Chief Military Observer (CMO) Deputy Force Commander (DFC)/ Deputy Chief Military Observer (DCMO)
Field Operations Division (FOD)

Personal Staff Senior Advisor (SA) Legal Advisor (LA) Press Information Officer (PIO)
Chief of Staff (COS)
Civilian Administrative Officer (CAO)
Operations Branch (OPS)
Aministration & Personnel Branch (A&P)
Logistics Branch (LOG)
Civilian Administrative Staff
MISSION HQ
Infantry Battalions Military Observers
Logistics Units
Operations/Support Elements
LESSON 1 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ
1.
On a day-to-day basis, peacekeeping operations are directed by who? A. The General Assembly; B. The Secretary-General; C. Solely by the Commander of Operations; D. The Security Council.
2.
The founders of the United Nations had not foreseen the possibility of engaging in what? A. Peacekeeping operations (PKOs); B. Conventional warfare; C. Development; D. Reconstruction.
3.
When a dispute arises between two governments, which one of the following statements is true according to the UN Charter? A. Parties are not obligated to seek a resolution through any means; B. The Secretary-General establishes guidelines for its resolution under instructions from the General Assembly; C. The Security Council may invoke sanctions to induce parties to seek a peaceful resolution, and may invoke the use of force as a last resort; D. The UN Charter does not address disputes that arise between two governments.
4.
Peacekeeping operations of the UN are outlined in: A. Chapter VI of the original Charter; B. Chapter VII of the original Charter; C. Chapters VI and VII of the original Charter; D. Not mentioned at all in the original Charter;
5.
What does Chapter VII of the UN Charter constitute? A. The core of the UN Collective Security System; B. The secondary role of the Security Council; C. The primary rules of disengagement for the UN system; D. The operating rules for the General Assembly.
6.
Military personnel who serve on UN peacekeeping operations: A. Are provided only by the five members of the Security Council; B. Always are conscripts who have been drafted by their nation; C. Are permanent employees of the United Nations; D. Are provided by Member States on a voluntary basis.
7.
Why were the U.S. draft resolutions, that were the basis of the establishment of the United Nations Forces in Korea, adopted by the Security Council (SC)? A. There was full support from all the Permanent Members of the SC; B. The U.S. was able to pressure all the members of the SC to support the resolutions; C. At the time, the USSR was boycotting the SC because of the question of the representation of China at the UN; D. There was no clear understanding of the implications of the resolutions.
8.
Why was Korea not considered an enforcement operation under Chapter VII of the Charter? A. It was not under the control of the Security Council; B. It did not have the full agreement of the Security Council; C. It was outside of the scope of the UN Charter as a whole; D. The Secretary-General did not endorse the mission.
9.
The Korean experience prompted the United States to do what? A. Retrench its foreign policy and not support the UN; B. Enhance the role of the General Assembly to maintain international peace and security; C. Change the way vetoes worked in the Security Council; D. Modify the role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace.
10. The Korean crisis highlighted the need for the United Nations to devise what? A. An alternative mechanism to restore peace in case of an outbreak of armed conflict; B. A standing military force; C. A re-evaluation of superpower rivalry in the Security Council; D. A reduced role for Permanent Members in the Security Council.
ANSWER KEY: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4D, 5A, 6D, 7C, 8A, 9B, 10A
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LESSON 2 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 The First UN Military Observer Mission Background on the First UN Peacekeeping Operation Major Contribution of Ralph Bunche Mandate of UNTSO Responsibilities of the Parties Involved The Second Truce The General Armistice Agreements Observation Operations Between 1967 and 1973 The 1973 War (Yom Kippur War)
2.10 UNTSO After 1973 2.11 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) 2.12 Impact of UNTSO on Other Early Military Observer Missions
Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 2 gives the student an overview of early UN peacekeeping activities, particularly as they evolved due to the stimulus of the Arab-Israeli crisis. It analyses the forerunners of UN Military Observers (e.g., in Indonesia) versus the first actual peacekeeping force in Palestine. It looks at major principles defined by Ralph Bunche that became the foundation of peacekeeping operations, and it examines the UN Truce Supervision Observer Mission (UNTSO) in Palestine as the prototype on which all other observer missions are based. The lesson also discusses responsibilities of the Host country and of all the parties involved in a mission.

Distinguish between military observer missions and peacekeeping operations; Understand and explain the significance of the Arab-Israeli conflict in keeping the international peace; Describe the background and origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict; State the role of the Suez Canal in the conflict in the Middle East; List the peace initiatives taken by the United Nations to resolve the Middle East crisis; and Define the significance of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) and the UN Truce Supervision Observer Mission (UNTSO), and outline major details involved in those missions.
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2.1
The First UN Military Observer Mission
The first time that the United Nations used Military Observers (UNMOs) was in 1947, when hostilities broke out in Indonesia between the Royal Dutch Army and the armed forces of the newly established Indonesian Government. As per Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the Security Council called for a ceasefire and established the UN Good Offices Commission (UNGOC), which was a Consular Commission comprised of local international diplomatic staff that were seconded to the UN to supervise the ceasefire and assist in the subsequent repatriation of Dutch forces back to Holland. That Commission was composed of five members of the Security Council, namely Australia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which had career consuls in Batavia (now Djakarta). It requested its members to make their military attaches available to carry out the monitoring task in the field. These military attaches were the first military observers at the service of the United Nations. But it should be noted that they were members of their own national delegations to the Consular Commission and thus were not directed by the Secretary-General or the UN. Therefore, they were not considered to be a UN peacekeeping operation but rather the forerunners of peacekeeping operations. UNGOC ran from 1 August 1947 to 1 January 1949. It was then called the UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) and ran until 30 April 1951, when the observers were withdrawn.
2.2
Background on the First UN Peacekeeping Operation
The first actual UN peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine (UNTSO), was created in 1948 as a military observer mission in response to war between the Arabs and the Israelis, what is now known as the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. UNTSO was an outgrowth of the initial UN General Assembly Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which had been established in 1947 after the United Kingdom (UK) had requested the UN to review the situation in the British Mandate of Palestine. UNSCOP made its final report, the United Nations Partition Plan, which was ratified by the General Assembly in November 1947; this resulted in the creation of a new Jewish state, Israel. The Palestinian Arabs and regional Arab governments UNTSO observers surrounded by children in condemned the creation of a Jewish state. When the war the late 1940s. (Source: UN/DPI) broke out in Palestine in May 1948 as the British mandate ended, the UN Security Council called on the warring parties to observe a truce (Truce Commission for Palestine) and asked the UN Mediator for Palestine (Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden) to supervise it with the help of military observers. On 29 May the Security Council called for a fourweek ceasefire, and through resolution 50 (1948) shaped what was to become UNTSO, even though it never mentioned the mission by name. Though never formally created as a peacekeeping force, UNTSO is the only non-temporary agency financed by the UNs regular budget.
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2.3
Major Contribution of Ralph Bunche
When these military officers arrived in the conflict area, they were organised into a cohesive group who were given a set of principles and operating procedures. Ralph Bunche, who was originally Deputy to the Mediator, became the Acting Mediator after the assassination of Bernadotte in Jerusalem in September 1948. Out of respect to Bernadotte, the title of the senior appointment in UNTSO to this day remains Chief of Staff. Bunche defined the principles that were to guide the organisation and functioning of UNTSO; he is especially known for first defining the principles of consent and impartiality. Bunche also made the decision that observers should not carry side-arms because he felt that in a situation of tension, possible antagonists would be less prone to use their arms against UN observers if they were known to be unarmed. Bunche resolved the thorny issue of the nationality of the UNMOs by requesting that each Member State of the Truce Commission (Belgium, France, Sweden, and the United States) initially provide personnel. Administratively the UNMOs remained under their own army establishments, and they wore their national uniforms and a UN armband (the blue beret did not come into use until 1956). They received their normal pay plus a UN subsistence allowance. They only took their orders from UN authorities, and they were protected under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations to ensure their freedom of movement and safety.
Personnel UNOs Contributors Belgium 21 France 21 Sweden United States 21 United Nations
Staff Officers
Support Personnel
Guards
5* 10 51**
* Included the Commander Lt. Gen Count Thord Bonde ** Recruited from the Secretariats security force at UNHQ in New York.
2.4
Mandate of UNTSO
The initial mandate of UNTSO observers was to help the Mediator supervise the truce called for by the Security Council. As such, UNTSO observers were part of the Mediators mission and were directed by the Mediator through his Chief of Staff. Bunche succeeded in this mission. In early 1949, Bunche brought about the first agreements ever achieved between Israel and the Arab States. Under his auspices, armistice agreements were signed by Israel with each of its four neighbouring Arab States: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. These agreements established an important supervisory role to the Chief of Staff and observers of UNTSO. Before relinquishing his post as Acting Mediator, Bunche succeeded in obtaining the Security Councils agreement to make UNTSO an autonomous operation placed under the authority of the Council and the day-to-day direction of the Secretary-General (resolution 78/1949). This is how UNTSO became the first peacekeeping operation in UN history. UNTSO was set up without a time limit and has continued to operate to this
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day. Its functions were later modified to accommodate changing circumstances following the 1956, 1967, and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. The number of UNMOs has varied accordingly, ranging between 40 and 700 at the missions peak. The mission was composed of UNMOs of various nationalities under the command of a Chief of Staff, who was appointed by the Secretary-General and was responsible to him. The UNMOs were provided by Member States on a voluntary basis at the request of the SecretaryGeneral. They operated under the principles of consent and impartiality, and they were unarmed. The UNMOs had no power to prevent truce violations or enforce truce agreements. However, their mere presence had provided some moral incentive by all sides to limit violations.
2.5
Responsibilities of the Parties Involved
The host countries were expected to give UN observers full co-operation in the performance of their duties and to ensure their safety in the mission area in accordance with the Convention on the Immunities and Privileges of the United Nations. Once assigned to UN service, the military observers took orders exclusively from the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff. If UNMOs were unable to come to a resolution on a complaint or incident, they had to report the matter to their supervisors, who in turn would pass it on up to the Mediator. At the Mediators discretion, he could pass on the report to the Secretary-General and, through him, on to the Security Council. When complaints came from local civilians or from troops of the separated parties, the UNMOs on the spot were to deal with the issue. Complaints from local military commanders were to be handled by the UN area commander of the Chief of Staff. Complaints by Governments were to be handled by the Mediator. Required investigations were to be carried out by the UNMOs on the scene, whenever possible. The first Headquarters (HQ) of UNTSO was located in Cairo, Egypt. However, due to the failure of the truce, it was subsequently moved to Haifa, Israel, in late June 1948. On 25 May 1949, UNTSOs HQ was moved once again, this time to Government House in Jerusalem.
2.6
The Second Truce
The initial four-week truce expired on 9 July 1948. While Israel accepted the Mediators proposal for a truce extension, the Arab Governments did not. Almost immediately, major fighting broke out between Arab and Israeli forces, and UNMOs were withdrawn on 9 July. The Mediator appealed to the SC to intervene, and on 15 July, the SC ordered a ceasefire with the clear threat that non-compliance would lead to an enforcement of Chapter VII of the Charter. All parties complied, and fighting ceased at 1500 GMT on 18 July. The new truce had no definite termination time frame and thus was to remain in force until peace was reached in Palestine. This new mission required a more complex and larger truce supervision system. Re-establishment of UNTSO involved a complete rebuilding of the UN forces due to the earlier pullout. The Mediator requested 100 UNMOs from Belgium, France, and the U.S.
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By August 1948, some 137 UNMOs had arrived, and the mission eventually had some 572 UNMOs and auxiliary personnel, though 682 UNMOs had been requested. Swedish Air Force General Aage Lundstrm was appointed as the Chief of Staff. He and nine other Swedish officers comprised the Mediators personal staff. One fundamental change in the way UNMOs were to operate was that they now were assigned into Groups to observe each Arab and Israeli army group in the mandated truce area as per SC resolution 50 (1948). In addition, one Group covered the coast and ports of the truce area, while another was assigned to Jerusalem. A third Group controlled convoys between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and later one more Group was established to cover airports. The SC under its Instructions to United Nations Observers Engaged in the Supervision of the Truce in Palestine (S/928: 28 July 1948) stated the following: Duty of the Chief of Military Staff is to: A. Organise a detailed plan for land, sea and air observation with the greatest possible dispatch; B. Assign the observers to their posts and direct their activities; C. On the basis of field observations to define on a map the positions of the respective armed forces in the several fighting sectors at the beginning of the truce. Alterations of such positions should be only in connection with local agreements negotiated concerning no-mans land. Questions of principle relating to the interpretation of the terms of the truce shall be referred to the Mediator for decision. (ii) Composition and Functions of the Central Truce Supervision Board. The Central Truce Supervision Board shall function under the chairmanship of the Chief of Military Staff and shall consist of one American, one Belgian and one French Senior Officer to be designated by the Mediator and the political advisor to the Chief of Military Staff. The Chief of Military Staff may designate a member of the Board to act as vice-chairman. The Central Truce Supervision Board shall advise the Chief of Military Staff on all questions relating to the administration of the truce. (iii) Regional Truce Supervision Boards. To the extent feasible the area affected by the truce will be divided into zones in each of which there will be a Regional Truce Supervision Board, the members of which will be designated by the Central Truce Supervision Board. Each regional board will be responsible to the Central Supervision Board for the system of observation to be established in that region. If breaches of the Truce could not be resolved by the Truce Supervision organisation, they would be reported by the Mediator to the Security Council, which would then take the appropriate action.
17 Truce Supervision System

Source: Sunil Ram
UNSC
Mediator
Chief of Staff advice Central Truce Supervision Board
Regional Truce Supervision Board Arab Armies
Regional Truce Supervision Board Israeli Armies
Regional Truce Supervision Board
Coast & Ports UNMO Group
Convoys UNMO Group (Tel Aviv & Jerusalem)
Jerusalem UNMO Group
Airports UNMO Group
On 17 September 1948 the Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated by Jewish terrorists belonging to the Stern Gang (also known as Lehi). Ralph Bunche, Bernadottes American deputy, took over the position as Mediator and was appointed Acting Mediator. As tensions rose over the next few months, fighting broke out in the Lebanese sector, the Negev, the Galilee, and in Jerusalem. The General Assembly and the Security Council reacted by passing a series of resolutions between October and December 1948 to stop the resurgent conflict. The resolutions are listed in the table below. The Acting Mediator, with the full support of both the General Assembly and the SC, by the end of 1948 put in place an effective ceasefire to be facilitated by the military observers of UNTSO.
Ralph Bunche (right) and Folke Bernadotte (left), 1948. (UN)
Date 19 October 1948 Security Council 19 October 1948 Security Council 4 November 1948 Security Council 16 November 1948 Security Council 11 December 1948 General Assembly 29 December 1948 Security Council
Resolution S/RES/59 (1948) S/1045 S/PV.367 S/INF/2/Rev. 1 (III) S/RES/61 (1948) S/1070 S/RES/62 (1948) S/1080 A/RES/194 (III) S/RES/66 (1948) S/1169
Objective Situation in Palestine/Assassinations report, difficulties with truce supervision Ceasefire Negev situation Situation in Palestine - Calls for withdrawal of forces, permanent truce lines/Appoints Committee of the Council Situation in Palestine/Chapter VII - Armistice to be established for permanent peace in Palestine Palestine question/UN Mediator report/UNCCP at Jerusalem/Right of return Situation in Palestine/Ceasefire/UNCCP to nominate representatives
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Arab territories seized by Israel in 1948 in violation of the UN partition plan. (Source: PASSIA archives)
1947 UN Partition Plan. (Source: Ram Military Consulting)
2.7
The General Armistice Agreements
At the time, the conclusion of the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the four surrounding Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) and the adoption of SC resolution 73 (1949) on 11 August 1949 was seen as a step towards a permanent peace in Palestine. The resolution also assigned new functions to UNTSO. Two key changes were the termination of the Mediator and the inactivation of the Truce Commission; this was not formally done but rather a fait accompli as the armistice had been abolished. The termination of the Mediator role made UNTSO an autonomous operation that now answered to the SC and was headed by the Chief of Staff. UNTSOs main responsibility became the work of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), which had been created by the General Armistice Agreements.
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Key Points of the Four General Armistice Agreements EGYPT- Signed on 24 February 1949: The armistice line was approximately drawn following the old international border that dated back to 1906. The Gaza-Rafa area along the Mediterranean Sea was left under Egyptian control and became what is now known as the Gaza Strip. The Egyptian forces besieged in the Al Faluja region were allowed to return to Egypt with their weapons, and the area was handed over to Israel. All POWs were to be exchanged, including those whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as those sentenced for crime or other offence. The area comprising the village of El Auja and vicinity was to be demilitarised, and it became the seat of the bilateral armistice committee. LEBANON - Signed on 23 March 1949: The armistice line (the Blue line) was drawn along the international border. Unlike the other agreements, there was no clause disclaiming this line as an international border, which was thereafter treated as it had been previously, as a de jure international border. Israel withdrew its forces in Lebanese territory from 13 villages, which were occupied during the war. JORDAN - Signed on 3 April 1949: Jordanian forces held most of their positions in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the Old City. Jordan withdrew its forces from their front posts overlooking the Plain of Sharon. In return, Israel agreed to allow Jordanian forces to take over positions in the West Bank previously held by Iraqi forces. A Special Committee was organised to oversee: free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads; resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto; free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; resumption of operation of the Latrun pumping station; provision of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the railroad to Jerusalem and any other such matters as may come up. SYRIA - Signed on 20 July 1949: The Armistice Demarcation Line and the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) were not to be interpreted as having any relation whatsoever to ultimate territorial arrangements affecting Israel and Syria. Syria withdrew its forces from most of the territories it had controlled west of the original international border. OTHERS: Iraq, whose forces took an active part in the war (although it has no common border with Israel), withdrew its forces from the region in March 1949. The front occupied by Iraqi forces was covered by the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan, and there was no separate agreement with Iraq.
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Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) The Egypt-Israel MAC was comprised of seven membersthree from each side and a chairman. The chairman in this case was the Chief of Staff (or a senior military officer designated by him). The other MACs were composed of five memberstwo from each side and a chairman. After August 1949, UNTSOs activities were oriented to the missions of the MACs. Further changes to command structure in UNTSO occurred in 1951, when the Chief of Staff (who had the status of an UNMO) was appointed to a more senior position within the UN Secretariat as a Principal Director. The position later became an Assistant Secretary-General. The primary mission of the MACs was the investigation and examination of the claims or complaints presented by the parties relating to the application and observance of the Armistice Agreements. Complaints of claims fell in the following areas:

The presence of troops or equipment in the DMZs; The presence of defensive areas in the DMZ; Illegal cultivation in the DMZs contrary to agreements; Firing across the Armistice Demarcation Line; Over-flights of the wrong side of the Armistice Demarcation Line; Crossing of the Armistice Demarcation Line by persons or animals; and Other special problems of common interest to the parties.
The role of the MACs UNMOs was to investigate complaints submitted to the MAC to which they were assigned. The UNMOs also handled the task of handing over people, animals, property, and goods that had crossed the Armistice Demarcation Line in violation of the General Armistice Agreements. They also observed the work done by the parties in regards to the anti-locust, antimalaria, and anti-rabies agreements. Furthermore, they were involved in search-and-rescue (SAR) missions carried out by UNTSO on request of one of the parties. The UNMOs were also to observe and maintain the SC ceasefire agreement resolution (15 July 1948, S/RES/54 (1948), S/902 Situation in Palestine/Chapter VII). In the event of a breakdown in the ceasefire, the Chief of Staff was to attempt to resolve it; in more serious cases, he would bring the issue to the SC through the Secretary-General. The Chief of Staff also had a special responsibility for the protection of Mount Scopus in Jerusalem. Each MAC had a HQ and as many secondary installations that were required to fulfil its mission objectives.
MAC HQ Egypt-Israel (EIMAC) Israel-Jordan (IJMAC) Israel-Syria (ISMAC) Israel-Lebanon (ILMAC)
HQ Location DMZ of El Auja. Transferred to Gaza in 1956 Neutral Zone in Jerusalem Damascus Beirut
Subsidiary Location
Control centre in Tiberias, Israel Substation at Naqoura, Lebanon - near the Armistice Demarcation Line
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Breakdown of the General Armistice Agreements The General Armistice Agreements were originally envisioned as temporary arrangements. However, a political impasse occurred and no real peace treaty was achieved due to Israel not allowing Palestinian Arabs to return to their land and the Arab states refusal to acknowledge the existence of the state of Israel. Even with growing UNMO intervention and good offices, the status quo slowly eroded the objectives of the Armistice Agreements. In 1951, Egypt imposed an embargo on Israel by restricting international commercial shipping and goods passing through the Suez Canal. Even though the SC requested that Egypt stop the embargo in 1953, it was extended into the Strait of Tiran. By early 1955, growing Palestinian fedayeen attacks into Israel resulted in retaliatory attacks from Israel. When Egypt established military posts near the border in the El Quseim-Abu Aweigila region, Israel responded by occupying the DMZ at El Auja in September 1956. UNTSO became unable to operate, and full-scale war broke out in October 1956. UNTSO continued its work, as the UN did not recognise Israels refusal to participate in EIMAC. The UNTSO HQ was moved to Gaza, but without Israels co-operation UNTSOs role was more symbolic than realistic. The peacekeeping was now being done by the UN Emergency Force (see Lesson 3), which had been set up in the wake of the 1956 war. When UNEF I was withdrawn at the request of the Egyptian government in 1967, UNTSOs role was expanded to provide a limited UN presence. Though Israel maintained its position on the Armistice Agreements, UNMOs were allowed to pass through Israeli checkpoints along the coastal road between Gaza and Jerusalem. The limited UNTSO presence did not avert another war, which broke out in June 1967. Similar problems of incursions and retaliation occurred along the Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese borders with Israel. These incidents all escalated into what has become known as the SixDay War in 1967. At the outbreak of war between Israel and the Arab states in June 1967, there were 128 UNMOs operating with UNTSO. 2.8 Observation Operations Between 1967 and 1973
Backed by various Western powers (mainly France), Israel destroyed the Arab forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and occupied the Gaza Strip (Egypt), the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt), the Golan Heights (Syria), East Jerusalem (Jordan), and the West Bank (Jordan). There was no fighting along the Israeli-Lebanese border. The Six-Day War ended on 11 June 1967 after the UNTSO Chief of Staff began the negotiations for the SCs call for a ceasefire on 10 June. It should be noted that by this time Israel had achieved many of its military objectives and was thus willing to negotiate. UNMOs moved into the combat areas on the early morning of 11 June. UNTSOs key role at this time was the establishment and supervision of the ceasefire agreements (this now also included the new boundaries between the countries). Even with the new ceasefire lines between Israel and its Arab neighbours and the fact that Israel denounced the other three agreements after the Six-Day War, the Secretary-General refused to accept Israels position, and there was no change to UNTSOs original mission. A series of ceasefire observation points (OPs) were set up along the new boundary lines.
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MAC HQ EgyptIsrael (EIMAC)
OPs on Israeli side 8 (controlled from Qantara)
OPs on Arab side 7 (controlled from Ismailia)
Date Estb. 17 July 1967
Issues Originally, only seven OPs were established along the Suez Canal. None were ever established around the Port Faud area. Some of the UNMOs nationalities were unacceptable to both or one side.
IsraelJordan (IJMAC) IsraelSyria (ISMAC) IsraelLebanon (ILMAC)
No OPs were set up as no agreement could be reached with either side 7 (controlled from Tiberius) none 9 (controlled from Damascus) 5 (controlled from Beirut & Naqoura) End of 1967
24 April 1972
Israel did not agree to the OPs, but also did not hinder their establishment on the Lebanese side of the demarcation line.
Israel before the Six-Day War (Source: Government of Israel)
Israel after the Six-Day War (Source: Government of Israel)
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2.9
The 1973 War (Yom Kippur War)
Tensions again began to rise between the Arab states and Israel, and the so-called Egyptian inspired war of attrition began in early 1969. In early 1970, Israel responded by bombing Egypt. Some 8,000 tons (8 million kgs) of munitions were dropped on Egyptian targets between January and April. Commando raids, artillery duels, and air attacks became the norm. However, neither side moved its positions, and fighting went on for some 20 months, but by the summer of 1970, both sides had realised they were stalemated. Mediation by the Secretary-General was inconclusive; however, a U.S. proposal ended fighting by 7 August. By 1973, Egypt and Syria were planning a surprise assault on Israel. On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel. On 8 October, Egypt formerly requested the withdrawal of UNMOs from its sector as they were now behind the Egyptian frontline. By 9 October, all UN OPs were closed on both sides of the Suez Canal, and the UNMOs were withdrawn to Cairo. Two UNMOs had been killed during the initial fighting. There was intense fighting on the Syrian front, which led to the withdrawal of some UNMOs. The IsraeliJordanian sector remained quiet, and UNTSO continued to operate its liaison office in Amman, which was manned by two UNMOs. In the aftermath of the 1973 War (also known as the Yom Kippur War), the Second UN Emergency Force (see Lesson 8) was established. UNTSO UNMOs were placed under the operational command of the UNEF II Commander and assisted UNEF II in its mission. By October 1973, the total strength of UNTSO was 225 UNMOs from sixteen countries.
2.10
UNTSO After 1973
With the withdrawal of UNEF II in 1979 and the subsequent peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the 1949 Armistice Agreement was superceded; this in turn terminated EIMAC. However, the SecretaryGeneral had indicated that the withdrawal of UNEF II did not necessarily mean the termination of UNTSO in the region. The Egyptian Government did in fact request the continued presence of UNTSO, which resulted in the creation of the Observer Group Egypt (OGE), which was headquartered in Cairo. Effectively EIMAC became the UN Liaison Office in Cairo (UNLOCA), when it was merged with Observer Group Sinai-Cairo (OGSC) to form the OGE. The OGE initially operated one outpost in Ismailia and six OPs in the Sinai. It patrolled most of the Sinai except for the region that was under the mandate of the Multinational Force and Observers (see Section 2.11). Over the years the OGE OPs were reduced and its HQ was moved to Ismailia. In 1995 the OGE only operated one OP in El Arish, and the UNTSO liaison office in Gaza was closed in April 1996.
OGE Pocket Badge
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UNTSOs role in the Israel-Syria sector was terminated on 31 May 1974 when the UN Disengagement Observer Force (see Lesson 8) was established. The 90 UNTSO UNMOs were assigned to UNDOF. They continued their duties as before, and in 1979 they were formed into the Observer Group Golan (OGG), which continued its operations under the operational control of the commander of UNDOF. Under the disengagement agreement, UNDOF personnel must be from nonPermanent Members of the SC. Therefore, those UNMOs who are from countries that are Permanent Members of the SC are not involved in the supervision of the disengagement agreement, but instead form a separate unit called the Observer Detachment Damascus (ODD). The ODD does liaison and support work for the OGG. After the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994, the UNTSO office in Amman was closed in 1995. Since then the UNTSO HQ in Jerusalem has been the liaison to the Jordanian authorities. On the ILMAC sector the Lebanese Army had provided security for the unarmed UNMOs; however, once the Lebanese civil war began in 1975 the national army collapsed, leaving the UNMOs in a very dangerous situation. The SecretaryGeneral asked the UNMOs to remain in place. Even though there were incidents of break-ins to OPs and the hijackings of UNMO vehicles, for the most part the factions respected the status of the UNMOs. After a ceasefire was set up in Lebanon, the SC established the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (see Lesson 10) in March 1978. UNIFIL took over UNTSOs ceasefire observation role, and UNTSOs UNMOs were assigned to assist UNIFIL in its tasks. The Report of the Secretary-General (S/12611 OGG Lapel Badge (1978), 19 March 1978) noted that UNTSO would still continue to function on the Armistice Demarcation Line after the termination of the mandate of UNIFIL. In addition, pending the appointment of a UNIFIL Force Commander, the UNTSO Chief of Staff (Major General E. A. Erskine) would act as the Interim Commander of UNIFIL. The UNMOs assigned to UNIFIL were formed into the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL), while the ILMAC HQ acted as a liaison office until UNIFIL established its own office in Beirut. UNIFILs HQ was eventually based in Naqoura, while UNTSO operated the ILMAC through its Liaison Office in Beirut (UNLOB). Even with this UN presence, Lebanon has proven to be one of the most hazardous UNMO assignments in the Middle East. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 quickly led to Israeli forces reaching the outskirts of Beirut. The main targets of Israels invasion were the various insurgent groups (mainly the Palestinian Liberation Organisation - PLO) who had been launching attacks into Israel from Lebanese territory. The PLO requested that UNIFIL be deployed in
Lt. Colonel William R. (Rich) Higgins, USMC, disappeared south of Tyre on 17 February 1988, while serving as the Chief, OGL and Senior Military Observer, United States Military Observer Group, UNTSO (Palestine). After being held captive by proIranian terrorists in Lebanon, Lt. Col. Higgins was subsequently murdered. The exact date of his death is unknown. He was declared dead on 6 July 1990; his remains were recovered 23 December 1991 and interred at Quantico National Cemetery 30 December 1991.
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the Beirut area. Israel would not agree to this and entered West Beirut. On the request of the Lebanese government, on 1 August the SC authorised (S/RES/516 (1982), 1 August 1982) the Secretary-General to deploy UNMOs in and around Beirut. Initially ten UNTSO UNMOs from ILMAC were deployed to areas controlled by the Lebanese Government. They were designated the Observer Group Beirut (OGB) and were deployed by 3 August. Israel, however, did not allow the OGB to be reinforced. By this time the United States had negotiated a withdrawal of PLO fighters under the supervision of the Multinational Force (MNF). The MNF was not a UN entity. The MNF was comprised of 800 U.S., 800 French, and 400 Italian troops, with the UK joining the force a few months later. After the PLO withdrawal from Beirut was completed on 1 September 1982, the MNF also withdrew. The return of Israeli forces to West Beirut in the wake of the assassination of the PresidentElect of Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel, led to the massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps, by his Christian militia. On 19 September the SC responded by raising the number of UNMOs to 50 in and around Beirut. On 24 September the Secretary-General informed the SC that some 2,000 troops from UNIFIL could be sent to Beirut, but by 24 September the MNF had returned to the city. The OGB UNMOs used OPs and mobile patrols to fulfil their duties. They were primarily to focus on incidents between Israelis and Palestinians. Once Israel withdrew from Beirut in September 1983, the OGBs role was reduced. The MNF withdrew in 1984 after a series of major attacks against its forces. By mid-1992 the OGB was converted into the UN Liaison Office in Beirut (UNLOB). The Chief of UNLOB was designated the Chairman of ILMAC. As of July 2005, peace agreements have been concluded between Israel and Egypt, as well as Israel and Jordan. In addition, Israel has pulled out of the Gaza Strip. Since its inception UNTSO has been able to adapt to the ever-changing regional politics of the Middle East. It developed into a truly multinational force that was capable of rapid reorganisation to meet its mission objectives. Many of UNTSOs military and civilian staff members casualties occurred as a result of being firefights between two warring factions, mine explosions, air raids, and unexplained shootings. Due to such a hostile environment all UNTSO personnel must be volunteers. As of August 2005, UNTSO still operated as an autonomous operation under the SC, though its functions had been modified, often due to changing regional politics.
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2.11
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)
The MFO is not a UN peacekeeping mission. Its mission was to supervise the implementation of the security provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and employ best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms. To achieve this, four security zones were established three in the Sinai in Egypt and one in Israel along the international border. The MFO was assigned the following tasks:
Operation of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and Line B, and within Zone C; Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions MFO Patch of Annex I, to be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties; Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party; and Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran.
MFO Organisation
Source: MFO
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2.12
Impact of UNTSO on Other Early Military Observer Missions
The arrangements and details of UNTSO were applied without major changes to all subsequent military observer missions. Five such missions were set up during the Cold War period:

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949; United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958; United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) in 1963; the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) in May 1965; and United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) in September 1965.
Each of these will be reviewed in more detail. These missions were assigned relatively simple peacekeeping tasks. Tasks ranged from monitoring a border area, to verifying the withdrawal of foreign troops, supervising a ceasefire, or supervising an armistice agreement. According to the task involved, total strength might vary from a few observers, as in the Dominican Republic, to several hundreds, as in the Arab-Israeli situation and in Lebanon. The two first military observer missions (the Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan missions) were set up without time limits and continue to operate. Other missions were established for limited durations. When enforcement is called for, it should be noted that the Security Council authorised all UN military observer missions.
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1.
When was the first time that the United Nations used military observers (UNMOs)? A. In 1946, with the lead-up to Indias independence from the British Empire; B. In 1947, when hostilities broke out in Indonesia between the Royal Dutch Army and the armed forces of the newly established Indonesian Government; C. In 1948, with the first Arab-Israeli War; D. In 1950, with the outbreak of the Korean War.
2.
What happened a day after the Jewish Agency in Palestinian Territory proclaimed the State of Israel on 11 May 1948? A. The Palestinian Arabs, aided by the Arab states, first attacked Israel, which marked the beginning of the conflict in the Middle East; B. Israels fledgling military launched pre-emptive attacks against the Arab states surrounding the new state of Israel; C. A pre-emptive attack by Egypt precipitated a larger attack by the Arab states against Israel. D. Israel attacked the Palestinian Arabs, resulting in military retaliation by other Arab states.
3.
Why is Ralf Bunche important in terms of defining some of the core principles of peacekeeping? A. He was the head of UNTSO; B. He first defined the principles of consent and impartiality; C. His guidance led to the creation of UNTSO, the first official peacekeeping mission; D. He had nothing to do with defining some of the core principles of peacekeeping.
4.
Though never formally created as a peacekeeping force, what is a unique feature of UNTSO? A. It is a non-multinational operation solely manned by the British; B. It was not sanctioned by the General Assembly; C. It is not under the control of the Secretary-General; D. It is the only non-temporary agency financed by the UNs regular budget.
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5.
Which one of the following statements is true regarding UNMOs of UNTSO? A. They are unarmed and have no legal immunity to local laws; B. They are armed and are assured of protection and full co-operation in the performance of their duties by their Host country; C. They are heavily armed and will engage in combat should the need arise; D. They are not assured of co-operation from the Host country.
6.
What was the primary mission of the MACs? A. To investigate and examine the claims or complaints presented by the parties in regards to the Armistice Agreements; B. To coordinate disarmament of all the parties to the Armistice Agreements; C. To continue peace negotiations between the parties to the Armistice Agreements; D. To investigate war crimes.
7.
Why was UNTSOs role in the Israel-Syria sector terminated on 31 May 1974? A. UNTSOs mission in the Middle East as a whole was over; B. UNEF II was established; C. UNDOF was established; D. Saudi Arabia demanded the withdrawal of UNTSOs UNMOs.
8.
The MFO was a what? A. An international observer force not under the UN; B. A UN military force used to impose peace in the region; C. A UN peacekeeping mission; D. A large UN NGO.
9.
The UN Truce Supervision Organisation in Palestine (UNTSO): A. Ended in 1973 after the Yom Kippur War; B. Ended in 1949 when Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria signed an agreement for permanent peace in the area; C. Continues to operate from its original mandate without modification; D. Still operates as an autonomous operation under the Security Council, though its functions had been modified often due to changing circumstances.
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10. What was the impact of UNTSO? A. The details of UNTSO were applied, but with major changes, to five Cold War military observer missions; B. The arrangements and details of UNTSO were applied without major changes to five Cold War military observer missions; C. UNTSO proved that there was no need for military observer missions; D. UNTSO had no impact on future UN missions.
ANSWER KEY: 1B, 2C, 3B, 4D, 5B, 6A, 7C, 8A, 9D, 10B
LESSON 3 THE FIRST UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF I)

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 Differences Between Military Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Missions Background on the Suez Canal Crisis UN Peace Initiatives for the Suez Canal Crisis The UN Emergency Force (UNEF) Principles Upon Which UNEF was Based Advisory Committee The Early Phase of UNEF The Status of the Force Agreement UNEFs Composition
3.10 The Weaknesses and Strengths of UNEF 3.11 The Egyptian-Israeli War and the Withdrawal of UNEF 3.12 Consequences of the Withdrawal of UNEF
Lesson 3 / The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I)
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 3 describes the crisis in the Middle East, which began over the Suez Canal, and how that resulted in the first actual peacekeeping operation. It outlines the difference between Military Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Operations, and it goes into details of peacekeeping operations regarding its unique aspects. Lesson 3 discusses in great length the details of the Suez Canal crisis and the response of the United Nations. The role of the UN peace force in establishing and maintaining peace in the area, how it was created and how it dissolved is given, including perspectives regarding its significance in maintaining international relations and peace. By the end of Lesson 3, the student will come to understand not only the historical significance of the first UN peacekeeping mission (UNEF), but also its role in defining UN peacekeeping operations.
Understand the policies and politics of the origins of the Suez Canal crisis in the Middle East; Give details regarding UN initiatives to resolve the Suez Canal crisis; Describe how UNEF was established and implemented; Outline the importance of UNEF in the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations; State the significance of UNEF for later peacekeeping missions; List the weaknesses and strengths of UNEF; and Understand why UNEF ended and the consequences of its withdrawal from the region.
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3.1
Differences Between Military Observer Missions and Peacekeeping Missions
Military observer missions are relatively modest operations involving limited numbers of unarmed military observers. They are adequate to monitor or supervise a truce or a ceasefire agreement. But if the peacekeeping mission requires more complex tasks, a larger operation is needed that is armed and has the capability to use armed force in self-defence. Such a need arose in 1956 with the Suez crisis.
3.2
Background on the Suez Canal Crisis
By the summer of 1955 there had been a steady deterioration in relations between Israel and Egypt. Egyptian-supported raids by Palestinian fedayeen had led to strong military responses by Israel. Egypts restrictions on ships going to Israel through the Suez Canal and later the Strait of Tiran further destabilised the overall political situation. Moreover, the 25 May 1950 Tripartite Declaration of France, the UK, and the U.S. to restrict regional arms sales had broken down. Both Israel and Egypt became involved in a major arms race with arms being supplied by both superpowers and their allies. The situation further escalated when in July 1956 the U.S. Government withdrew its financial aid for the building of the Aswan Dam on the Nile due to Egyptian purchases of arms from the Soviet Bloc. In an effort to pay for the dam project, President Gamel Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, which had been owned by British and French shareholders. On 23 September 1956, France and the UK requested that the SC resolve the matter in their favour based on the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. Egypt responded by saying that various powers, mainly France and the UK, were violating the UN Charter by their actions. While the SC passed a resolution on 13 October (SC 118 (1956), 13 October 1956 [S/3675]) on how to resolve the crisis, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom secretly planned an invasion of Egypt. France became involved partly due to Egypts continued support of insurgents in Algeria, while Britains involvement resulted from the loss of control over the Suez Canal. Both also wanted to see a government in Cairo that was more amenable to western interests. Israel saw the opportunity to expand its territory and eliminate the growing military threat that Egypt posed. Israeli forces began the invasion of Egypt on the morning of 29 October. Four Israeli columns advanced through the Sinai: northern (Gaza Strip-El Arish-El Qantara); central (Al Auja- El Quseima-Abu Aweigila-Bir Gifgafa-Ismailiya); southern (El Kuntilla-El Thamad-Nakhl-Mitla Pass); and eastern /western (which followed south on both sides of the Sinai Peninsula to Sharm el Sheikh). Early the next morning UNTSOs Chief of Staff, Canadian Major-General E.L.M. Burns, called for a ceasefire and asked Israel to withdraw its forces back to its side of the border. Later in the day Britain and France gave an ultimatum to both Egypt and Israel to cease hostilities within 12 hours and to withdraw their respective forces 10 miles from each side of the Suez Canal. Egypt was asked to allow the temporary stationing of Anglo-French forces on the Canal at Ismailia, Port Said, and Suez ostensibly to separate the two sides and to ensure the safety of shipping through the Canal. Keeping in mind that Israel was part of the secret plan to attack Egypt, Israel accepted the proposal
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while Egypt refused. This refusal then precipitated French and British air attacks between 31 October and 4 November against various targets in Egypt. This was followed on 5 November by an airborne assault in and around Port Said and Port Fouad by British and French paratroops. The next day naval landings by French forces at Port Fouad and British forces at Port Said secured the northern end of the Suez Canal.
Israeli, British, and French Attacks, 1956. (Source: Ram Military Consulting)
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To resolve the crisis, the UN deemed it necessary to: bring about the withdrawal of the occupation forces; alter the completion of the withdrawal process; and establish a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. To achieve these objectives, the United Nations created its first peacekeeping force, known as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Following the launching of the Israeli invasion on 29 October 1956, the Security Council met in an emergency session. However, due to the British and French vetoes, it was not able to take any action on the situation. The matter was thus referred to the General Assembly under the latters Uniting for Peace Resolution.
3.3
UN Peace Initiatives for the Suez Canal Crisis
During the General Assemblys deliberations in early November, the then Foreign Minister of Canada, Lester B. Pearson, attempted to work out a solution to the crisis in close co-operation with Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld. At the time, there were only two United Nations peacekeeping operations, both in the form of military observer missions, one in Palestine (UNTSO) and another in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Pearson was convinced that a military observer mission would not be able to cope with the conflict at hand and that a larger operation in the form of a police force would be required. On Pearsons proposal, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a plan for the setting up of an emergency international UN force to supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Suez Canal zone (GA resolution 998 [ES-I]). As per the Charter, this was done with the consent of the parties concerned. The Secretary-General submitted the plan to the General Assembly, which, on the basis of Pearsons recommendations, authorised that the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) be established (GA resolution 1000 [ES-I]). Egypt, France, Israel, the UK, the Soviet Union, and Eastern European States abstained.
In resolution 1000 [ES-I], the General Assembly:
Source: UNDPKO
Established a United Nations Command for an emergency international Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956; Appointed, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) E.L.M. Burns, as Chief of the Command; Authorized the Chief of the Command to immediately recruit, from the observer corps of UNTSO, a limited number of officers who were to be nationals of countries other than those having permanent membership in the Security Council. He was further authorized, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment of the additional number of officers needed directly from various Member States other than the Permanent Members of the Security Council; Invited the Secretary-General to take such administrative measures as might be necessary for prompt execution of the actions envisaged.
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3.4
The UN Emergency Force (UNEF)
UNEF was commanded by a Force Commander under the overall direction of the SecretaryGeneral. The first Commander of UNEF was Major-General E.L.M. Burns of Canada. He was appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, but all of his successors were appointed directly by the Secretary-General. The Force was composed of national contingents provided by Member States of the United Nations. Forces were provided on a voluntary basis at the request of the Secretary-General. In selecting the troop-contributing countries, the Secretary-General took into account the views of the parties concerned as well as other factors, such as the availability of suitable troops and the need for a balanced composition of countries in the Force. Troops from the five Permanent Members of the Security Council and any countries that might have a special interest in the conflict were excluded.
3.5
Principles Upon Which UNEF was Based
The Force operated under the principles of: (a) consent; (b) impartiality; and (c) the non-use of force except in self-defence. UNEF operated in a zone that extended from the Armistice Demarcation Lines of the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt and the Suez Canal. The establishment of UNEF in a conflict area required the consent of the host government and the other parties concerned. While the soldiers of UNEF were provided with light defensive weapons, they were not authorised to use force except in self-defence. They were obliged to act with impartiality and restraint at all times and were required to carry out their tasks by persuasion and negotiation and not by coercion. Moreover, UNEF would have no rights beyond those that were necessary to do its work in co-operation with local authorities. Like the military observers of UNTSO, the various national contingents of UNEF took orders exclusively from the United Nations. But they remained administratively under their respective army establishments. Each contributing government covered the costs of the troops and equipment of its national contingent against reimbursement by the United Nations at an agreed rate. Their soldiers wore their national army uniforms, but with the addition of the UN insignia and UN Blue Beret the UN blue helmet or beret, which were used for the first time at the start of UNEF.
3.6
Advisory Committee
Based on the fact that there had not been enough time to cover all matters relating to UNEF, the Secretary-General suggested that those matters be left to a small advisory committee of the General Assembly. On 7 November, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1001 (ES-I), which approved the guiding principles for the organisation and functioning of the UNEF. The General Assembly also established an Advisory Committee composed of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and Pakistan. The Committee was chaired by the Secretary-General and was to address matters pertaining to the mission that were not already dealt with by the General Assembly and which did not fall within the area of the direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command,
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Major-General E.L.M. Burns. Following consultation with the Committee, the Secretary-General was authorised to take all necessary administrative and executive actions and to issue all essential rules and regulations for the functioning of UNEF. The role of the Committee was to assist the Secretary-General in his responsibilities, and it could request the convening of the General Assembly if needed. Resolution 1001 (ES-I) and resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4 November, formed the basis for the establishment of UNEF. 3.7 The Early Phase of UNEF
UNEF became operational by mid-November 1956. It played an instrumental role in bringing about the withdrawal of the Anglo-French and Israeli occupation forces and, after the completion of the withdrawal process, was deployed as a buffer along the Egypt-Israel border. However, in terms of applying UNEF, Israel refused to accept UNEF troops on its soil, so that UNEF was deployed only on the Egyptian side of the border. In addition, the Egyptian Government made it clear that UNEF was deployed on its soil only with its express consent and would have to be withdrawn if it so requested. Furthermore, the UN assured Egypts sovereignty and that it would retain the power to negotiate a settlement for the Suez Canal and also not need to submit to any foreign power. The creation of UNEF was a pre-condition for both securing the ceasefire and for allowing an orderly withdrawal of Israeli, French, and British forces. Thus, the assembly of a viable military force and its deployment to Egypt as fast as possible were a priority for the Secretary-General. Clearly there was no real precedent for creating such a force. UNTSO was somewhat analogous, but it was a much simpler operation. It also did not offer any insights on organisational and operational problems involved in peacekeeping. Once authorised by the UN, the Chief of Command, General Burns, began planning the organisation of UNEF with some UNTSO UNMOs. In the meantime, the Secretary-General began negotiations with Egypt to secure the entry and stationing of UNEF in Egypt. At the same time, the Secretary-General also approached various Member States in an effort to obtain the military forces required to man UNEF. One of the founding principles of the deployment and functioning of UNEF was the consent of the host government, as the mission was not a Chapter VII intervention. The idea of consent became one of the key foundations of future UN peacekeeping missions. This principle was enshrined by the General Assembly in resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956 and the subsequent Good Faith Agreement of 20 November between Egypt and the UN. The Good Faith Agreement, which was included in the UNEF aide-memoire, served as the basis for UNEFs deployment in Egypt. Paragraph two states: The United Nations takes note of this declaration of the Government of Egypt and declares that the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the Force in the aforementioned resolutions; in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is completed.
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Two other agreements outlined that the area to be occupied by UNEF would be subject to agreement after the Israeli withdrawal. In addition, the UNEF Force could not function in the Suez Canal or Port Said areas after the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces. Moreover, without the consent of the Egyptian Government, UNEF could not stay or operate in Egypt. The functions of UNEF were also separated from the question of the reopening of the Suez Canal.
3.8
The Status of the Force Agreement
The Status of the Force Agreement was the first of its kind. It provided the blueprint for many future UN peacekeeping missions and was used as a precedent when problems arose during future missions. It covered a wide range of issues, including:

The premises of the Force and the use of the United Nations flag; Freedom of movement, privileges and immunities of the Force; Civil and criminal jurisdiction and settlement of disputes or claims; Full freedom of movement in the performance of UNEF members in fulfilling their duties; and Exclusive jurisdiction of UNEF Members national Governments in respect to any criminal offences that they might commit in Egypt. UNEF Members were to be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national Governments in respect of any criminal offences that they might commit in Egypt.
3.9
UNEFs Composition
The principles of consent also applied to those Member States that participated in UNEF. The Force was to be composed of volunteer national contingents from Member States that were acceptable for service by the Secretary-General. The only forces that were excluded from participation were those from any country that might have had a geographical or special interest in the conflict or were Permanent Members of the SC. Issues that were considered in the selection of contingents included:

Suitability in terms of the needs of the Force; Size and availability; Extent to which the contingent would be self-contained; Undesirability of too great a variation in ordnance and basic equipment; Problem of transportation; and The goal of a balanced force composition.
In context of the mission requirements and objectives, the Commander in consultation with the Secretary-General defined the size of UNEF. The original estimate was set at some 6,000 personnel, about two combat brigades. It was decided that the national contingents would be required to be sufficiently large enough to be relatively self-contained. UNEF was also to have adequate support units and a light air-unit. No one contingent was to be overly large so that UNEF
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would become dependent on one Member States contingent. To allow for operational planning, some continuity of service from each Member States contingent was also required. Moreover, each national contingent of UNEF had to take orders exclusively from the Force Commander. An exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and participating Member States governments formalised these agreements. The following countries offered contingents: Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia. The U.S. was willing to provide logistical support in the form of airlifts, shipping, transport, and supplies. Italy offered to airlift UNEF personnel and equipment from Italy to Egypt. In addition, the facilities at Capodichino Airport in Naples were offered for the assembly and transit of UNEF personnel and equipment, while Switzerland, who was not a Member State, offered to defray part of the cost of Swiss Air charter planes. Based on the various agreements and after consultations with Egypt and the Force Commander, the Secretary-General accepted the following contingents: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. He also accepted the offers from Italy, Switzerland, and the U.S. The initial UNEF staging base in Egypt was the air base at Abu Suweir near Ismailia.
Yugoslav troops with UNEF on patrol. El Arish, Egypt, January 1957. (UN/DPI)
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Area of Responsibility within the Armistice Demarcation Line Rafah El Arish
Contingent Nationality Brazil Canada
Role Infantry Battalion Fully equipped, light-armoured squadron for reconnaissance Medical Provided units for transport, the Provost Marshal and signals Ordnance depot and workshop, the base post office, engineering, the dental unit, movement control and air support (RCAF Detachment) Infantry Battalion Infantry Battalion* Infantry Battalion Supply depot and the service institute Provided units for transport, the Provost Marshal and signals Infantry Battalion Medical Infantry Battalion* and an air transport service (SCANAP)** Reconnaissance battalion
Colombia Denmark Finland India Indonesia Norway Sweden Yugoslavia
Khan Yunis Beit Hanun Deir-el-Ballah
Beit Hanun Gaza El Arish
*A joint Danish-Norwegian battalion (DANOR) **A joint Danish-Norwegian-Swedish unit
Canadian and Yugoslav reconnaissance units patrolled the International Frontier. They were aided by Canadian air units that operated from El Arish east to the Gulf of Aqaba on the Red Sea. Small desert outposts manned by Yugoslavian troops aided these air units. There also was a small UNEF garrison at Sharm-el-Sheikh that guarded the Egyptian army installations there. By February 1957, UNEF had reached its target strength of some 6,000 personnel. Once UNEF staff officers were appointed, the UNMOs of UNTSO, who had been temporarily assigned to planning for UNEF, returned to their assigned duties. As planned, the Indonesian contingent withdrew in September 1957, followed by the Finns in December of the same year. The Columbians withdrew a year later in December 1958. The other contingents continued to serve with UNEF until the withdrawal of the Force in 1967. During the course of the mission, contingents had their assignments and deployments changed based on the operational requirements at the time. The mission over time was also reduced in size as the situation stabilised and as financial difficulties mounted vis--vis UN funding.
Year 1957 1960 1963 1965 1966 May 1967
UNEF Strength 6,000 5,341 5,102 4,581 3,959 3,378 (Force began its withdrawal)
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Withdrawal of the Belligerent Forces It took some two months to negotiate the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, but by 22 December 1956, the withdrawal had been completed, and UNEF moved in around the Port Said positions occupied by the British and French. The negotiations for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces took much longer. On 21 November, Israel indicated that its forces had withdrawn along the entire Egyptian frontier. However, the General Assembly noted that this withdrawal was not behind the armistice lines. On 21 December, Israel responded with a new withdrawal proposal that indicated that its forces would withdraw in two phases behind the armistice lines at an un-stated date. By 7 and 8 January 1957, there were no Israeli forces west of El Arish. By 15 January, except in the area of Sharm el Sheikh, Israeli forces withdrew another 25 to 30 kilometres eastward. By 8 March, Israel had withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh. On 8 March 1957, the Secretary-General told the General Assembly that there had been full compliance with its resolution 1124 (XI) of 2 February 1957. As of 8 March 1957, UNEF was deployed along the western side of the Armistice Demarcation Line along the Gaza Strip, along the international frontier between the Sinai and Israel, as well as in the Sharm el Sheikh area. The operation of the Force during this period may be divided into four phases, which covered a period of more than 10 years from November 1957 to May 1967.
Phase Date First phase (12 NovemberDecember 1956) Second phase (December 1956March 1957) Third phase (March 1957) Final phase (March 1957May 1967)
Location Suez Canal area Sinai peninsula Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh Israeli-Egyptian Border
Description UNEF Role Supervise the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces from the Port Said area Supervise withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Sinai peninsula Supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Sharm el Sheikh area Deployment/peacekeeping role of UNEF forces along the borders between Egypt and Israel
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3.10
The Weaknesses and Strengths of UNEF
There were serious weaknesses in the initial establishment of UNEF, which later created problems. First, UNEF forces were deployed only on Egyptian soil. Secondly, the opposition of the Soviet Union, which held that the General Assembly had no authority to establish UNEF, constituted a serious handicap. However, despite these challenges, initially, UNEF was a resounding success. It helped to effectively resolve a dangerous crisis that directly involved two major powers. In addition, once deployed along the Egyptian-Israeli border, it maintained peace in this sensitive area for more than ten years until it was withdrawn in May 1967, at Egypts request. UNEF served as a model for later peacekeeping forces. The principles laid down by Dag Hammarskjld for the organisation and functioning of UNEF were applied to Canadian members of UNEF inspect an all peacekeeping forces. Later, changes were made on the Egyptian base in the Sinai Peninsula in 1958. application of these principles and on certain requirements (Source: Canadian Government) for each new operation. Such revisions were based on the individual needs of each case, including the political circumstances at each instance. The history of the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations was marked by major crises. These are recounted in the following lessons.
3.11
The Egyptian-Israeli War and the Withdrawal of UNEF
The next serious crisis affecting UN peacekeeping arose in May 1967, when the Egyptian government requested the withdrawal of UNEF. UNEF had been set up in November 1956 and had maintained peace along the Egyptian-Israeli borders effectively for more than ten years. The Palestine problem was at the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East and remained unresolved despite the efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. Although quiet prevailed in the Egyptian-Israeli sector, tension related to the Palestinians continued in the other sectors of the Middle East, especially on the Israeli-Syrian front. Such mounting tensions precipitated the next crises for the UN. In April 1967, a series of serious incidents took place between Israel and Syria. Following these, Syria, which had long accused Egyptian President Nasser of hiding behind UNEF, apparently persuaded him to re-join the Arabs in a common struggle against Israel. As a result, in May 1967, the Egyptian Government requested Secretary-General U Thant to withdraw UNEF from Sinai and the Gaza Strip. At this point in time, earlier discrepancies in the establishment of UNEF brought up problems that limited the UNs response to the Egyptian Government. As discussed earlier, UNEF had been authorised by the General Assembly rather than by the Security Council. Secondly, because Israel refused to accept the UN force on its territory, UNEF was deployed only along the border on the
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Egyptian side. These two factors now became serious handicaps. Though the deployment of UNEF on Egyptian soil was negotiated by Dag Hammarskjld, the responsibility for dealing with the Egyptian request fell on his successor, Secretary-General U Thant. U Thant immediately initiated intense consultations with the members of the Security Council and with the UNEF Advisory Committee, composed of the representatives of troopcontributing countries. It became apparent to U Thant that there was a deep division within both groups regarding what action to take. For three days, 16-18 May, the Secretary-General did all he could to persuade Egypt to withdraw its request and to persuade Israel to accept the UN force on its side of the border. However, neither government would co-operate. Thus, when the Egyptian Government maintained its request per the original agreement negotiated by Dag Hammarskjld, which stipulated that UNEF would be withdrawn upon Egypts request, U Thant had no alternative but to comply.
3.12
Consequences of the Withdrawal of UNEF
With the benefit of hindsight, some might argue that U Thant might have brought the matter before the Security Council by invoking Article 99 of the Charter. However, U Thant knew that with the United States and the Soviet Union firmly on opposing sides, no action could be taken by the Council. Thus, such an action would have been inconsequential. Unfortunately, withdrawal of UNEF was followed within three weeks by a new war between Egypt and Israel in the Middle East (the Six-Day War). This greatly affected the credibility of UN peacekeeping operations and impeded their further development. No new operations were established for the next six years.
UNEF commander, General E.L.M. Burns, inspects the 56 Transport Company of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC). (Source: Canadian Forces)
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1.
The first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was implemented in the Middle East after what event? A. The collapse of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel; B. The breakout of the Korean War; C. Israels invasion of Jordan; D. A vote in the General Assembly to further partition Palestine.
2.
The Good Faith Agreement was a memorandum between the United Nations and the government of Egypt, and it confirmed that: A. UNEF forces could be stationed in Egypt and would receive the full protection of the Egyptian government; B. UNEF or any peacekeeping force could not be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the government of that country; C. UNEF forces would be stationed in Egypt immediately, but that various questions regarding details would be answered at a later point, based on the good faith between the UN and Egypt; D. UNEF forces would destroy any Israeli forces to protect the sovereignty of Egypt.
3.
In 1956, the composition of the original UNEF I troops, which established a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel, excluded contingents from which of the following groups? A. All North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members; B. All Warsaw Pact members; C. The five Permanent Members of the Security Council and any countries that might have had a special interest in the conflict; D. They were no exclusions; any Member State could provide troop contingents.
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4.
UNEF I provided a pattern for later peacekeeping operations. What were two key provisions of the Force agreement that related to freedom of movement and criminal liability? A. UN forces retained full freedom of movement in the performance of duties, and criminal offences of force members would be subject to prosecution by the host country; B. UN forces retained full freedom of movement in all territory of the host nation, and they would be free from prosecution in the event of criminal activities; C. UN forces retained full freedom of movement in the performance of duties, and criminal offences of force members would be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national governments; D. There would be limited freedom of movement for UN forces, and criminal offences of force members would be subject to prosecution by the Host country.
5.
What was the role of the Advisory Committee? A. Suggest new tactics for UN peacekeeping operations; B. Oversee the Secretary-Generals decisions regarding UNEF; C. Tell the Secretary-General what to do on a day-to-day basis with UNEF; D. Assist the Secretary-General in his responsibilities with regards to UNEF.
6.
What was provided by the Status of the Force Agreement? A. Background on the UN deployments in the region; B. The rules that Israel and Egypt had to abide by in relation to UNEF; C. The blueprint for many future UN peacekeeping missions; D. The rules of engagement for UNEF.
7.
Who laid down the principles for the organisation and functioning of UNEF that were then applied to all peacekeeping forces? A. Dag Hammarskjld; B. Ralphe Bunche; C. U Thant; D. Lester Pearson.
8.
What was one of the serious weaknesses in the initial establishment of UNEF I? A. The U.S. did not support the mission; B. UNEF forces were deployed only on Egyptian soil; C. Member states were not willing to provide the right equipment for their contingents; D. There were no serious weaknesses in the initial establishment of UNEF.
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9.
What event precipitated the withdrawal of UNEF I form Egypt? A. Israel attacked Egypt; B. Egypt attacked Israel; C. The loss of financial support for the mission; D. The Egyptian government requested the withdrawal of UNEF.
10. What was the impact of the withdrawal of UNEF I in 1967 on new peacekeeping missions? A. They all had robust military capabilities; B. New missions did not follow the principles established by UNEF I; C. No new operations were established for the next six years; D. There was no impact, and new missions were established immediately.
ANSWER KEY: 1A, 2B, 3C, 4A, 5D, 6C, 7A, 8B, 9D, 10C
LESSON 4 UN OPERATION IN THE CONGO (ONUC)

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 Background on the UN Operation in the Congo The Post-Independence Crisis (1960-61) The Withdrawal of Belgian Forces The Constitutional Crisis The Secession of Katanga Fighting Between Katangan and ONUC Forces The Re-establishment of the Central Government Personnel and Logistics Issues Lack of Intelligence Gathering Capability
4.10 The Outcome of the ONUC Mission 4.11 Effects of ONUC on the United Nations 4.12 The Role of ONUC in the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations
Lesson 4 / UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 4 is an in-depth examination of the crisis in the Congo and its effects on the evolution of UN peacekeeping. Understanding the background and history between Belgium and the Congo is important in understanding the role of the UN and is presented in detail. The lesson includes a description of the role of two UN Secretary-Generals in the Congo, as well as the striking effects of the involvement of each in the situation. Lesson 4 also outlines how the internal problems in the Congo impacted on the initiatives taken by the UN. It goes into great detail regarding the mandates of the UN mission in the Congo that changed over time. Finally, it includes a discussion about the mixed effect of the Congo on the UN, specifically in how the UN learned to define a UN peacekeeping operation, and how a mission could have a drastic negative impact on the UN as a whole.

Describe the background and the political implications of the crisis in the Congo; List the mandates it had over time; Discuss the opposition of the Soviet Union to the Congo mission and how that affected the situation; Describe both the successes and difficulties of the UN mission in the Congo, and the aftermath of the mission; and Understand the role of the Congo in the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations.
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4.1
Background on the UN Operation in the Congo
The fifth peacekeeping operation, the UN Operation in the Congo (generally known by its French acronym ONUC, lOpration des Nations Unis au Congo), met with serious problems. It thus produced the first major crisis in the history of United Nations peacekeeping. The Security Council established ONUC on 14 July 1960, two weeks after the Congo (formerly Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo) acceded to independence, and four days after the Belgian invasion. It was by far the largest peacekeeping operation in the earlier years of the UN in terms of the manpower required (nearly 20,000 troops and 4,000 civilians), its responsibilities, and its area of operation (approximately 2,345,000 square kilometres, which is about the size of Western Europe). Congos strategic position in central Africa and its wealth of natural resources, combined with the rapid plan for decolonisation by Belgium, created an environment that was highly volatile. Belgium had ruled Congo in a highly brutal and paternalistic way; in fact, the territory had historically been the personal property of King Leopold II of Belgium. Even when it became a colony of Belgium in 1908, the use of brutality against the indigenous population remained. The paternalistic policy of the colonial administration left the local population with limited educational and political development. At the time of Independence in 1960, there were only 17 Congolese university graduates, there were no lawyers, doctors, or engineers, and few Congolese had any education beyond a secondary level. Political activity was not really allowed until 1959, when the Belgian government began the process of decolonisation. By the early 1950s, the native Congolese elites had formed semi-political organisations that became the main political parties in the late 1950s. The underlying problem with these organisations was that they had been formed on foundations based on either ethnic kinship, connections formed in schools, or urban intellectualism. These groups were for the most part not politically compatible. By March 1960 the Belgian Government had created a constitution, the Loi foundamentale, for the Congo and had set general and provincial elections for the same month. Once the newlyelected Parliament convened, it was forced to deal with the issue of how to deal with the two dominant political leaders of Congo. One was Joseph Kasavubu, who was the leader of the ABAKO (the Association des Bakongo) movement, which represented his own ethnic lower Congo River Bakongo people. The other political leader was Patrice Emery Lumumba of the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), a pro-independence movement. Lumumba and the MNC formed the first government on 23 June 1960, with Lumumba as Prime Minister and Kasavubu being made President on Congos independence on 30 June 1960. On 29 June, a treaty of friendship, assistance, and co-operation was signed between Belgium and the newly formed Congolese Government, though this treaty was never ratified. The treaty allowed for many of the existing Belgian administrative and technical personnel of the former colonial administration to remain in Congo to support the transition of the new Government. The treaty also ceded the military bases at Kamina and Kitona to Belgium. In turn, the Belgian Government would allow their troops to be called out to maintain law and order if requested by the Congolese Government. Law and order was supposed to be maintained by the 25,000 personnel of the Force Publique. This organisation had been Belgiums security force during colonial times, and it continued to be commanded by Belgian officers after independence. Secretary-General Dag
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Hammarskjld realised that Congo would require more than the Belgian Government had offered in assistance if Congo was to survive past independence.
4.2
The Post-Independence Crisis (196061)
Shortly after independence, the Congolese rank and file of the Force Publique demanded promotions. General Emile Janssens, the Belgian commander of the Force Publique, refused their request, famously noting, things wont change [for the Force Publique] just because of independence. On 5 July the garrison at Leopoldville mutinied. This mutiny quickly spread to other garrisons and resulted in atrocities being committed against Europeans. As a result, the majority of the Belgians who were running the machinery of government fled the country, which in turn caused a rapid nationwide collapse of essential services. Rather than calling out the Belgian troops to quell the mutiny, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba acquiesced to the demands of the mutineers by renaming the Force Publique to the Arme Nationale Congolaise (ANC). They dismissed General Janssens and made Victor Lundula the new ANC commander, with Joseph Mobutu as his Chief of Staff. All Congolese soldiers were promoted by one rank grade in an effort to Africanise the ANC. The result was total chaos as the remaining Belgian officers revolted. In an Congolese troops after riots, 1960 effort to stave off total collapse of the Congolese Government, Ralph Bunche urged Belgium not to commit its forces. At the same time, the Secretary-General offered substantial UN military and technical support to Congo in an effort to stabilise the situation. On 10 July, the Congolese Government put forth a formal request for UN support. However, the Belgian Government flew in troops ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens, without the express permission of the Congolese Government. On 11 July, the Province of Katanga, the richest region of Congo, declared its independence after Belgian troops arrived in Elizabethville. Katanga represented some fifty percent of Congos national revenues. It was clear that there was tacit Belgian support for the secession, but what also must not be forgotten was the tribal conflict between the Lunda and the Baluba within Katanga and between Katanga and the Congo. On 12 July Kasavubu and Lumumba requested UN intervention. In response, the next day the Secretary-General invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter to initiate an emergency meeting of the Security Council to debate the growing crisis in Congo. On 13-14 July the Security Council adopted resolution 143 (1960), which called for the withdrawal of Belgian forces from Congo. It also authorise[d] the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.
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The Secretary-General noted that in order to act quickly, the intended UN force for Congo would be built with the support of African States. The selection of the force contingents would be guided by troop availability, geographical distribution in the region, and language. Offers were accepted from Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia. Seven battalions were sent, numbering some 4,000 troops. One battalion of Swedes from UNEF was also transferred to ONUC. The first Commander of ONUC was drawn from UNTSO; Lt. General Carl C. von Horn of Sweden was assisted by a small staff of officers also drawn from UNTSO. By the evening of 15 July 1960 the first contingent of some 90 Tunisian officers and men had landed in Leopoldville. Ralph Bunche was made the temporary commander until the arrival of Lt. General von Horn (who arrived with his staff on 18 July). Logistics, air support, and signals units were brought in from western states, and by July 1961 ONUC reached its peek strength of 19,828 military personnel and some 2,000 civilian experts and technicians. 4.3 The Withdrawal of Belgian Forces
ONUC initially had two primary goals: (1) to aid the Congolese Government to restore law and order; and (2) to quickly bring about the withdrawal of Belgian forces. Both of these goals were tied to the other. As ONUC forces began to arrive, they started to secure critical infrastructure and to deploy into positions held by Belgian troops. The Belgian forces were withdrawn to their bases, and by the beginning of August 1960 Belgian forces had been withdrawn from Congo with the exception of their two existing bases and the breakaway Province of Katanga. With the adoption on 9 August of SC resolution 146 (1960), Belgium was called to immediately withdraw its troops from Katanga. On 12 August the Secretary-General personally led ONUC forces into Katanga. This precipitated the withdrawal of Belgian forces, and by the beginning of September, all Belgian forces had been withdrawn. This included those at the Kamina and Kitona bases, which were subsequently occupied by ONUC. There was, however, one serious problem that arose. Prime Minister Lumumba objected to the way the Secretary-General had implemented the various resolutions regarding Congo and thereafter refused to co-operate with him. Thus, the actual issue of the secession of Katanga was not resolved with the withdrawal of the Belgians. The goal to restore law and order was far more troublesome. Even at its peak strength of nearly 20,000 troops, ONUC was hard-pressed to cover such a vast country like Congo. In addition, ONUC personnel had been officially instructed that they were part of a peace force, not a combat force. Therefore, they could use force only when protecting people from violence and in their own self-defence. ONUC troops were forced to completely take over all security matters in Congo due to the collapse of its own security forces. ONUC was successful in this initial phase of the operation, but by August the internal situation in Congo had caused the country to fracture further.
Members of the Canadian Army Provost Corps en route to Maluku, Congo, on 9 October 1960. (Daryl Pentland, CF)
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Due to existing tribal rivalries, the southern part of the Province of Kasia declared itself independent, calling itself the Autonomous Mining State of South Kasai. This other new state had its capital at Bakwanga. The provinces of Equateur and Leopoldville began to oppose central Government rule. ANC forces were used to suppress the rebellious provinces, but in many cases the ANC troops proved to be uncontrollable due to their limited training and professional leadership. In many instances, these troops committed atrocities against the innocent civilian population. ANC forces were also massed along the border of Katanga. ONUC was constantly hampered in its efforts to re-establish law and order by the non-cooperation of the central Government and its inability to fully control the ANC. The Governments military operation in August 1960 against Kasai failed. Prime Minister Lumumba called for the ONUC forces to attack Katanga. The UN reminded Lumumba that its forces were neutral peacekeepers; thus, they could not support either side. Lumumba turned to the USSR for aid. The Soviets had been looking for a foothold in Africa and willingly provided Lumumbas forces with transport planes and trucks. This was seen by the U.S. as a major threat, and the American Government put its support behind President Kasavubu.
4.4
The Constitutional Crisis
On 5 September 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba as Prime Minister, and, in turn, Lumumba dismissed Kasavubu as President. This caused the constitutional crisis, which went on for eleven months as there was no legal government, and Congo was broken up into four distinct factional regions. ONUC was left in the unenviable position of having to deal with de facto authority in an effort to avert civil war and protect the civilian population. On the night of 5-6 September ONUC immediately closed down the Leopoldville airport to stop arms shipments and the arrival of rival troops. The following day ONUC closed down the local radio station as it had been used to incite violence. The remains of the Parliament passed a resolution that dismissed the Presidential ordinance. ONUC reopened the radio station on 13 September once the situation had stabilised. On 14 September Colonel Joseph Mobutu led a coup that placed an army-backed regime in power. However, the coup was not wholly successful. Thus, Congo collapsed quickly into four rival regions (see page 54). Between 14-17 September the Security Council debated on how to resolve the growing crisis in Congo; however, it was unable to make a decision. The General Assembly sat for an emergency special session from 17-20 September. It resolved (resolution 1474 ES-IV) to have the SecretaryGeneral take vigorous action according to previous SC resolutions. A Conciliation Commission was created to assist in the resolution of the Crisis. Delegations representing the Kasavubu and Lumumba camps came to the UN to make their respective cases for being the legitimate government of Congo. Kasavubu even came to the 15th regular session of the GA. However, nothing was resolved. ONUC troops had also been attacked during this period; on 8 November an ONUC patrol of Irish soldiers was attacked and eight were killed. On 24 November ANC forces attacked the Ghanaian Embassy in Leopoldville, wounding several and killing one of the UN soldiers of the Tunisian unit guarding the Embassy. The various factions also started to import military equipment
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and arms; ONUC simply did not have enough personnel to control all the points of entry into Congo to stop most of these shipments. ONUC troops had been guarding Lumumba, but when he left his Leopoldville residence on the night of 27 November in an attempt to reach his political stronghold in Stanleyville, he was intercepted and arrested by ANC troops loyal to Colonel Mobutu. Once arrested by the de facto Government, ONUC forces due to their mandate could do nothing to directly force the release of Lumumba, though all diplomatic means were used. On 17 January 1961, Lumumba and two other political prisoners were transferred to Elisabethville in Katanga. The UN put up strong objections to the transfer; however, by the end of 17 January word came that Lumumba had been murdered. The reality of this murder was that the Governments of both Belgium and the United States were complicit in this crime by aiding the forces of Kasavubu in the removal and subsequent death of Lumumba, who was seen as pro-Communist. The result was a nascent civil war as pro-Lumumba and anti-Lumumba forces openly clashed. The other negative impact was several troop-contributing nations, including Guinea, Mali, and Morocco, withdrew their contingents, resulting in ONUCs overall strength being reduced to some 15,000 troops at a critical moment. The Soviets demanded the resignation of the Secretary-General.
The capture of Patrice Lumumba by ANC troops
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Congolese Factional Territorial Control During the Congo Crisis (1960-61)

Faction National Government Rival National Government Autonomous Mining State of South Kasai Republic of Katanga Leader Joseph Kasavubu Antoine Gizenga acting on behalf of Patrice Lumumba Albert Kalonji Capital (modern name) Lopoldville (Kinshasa) Stanleyville (Kisangani) Bakwanga Province(s) Controlled Equateur Leopoldville Orientale Kivu Northern Kasai & Katanga South Kasai Map Colour Tan Mauve
Yellow
Moise Tshombe
Elizabethville (Lubumbashi)
Southern/Central Katanga
Green
Source: Ram Military Consulting
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The SC met on 15 February and, after much debate, passed resolution 161 (1961), which authorised the use of force by ONUC in an effort to avert a full-blown civil war in Congo. The resolution also called for the evacuation of all mercenaries and other personnel not under UN command. In an effort to retain control of the country, Kasavubu tried to set up a provisional government, but only his allies participated, making it of limited use but gaining him favour with the UN. ONUC found its task very difficult due to: (a) its reduced strength; and (b) the lack of cooperation from all the various Congolese factions, as they saw ONUC as a force that was trying to stop them. This volatile situation led to a number of serious attacks against ONUC personnel.
Major Incidents Against ONUC Forces in 1961
Date 4 March 1961 Description ONUC only had one seaport available at Matadi, near the mouth of the Congo River, to bring in supplies. As the situation deteriorated in late February and early March 1961, the port was guarded by a Sudanese detachment. Elements of the ANC attacked the port on 4 March. Faced with over-whelming odds and a decreasing supply of ammunition, ONUC HQ in Leopoldville ordered a counterattack using the small landing strip at Matadi as a point of entry. At the time the strip was controlled by Congolese forces, they had partially obstructed it to stop reinforcements. Luckily the ONUC Force Commander was briefed about the plan and instead withdrew the Sudanese detachment. This decision ultimately saved ONUC from even more casualties. The incident was triggered by a provocative speech given by the Congolese Interior Minister during a visit to Port Francqui, in north-western Kasai Province. The minister accused the local ANC of being a problem to law and order and threatened that the ONUC forces would disarm them. Responding to what seemed like a provocation, ANC forces attacked the Ghanaian ONUC garrison at Port Francqui. The ninety-man garrison was not expecting an attack and was dispersed in six different locations throughout Port Francqui. The Ghanaians were quickly overrun by the ANC forces, and forty-four Ghanaian soldiers were massacred. An ONUC air transport was delivering two scout cars to the Malayan contingent at the Congolese base at Kindu. Congolese soldiers, who claimed that they were looking for Belgian soldiers, attacked 13 Italian airmen of ONUC. The Italians were beaten and then jailed; all were subsequently murdered.
28-29 April 1961
November 1961
In April, the Secretary-General called for a reinforcement of ONUC to some 18,000 troops to stabilise the situation, but in the meantime ONUC representatives were able to negotiate the implementation of resolution 161 with Kasavubu. This at least brought some calm to northern Congo. However, the Katangan crisis was growing in the south as foreign mercenaries leading Katangan troops launched an offensive to push out anti-Tshombe forces. ONUC troops intervened against the Katangan forces and re-established some control in the region of northern Katanga. ONUC tried to mitigate the civil war but concluded that only the reconvening of Parliament and the approval of a new national unity government, one that was not being influenced by foreign interests, could resolve the crisis. A series of efforts were launched to re-establish the central governments control over Congo. While the March 1961 Tananarive Conference, held in Madagascar, brought little progress, the Coquilhatville Conference, held in Congo in late March, proved to be more useful. To facilitate the meetings, ONUC provided the security. After much negotiation Parliament was reopened on 22 July, and the majority of the 221 members attended. Many of them were brought to Leopoldville with help from and under ONUC protection. On 2
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August a new Government of national unity was constituted. The UN responded by acknowledging it would recognise this new government and give it what support it needed. This now left the Katangan secession to be resolved.
4.5
The Secession of Katanga
The UN chose not to become involved in the initial phase of the Katangan secession because it did not want to undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of Congo. Moreover, ONUC was not authorised to take sides or exert influence on what was seen as an internal conflict. Overall, the UNs goal was to maintain international security while not becoming embroiled in the domestic aims of the Congolese Government. In this vein, ONUC resorted to reconciliation to resolve the crisis. However, two factors worked against these goals in regards to Katanga: (1) the influence of foreign industrial concerns; and (2) the presence of mercenary forces. The Union Minire du Haut Katanga (UMHK), formed in 1906, was a Belgian mining trust operating in Katanga. The Socit Gnrale de Belgique, Belgiums largest holding company, owned UMHK. Katanga was rich with cobalt, copper, tin, uranium, and zinc deposits, which were at the time some of the richest in the world. In 1960 UMHK was producing 60 percent of the uranium in the West, 73 percent of the cobalt, and 10 percent of the copper, all of which came from Katanga. For the obvious commercial realities, UMHK supported Katangan independence and opposed the presence of ONUC. By using its financial power, UMHK simply paid its taxes to the local government led by Moise Tshombe, rather than the central government in Leopoldville. This gave Tshombe the wealth he needed to continue down the path of secession. UMHK also allowed its industrial facilities to be used by the growing Katangan mercenary army. This gendarmerie was led by some 600 Belgian soldiers who had not left the Congo as per SC resolution 143 (1960). Although Belgium never formally recognised Katanga (nor did any other state for that matter), little was done to bring back those civilian and military personnel who had been working in the region under the 1960 treaty of friendship. Many of these people took over key military and administrative positions in Katanga. Furthermore, recruitment agencies were set up in Brussels for the enlistment of mercenaries. It was not until October 1961 that the Government of Belgium began taking stronger steps to stop Belgians and other foreign nationals from entering Congo. Tshombe, however, continued to recruit foreigners, many of whom replaced the Belgian soldiers and technical advisors. ONUC at the same time was strengthened and was able to begin the evacuation/removal of non-Congolese personnel from Katanga. Even so, in late June 1961 there was still in excess of 500 mercenaries and ex-Belgian military operating with the Katangan gendarmerie. Once the new Government of national unity was formed and after all attempts to negotiate with Tshombes regime in Katanga failed, the new Congolese Government passed an ordinance on 24 August to expel all foreign officers and mercenaries that were supporting the Katangan secession. On 28 August, ONUC began to round up those foreign elements scheduled for deportation. ONUC also set up security in and around Elizabethville to quell any possible disorder that might have occurred. Though many of the mercenaries were deported by 9 September, it became obvious that some had re-infiltrated to Katanga and were continuing to support the secessionist movement.
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4.6
Fighting Between Katangan and ONUC Forces
In an effort to discredit ONUCs actions against the mercenaries and to imply that ONUC was causing disorder, the Katangan Surete (political police), which was led by foreign officers, began a brutal campaign against members of the antiTshombe Baluba tribe who were in Elizabethville. By 9 September 1961, some 35,000 Baluba had fled Elizabethville and were being protected by ONUC forces. The crisis caused a major food and health problem for ONUC and also heightened the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld inspecting ONUC Guard of escalation of tribal conflict. ONUCs efforts Honour in the Congo. At his side are Premier Adoula and Dr. to resolve the refugee issue were rebuffed by Sture Linner, Chief of UN Civilian Operations, 13 September Tshombe, and on 13 September ONUC 1961. (Source: 71642 UN/DPI Photo) forces set up similar security precautions to those of the previous month to try to resolve the issue. Almost immediately Katangan forces throughout the region attacked ONUC forces. The small Katangan air force seriously impeded ONUCs capability to reinforce its forces in Katanga. ONUC simply did not have any substantial offensive capability due to it being established as a peace force. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld had come to Congo to discuss the future of ONUC and also to try and resolve the Katanga secession. In an effort to create a ceasefire between ONUC and Katangan forces, the Secretary-General flew to meet Moise Tshombe at Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). On the night of 17 September his plane crashed, killing him and fifteen others. The flight occurred at night due to the threat of attack by a lone Katangan fighter aircraft during the day. Mahmoud Khiari, head of ONUC civil operations, flew to Ndola and signed the ceasefire agreement on 20 September with Tshombe. Twenty of ONUCs soldiers were killed and 63 wounded during this fighting. A further protocol was signed on 13 October, outlining the provisions of the ceasefire. In short, it allowed for defensive fire if troops were attacked and prohibited the movement of ONUC and Katangan forces. The ceasefire aside, Katangan forces continued to violate it, while ONUC maintained its positions. ONUC had by now been reinforced by jet fighter squadrons from Ethiopia, India, and Sweden to stop Katangan air attacks. However, ONUCs overall capability had been reduced to the withdrawal of the Tunisian and Ghanaian contingents and size reductions in other ONUC units. Frustrated by events, and in an effort to put an end to the secession, the central Government launched its own attack against Katanga in October 1961. The central Government requested ONUC help to transport ANC troops. However, under the original mission mandate, ONUC refused to help. The attack had limited territorial success, but it did not resolve the secession issue.
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On 24 November 1961, the SC passed resolution 169 (1961) and authorised the use of force to remove the mercenaries from Katanga. Incited by Tshombe, Katangan forces began low-level violence against ONUC forces; by 5 December, this had escalated into full-scale fighting. By late December ONUC had stabilised the military situation, and negotiations began to restore the peace. Nothing substantial came of these negotiations, which were suspended in June 1962. U Thant, the UNs new secretary-general, then offered a national reconciliation plan that was accepted in principle by both sides. However, the Katangan government did nothing to implement the plan, and by December 1962 ONUC forces again were sent to engage Katangan units to regain control of the region. By the end of December, ONUC forces had regained control of the area around Elizabethville and were in control of Kamina. By 4 January 1962 ONUC forces had secured the Elisabethville, Kipushi, Kamina, and Jadotville areas. Tshombe had retreated to his final stronghold in Kolwezi. Amnesty had been offered to the Katangan government in November 1961; they now accepted the offer, and by 21 January Indian troops of ONUC entered the town. As of that date, the Katangan secession was over. Due to the obvious skill and restraint of ONUC forces, UN casualties amounted to 22 killed and 77 wounded. Katangan casualties appeared to be light, as well.
4.7
The Re-establishment of the Central Government
From the onset, one of ONUCs objectives had been the training of Congolese personnel to run the civil structures of government and its support agencies in the country. With the end of the Katangan crisis, there was an ever-greater need for technical experts to help in the reintegration of Katangan governmental, monetary, and civil services with Congo. As ONUC had continued to train people, many of these individuals were now available to take over positions that had been held by Belgian technical experts in Katanga. ONUC also Volunteers, supplied by ONUC, UNICEF, FAO, and Build Road. Leopoldville, July 1962. (Source: 74797 UN/DPI/B. Zarov) took over command of the Katangan gendarmerie. Though there had been an effort by ONUC to reorganise the Congolese military, this mission was eventually carried out outside of the UN system due to the various secessions and the civil war. There had been no specific date for the termination of the ONUC mission, but as the mandate of ONUC had been substantially fulfilled, the force size was reduced. The Secretary-General noted that there was still a need for the presence of ONUC as per the request from Congolese Prime Minister Adoula. Thus, some 3,297 ONUC troops remained in Congo into 1964. The SecretaryGeneral noted in his report of 29 June 1964 that the Government of Congo had to take responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and its own territorial integrity. Even with continuing
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problems in Kwilu, Kivu, and northern Katanga, the presence of ONUC forces would not help. Ultimately, he noted that no request for a mission extension had come from the Congolese Government. Thus, on 30 June 1964, ONUC withdrew as planned. The Civilian Operations programme was also terminated, but the overall technical assistance provided by the UN was continued under the Office of the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
4.8
Personnel and Logistics Issues
ONUC suffered from personnel problems due to its multinational composition. There was great variation in unit capability, and many contingents did not speak either of the two official UN languages at the mission (English and French), which created communication difficulties. In addition, the six-month tours of duty created high rates of personnel turnover, which in turn created a lack of unit cohesiveness. However, most of these issues were mitigated by the superior quality and overall professionalism of the ONUC officer corps. ONUC also had to deal with the reality of the lack of logistical capability and the arming and supplying of a large multinational force with different capabilities. This situation was then compounded by the primitive transport system that existed in Congo, with limited roads, an inoperable rail system, and the harsh terrain and climatic conditions of central Africa. Air transport was the only viable solution for ONUC to move anything into the interior of Congo. The United States Air Force provided the majority of the airlift capability during the ONUC mission. Initially, there were few airfields that could support large military transport aircrafts. In addition, there were few good maps and even fewer local air traffic control and ground crews (most had been Belgians who had fled the country). ONUC was supported by the UNs Field Operations Service, which was not really set up for major military operations, therefore suffering deficiencies in its administrative and planning capabilities. As General von Horn, the missions first commander, observed, During my entire six months in the Congo, the Force never enjoyed a satisfactory supply system because both its direction and application remained exclusively in civilian hands. General von Horns criticism aside, the logistical issues ONUC faced did not overly impact its capabilities.
Canadian troops arrive in the Congo, November 1963. (Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Center, UNC63-164-1)
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4.9
Lack of Intelligence Gathering Capability
One of the major problems that faced ONUC was the gathering of intelligence. There was no organised intelligence gathering system to provide critical information about threats against ONUC or to the civilian population it was sent to protect. Part of the reason for this lack of capability was the civilian leaderships belief that ONUC was mandated as a peacekeeping force. Therefore, to maintain its neutrality, it could not be seen acting in a military manner, that is, gathering intelligence for clearly military uses. This lack of capability continued until early 1961. The lack of an intelligence capability many times left ONUC unaware of worsening conditions until after violence had broken out. Once ONUCs mandate was changed to include enforcement, its intelligence capacities were institutionalised with the creation of the Military Information Branch (MIB). Even so, ONUCs intelligence gathering capability was still insufficient, creating occasional problems for the mission.
4.10
The Outcome of the ONUC Mission
Despite extreme difficulties, in the end ONUC was able to fulfil its peace mission. By the time the operation was terminated in June 1964, its successes could be listed as:

All foreign troops had been withdrawn from the Congo; The secession of Katanga had been ended without a bloodbath; A national reconciliation government had been installed in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa); And most important of all, the intervention of the UN had insulated the Congo from superpower rivalry.
4.11
Effects of ONUC on the United Nations
Despite this success, the United Nations paid a very heavy price for its operation in the Congo. This was due to the fact that the ONUC peacekeeping mission afterwards provoked a serious political and financial crisis within the United Nations. Due to ONUC, the UN had lost its greatest Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjld, and in its aftermath, political and financial battles over ONUC nearly destroyed the United Nations as an organisation. In addition, although ONUC was cleared of all responsibility regarding the death of Lumumba, the tragedy of his death cast a dark cloud over the entire operation.
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4.12
The Role of ONUC in the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations
Both the United Nations and its peacekeeping activities survived the Congo crisis. In the final analysis, ONUC was an important step in the evolution and development of UN peacekeeping. The significance of ONUC in the evolution of PKOs is as follows:

It was the first peacekeeping force established by the Security Council; It was the first multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation which combined traditional peacekeeping tasks with important civilian activities of a political and humanitarian nature; and It was the only PKO during the Cold War for which the Security Council authorised the use of force, considering this as an exceptional, last resort, and beyond self-defence measure. The Council gave such authorisation twice during ONUC, first in February 1961 after the murder of Lumumba in order to prevent civil war, and in November 1961 to expel foreign mercenaries working for the Katangese secessionists.
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1.
What event triggered the post-independence crisis in Congo? A. The invasion of Congo by Belgian forces; B. The mutiny of the Force Publique; C. Rivalry between the national political parties; D. The presence of UN military observers.
2.
What was one of ONUCs initial primary goals? A. To disarm the ANC; B. To aid Belgian forces in restoring law and order; C. To aid the Congolese Government to restore law and order; D. To bring in humanitarian aid.
3.
The constitutional crisis between September 1960-61 led to what? A. Congo broke up into four distinct factional regions; B. ONUC was forced to withdraw from Congo; C. Congo was invaded by Northern Rhodesia; D. Belgium took over Congo.
4.
How did the murder of Patrice Lumumba negatively impact ONUC? A. There was no negative impact on ONUC or its operations; B. The Secretary-General and the Force Commander were forced to resign, and ONUC was withdrawn from Congo; C. Several troop-contributing nations withdrew their contingents, reducing ONUCs overall strength to some 15,000 troops at a critical moment; D. ONUC was immediately withdrawn from Congo.
5.
What did SC resolution 161 (1961) allow ONUC to do? A. It authorised the use of force by ONUC; B. It allowed ONUC to withdraw to safe positions within Congo; C. It allowed ONUC to withdraw from Congo; D. It authorised ONUC to engage in humanitarian relief operations.
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6.
What did SC resolution 169 (1961) of 24 November 1961 authorise? A. The use of force against any group that opposed ONUC operations; B. The use of force to remove the mercenaries from Katanga; C. The withdrawal of ONUC forces from Katanga; D. The expansion of ONUC forces in Katanga.
7.
With the termination of ONUC, overall technical assistance continued to be provided under what UN entity? A. UNESCO; B. The World Bank; C. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General; D. The Office of the Resident Representative of UNDP.
8.
What was one of the major problems that faced ONUC before its mandate was changed to include enforcement? A. It lacked an intelligence gathering capability; B. It lacked the forces to fulfil its mandate; C. Its command structure was too complicated; D. It did not have enough political leadership.
9.
ONUC had what impact on the UN? A. It set the blueprint for all future UN PKOs; B. It provoked a serious political and financial crisis within the UN; C. It put the UN on secure financial footing in terms of running PKOs; D. It had no impact on the UN.
10. What was the significance of ONUC in the evolution of PKOs? A. It was the first peacekeeping force established by the Security Council; B. It was the only peacekeeping mission that failed; C. It introduced the use of the blue beret and blue helmet as a symbol of peacekeeping; D. It had no significance on the evolution of PKOs.
ANSWER KEY: 1B, 2C, 3A, 4C, 5A, 6B, 7D, 8A, 9B, 10A
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LESSON 5 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE EARLY 1960s

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 What Precipitated the Financial Crisis at the United Nations The Financial Background of UNEF and ONUC Steps Taken by the UN to Resolve Its Financial Crisis The Stand Taken by the United States Regarding Article 19 The Report of the Special Committee and Resolution of the Financial Crisis Impact of the Financial Crisis
Lesson 5 / The Financial Crisis of the Early 1960s
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 5 examines how the financial crisis occurred in the United Nations in the early 1960s, how it was resolved, and what steps were taken so that it would not take place again. It describes several factors that were related to its onset, including major peacekeeping missions related to the crisis in the Congo and the Arab-Israeli wars. Lesson 5 looks into the role of the Soviet Union and its confrontation with the United States in precipitating and worsening the situation. Finally, the lesson outlines steps taken to resolve the financial crisis, which involved a Special Committee, and how its resolutions guarantee that such a crisis could not recur.
List the costs of major missions such as UNEF and ONUC that brought on the financial crisis; Define the roles of both the Soviet Union and the United States in the onset of the financial crisis, and also in its resolution; Understand how and why a Special Committee was set up to examine the financing of peacekeeping missions, and its mandates; and State the recommendations of the Special Committee and how their resolutions guarantee that the UN would not face another financial crisis.
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5.1
What Precipitated the Financial Crisis at the United Nations
The expenses of ONUC (the Congo Crisis), combined with those of UNEF (the Suez Crisis), precipitated a grave financial crisis that nearly wrecked the United Nations. Both operations were financed by contributions from Member States as apportioned by the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. The rate of assessment was the same as those used to raise funds for the regular budget of the United Nations, but the contributions for the two operations were managed in special and separate accounts.
5.2
The Financial Background of UNEF and ONUC
From the start, both UNEF and ONUC operations experienced financial problems. Their costs were very high, averaging over US$20 million per year for UNEF and approximately $100 million per year for ONUC. Financial problems ensued when the Soviet Union and other countries refused to pay their assessments for UNEF on the grounds that the force was not authorised by the Security Council and was therefore illegal. In addition, the Soviet Union, together with some other countries (not necessarily the same as those opposing UNEF), also refused to pay for ONUC because they opposed the policy adopted by the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjld, in directing that operation. While not opposing the expanded Congo mission on political grounds, the French Government joined the Soviet Union in its rejection of the authority of the General Assembly to authorise UN peace and security operations. France felt that only the SC, with the agreement of its Permanent Members, could authorise any peacekeeping operation, especially if the use of force was involved. On this basis, France also refused to pay for ONUC. The legal and constitutional issues arising from their refusal to contribute were put to the test when the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. The court ruled that the expenses of UNEF and ONUC constituted expenses of the Organisation within the meaning of the Charter, which ruled the expenses constitutional, and thus, they had to be paid.
5.3
Steps Taken by the UN to Resolve Its Financial Crisis
Nevertheless, by the end of 1961, the United Nations had a massive shortfall of some US$200 million in its regular budget and special accounts combined. After being warned by the SecretaryGeneral, U Thant, that the UN was facing imminent bankruptcy, the General Assembly authorised the Secretary-General to issue UN bonds of up to $200 million and to use the proceeds to cover operating requirements, essentially those of the PKOs. Bonds were sold in the amount of $169 million and had an interest rate of 2%. The bonds principal and interest were repaid with additional contribution assessments to the UN budget from the Member States.
Secretary-General U Thant, elected 30 November 1962. (Source: UN/DPI/Y. Nagata)
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But the bond issue in turn brought about a new kind of financial crisis. Several Member States, which had refused to pay their assessments for UNEF and ONUC in the first place, then withheld a portion of their assessed contributions to the regular UN budget for the same reason. By September 1964, the total withholdings of the Soviet Union exceeded two years assessed contributions and, in accordance with Article 19 of the Charter, the Soviet Union would become liable to lose its right of vote in the General Assembly.
5.4
The Stand Taken by the United States Regarding Article 19
At the start of the 19th Session of the General Assembly in September 1964, the United States insisted on the application of Article 19 with regard to the arrears of the Soviet Union. In rebuttal, the Soviet Union threatened to leave the UN if the General Assembly so decided. This confrontation was postponed because the Member States agreed not to vote on any matters during the session and that in the interim, a Special Committee, which included the five Permanent Members of the Security Council minus China, would undertake a comprehensive review of UN PKOs, including financial aspects. This solution was reached by a consensus of the General Assembly. The adjournment helped the UN to cut down on operating costs, but by January 1965 it was operating on a month-to-month basis.
Article 19 A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.
In part, the financial crisis was alleviated because the U.S. stopped pressing the Soviet Union for payment. Washington had realised that it was not in the interest of the U.S. to enforce Article 19 on the Soviet Union because the majority of poor African and Asian states in the General Assembly could use the same tactic on the U.S. They in effect could vote for large assessments on the U.S., which if not paid would lead to the U.S. losing its General Assembly vote.
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5.5
The Report of the Special Committee and Resolution of the Financial Crisis
One year later, on 31 August 1965, the Special Committee submitted its report to the General Assembly. It recommended that: 1) The Assembly carry on its work in a normal manner in accordance with its rules of procedure; 2) The question of the applicability of Article 19 in regards to the arrears of the Soviet Union should not be raised with regard to UNEF and ONUC; and 3) The financial difficulties of the UN should be resolved through voluntary contributions by Member States, especially contributions of the developed countries. The next day, at the close of its 19th Session, the General Assembly adopted the report of the Special Committee. Thus, the crisis of the Soviet Unions threatened expulsion from the Security Council and threatened withdrawal from the UN was averted, which, given the pallor of the Cold War, was an important victory.
5.6
Impact of the Financial Crisis
The 1964 financial crisis together with the UN Operation in the Congo highlighted the flexibility and resiliency of the Organisation in two important ways. First, the Member States resorted to an extraordinary and imaginative device (avoid taking votes during an entire session of the General Assembly) to avert a major crisis that could have irreparably crippled the United Nations as the primary world-peace organisation. Second, despite the formidable difficulties it encountered, the United Nations was not only able to carry out its Congo Operation to a successful end but could also set up three peacekeeping operations at the height of the Congo crisis. Namely, these included the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA) in 1962; the United Nations Observer Mission (UNYOM) in 1963; and the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964. To overcome the prevailing potential constraints, the United Nations made two adjustments: all three new operations were financed outside the UN budget, and they were authorised for limited time periods, whereas the preceding operations were all open-ended. These three new operations will be dealt with in later lessons.
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UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION EXPENDITURES, 1947-1965
YEAR 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
TOTAL EXPENDITURES* 0 4 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 9 26 30 26 76 126 126 127 91 45
MISSION UNTSO 1948-present UNMOGIP 1949-present
UNEF I 1956-67 UNOGIL 1958 ONUC 1960-64 UNSF/UNTEA 1962-63 UNYOM 1963-64 UNFICYP 1964-present UNIPOM 1965-66, DOMREP 1965-66
*in millions of U.S. dollars
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1.
What precipitated the grave financial crisis that nearly wrecked the United Nations? A. All Member States not paying their assessments; B. Gross financial mismanagement at UNHQ; C. A global financial recession; D. The expenses of ONUC combined with those of UNEF.
2.
What was the average annual cost for UNEF I? A. Under $20 million a year; B. Over $20 million a year; C. Under $100 million a year; D. Over $100 million a year.
3.
Why did France refuse to pay for ONUC? A. France felt that only the Security Council, with the agreement of its Permanent Members, could authorise any peacekeeping operations; B. The French Government did not want to offend Belgium by supporting the mission; C. France felt it had no national interest in the events in Congo; D. There was no political support in France for ONUC.
4.
How did the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rule to resolve the issues arising from cost of UNEF and ONUC? A. It ruled that Member States only had to pay for PKOs that they endorsed; B. It ruled that it was unconstitutional to force Member States to pay for all PKOs; C. It ruled that the expenses were constitutional, and thus, they had to be paid; D. The ICJ was unable to resolve the issue.
5.
At the end of 1961, how much was the UNs financial shortfall? A. Some $169 million in its regular budget and special accounts combined; B. Some $200 million in its regular budget and special accounts combined; C. Some $200 million in only its regular budget; D. Some $200 million in only its special accounts.
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6.
How did the UN resolve its financial crisis? A. It sold off UN-controlled property; B. It reduced UNHQ staff by 50% and eliminated jobs in other UN agencies; C. It issued UN bonds of up to $200 million; D. It borrowed money from the state banks of the Permanent Members.
7.
What does Article 19 of the UN Charter state? A. No Member State can leave the UN without a vote in the General Assembly; B. If a Member State is in arrears to the UN of an equivalent to its assessments for two years, it is out of the UN; C. If a Member State is in arrears to the UN of an equivalent to its assessments for two years, it can lose its vote in the Security Council; D. If a Member State is in arrears to the UN of an equivalent to its assessments for two years, it can lose its vote in the General Assembly.
8.
What did the Soviet Union threaten to do when the United States insisted on the application of Article 19 with regard to the arrears of the Soviet Union? A. It gave up its seat in the Security Council; B. It threatened to leave the UN; C. It paid one year of its arrears; D. It paid all of its arrears.
9.
In regards to the financial crisis, on 31 August 1965, the Special Committee submitted its report to the General Assembly. What was one of its recommendations? A. The Soviet Union should be expelled from the UN under Article 19; B. The question of the applicability of Article 19 in regards to the arrears of the Soviet Union should not be raised with regard to UNEF and ONUC; C. The UN should refrain from establishing additional PKOs until all arrears were paid in full; D. Article 19 did not apply in regards to assessments for any PKOs.
10. The 1964 financial crisis, together with the UN Operation in the Congo, highlighted what about the UN? A. Its flexibility and resiliency; B. Its weaknesses; C. The weakness of the Charter; D. It highlighted nothing.
ANSWER KEY: 1D, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6C, 7D, 8B, 9B, 10A
LESSON 6 UN TEMPORARY EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY (UNTEA) IN WEST NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN)
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 Background on UNTEA Establishment of UNSF Establishment of UNTEA Indonesia Takes Over UNTEAs Impact
UN YEMEN OBSERVER MISSION (UNYOM)

6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 Background on UNYOM Establishment of UNYOM Organisation of UNYOM Operations and Termination
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP)

6.10 6.11 6.12 6.13 Background on DOMREP The Inter-American Peace Force Role of DOMREP DOMREPs Impact
Lesson 6 / UNTEA, UNYOM, and DOMREP
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 6 examines UN Missions in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNTEA), Yemen (UNYOM), and in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP). The issues related to each will expand the students understanding of the broad range of purposes found in peacekeeping operations, and how each contributed to the evolution of peacekeeping concepts. In West New Guinea (West Irian), Lesson 6 describes the ceasefire required before peace initiatives could be taken and the ongoing issues between the Netherlands and Indonesia over that territory. In terms of UNYOM, Lesson 6 discusses the crises over boundaries and territorial rights that a move towards self-rule engendered, and how it required the Secretary-Generals Special Representative to help resolve it. A Representative of the Secretary-General was also sent to the Dominican Republic, which was plagued by military coups and a civil war while attempting to become a democratic nation. In each case, UN peace initiatives were tailored to the unique needs of each region.
Understand how the history of the Netherlands and Indonesia played a role in the crises in New Guinea; Describe the mandate of UNTEA, including that of the Security Force that was a part of that mission; State the problems encountered by the Executive Authority of the UN in attempting to administer West New Guinea (West Irian); Outline the origins and background of the difficulties in Yemen; Describe the mandate of UNYOM; Understand the development of the crisis in the Dominican Republic; Define the mandate of the UN Representative in the Dominican Republic; and Discuss the international repercussions which arose from the crisis in the Dominican Republic.
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UNTEA IN WEST NEW GUINEA (WEST IRIAN) 6.1 Background on UNTEA
West New Guinea (West Irian) had been a colony of the Netherlands since 1828. In the postWWII push for decolonisation, the Netherlands gave independence to Indonesia in 1949. However, the status of West Irian remained unresolved. Due to the ambiguous nature of the language used in the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty, which gave Indonesia its independence, the Netherlands felt it remained the sole power in West Irian, while Indonesia saw the Dutch role as strictly administrative, until the implied incorporation of the territory within a year after Indonesian Independence. The issue remained unresolved, although the matter was discussed at the General Assemblys regular sessions from 1954 to 1957 and at the 1961 session. By December 1961 it was becoming obvious that a negotiated settlement was unlikely. Thus, then-acting Secretary-General U Thant, offered his good offices to resolve the matter. The parties agreed to informal talks that began in early 1962. However, tensions grew as Indonesian troops entered West New Guinea on a number of occasions in the first part of 1962, but by 31 July there was a preliminary agreement reached. The agreement came on 15 August and was ratified on 20 September 1962. The next day, the General Assembly in resolution 1752 (XVII, 21 September 1962) authorised UN administration of the territory. The administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) was to be transferred to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). UNTEA would have full authority after 1 October 1962 to administer the territory, to maintain law and order, to protect the rights of the inhabitants, and to ensure uninterrupted, normal services until 1 May 1963, when the administration of the territory was to be transferred to Indonesia. In addition, the UN would provide a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) to assist UNTEA to observe the implementation of the ceasefire that was to become effective before UNTEA assumed authority. The mission, therefore, had a dual role in terms of peacekeeping and its administrative responsibilities. In an effort to quickly set up the ceasefire, the Secretary-General sent UNMOs without the prior authorisation of the General Assembly or the Security Council, the first time this had ever been done. The UNMOs tasks included:

Observing the ceasefire; Protecting the security of Dutch and Indonesian forces; Restoring the situation in the event of breaches of the ceasefire; Assisting in informing Indonesian troops in the jungle of the existence of the ceasefire; and Providing a non-military supply line to Indonesian troops.
Indian Brigadier-General Indar Jit Rikhye was made the UNs Military Adviser and headed the military observer team that was sent to supervise the ceasefire set-up. Brazil, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Nigeria, and Sweden provided 21 UNMOs for the team. The UNMOs came specifically
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from UNEF I or ONUC. The ceasefire was established at 0001 GMT on 18 August 1962. With the co-operation of both sides and the support of the Thirteenth United States Task Force for the Far East and the Royal Canadian Air Force, by 21 September General Rikhye and his team had fulfilled their mandate without incident.
6.2
Establishment of UNSF
With the ceasefire in place, General Rikhye and his team had to make sure that law and order was maintained in the territory, as well as to lay the groundwork for the arrival of UNSF. Article VIII of the Indonesian-Netherlands agreement stipulated the role and purpose of UNSF:

The Secretary-General would provide the UNTEA with such security forces as the United Nations Administrator deems necessary; Such forces would primarily supplement existing Papuan (West Irianese) police in the task of maintaining law and order; The Papuan Volunteer Corps, which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator would cease being part of the Netherlands armed forces; The Indonesian armed forces in the territory would be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the Secretary-General for the maintenance of law and order; The United Nations Administrator would, to the extent feasible, use the Papuan (West Irianese) police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and at his discretion also use the Indonesian armed forces for the same purpose; and The Netherlands armed forces would be repatriated as rapidly as possible and, while still in the territory, will be under the authority of the UNTEA.
UNSF was the police arm of UNTEA and would operate as an internal law and security force. Its responsibilities included the supervision of the development of a viable local police force and aiding the smooth implementation of UNTEAs administrative mandate. The UNSF mandate was to begin no later than 1 October 1962. Pakistani Major-General Said Uddin Khan was appointed as the Commander of UNSF, and the force was comprised of 1,500 Pakistani troops. Units of the RCAF and the USAF provided communications and troop transport for UNSF. By 5 October UNSF was in place. The UN also had under its control some 1,500 personnel comprised of the Papuan Volunteer Corps, the civil police, and the remaining Dutch and Indonesian troops. UNSF was created to uphold the authority of UNTEA.
Pakistani UNSF troops land at Kaimana.
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6.3
Establishment of UNTEA
When General Assembly resolution 1752 (XVII) was adopted on 21 September 1962, UNTEA personnel were immediately sent to the region of West New Guinea (West Irian). For the first time in its history, the UN had temporary executive authority under the jurisdiction of the Secretary-General over a territory. Mr. Jos Rolz-Bennett, became the Secretary-Generals Representative in West New Guinea (West Irian), and he arrived in West New Guinea on 21 September. The first serious task UNTEA had to deal with was the exodus of the majority of the Dutch civil servants, which had created an administrative vacuum that could have caused serious disruption of government services. Though some Papuan officials filled vacant posts, there was still a serious shortage of adequately trained locals. An emergency task force was set up to recruit and retain international, Dutch, and Indonesian personnel. In addition, the Dutch Government encouraged its nationals to stay and help UNTEA, while the Indonesian Government provided a group of civil servants to fill key posts. On 1 October the administration of the territory was transferred from the Netherlands to UNTEA. On the same day, Dutch and Indonesian liaison missions were established with UNTEA in Hollandia/Kotabaru. A new UN Administrator, Mr. Djalal Abdoh (Iran), was appointed on 22 October; he replaced Mr. Rolz-Bennett on 15 November. Role of UNTEA New West Guinea had little development. There was only an estimated 900 kilometres of roads in the region. Telephones were only available inside the major towns. Air transport of all supplies from ports to inland areas was a critical requirement for the missions success. The terrain also created serious communication problems. All these issues had to be surmounted by UNTEA to fulfil its mandate. Once in place, UNTEAs powers included:

The administration of the territory; The right to appoint government officials and members of representative councils; The right to legislate for the territory, subject to certain qualifications; and The right to guarantee civil liberties and property rights.
The transfer of authority meant that the Dutch system of government and use of the Dutch language had to be replaced with Indonesian systems and the Indonesian language. In addition, the indigenous forces had to be adapted to allow UNTEA personnel to handle the situation until Indonesia took over. The judicial system had almost ceased to function once the Dutch left. UNTEA quickly filled the vacant positions with qualified Indonesians. The Papuan Volunteer Corps Dutch officers and non-commissioned officers were replaced with Indonesian officers. This process was completed on 21 January 1963, when the Corps was transferred to Indonesian command. The Papuan police was an all-Dutch force, and there were no qualified Papuans to replace them. The Dutch officers were temporarily replaced by Filipino personnel, which were then later replaced by Indonesians. The entire corps was officered by Indonesians by the end of March 1963. It was agreed when UNTEA took over control of the New
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West Guinea, except with the prior consent of the UNTEA administration, that the number of Indonesian troops would not exceed the strength of the Pakistan contingent of UNSF. By 15 November Dutch troops had fully withdrawn from the territory. Though there were minor incidents during the UNTEA mandate, order was always re-established by UNSF troops, and there was no situation in which the Indonesian military had to be used outside of joint patrols with UNSF. UNTEA was also responsible for opening and closing the New Guinea Council and, in consultation with the Councils members, appointing its new representatives. UNTEA was also responsible for the 11 regional (representative) councils in New West Guinea. In addition, UNTEA informed the population of the change to the transfer of the territorys administration to Indonesia and the question of self-determination. The later point was about a plebiscite to be held no later than 1969 in which they could choose to remain with Indonesia or to sever their ties with Indonesia. UNTEA also had to run the public health system and established a comprehensive plan for the set up of hospitals and clinics throughout the territory. Again, due to the exodus of the Dutch, only 32 of some 317 personnel stayed to support the public works system after UNTEAs takeover. UNTEA, with the help of the Indonesian liaison mission, was able to re-establish the existing public works system and begin new projects. In late 1962 and early 1963, some Papuan leaders and various groups in the territory requested that the period of UNTEA administration in West Irian be shortened. However, the UN determined that this would not be feasible, and the transfer of the administration of the territory to Indonesia would occur as scheduled on 1 May 1963. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands on 13 March 1963 greatly helped UNTEA in the final phase of the territorial transfer of authority to Indonesia. By the end of April, there were some 1,564 Indonesian and 7,625 Papuans, as well as other indigenous people of West Irian, holding 7,625 civil service posts. All the provisions of the agreement leading up to the transfer of administration had been fully implemented. In addition, at the end of April the units and garrisons of UNSF began their withdrawal and were systematically replaced with Indonesian troops.
6.4
Indonesia Takes Over
The Governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia covered all costs equally that were incurred by UNTEA during its mandate. As scheduled, on 1 May 1963 UNTEA transferred administrative control of West New Guinea to the Government of Indonesia. The UN, in consultation with Indonesia, assigned a small number of UN experts to oversee the territorial plebiscite as per Article XVII of the Indonesia-Netherlands agreement. At the end of
Construction project on the main street in Jayapura. (Source: Indonesian Mission)
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August 1969, the population of West New Guinea (West Irian) freely chose to remain a part of Indonesia. With the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2504 (XXIV) of 19 November 1969, the Secretary-General acknowledged the completion of the UNs task as per the 1962 agreement.
6.5
UNTEAs Impact
The UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) was established in West New Guinea (West Irian) in September 1962. It was one of the more ambitious and successful peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN in its first twenty years, overseeing the transition of western New Guinea from Dutch colonial rule to Indonesian administration. Importantly, the operation was limited in duration from the onset and had the support of both these countries, who also paid for the mission. It was the first time in the history of peace forces that the UN came so close to full administrative authority in a territory during the course of a political-military mission. On the other hand, despite the United Nations endeavour to allow the populace to choose to become a democratic nation, in a plebiscite, it voted to join Indonesia rather than become independent, a voting process that was carefully orchestrated by Indonesian authorities and took place six years after the UN forces had left. UNTEA brought into play three innovative features:

It was the first peacekeeping operation entrusted with exercising authority over a territory; Secretary-General U Thant concluded an agreement with Indonesia and the Netherlands to establish UNTEA at no cost to the UN in order to assist in the transfer of the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) from Dutch to Indonesian control; and To carry out this agreement, he sought the approval of the General Assembly rather than the Security Council on the grounds that it was essentially a matter of decolonisation. The Soviet Union did not raise any objection to his initiative. Thus, aside from UNEF, it was the only peacekeeping operation authorised by the General Assembly.
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Map of West New Guinea (West Irian)

Note: Map depicts current names.
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UN YEMEN OBSERVER MISSION (UNYOM) 6.6 Background on UNYOM
When the Yemeni civil war broke out in September 1962, it had the potential of becoming a wider regional conflict. A week after the succession of Imam Mohammed Al-Badr on 19 September 1962, an Egyptian-inspired coup overthrew him and declared the new state of the Yemen Arab Republic. On 29 September Egypt, which already had a relationship with Yemen, recognised the new state, and the Soviet Union followed suit the next day. However, all other major powers that had regional interests did not recognise the new state or its government. Subsequently, Imam Al-Badr escaped and was able to rally the desert tribes in northern Yemen to his side. A fierce guerrilla campaign broke out between the new military-backed regime and those of the royalist forces of Iman Al-Badr. Saudi Arabia and its western allies supported the royalist forces, while Egypt, supported by the Soviet Union, gave its support to the revolutionary government. The Sallal revolutionary government threatened to invade Saudi Arabia because of its direct involvement in supporting the royalists. In October, on request of the revolutionary government, Egyptian forces arrived in Yemen to support the war against the royalists. By early November, militarily the situation had reached a deadlock. On 27 November, the Yemeni mission to the UN, which was still staffed by the royalists, requested the UN to address the matter of foreign involvement in Yemen. This created a dilemma for the UN as it had two sets of representatives for the country. On 20 December the General Assembly, after reviewing the recommendation of the Credentials Committee, accepted the credentials of the President of the Yemen Arab Republic.
Mohammed Al-Badr with royalist tribesmen in Yemen. (Source: The Bettman Library)
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6.7
Establishment of UNYOM
In a report dated 29 April 1963, the Secretary-General noted that after having UN and U.S. representatives independently review the situation since the autumn of 1962, the Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen formally confirmed their acceptance of identical terms for disengagement in Yemen. Under the terms of the disengagement:
Saudi Arabia would terminate all support and aid to the royalists of Yemen and would prohibit the use of Saudi Arabian territory by royalist leaders for carrying on the struggle in Yemen; Simultaneously with that suspension of aid, Egypt would begin withdrawing their troops that had been sent to Yemen at the request of the new Government, the withdrawal to be phased and to take place as soon as possible; A demilitarised zone would be established to a distance of 20 kilometres on each side of the demarcated Saudi ArabiaYemen border, and impartial observers would be stationed there to check on the observance of the terms of disengagement; and The observers would also certify the suspension of activities in support of the royalists from Saudi Arabian territory and the outward movement of the Egyptian forces and equipment from the airports and seaports of Yemen.
Swedish Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, was dispatched to work out with the three parties concerned how the UNMOs would operate. The SecretaryGenerals report of 27 May noted that, based on Lt. General von Horns recommendations, 200 UNMOs be sent immediately to establish the observer mission for a period of four months. The cost of the mission was estimated at approximately US$1 million, it was hoped that Saudi Arabia and Egypt would bear this cost. Saudi Arabia agreed to a proportionate share, while Egypt agreed to provide $200,000. Thus, the mission costs were covered for the first two months. On 11 June 1963, the Security Council adopted resolution 179 (1963), which allowed for the establishment of the UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM). No time limit was set for the mission, and the Secretary-General noted that he would extend UNYOM without a decision of the Security Council if he deemed it necessary and if there was the required financial support. On 7 November 1963 and after agreement that Saudi Arabia and Egypt would continue to fund UNYOM, the mission was extended for an additional two months. After successive consultation every two months, UNYOM was extended for successive two-month periods until 4 September 1964. In late August 1964, Saudi Arabia stated that is could no longer afford to pay its portion of the mission costs, and on advisement Egypt noted that it had no objection to the termination of UNYOM on 4 September. Thus, the mission was formerly terminated on 4 September 1964.
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6.8
Organisation of UNYOM
UNYOM began operations on 4 July 1963. In August, Lt. General von Horn resigned, and his Yugoslavian deputy, Colonel Branko Pavlovic, took command of UNYOM. He was replaced in September 1963 with Indian Lieutenant-General P. S. Gyani, who was put on temporary assignment from his position as Commander of UNEF.
UNYOM FORCES: 4 July-November 1963 Source UNEF UNTSO UNEF airbase El Arish International Number of Personnel 114 troops Six 50 officers and men; Six fixed wing aircraft and six helicopters 28 staff members and a small military staff Formation Reconnaissance unit UNMOs Air support unit Location Jizan, Najran and Sadah in the DMZ and surrounding area Sana, Al Hudaydah (two positions mainly used to certify the Egyptian withdrawal Jizan, Najran and Sadah
UNYOM HQ
Sana
UNYOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)

The cities of San'a and Al Hudaydah; and The DMZ on each side of the demarcated portion of the Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border.
In November 1963, due to the co-operation by Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the general peace in the AOR (area of responsibility) of the mission, there was no need to keep a UN military formation in the DMZ (demilitarised zone). The reconnaissance unit was progressively withdrawn, and the number of UNMOs was raised to 25. At the same time, the number of aircraft dedicated to UNYOM was reduced to two. As the end of the initial two-month period of the mission was coming to an end, there was some question of further financial support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Based on this, the Secretary-General put in motion a plan to withdraw UNYOM. In an effort to maintain at least a civilian UN presence in Yemen after the UNYOM withdrawal, he appointed Mr. Pier P. Spinelli, head of the United Nations Office at Geneva, as his Special Representative in Yemen. However, because the financial support came through, the withdrawal plan was cancelled. However, given that Lt. General Gyani had to return to his UNEF command, the idea of appointing Mr. Spinelli was retained. When the General did leave in November 1963, Mr. Spinelli was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General and was also made head of UNYOM. He retained this dual role until the termination of UNYOM.
Ralph Bunch in Yemen, 1963. (UN)
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6.9
Operations and Termination
Given that there was no ceasefire agreement, UNYOM did not have a ceasefire to supervise. Therefore, UNYOMs authority was significantly more limited than other UN observation missions. UNYOMs tasks were limited to:

Observing; Certifying and reporting the termination of Saudi Arabias support of the royalists in Yemen; and Certifying the Egyptian troop withdrawal from Yemen.
A series of checkpoints and air/ground patrols were established to cover all main roads and tracks leading into Yemen and the demilitarised zone to stop royalist movements and material support from Saudi Arabia. As there were few passable roads in the mountainous central part of the DMZ, daily air and ground patrols had randomised timings and routes, in order to dissuade any incursions. One problem with this plan was that traditionally, due to daytime heat, people travelled at night. This obviously limited the method of patrolling over such a large region. To mitigate this situation, UNYOM military observers were positioned at various communication centres for 40 hours or more to cover the night-time movements of people and cargos. In addition, Saudi liaison officers were assigned to UNYOM checkpoints and worked hand-in-hand with the UNMOs. The majority of complaints handled by UNYOM related to allegations of violations by both sides of breaches of the disengagement treaty. Mandate and mission limitations aside, the presence of UNYOM had a moderating effect on hostile actions by both sides. UNYOM, within its mandate limits, also functioned as a mediator during negotiations between the two sides; this became a key part of Mr. Spinellis job. Nonetheless, the SecretaryGenerals assessments between 4 September 1963 and 2 September 1964 at the termination of UNYOM clearly showed that there was very little progress towards finding a peaceful solution. In addition, though there had been troop reductions and conflict was limited, overall there had been a failure by both sides to implement the disengagement agreement. UNYOM had at least achieved a restraining influence during its mandate. The region soon collapsed into civil war that split the region in two until the final conflict in the mid-1990s, which reunited the region.
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DOMREP IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 6.10 Background on DOMREP In the latter half of April 1965, a political crisis in the Dominican Republic erupted into a civil war. By 25 April, heavy fighting had broken out between the ruling military junta, which had overthrown the Bosch government, and a group of young military officers and civilians, who wanted the restoration of the 1963 constitution and the reinstatement of former President Juan Bosch. On 28 April 1965, the United States announced it was sending troops to the country in order to protect Americans there and escort them to safety. The U.S. did inform the UN Security Council of its actions and also called for a meeting of the Organisation of American States (OAS) to discuss the situation. The Council of the OAS met on 29 April and called for a suspension of armed hostilities. By 30 April U.S. Marines and paratroopers had become involved in the fighting. On 1 May the Soviet Union called for an urgent meeting of the SC to discuss if the U.S. had militarily intervened in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. The issue was never really resolved in a series of further meetings that went on until the summer of 1965. On 6 May the OAS informed the Security Council that it was calling on OAS members to send troops to the Dominican Republic. On 14 May the SC passed resolution 203 (1965) calling for a ceasefire and for the Secretary-General to send a representative to assess the situation in the Dominican Republic. Indian Major General I.J. Rikhye, with an advance party of two UNMOs, was sent to Santo Domingo as Military Advisor. At any one time, the two UNMOs were selected from three Member States, Brazil, Canada, or Ecuador. By 14 May U.S. forces had enforced a safety zone on the island to begin evacuation operations. Mr. Jose Antonio Mayobre was made the SecretaryGenerals Representative in the Dominican Republic, where he arrived on 18 May. He reported that there was still heavy fighting in the northern part of the capital, Santa Domingo. The OAS noted that the presence of the UN had compromised and interfered with its efforts and asked the UN to coordinate its efforts with the OAS representative. 6.11 The Inter-American Peace Force
Further communications and discussion occurred between the UN and the OAS, but on 23 May, the OAS set up the InterAmerican Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic. By 26 June, the IAPF was composed of 1,600 troops and policemen from six Latin American countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay) and 12,400 troops from the United States. As the Latin American soldiers arrived, U.S. military strength was gradually reduced as the Latin American forces began to arrive. U.S. forces were eventually reduced to 6,243 troops. Brazil was the largest Latin contingent, providing an infantry battalion with its own logistics capability of some 1,130 troops. The other five Latin countries personnel for the most part were ill-equipped and required U.S. logistical support to operate.
Brazilian troops of the IAPF. (USMC)
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IAPF Command Relationships

Source: U.S. Dept. of the Army
IAPF Organisation
Source: OAS
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6.12
Role of DOMREP
The Representative was able to negotiate a short ceasefire between the two sides on 21 May. The ceasefire essentially became a de facto cessation of hostilities. The Representative with his Military Adviser and the UNMOs were to:

Observe and report on the developments in the Dominican Republic; Observe the situation there and to report to the Secretary-General on breaches of the ceasefire; and Observe and report on any other events that might affect the maintenance of peace and order in the country.
Based on DOMREP reports from the Representative, the Secretary-General noted in his 16 July report to the SC that numerous human rights violations and a worsening economic situation prevailed throughout the country. Moreover, there was an immediate need to find a political solution and bring in external emergency aid, financial support, and technical assistance. The OAS was able to negotiate a proposal, the Act of Dominican Reconciliation, that was acceptable to both sides. It established Hector Garcia Godoy as the sole head of the government and that both sides would accept a proposed Institutional Act. Godoy took office on 3 September, but tension over reintegration of the Dominican Republics armed forces was creating further friction. DOMREP reports noted that violence had shifted to acts of terrorism and armed clashes between civilians and the police and military. Further reports observed that heavy fighting had broken out in December in Santiago followed by a wave of terrorist attacks in Santa Domingo. However, by 25 December the security forces had been able to maintain control, but it was noted in early January 1966 that the situation still remained tense and unstable. Between January and the end of May 1966, the Secretary-General reported that there were still serious incidents occurring, but that they had lessened by May. Elections were held on 1 June, and IAPF and Dominican military forces were confined to their barracks. The OAS invited 41 observers to report on the elections. The elections went smoothly, and the new government was installed in July. Early in July a phased withdrawal of the IAPF began, which was completed on 21 September. The Dominican Foreign Minister sent a letter dated 13 October 1966 to the SecretaryGeneral, which expressed his countrys appreciation to the UN for support in the restoration of peace in the Dominican Republic. The letter further noted that since the objectives of the Security Council had been achieved, DOMREP should be withdrawn. The withdrawal occurred by 22 October 1966.
U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, Santa Domingo. (U.S. Army)
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6.13
DOMREPs Impact
The Secretary-General observed that DOMREP was of unusual complexity and had considerable international repercussions, specifically due to the unilateral decision by the U.S. to intervene early on in the coup. Moreover, the situation was further exacerbated by the presence of the IAPF. The presence of DOMREP had a moderating factor in a volatile situation. In addition, for the first time, a UN mission had operated in the same area and dealt with the same matters as an operation of a regional organisation, in this case the OAS.
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1.
In regards to UNTEA, what did the Secretary-General do in an effort to quickly set up the ceasefire? A. He sent the UN Peace Forces in without prior authorisation of the GA or SC; B. He sent UNMOs without the prior authorisation of the GA or SC, the first time this had ever been done; C. He asked the U.S. to deploy Marines while the UN forces were organised; D. He asked all parties concerned to withdraw their forces 100 miles from either side of the disputed border.
2.
One of UNTEAs powers included: A. The right to expel anyone from the region; B. The control of all communications; C. The administration of the territory of New West Guinea; D. The right to exploit the natural resources of the territory to offset the mission cost.
3.
What greatly helped UNTEA in 1963 during the final phase of the territorial transfer of authority to Indonesia? A. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands; B. The expansion of the size of the mission; C. More funds becoming available from the World Bank; D. Indonesias military support for the mission.
4.
Who bore the costs of UNTEA? A. The UN, through special assessments of the Member States; B. The UN, through its regular budget; C. The States that contributed forces to UNTEA; D. The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands.
5.
What was the time limit set for UNYOM? A. Six months; B. One year; C. Two years; D. There was no time limit set for the mission.
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6.
Why did the Secretary-General put in motion a plan to withdraw UNYOM at the end of the initial two-month period of the mission? A. Saudi Arabia had requested UNYOMs withdrawal; B. There was some question of further financial support from Saudi Arabia and Egypt; C. The mission had been successful and there was no longer a need for it; D. There was a loss of support for the mission from the troop-contributing countries.
7.
After UNYOM withdrew in 1964, what happened in Yemen? A. Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed a peace accord; B. The Soviets negotiated a peace agreement between the two Yemeni factions; C. The forces of Imam Mohammed Al-Badr reunited Yemen; D. The region soon collapsed into a civil war that split the region in two.
8.
What was one of the roles of DOMREP? A. To observe and report on the developments in the Dominican Republic; B. To report on IAPF violations; C. To review Latin American military procedures; D. To only observe the withdrawal of U.S. military forces.
9.
How many personnel made up DOMREP at any one time? A. 10 UNMOs; B. One UNMO and the Military Advisor; C. Two UNMOs and the Military Advisor; D. 26 UNMOs and the Military Advisor.
10. As stability returned to the Dominican Republic, what happened to IAPF? A. It was replaced with a new UN peacekeeping force; B. It was withdrawn all at once; C. It began a phased withdrawal; D. It remained in the country for another two years.
ANSWER KEY: 1B, 2C, 3A, 4D, 5D, 6B, 7D, 8A, 9D, 10C
LESSON 7 UN OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON (UNOGIL)

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 Background on UNOGIL Deployment of UNOGIL Role of UNOGIL Presence of U.S. Military Forces in Lebanon Events in Jordan General Assembly Emergency Session Termination of UNOGIL
UN MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP)

7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 Background on UNMOGIP Role of UNMOGIP Establishment of UNIPOM The Tashkent Agreement The Continuation of UNMOGIP The 1999 Kargil Conflict Ongoing Issues
Lesson 7 / UNOGIL and UNMOGIP
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 7 covers two different UN peace initiatives: the short-lived conflict between Lebanon and Syria, and the long-lived dispute between India and Pakistan. It explains how each dispute emerged, and how and why the UN was invited to help settle each dispute, despite their many complications. It sheds light on how events in Jordan shaped the conflict in Lebanon, and how a Special UN Representative was able to intervene and help settle problems there. Lesson 7 also gives the student insight into the complex history of the rivalry between India and Pakistan, and why the territory of Kashmir became a point of dispute between them. That mission helps the student understand how the United Nations handled long-term disputes, and how peacekeeping missions are adjusted over time in response to changing conditions.

Understand the reasons behind the civil war in Lebanon; Describe how the UN became involved in peace initiatives in Lebanon, and what it took on as its mandate there; State how the conflict over Kashmir began between India and Pakistan, and how the conflict proceeded; Describe how the UN initiated the ceasefire between India and Pakistan, and how it continued to supervise the ceasefire; Outline how UNIPOM and UNMOGIP are related; and Define the Line of Control.
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UNOGIL THE UN OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON 7.1 Background on UNOGIL
In May 1958, when Lebanese President Camille Chamoun (a Maronite Christian) tried to amend the countrys Constitution so he could try to be re-elected for a second term, an armed rebellion erupted. It soon became an all-out civil war. On 22 May, the Lebanese Government charged Egypt (then called the United Arab Republic) with the following:
Encouraging and supporting rebellion through the supply of arms to anti-government groups in Lebanon; Infiltrating armed personnel from Syria into Lebanon; and Conducting a violent press and radio campaign against the Lebanese Government.
The Security Council delayed debate on the matter while the League of Arab States tried to settle the dispute. As the League was unable to resolve the conflict, the SC took charge of the matter, adopting resolution 128 (1958) on 11 June. The resolution authorised the Secretary-General to send an observation group to Lebanon, forming the basis of the creation of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).
7.2
Deployment of UNOGIL
The Secretary-General made it clear that UNOGIL was only an observer force. The membership of UNOGIL was comprised of Mr. Galo Plaza Lasso of Ecuador, who was made Chairman, and Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal of India, who was made a member, and Norwegian MajorGeneral Odd Bull, who was in charge of the UNMOs of UNOGIL. Ten UNTSO UNMOs were immediately assigned to UNOGIL. UNMOs from UNTSO were chosen as they could reach Beirut in one day. The first five arrived in Beirut on 12 June 1958 and began their work on 13 June. By 16 June there were 100 UNMOs, and by the end of the month, they had two helicopters and four light observation fixed-wing aircraft at their disposal. Dag Hammarskjld arrived in Beirut on 18 June as Chairman of UNOGIL, and the Members of UNOGIL arrived the next day.
7.3
Role of UNOGIL
The area of responsibility of UNOGIL consisted of the border between Lebanon and Syria. It is important to note that UNOGIL was not to mediate, arbitrate, or forcefully prohibit illegal infiltration. It was hoped that the presence of UNMOs would at least discourage illegal activity. The mission was to ascertain whether the illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders was occurring.
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UNOGIL used the following methods to fulfil its mandate: (1) The UNOGIL military observers would conduct regular and frequent patrols of all accessible roads from dawn to dusk, primarily in border districts and the areas adjacent to the zones held by the opposition forces. (2) A system of permanent observation posts was to be established and manned by military observers. There were initially 10 such stations. The observers at these stations attempted to check all reported infiltration in their areas and to observe any suspicious development. (3) An emergency reserve of military observers was to be stationed at headquarters and man observation posts for the purpose of making inquiries at short notice or investigating alleged instances of smuggling. (4) An evaluation team was to be set up at headquarters to analyse, evaluate, and coordinate all information received from observers and other sources. (5) Aerial reconnaissance was to be conducted by light aircraft and helicopters, the former being equipped for aerial photography. (6) The Lebanese Government would provide the Observation Group with all available information about suspected infiltration. The Group would also request the military observers to make specific inquiries into alleged activities as occasion required. Initially, UNOGILs UNMOs had problems accessing the border region due to the presence of Egyptian forces. At this point only day and night aerial reconnaissance was possible. However, by 16 July, UNOGIL had full freedom of movement to the entire Lebanese border and was assured that its ground patrols would be allowed throughout the area north of Tripoli and that it could establish permanent observation posts anywhere within the its AOR. It was also agreed that the UNMOs could inspect all vehicles and cargoes crossing Lebanons northern border. The Members of UNOGIL noted that the number of UNMOs needed to be raised to 200. This would then require a support force of unarmed non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and other ranks, and there would also be a requirement for more observation aircraft and crews. With this larger force, UNOGIL could constantly patrol the whole frontier.
7.4
Presence of U.S. Military Forces in Lebanon
On 14 July 1958, a military coup dtat in the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq overthrew the monarchy (most of whom were executed along with many of their officials). The coup effectively ended the Baghdad Pact and put an end to the Iraq-Jordan Federation, which had been formed in March to counterbalance the union of Egypt and Syria. Due to the expansionist goals of Egypt, both Jordans and Lebanons leadership were seriously concerned about their survival. Thus, President Chamoun immediately asked for U.S. intervention to protect Lebanons political independence and its territorial integrity.
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On 15 July, the American representative informed the Security Council that the U.S. would militarily intervene in Lebanon in an effort to stabilise the situation until UN forces could take over. Marines from the U.S. Sixth Fleet landed on the same day. By the end of July, U.S. military forces had consolidated their positions. Initially, American troops were limited to the beach zone. Eventually, a defence perimeter was extended out from Beirut for 20 miles to protect the city from any attacks. The major problems that faced U.S. forces were:

The avoidance of conflict with the local U.S. Marines patrol the streets of Beirut, 1958. Lebanese irregulars; and The provision of the necessary staff, logistical, and combat support of the land forces in Lebanon. Events in Jordan
(USMC)
7.5
On 17 July, Jordan urgently asked the Security Council to review its complaint that Egypt was also interfering in its internal affairs. During the SC discussions, the British Government stated that its forces were being sent to Jordan to preserve the rule of King Hussein. On the same day, British paratroops landed in Jordan at the request of the King. The Soviet Union countered by drafting a resolution that called for both the UK and U.S. to cease armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab States and to remove their troops from the territories of Lebanon and Jordan immediately. The U.S. countered with its own resolution to protect the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon, and Sweden called for the withdrawal of UNOGIL. All three proposals were rejected or vetoed. A subsequent proposal by Japan that followed the lines of the U.S. proposal was also rejected. The Secretary-General, acknowledging the inconclusive results of the SC debates, noted that he would still act on the expansion of the mission within the existing mandate. In this vein, he increased UNOGILs strength to 287 on 20 September and to 591 in mid-November. This included 32 NCOs in support of ground operations and 90 such officers in the air section. By November 1958, UNOGIL was operating 18 aircraft and six helicopters for aerial observation. In addition, it was using 290 vehicles for various tasks and had set up 49 permanently manned posts of all types. On 30 July, UNOGIL felt that, due to its intensive air reconnaissance and ground patrolling, very little if any infiltration was taking place. Moreover, what did occur was limited to small arms and ammunition. Given the open nature of the frontier and the regular movement of tribal groups across the border, UNOGIL noted that it had not detected any incursions by enemy forces into or out of Lebanon. UNOGIL also reported that there were no contacts between its UNMOs and the U.S. forces. However, the American presence had caused some limited problems carrying out the mission tasks.
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7.6
General Assembly Emergency Session
On 7 August, the Security Council called an emergency special session of the General Assembly. The session ran from 8 to 21 August 1958. During this time, two key events occurred: 1) General Fuad Chehab was elected as the new President of Lebanon. This eliminated the whole issue of Mr. Chamouns second term, which had sparked the civil war. 2) The new Government of Iraq had accepted the obligations of States under the UN Charter and, in turn, had been recognised by both the UK and the U.S. In its report of 14 August, UNOGIL noted that there had been a noticeable reduction of tension in Lebanon and few armed clashes between the Government and the insurgents. In effect, there had been a de facto nationwide truce since 31 July. On 21 August the General Assembly adopted resolution 1237 (ES-III), in which the UN would help facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from Jordan and Lebanon. The Secretary-General commented that UNOGILs mandate would be modified accordingly. However, Jordan was not willing to accept the presence of UN forces or even UNMOs in its territory, though the Government was willing to accept a special representative. The Secretary-General sent Mr. Pier P. Spinelli, the Under-Secretary in charge of the UN Office at Geneva, to Jordan as his Special Representative. Both Lebanon and Jordan had begun negotiations for the withdrawal of U.S. and British troops by October 1958 from their respective territories. On 29 September 1958, UNOGIL noted that even with the presence of a large numbers armed people, there had been no serious incidents between the Lebanese army and the opposition forces. There were no detected cases of infiltration, and, if any infiltration was still taking place, it was regarded as insignificant.
7.7
Termination of UNOGIL
During the first week of October, both the British and American Governments agreed to withdraw their forces by the end of the month. The U.S. troop withdrawal was completed by 25 October and the British withdrawal by 2 November. UNOGIL began its planned three-phase withdrawal on 26 November. The withdrawal was completed by 9 December 1958.
Secretary-General arriving at Beirut Airport to attend the first meetings of the UN Observation Group in Lebanon with Mr. Plaza of Ecuador (first to the right) and Ambassador Dayal of India, June 1958. (Source: 57763 UN/DPI)
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN: UNMOGIP AND UNIPOM 7.8 Background on UNMOGIP
Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, India and Pakistan became independent from the British Empire in August 1947. The plan for partition allowed for the predominantly Moslem princely state of Kashmir to freely decide if it wished to join India or Pakistan. However, the accession of Kashmir quickly became an issue when Pakistan sent Moslem tribesman into the region to seize it. The maharaja of Kashmir, who was Hindu, chose to accede to India. Conflict broke out between India and Pakistan as they both tried to claim the region. In January 1948, India formally complained to the Security Council about the Pakistani tribal incursions. On 20 January the SC adopted resolution 39 (1948), which established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), whose task was to investigate and mediate the dispute. Initially, however, both India and Pakistan blocked the implementation of UNCIP. I n April 1948, the SC adopted resolution 47 (1948), whereby the membership of UNCIP was enlarged from three to five members. The new membership was composed of representatives from Argentina, Belgium, Columbia, Czechoslovakia, and the U.S. UNCIP began its work on 7 July 1948. Resolution 47 envisioned UNCIPs objectives in three phases: I. The establishment of a ceasefire; II. A truce period leading to a withdrawal of forces by both sides; and III. Consultations to allow for a free plebiscite to enable the people of Kashmir to decide their own fate. Once in place, UNCIPs members requested the presence of a Military Advisor. On 13 August UNCIP called for a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. UNCIP would provide UNMOs to supervise the ceasefire. The ceasefire came into effect just before midnight on 1 January 1949, and the next day Belgian Lt. General Maurice Delvoie arrived to take up the post of Military Advisor to UNCIP. The first seven UNMOs arrived on 24 January, and by the end of February their strength had been raised to 20. This group formed the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).
7.9
Role of UNMOGIP
The UNMOs were not to directly intervene between the opposing parties, but the local commanders of the opposing sides were to report violations of the ceasefire to the UNMOs. Overall, the mission followed the same general administrative arrangements and operating principles as those used by UNTSO. These sets of rules stayed in place until the Karachi Agreement of July 1949. American Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz was appointed the UN Plebiscite Administrator for the resolution of the vote that would decide which country Kashmir would join (as of 2006, this has not yet taken place). The tasks of UNMOGIPs UNMOs were to:
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Accompany the local authorities in their investigations of ceasefire violations; Gather as much information as possible; and Report their findings to the senior observer of the group.
On 27 July 1949, the Karachi Agreement established the ceasefire line, which would be supervised by UNMOGIP. The Agreement prohibited either side from strengthening their defences, increasing their forces, or adding further military potential into the region of Kashmir. The Karachi Agreement had not covered the boundary between Kashmir and Pakistan. Therefore, on mutual agreement, in February UNMOGIP also began to investigate incidents along this frontier. The Military Advisor established six categories of breaches of the ceasefire:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Crossing of the ceasefire line Firing and use of explosives within five miles of the ceasefire line New wiring and mining of any positions Reinforcing existing forward defended localities with men or warlike stores Forward movement from outside Kashmir of any warlike stores, equipment and personnel, except for relief and maintenance, and 6. Flying of aircraft over the other sides territory
Organisation of UNMOGIP
UN HQ New York
SECRETARY GENERAL

Chief Military Observer (CMO) Deputy Chief Military Observer (DCMO)
MISSION HQ
Military Staff
Group Control HQ Rawalpindi (Pakistan)
Group Control HQ Jammu* (Indian Kashmir)
Military Personnel
*transferred at the end of March 1949 to Srinagar
Liaison
Field Stations Pakistan Field Stations India
Command
Each group was divided into two teams of two UNMOs
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The organisation of UNMOGIP was changed in 1959 when the Chief Military Observers status was changed to an appointment as an official within the UN Secretariat. The position was now that of an Assistant Secretary-General, and like UNTSO, became the general rule for all heads of UN peacekeeping operations. Termination of UNCIP In September 1949, UNCIP made it clear that it had not achieved its objectives as outlined in SC resolution 47 (1948). Therefore, the members returned to UNHQ in New York. In December the SC had the Council President, Canadian General Andrew McNaughton, meet informally with the Governments of Pakistan and India to try and resolve the Kashmir problem. However, little came of this, making further efforts futile. On 14 March 1950, the SC adopted resolution 80 (1950), which terminated UNCIP. The Continuing Role of UNMOGIP to 1965 In an effort to continue the work of UNCIP at the same time that it was terminated, the SC appointed Australian Major-General Sir Owen Dixon as the UN Representative for India and Pakistan. Canadian Brigadier General H.H. Angle was appointed as Dixons Chief Military Observer and head of UNMOGIP. Brigadier Angle, one civilian, and two military personnel of UNMOGIP were killed when their plane crashed in Kashmir in July 1950. The adoption of SC resolution 91 (1951) on 30 March 1951 continued the presence of UNMOGIP in Kashmir. The Representative, however, was only to deal with the question of the demilitarisation of the region. Between 1949 and 1964, the year before the second Indo- BGen. Harry Angle, CMO and Pakistan War broke out, the number of UNMOs varied between 35 head of UNMOGIP. (Source: CF) and 67, based on mission requirements. When war broke out in 1965, there were 45 UNMOs from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, and Uruguay that were part of UNMOGIP. Due to the limited nature of UNMOGIPs mandate, which limited it to observing, reporting, and investigating complaints, there were misunderstandings of its role, in that the UNMOs could not enforce anything. 7.10 Establishment of UNIPOM
During the beginning of 1965, relations between India and Pakistan began to deteriorate due to conflicting claims over the Rann of Kutch (the waters of the tidal area on the west coast of India and Pakistan) at the southern end of the international boundary along the Indian province of Gujarat. By August, full-scale fighting had broken out between both sides along the ceasefire line in Kashmir. On 4 September 1965, by resolution 209 (1965) the Security Council called for a ceasefire and asked both sides to co-operate with UNMOGIP in its task of supervising the ceasefire.
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In an effort to calm down the situation, the Secretary-General visited the region from 7 to 16 September. He tried to reach some sort of negotiated solution; however, little came of it as hostilities spread by 20 September to the international border between India and West Pakistan. On the same day, the SC adopted resolution 211 (1965), which demanded a ceasefire take effect at 0700 hours GMT on 22 September 1965 and a withdrawal of all armed forces back to the positions held before 5 August. UNMOGIP took on the new ceasefire supervisory role in Kashmir. Its strength was raised to 102 UNMOs. However, as the conflict was beyond the existing ceasefire line in Kashmir, an administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP, the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), was established to supervise the ceasefire along the India-Pakistan border outside the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Ninety UNMOs were assigned to UNIPOM. UNIPOM was closely coordinated both administratively and operationally with UNMOGIP. UNIPOMs role was to (a) observe and (b) report on breaches of the ceasefire as per the various Security Council resolutions. If there was a breach of the ceasefire, the UNMOs were to try and persuade the local commanders to restore the ceasefire. However, the UNMOs, like those of UNMOGIP, had no authority or power to order a cessation of firing. It soon became obvious that the ceasefire was not working. The SC adopted resolution 214 (1965) on 27 September, demanding that both sides honour their commitments to observe the ceasefire and withdraw their troops. Violations continued, and on 5 November, the SC adopted resolution 215 (1965), which called on both Governments to co-operate with the UN and cease all military activity. On 15 December India and Pakistan indicated that they both wanted the UN presence to remain in the region after 22 December 1965, which was the end of the first three months of the ceasefire demanded by the SC in resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965. UNIPOMs mandate was extended for a second period of three-months.
7.11
The Tashkent Agreement
On 10 January 1966, by request of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, the leaders of India and Pakistan met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan (then part of the Soviet Union). They agreed to the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions they had held prior to 5 August 1965. The withdrawals were to be completed by 25 February 1966, as per the terms of the ceasefire. To finalise the withdrawal process, military representatives of India and Pakistan had a series of meetings at Lahore and Amritsar under the auspices of Chilean Brigadier-General Tulio Marambio, who was the Secretary-Generals representative for the withdrawal process. The disengagement and withdrawal plan was finalised in New Delhi on 22 January 1966.
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The plan was to be implemented in two stages through the good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM. Stage one was the disengagement of forces, and if a disagreement did occur, General Marambios decision would be final and binding on both sides. The good offices of UNMOGIP and UNIPOM were also used during stage two, which was the implementation and withdrawal of troops. On 26 February 1966, the Secretary-General reported that the withdrawal of the troops had been completed on schedule. Having fulfilled its mandate, UNIPOM was terminated on 22 March 1966, and its 59 UNMOs were gradually withdrawn.
7.12
The Continuation of UNMOGIP
At the end of 1970, the cessation movement of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) had begun. By mid-1971civil war had broken out, and West Pakistan (Pakistan) was trying to move forces into the region to quell the civil war. India had refused to allow Pakistani troops to cross its territory, but it was forced to deal with millions of refugees from East Pakistan. Due to constant guerrilla incursions and the need for political expediency, India sided with the breakaway state and sent its forces into East Pakistan on 22 November 1971. By 4 December full-scale war had broken out. Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to India on 16 December, at which time Indian forces crossed into West Pakistan. Due to diplomatic wrangling between the U.S. (who supported Pakistan) and the Soviet Union (who supported India), the Indian Government announced a unilateral ceasefire on 17 December. On 21 December the Security Council adopted resolution 307 (1971), which demanded that the ceasefire remain in place and a withdrawal occur back to positions demarcated by the ceasefire line supervised by UNMOGIP. Because the situation had changed, India made it clear that it would negotiate directly with Pakistan in regards to a number of changed positions of military on both sides of the 1949 ceasefire line. In May 1972, the Secretary-General reported that Pakistan was still complying with UNMOGIP, but India had effectively stopped participating in reporting ceasefire violations. Pakistan and India began negotiations, but Pakistan continued to make claims of Indian violations of the ceasefire. India, however, maintained that since the ceasefire line had changed since the 1949 Karachi Agreement, the Agreement was void and, therefore, UNMOGIPs mandate had lapsed. In July 1972, Indian and Pakistani representatives met in Simla and agreed to define a Line of Control in Kashmir. Agreement of what constituted the Line of Control (LOC) was achieved in December 1972, and with minor deviations, it followed the same course as the ceasefire line established by the Karachi Agreement in 1949. Pakistan maintained the position that UNMOGIPs presence was required, while India maintained its view that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed. The Secretary-General maintained that UNMOGIP could only be terminated by a decision of the Security Council. As of 2005, Pakistan has continued to lodge complaints, while India has not lodged a complaint since January 1972 and has restricted the activities of the UN observers on the Indian side of the LOC. It should be noted that India has continued to provide accommodation, transport, and other facilities to UNMOGIP.
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7.13
The 1999 Kargil Conflict
The 1999 Kargil conflict began with the surreptitious infiltration of Pakistani troops and Kashmiri militants during April and early May 1999. Indian patrols were surprised on 8 May when they encountered these forces on the Indian side of the LOC. Pakistans military aim had been to exploit the large gaps that existed in the defences in the sector on both sides of the LOC. The primary political objective for the Government of Pakistan was to internationalise the Kashmir issue, as global attention had waned over the recent years.
Initial Phase of 1999 Kargil Conflict
Source: Pakistani Navy
The February 1999 Lahore Summit had just occurred between the respective Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, and it had been assumed that this meeting had de-escalated the growing tensions that had existed since May 1998s nuclear tests of both India and Pakistan. The SC noted in resolution 1172 (1998) on 6 June 1998 that, aside from the nuclear threat posed by both countries, Kashmir was also one of the root causes of tension in South Asia. In addition, since 1977, there had been an informal concord between India and Pakistan that neither side would occupy posts from 15 September to 15 April of each year due to the extreme weather conditions that make the region almost impassable. The terrain of the LOC and Kargil are, at best, inhospitable, with jagged heights of up to 18,000 feet, harsh gusts of wind, and temperatures as low as -60 degrees Celsius in the winter. The intrusions by Pakistani forces would give Pakistan control over much of this strategic land area across the LOC. This would have given Islamabad a strong negotiating position in terms of the larger dispute over Kashmir.
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On 8 May, Indian forces detected Pakistani troops atop the Kargil ridges. Pakistan denied that its military forces were involved and that these were insurgents. However, it soon became clear that this was a major offensive planned by the Pakistani military. In late May, as Indian forces began to drive the Pakistanis out of the areas they had occupied in the Kargil sector, the Indian Government rejected the UN offer to send a special envoy to resolve the dispute. The Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, also rejected the Secretary-Generals suggestions to send in UNMOs and reaffirmed Indias military operations to push out Pakistani forces from Kargil. By 30 June, Indian forces began a major high-altitude offensive against Pakistani positions in the Kashmir region. Some 730,000 Indian troops had been moved into the region backed by large Indian Air Force assets. India soon gained the upper hand, and with the intervention of U.S. President Bill Clinton and pressure from the UN, the potential for an escalation into a regional nuclear conflict was averted. By 14 July 1999, both sides had essentially ceased their military operations. Though Pakistan had Indian Air Force air reconnaissance photo of Pakistani positions on always supported the presence of Muntho Dhalo, 17 June 1999. (Source: Indian Air Force) UNMOGIPs UNMOs, it clearly went to great lengths to launch its surprise attack against India. Part of that plan was to make sure Pakistani movements were not detected by UNMOGIP. 7.14 Ongoing Issues
In 2004, the Spokesman for Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in a UN press release (SG/SM/8335) that the local Kashmiri press had made groundless and potentially inflammatory accusations about the role of UNMOGIP. UNMOGIPs role had not changed, and based on its chain of command, its HQ only reports to UNHQ in New York. It never provides information to any third parties. Pakistan has maintained the position that UNMOGIPs presence could play a vital role in promoting confidence-building in the region. In the Islamabad Declaration of 6 January 2004, Pakistan and India agreed to seek a solution over the dispute for Jammu and Kashmir. The continued presence of UNMOGIP and the use of its good offices could help to bring a peaceful resolution to the dispute.
Italian, South Korean, and Croatian UNMOs at a local school in Pakistan. (Source: UNDPKO)
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1.
What was the role of UNOGIL? A. To observe U.S. troop movements across the Lebanese borders; B. To observe Israeli troop movements along the Lebanese border; C. To observe in order to ascertain whether an illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders was occurring; D. The demining of the AOR, as well as observation.
2.
Where was UNOGILs area of responsibility (AOR)? A. The border between Lebanon and Israel; B. The border between Lebanon and Jordan; C. The border between Lebanon and Iraq; D. The border between Lebanon and Syria.
3.
Why was UNOGIL expanded by the Secretary-General in late 1958? A. By request from the Lebanese government; B. By request from Jordan and the subsequent inconclusive Security Council debates; C. A decision made by the Security Council after a request from Jordan; D. A decision made by the Security Council after a request from Lebanon.
4.
Why did the Security Council establish UNCIP in 1948? A. To resolve the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan; B. To deal with the massive refugee and displaced persons problems in Kashmir caused by the partition of India and Pakistan; C. To investigate and mediate the dispute between India and Pakistan after India complained about the Pakistani tribal incursions into Kashmir; D. To monitor the withdrawal of Indian forces from Kashmir.
5.
One of the tasks conducted by UNMOGIPs UNMOs is to: A. Accompany the local authorities in their investigations of ceasefire violations; B. Oversee demining operations; C. Observe disarmament procedures; D. Report on treaty violations by tribal groups.
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6.
Which agreement or resolution established the ceasefire line to be supervised by UNMOGIP? A. Security Council resolution 39 (1948); B. Security Council resolution 47 (1948); C. The Karachi Agreement of July 1949; D. The Tashkent Agreement of 1966.
7.
UNIPOM can be described as: A. A separate UN PKO; B. An administrative adjunct of UNMOGIP; C. A diplomatic operation in Kashmir; D. A separate administrative mission in Pakistan.
8.
The Tashkent Agreement led to which of the following? A. A final resolution of the Kashmir dispute; B. The surrender of Kashmir to India; C. The ceding of Kashmir by India to Pakistan; D. The withdrawal of all armed personnel of India and Pakistan to the positions they had held prior to 5 August 1965.
9.
How did the 1999 Kargil conflict begin? A. By the elimination of UNMOGIP observation posts by Pakistani commandos along the Line of Control (LOC); B. By high altitude bombing of Indian positions along the LOC by the Pakistani air force; C. With the infiltration of Pakistani troops and Kashmiri militants into the Indian side of the LOC; D. By a threat of nuclear attack by India.
10. In the Islamabad Declaration of 6 January 2004, Pakistan and India agreed to what? A. To seek a solution over the dispute for Jammu and Kashmir; B. To withdraw military forces from the region indefinitely; C. To mutually aid in the War on Terror; D. To stop China from violating the region further.
ANSWER KEY: 1C, 2D, 3B, 4C, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8D, 9C, 10A
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LESSON 8 THE SECOND UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF II)

8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 Background on the Six-Day War of 1967 The October 1973 War and the UNs Response Establishment of UNEF II Composition and Strength of UNEF II Mission Mandate Renewals UNEF Command and the Status of the Force Phases of UNEF II Significance and Innovations of UNEF II
DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF)

8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12 8.13 8.14 Background on UNDOF Establishment of UNDOF Organisation of UNDOF Force Modernisation The Area of Separation Role and Activities of UNDOF
Lesson 8 / UNEF II and UNDOF
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 8 addresses the Arab-Israeli conflict at a later point in time. As one of the longeststanding regional conflicts with international repercussions, the crises in the Middle East required much discussion and many initiatives from the United Nations. During the 1970s, an escalation of conflict in the area led to the October 1973 war, leading to required emergency sessions of the UN Security Council. Because the two superpowers had interests in the regional conflict, it was imperative that the situation be resolved as quickly as possible. Lesson 8 outlines the background to the conflict and the steps that were taken to resolve it. It describes the formation of UNEF II and UNDOF, as well as how each contributed to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the area.

Understand the problems behind the ongoing conflict in the Middle East; Describe the role of the superpowers during the conflict; List the initiatives toward peace taken by the UN; Define the role of the peace conferences and peace agreements in resolving issues; State the mandates of UNEF II and UNDOF; Understand how UNEF II and UNDOF influenced the United Nations policy towards peacekeeping operations; and Describe the principles of UN peacekeeping that evolved from UNEF II and UNDOF.
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THE SECOND UN EMERGENCY FORCE (UNEF II)
8.1
Background on the Six-Day War of 1967
The Six-Day War ended on 10 July 1967, with a ceasefire called for by the Security Council and supervised by the military observers of UNTSO. By that time, Israel had seized large portions of Arab-controlled territories: it had seized Sinai and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. During the hostilities, the Security Council had reached agreement calling for an immediate ceasefire. However, it addressed the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied territories later. In November 1967, nearly six months after the end of the Six-Day War, the Council adopted resolution 242 (1967), which called for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict based on two principles: 1) Withdrawal of the Israeli forces from territories occupied in June 1967; and 2) The recognition of the right of all states in the region to live in peace within secure and recognised borders. In the pursuance of the same resolution, the Ambassador of Sweden, Gunner Jarring, was appointed the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to help to negotiate such a settlement. Despite intensive efforts, no agreement could be achieved, and his mediation mission ended in early 1973. The core problem that remained the underlying cause of overall conflict was the Palestinian problem. A few months later, a new war broke out in the Middle East.
8.2
The October 1973 War and the UNs Response
In October 1973, Egyptian and Syrian forces launched simultaneous attacks against Israeli posts in the Suez Canal Zone and on the Golan Heights for the stated purpose of liberating their occupied territories. The Security Council immediately met to consider the new crisis but failed to take action because of the divergent positions of the two superpowers. Fighting intensified, especially on the Egyptian front, where on 21 October Israeli forces were about to cut off the Egyptian Third Army on the East bank of the Suez Canal. On behest of the U.S. and USSR, the Security Council met again on 22 October. It adopted resolution 338 (1973), which called on the parties to cease all fighting and to begin negotiations under appropriate auspices, aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East on the basis of resolution 242 (1967). The ceasefire call was confirmed in resolution 339 (1973) of 23 October, and the Secretary-General was requested to send UNMOs immediately. Fighting continued, however, and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt issued direct appeals to the Soviet Union and the United States, requesting them to send American and Soviet troops to the area to enforce the ceasefire. The United States Government was opposed to the request (as it had been supporting Israel), but the Soviet Union agreed. The two major powers, in disagreement after their joint ceasefire initiative, were suddenly on a collision course, each threatening military action.
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The SC was convened again on 24 October at the request of Egypt. The non-aligned members of the Council, in close co-operation with the Secretary-General, worked out a resolution calling for an increase in UNTSO observers in the area and the establishment of a new United Nations peacekeeping force, which became the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). The establishment and dispatch of the new peacekeeping operation effectively brought the crisis to an end.
Egyptian and Syrian attacks. (Source: Orbis)
On 25 October 1973, the Council ordered an immediate ceasefire. The Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, was requested to submit a report within 24 hours on the measures needed to set up the force. The report was submitted the next morning. It generally followed the principles and guidelines laid down by Dag Hammarskjld for UNEF in 1956, but Waldheim proposed several changes in the UN application for the new emergency force. The proposed principles and guidelines for UNEF II were as follows: A. Three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit. B. The Force would be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the SecretaryGeneral, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field would be
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exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the Councils consent. The Force Commander would be responsible to the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General would keep the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All matters that could affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force would be referred to the Council for its decision. C. The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force and its personnel should be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Force should operate at all times separately from the armed forces of the parties concerned. Consequently, separate quarters and, wherever desirable and feasible, buffer zones would have to be arranged with the co-operation of the parties. Appropriate agreements on the status of the Force would also have to be concluded with the parties. D. The Force would be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents would be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographical representation. E. The Force would be provided with weapons of a defensive character only. It would not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the Security Councils mandate. The Force would proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would take all the necessary steps for compliance with the Councils decisions. F. In performing its functions, the Force would act with complete impartiality and would avoid actions that could prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of the parties concerned. G. The costs of the Force would be considered as expenses of the Organisation to be borne by the Members, as apportioned by the General Assembly. In the same report, the Secretary-General set forth certain urgent steps to be taken. In order for UNEF II to fulfil the responsibilities entrusted to it, it was considered necessary that the Force have a total strength of approximately 7,000. The Force would initially be stationed in the area for a period of six months, subject to extension. The report was approved by the SC on 27 October in resolution 341 (1973). Waldheim had voluntarily proposed to relinquish several important prerogatives of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. He had been influenced by the discussions that had taken place by the Special Committee on UN Peacekeeping Operations. He also took these measures to avoid any objection by the Soviet Union that could have delayed the establishment and deployment of the new force.
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8.3
Establishment of UNEF II
The first troops of UNEF II were three units of Austrian, Finnish, and Swedish troops detached from UNFICYP, which arrived in the conflict area within 36 hours. Their arrival stabilised a dangerous situation that could have led to a direct military confrontation between the two superpowers. A few days later, an Irish company reinforced the initial troop deployment. Finnish Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, was appointed as interim Commander of UNEF II. The Forces provisional headquarters was established in Cairo with personnel from UNTSO.
8.4
Composition and Strength of UNEF II
The Secretary-General now began to get commitments for the balance of the 7,000 force strength from western countries. However, the Soviet Union insisted that a Warsaw Pact country should be included in UNEF II if a NATO member was also included. This resulted in troops coming from Canada, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, and Senegal, in addition to those already in the region. Originally, each contingent was to be a battalion of 600 troops. However, due to the complexity of the logistical problems for the mission, Canada and Poland, who had responsibility for the missions logistical support, had their contingent sizes increased. The logistics support system was composed of a Polish road transport unit that included a maintenance element, as well as a Canadian service unit consisting of a supply company, Lorries, trucks, and heavy machines being unloaded at Port Alexandria from the a maintenance company, a Polish freighter "Wieliczka" (named after the oldest salt mining town in Poland) movement control unit, and a under direction of UNEF Canadian and Polish logistics teams (1974). postal detachment. In addition, (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 124430) Canada provided an aviation unit, while Poland supplied a medical unit, subject to the availability of a suitable building. The Canadian contingents strength was about 1,000 troops, and the Polish contingents was about 800 troops. By mid-November, advance parties of the Canadian and Polish contingents had arrived, and by the end of November, the logistics components were well established. By 20 February UNEF II had reached the authorised personnel level. During UNEF IIs mandate, its personnel levels changed due to mission requirements, as shown in the chart on the next page.
113 UNEF II Mission Strength
DATE 20 February 1974
STRENGTH 6,973
CHANGES Contingents from 12 countries: Austria (604), Canada (1,097), Finland (637), Ghana (499), Indonesia (550), Ireland (271), Nepal (571), Panama (406), Peru (497), Poland (822), Senegal (399), Sweden (620). some reduction of the Finnish, Peruvian and Swedish contingents the Irish contingent was withdrawn at the request of its Government Austrian and Peruvian contingents and elements of the Canadian and Polish logistics contingents (approximately 1,050 troops in all) were transferred from UNEF II to UNDOF in Syria. arrival of additional Canadian and Polish personnel Nepalese contingent withdrawn Panamanian contingent withdrawn Due to previous withdrawals Contingents from Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Poland, Senegal, Sweden Secretary-General calls for more UNEF II personnel due to more extensive responsibilities and a large increase in the AOR for UNEF II Each non-logistic contingent reinforced by one company (an increase of some 750 all ranks) Finland, Ghana, Indonesia and Sweden each agreed to supply an additional rifle company. Polish and Canadian logistics contingents raised by 50 and 36 men, respectively Australia supplied four helicopters with their crews and support personnel (45 men) Senegalese contingent was withdrawn Withdrawal of UNEF II. Individual contingent strengths- Australia (46), Canada (844), Finland (522), Ghana (595), Indonesia (510), Poland (923), Sweden (591). Of this total, 99 all ranks were assigned to UNEF II headquarters. The international civilian supporting staff of that headquarters numbered 160. In addition to the above, UNEF II was assisted by 120 military observers from UNTSO.
February to May 1974 June 1974
6,645 5,079
End of July August 1974 November 1974 April 1975 October 1975 17 October 1975 October 1975
5,527
4,029 3,987
May 1976 May-June 1976 July 1979 4,174 4,031
8.5
Mission Mandate Renewals
The mandate of UNEF II, which was originally approved for six months until 24 April 1974, was subsequently renewed eight times, although sometimes with some resistance from Egypt. In October 1978, the Soviet Union, which was opposed to the Camp David Accords concluded earlier that year, opposed a further extension for one year, and the Security Council finally settled for an extension period of nine months. In July 1979, after the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which had entered into force on 25 April 1979, the Council was unable to extend the mandate of UNEF II and decided to let it lapse on 24 July 1979. It should be noted that both Egypt and Israel were in favour of an extension of the mandate of UNEF II, but it was the Soviet Union that opposed the extension. In addition, under the guidelines approved by the SC in October 1973, all matters that might affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force would be referred to the Council for its decision. The SecretaryGeneral added that he would be ready to make the necessary arrangements, no matter what decisions the Council might reach. The SC did not extend the mandate of UNEF II, which lapsed on 24 July 1979.
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Mission Terms of Reference The terms of reference of UNEF II were to:
Supervise the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), which demanded that an immediate and complete ceasefire be observed and that the parties return to the positions they had occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973; Use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and in the fulfilment of its tasks it would have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO; and Co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian endeavours in the area.
8.6
UNEF Command and the Status of the Force
General Siilasvuo was appointed UNEF Commander on 12 November 1973. In August 1975, he was assigned to the new post of Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East and was replaced as UNEF Commander by Swedish Major-General (later Lieutenant-General) Bengt Liljestrand, who held the post until 1 December 1976. MajorGeneral Rais Abin (Indonesia), who became Acting Force Commander on that date, was appointed UNEF Commander on 1 January 1977 and held the post until the withdrawal of the Force in 1979. No special Status of Force Agreement could be drawn up with Egypt or Israel. Therefore, a practical arrangement between the UN and the Governments of Egypt and Israel was that UNEF II would be guided by the provision of the Status of the Force agreement for UNEF I and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN. One problem that arose from this situation was the question of freedom of movement for UNEF II personnel. The specific problem related to UNEF II personnel from Ghana, Indonesia, Poland, and Senegal. As these UNEF Commander, Major General Ensio Siilasvou, briefing countries did not have diplomatic relations with the press at conclusion of a meeting held in November 1973 between Israeli and Egyptian delegations at the UN Israel, Israel refused to extend freedom of checkpoint at Kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez Road in movement to these UNEF II personnel in the Egypt. (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 124094) areas it controlled. UNEF IIs Soviet UNMOs were also restricted. Though there were strong protests from the UN, Israel did not relent, and those personnel that had restrictions on movement had to be deployed in the Egyptian-controlled areas or within the UN buffer zones.
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8.7
Phases of UNEF II
The SC approved UNEF IIs terms of reference on 27 October 1973. They remained unchanged for the duration of the mission; however, the mission itself, due to changing regional political realities, can be divided into four key phases.
FIRST PHASE: October 1973 to January 1974 Oct. 1973 Jan. 1974 UNEF II stopped the fighting and prevented all movement forward of the troops on both sides. Non-military supplies were provided to Suez city and the Egyptian Third Army trapped on the east bank of the Suez Canal. With the assistance of UNTSOs UNMOs, observation posts and checkpoints were set up, and patrols were undertaken in sensitive areas. Henry Kissinger, the U.S. Secretary of State, got a preliminary agreement between Egypt and Israel for the implementation of SC resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). The agreement came into force immediately and contained the following six points: 1. Egypt and Israel agreed to observe scrupulously the ceasefire called for by the Security Council; 2. Both sides agreed that discussions between them would begin immediately to settle the question of the return to the 22 October positions; 3. The town of Suez would receive daily supplies of food, water, and medicine, and all wounded civilians in the town would be evacuated; 4. There would be no impediment to the movement of non-military supplies to the east bank; 5. The Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road would be replaced by United Nations checkpoints; and 6. As soon as the United Nations checkpoints were established on that road, there would be an exchange of all prisoners of war, including the wounded. Except for the provision on the return to the 22 October positions, the agreement was implemented without much difficulty.
In a UN tent, the Israelis and Egyptians discuss disengagement at Km. 101, on 11 November 1974. (Source: 130417c UN/DPI/Y. Nagata)
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SECOND PHASE: January 1974 to October 1975 The United States and the Soviet Union jointly promoted the implementation of SC resolution 338 (1973), which called for negotiations to start between the parties concerned in an effort to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East. The Peace Conference on the Middle East at Geneva convened and discussed the disengagement of forces in the Egypt-Israel sector, as well as a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan attended, but Syria refused to come, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was not invited. The Conference was inconclusive and adjourned after three meetings. However, a Military Working Group was established to discuss the question of the disengagement of forces. The Working Group was composed of the military representatives of Egypt and Israel and was chaired by the Commander of UNEF II. Separate mediation by the U.S. Secretary of State with the Governments of Egypt and Israel, in what was known as his shuttle diplomacy, resulted in a disengagement and separation of military forces agreement. The agreement was signed, providing for the deployment of Egyptian forces on the eastern side of the Canal, west of a line designated on the map annexed to the agreement (the line ran parallel to the Canal, about 10 kilometres east of it), the deployment of Israeli forces east of another line, the establishment of a zone of disengagement manned by UNEF II, and areas of limited forces and armament on both sides of that zone. There was a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces. At each phase, Israeli forces withdrew from a designated area after handing it over to UNEF II, and UNEF II held that area for a few hours before turning it over to the Egyptian forces. UNEF II interposed between the forces of the two sides by establishing temporary buffer zones. UNEF II, with the assistance of Egyptian and Israeli army surveyors, surveyed and marked the lines of disengagement. After the completion of the operation, most non-logistic contingents were deployed in or near the newly established zone of disengagement. UNEF II controlled this zone with static checkpoints, observation posts, and by conducting mobile patrols. Also, with the assistance of UNTSO UNMOs, UNEF II conducted weekly and later bi-weekly inspections of the areas of limited forces and armament (30 km zone), as well as inspections of other areas agreed by the parties. UNEF II also assisted in the exchange of POWs and the transfer of displaced civilians. An operation was conducted to search for the remains of soldiers killed during the October 1973 war. The headquarters of UNEF II was moved to Ismailia.
21 Dec. 1973
22 Dec. 1973
Early Jan. 1974 18 Jan. 1974
Late Jan. 4 March
Mid-March 1974
Completed in July 1974 Aug. 1974
Members of the Canadian 1st Signal Regiment testing radio equipment at UNEF Headquarters in Ismailia, Egypt (1973). (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 124321C)
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THIRD PHASE: November 1975 to May 1979 14 Sept. 1975 Henry Kissinger succeeded in obtaining the agreement of Egypt and Israel for a second disengagement of their forces in the Sinai. Buffer zones controlled by UNEF II were to be established. A joint commission, under the aegis of the United Nations Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East, considered any problems arising from the agreement and assisted UNEF II in the execution of its mandate. The United States planned to establish an early warning system in the area of the Giddi and Mitla Passes, consisting of three watch stations set up by the United States and two surveillance stations, one operated by Egyptian personnel and the other by Israeli personnel. The Military Working Group signed the agreement. Its protocols set out a detailed procedure for the implementation of the agreement. UNEF II began its assistance to the parties for the redeployment of their forces. Redeployment was completed in the southern area. UNEF II, through the Chief Coordinator, also supervised the transfer of the oilfields and installations in the area. Second phase of the redeployment took place in the northern area. UNEF acted as a secure channel of communication and contact between the parties during the redeployment process. Overall, UNEF II operated without any major incidents.
22 Sept. 1975 November 1975 1 Dec. 1975 12 Jan. 22 Feb. 1976 Mar. 1976 Feb. 1979
UNEF II Southern Area Tasks:
Assure that no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications, or military installations were in the area. To perform that task, UNEF II established checkpoints and observation posts in accordance with the protocol and conducted ground and air patrols throughout the area. Ensure the control of southern buffer zones by maintaining permanent checkpoints along the buffer-zone lines. Supervise the use of common road sections by the parties in accordance with arrangements agreed to by them and provide escorts in those sections when necessary.
UNEF II Northern Area Tasks:

Ensure the control of the northern buffer zone through a system of checkpoints, observation posts, and ground patrols. Provide escorts, as required, to and from the U.S. watch stations and the Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations in the early-warning-system area. Ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations of forces and armament within the areas specified in the agreement by conducting bi-weekly inspections. UNTSO UNMOs carried out the inspections under UNEF supervision, accompanied by liaison officers of the respective parties.
Complaints of violations were taken up with the party concerned by the Force Commander or the Chief Coordinator and, in some instances, were referred to the Joint Commission. UNEF II kept in close contact with representatives of ICRC and extended its assistance in providing facilities for family reunions and student exchanges, which took place at an agreed site in the buffer zone.
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FOURTH PHASE: MayJuly 1979 March 1979 25 April 25 May 1979 The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was concluded. The peace treaty was entered into force. In pursuance of the relevant provisions of the peace treaty, the Israeli forces withdrew from the northern Sinai to the east of El Arish, and the Egyptians took over control of that area. UNEF II withdrew from the northern part of the buffer zone, which was handed over to the Egyptian authorities (except in areas of the Sinai controlled by Egyptian forces, where it continued to function as before). Due to strong opposition to the peace treaty from the PLO and many Arab States, and opposition by the Soviet Union in the Security Council, UNEF IIs mandate was allowed to lapse.
24 July 1979
Termination of UNEF II After the mandate of UNEF II lapsed in July 1979, the various contingents were rapidly repatriated, except for a Swedish guard unit and limited groups of the Canadian and Polish logistics contingents that remained in the area to assist in the winding up of the Force. The mission was replaced by the American-led MFO.
8.8
Significance and Innovations of UNEF II
UNEF II was an important milestone in the development of UN peacekeeping operations. The new guidelines were applied to all later operations during the Cold War period and beyond. In addition to the changes mentioned above, the guidelines included fixing a time-limit for the operation (six months, subject to extension by the Security Council), a practice begun with UNFICYP. Another change related to the method of financing. Like UNEF I and ONUC, UNEF II was financed by assessed contributions to special accounts set up outside the regular budget, but with two differences:
Finnish troops at a UNEF observation post in Southern Sinai, November 1975. (Source: 134268c UN/DPI/Y. Nagata)
The rate of assessment for UNEF II was different from that of the regular budget; contributions from the five Permanent Members of the Security Council and of some wealthy countries was significantly increased, while those of the least developed countries was decreased. In the previous peacekeeping forces, each troop-contributing country was reimbursed for the costs of its contingent in accordance with a special agreement concluded with the United Nations. However, the reimbursement for UNEF II was based on a uniform rate determined by the General Assembly and applicable to all troop-contributing countries.
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UNDOF: THE UN DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE
8.9
Background on UNDOF
The 1973 Yom Kippur War resulted in the destabilisation of the Golan Heights region in Syria. In the wake of the war, the establishment of UNEF II did not fully stabilise the Israeli-Syrian front on the Golan Heights, and tensions remained high due to continued exchanges of fire and overflights of military aircraft by both sides. From March 1974 to the end of May 1974, the situation had become very unstable as artillery, tank, and rocket duels escalated. In an effort to avert further hostilities between Israel and Syria, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissenger initiated diplomatic contact, which resulted in the conclusion of an Agreement on Disengagement (S/11302/Add.1, annexes I and II) between both sides. The Agreement was signed on 31 May 1974, with Lt. General Siilasvuo, the UNEF II Commander, acting as the witness. The Agreement provided for an area of separation and for two equal zones of limited armaments and forces on both sides of the area. It also called for the establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) to supervise its implementation. The details of the separation were to be resolved by the Israeli and Syrian representatives in the Military Working Group. Disengagement began 24 hours after the signing of the Agreement and was completed within 20 days.
8.10
Establishment of UNDOF
On the same day the Agreement was signed, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974), which established UNDOF. The Force was set up initially for a six-month period, subject to renewal by the SC. Initially, UNDOFs personnel were drawn from existing regional UN missions and its authorised strength was set at 1,250 personnel. UNDOF was to generally comply with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations and not interfere with the local civilian administration. The mission was also allowed freedom of movement and communications relevant to its mandate, and personnel were allowed to carry small arms for self-defence. The initial composition of UNDOF was comprised of the Austrian and Peruvian contingents, which were withdrawn from UNEF II, and logistical elements of the Canadian and Polish units from UNEF II. UNTSO provided the UNMOs. Peruvian Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos, the commander of UNEF IIs northern brigade, was made the interim commander of UNDOF, and his staff officers were drawn from UNEF II and UNTSO. By 3 June, advance elements of UNDOF had arrived, and its provisional HQ had been established in Damascus. By 16 June, UNDOF had reached near its authorised strength of 1,250 personnel. During this period, through negotiations with the Military Working Group, Israel and Syria exchanged POWs and returned bodies through the good offices of the ICRC. Both sides also provided UNDOF with maps of minefield locations.
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8.11
Organisation of UNDOF
UNDOF was essentially organised along the lines of UNEF II and was under the exclusive command and control of the UN. The original contingents were the Austrians and the Peruvians, with the Poles and Canadians providing logistical support. In July 1975 the Peruvian contingent was withdrawn and was replaced by an Iranian contingent in August. Due to domestic problems, the Iranians were withdrawn in 1979 and replaced by a Finnish contingent. In addition, due to the withdrawal of UNEF II in 1979, UNDOFs authorised strength was raised to 1,450 personnel. By May 1985, its strength was at 1,331 personnel. In 1992, UNDOF had its force size reduced in order to reduce mission expenditures. There was an overall reduction of 15 percent of personnel in each military contingent, the HQs and support units, and the international civilian staff. However, the number of soldiers on patrol and manning the observation posts remained the same. In the second half of 1992, most of the military components of UNDOF HQ in Damascus were moved to Camp Faouar, which became UNDOFs new HQ, while other elements were moved to Camp Ziouani. When Finland withdrew its infantry battalion at the end of 1993, a Polish infantry unit replaced it in December. During the same period, the Polish logistics unit was withdrawn, and logistical support was consolidated under a strengthened Canadian logistical unit. In addition, some logistical requirements were taken over by the individual contingents. In 1996, UNDOF was composed of one infantry battalion from Austria and one from Poland, the logistics and signals units from Canada, a transport platoon from Japan, and UNTSO military observers from OGG. At the end of May 1998, a Slovakian infantry platoon replaced an Austrian one. The Slovak platoon was integrated into the Austrian battalion. In 2004, because the force commander came from Nepal, two Nepalese were now part of UNDOF. UNDOF at this time had also completed two-thirds of its modernisation programme, which was completed in 2005.
UNDOF Organisation
SECRETARY GENERAL
UN HQ New York

Force Commander (FC) Deputy Force Commander (DFC)

MISSION HQ
Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS)
Liais on
Personnel
Logistics
Liaison
Infantry Battalions UNMOs (OGG) Logistics Unit
Command
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8.12
Force Modernisation
By the early 2000s, UNDOF had serious problems with its aging infrastructure of buildings, communications, and roads. Much of the infrastructure was 30 years old and needed serious repair work, and all of it was located in mountainous areas full of hidden landmines. The existing 30 small military observer camps/positions needed to be rebuilt and consolidated; moreover, the mission required more vehicles to enable safe and more frequent patrolling. Spearheaded by Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel Rick Charlebois, the former Chief Logistics Officer for UNDOF, Canada led the operation to upgrade UNDOFs infrastructure. The objective of the changes and upgrades in military operations was to create a more mobile, flexible, and responsive force. The changes were focused on providing adequate electrical power, upgrading communications and buildings, and maximising construction efficiencies, including using prefabricated structures. UNDOFs Force Modernisation was completed in late 2005 and included:

Consolidation of 30 positions into 17; Establishment of two permanent reserve force platoons; Increased capacity to gather, analyse, and report operations information; The creation of a training cell; A larger armoured personnel carrier (APC) fleet; Improved capability for night-time surveillance; and The relocation of the Military Police HQ to improve the operational focus of the police.
The overall impact of Force Modernisation streamlined the infrastructure and logistics support and improved communication facilities. Through consolidation, eight positions were saved that could be used at UNDOF HQ. It also increased the number of troops available for operational activities, and it improved the quality of life, working conditions, and communications for UNDOF personnel.
UNDOF Force Modernization Concept (Source: Canadian Forces)
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8.13
The Area of Separation
Disengagement Operations occurred in four phases between 14 June and 27 June. The only serious incident occurred during the final phase of disengagement when, on the early morning of 25 June, one Austrian soldier was wounded and another four were killed when their vehicle was destroyed by a landmine on Mount Hermon. Following disengagement, UNDOF working with Israeli and Syrian forces delineated and marked the lines that were the boundaries of the area of separation. This process was completed by early July 1974. The area of separation was some 80 kilometres long and varied in width, between approximately 10 kilometres in the centre to less than one kilometre in the extreme south. Overall, the terrain is very hilly and is dominated to the north by Mount Hermon. No military forces other than UNDOF were permitted within the area of separation, but it was inhabited and was policed by the Syrian authorities. UNDOF was entirely deployed within and close to the area of separation. On each side of the area of separation, there is one area of limitation with three zones, one 0 to 10 kilometres, one 10 to 20 kilometres, and one 20 to 25 kilometres wide. UNDOF inspected these areas every two weeks in order to ascertain that the agreed limitations in armaments and forces were being observed. The Austrian battalion was deployed in the northern part of the area of separation, and the Polish battalion was deployed in the southern part. The Canadian and Japanese logistic units were based in Camp Ziouani, with a detachment in Camp Faouar.
Canadian signals bunker in Camp Ziouani. Unit insignia.
(Source: Canadian Forces)
8.14
Role and Activities of UNDOF
The primary role for UNDOF was the supervision of the area of separation by ensuring that there was no presence of military forces from either side in the area. To do this, UNDOF had permanently manned positions and observation posts, and they ran foot and mobile patrols operating at irregular intervals by day and night on predetermined routes.
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UNDOF also conducted humanitarian activities, including mine clearance, providing assistance to the ICRC with facilities for mail and the passage of persons through the area of separation, and providing limited medical treatment to the local population. Due to the extensive mine threat in its AOR, UNDOF, with the Syrian authorities, instituted a minefield security and maintenance programme in the area of separation to identify and mark all minefields. This initiative was supported by the United Nations Childrens Fund to promote mine awareness among the civilian population. UNDOF, due to its long presence in the region, also took great efforts to address the environmental consequences that resulted from its activities and presence in its AOR. As of 2005, the Security Council had renewed UNDOFs mandate, and the mission had continued to soldiers demining in the Golan perform its functions effectively, with the co-operation of Polish 1974. (Source: 134,088 UN/DPI)Heights, Syria, all parties. It should be noted, however, that both the Israelis and the Syrians regularly put restrictions on the movement of UNDOF inspection teams during their visits to the areas of limitation of armament and forces. It was also noted by the Secretary-General that there had been a growing shortfall of funding for the mission in the order of US$13 million, which was money owed to the Member States that contributed troops to UNDOF.
Japanese transport unit at UNDOF (Source: Japanese Self Defence Force)
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1.
Which Security Council resolution called for a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict based on two principles? A. Resolution 242 (1967) B. Resolution 247 (1968) C. Resolution 338 (1973) D. Resolution 339 (1973)
2.
In October 1973, which countries launched simultaneous attacks against Israel? A. Egypt and Syria; B. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan; C. Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia; D. Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.
3.
During UNEF IIs mandate, why did its personnel levels change? A. Certain contingents were withdrawn by their respective governments for political reasons; B. This was the normal rotation of contingents as dictated by the SC; C. This occurred due to mission requirements; D. UNEF IIs personnel levels did not change.
4.
Even though both Egypt and Israel were in favour of an extension of the mandate of UNEF II, why did the Security Council allow the mandate to lapse in July 1979? A. The United States opposed the extension; B. The Soviet Union opposed the extension; C. No Member States were willing to offer contingents after 1979; D. There was no longer any money in the UN Special Account to pay for the mission.
5.
Why was UNEF II an important milestone in the development of UN peacekeeping operations? A. It involved Warsaw Pact nations; B. The UN moved from Chapter VI to Chapter VII missions; C. It became the benchmark to resolve Arab-Israeli disputes; D. The new guidelines used in UNEF II were applied to all later operations during the Cold War period and beyond.
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6.
Which of the following statements best applies to UNDOF? A. It was did not have to comply with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations, and it did not interfere with the local civilian administration. B. It was did not have to comply with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations, and it could interfere with the local civilian administration when required; C. It was to generally comply with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations and not interfere with the local civilian administration; D. It was a peace enforcement mission that generally complied with the relevant Syrian laws and regulations.
7.
Why did UNDOF have its force size reduced in 1992? A. There was a need to consolidate and strengthen its infantry battalions; B. UNDOF wanted to reduce mission expenditures; C. Due to the calm in the region, there was little need for so many UN troops; D. There were not enough states willing to contribute troops to the mission.
8.
By the early 2000s, UNDOF had serious problems with: A. Its aging infrastructure of buildings, communications, and roads; B. Acquiring new contingents from Member States; C. Lack of funding from the UN; D. Its out-dated mandate.
9.
UNDOF, due to its long presence in the region, also took great efforts to address what issue? A. Poverty amongst the local Bedouin tribes; B. The rebuilding of destroyed villages and settlements; C. The environmental consequences of its activities and presence in its AOR; D. The economic impact the presence of the mission had on Syria.
10. What was the primary role of UNDOF? A. Demining the area of separation; B. Negotiating a permanent peace agreement between Israel and Syria; C. Supervising the area of separation by making sure there were no Israeli forces in the area; D. Supervising the area of separation by making sure there was no presence of military forces from either side in the area.
ANSWER KEY: 1A, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5D, 6C, 7B, 8A, 9C, 10D
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LESSON 9 UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP)

9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.9 Background on UNFICYP Establishment and Organisation of UNFICYP Guiding Principles for UNFICYP Liaison Arrangements and Freedom of Movement Ceasefire Supervision and Normalisation Efforts The 1967 Crisis Arms Imports Force Reductions Between 1965-1974 The 1974 Coup dtat
9.10 The 1974 de facto Ceasefire 9.11 Secretary-Generals Good Offices Mission 9.12 The Financial Problems and Subsequent Restructuring of UNFICYP 9.13 UNFICYP to the End of 2005
Lesson 9 / UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 9 explains the historical and political factors that led to the crisis in Cyprus, including perspectives regarding how that crisis impacted internationally. It discusses how Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey were related to the crisis, both adding to its tensions and ultimately helping to resolve them. Lesson 9 shows the student how a peacekeeping mission may need to address conflicts at many levels: civil war, the struggle to establish democracy, and the birth of a nation, as well as international relationship implications.

Understand the historical factors that contributed to the crisis in Cyprus; Delineate the political and constitutional factors that contributed to the crisis and added to its escalation; Describe how its geographical location played a key role in the situation; State the role of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey in the internal strife of Cyprus; List the interim steps taken towards resolving the crisis; Describe the solutions that ultimately brought stability and peace to the area; and Understand the mandate of UNFICYP and how it carried out its mandate.
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9.1
Background on UNFICYP
Due to Cold War realities, an independent Cypriot state was created, rather than resolving the crisis between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. One month after independence from the UK, on 16 August 1960, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the UN. Cyprus new constitution was designed to balance the interests of both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities on the island. Turkey and the UK had entered into a treaty as guarantors of the basic provisions of the Constitution and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. However, the Greek and Turkish communities were unable to realistically apply the provisions of the Constitution, which in turn led to a succession of constitutional crises. The growing tension eventually led to violence on 21 December 1963. The UK, Greece, and Turkey offered their joint good offices to Cyprus by sending a joint peacekeeping force to maintain order. This force was to be composed of troops from the existing garrisons of all three countries that were allowed on the island due to existing treaties with Cyprus, the Treaties of Alliance and Establishment. A ceasefire was imposed on 29 December, and on 30 December a neutral zone was created between the two sides along the ceasefire line, which as also know as the green line. The name green line was derived from the green wax pencil that was used by the British to mark the line on a map of Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus. This zone was to be patrolled jointly by British, Greek, and Turkish forces, but was for the most part patrolled by British troops. In order to establish peace, a conference was schedule for January 1964 in London. In the meantime, on 27 December, the Security Council met to consider a complaint by Cyprus that charged Turkey with intervention in its internal affairs. Turkey maintained that Greek Cypriot leaders had tried for more than two years to nullify the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community and denied all charges of aggression. On agreement from all sides, it was decided by the UN to send a personal representative of the Secretary-General to observe the peacemaking operation. On 17 January 1964, Indian Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani was appointed as the personal representative. Lt. General Gyanis mandate was to run through the end of February 1964 but was extended an extra month to the end of March. During this time, he reported that there was a rapid and very serious deterioration of law and order in the country and that the British peacekeeping force was increasingly hard-pressed to do its job. The overall situation in Cyprus had not been helped by the failure of the 15 January London Conference and the growing threat of military intervention by Greece or Turkey. Under the existing treaties, Greece and Turkey had been allowed to maintain army contingents of 950 and 650 troops respectively on Cyprus.
9.2
Establishment and Organisation of UNFICYP
On 15 February 1964, after all attempts to restore peace on the island had failed, the representatives of the UK and Cyprus requested urgent action by the Security Council. On 4 March 1964, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 186 (1964), by which it recommended the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). UNFICYPs size was to be determined by the Secretary-General, and the initial mandate was to run for three months. On 6 March, Lt. General Gyani was appointed as the mission Commander.
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The role of UNFICYP was to:

Preserve international peace and security; Prevent a recurrence of fighting; Contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order; and Return the island to normal conditions.
The situation deteriorated further during March, and Turkey stated on 12 and 13 March that it would send its troops to protect Turkish-Cypriots from attack. At the same time, the first contingent of Canadian peacekeepers arrived, but due to limited strength, UNFICYP did not become operational until 27 March 1964. UNFICYP was initially composed of Canadian and British forces (the existing British troops on Cyprus were incorporated into the Force), as well as advanced parties from Finland, Ireland, and Sweden. The balance of the latter three contingents arrived in April, and an approximately 1,000strong Danish contingent arrived in May. The same month, an Austrian field hospital arrived with additional troops from Sweden that had been transferred from ONUC. Finnish soldiers bicycling to Nicosia from Dhekelia, a distance of 120 miles, pass As UN contingents arrived, a sentry post (1964). (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 84941) certain British units from the original peace enforcement mission were replaced. By 8 June, UNFICYP had reached a strength of 6,411 personnel, which included 173 civilian police (CIVPOL) officers from Australia, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand. The CIVPOL component had been operational since 4 April 1964. On 11 May, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Galo Plaza Lasso of Ecuador as his Special Representative. In September, Mr. Plaza Lasso was made the Mediator, and Mr. Carlos A. Bernardes replaced him as the Special Representative. Mr. Plaza Lassos attempts at mediation failed when, in 1965, Turkey refused to accept his findings (a previous 1964 plan by former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had also failed). Plaza Lasso resigned his post in December of the same year. General Gyani retired in June 1964 and was replaced by another Indian officer, General K.S. Thimayya, who came out of retirement to command UNFICYP. General Thimayya died during his tenure as Commander and was replaced by British Brigadier-General A.J. Wilson, who served as the acting commander until 1966.
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In order to foster a close working relationship with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot authorities and leaders, contingents were initially deployed across Cyprus as far as possible to match their areas of responsibility (zones or districts) with the islands existing administrative district boundaries. In addition, districts had troop strengths based on the intensity of the armed conflict. Nicosia was organised as a single zone under Canadian command. In Nicosia, UNFICYP troops were positioned for an observation role along the length of the green line. In two other districts, Kyrenia and Lefka, United Nations posts were deployed between the two defence lines; observation and patrolling took place from those posts. On the rest of the island, UNFICYP troops were generally deployed and positioned in areas where confrontation was likely to arise. Observation squads, backed by mobile patrols, were regularly deployed into areas that were likely to be potential trouble spots.
UNFICYP Deployments 1965
Source: UNFICYP
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UNFICYP Organisation
UN HQ New York
SECRETARY GENERAL

Special Repres entative of the Secretary General (SRSG)
Senior Advisor (SA) Politcal Affairs Officer (PAO) Spokesman
Personnel
Logistics
MISSION HQ
Liaison
Infantry Battalions Civilian Police (CIVPOL) Logistics Units
Command
Numerous redeployments of UNFICYP contingents have occurred during the decades of this mission. Redeployment allowed UNFICYP to better utilise its personnel as the situation dictated and as new areas of tension arose. The Mobile Force Reserve (MFR) The Mobile Force Reserve was created in 1997 from the existing Permanent Force Reserve (PFR) to provide the Force Commander with a mobile, flexible, and well-equipped response capability for incidents that occurred in the buffer zone. The MFR was based within UNFICYP HQ in Nicosia and was a company size formation comprised of 105 personnel from the Argentinean, Austrian, British, Dutch, and Hungarian contingents. The MFR consisted of four platoons (three rifle platoons and one Argentinean armoured personnel carrier platoon).
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Rifle Platoon Number 1 2 3
Role (the platoons rotate every 21 days) UNFICYP HQ camp security Internal and perimeter patrols Quick reaction force on a 24/7 basis Mobile patrol and reconnaissance duties Training and standby phase
9.3
Guiding Principles for UNFICYP
After the first six months of the mission, the Secretary-General in his report of 10 September 1964 summarised the guiding principles of the mission. The key points were as follows:

The Force was under the exclusive control and command of the United Nations at all times; The Force could not operate outside of its mandate; UNFICYP personnel could carry small-arms for self-defence only. When acting in selfdefence, the principle of minimum force had to be used; and The personnel of the Force had to act with restraint and with complete impartiality towards the members of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
The CIVPOL contingents duties included:

Establishing liaison with the Cypriot police; Accompanying Cypriot police patrols that were to check vehicles on the roads for various traffic and other offences; Manning United Nations police posts in certain sensitive areas, namely, areas where tension existed and might be alleviated by the presence of UNFICYP police elements; Observing searches of vehicles by local police at roadblocks; and Investigating incidents where Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots were involved with the opposite community, including searches for persons reported as missing.
An UNFICYP peacekeeping soldier escorts an elderly Greek woman across the bridge in Ayios Theodoros from the Turkish sector to the Greek sector, 1964. (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 84927)
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9.4
Liaison Arrangements and Freedom of Movement
Due to the comprehensive functions of UNFICYP, the mission soon became involved in carrying out a vast array of activities that affected almost every aspect of life on the island. These functions were carried out in contact and consultation with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot authorities and, when required, with the Governments of Greece and Turkey. However, UNFICYP was impeded by both sides due to their conflicting interpretations both of which the Secretary-General rejectedof the duties of the force:

The Government of Cyprus felt that UNFICYPs task was to assist it in ending the rebellion of the Turkish Cypriots and extending its authority over the entire territory of the Republic. The Turkish Cypriots felt that UNFICYPs task was to restore, by force if necessary, the status of the Turkish Cypriot community under the 1960 constitution.
Freedom of movement was seen as an essential condition for the proper functioning of UNFICYP. However, from the on-set of the mission, UNFICYP encountered many difficulties. Both sides were involved in incidents of obstruction and harassment, including manhandling of personnel and even firing at UNFICYP troops. Though UNFICYP went to great efforts to mitigate the friction on all sides, the incidents persisted through the 1960s.
9.5
Ceasefire Supervision and Normalisation Efforts
UNFICYP, through the use of persuasion, negotiation, and interposition, tried to stop the fighting. Moreover, it assisted civilians, evacuated the wounded, and tried to resolve the underlying security and related problems that were causing continued conflict. In order to implement the ceasefire, even with the continued belligerence by both sides, UNFICYP set up a system of:

Fixed posts and frequent patrols; Intervention on the spot and interposition to prevent incidents from escalating into serious fighting; Demarcation of ceasefire lines where appropriate; Proposals or plans for remedying situations of military tension or conflict; and Withdrawing or eliminating fortifications erected by the two sides.
These measures aside, there was still sporadic violence. A number of serious incidents occurred during 1964, some of which resulting in the death of UNFICYP soldiers. On 14 June 1964, General Grivas returned to Cyprus. During the following two months, 5,000 Greek troops arrived to form the Greek Army in Cyprus under his command. The 950 men of the Greek National Contingent ostensibly remained a separate organisation. As tension grew over the summer of 1964, Turkish fighter aircraft became involved in the conflict during the first week of August, which resulted in the Security Council adopting resolution 193 (1964), which called for an immediate ceasefire. Surprisingly, both sides agreed and accepted the ceasefire without conditions. The conflict between 1963 and 1964 can be divided into eight periods:
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Period 1 2 3 4
Date 21 December 1963 to 31 December 1963 1 January 1963 to 31 January 1964 1 February 1964 to 14 February 1964 15 February 1964 to 4 March 1964 5 March 1964 to 26 March 1964 27 March 1964 to 13 June 1964 14 June 1964 to 5 August 1964 6 August 1964 to 10 August 1964
Description The first outburst of violence occurs. The violence is partially subdued while a negotiated settlement is sought at the London Conference. Following the failure of the London Conference, the violence intensifies. The violence is again held in check while the Security Council takes up the problem and resolves to form a peacekeeping force (UNFICYP) and to send a mediator. Violence increases as the Cyprus Government attempts to consolidate its holdings before UNFICYP becomes operational. UNFICYP is unable to halt the violence, which reaches a climax in Famagusta. The violence is contained following the return to Cyprus of General Grivas, and both communities concentrate on re-organising their armed forces. An offensive by Greek-Cypriot troops against Turk-Cypriots at Kokkina prompts Turkish air raids and halts the attempt to find a geopolitical solution through force of arms.
5 6 7 8
Another critical issue to maintaining the ceasefire was the periodic partial rotation of the Turkish national contingent stationed in Cyprus. On 25 September, U Thant announced in the Security Council that agreement had been reached for the re-opening of the Nicosia-Kyrenia road under the exclusive control of UNFICYP, and for the unimpeded rotation of the Turkish national contingent. The road re-opened on 26 October 1964, and UNFICYP continued supervision of the road until the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. In his report of December 1964, the Secretary-General reported that fighting had virtually ceased. However, the underlying tensions were still present, and UNFICYP had little or no success in inducing the parties to scale down their military confrontation or dismantle their fortifications. Return to Normal Conditions In its efforts to return Cyprus to normal conditions, UNFICYP used persuasion and negotiation exclusively on an ad hoc basis. These ad hoc measures were designed to save lives, minimise suffering, and, to the extent possible, restore essential civilian activities. The principal objective was to restore conditions that would enable all the people of the island to go about their daily business without fear for their lives and without being victimised, and in this connection to restore governmental services and economic activities disrupted by the inter-communal strife.
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UNFICYPs Ad Hoc Measures
Escorts for essential civilian movements, including people, food, and essential merchandise, on the roads of Cyprus, especially for members of the Turkish Cypriot community who feared abduction. Harvest arrangements, including escorts and patrols, to enable farmers to till their lands in the vicinity of positions held by members of the other community; agricultural arrangements, including grain deliveries by the Turkish Cypriots to the Cyprus Grain Commission; maintenance of abandoned citrus orchards, etc. Arrangements for government property in Turkish-Cypriot-controlled areas; water and electricity supplies to the Turkish Cypriot sectors; postal services; payment of social insurance benefits; efforts to normalize the public services, including arrangements to re-employ Turkish Cypriot civil servants, etc. Co-operation with the Red Cross and the Cyprus Joint Relief Commission in providing relief assistance for displaced persons (mainly Turkish Cypriots). UNFICYP also made intensive efforts to alleviate hardships resulting from the economic restrictions that had been imposed on the Turkish Cypriot community.
Though UNFICYP tried valiantly to implement the normalisation process, the ongoing political problems between the two sides limited the effectiveness of the normalisation efforts.
9.6
The 1967 Crisis
A series of incidents starting in January 1967 grew in intensity over the following months. On 21 April 1967, a military coup led by Colonel George Papadopoulos overthrew the Greek government. The new junta of Greek colonels resolved to end the dispute over Cyprus by political or military means, which merely exacerbated an already tense situation. By late November 1967, the escalation of incidents, many triggered by General Grivas forces, had created a severe political crisis. Turkey threatened to attack Greece directly if Grivas was not removed. The SecretaryGeneral sent a number of appeals to all sides in the conflict to show restraint and urged the three parties to agree upon a staged reduction and ultimate withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces. Finally, in late December all three sides agreed to the Secretary-Generals appeals. The Security Council met on 22 December and adopted resolution 244 (1967), which noted the SecretaryGenerals appeals and the replies of the three governments. With the aid the United States, Greece and Turkey reached an agreement under which some 12,000 Greek troops were withdrawn from Cyprus between 8 December 1967 and 16 January 1968. Under the agreement, the National Guard (an intensely anti-communist force led by Greek officers) was supposed to have been dissolved, and the size and powers of UNFICYP was supposed to have been increased. However, this never happened. In March 1968, the last economic restrictions were withdrawn from the Turkish enclaves, but the Turkish Cypriot community maintained their roadblocks against their Greek Cypriots neighbours.
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9.7
Arms Imports
The importation of arms and military equipment quickly became a serious problem for UNFICYP in terms of the missions ability to discharge its mandate. UNFICYP did monitor the imports, but under resolution 186 (1964) it was questionable if the mission could take any additional action. Even though it was agreed on 10 September 1964 that UNFICYP could be present at the unloading of military equipment at Famagusta and Limassol, other military material was being imported at Boghaz, unobserved by UNFICYP. Again, ad hoc arrangements were made to stop the distribution of weapons in regards to some shipments, but as tensions increased due to the illegal activity by pro-Enosis (union with Greece) elements on the island, the government imported a substantial quantity of arms and ammunition in January 1972. In an effort to stop an armed escalation of hostilities, UNFICYP negotiated a provisional agreement on 10 March, whereby the imported arms were put in safekeeping and open to inspection by the Force Commander. On 21 April, this agreement was improved in that the weapons and munitions, except for the high explosives, would be stored in a fenced area within the perimeter of an UNFICYP camp. The high explosive munitions were stored at Cyprus police headquarters, but the fuses were removed and stored at the UNFICYP camp. In the summer of 1999, the ammunition was handed over to the Cyprus government for destruction. The weapons purchased in 1972 were destroyed between April and May 2002.
A foot patrol amid the ruined homes of Athna, 1990. (Source: UN/DPI Photo# 157804C)
9.8
Force Reductions Between 1965-1974
As tensions lessened, UNFICYP began a gradual reduction in its force size.

Time Frame December 1964 December 1965 December 1966 December 1967 April - December 1968 1969-1970 1970-1972 Military and CIVPOL Personnel 6,275 5,764 4,610 4,737 3,708 Reductions to approximately 3,150 Approximately 3,150
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Between October and November 1973, personnel of the Austrian, Finnish, Irish, and Swedish contingents of UNFICYP were transferred to the Middle East to form the advance elements of UNEF II. Their governments replaced these troops; however, Ireland only agreed to send additional troops to the Middle East, and the Irish UNFICYP contingent was reduced to a token detachment at UNFICYPs HQ. By the spring of 1974, the Force was reduced by another 381 troops, but the events of July 1974 soon changed everything. 9.9 The 1974 Coup dtat
President Makarios decision not to disband the National Guard and request the enlargement of UNFICYP came back to haunt him on 15 July 1974 when a coup dtat staged by Greek officers of the National Guard occurred. UNFICYP was put on a state of alert the same day. Turkey responded by invoking the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 and subsequently launching an invasion of northern Cyprus on 20 July, putting UNFICYP on full alert. The UN responded by passing a number of Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire, but these ultimately failed. At the same time, the SC indicated to UNFICYP that it was to continue its mandate even thought the situation on Cyprus had fundamentally changed. On 21 July, UNFICYP played a major role in the evacuation of foreign missions to the British Sovereign Base Area (SBA) at Dhekelia. UNFICYP also tried to maintain the ceasefire by trying to prevent incidents from escalating into full scale fighting by establishing additional OPs and extensive patrolling. The Secretary-General had also requested reinforcements from the contributing nations; these arrived on 24 July and 14 August, raising UNFICYPs from 2,366 to 4,444 troops. This allowed UNFICYP to expand its operations, including an increasing number of humanitarian tasks. The Geneva Declaration and Its Results Security Council resolution 353 (1974) of 20 July prompted the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece, and the UK to begin discussions in Geneva on 25 July. On 30 July, they made the Geneva Declaration, whereby all sides agreed on certain measures that involved action by UNFICYP. This incorporated the following:
A security zone of a size to be determined by representatives of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, in consultation with UNFICYP, was to be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces. This zone was to be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP, which was to supervise the prohibition of entry. Pending the determination of the size and character of the security zone, the existing area between the two forces was not to be entered by any forces. All the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces were to be immediately evacuated and would continue to be protected by UNFICYP. Other Turkish enclaves outside the area controlled by the Turkish armed forces would continue to be protected by an UNFICYP security zone and could, as before, maintain their own police and security forces.
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In mixed villages, the functions of security and police were to be carried out by UNFICYP. Military personnel and civilians detained as a result of the recent hostilities were to be either exchanged or released under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) within the shortest time possible.
The ongoing talks at the second Geneva Conference broke down on 14 August, and fighting resumed on the island. UNFICYP resorted to ad hoc emergency operating procedures to try to either contain or end the fighting. However, in some areas UNFICYP had to withdraw its posts due to the serious threat from local fighting. In some cases, the lack of a UN presence resulted in civilian casualties. On 16 August the Security Council adopted resolution 360 (1974), which stated the UNs formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus and urged the parties to comply with its previous resolutions and to resume the negotiations called for in resolution 353 (1974) without delay. By this time, Turkish forces had occupied some 36.5 % of Cyprus, reaching as far south as the Louroujina salient, in effect creating a Turkish-occupied zone on the island. Due to its inability to agree on a course of action, the military junta in Athens collapsed and handed over power to civilians under Constantine Karamanlis. During July and August 1974, UNFICYP also took on a number of humanitarian functions. On 22 July, a special humanitarian and economics branch was set up at UNFICYP HQ. However, it soon became evident that a more systematic and larger scale of operation was needed, as nearly one third of the Cyprus population was displaced, homeless, or in need of assistance. In response to this growing crisis, on 20 August, the Secretary-General designated the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as Coordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus.
9.10
The 1974 de facto Ceasefire
World sympathy was shifting back towards Greece due to its return to civilian rule and away from Turkey due to its invasion of Cyprus. Given this reality, coupled with Turkey having reached some of its military goals and Greece realising that Turkey held a major strategic advantage, a ceasefire came into effect at 1800, local time, on 16 August 1974. UNFICYP immediately recorded where the military forces on both sides were deployed. The line between the forces became the effective ceasefire lines between the two sides. Since there was no formal ceasefire agreement, the military status quo as recorded by UNFICYP at the time became the standard by which it was judged, whether or not any changes constituted violations of the ceasefire. The ceasefire lines extended approximately 180 kilometres from Kato Pyrgos on the northwest coast to the east coast at Dherinia. The United Nations buffer zone between the lines varied in width from less than 20 metres in Nicosia to some seven kilometres near Athienou. It covered about three percent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land. The military status quo was clarified and adjusted through local agreements. In early 1989, the majority of these agreements were consolidated into a simple set of rules. UNFICYP kept the ceasefire lines and the buffer zone under constant surveillance through a system of observation posts
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and patrols. A patrol track running the length of the buffer zone was used for surveillance, the monitoring of agricultural activities, the re-supply of observation posts, and the rapid reaction to any incidents. The most serious ceasefire violations occurred in Nicosia, where the ceasefire lines of the two sides were in close proximity. In May 1989, UNFICYP reached an agreement with both sides whereby they unmanned their positions and stopped their patrols in certain sensitive locations. As a result, the numbers of incidents in Nicosia were reduced. Due to the Security Council resolutions resulting from the hostilities in 1974, UNFICYPs additional functions were added to the mission, with an emphasis of the maintenance of the ceasefire.
UNFICYP provided its good offices, as necessary, in regard to the supply of electricity and water across the lines. It facilitated normal contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots by making available meeting facilities, providing emergency medical services, including medical evacuations, and delivering mail and Red Cross messages across the ceasefire lines. UNFICYP discharged certain humanitarian functions for the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island, mostly in the Karpas peninsula. The force delivered to them supplies provided by the Cyprus Government and the Cyprus Red Cross Society, as well as pension and welfare payments. Further, UNFICYP personnel verified that any permanent transfers to the southern part of the island were voluntary. UNFICYP also delivered supplies to the Maronites living in three villages in the northern part of the island and generally assisted them in humanitarian matters. UNFICYP periodically visited Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island and helped them maintain contact with their relatives in the north. UN CIVPOL maintained close co-operation and liaison with the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police on matters of inter-communal aspects. Together with the line units, they contributed to law and order in the buffer zone and assisted in investigations and in the forces humanitarian activities. UNFICYP co-operated with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as coordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance to needy displaced persons in Cyprus, and with the United Nations Organisation for Project Services, in particular to facilitate projects involving both communities. UNFICYP monitored the status quo, using a system of 154 observation posts, through mobile patrolling and the Mobile Force Reserve (MFR) Unit.
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UNFICYP Deployment 1975

Source: UNFICYP
9.11
Secretary-Generals Good Offices Mission
Since the inception of UNFICYP, successive UN Secretary-Generals and their special representatives have tried to use their good offices to resolve the Cyprus issue. The 1990s saw an intensification of these efforts, in a draft agreement known as the Set of Ideas. In November 1992, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that it had not been possible to reach agreement on the Set of Ideas and suggested the adoption of confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a means of facilitating progress. Extensive efforts were made during 1993 and the first half of 1994 to reach an agreement on CBMs. By mid-1994, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that agreement on the CBMs remained beyond reach. Under the auspices of the Secretary-General, an intensive effort was undertaken between 1999 and early 2003. Initially, it involved proximity talks and then direct talks to resolve the Cyprus issue. On 14 April 2003, the SC expressed its regret that, due to the negative approach of the Turkish Cypriot leader, it had not been possible to put the Secretary-Generals settlement plan to simultaneous referenda by Turkish and Greek Cypriots and, as a result, there would be no comprehensive agreement on reunification of the island before 16 April the date that Cyprus accession treaty to the European Union was to be signed.
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On 10 February 2004, talks resumed between both sides, with Greece, Turkey, and the UK acting as guarantors. The objective of the negotiators was to have a text ready to be put to referenda in April, in the hope that Cyprus could be reunited in time to accede to the European Union on 1 May 2004. Consensus was reached for the first time, and the proposed Foundation Agreement in The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem was finalised. However, it had to be ratified by an electoral vote by both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Ultimately, it was approved by the Turkish Cypriot electorate by a margin of two to one, but it was rejected by the Greek Cypriot electorate by a margin of three to one. Thus, another opportunity to resolve the Cyprus issue was missed. In his report of 28 May 2004, the Secretary-General concluded that there was no apparent basis for resuming the good offices effort while the current stalemate continues.
9.12
The Financial Problems and Subsequent Restructuring of UNFICYP
UNFICYP was the only UN peacekeeping mission to be financed by the Governments that provided the missions contingents and through voluntary contributions from Member States. The UN covered the operational costs for administrative and logistical support. The mission very quickly found itself in financial trouble as voluntary contributions were not readily forthcoming and contributing states were not being paid for covering the administrative and logistical expenditures. The financial crisis was reflected in October 1977 with the withdrawal of the Finnish contingent. Due to financial constraints, it was not replaced, and UNFICYP was redeployed to cover the loss of the Finn battalion. In December 1987, Sweden withdrew its contingent due to the forces weak financial situation and an inability to resolve the political situation. The loss of the Swedish infantry battalion resulted in another major redeployment of the force. A UN armoured vehicle at an observation post near Skouriotissa in DANCON The situation was mitigated (Danish contingent) territory, 1990. (Source: UN/DPI) somewhat when Austria and Canada augmented their contingents, but there was still a net reduction of 206 personnel in UNFICYP. Furthermore, in 1992, due to the deteriorating financial situation of the force and frustration over the lack of progress towards a lasting political solution to the Cyprus problem, a number of troop-contributing governments reconsidered their participation in UNFICYP. In December 1992, the Danish battalion and reductions in the Austrian, British, and Canadian contingents reduced UNFICYPs strength by approximately 28 percent.
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In June 1993, the Canadian battalion was withdrawn, by which time the special account, funded by voluntary contributions, for UNFICYP had a total deficit of approximately US$200 million. Reimbursement claims from the troop-contributing countries had only been paid up to December 1981. The Secretary-General had repeatedly voiced his concerns about the deteriorating financial situation of UNFICYP. He suggested that to resolve the matter UNFICYP should be financed through assessed contributions. Thus, in Security Council resolution 831 (1993) of 27 May 1993, the financing was restructured to the Secretary-Generals recommendation. UNFICYP was also restructured to a strength of three infantry battalions of approximately 350 personnel each, a strength considered to be the minimum number required to maintain effective control of the buffer zone. A limited number of military observers were added to UNFICYP for reconnaissance, liaison, and humanitarian tasks in 1993 but were discontinued in 1994. The result of the various force reductions left UNFICYP covering the ceasefire lines with a very thin blue line. To compensate for the loss of personnel, a larger portion of UNFICYPs infantry battalion strength was moved into the buffer zone. In addition, the system of observation posts was reorganised, and there was a greater reliance on mobile patrolling. Certain humanitarian activities were also given to the two sides. On 22 October 2004, by recommendation of the Secretary-General and based on a review of the mandate, force levels, and concept of operations of UNFICYP, the Security Council reduced the military component of the mission to 860, increased the CIVPOL component to 69 officers, and raised the number of civilian affairs officers working in the mission. By 7 February 2005, the strength of UNFICYP was 875 military personnel.
9.13
UNFICYP to the End of 2005
In his periodic report of 27 May 2005, the Secretary-General said that the overall situation in Cyprus remained stable. However, contact had not been re-established between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership since the break of relations in the post-April 2004 referendum. As of 2005, a continued distrust existed between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities and leadership, which was due to there being no viable political solution to the overall situation and what were perceived as a series of military threats from both sides. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1604 (2005) of 15 June 2005, the mandate of UNFICYP was extended to 15 December 2005. As of 2005, UNFICYP, as a Cold War model of peacekeeping, had failed in reconciling the two sides and was unable to reduce the level of threat that either side felt. Thus, it did not create the confidence on both sides that would allow the mission to end. Generally, the mission failed in its objectives of social reintegration and nation building. However, for the most part, UNFICYP has been successful in keeping the peace between the two sides, excluding the 1974 coup dtat period.
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1.
After a ceasefire was imposed on 29 December 1963 in Cyprus, a neutral zone was created the next day between the two sides along the ceasefire line. What was its name? A. The green line; B. The blue line; C. The Neutral Zone; D. The Ceasefire Zone.
2.
Who requested help from the Security Council in February 1964, when all attempts to restore peace on Cyprus failed? A. The Turkish Ambassador to the United States; B. The representatives of the UK and Cyprus; C. The permanent representatives to the UN of Cyprus, Turkey, and the UK; D. The British Foreign Minister.
3.
Which one of the following was NOT a role of UNFICYP? A. To preserve international peace and security; B. To prevent a recurrence of fighting; C. To return the island to normal conditions; D. To negotiate a lasting peace with both sides to the conflict.
4.
Which of the following was one of the guiding principles of UNFICYP? A. The contingents could come under national command in times of crisis; B. The Force was under the exclusive command and control of the United Nations at all times; C. The Force could be used in whichever way the UN deemed fit, even to operate outside of its mandate; D. Given that Cyprus fell under the operational sphere of NATO, NATOs Supreme Commander could take control of the mission during a crisis. What happened when the ongoing talks at the second Geneva Conference broke down on 14 August 1974? A. UNFICYP withdrew to its strong points; B. Nothing happened, and the status quo remained; C. Fighting resumed on the island; D. Greece invaded Cyprus.
5.
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6.
The de facto ceasefire of 1974 created a military status quo, as recorded by UNFICYP at the time. What did this effectively become? A. The line used to formally separate Cyprus between its Greek and Turkish populations; B. The standard by which it was judged whether any changes constituted violations of the ceasefire; C. A temporary demarcation between both sides, but it was abandoned in 1982; D. The main negotiating position of the Greek Cypriots.
7.
Why was the Mobile Force Reserve (MFR) created in 1997 from the existing Permanent Force Reserve (PFR)? A. To provide the Force Commander with a mobile, flexible, and well-equipped response capability for incidents that occurred in the buffer zone; B. To have a rapid response capability to incidents outside the buffer zone; C. To provide a robust military capability to support UN PKOs in the Middle East and the Balkans; D. To serve as part of the restructuring of UNFICYP due to its financial problems.
8.
With the various force reductions in the 1990s, what did UNFICYP do to compensate for the loss of personnel? A. It reduced its area of responsibility; B. It allowed local police to patrol on behalf of the mission; C. It gave some of its patrolling responsibilities to the CIVPOL component; D. A larger portion of UNFICYPs infantry battalion strength was moved into the buffer zone.
9.
What was one of the unique features of UNFICYPs financing? A. It was financed by the Permanent Members of the Security Council; B. It was financed through the issue of UN Bonds; C. It was the only UN peacekeeping mission to be financed by the Governments that provided the missions contingents; D. There was nothing unique about UNFICYPs finances.
10. Which of the following statements best describes the UNFICYP mission at the end of 2005? A. It was a highly successful mission in the context of the Cold War peacekeeping paradigm; B. The mission had continued due to the inability of the UN to resolve the dispute with Turkey; C. UNFICYP, as a Cold War model of peacekeeping, had failed in reconciling the two sides, thus not allowing the mission to end; D. UNFICYP has been successful in keeping the peace, but it has not been able to end due to intransigence in the Security Council.
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ANSWER KEY: 1A, 2B, 3D, 4B, 5C, 6B, 7A, 8D, 9C, 10C
LESSON 10 UN INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL)

10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 Background and Establishment of UNIFIL Organisation of UNIFIL to April 1982 Ceasefire and Israeli Withdrawal The Imperfect Buffer Zone Limited Lebanese Government Control Over Southern Lebanon The 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon Withdrawal of the IDF The Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) Landmine and UXO Clearance
10.10 Role of UNIFIL from 1985 to April 2000 10.11 The Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon 10.12 UNIFIL from July 2000 to January 2006 10.13 UNIFILs Deficiencies and Shortcomings 10.14 The Aftermath of UNIFILs Failure
Lesson 10 / UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 10 discusses the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, the last peacekeeping operation formed during the Cold War, and as such, of historical significance in the evolution of peacekeeping operations. Aside from the operation in the Congo, Lebanon was the most difficult mission of the Cold War period, and, in terms of the evolution of peacekeeping operations, the student can gain much insight from how the UN dealt with its unique complications. Lesson 10 goes into detail regarding how and why UNIFIL was established, its mandate, and how a lack of co-operation between major parties contributed to its inability to fulfil its mandate. Finally, because UNIFIL was the last mission established during the Cold War period, the effects of its failure on international relations are elucidated for the student.

Describe the origins of the problems in Lebanon; Outline the role of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) throughout the crisis; State the stand taken by the Lebanese government towards internal problems and towards UNIFIL; Describe the establishment of UNIFIL and its mandate; List the difficulties and setbacks encountered by UNIFIL; Understand the involvement of the superpowers and the consequences of their involvement to the mission; and Define the Security Zone and the pivotal role that it played.
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10.1
Background and Establishment of UNIFIL
In the wake of the Lebanese civil war, which had technically ended in October 1976, Lebanon was partitioned by default. The northern region was controlled through proxy by Syria, while in the south no central authority existed. This region was split between Christian militias, who were backed by Israel, and the armed elements of the Lebanese National Movement, which was a loose association of various Islamic and leftist parties who were backed by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The PLO became the power broker in southern Lebanon, which resulted in PLO/PLO-backed commando raids across the border into Israel, which in turn led to intensified reprisal attacks by Israel against Palestinian bases in Lebanon. In what became known as the Coastal Road Massacre, on 11 March 1978, eight Fatah (armed wing of the PLO) commandos infiltrated Israel by sea from Lebanon. They first killed an American tourist on the beach and then hijacked a bus on the coastal road near Haifa. The subsequent shoot-out with Israeli security forces left 35 of the passengers dead and 71 wounded. Six of the commandos were also killed. On the night of 14 March, Israeli forces responded by invading Lebanon; this invasion was known as Operation Litani. In a few days, they occupied the area south of the Litani River, with the exception of Tyre. Operation Litanis objectives were to drive Palestinian militant groups away from the border with Israel, as well as to aid the South Lebanon Army, an Israeli ally. It was estimated that some 1,100 to 2,000 Lebanese were killed, most of whom were civilians, and some 285,000 refugees were forced to flee their homes. The PLO fell back to north of the Litani River and to a pocket around Tyre. On 15 March, the Lebanese Government submitted a strong protest against the Israeli invasion to the Security Council. The Lebanese Government made it clear that it had no control of the PLO in southern Lebanon and that it had no connection to the PLO attack. On 19 March, the SC adopted resolutions 425 (1978), which called for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognised boundaries, and it called upon Israel IDF units cross into South Lebanon, 1978. (Source: IDF) immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. In addition, resolution 426 (1978) was adopted on the same day, calling for the immediate establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
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Mission Terms of Reference UNIFIL was to operate in its Area of Operations (AO) to prevent the recurrence of fighting and assure that its AO was not being utilised for hostile activities of any kind. UNIFIL would be supported by UNTSO military observers, who would continue their operations along the Armistice Demarcation Line (ADL) after the withdrawal of UNIFIL. The missions terms of reference were:

To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces; To restore international peace and security; and To assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.
Emphasis was put on the principles of non-use of force and non-intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Force could only be used in self-defence, including resistance to attempts by forcible means to prevent UNIFIL from discharging its duties. The overall guidelines for UNIFIL were essentially the same as those for UNDOF and UNEF II. However, two key problems came into play in the early days of the mission: First- UNIFIL had no powers of enforcement, thus requiring both Israel and the Government of Lebanon to co-operate so that it could fulfil its mandate. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that UNIFIL constantly had to deal with the non-state actors from both sides, such as the PLO or the Christian militias (the Lebanese de facto forces). Second- UNIFIL was seriously burdened by the fact that there had been no clear definition of its AO. Both Israel and the Government of Lebanon had very different ideas on what the actual tasks of UNIFIL were, which then translated into different perceptions of what the missions AO should be.
UNIFIL AO (Source: Ram Military Consulting)
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10.2
Organisation of UNIFIL to April 1982
Ghanaian Major-General Emmanuel Erskine, who was the UNTSO COS, was appointed as UNIFILs interim commander on 19 March. The strength of UNIFIL was set at 4,000 troops, and the initial mandate was for six months. MGen. Erskine set up a temporary HQ at the UNTSO out-station in Naqoura. He also had 45 UNMOs in the area, which were soon reinforced by another 19 UNMOs from UNTSO. To make the mission viable as soon as possible, one reinforced company from the Swedish contingent and a Canadian signals and movement control detachment of UNEF II, as well as one reinforced company of the Iranian contingent of UNDOF, were temporality assigned to UNIFIL. France, Nepal, and Norway agreed to provide the first contingents. French troops began to arrive in Beirut on 23 March; the Norwegians arrived two weeks later and the Nepalese by midApril. Including the Canadian, Iranian, and Swedish troops, UNIFIL had reached a strength of 4,061 by the beginning of May 1978.
UNIFIL Organisation (as of 1986)
UN HQ New York
SECRETARY GENERAL

Personal Staff Senior Advisor (SA) Press Information Officer (PIO) Legal Advisor (LA)
MISSION HQ
Liason
Logistics
Administration & Personnel (A&P)
Liaison
Infantry Battalions UNMOs (OGL) Logistics Units Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) Air Unit
Command
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On 1 May 1978, based on reports from both the Commanders of UNTSO and UNIFIL noting the harsh conditions and dangers of the mission, the Secretary-General recommended (S/12675) that the strength of UNIFIL be raised to 6,000 personnel. The Security Council approved the increase in UNIFILs strength on 3 May in resolution 427 (1978). Fiji, Iran, and Ireland each provided a battalion, which arrived at the beginning of June. The Iranian and Swedish companies that had been detached from UNDOF and UNEF II were returned to their respective missions. By mid-June 1978, UNIFILs strength was 6,100 troops and 42 UNMOs of the Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) from UNTSO. The ceiling strength of UNIFIL was further increased to 7,000 personnel in early 1982. By June 1982, the missions strength had been raised to 6,945 troops. However, after the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel, the strength and composition of UNIFIL fundamentally changed.
10.3
Ceasefire and Israeli Withdrawal
On 27 March 1978, the Secretary-General had called for a general ceasefire, which by 8 April was essentially being respected by both sides. Israeli forces began a two-stage phased withdrawal on 11 April. After the second phase, on 14 April, the area evacuated left 110 sq kms, about one-tenth of the land occupied by the initial invasion. This, however, was not acceptable to the UN, and a further withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) was demanded. Israel agreed, and this withdrawal took place on 30 April. Israel gave up about 45 percent of the territory it had occupied, and these regions were immediately taken over by UNIFIL forces. The withdrawal of the IDF created two problems for UNIFIL: First- Israel was very reluctant to give up the remainder of the territory it had occupied in Lebanon. However, after pressure from the UN, Israel agreed to a full withdrawal by 13 June 1978. Almost immediately, as UNIFIL began occupying the vacated territory, the Lebanese de facto forces (Israels allies) threatened to use force to stop further UNIFIL deployments. This situation led to the harassment of UNIFIL forces by the de facto forces, even after on 5 September 1978 the Government of Lebanon declared that these forces had no authority in the UNIFIL area of operation. By September 1978, UNIFIL had eventually occupied 24 positions, including its HQ at Naqoura and five existing UNTSO positions. However, this was the limit of UNIFILs presence and, thus, fundamentally handicapped its ability to fulfil its mission. The de facto forces essentially created their own enclave in the area vacated by the third phase of the Israeli withdrawal. Second- Once the IDF had withdrawn, PLO armed elements began to try to enter into the region based on their interpretations of the 3 November 1969 Cairo Agreement, in which Lebanon agreed to facilitate commando activity by means of facilitating the passage of commandos and specifying points of passage and reconnaissance in the border areas. This led to serious armed clashed between UNIFIL and PLO elements, which many times resulted in injury or death to UNIFIL troops over the years.
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UNIFIL deployed into two separate zones south of the Litani River, but there was a 15kmwide gap between the two zones, just south of Chateau de Beaufort. UNIFIL was only able to establish four isolated observation posts.
10.4
The Imperfect Buffer Zone
Overall, the difficulty of the terrain, UNIFILs limited size, and its lack of enforcement power made it almost impossible to stop infiltration. By July 1981, there were 30 PLO armed element positions within UNIFILs AO. In regards to UNIFILs AO, with the aid of the IDF, UNIFIL was able to come to a modus vivendi with the de facto forces in their self-created enclave, in that UNIFILs troops had freedom of movement on the main roads for five days a week in order to rotate personnel and re-supply. UNIFIL could also have over-flights, but only with permission of Major Saad Haddad, who commanded the de facto forces. Sometimes this limited movement was denied to UNIFIL, and there were still attacks directed against UNIFIL positions and specific contingents. These attacks included the April 1980 shooting and murder of three Irish soldiers and the heavy shelling of the UNIFIL HQ on 24 April 1980. The de facto forces also infiltrated UNIFILs AO between July 1979 and July 1980 and set up strategic positions. Negotiation with Israel was the only real option to avoid heavy combat, but Israel felt it was in its strategic interest to have the de facto forces occupy these positions. Thus, it would not help convincing Major Haddad to remove them. From November 1979 on, IDF incursions into UNIFILs AO began to occur. These included mine-laying, construction of new positions inside the Lebanese border, manning checkpoints, and transporting supplies. By 1980, the IDF was also intruding into Lebanons airspace and territorial waters. During November 1980, UNIFIL recorded 312 air and 89 sea violations. Give there was a 15 km gap between the two AOs of UNIFIL, the two sides were only separated by the Litani River in this area. Their respective artillery could shoot at each others positions and territory. From March 1979, there were frequent exchanges of fire between the PLO and the de facto forces. Israel also retaliated against the PLO positions with air attacks. This situation led to two major incidents. One occurred in August 1980, when the IDF launched a large helicopter commando raid backed by artillery and air support into the Chateau de Beufort and Arnun areas. The other occurred in July 1981 when, after PLO forces shelled the Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona on 10 July, the IDF retaliated with massive air and artillery strikes; by 16-17 July, Israeli warships became involved. After nearly two weeks of conflict, the fighting eventually died down Dutch observational post. (Source: UN) around 24 July.
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The Security Council President called for an end to hostilities, and on 21 July the SC adopted resolution 490 (1981), which called for an end to the armed attacks and reaffirmed Lebanons independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Efforts by the UN and U.S. led to the establishment on 24 July of a de facto ceasefire, the same day that the fighting had abated. UNIFIL reported that as of 1320 local time everything was quiet. The 24 July 1981 ceasefire, for the most part, held until April 1982. The only real threats to it were the initial attacks by Ahmed Jebrils Syrian-backed Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC), as well as the continued over-flights of Israeli reconnaissance missions. Yassar Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, was able to make Jebril honour the ceasefire on 27 July. Israel, on the other hand, continued its reconnaissance missions, but these did not evoke a response from the PLO. 10.5 Limited Lebanese Government Control Over Southern Lebanon
From the inception of UNIFIL, various efforts were made to re-establish control over the southern enclave that Israel was controlling directly or through its proxy force, the de facto forces. UNIFIL helped to establish Lebanese Government officials in various places in the enclave and also assisted in a number of humanitarian and rehabilitation projects in conjunction with the Government. UNIFIL also diplomatically supported a number of attempts to establish a presence of the newly reformed Lebanese National Army (LNA) in the enclave. The first small task force was sent into the region in July 1978, but due to lack of Israeli support for the initiative, the task force was forced to withdraw after the de facto forces began heavy harassing fire. A second attempt to establish a LNA battalion in April 1979 did succeed, even with serious attacks by the de facto forces against UNIFIL. The LNA battalion was reinforced in December 1980, and by early 1981, some of its units were deployed beyond its initial operational limits around Arzun. In June, a second battalion was successfully deployed without any serious problems. This brought the LNAs strength to 1,350 troops in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Government also tried to reactivate the 1949 Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in an effort to re-establish control over southern Lebanon. After a number of preliminary meetings and negotiations, a meeting was held between the parties on 1 December 1980. It was chaired by the COS of UNTSO. No agreement could be reached on the matter.
10.6
The 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon
The growing tension in the occupied territories and the response by Palestinians to violence directed at them by Jewish settlers in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as Israels annexing of the Golan Heights and the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, all led to massive tension in the region. Israels objective was to weaken the growing strength of the PLO in the Occupied Territories by attacking its base in Lebanon. Consequently, Israel tried to provoke the PLO into attacking in order to provide a pretext for an attack into Lebanon. However, the PLO did not launch attacks into Israel between July 1981 and June 1982.
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Israel was able to use the 3 June 1982 assassination attempt on Shlomo Argov, Israels Ambassador to Great Britain, by Abu Nidals Palestinian terrorist group as a pretext for the attack. The IDF promptly bombed PLO bases and ammunition dumps in Beirut and attacked other targets in Lebanon between 4-5 June. The PLO responded with a massive artillery and mortar attack on the Israeli population of the Galilee. On 6 June, under the direction of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, in Operation Peace for the Galilee, Israel invaded Lebanon. By mid-June, Israel had driven the PLO back and surrounded it in Beirut. Syrian and PLO forces were put under siege by the IDF for three months. In August, with the help of the U.S., an agreement was reached for the evacuation of PLO fighters and Syrian troops from West Beirut. The evacuation was to be covered by a three-nation Israeli APC and tanks in Beirut, 1982 Multinational Force (MNF) (Source: Lebanese Information and Research Centre) composed of American, French, and Italian troops. The evacuation was completed by 1 September, with the MNF units withdrawing by 10 September. LNA forces then began to move into the region occupied by the PLO. However, when newly-elected Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated on 14 September, IDF units entered Beirut the next day. Over the next three days, Lebanese militiamen (mostly Phalangists) but also some troops of the Israeli-supported SLA, massacred some 700 to 800 Palestinian men, women, and children in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in west Beirut while IDF troops looked on. MNF forces returned to Beirut at the end of September as a symbol of support for the government, which was now led by the former presidents brother. In February 1983, a small British contingent joined the MNF in Beirut. The Lebanese Governments primary goal was the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian, and Palestinian forces from Lebanon, and in late 1982, Lebanese-Israeli negotiations commenced with U.S. participation. Israel only achieved part of its military and political goals; though the PLO had been pushed out of Lebanon, it had not been destroyed. Syria filled up the power vacuum left in the region. The resulting Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon led to continued attacks by Lebanese Muslims, which inflicted heavy casualties on the IDF, while Syria provoked attacks on MNF troops. Worse of all, a far more dangerous organisation replaced the PLO. In 1983, HizbAllah or Hizbollah (Party of Allah) was born; it was an Islamasist organisation backed by Syria, but it drew its ideological inspiration from revolutionary Iran. Hizbollahs manifesto was to create an Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and to remove all non-Islamic influences from the region.
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Control of Lebanon, 1979-80 (Source: Ram Military Consulting)
Control of Lebanon after June 1982 (Source: Ram Military Consulting)
UNIFIL During the Israeli Occupation of Southern Lebanon By 8 June 1982, UNIFILs area of operation had fallen under IDF control. It was decided that UNIFIL could no longer fulfil its mandate, but the mission was to continue to occupy its positions unless personnel were seriously threatened. It was also to provide humanitarian assistance whenever possible. For three years, UNIFIL remained behind the Israeli lines. UNIFILs major security problems came from the presence of the de facto forces, which were now calling themselves the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and whose units were generally ill-disciplined and acted arbitrarily. UNIFIL troops had standing orders to disarm these forces or at least contain their activities when they were not being directly support by the IDF. Between June 1982 and the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces in 1985, the UNIFIL AO, for the most part, was more peaceful than the rest of Lebanon. This reality was recognised by local civic leaders and the Lebanese Government, which led to a lobby for the mission to be extended. Their requests to extend the mandate of UNIFIL were accepted by the UN.
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10.7
Withdrawal of the IDF
Ongoing diplomatic efforts by the U.S. led to the 17 May 1983 signing of an agreement between Israel and Lebanon for the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Forces, the disbanding of other irregular forces, and a joint security arrangement between both governments. The agreement was conditional on a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. However, this did not happen, and due to internal opposition and pressure from Syria, the Lebanese government never ratified the agreement. However, due to ongoing fighting against the Druze militias in the Shouf Mountains, the IDF pulled back to the south of the Awali River in early September 1983. This left a power vacuum that was immediately filled by the Druze militias and resulted in attacks and massacres of Christian Lebanese in the region. In an effort to find a solution, the Secretary-General was able to initiate a series of talks, which began on 8 November 1984, with military representatives of both sides at the UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura. On 14 January 1985, Israel announced its plan for a unilateral three-phase withdrawal. The Lebanese Government was not satisfied with the IDF plan. By the end of the fourteenth meeting on 24 January 1985, it became clear that there was no reason to continue the talks. Israels decision to withdraw was based in the reality that the IDF could no longer afford the attritional guerrilla war being fought, as well as due to mounting political pressure at home due to the growing death and injury toll to Israeli soldiers. On 16 February, the IDF began the first phase of its withdrawal as it pulled out of Sidon. This resulted in more intensive attacks by Shiite guerrilla forces against the IDF. More and more of these attacks began to occur inside the UNIFIL AO, but UNIFIL could not impede the IDF in its defensive tactics, nor did UNIFIL have the right to impede Lebanese resistance efforts on their own territory. The second phase of the withdrawal took place between March and April 1985, wherein the IDF withdrew to a strip of land north of the border between Israel and Lebanon. This area extended from the Mediterranean Sea to the Hasbayya area. Its depth varied between two and twenty kilometres. The third and final phase was completed on 10 June, when the IDF handed over its positions in the new Security Zone to its allies the SLA. Some IDF troops remained in the Security Zone as advisors to the SLA. During this third phase, the UN tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a full withdrawal of the Israeli Security Zone (Source: Ram Military Consulting) IDF and its allies.
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10.8
The Force Mobile Reserve (FMR)
Prior to the establishment of the Force Mobile Reserve in 1986, armoured units from various battalions where employed in critical situations when the use of force could be required. This force structure resulted in the following problems:

Mobility was time-consuming and inefficient; Tactical drills and procedures were not standardised and led to limited or no coordination between units; Language difficulties and great variations in the knowledge and use of English as the operational language; and The lack of command structure/leadership of the combined unit.
Due to these problems, the unit was unable to execute its mission during the armed element attacks on French forces during August to September 1986. As a result of the losses sustained by UNIFIL forces, Finnish General Gustav Hegglund, who was the Force Commander at the time, acquired approval from UNHQ in New York to assemble the platoons into one unit, the FMR.
Norwegian FMR APCs on patrol. (Source: UN)
The unit was initially located in Naqoura; it was then moved to Fijian battalion Position 1-15, where a tent-camp was established while the FMR camp was being constructed. The unit moved into the camp on 1 June 1986. The camp was later named Camp Grotle after Arild Grotle, a Norwegian soldier in the NORPLATOON FMR who was killed when a SISU APC overturned in 1989. FMR normally had 75 percent of the unit ready for immediate operations, which meant that nine SISU APCs could be sent out to respond to an incident. When alerted, the FMR should be able to reach anywhere in Western AO in less than one hour and Eastern AO in less than two hours. The FMR was organised into four mechanised platoons that patrolled the UNIFIL AO. To show multinationality, the platoons were organised as follows:
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NOR/FIJI: NORPLATOON: One crew and two infantry squads; FIJIPLATOON: One crew, including a gunner/reserve leader; GHAN/NOR: GHANPLATOON: Two infantry squads and one crew; NORPLATOON: One crew including a gunner/reserve leader; FIJI/GHAN: FIJIPLATOON: One crew and two infantry squads; GHANPLATOON: One crew, including a gunner/reserve leader; and FIN/IR/NEP: FINNPLATOON: One crew; IRISHPLATOON: One Crew; NEPPLATOON: Two infantry Squads.
On missions involving two or more platoons, personnel from the NOR/FIJI/GHAN/IR/FIN-PLATOON manned FMRs Command Post, which was set up in a SISU XA-186NO Command Post APC.
FMR Pocket Badge (Source: UNDPKO)
10.9
Landmine and UXO Clearance
UN Security Council resolutions 425, 426, and 511 did not provide sufficient guidance to authorise UNIFIL to undertake humanitarian demining in its AOs. Thus, UNIFILs demining efforts had been directed to operational areas where UNIFIL personnel were located. However, SC resolution 1337 (paragraph 10) allowed UNIFIL to expand and undertake emergency demining activities in southern Lebanon. Generally, requests from the local population for emergency demining would have been handled by UNIFIL and would have involved the clearance of minefields and clusters to extricate casualties or mines/UXO that were clearly identifiable and posed an immediate threat. At the request of UNIFIL, a regional Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) was established within UNIFIL in July 2000. The UNIFIL-MACC formed the core of the Mine Action Coordination Centre, Southern Lebanon (MACC SL). In January 2002, the UNIFILMACC relocated from its office in Tyre to the former UNIFIL Logistics Base in Tyre and started its operational activities.
Belgian PRB M35 anti-personnel mine in FINBATT AO. (Source: MACC SL)
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Minefield Incidents in UNIFIL AOs - September 2001

UNIFIL AO FIJI NEPAL IRELAND GHANA FINLAND INDIA TOTAL No. of Minefields 43 20 54 14 78 86 295 Size of Area (m ) 1,783,979 777,968 2,993,251 1,543,583 4,674,483 4,186,479 15,948,561
2
Injuries 5 7 21 5 2 8 48
Deaths 2 0 3 2 0 1 8
Total 7 7 24 7 2 9 56
UNMACC SL Logo
Source: UN Mine Action Coordination Cell (MACC) IMSMA Database, Tyre, Lebanon: September 2001
The MACC SL provides the following support to UNIFIL in accordance with the original mandate and the guidance given in SC resolution 1337, paragraph 10:
Landmine Safety training to all United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) teams during their in-country orientation. This involves a brief on a monthly basis with the team members who have arrived that month. Technical advice and coordination with the UNIFIL Demining Coordination Cell (DCC). IMSMA and information support to the UNIFIL DCC. IMSMA mapping of mined areas to UNIFIL HQ Operations, Battalions, and UNTSO OGL.
Irish peacekeeping soldiers train members of other battalions in the use of a bomb-defusing robot, 1990. (Source: UNIFIL)
At the end of September 2001, 4,365 landmines/UXO of all types had been neutralised. MACC SL and UNIFIL created a database for known and suspected minefields, booby-trapped areas, areas cleared of mines, and incidents. 10.10 Role of UNIFIL from 1985 to April 2000 Overall, there were no substantial changes to UNIFILs position from 1985 to 2000. The IDF/SLA set up a number of military positions in or near the UNIFIL AO and further fortified their own positions. The IDF/SLA also imposed its own restrictions and regulations for the Lebanese population within the Security Zone; this led to growing tensions between the occupiers and the occupied population, resulting in numerous attacks by guerrillas against the IDF/SLA. Many times, UNIFIL troops found themselves caught between the two sides.
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The August 1986 retaliatory attacks by the Islamic Amal Movement, which continued to 28 September against 10 French manned UNIFIL positions, left three French soldiers dead and another 24 wounded, causing UNIFIL to change its security stance. Additional shelters were built, physical defences were improved, vulnerable positions were closed, and additional security precautions were instituted. With the subsequent withdrawal of the French contingent, a major redeployment of UNIFIL took place between December 1986 and January 1987. UNIFIL was consolidated, and deployments were to fewer positions with better protection. In addition, the ad hoc force reserve was turned into a permanent composite unit called the Force Mobile Reserve (FMR, see Section 10.8). Overall, the majority of armed incidents against UNIFIL involved IDF/SLA forces, many of which resulted in the wounding or even death of UNIFIL soldiers. UNIFIL continued to try to fulfil its mandate and continued to offer humanitarian support where it could. One task that became of great importance was demining and the removal of unexploded ordinance (UXO, see Section 10.9). UNIFIL suffered numerous casualties from this menace, one of the worse incidents occurring on 21 March 1989 when three Irish soldiers were killed by a landmine explosion. UNIFIL concluded that the mines had been laid on the previous night. The Taif Agreement for national reconciliation of October 1989 made provisions for the Lebanese Government to restore control all over the country. It also legitimised the Syrian presence in Lebanon but laid the groundwork for a future Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. In 1990, Lebanese governmental control was established in the greater Beirut area. In 1991, this control was extended beyond the greater Beirut area, and militias that had been operating in these areas were disarmed and A Norwegian Peacekeeping soldier with a canine bomb scout in disbanded. In July 1991, the LNA was Beirut, 1990. (Source: UN) deployed into the Sidon and Tyre regions. In addition, the western part of the UNIFIL AO (approximately 32 sq. kms.) occupied by the Ghanaian battalion was turned over to the LNA. The handover was completed by early April 1992. Further handovers continued in 1993. In consultation with UNIFIL, in August 1993, a 300-man LNA unit was sent into the UNIFIL AO to maintain law and order. Further establishment of checkpoints occurred in the AO. The presence of the LNA proved to aid UNIFIL in its work, especially in regards to diffusing incidents involving armed elements. With this level of co-operation established, in December 1995 the Government of Lebanon and the UN signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for UNIFIL. Overall, the status quo remained in place between 1985 and 2000, when UNIFILs mission changed due to Israel announcement that it would withdraw from the Security Zone.
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10.11 The Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon On 17 April 2000, Israel informed the Secretary-General that it would withdraw its forces from Lebanon by July 2000 in full accordance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). In response, the Secretary-General dispatched his Special Envoy (Terje Roed-Larsen of Norway), the Force Commander of UNIFIL, and a team of experts to meet with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon and concerned Member States in the region, including Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, to establish the withdrawal process. The delegation also met with the PLO and the League of Arab States. Israel began its withdrawal on 16 May; the IDF and de facto forces withdrew under fire. On 21 May, Lebanese civilians and armed elements began to enter the former Israeli-controlled area. Many de facto forces members fled to Israel with their families, while others surrendered to the Lebanese authorities. The de facto forces ceased to exist within a few days of the withdrawal. By 25 May, the withdrawal was complete, and Israel was finally in compliance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). The Secretary-General stated that UNIFIL would require phased reinforcement to carry out its responsibilities in the light of the changed security situation in southern Lebanon. He recommended that UNIFIL force size be raised to a total of eight battalions plus appropriate support units, or approximately 7,935 peacekeepers. On 16 June, the Secretary-General confirmed the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978). Israel had also completed the withdrawal in conformity with the line identified by the UN. The de facto forces/SLA had been dismantled, and all detainees held at Al-Khiam prison had been freed. Violations of the Line On reviewing the vacated region, UNIFIL discovered two types of violations: The Israeli technical fence crossed the withdrawal line in a number of places; and The IDF used patrol tracks that also crossed the line. The Government of Lebanon at this point refused to consent to the deployment of UNIFIL to the vacated areas until all the Israeli violations had been corrected. Israel committed itself to the removal of violations, which were completed by 24 July. On the same day, Lebanon consented to the full deployment of UNIFIL, which was to be followed immediately by the deployment of a composite Lebanese unit, comprised of army and internal security personnel. On moving into the region vacated by the Israelis, the Lebanese army, gendarmerie, and police established checkpoints to control movement and maintain law and order. The Lebanese army retrieved heavy weapons abandoned by IDF and de facto forces. UNIFIL patrolled the area and, together with the Lebanese authorities, provided humanitarian assistance to locals. UNIFIL also assisted former members of the de facto forces and their families who decided to return from Israel to Lebanon. UNIFIL monitored the line of withdrawal by means of daily ground and air patrol and immediately reported any violations to both sides.
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10.12 UNIFIL from July 2000 to January 2006 From the end of July until early October 2000, the situation in the UNIFIL area of operations was generally calm, except for numerous minor violations of the line of withdrawal, the so-called Blue Line. Two serious incidents occurred on 7 October and 20 October, resulting in reprisal attacks from the IDF. On 9 August, the Lebanese Government deployed a Joint Security Force of 1,000 troops drawn from the Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese army. The Forces HQs were in Marjayoun and Bint Jubayl. Israeli aircraft continued to violate the Blue Line on an almost daily basis, penetrating deep into Lebanese airspace. However, near the Blue Line the Lebanese Government, in effect, left control of the area to Hizbollah. Hizbollah forces worked in civilian attire and were normally unarmed. They monitored the Blue Line, maintained public order, and, in some villages, provided social, medical, and education services. The Government of Lebanon took the position that as long as there was no comprehensive peace with Israel, the army would not act as a border guard for Israel and would not be deployed to the border. Hizbollah personnel occasionally restricted the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and interfered with its redeployment. UNIFIL monitored the area through ground and air patrols and a network of observation posts. It acted to correct violations by raising them with the side concerned, and used its best efforts through continuous and close liaison with both sides to prevent friction and limit incidents. However, UNIFIL has not been able to persuade the Lebanese authorities to assume their full responsibilities along the Blue Line. At the end of July and in early August, UNIFIL redeployed southwards and up to the Blue Line. The redeployment proceeded smoothly, with the Lebanese authorities assisting in securing land and premises for new positions. At the same time, in order to free the capacity needed for the move south, UNIFIL vacated an area in the rear and handed it over to the Lebanese authorities. With the withdrawal of the IDF and its allies, UNIFIL focused on the remaining part of its mandate: the restoration of international peace and security, thus evolving the mission into a more traditional observer mission. However, due to the remaining instability and lack of Lebanese Governmental control of the Blue Line, UNMOs alone were not sufficient to maintain the peace. Thus, a combination of armed infantry (two infantry battalions) and an UNMO group composed of UNTSO observers and support personnel was suggested by the Secretary-General as the new force structure for UNIFIL. On 30 January 2001, SC resolution 1337 (2001) authorised the military strength of UNIFIL to be reduced by 31 July 2001. The reconfiguration called for the deployment of most troops in protected positions close to the Blue Line, with UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura having a dedicated guard unit. The demining unit would also be maintained. Through a gradual reduction, the Force would eventually comprise 2,000 all ranks, including troops from France, Ghana, India, Italy, Poland, and Ukraine. The reconfiguration would be achieved in the course of normal troop rotations. UNIFILs strength was stabilised at 2,000 troops by the end of 2002.
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There was a brief but serious outbreak of incidents from 17 January to 12 July 2002 across the Blue Line. These incidents coincided with the substantial escalation of tension in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. However, things calmed down, and the Secretary-General noted in his report of 23 July 2003 that stabilisation was occurring and that this was reflected by how well demining had been going. By 2004, some 4.8 million square metres had been cleared. Though there had been a fragile calm over the UNIFIL AO, the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on 14 February 2005 created a period of increased political instability. However, due to pressure from the U.S., the subsequent withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon at the end of April, and the holding of free and fair parliamentary elections over a four-week period in May and June, re-established the peace. It also became clear that the Lebanese armed forces could maintain effective security throughout the country. However, due to planned reductions, this ability was being marginalised. Thus, Lebanese authorities and diplomats confirmed that, in the currently prevailing uncertain political and security conditions, UNIFIL continued to play a crucial role in implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978). The Secretary-General concluded that the situation in Lebanon and the wider region did not support a change in the UNIFIL mandate or another reconfiguration of the Force. Thus the SC adopted resolution 1614 (2005), which extended UNIFILs mandate to 31 January 2006.
10.13 UNIFILs Deficiencies and Shortcomings When UNIFIL was originally organised, there was no provision for an organic HQ Company that included Defence and Employment, Military Police, Transport, Engineers, and Welfare Sections. The result was that these tasks were downloaded to the already over-tasked contingents. Also, due to the requirement for a rapid integration of a multinational HQ staff, problems arised due to language and procedural differences. During the first two months of the mission, this led to misdirected staff work, confusing instructions, and a lack of direction in the handling of incidents. The UN had directed national governments that were providing contingents to arrive self-sufficient and capable of supporting themselves administratively, logistically, and operationally for at least six months. Some contingents, such as the Nepalese and Fijian, arrived lacking many of these capabilities, including basic internal communications equipment.
UNIFIL road patrol. (Source: UN)
All these factors were soon overcome, but the major problem for UNIFIL that plagued it throughout its mandate was the inability to use force, other than in a limited self-defence role. This, over the decades, led to many casualties and deaths of UNIFIL troops and in some instances led to
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the withdrawal of national contingents. Nonetheless, UNIFIL troops continued their vigil under hazardous conditions in one of the most volatile region of the world.
10.14 The Aftermath of UNIFILs Failure After UNIFIL was established in March 1978, no new peacekeeping operations were set up until May 1988, a period of more than 10 years. The first years of this period of drought were marked by an intensification of the Cold War, highlighted by the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Reagan administrations espousal of unilateralism in foreign policy, and the military build-up of both superpowers. It was also a time of increasing conflicts in the Third World, such as the invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese, the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, the invasion of Lebanon by Israel, the crisis in the Falkland Islands (The Malvinas), and the Cuban and South African interventions in Angola. However, after 1985, international relations began to improve. Much credit for this goes to Mikhail Gorbachevs policies of glasnost and perestroika and his new thinking in international affairs. This soon led to a new detente between the two superpowers. It culminated in the Washington Summit of December 1987, during which Gorbachev and Reagan signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and agreed on the use of the United Nations machinery for the control of regional conflicts. The Washington Summit, which can be considered as marking the beginning of the end of the Cold War, was to be followed by a resurgence of UN peacekeeping operations.
Nepalese peacekeeping troops, on foot patrol in southern Lebanon, November 1990. (Source: UN Photo# 157878C)
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1.
After the de facto end of the Lebanese civil war in 1976, who was left in control of Lebanon? A. The Christian militias; B. Syria in the south and the PLO in the north; C. The northern region through proxy by Syria, while no central authority existed in the south; D. The government forces of Lebanon.
2.
Why did Israel launch Operation Litani? A. To conquer Lebanon; B. To stop PLO/PLO-backed commando raids across the border into Israel; C. To fulfil a promise the Israeli government had made to its Christian Lebanese allies; D. It was a reconnaissance mission only.
3.
What was one of the terms of reference for UNIFIL? A. To assist the Lebanese government in demining; B. To restore the positions held by the PLO; C. To establish a DMZ based on the current positions of Israeli and Lebanese forces; D. To confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces.
4.
What was one of the key problems that came into play in the early days of UNIFIL? A. It was seriously burdened by the fact that there had been no clear definition of its AO; B. It lacked the personnel to fulfil its mandate; C. It lacked financial support from Member States; D. Its overall mandate was open to interpretation by all sides to the conflict.
5.
What efforts were diplomatically supported by UNIFIL? A. Reciprocity trade agreements within the enclave; B. Repatriation of occupied land; C. A number of attempts to establish a presence of the newly reformed LNA in the enclave; D. UNIFIL did not support diplomatic efforts.
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6.
What was the result of the removal of the PLO from Lebanon? A. It allowed for a peaceful settlement with Israel; B. The Lebanese state stabilised, and all outside influences were removed; C. The Christian militias became the most powerful group in Lebanon; D. A more dangerous organisation called Hizbollah replaced the PLO.
7.
By 8 June 1982, what had happened to UNIFILs AO? A. The Syrians had control of it; B. The SC decided to withdraw UNIFIL and hand over its AO to Lebanon; C. It had ceased to exist; D. It had fallen under IDF control.
8.
Why was the Force Mobile Reserve (FMR) created? A. It eliminated the previous problems of coordinating individual units from different contingents; B. It gave the Norwegian armour unit something to do; C. It was a show of strength; D. It made the new Force Commander look like he was doing something new.
9.
What is the so-called Blue Line in Lebanon? A. The line that separates UNIFILs AO with that of UNDOF; B. The Israeli-Lebanese border; C. The line of withdrawal; D. The border around the Israeli Security Zone.
10. In 2005, in the wake of the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, what happened to UNIFIL? A. The mission was terminated; B. The missions mandate was extended to 2006; C. The missions strength was reduced; D. The mission was reconfigured into a more robust peace enforcement mission.
ANSWER KEY: 1C, 2B, 3D, 4A, 5C, 6D, 7D, 8A, 9C, 10B
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LESSON 11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

11.1 Summary 11.2 Evaluating the Performance of UN Peacekeeping During the Cold War 11.3 General Criticisms of Peacekeeping 11.4 Conclusion
Lesson 11 / Summary and Conclusions
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LESSON OBJECTIVES
Lesson 11 summarises for the student how peacekeeping operations have evolved and their status by the end of the Cold War period. It also puts into perspective for the student what peacekeeping operations are capable of accomplishing, and what their limitations are. Finally, the lesson evaluates the accomplishments of United Nations peacekeeping missions during its first 40 years of existence, which encompassed the Cold War years. The evaluation is given both with a critical eye and with a kind eye, with a view to pointing out to the student both what has been accomplished by UN peace forces and what yet remains to be done.

List the basic principles of UN peacekeeping missions; Know what types of peacekeeping operations exist; State the overall budget of the UN organisation as compared to that of UN peacekeeping missions; Define the balance of nuclear terror; Describe the strengths and weaknesses of UN peacekeeping operations; Identify the general criticisms of UN peacekeeping missions; and Understand the effect of the Cold War, as well as the end of the Cold War, on the evolution of peacekeeping in the United Nations.
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11.1
Summary
As observed in Lesson 1, the concept of peacekeeping was not mentioned in the original UN Charter. It evolved at the start of the Cold War because the UNs original collective security proposals became unworkable as a result of the increasing mistrust and disagreement between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Types of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Peacekeeping operations, as they have evolved, may be summarised as follows. Depending on the tasks involved, UN peacekeeping operations may take two forms: (a) Military observer missions; or, (b) The larger peacekeeping force. The Basic Principles of Peacekeeping Operations In either form, the principles followed are the same. UN peacekeeping operations must be authorised by the Security Council and, in some exceptional cases, by the General Assembly. In either case, the Secretary-General always directs their day-to-day activities. Peacekeeping missions are based on consent and can be set up only with the consent of the main parties concerned. This principle of consent also applies to the troop-contributing countries, which voluntarily supply the required military personnel. The two other major principles of peacekeeping are impartiality and the non-use of force. United Nations military observers are normally unarmed, and, when the soldiers of UN peacekeeping forces are provided with light defensive weapons, they are not authorised to use them except in selfdefence. UN peacekeepers must act with impartiality and restraint at all times. They seek to carry out their mission by negotiation and persuasion rather than through coercion. The Basic Weaknesses of Peacekeeping Operations At the time of their creation, Walter Lippman, one of Americas great journalists, said that UN peacekeeping operations were based on a new, bold, and sublime concept, the concept of the soldier of peace, sent to an area of conflict not to wage war but to promote peace, not to fight enemies but to help friends. This is a most appealing concept, but in application it exhibits some problems. Lacking enforcement powers, UN peacekeeping operations have certain basic weaknesses. (a) First, they cannot be set up without the consent of the parties concerned and the acquiescence of the major powers. (b) Second, even when a peacekeeping operation has been set up, it can function effectively only with the co-operation of all the parties. Generally, the required co-operation is available because UN peacekeeping operations deal with international conflicts involving governments
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willing to consent to such an operation. There are, however, exceptions. A complex conflict may involve not only governments but also internal factions and liberation movements. Or, a peace process may be hopelessly deadlocked, at which point some of the parties involved may be unable or unwilling to give the UN the co-operation it needs.
11.2
Evaluating the Performance of UN Peacekeeping During the Cold War
The development of UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War had many ups and downs. Peacekeeping operations were plagued by several major crises. Yet each time, peacekeeping operations showed great resilience and a remarkable ability to overcome temporary setbacks and to adapt to changing political circumstances. Despite many difficulties and obstacles, they became one of the most valuable peace instruments of the United Nations. Indeed, by 1989 the expenses for UN peacekeeping operations approached that of the UNs regular budget (in the ensuing years, the peacekeeping budget would actually exceed the regular budget). However, the performance and impact of UN peacekeeping operations should not be measured in funds expended, nor assessed through the enumeration of specific activities. Rather, they should be viewed in the larger context of their impact on the maintenance of international peace and security. During the Cold War years, the performance of UN peacekeeping operations often depended on the attitudes of the two superpowers, which, unfortunately, Through resolution 242, the Security Council were not always positive. Their rivalry often prevented affirms the establishment of peace in the Middle 22 November 1967. the Security Council from taking firm action to contain or East. New York, UN/DPI/Y. Nagata) (Source: 101873 resolve conflicts. As a more serious repercussion, many regional conflicts were actively fuelled or even fomented by one or the other of the superpowers. However, their rivalry was tempered by what came to be known as the balance of the nuclear terror. Both superpowers knew that with the awesome nuclear weapons they possessed in equivalent quality and quantity, a direct military confrontation between them would have incalculable consequences. Consequently, when a regional conflict escalated beyond control and threatened to drag them into a direct confrontation, they took action to avoid it, often by using the UN peacekeeping mechanism. Thus, a number of UN peacekeeping operations were set up during the Cold War with the support of the two superpowers (or at least their acquiescence) in order to contain potentially dangerous conflicts. It may be said that the attempt to maintain the balance of the nuclear terror, supplemented by the UN peacekeeping mechanism, produced a sort of negative stability during the Cold War. There
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were many regional conflicts and many local wars. However, all wars remained localised and a general war was avoided, which would inevitably have entailed a direct confrontation between the two superpowers (and possibly a nuclear holocaust and the end of the civilised world). UN peacekeeping operations were not the main factor of this negative stability but nevertheless played a crucial role.
11.3
General Criticisms of Peacekeeping
There have been claims of hypocrisy on the part of some states in regards to UN peacekeeping. Countries like the U.S. had been reticent to commit their armed forces to UN peacekeeping operations due to an unwillingness to have their national forces under foreign command, while other states have been accused of using peacekeeping for their own goals. Some have been accused of trying to increase their international power or prestige. For instance, Canada, in part to differentiate itself from its American neighbour, has created a national mythology of its importance in peacekeeping, when in fact the empirical data proves otherwise. It has been argued that Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden, who are all major arms suppliers, have participated in peacekeeping operations while at the same time selling weapons in the same regions. Some states, the U.S. having been the main voice, complained that for them to participate in UN operations their soldiers had to have immunity from the International Criminal Court. Other critics have claimed that peacekeeping is a form of neo-colonialism by using the UN Charter as a means to justify intervention throughout the globe. On the other hand, many military establishments felt that peacekeeping during the Cold War had a detrimental effect on their units war-fighting capabilities. In turn, it has been found that peacekeeping can be extremely stressful, and many militaries have observed higher rates of mental problems, suicide, and substance abuse among peacekeepers. Many military doctrines of the time saw peacekeeping and war fighting as two distinct activities. Moreover, some have argued that due to the diverse cultures and religions of UN peacekeeping forces, inherent cultural biases and incompatibilities existed. Contingent capabilities and equipment also varied in addition to the fact that Naval and Air Force units had to adapt to mainly ground-based missions. There is the obvious argument that Cold War peacekeeping did not, in fact, resolve conflicts but instead created an unstable status quo. As of 2005, UNTSO has continued since May 1948, UNMOGIP since January 1949, UNFICYP since March 1964, UNDOF since June 1974, and UNIFIL since March 1978. It should be kept in mind that these missions were never designed to create a permanent solution, but rather the stabilisation of a volatile Cold War situation.
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim visits Norwegian peacekeepers with UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, 18 April 1978. (Source: 137818 c UN/DPI Photo/J. Isaac)
174
11.4
Conclusion
For the most part, Cold War peacekeeping was interpositional in nature. It was designed to reduce or even stop hostilities by separating the combatants and monitoring and maintaining ceasefires. The process in the early stages was an ad hoc approach and clearly was designed to stop Cold War superpower rivalries from going hot. Peacekeeping during the Cold War was not designed to use internationally-sanctioned force, nor was it created to settle disputes or induce observation of international norms or rebuild shattered societies. In fact, Member States of the UN rarely agreed on such ideals or objectives, and in many cases the major Member States, especially the permanent five of the Security Council, were unable or unwilling to commit troops. Thus, the UN became reliant on small, neutral, or poor non-aligned nations for troop contributions, which resulted, for the most part, in the UN being unable to deploy adequately equipped, trained, and integrated forces during this period. However, even with these problems, the UN was able to surmount many of them and developed peacekeeping as an alternative to war. In short, peacekeeping during the Cold War era was not a perfect instrument, but it did prove its utility in maintaining peace for some 40 years. This fact was recognised by the Nobel Committee in 1988 when it awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to UN peacekeepers.
Peacekeeping Fatalities by Year, 1948-1989*
Source: UNDPKO
Year 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Total 8 3 5 0 0 1 0 0 2 16 17 10 43 156 46 35 22 18 20 22 7
Running Total 8 11 16 16 16 17 17 17 19 35 52 62 105 261 307 342 364 382 402 424 431
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Total 6 8 9 6 14 41 17 14 17 28 30 20 30 26 11 14 16 27 17 11 33
Running Total 437 445 454 460 474 515 532 546 563 591 621 641 671 697 708 722 738 765 782 793 826
* does not include Korean War
175
1.
Which of the following is a form of a PKO in the context of the Cold War? A. Armed interventions; B. Military Observer Missions; C. Aid operations only; D. Chapter V Operations.
2.
Which one of the following is one of the major principles of peacekeeping? A. War fighting when required; B. Non-neutrality; C. Non-consent; D. Impartiality
3.
Because PKOs lack enforcement powers, UN peacekeeping operations have certain basic weaknesses, such as: A. They cannot be set up without the consent of the parties concerned; B. They lack robust military capabilities; C. They can be manipulated by the whims of the SC; D. They can be forced to act when provoked.
4.
Although peacekeeping operations were plagued by several major crises, each time they showed: A. An inability to adapt to changing circumstances; B. A tendency to suffer from mission creep, as mandates kept being changed; C. A great resilience and a remarkable ability to overcome temporary setbacks and to adapt themselves to changing political circumstances; D. An ability to become far less expensive than anticipated.
5.
By 1989, the expenses for UN peacekeeping operations approached what? A. The expenses of the Security Council; B. The expenses of the UNs regular budget; C. The expenses of the General Assembly; D. The expenses of all UN aid agencies combined.
176
6.
During the Cold War years, the performance of UN peacekeeping operations often depended on: A. The attitudes of the two superpowers; B. The attitudes of the Permanent Members of the Security Council; C. The attitude of the Secretary-General; D. The attitudes of the Member States that contributed forces to a mission.
7.
It may be said that the attempt to maintain the balance of the nuclear terror, supplemented by the UN peacekeeping mechanism, produced what? A. Global peace and security during the Cold War; B. Major conflicts between the superpowers; C. A sort of negative stability during the Cold War; D. Massive social unrest that led to constant war.
8.
With the U.S. acting as the main voice, what did some states complain about in regards to participating in UN operations? A. Their soldiers had to have immunity from the International Criminal Court. B. Their soldiers were not obligated to do anything their contingent commander felt was not appropriate. C. They felt since they were paying UN assessments, why did they need to send their troops. D. They were a waste of time.
9.
Which of the following Cold War peacekeeping missions was still ongoing as of 2006? A. UNEF I B. UNTEA C. ONUC D. UNFICYP
10. For the most part, Cold War peacekeeping was: A. Neutral at all times; B. Confrontational; C. Interpositional in nature; D. One-sided and confrontational.
ANSWER KEY: 1B, 2D, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7C, 8A, 9D, 10C
177
Appendix A / List of Acronyms
178
APPENDIX A: LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym ABAKO ADL ANC AO AOR APC CBM CIVPOL COS DCC DMZ FC FMR GA HQ IAPF ICC ICJ ICRC IDF ILMAC IMSMA LNA LOC MAC MACC MFO MFR MIB MNC MNF NATO NCO NGO OAS ODD Meaning Association des Bakongo Armistice Demarcation Line Arme Nationale Congolaise Area of Operation Area of Responsibility Armoured Personnel Carrier Confidence-Building Measure Civilian Police Chief of Staff Demining Coordination Cell Demilitarised Zone Force Commander Force Mobile Reserve General Assembly Headquarters Inter-American Peace Force International Criminal Court International Court of Justice International Committee of the Red Cross Israeli Defence Forces Israeli-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission Information Management System for Mine Action Lebanese National Army Line of Control Mixed Armistice Commission Mine Action Coordination Centre Multinational Force and Observers Mobile Force Reserve Military Information Branch Mouvement National Congolais Multinational Force North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Commissioned Officer Non-Governmental Organisation Organisation of American States Observer Group Damascus
Appendix A / List of Acronyms
179
Acronym OGB OGE OGG OGL OGSC OP PFLP-GC PFR PKO PLO POW SBA SC SG SLA SOFA SRSG TCC UMHK UNCI UNCIP UNDP UNDPKO UNGOC UNHCR UNHQ UNICEF UNLOB UNLOCA UNMO UNSCOP UXO
Meaning Observer Group Beirut Observer Group Egypt Observer Group Golan Observer Group Lebanon Observer Group Sinai-Cairo Observation Post Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command Permanent Force Reserve Peacekeeping Operation Palestinian Liberation Organisation Prisoner of War Sovereign Base Area Security Council Secretary-General South Lebanon Army Status of Force Agreement Special Representative of the Secretary-General Troop-Contributing Country Union Minire du Haut Katanga UN Commission for Indonesia UN Commission for India and Pakistan UN Development Programme UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations UN Good Offices Commission UN High Commissioner for Refugees UN Headquarters UN Childrens Fund UN Liaison Office in Beirut UN Liasion Office in Cairo UN Military Observer UN Special Committee on Palestine Unexploded Ordinance
Appendix B / List of Peacekeeping Operations
180
APPENDIX B: LIST OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

DOMREP MINUGUA MINURCA MINURSO* MINUSTAH* MIPONUH MONUA MONUC* ONUB* ONUC ONUCA ONUMOZ ONUSAL UNAMA* UNAMIC UNAMIR UNAMSIL UNASOG UNAVEM UNCRO UNDOF* UNEF UNFICYP* UNGOMAP UNIFIL* UNIIMOG UNIKOM UNIOSIL* UNIPOM UNMEE* UNMIBH UNMIH UNMIK* UNMIL* UNMIS* UNMISET UNMOGIP* UNMOP UNMOT UNOCI* Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti United Nations Observer Mission in Angola United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo United Nations Operation in Burundi United Nations Operation in the Congo United Nations Observer Group in Central America United Nations Operation in Mozambique United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador United Nations Mission in Afghanistan United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group United Nations Angola Verification Mission United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation United Nations Disengagement Observer Force United Nations Emergency Force United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Mission in Haiti United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in the Sudan United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan United Nations Operation in Cte dIvoire
Appendix B / List of Peacekeeping Operations
181
UNOGIL UNOMIG* UNOMIL UNOMSIL UNOMUR UNOSOM UNOTIL* UNPREDEP UNPROFOR UNPSG UNSF UNSMIH UNTAC UNTAES UNTAET UNTAG UNTMIH UNTSO* UNYOM
United Nations Observation Group In Lebanon United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations Office in Timor-Leste United Nations Preventive Deployment Force United Nations Protection Force United Nations Civilian Police Support Group United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) United Nations Support Mission in Haiti United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor United Nations Transition Assistance Group United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
* Ongoing operations, as of June 2006.
For more information on these operations, visit UNDPKOs website at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp.
Appendix C / Mission Data
182
APPENDIX C: MISSION DATA

Note: This appendix provides mission data for the operations discussed in this course. The information was compiled from UNDPKOs website, and the maps and other images can be found through the UN website.
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

MANDATE: UNTSO was established in May 1948 to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine. Since then, UNTSO has performed various tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council, including the supervision of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 and the observation of the ceasefire in the Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights following the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. At present, UNTSO assists and co-operates with UNDOF on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector, and UNIFIL in the Israel-Lebanon sector. UNTSO is also present in the Egypt-Israel sector in the Sinai. LOCATION: DURATION: Middle East May 1948 to present
HEADQUARTERS: Government House, Jerusalem CHIEF OF STAFF: Brigadier General Clive Lilley (New Zealand) STRENGTH: 154 UNMOs, supported by 99 international civilian personnel and 120 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and United States FATALITIES: 18 military personnel 14 military observers 8 international staff 4 local civilian staff 44 total FINANCING: Method of financing: United Nations regular budget Appropriations for 2006: $14.66 million
UNTSO MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon has a UN blue background with two narrow white stripes, the colours of the UN. Six months service is the eligibility period for service with UNTSO. Information current as of 30 April 2006
183 UNTSO Deployment as of July 1997
184
First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)

MANDATE: UNEF I, the first Untied Nations peacekeeping force, was established by the first emergency special session of the General Assembly which was held from 1 to 10 November 1956. The mandate of the Force was to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire. UNEF was withdrawn in May-June 1967, at Egypts request. LOCATION: First, the Suez Canal sector and the Sinai peninsula. Later, along the Armistice Demarcation Line in the Gaza area and the international frontier in the Sinai peninsula (on the Egyptian side) November 1956 - June 1967 Nov. 1956 Dec. 1959 Dec. 1959 Jan. 1964 Jan. 1964 Aug. 1964 Aug. 1964 Jan. 1965 Jan. 1965 Jan. 1966 Jan. 1966 June 1967
HEADQUARTERS: Gaza DURATION: FORCE COMMANDERS: Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns (Canada) Lieutenant-General P. S. Gyani (India) Major-General Carlos F. Paiva Chaves (Brazil) Colonel Lazar Musicki (Yugoslavia) (Acting) Major-General Syseno Sarmento (Brazil) Major-General Indar J. Rikhye (India)
STRENGTH: Maximum, Feb. 1957: 6,073 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal, June 1967: 3,378 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia FATALITIES: 109 military personnel 1 local staff 110 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Expenditures: $214.2 million* [*The financial cost was considerably reduced by the absorption by the countries providing contingents of varying amounts of the expenses involved]
UNEF MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon has a background of a sand or buff colour symbolising the Sinai with a wide centre band of UN blue. Two thin lines in dark blue and green appear at either end of the ribbon, the blue representing the Suez Canal, and the green, the Nile Valley. Ninety days of service in the Mission was necessary to qualify for award of the medal.
185 UNEF I Deployments as of August 1957
186
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

MANDATE: ONUC was established by Security Council resolution 143 (1960) of 14 July 1960, to provide the Government of Congo with military and technical assistance, to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Republic of the Congo, and to assist the Government in maintaining law and order. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified by 1961 to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal from the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United Nations Command, and all mercenaries. LOCATION: DURATION: Republic of the Congo July 1960 to June 1964 July-Aug 1960 Aug-Sept 1960 Sept 1960-May 1961 Mar-May 1961 May 1961-Jan 1962 Feb 1962-May 1963 May 1963-Apr 1964 Apr-Jun 1964 July-Dec 1960 Jan 1961-Mar 1962 Apr 1962-July 1963 Aug-Dec 1963 Jan-June 1964
HEADQUARTERS: Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) SRSGs: Ralph J. Bunche (United States) Andrew W. Cordier (United States) Rajeshwar Dayal (India) Mekki Abbas (Sudan) (Acting) OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE: Sture Linner (Sweden) Robert K.A. Gardiner (Ghana) Max H. Dorsinville (Haiti) Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall (Mexico) FORCE COMMANDERS: Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn (Sweden) Lieutenant-General Sean MacEoin (Ireland) Lieutenant-General Kebbede Guebre (Ethiopia) Major-General Christian Kaldager (Norway) Major-General Aguiyu Ironsi (Nigeria)
STRENGTH: Maximum, July 1961: 19,828 all ranks, supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff At withdrawal, 30 December 1963: 5,871 all ranks, supported by international civilian and locally recruited staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaya, Federation of Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. [From February 1963 to the end of the operation, a battalion of the Congolese National Army was incorporated in ONUC] FATALITIES: 245 military personnel 5 international civilian staff 250 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account. Expenditures: $400.1 million
187
ONUC MEDALS/RIBBONS: Originally, the medal awarded for service in the Congo was a UN blue and white ribbon with a bar indicating Congo service (top). In 1963 it was decided that a distinctive ribbon should be issued (bottom). The ribbon subsequently awarded carries a broad centre band of green, symbolic of hope, which was thought to be appropriate for a young nation, and also to represent the Congo Basin. Two narrow white bands, representing the UN Mission, flank the centre band and at either end are two bars of UN blue. To qualify for the medal three months of service in the Mission were required.
ONUC Deployments as of June 1961
188
Untied Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)

MANDATE: The agreement signed Indonesia and the Netherlands on 15 August 1962, provided for the administration of West New Guinea (West Irian) to be transferred by the Netherlands to a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), to be headed by a United Nations Administrator. The agreement also stipulated that the Secretary-General would provide a United Nations Security Force (UNSF) to assist UNTEA with as many troops as the United Nations Administrator deemed necessary. In related understandings to the main agreement, it was established that United Nations personnel would observe the implementation of the ceasefire that was to become effective before UNTEA assumed authority LOCATION: DURATION: West New Guinea (West Irian) October 1962 - April 1963
HEADQUARTERS: Hollandia (now Jayaphra) FORCE COMMANDER: Major-General Said Uddin Khan (Pakistan) STRENGTH (maximum and at withdrawal): 1,500 infantry personnel and 76 aircraft personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Pakistan, Canada (RCAF) and United States (USAF) [From 18 August to 21 September 1962, prior to the establishment of UNSF, the Secretary-Generals Military Adviser, and a group of 21 military observers assisted in the implementation of the agreement of 15 August 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands on cessation of hostilities. The military observers were provided by Brazil, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Nigeria and Sweden] FATALITIES: None FINANCING: The Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands paid full costs of the operation in equal amounts
UNTEA/UNSF MEDAL/RIBBON: The medal ribbon has a background of UN blue with three centred narrow stripes in the colours dark green, white and light green. The dark green represents the jungle and the swampland, white indicates the snow-capped mountains and pale green represents the coral beaches of the region.
189
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)

MANDATE: UNYOM was established on 11 June 1963 by Security Council resolution 179 (1963), to observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. The mandate of UNYOM stemmed from the disengagement agreement entered into by the three Governments concerned, namely, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic and the Arab Republic of Yemen, set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 29 April 1963. The function and authority of UNYOM as defined in the agreement were considerably more limited than in the case of other United Nations observation missions. Its establishment was not based on any ceasefire agreement and there was no ceasefire to supervise. The tasks of UNYOM were limited strictly to observing, certifying and reporting in connection with the intention of Saudi Arabia to end activities in support of the royalists in Yemen and the intention of Egypt to withdraw its troops from that country. The mandate of UNYOM ended on 4 September 1964 and its personnel and equipment were withdrawn. LOCATION: DURATION: Yemen July 1963 - September 1964 November 1963 - September 1964
HEADQUARTERS: Sanaa SRSG / HEAD OF MISSION: Pier P. Spinelli (Italy)
COMMANDERS: Lieutenant-General Carl C. von Horn (Sweden) July August 1963 Colonel Branko Pavlovic (Yugoslavia) (Acting) August - September 1963 Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani (India) September - November 1963 CHIEFS OF STAFF: Colonel Branko Pavlovic (Yugoslavia) Colonel S.C. Sabharwal (India) November 1963 November 1963 September 1964
STRENGTH: Maximum: 189 military personnel, including 25 military observers, 114 officers and other ranks of reconnaissance unit, 50 officers and other ranks of air unit; supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal: 25 military observers and supporting air unit; supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ghana, India, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia FATALITIES: None FINANCING: Method of financing: Contributions from Saudi Arabia and Egypt in equal parts Expenditures: $1.8 million
UNYOM MEDAL/RIBBON: The centre of the ribbon is a wide bar filled with varying shades of brown indicating the dry and rugged mountainous mass in Yemen, while the lighter shades represent the desert. The centre is flanked by two stripes of UN blue. Sixty days of service were required to qualify for the award of the medal.
190 UNYOM Mission Map
191
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)

MANDATE: DOMREP was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 203 (1965) of 14 May 1965. Its functions were to observe the situation in the Dominican Republic and to report to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security Council, on breaches of the ceasefire called by the Council or any events, which might effect the maintenance of peace and order in the country. LOCATION: HEADQUARTERS: DURATION: Dominican Republic Santo Domingo May 1965 - October 1966
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: Jos Antonio Mayobre (Venezuela) MILITARY ADVISER: Major-General Indar J. Rikhye (India) STRENGTH: 2 military observers at any one time CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY OBSERVERS: Brazil, Canada and Ecuador FATALITIES: None FINANCING: Method of financing: Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget Expenditures: $275,831
192
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)

MANDATE: UNOGIL was set up by Security Council resolution 128 (1958) of 11 June 1958, which decided to dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders. The role of UNOGIL was strictly limited to observation. It was not UNOGILs task to mediate, arbitrate or forcefully to prohibit illegal infiltration, although it was hoped that its very presence on the borders would deter any such traffic. LOCATION: DURATION: Lebanese-Syrian border areas and vicinity of zones held by opposing forces June - December 1958
HEADQUARTERS: Beirut MEMBERS OF OBSERVATION GROUP: Galo Plaza Lasso (Ecuador) Chairman Rajeshwar Dayal (India) Member Major-General Odd Bull (Norway) Executive member in charge of UNMOs STRENGTH: Maximum, November 1958: 591 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal: 375 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Afghanistan, Argentina, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal and Thailand FATALITIES: None FINANCING: Method of financing: Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget Expenditures: $3.7 million
UNOGIL MEDAL/RIBBON: This is the same medal/ribbon used by UNTSO.
193 UNOGIL Mission Map
194
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

MANDATE: The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed in January 1949 to supervise, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the ceasefire between India and Pakistan. Following the 1972 India-Pakistan agreement defining a Line of Control in Kashmir, India took the position that the mandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed. Pakistan, however, did not accept this position. Given that disagreement, the Secretary-Generals position has been that UNMOGIP can be terminated only by a decision of the Security Council. In the absence of such a decision, UNMOGIP has been maintained with the same mandate and functions. LOCATION: DURTION: The ceasefire line between India and Pakistan in the State of Jammu and Kashmir January 1949 to present
HEADQUARTERS: Rawalpindi (November-April) / Srinagar (May-October) CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER: Major-General Dragutin Repinc (Croatia) STRENGTH: 43 military observers, supported by 22 international civilian personnel and 45 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Sweden, and Uruguay FATALITIES: 5 military personnel 1 military observers 2 international civilian staff 3 local staff 11 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Six-month appropriation for 2006: $3.87 million (gross)
UNMOGIP MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon bears a wide central band in various shades of green to represent the Himalayan Range and the Kashmir Valley, flanked by narrow white stripes representing the snow-capped mountains. Two equal bars of UN blue appear at either end of the ribbon. Eligibility for the award of the medal is earned following six months of service in the Mission.
Information current as of 30 April 2006
195 UNMOGIP Positions as of 2005
196
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)

MANDATE: UNIPOM was established in accordance with Security Council resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965, to supervise the ceasefire along the India-Pakistan border except in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, where the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) operated, and the withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965. After the withdrawal of the troops by India and Pakistan had been completed on schedule, UNIPOM was terminated. LOCATION: DURATION: Along the India-Pakistan border between Kashmir and the Arabian Sea September 1965 - March 1966
HEADQUARTERS: Lahore (Pakistan) / Amritsar (India) CHIEF OFFICER: Major-General B.F. Macdonald (Canada) STRENGTH: Maximum deployment, October 1965: 96 military observers, supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal: 78 military observers, supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: In its initial stage (seconded from UNTSO and UNMOGIP): Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden September 1965 - March 1966: Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria and Venezuela FATALITIES: None FINANCING: Method of financing: Appropriations through the United Nations regular budget Expenditures: $1.7 million
197
Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)

MANDATE: UNEF II was established on 25 October 1973 with the mandate to supervise the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), which demanded that an immediate and complete ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces be observed and that the parties return to the positions they had occupied at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973. The Force would use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and in the fulfilment of its tasks it would have the cooperation of the military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). UNEF II was also to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its humanitarian endeavours in the area. These terms of reference, which were approved by the Security Council on 27 October 1973 (resolution 341), remained unchanged during UNEFs entire mandate, but within this general framework the activities of the Force varied considerably over the years in the light of prevailing circumstances and of the agreements reached between the parties. Following the conclusion of the agreements of 18 January 1974 and 4 September 1975, UNEF II was to supervise the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under those agreements. LOCATION: DURATION: Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai peninsula October 1973-July 1979 October 1973-August 1975 August 1975-November 1976 December 1976-September 1979
HEADQUARTERS: Cairo (October 1973-August 1974) & Ismailia (August 1974-July 1979) FORCE COMMANDERS: Lieutenant-General Ensio P. H. Siilasvuo (Finland) Lieutenant-General Bengt Liljestrand (Sweden) Major-General Rais Abin (Indonesia)
STRENGTH: Maximum, February 1974: 6,973 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff At withdrawal, July 1979: 4,031 military personnel, supported by international and local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal and Sweden FATALITIES: 49 military personnel 2 international civilian staff 51 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Expenditures: $446.5 million
UNEF II MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon bears a wide central band of a sand or buff colour symbolising the Sinai Desert with two narrow dark blue lines through the middle, representing the Suez Canal. Two wide bars of UN blue appear at either end. Eligibility period was 90 days of service in the Mission.
198 UNEF II Mission Map
199
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

MANDATE: UNDOF was established by Security Council resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974 to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria, to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation, as provided in the Agreement on Disengagement. The mandate of UNDOF has since been renewed every six months. The current mandate expires on 31 December 2006, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1685 (2006) of 13 June 2006. In recommending the extension of the mandate, the Secretary-General observed, as on previous occasions, that, despite the present quiet in the Israeli-Syrian sector, the situation in the Middle East was very tense and was likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem was reached. In the prevailing circumstances, he considered the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. LOCATION: DURATION: Syrian Golan Heights May 1974 to present
HEADQUARTERS: Camp Faouar FORCE COMMANDER: Lieutenant-General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal) STRENGTH: 1,033 troops, assisted by some 57 military observers of UNTSOs Observer Group Golan; and supported by 33 international civilian personnel and 107 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Austria, Canada, India, Japan, Nepal, Poland, Slovak Republic FATALITIES: 41 military personnel 1 international civilian staff 42 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Approved budget: 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $43.71 million (gross)
UNDOF MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon contains a central stripe of UN blue with a red line down the middle representing the UN patrolled Area of Separation; two narrow stripes of black, representing the volcanic rock of the Golan region appear on either side with two narrow bands of white, symbolic of the snow on Mt. Hermon, outside these. At either end are wide bands of burgundy, symbolising the purple haze at sunset and the native thistles of the Golan. Ninety days service is the qualifying time for award of the medal.
200 UNDOF Mission Map
201
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

MANDATE: UNFICYP was established through Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, with the mandate to prevent a recurrence of fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. UNFICYP became operational on 27 March 1964. Following the hostilities of 1974, the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions expanding the mandate of UNFICYP to include supervising a de facto ceasefire, which came into effect on 16 August 1974, and maintaining a buffer zone between the lines of the Cyprus National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces. In the absence of a political settlement to the Cyprus problem, UNFICYP continues its presence on the island. The Security Council most recently extended the mandate of the Force until 15 December 2006 by its resolution 1687 adopted on 15 June 2006. LOCATION: DURATION: Cyprus March 1964 to present
HEADQUARTERS: Nicosia SRSG / CHIEF OF MISSION: Michael Mller (Denmark) FORCE COMMANDER: Major General Rafael Jos Barni (Argentina) STRENGTH: 928 total uniformed personnel, including 859 troops and 69 civilian police; supported by 33 international civilian personnel and 108 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: Argentina*, Austria, Canada, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom [*The Argentinean contingent included soldiers from Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay] CONTRIBUTORS OF CIVILIAN POLICE PERSONNEL: Argentina, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, El Salvador, India, Italy, Ireland, and Netherlands FATALITIES: 167 military personnel 3 civilian police 4 international civilian staff 2 local civilian personnel 176 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Approved budget: 1 July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $46.51 million (gross), including voluntary contributions of one-third share from Cyprus and $6.5 million from Greece
UNFICYP MEDAL/RIBBON: The medal has three equal bars, one of white in the centre and two of UN blue at either end. The bars are separated by two narrow bands of dark blue symbolising the Mediterranean Sea. Qualifying time for the medal is three months of service in the Mission. Information current as of 30 April 2006
202 UNFICYP Deployment as of May 2006
203
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

MANDATE: According to Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, UNIFIL was established to: confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon; restore international peace and security; and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. Most recently the mandate of UNIFIL was extended until 31 July 2006 by Security Council resolution 1655 (2006) of 31 January 2006. LOCATION: DURATION: Southern Lebanon March 1978 to present
HEADQUARTERS: Naqoura FORCE COMMANDER / CHIEF OF MISSION: Major-General Alain Pellegrini (France) STRENGTH: 1,991 troops, assisted by some 50 military observers of UNTSO; and supported by 95 international civilian personnel and 295 local civilian staff CONTRIBUTORS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL: China, France, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, and Poland FATALITIES: 249 troops 2 military observers 2 international civilian staff 4 local staff 257 total FINANCING: Method of financing: Assessments in respect of a Special Account Approved budget: July 2005 - 30 June 2006: $99.23 million (gross)
UNIFIL MEDAL/RIBBON: The ribbon bears three equal bands of UN colour: blue, green and UN blue. The bands are separated by two equal sized white stripes, each bisected by a narrow red line. The colours represent the UN and Lebanese flags. The qualifying period of service to earn the medal is 90 days of service in the Mission.
204 UNIFIL Deployment as of 2006
End-of-Course Examination Instructions
205

The End-of-Course Examination is provided as a separate component of this course.
The examination questions cover the material in all the lessons of this course.
Read each question carefully and follow the provided instructions to submit your exam for scoring.
206
INFORMATION ABOUT THE END-OF-COURSE EXAMINATION
Format of Questions The End-of-Course Examination consists of 50 questions. Exam questions generally give you a choice of answers, marked as A, B, C, or D. You may choose only one response as the correct answer.
Time Limit to Complete the End-of-Course Examination Because your enrolment in the course is valid for one year only, the examination must be submitted before your enrolment expires.
Passing Grade A score of 75% is the minimum score required for a passing grade. You will be presented with an electronic Certificate of Completion when you pass your exam. If your score is less than 75%, you will be informed that you have received a failing grade. You will be provided with an alternate version of the End-of-Course Examination, which you may complete when you feel you are ready. If you pass the second version of the examination, you will be presented with an electronic Certificate of Completion. If you fail the second time, you will be informed and dis-enrolled from the course.
TO VIEW OR SUBMIT YOUR EXAMINATION, PLEASE VISIT THE WEBSITE FOR YOUR TRAINING PROGRAMME.
IF YOU ARE UNSURE OF YOUR PROGRAMMES WEBSITE, VISIT HTTP://WWW.PEACEOPSTRAINING.ORG/JOIN.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

PROFESSOR SUNIL V. RAM
Originally from the UK, Prof. Ram resides in Toronto, Canada. He presently teaches Military History and Land Warfare to the U.S. Armed Forces at American Military University, in West Virginia. He is also the Contributing Editor of SITREP, the private defence journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute. He has served in the Canadian Forces (CF) as both a soldier and officer between 1980 and 1999. Prof. Ram is also one of Canadas acknowledged experts in the fields of peacekeeping, military affairs, and the Middle East. He has over a decade worth of experience as a military advisor with the Saudi Royal Family, including involvement in the 1991 Gulf War and the Yemeni conflict in the 1990s. Prof. Ram has won a number of awards over the years, including the UN Global Citizen Award, which was presented to him in 1995 by the UN, the UNAC, and the Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the UN for the furthering of world peace through public awareness of peacekeeping. He is an active member of a number of prestigious Canadian think tanks and organisations, the most important being The Royal Canadian Military Institute, where he sits on the Defence Studies Committee. Prof. Ram has also published and presented numerous articles and books over the years and has contributed occasional columns on military affairs for Canadas national newspaper, the Globe and Mail. Prof. Ram has also dedicated his time to a number of private, non-NGO supported development projects in Africa that have directly helped local populations in numerous ways. These include work in the DRC and Somalia.
F.T. Liu
Mr. F. T. Liu was a graduate of the Institute of Political Science of Paris and the faculty of Sciences (mathematics) of the University of Paris. He joined the United Nations Secretariat at the beginning of 1949, where he worked for 37 years until December 1986. During most of this period, he was assigned to the Office of Special Political Affairs, where he played an important role in the organisation and development of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In addition to his regular assignments at United Nations Headquarters, he took part in many United Nations peacekeeping and political missions overseas, particularly in the 1960s. From 1970 to 1986, Mr. Liu worked mainly at UN Headquarters. As Director, and later Assistant Secretary-General, for Special Political Affairs, he assisted the Secretary-General in managing and supervising UN peacekeeping operations and related peacekeeping missions. Following his retirement from the United Nations, Mr. Liu taught as a visiting professor at the University of Nice in France. Throughout the final years of his life, F.T. Liu remained active through his writing, teaching, and association with the International Peace Academy, of which he acted as Senior Advisor. In 2001, he died in New York at the age of 81.
HistoryDuring 090625

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History 1

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History 1

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Peace Operations Training Institute

2008 Peace Operations Training Institute

Peace Operations Training Institute

3.10 3.11 3.12

UN YEMEN OBSERVER MISSION (UNYOM)

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (DOMREP)

LESSON 7 UNOGIL AND UNMOGIP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91

UN MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (UNMOGIP)

LESSON 8 UNEF II AND UNDOF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107

DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF)

9.8 9.9 9.10 9.11 9.12 9.13

END-OF-COURSE EXAMINATION INSTRUCTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

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LESSON 1 THE GENESIS OF PEACEKEEPING

Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping

Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping

Genesis of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping

UN Collective Security System

Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping

The Korean Crisis and Its Aftermath

Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping

Increasing the Role of the General Assembly

Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Chain of Command

Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA)

Field Operations Division (FOD)

Chief of Staff (COS)

Civilian Administrative Officer (CAO)

Operations Branch (OPS)

Aministration & Personnel Branch (A&P)

Logistics Branch (LOG)

Civilian Administrative Staff

Infantry Battalions Military Observers

Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping

LESSON 1 END-OF-LESSON QUIZ

Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping

Lesson 1 / The Genesis of Peacekeeping

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LESSON 2 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict

The First UN Military Observer Mission

Background on the First UN Peacekeeping Operation

Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Major Contribution of Ralph Bunche

Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Responsibilities of the Parties Involved

The Second Truce

Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict

Lesson 2 / The Arab-Israeli Conflict

17 Truce Supervision System

Chief of Staff advice Central Truce Supervision Board

Regional Truce Supervision Board Arab Armies

Regional Truce Supervision Board Israeli Armies

Regional Truce Supervision Board

Regional Truce Supervision Board

Regional Truce Supervision Board

Regional Truce Supervision Board

Coast & Ports UNMO Group

Convoys UNMO Group (Tel Aviv & Jerusalem)

Jerusalem UNMO Group

Airports UNMO Group