At Consult CP

SDI 2010 Consult Aff
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Consult CP Aff SDI 2010 BBHS

Consult CP Aff SDI 2010 BBHS..........................................................................................................................1
Consult CP Aff SDI 2010 BBHS.............................................................................................1 *** Consult General 2AC***........................................................................................................6

2AC Consult CP Perms............................................................................................................................................7
2AC Consult CP Perms..............................................................................................................7

2AC Consult CP Theory..........................................................................................................................................8
2AC Consult CP Theory.............................................................................................................8

2AC Consult CP Heg DA........................................................................................................................................9
2AC Consult CP Heg DA...........................................................................................................9

2AC Consult CP Say No Generic.......................................................................................................................10
2AC Consult CP Say No Generic.........................................................................................10 ***Consult Perms***..................................................................................................................11

Lie Perm AT: Leaks..............................................................................................................................................12
Lie Perm AT: Leaks.................................................................................................................12

Lie Perm Leaks Good............................................................................................................................................13
Lie Perm Leaks Good...............................................................................................................13

Lie Perm AT: Lies Immoral..................................................................................................................................14
Lie Perm AT: Lies Immoral....................................................................................................14 ***Generic Consult DAs***......................................................................................................15

2AC Consult CP Constitution DA.........................................................................................................................16
2AC Consult CP Constitution DA...........................................................................................16

1AR Consult CP Constitution DA Links...............................................................................................................17
1AR Consult CP Constitution DA Links................................................................................17

2AC Consult CP Democracy DA...........................................................................................................................18
2AC Consult CP Democracy DA.............................................................................................18

2AC Consult CP Solvency Deficit Commitment................................................................................................19
2AC Consult CP Solvency Deficit Commitment.................................................................19

2AC Consult CP Solvency Deficit Commitment................................................................................................20
2AC Consult CP Solvency Deficit Commitment.................................................................20

2AC Consult CP Politics Links Unpopular.........................................................................................................21
2AC Consult CP Politics Links Unpopular.........................................................................21

2AC Consult CP Politics Links GOP Backlash..................................................................................................22
2AC Consult CP Politics Links GOP Backlash...................................................................22

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2AC Consult CP Politics Links Political Capital................................................................................................23
2AC Consult CP Politics Links Political Capital................................................................23 ***Consult Australia***.............................................................................................................24

2AC Consult Australia Consult Hurts Relations....................................................................................................25
2AC Consult Australia Consult Hurts Relations...................................................................25

2AC Consult Australia Relations Resilient............................................................................................................26
2AC Consult Australia Relations Resilient.............................................................................26

2AC Consult Australia Consult Now.....................................................................................................................27
2AC Consult Australia Consult Now......................................................................................27

1AR Consult Australia Consult Hurts Relations....................................................................................................28
1AR Consult Australia Consult Hurts Relations...................................................................28

1AR Consult Australia Consult Now.....................................................................................................................29
1AR Consult Australia Consult Now......................................................................................29

1AR Consult Australia Relations Resilient............................................................................................................30
1AR Consult Australia Relations Resilient.............................................................................30

1AR Consult Australia Relations Resilient............................................................................................................31
1AR Consult Australia Relations Resilient.............................................................................31 ***Consult Brazil***...................................................................................................................32

2AC Consult Brazil Consult Hurts Relations........................................................................................................33
2AC Consult Brazil Consult Hurts Relations.........................................................................33

2AC Consult Brazil Relations Resilient.................................................................................................................34
2AC Consult Brazil Relations Resilient..................................................................................34 ***Consult Egypt***...................................................................................................................35

2AC Consult Egypt Delay......................................................................................................................................36
2AC Consult Egypt Delay........................................................................................................36

2AC Consult Egypt Relations Resilience..............................................................................................................37
2AC Consult Egypt Relations Resilience................................................................................37 ***Consult EU***........................................................................................................................38

2AC Consult EU Consult Now EU.....................................................................................................................39
2AC Consult EU Consult Now EU.......................................................................................39

2AC Consult EU Heg DA......................................................................................................................................40
2AC Consult EU Heg DA.........................................................................................................40

2AC Consult EU Relations DA.............................................................................................................................41
2AC Consult EU Relations DA................................................................................................41

2AC Consult EU No Impact..................................................................................................................................42 2
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2AC Consult EU No Impact.....................................................................................................42

2AC Consult EU Delay..........................................................................................................................................43
2AC Consult EU Delay.............................................................................................................43

1AR Consult EU Delay..........................................................................................................................................44
1AR Consult EU Delay.............................................................................................................44 ***Consult Japan***...................................................................................................................45

2AC Consult Japan Delay......................................................................................................................................46
2AC Consult Japan Delay........................................................................................................46

2AC Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient............................................................................................47
2AC Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient............................................................47

2AC Consult Japan No Impact Empirically Denied...........................................................................................48
2AC Consult Japan No Impact Empirically Denied...........................................................48

2AC Consult Japan Consult Bad Hurts Alliance................................................................................................49
2AC Consult Japan Consult Bad Hurts Alliance................................................................49

2AC Consult Japan Air Power DA........................................................................................................................50
2AC Consult Japan Air Power DA..........................................................................................50



2AC Consult Japan Russia/China DA...................................................................................................................53
2AC Consult Japan Russia/China DA....................................................................................53

1AR Consult Japan Say No/Delay.........................................................................................................................54
1AR Consult Japan Say No/Delay...........................................................................................54

1AR Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient............................................................................................55
1AR Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient............................................................55

1AR Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient............................................................................................56
1AR Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient............................................................56

1AR Consult Japan SQ..........................................................................................................................................57
1AR Consult Japan SQ.............................................................................................................57

1AR Consult Japan SQ Solves...............................................................................................................................58
1AR Consult Japan SQ Solves.................................................................................................58

1AR Consult Japan Delay......................................................................................................................................59
1AR Consult Japan Delay........................................................................................................59

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Air Power High...........................................................................................60 3
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1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Air Power High..........................................................60

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Air Power High...........................................................................................61



1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA War.............................................................................................................64
1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA War..............................................................................64

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Deterrence...................................................................................................65
1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Deterrence...................................................................65

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA US-Russia Relations...................................................................................66
1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA US-Russia Relations...................................................66

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Prolif...........................................................................................................67
1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Prolif............................................................................67

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Heg..............................................................................................................68
1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Heg...............................................................................68 ***Consult NATO***..................................................................................................................69

2AC Consult NATO Generic.................................................................................................................................70
2AC Consult NATO Generic...................................................................................................70

2AC Consult NATO Delay....................................................................................................................................71
2AC Consult NATO Delay.......................................................................................................71

2AC Consult NATO Consult Now........................................................................................................................72
2AC Consult NATO Consult Now...........................................................................................72

2AC Consult NATO Heg DA................................................................................................................................73
2AC Consult NATO Heg DA...................................................................................................73

1AR Consult NATO SQ Solves/Delay..................................................................................................................74
1AR Consult NATO SQ Solves/Delay.....................................................................................74

1AR Consult NATO Say No Article 4................................................................................................................75
1AR Consult NATO Say No Article 4..................................................................................75

1AR Consult NATO Say No Rubber Stamp.......................................................................................................76
1AR Consult NATO Say No Rubber Stamp.......................................................................76

1AR Consult NATO Say No Turkey..................................................................................................................77
1AR Consult NATO Say No Turkey....................................................................................77

1AR Consult NATO Say No NATO = Unanimous............................................................................................78 4
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1AR Consult NATO Say No NATO = Unanimous.............................................................78

1AR Consult NATO Delay....................................................................................................................................79
1AR Consult NATO Delay.......................................................................................................79 ***Consult South Korea***.......................................................................................................80

2AC Consult South Korea Consult Now...............................................................................................................81
2AC Consult South Korea Consult Now.................................................................................81

1AR Consult South Korea Consult Now...............................................................................................................82
1AR Consult South Korea Consult Now.................................................................................82 ***Consult Turkey***.................................................................................................................83

2AC Consult Turkey Lie Perm..............................................................................................................................84
2AC Consult Turkey Lie Perm................................................................................................84

2AC Consult Turkey Say No.................................................................................................................................85
2AC Consult Turkey Say No....................................................................................................85

2AC Consult Turkey Delay....................................................................................................................................86
2AC Consult Turkey Delay......................................................................................................86

2AC Consult Turkey Normal Means.....................................................................................................................87
2AC Consult Turkey Normal Means......................................................................................87

2AC Consult Turkey US-Turkey Relations Resilient............................................................................................88
2AC Consult Turkey US-Turkey Relations Resilient............................................................88

1AR Consult Turkey Normal Means.....................................................................................................................89
1AR Consult Turkey Normal Means......................................................................................89
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*** Consult General 2AC***
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2AC Consult CP Perms

( ) Perm Do both. ( ) Perm Do the CP its plan plus. ( ) Perm Consult (_____________) as per the counterplan and do the plan no matter what. ( ) Perm Do the plan and consult (_____________).
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2AC Consult CP Theory

( ) They should lose for reading a consult CP its unfair and not competitive. a) Fairness they can concede say no to win a link to their DA, which forces the aff to read DAs to themselves. b) Infinitely Regressive Justifies consulting 194 countries and is plan plus legitimizes counterplans like delay or conditioning the plan on space c) Education Consult is a generic shortcut to avoid talking about the aff other counterplans and reading the net-benefit as a DA solve neg fairness and education.
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2AC Consult CP Heg DA

Consultation destroys heg Jamie Carroll, ed. Emory Intl L.R., JD Emory, 2009, Back to the Future, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, ln
n221. See Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., 9/11 is Over, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 2007, 4, at 12. This does not mean, however, that foreign countries should hold a veto over U.S. foreign or domestic policies, particularly policies that are not directly related to their national survival. Allowing foreign countries or international institutions to veto or modify unrelated U.S. policies would make a mockery of our foreign policy and destroy the credibility of American leadership. International cooperation does not require making our policy subservient to the whims of other nations. See generally The Allies and Arms Control (F.O. Hampson et al. eds., 1992). See also Khalilzad, supra note 177.
Leadership is essential to prevent global nuclear exchange Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous
advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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2AC Consult CP Say No Generic

( ) Consultation doesnt solve relations and other countries say no Richard N. Haass, Sydney Stein Chair in Intl Sec. @ Brookings, 1999, What to do with American Primacy?
usembassymalaysia.org.my/lrc/dd/What%20to%20Do%20With%20American%20Primacy%20--%20Richard %20N_%20Haass.htm Still, consultations aloneeven consultations buttressed by incentiveswill not bring about consensus in every area. Persuasion has its limits. The major powers may not agree on general rules; even when they do, they may not agree on how to apply them in a particular situation. In such circumstances, it makes little sense for the United States to work in vain for the emergence of international consensus, guaranteeing only inaction or a lowest common denominator and hence ineffective foreign policy.
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***Consult Perms***
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Lie Perm AT: Leaks

Lie perm solves the net-benefit despite leaks unilateralism is forgiven when we put up the front of consultation Mike Moore, Labour Party Leader, PM New Z., Dir. Gen. WTO, 2-6-2003, AFR, p ln
Multilateralism does not weaken the nation state, it strengthens it. The nation state is the main actor and always will be. Governments are, in the main, accountable and replaceable, and only governments can implement agreements. Critics correctly point out the inadequacies of the system. Some talk of global government, which is utopian and dangerous. Theres a great difference between global governance and global government. The UN Security Council is a good idea, but sadly too often it is immobilized by national interests. For some, multilateralism is about cornering the US, Europe or Japan to extract a concession. Its good that nation building is coming back into fashion. Wars can be won; its the peace that worries many. Serious people are trying the multilateral road. As Joseph Nye of the Kennedy School of Government commented, in his book The Paradox of American Power, (Oxford University Press), if the US first makes an effort to consult others and tries a multilateral approach, its occasional unilateral tactics are more likely to be forgiven. Even a superpower should follow the rule of thumb and try multilateralism first.
( ) No leaks Obama administration is hardcore at keeping information secret when it wants to AP, 4-19-2009, Obama Breaks Promise on Government Secrecy, Newsmax,
http://www.newsmax.com/headlines/obama_secrets/2009/04/19/204634.html Despite a pledge to open government, the Obama administration has endorsed a Bush-era decision to keep secret key details of an FBI computer database that allows agents and analysts to search a billion documents with a wealth of personal information about Americans and foreigners. President Barack Obama's Justice Department quietly told a federal court in Washington last week that it would not secondguess the previous administration's decisions to withhold some information about the bureau's Investigative Data Warehouse. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital rights advocacy group, had sued under the Freedom of Information Act to get records showing how the FBI protects the privacy of Americans whose personal information winds up in the vast database. As a result, there is no public list of all the databases the FBI sucks into this computer warehouse; no information on how individuals can correct errors about them in this FBI database; and no public access to assessments the bureau did of the warehouse's impact on Americans' privacy. "In light of all the fanfare at the highest levels of the administration about a new transparency policy, it's remarkable that not one word of additional material has been released as a result of that new policy," said David Sobel, the foundation's lawyer in the case. The administration's handling of the decision fit a pattern that emerged this month: Highly visible announcements when Obama breaks with Bush policy in order to open hidden government files, but an almost stealthy rollout of decisions when Obama endorses secrecy.
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Lie Perm Leaks Good

( ) Leaks boost relations comparative evidence Briad Toohey, Walkley award winning journalist, former ed. National Times, 5-23-1999, Sun Herald (Sydney), p
ln Presumably, it did not think much of the documents or it would have offered to buy them rather than hand Wispelacre on a plate to the FBI as reported. If it had bought the documents, this might have had the beneficial effect of leading to better informed decisions which reduced tensions in the region. But it is impossible to tell without knowing what was in the documents and how they would be interpreted. Leaked intelligence information in the past has sometimes acted as a stabilizing influence, reducing unfounded fears about a potential enemy. In a similar vein, as part of their arms control negotiations, the US and the former Soviet Union agreed not to encrypt data transmitted during missile tests. By ensuring easy access to the content of the signal, each side had less cause to wrongly suspect the other.
( ) Leaks are strategic, and only help US position Brahma Chellaney, Prof sec. studies @ Center for Pol. Res. In New Delhi, 6-13-1997, IHT
Intelligence leaks to newspapers, and release of classified information in official testimony to congressional panels, can be a useful tool of U.S. nonproliferation diplomacy. Such methods have been particularly effective against India. They usually put the Indian government on the defensive, and often help dissuade it from going ahead with moves that would openly challenge American efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The latest such intelligence leak, published recently in The Washington Post, put the international spotlight on India's tactical Prithvi missile, which seeks to counter short-range missiles supplied by China to Pakistan. The Post, citing U.S. officials, reported that India had moved ''a handful'' of medium-range Prithvis to a prospective launching site in the state of Punjab near the border with Pakistan. The disclosure was embarrassing for India, which does not admit to deploying a single missile system, despite flight-testing several different kinds in the past decade. India tested a nuclear explosive device 23 years ago, but it has not conducted any further tests. U.S. pressure has been an important deterrent. Twice in the last 18 months India came close to carrying out another nuclear test, only to retreat at the eleventh hour. The second such move had to be aborted because of the expected fall of the then Indian government, but the first was halted in late 1995 because of an American newspaper expose relying on U.S. intelligence sources.
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Lie Perm AT: Lies Immoral

( ) No impact and non-unique tons of lies happen all the time ( ) Perm isnt a lie the negotiators dont know about fiat, so they dont know the USFG will do the plan anyway. ( ) Lying is not immoral this functions as an impact turn George Herbert Mead, Philosophy and Social Psychologist, 1936, Philosopher of the Revolution
spartan.ac.brocku.ca/~lward/Mead/pubs2/movement/Mead_1936_02.html Kant did not succeed in that. He did not succeed even with reference to lying. There are many situations in which lying is not immoral. Sometimes it is highly moral, as in the typical case of the man who deceives an assassin trying to murder someone. We talk about morality in warfare, and, of course, warfare is a game in which you have to deceive your enemy. The general, the military strategist, succeeds by deceiving his enemy. And then we have the whole list of white lies that we always tell -- cases where. we feel we are justified in deceiving a person who insists on knowing something he has no right to know, where we give a reason which is good but which is not the real reason, in order to save somebody's feelings. There are all grades between the whiteness of truth and the blackness of lying. It is not possible to draw a hard and fast line between (29) them. If everyone insisted on telling the truth all the time, society itself would perhaps become impossible. When Kant tried to work out other matters on the principle of the categorical imperative, such as the case of a man who wants to commit suicide in order to relieve himself from suffering from a disease and his friends from the care they will have to give him, or the case of the man who is too lazy to work although he has competence, I think the principle broke down pretty definitely.
( ) Consequentialism key < Insert >
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***Generic Consult DAs***
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2AC Consult CP Constitution DA

Constitution DA -A. Counterplan violates the constitution James R. Edwards Jr, is an adjunct fellow with the Hudson Institute, 9-4-02, Washington Times, p. ln
In other words, Congress would lose much of its constitutional ability to check the executive branch. And foreign governments, unelected supranational bodies and bureaucrats would be free to dictate to Americans what our laws are. The courts have consistently upheld the right of Congress to determine who to admit, exclude and expel and on what basis. This is a right of sovereignty. And exercising this right belongs to Congress alone among its plenary powers. To pawn off this exclusive congressional power to the executive branch or foreign entities would upset the constitutional balance. It would give noncitizens of the United States the ability to dictate our own laws, even if the Senate had never ratified a related treaty.
B. Must reject constitutional violations Levinson, 2000 (Daryl J., Associate Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. University of Chicago Law
Review- Spring) Extending a majority rule analysis of optimal deterrence to constitutional torts requires some explanation, for we do not usually think of violations of constitutional rights in terms of cost-benefit analysis and efficiency. Quite the opposite, constitutional rights are most commonly conceived as deontological side-constraints that trump even utility-maximizing government action. n69 Alternatively, constitutional rights might be understood as serving rule-utilitarian purposes. If the disutility to victims of constitutional violations often exceeds the social benefits derived from the rights-violating activity, or if rights violations create longterm costs that outweigh short-term social benefits, then constitutional rights can be justified as tending to maximize global utility, even though this requires local utility-decreasing steps. Both the deontological and rule-utilitarian descriptions imply that the optimal level of constitutional violations is zero; that is, society would be better off, by whatever measure, if constitutional rights were never violated.
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1AR Consult CP Constitution DA Links

( ) CP Violates sovereignty and the constitution James R. Edwards, adjunct fellow @ Hudson, 9-4-2002, Homeland Security, Wash. Times, p ln
The immigration provisions in the bill risk sovereignty and undermine the Constitution. "Immigration law" would be newly defined to include much, much more than immigration law. It would now include executive orders, regulations and the like, as well as unratified international agreements. In other words, Congress would lose much of its constitutional ability to check the executive branch. And foreign governments, unelected supranational bodies and bureaucrats would be free to dictate to Americans what our laws are. The courts have consistently upheld the right of Congress to determine who to admit, exclude and expel and on what basis. This is a right of sovereignty. And exercising this right belongs to Congress alone among its plenary powers. To pawn off this exclusive congressional power to the executive branch or foreign entities would upset the constitutional balance. It would give noncitizens of the United States the ability to dictate our own laws, even if the Senate had never ratified a related treaty.
( ) Granting another country a veto over US policy is unconstitutional Brett D. Schaefer, fellow Intl Reg. Affairs @ Heritage, 9-15-2002, Columbia Daily Trib, US Doesnt Need,
http://www.showmenews.com/2002/Sep/20020915Comm009.asp Permission granted. America does not need U.N. permission to use its armed forces. Under the Constitution, the authority to determine when its appropriate for the United States to invoke and exercise its right to use military force in its own defense is vested in the president, as commander in chief of the armed forces, and in Congress, which has authority to raise and support armies and to declare war. No treaty, including the U.N. charter, can redistribute this authority or give an international organization a veto over U.S. actions otherwise lawful and fully in accordance with the Constitution.
( ) CP violates sovereignty Lee McKenzie, 2004, Is US Sovereignty,

http://www.prohibitionists.org/Background/Party_Platform/sovereignty/body_sovereignty.html, accessed 11-11 By placing United States lands under the direction and control of foreign entities, the United States has agreed to limit our sovereign power to manage our own lands. Americans who live in areas adjacent to Biosphere reserves are being deprived of their rights of property. The Clinton Administration's designation of Yellowstone Park as a World Heritage Site "in danger" has already been used to shut down a gold mine near (not even in) Yellowstone. Currently the Park Service is choking off the local economy by refusing to maintain certain highways and by buying up any property available. Of course, there will be plenty available as more and more owners are denied the use of their own private property which causes businesses to shut down and the economy to show. The UN/UNESCO representatives have made no secret of their goals. Their next step is their Wildlands Project, a plan to designate one half of the United States as "protected areas or areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve biological diversity." Inside Yellowstone, the Park Service is shutting down campgrounds as the park is being prepared to become the core of a huge biosphere reserve, as part of the United Nations global plan. Once established, no human activity will be permitted in the area.
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2AC Consult CP Democracy DA

( ) CP hurts democracyunaccountable policymakers are acting instead of representative democracy John Hulsman, research fellow in Euro. Affairs @ Heritage and Greg Schmitt, Heritage Euro Affairs, 7-212001, Washington Times
The treaty would infringe on the sovereignty of the national court system and give more power to a supranational organization that has no democratic claim over U.S. citizens, and is thus politically unaccountable. Obviously, such a system undermines the legitimacy of the U.S. Constitution and the rights of each citizen.
( ) US democracy key to the global model Scott Langley, Instructor P.E.A.K., NetLeaf Corp & BS Oregon State U, Fall 1993, Daily Barometer
With the Cold War over, we no longer feel an obligation to lead. But there is no nation or group of nations willing to take our place or that shares the same optimism that have about achieving a world of peaceful, democratic nations. Other nations will follow our lead, but they are not willing to do it without our leadership witness Bosnia and the decline of the operation in Somalia. It doesnt seem fair that the promotion of democracy around the world should rest upon our shoulders. But I believe that if we are not willing to take the lead or at least help develop the UN into an organization capable of tackling difficult peacekeeping tasks, the peace will not be kept outside of the increasingly narrowly defined sphere of US national interests. World affairs will become more of a survival of the fittest struggle, where the strong dominate the weak. That is why I believe this attitude of Why should we have to do it? towards helping the UN will only result in a more cruel and indifferent world that I do not wish to see. The world needs our moral and political leadership.
( ) Democracy key to check inevitable extinction Larry Diamond, Sen. Research Fellow @ Hoover, 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, p. 6-7
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful internationalist crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly-corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
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( ) Consult makes it look like were not totally committed to the plan Tobias Harris, Editor of Concord Bridge, 5-20-2003, Gulliver Unbound, Concord Bridge,
http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbmag/Articles/2003%20May/Gulliver%20unbound-%20May%202003.pdf
As the Bush administration made its final preparations for war following the failure to secure a new Security Council resolution, Senate minority leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) issued a repartee typical of much of the flak received during the lead-in to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Im saddened, he said, saddened that this president failed so miserably at diplomacy that were now forced to war. This view, often repeated by various members of the Democratic Party, the New York Times editorial page, the European press and the various foreign policy experts in Ho llywood, is reflective of an attitude towards the exercise of power that achieved unprecedented prominence in the wake of the cold war. During the cold war, it was acknowledged both within the American foreign policy establishment and among Americas allies that American power was the bulwark of the Free World. The United States secured the sphere of liberal democracies from Soviet aggression, allowing for a stable trading system and the peaceful mediation of disputes by a host of international organizations, while resisting communism elsewhere in the world, whether by dispatching its military or providing aid along the lines of the Truman or Reagan doctrines. With the end of the Eastern Bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, many intellectua ls on both sides of the Atlantic came to regard power as superfluous. The real challenges were soft challenges, challenges like global warming, international financial crises, trade liberalization and the spread of AIDS which necessitated multilateral cooperation in international fora. Even security issues such as the break- up of Yugoslavia and the
containment of Iraq were seen as the concern of the international community; the rest of the world deserved the right to adjudicate on the appropriate course of action, although the United States would be bearing the brunt of the responsibility. The Clinton administration acquiesced to demands for multilateralism at the dawn of the unipolar moment, advocating assertive multilateralism that would seek a consensus on the use of force. Thus at a time of unprecedented American power, America embraced a foreign policy that, while not actually altering power disparities, called for Americas submission to the international community. In the immediate postcold war world,
the United States could afford the luxury of a foreign policy not driven by national interest. Democratization and liberalization, its major foreign policy aims, could be achieved adequately through multilateral institutions. September 11th raised the stakes of multilateralism considerably. The disparate but related problems of Islamist terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among rogue states could no longer be handled with the kid gloves of the Clinton administration. Urgency demanded the mailed fist. And as the Bush administration acquired new faith in the many possibilities inherent in American power, the multilateralists of the 1990s recoiled in horror. Gulliver was snapping the multilateral bonds he had so graciously accepted during more pacific times. Lilliputians saw the need to restrain him become more pressing as the Bush administration signaled its intention to destroy the regime of Saddam Hussein in order to remove a major rogue state while simultaneously enforcing a long string of UN Security Council resolutions. Despite the emergence of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis of Lilliputians, the United States launched an attack without UN sanction but with a multitude of allies (the coalition of the willing), quickly reaching Baghdad and destroying the Hussein regime, with the war in its mopping- up phase at the time of this writing. The Iraq incident marks a clear departure in international politics from post-cold war to post-post-cold war, with the United States restoring national interest to its proper place as the key motivator of American foreign policy. America has reached the limits of unipolar multilateralism, and indeed stands at the crossroads of the unipolar moment. If the Bush administration and hawks in the Democratic Party unite to acknowledge the inadequacies of multilateralism in providing for American security, and institutionalize a long-term foreign policy based on the robust use of American power to alter the international security environment in Americas favor, the United States can extend the unipolar moment into a unipolar era lasting well into the foreseeable future. As the 2002 National Security Strategy declares, We will maintain the forces sufficient to support our obligations, and to defend freedom. Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. Before downgrading multilateralism as an element of American foreign policy, however, it is necessary to assess both its possibilities and drawbacks for the United States. Multilateralism is applicable in a variety of policy areas, including but not limited to security affairs, the environment, trade and international finance. The much-maligned WTO, with its predecessor GATT, is perhaps the worlds most successful multilateral body, as WTO/GATT has succeeded in lowering industrial tariffs, and, since the creation of the WTOs Dispute Settlement Body, providing legal recourse for the victims of unilaterally- imposed discriminatory trade practices. America participates fully in these organizations and, contrary to the claims of environmentalists, is party to a variety of multilateral environmental agreements and was the major instigator of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Multilateralism clearly contains unmitigated benefits for the United States in these realms, as it allows America to reap the many gains associated with institutionalization, including lower transaction costs and more certain guarantees that promised actions will be performed. Multilateralism becomes more problematic in the security realm, when lesser powers demand
that the United States considers and accedes to their demands when pondering the use of force to achieve a desired outcome. A considerable part of the problem is technical. Due to post-cold war defense budgets that far
exceeded those of the rest of the world, especially in research and development, which is currently roughly 85% of the worlds total, the United States enjoys an unassailable advantage in military technology, from various fighting platforms to the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) technology that allow American units to dominate the
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battlefield. Accordingly, security multilateralism is increasingly asymmetrical, with the United States forced to respect the input of nations that do not even possess the technology that would allow them to share the battlefield with the United States military. At what
point does asymmetrical multilateralism cease being multilateral and become the mediocre acting to restrain the supremely capable? Beyond the gross inequality of capabilities, however, lies the political challenge of security
multilateralism. During the 1990s, the use of force, even multilateral force, became increasingly unpopular in the international community. International efforts were organized, but for more limited objectives than during the cold war. International security initiatives in the Balkans, for example, were purely reactive. Rather than clearly identifying the threat posed by Slobodan Milosevic and acting decisively to eliminate that threat, the international community dithered, and when it did act in Bosnia and Kosovo, it merely sought to bring Milosevic back to the negotiating table. The Iraq crisis shows how deep-seated the aversion to power is within the international community. Various governments and their citizenries, despite being presented with a vast array of evidence of Iraqi proliferative activities in violation of more than a dozen UN Security Council resolutions issued since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, adamantly opposed any use of force in response to Husseins recalcitrance. The most extreme case was Germany, which unilaterally declared that it would not support the use of force against Iraq even if sanctioned by the United Nations. The protests that crowded the streets of the worlds major cities demonstrated the extent to which the international community has come to disdain the use of force in international relations. There are several possible explanations as to why force (or hard power) has become so objectionable to international opinion. Among these explanations is the development of an international norm against the aggressive use of force; a reply based on the impotency of much of the world in the face of Americas overwhelming military superiority; and anti-Americanism that has accompanied the unipolar moment, signifying that opposition is more to the American unilateral use of force rather than to any use of force per se. Reality probably lies somewhere in the midst of these options. Clearly the rise of legalized institutions within the Free World since the end of World War II has delegitimized the use of force, as nations have come to view institutions as more capable of resolving international disputes than force-of-arms. Force has become bte noire especially among the nations of Europe, who, through the European Union, have seen the supposed bounty of institutionalized multilateral cooperation. To them, force is the bluntest tool in the foreign policy toolbox, often causing more problems than it solves. Engagement and discussion are seen as softer tools that ensure an equitable outcome for those involved, forestalling war and its attendant train of miseries, including civilian casualties, refugee flows and economic disruption. The international community and many Americans view the associated costs of war as far outweighing any benefits of military action, and thus nations must go to great length to avoid international conflict. In short, multilateralism is Europeanism writ large, as pointed out by Robert Kagan in Of Paradise and Power. It is consensus-driven because, after all, consensus means no one loses. But consensus precludes the possibility of firm moral positions, as decisions reflect the lowest-common denominator among actors. American foreign policy has long had a moralistic strain that seeks to improve the world, by force if necessary. Decisions are not made between two relatively equivalent choices but between what is right and wrong. Thus unless
America can convince the international community to accept the virtues of its moral stances, multilateralism necessarily entails moral equivocation and watereddown positions.
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( ) Consultation is massively unpopular accountability Edward Luck, Dir. Center on Intl Organization and Inst. And prof @ Intl and Pub. Affairs Columbia, 2002,
Multilat. And U.S. Foreign Policy, Ambivalent Engagement, ed. Stewart Patrick, p. 52-3 Legitimacy, like power, requires accountability. As Ian Hurd has noted, Any institution that is accepted as legitimate stands in a position of authority over states and thus exercises power. But, he asks, if international institutions can be authoritative, how do we make them accountable? Most Americans view accountability through the lens of their own domestic model. In a democratic society, those to whom the citizens delegate power are expected to exercise it in a manner that is as transparent as possible and that permits sufficient oversight by the people and/or their elected representatives. Officials of the executive branch must be able to defend their policies, practices, and use of public monies before Congress and the court of public opinion. Independent and aggressive media, an active civil society, an engaged political opposition, and an inherent public skepticism about the wisdom and efficiency of big government combine to reinforce the constitutional assumption that power and legitimacy flow from the people to the government and not vice versa. These conditions, of course, cannot be fully replicated in global interstate organizations, where the prime constituents are governments rather than individuals, transparency is limited, a wide spectrum of political cultures is represented, and even parliamentarians lack a formal place at the table. When many agencies and countries are involved in an undertaking, whether it be poverty elimination or peacekeeping, it is unclear who should be held accountable for mistakes, miscalculations, and failures. When everyone is responsible, too often it appears that no one is responsible. Reflecting a common criticism, Jeremy Rabkin charges that UN agencies seek an authority that is somehow above government, without the accountability that actual governments have toward particular electorates or defined citizen bodies. Therefore, in his view transnational NGOsa sort of phantom citizenryare the perfect partners for the phantom authority exercised by UN agencies. Those calling for greater accountability and transparency in international institutions are a pluralistic lot. For instance, the antiinstitutional agenda of the antiglobalization movement has attracted supporters from both the right and the left ends of the political spectrum, leaving the center to defend the legitimacy of multilateral accords and agencies. Patrick Buchanan and Ralph Nader alike have voiced shrill attacks on allegedly anonymous and unaccountable international bureaucratic and intellectual elites, contending that working-class Americans have suffered disproportionately from the machinations of transnational elites and yet have no political avenues open to them for seeking redress or a change in global policymaking.
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GOP would hate the counterplan Stewart Patrick, Res. Assoc. Center on Intl Coop @ NYU, Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy, 2002,
Ambivalent Engagement, p. 20 During the 1990s, Clinton administration officials often called congressional critics of its multilateral initiatives isolationists. This was largely a mischaracterization, for internationalists dominate both parties in Congress. Where these internationalists disagree is over how selective U.S. engagement and responsibilities should be and, in particular, whether the United States should rely on and defer to international organizations, accepting some constraints on its sovereignty and freedom of action in return for the benefits of multilateral cooperation. As a broad generalization, Republicans in Congress, among elites, and in the wider public tend to be more sensitive to these constraints than Democrats, and thus more prepared to act alone in the national interest. However, attitudes toward multilateralism do not break cleanly along partisan lines. Both parties are often internally divided about its trade-offs. And in certain matters such as trade Republicans are arguably the more multilateral party. Any president hoping to sustain multilateral cooperation must adapt to the new era of congressional assertiveness, seeking to persuade legislators that globalization makes constructive U.S. engagement imperative. He or she will need to articulate a persuasive rationale for multilateralism, be commited to continual consultation with Congress, and mobilize important domestic constituencies behind constructive internationalism. In this vein, broadly speaking, U.S. elites might by divided into four different orientations, according to their support or rejection of multilateralism and unilateralism, as depicted in Figure 1.3. These groups include liberal internationalists, who consistently advocate multilateral approaches; hard-line conservative internationalists, who are open to either strategy depending on the circumstances; and a small minority of isolationists (either conservative or liberal), who reject either form of engagement.
Conservatives like unilateral approach Patrick 2001 (Stewartresearch associate at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University,
and a 2001-02 international affairs fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, World Policy Journal, Sept. 22) The epithet unilateralism has been much in vogue during the first year of the Bush administration. During the presidents June trip to Europe, transatlantic commentators discerned an American penchant for going it alone on issues from global warming to missile defense. Liberal internationalists have bemoaned this alleged tendency and warned of an inevitable backlash. Conservatives hve welcomed it as a declaration of diplomatic independence.
GOP would backlash if US gave veto authority to another entity Patrick 2001 (Stewartresearch associate at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University,
and a 2001-02 international affairs fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, World Policy Journal, Sept. 22) Unlike in Europe, where political leaders and publics have come to terms with some erosion and pooling of national sovereignty, Americans tend to regard sovereignty as a precious substance to be jealously guarded. This makes them suspicious of attempts to bind the United States to formal organizations and legal rules that may lack domestic standards of transparency and accountability, usurp the authority of its elected representatives, or open the country to external scrutiny. Voices from across the political spectrum have called for vigorous defense of the countrys national sovereignty and domestic values against the encroachments of distant and unaccountable multilateral institutions. In autumn 1999, a largely left-wing coalition of activists took to the streets of Seattle to protest the alleged complicity of the WTO as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fun, in driving down global labor and environmental standards. Some activists sought the abolition of multilateral organizations, others sweeping reform to incorporate social concerns in global economic regimes. Meanwhile, many conservatives, and libertarians, alarmed at the growing legalization of multilateral rules, insist that the United States, not cede its law-making authority to an unelected global bureaucracy.
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( ) Consultation drains political capitalcauses GOP backlash Patrick 2001 (Stewartresearch associate at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University,
and a 2001-02 international affairs fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, World Policy Journal, Sept. 22) The administration, for its part, disavows the label, advancing the more comforting leadership and underlining its commitment to consultations with foreign partners. As President Bush told the press at the NATO summit, Unilateralists dont come around the table to listen to others Unilateralists dont ask opinions of world leaders. (1) Yet skepticism about multilateral cooperation runs deep within this administration. A common Republican attack during the 2000 presidential campaign was that the Clinton administration (and by extension Al Gore) had made a fetish of multilateralism. Condoleeza Rice, now national security advisor, chided Democrats for subordinating U.S. national interests to the interests of an illusory international community and for clinging to the belief that the support of many states or even better, institutions like the United Nationsis essential to the legitimate exercise of power. Republicans, in contrast, understood that multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves. During its first year in office, the new Bush administration has moved to implement this foreign policy philosophy, walking away from a number of international treaties and commitments.
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***Consult Australia***
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Strong ties to the US cause Australian public backlash that harms US credibility and relations Raymond Bonner reported for The New York Times and Donald Greenlees for the International Herald Tribune, March 29 2005 Tuesday Australians view U.S. as a threat to peace; America lags behind Japan and China
in popularity, poll finds Lexis U.S. foreign policy poses as big a threat to world peace as Islamic fundamentalism, while the rise of China is the last on a list of potential threats, according to a survey released Monday of public opinion in Australia, one of Washington's closest allies in the Asia-Pacific. The results of the comprehensive survey of opinion in a country that has been a close and valued ally of the United States in the war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq have surprised foreign policy analysts in Australia and underscore the problems facing the Bush administration as it tries to improve the international image of the United States. The survey the most comprehensive ever conducted on public opinion in Australia on international relations shows that America trails far behind China and Japan in public popularity. Although 84 percent of Australians had positive views of Japan and 69 percent expressed positive views of China, only 58 percent felt the same way about the United States. The 53-year-old U.S.-Australia alliance, or Anzus, is one of Washington's strategic anchors in the Pacific. But the ambivalence of popular opinion in Australia toward the United States shows the difficulty ahead in an administration project in public perceptions. In March, President George W. Bush tapped a longtime confidante and former White House counselor, Karen Hughes, for the job of transforming America's image in the Arab world. The results of the Australian survey suggest that the problem facing the new under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs goes well beyond the Middle East; even close allies might need some attention. While Australia, a predominantly Christian, Anglo-Saxon country, has a lot of cultural affinities with the United States, analysts say the historically close relationship, which has seen Australians alongside American soldiers in Korea, Vietnam and the two Gulf wars, has become a harder sell during the Bush presidency. "There is quite a big disconnect between how the world views Bush and how the Americans view Bush," says Don Russell, Australia's ambassador to Washington between 1993 and 1995. "If you did a similar poll during the Clinton years," he said, "you would get a cyclical high, and now you have a cyclical low." The findings of the opinion poll, commissioned by the Lowy Institute, a research institute with a generally center-right orientation, suggest that one of the main reasons for the lack of popularity of America in Australia is the perceived influence that Washington exercises over Australian foreign policy. The poll found that more than twothirds of respondents felt "we take too much notice of the views of the United States." The Lowy Institute says it modeled the poll on the work of the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations and the Pew Research Institute. It was based on interviews with 1,000 Australians and had a 3.1 percent margin of error. The results can be found at: www.lowyinstitute.org.
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U.S.-Australian relations are resilientmutually beneficial and deeply fortified Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs and Director of the Asian Studies Centre at The
Heritage Foundation, and was former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Office of US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from 2001-2002, August 17, 2005 Australia and the U.S.: Regional and Global Partners The Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed081105d.cfm Despite unprecedented levels of cooperation, some will argue that the current honeymoon in American and Australian relations will wane. This is sure to be the case, especially as our respective governments change from liberal to conservativeand back again. It is a certainty that they are not always going to be in synch on all issues. The issue of trade comes immediately to mind. But a relationship based on shared values has a greater chance of weathering the tough times than one that is based on an incidental overlap of interests. This is the case with the US-Australian relationship. The US-Australia alliance is firmly anchored in our shared values of personal freedom, democracy and free markets. And the alliance is much more than the bravery and courage exhibited by American and Australian forces in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq. It is mutually beneficial relationship, fortified by vibrant people to people contact and friendship. Matching Americas size with Australian grit and determination benefits both countries. The United States and Australia are not just regional partnersthey are global partners, sharing global responsibilities for making the world a better and more secure place for themselves and others. Based on mutual respect and understanding, it is an alliance that is sure to endure well into the 21st century.
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Rudd consults with the US now over Asia-Pacific Community Ross Peake, National Affairs Writer for the Canberra Times, June 6 2008, Libs slam Rudd's 'presumptuous'
regional proposal Lexis Forming an Asia-Pacific Community could reduce the risk of wars in the region, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd said yesterday. But the Opposition said his ambitious plan was presumptuous and a stunt. Mr Rudd revealed on Wednesday that he wanted the new regional body to be in place by 2020, spanning the entire Asia-Pacific, including the United States, Japan, China, India and Indonesia. It would be modelled on the European Union but would not involve a common currency. "It's a big idea, it will be controversial," Mr Rudd said. "Some people will not necessarily support it, but what I'm trying to do is to move the agenda forward so that we reduce the risk of conflict in the future and enhance the possibility of acting together on prosperity and environmental sustainability. "Remember that the region is currently host to a whole range of unresolved territorial conflicts the Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula, Kashmir involving a whole range of nuclear-weapon states. "Remember France and Germany had been at each other's throats for a couple of hundred years prior to 1945 and they managed to have sorted that through. "We need to draw from some of that experience in shaping an Asia-Pacific Community."Mr Rudd will begin lobbying leaders next week in Japan and Indonesia, and on his visit in July to South Korea and Malaysia. It is understood he consulted the United States, China, Japan and India about the idea.
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The deputy sheriff image undermines support for the alliance with Australian voters and risk total ANZUS collapse William T. Tow, Professor of International Relations at Griffith Universitys Department of International Business and Asian Studies, editor of the Australian Journal of International Affairs, June 2004 "Deputy sheriff or
independent ally? Evolving AustralianAmerican ties in an ambiguous world order" The Pacific Review, Vol. 17 No. 2 June 2004: 271290, Ingenta Connect More significantly, the deputy-sheriff image could threaten the very fabric of the AustralianAmerican alliance as more Australians question the extent to which their countrys unqualified loyalty to Americas international security policies seemingly cultivated by Australias current Coalition government serves Australias national security interests (Kevin 2002, Shananan and Marris 2002). In the aftermath of the October 2002 terrorist attack in Bali, where eighty-eight Australians lost their lives, President Bushs declaration that terrorism is a global menace that must be faced by a global coalition was questioned by those in Australia who argued that their country should instead focus its counter-terrorist and overall strategic efforts and resources on its own region, rather than commit itself to fight Middle Eastern or other regimes that Washington has targeted for elimination (Gunaratna 2002, Rudd 2003).
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Rudd consulted Bush over Iraq troop withdrawl Laura Tierman, writer for the World Socialist Web Site, 17 April 2008 Australian prime ministers world trip:
a bright new image for US alliance http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/apr2008/rudd-a17.shtml At their joint White House press conference, Bush thanked Rudd for being a good loyal ally on Iraq. Rudd, he emphasised, had consulted closely with US military commanders in relation to the announced withdrawal of troops from Iraq, he acted like youd expect an ally to act. The Australian troops were being withdrawn as a return on success.
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( ) US-Australian relations are resilient William Tow, Dir. Intl Rel. And Asian Politics Research Unit @ Queensland, 10-22-2003, Courier Mail, p ln
THE American alliance commands primary attention in Canberra this week. President George W. Bush's whirlwind visit is intended to thank Australians for their country's support of the US military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Discussion about the longer-term viability of alliance objectives are not on the agenda because Bush is convinced that Australia is one ally that is constantly in step with US policy. His expectations regarding Australia are justifiably high. But his understanding of its diverse political landscape is coloured by his immense confidence in Prime Minister John Howard's continued ability to sell the relationship to his country. Three looming challenges will test the remarkable intimacy that now marks US-Australian relations: negotiating a successful free trade agreement, avoiding potential conflicts of interest over Asian strategy; and sustaining a clear sense of alliance purpose. Failing to meet these challenges would not end this special relationship, but such failure would significantly weaken Howard's ability to generate Australian support for its implementation.
( ) US-Australian ties are binding and resilient Australian, 5-5-2003, Dennis Shanahan, Political Editor, p ln
It is a central tenet of Howard's foreign policy and one that hopelessly and dangerously divides the Australian Labor Party. As the world moves into a new order with a single superpower prepared to use its military might in the war on terror, that view of the closeness of US-Australian relations will be critical. It is also significant that the alliance is firmly based on shared values, historical alliance, political and military risk, personal links and some serendipity. The curious and happy coincidence for Australia's benefit was that Howard was in Washington on September 11, 2001. Since then Howard has been to Washington five times, Australian troops have fought beside US troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the once distant hope of a free trade agreement with the world's largest economy has moved towards reality. Bush's expectation is that the free trade agreement should go to Congress by the end of the year. Without the sad serendipity of September 11 and the robust Australian military commitment since, it is unlikely such a timetable for a trade deal could be considered. As Schieffer told The Australian, friendship and loyalty count a great deal with Bush and he particularly values people who "are friends when it is hard to be a friend". Schieffer says Bush recognises the risk Howard and British Prime Minister Tony Blair took in supporting him over Iraq, and will not forget it. The President has taken every opportunity to shower favours and publicity on Howard, with whom he shares a number of personal values. BUSH made the totally unnecessary but highly publicised gesture of giving Howard a lift on Air Force One from California to his ranch for the stayover. Bush's spectacular stunt the day before -- in flying on to the Abraham Lincoln and delivering an address from the flight deck -- ensured maximum limelight for Howard. The content of the speech also meant Howard was again Johnny on the spot. Bush's speech resonated with Lincoln's second inaugural speech; Abe's "other" speech, which was delivered at the end of a war, talked of reconstruction for the US, copiously appealed to God and quoted the Bible, and didn't deliver the expected triumphal exhortations but warned of the tough times and continuing struggle. In Bush's case, here was a confident President reviving national spirit and invigorating the presidency with youth and action without the sleaze. The US administration is ripe for assisting its friends -- Bush cancelled a visit to Canada to meet Jean Chretien to have a barby with Howard -- and there is a popular recognition and genuine warmth towards Australians that may help Congress pass contentious trade laws. Schieffer believes Howard did not get the recognition he deserved in Australia for influencing Bush's decision to go back, albeit unsuccessfully, to the UN over Iraq. He describes the personal relationship between Howard and Bush as extraordinary and says Bush is absolutely committed to keeping the US engaged in the region, guaranteeing Australia strategic support. He has made it clear he wants the free trade agreement finalised by the end of the year. If all of that happens, and the trade agreement is not simply a giveaway to the US, Howard will get credit for a renewed awakening and even more solid foundations for the US alliance. As Schieffer says, it is about old allies becoming dear friends. It's also about the ties that bind.
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( ) US-Australian relations are resilient they have been strong throughout the century Daily Telegraph, 2-12-2003
Life went on and the US-Australia relationship wasn't even mildly shaken by the leadership change. George Bush lost a golfing partner, but not a nation friend. Some 12 years later the relationship is being guided by George W. Bush who yesterday met John Howard in the White House. The lavishness of his welcome wasn't remarkable. When war is afoot, US presidents don't leave an ally unloved. "Prime Minister Howard is a close, personal friend of mine, a person whose judgment I count on, a person with whom I speak quite frequently," Mr Bush said. "I believe he is a man of clear vision. He sees the threats that the free world faces as we go into the 21st century." Australians have always found it hard to respond in exuberant kind. Mr Howard simply said Mr Bush had been a strong leader and had argued a strong case on Iraq. One president back and the language would have been different. Bill Clinton didn't get on with John Howard, and on one visit left him waiting outside in the rain before an official meeting. Paul Keating and Clinton, however, clicked immediately when brought together by summits such as APEC. On the plane back from an APEC meeting in Indonesia, Mr Keating explained to reporters in admiration how during private talks the President had charmed the summit. He had used a folksy term, "stomp the frog", to outline the need for initiatives to speed up the free trade process -- just as you can make a frog jump by stomping the ground behind it. On another occasion the admiration was reversed. Keating endorsed a North American Free Trade Agreement by writing in the air the equation: NAFTA+APEC=JOBS. The President, standing alongside, was impressed. The personalities change, but the constants of the US-Australian relations, established in World War II, have persisted from one century into another, occasionally intensified by military partnership. And so has the basic ritual of prime ministerial visits to Washington. Jimmy Carter knew so little about his guest that he called him John Malcolm Fraser, but what was important was that Malcolm Fraser had been invited to the White House. Labor's John Curtin established the primacy of America in Australia's international network, and this survived Robert Menzies' obsession with Britain.
( ) US-Australian relations are too deep and secure to be shaken Geography IQ.com, 2003, From the US Dept. of State and the CIA World Fact Book,
The World War II experience, similarities in culture and historical background, and shared democratic values have made U.S. relations with Australia exceptionally strong and close. Ties linking the two nations cover the entire spectrum of international relations--from commercial, cultural, and environmental contacts to political and defense cooperation. Two-way trade reached $25 billion in 2003. More than 400,000 Americans have visited Australia in a single year. Traditional friendship is reinforced by the wide range of common interests and similar views on most major international questions. For example, both countries sent military forces to the Persian Gulf in support of UN Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait; both attach high priority to controlling and eventually eliminating chemical weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and anti-personnel landmines; and both work closely on global environmental issues such as slowing climate change and preserving coral reefs. The Australian Government and opposition share the view that Australia's security depends on firm ties with the United States, and the ANZUS Treaty enjoys broad bipartisan support. Recent Presidential visits to Australia (in 1991, 1996 and 2003) and Australian Prime Ministerial visits to the United States (in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004) have underscored the strength and closeness of the alliance.
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***Consult Brazil***
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Turn lockstep politics close U.S. Brazilian consultation alienates Brazil, collapsing relations Peter Hakim, Pres. Inter-American Dialogue, Jan/Feb 2004, Foreign Affairs
To sustain constructive ties, Washington must keep its expectations realistic. Some analysts and U.S. officials have advocated a far tighter relationship between the two countries, with more regular and structured collaboration. But Brazilians have traditionally preferred pragmatic and opportunistic cooperation with the United States on specific issues. Still somewhat distrustful of Washington, Brasilia is wary of creating the expectation that it will quasi-automatically support U.S. positions, compromise its ability to set an independent course for itself, or diminish the diversity of its other international relations. Brazil, in other words, has little interest in developing a privileged relationship with the United States of the type Argentina once sought. That leaves Washington with having to earn Brasilia's cooperation issue by issue, without presuming it will be granted. Still, the relationship has been remarkably stable and consistent over the years. The two countries have not been steady allies or continuing adversaries, but they have usually worked productively together. Today the United States can usually count on Brazil for an important measure of collaboration on most issues and can usually avoid its outright opposition on others.
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US-Brazil relations resilient Peter Hakim, Pres. Inter-American Dialogue, Jan/Feb 2004, Foreign Affairs
So far, trade has been the only issue to provoke open and potentially damaging friction between the two countries. They have been able to cooperate, at least minimally, on thorny issues such as Venezuela and Colombia, and they have managed to swallow harsh rhetoric and avoid public quarrels on others, such as Cuba and the Iraq war. And although they have strikingly different backgrounds, personal styles, and political perspectives, the two presidents have apparently developed sincere respect for each other.
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***Consult Egypt***
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( ) Consultations with Egypt are lengthy BBC, 4-6-2000, p ln
On the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, his excellency said the negotiations are still at their beginning. He said the United States and Egypt are participating effectively in the negotiations, but no solution has yet been reached to the substantive issues. [Arafat - recording] We thank the president for everything that he has been doing for the Palestinian people and on the Palestine question for many years. We had lengthy discussions with him, including today's meeting.
( ) More Washington Post, 6-29-2003, p ln

On Friday, however, senior militant leaders seemed reluctant to let bloodshed spoil the separate but parallel agreements forged in complex negotiations involving mediators from the United States and Egypt, after weeks of mounting political pressure from Arab nations throughout the region.
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Empirically false US failed to consult Egypt over Iraqi air strikes IHT, 2-20-2001
Mr. Powell is due in the Middle East for visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other leading Arab members of the coalition that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, when Mr. Powell headed U.S. armed forces. But key allies then, including Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, have complained that they were not consulted about last weeks air strikes.
US-Egypt ties resilient US failure to consult on West Bank Observers proves AFP, 4-2-2001
He also said he was ignored by the United States last week when he pleaded with the State Department not to veto a UN Security Council resolution calling for deployment of UN observers in the West Bank and Gaza during an Arab summir in Amman. In the interview, the Egyptian leader also took the Bush administration to task for its Iraq policy, which involves strikes against Iraqi antiaircraft batteries that US military officials say threaten US and British planes patrolling the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.
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***Consult EU***
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Were consulting the EU on our foreign policy. ROBERT BRADTKE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, March 2, 2005, PANEL SIX OF A
HEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, Federal News Service Mr. Chairman, you mentioned President Bush's visit to Brussels and Bratislava last week, and they, these visits did provide us the opportunity to put into perspective our foreign policy successes in Europe and Eurasia, as well as the challenges that we still face there. Those successes could not have been achieved without the contribution of our foreign assistance. And, without the contribution of our foreign assistance, we will not succeed in addressing the challenges that we still face. In Brussels, the President consulted with our partners and friends in the EU and NATO. These two institutions have acted like magnets in recent years. Very powerful forces pulling countries towards democracy, free markets, the rule of law, the resolution of ethnic and territorial conflicts. In other words, towards the values consistent with American values, and favorable to our foreign policy interests.
The US actively consults with EU. Robert Zoellick, deputy secretary of State, February 15, 2005, HEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SUBJECT: NOMINATION OF ROBERT ZOELLICK TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, Federal News Service Third, the secretary has asked that I assist in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy abroad. When the secretary announced her first trip abroad, to Europe and the Middle East, she also announced that, if confirmed, I would visit all the other NATO capitals, so together we would be consulting directly with 26 alliance partners early in 2005. I also hope to arrange a session with the European Parliament, as I did shortly after becoming the U.S. Trade Representative in 2001, and will maintain my close ties of the various institutions of the European Union.
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( ) Genuine consultation with the EU or NATO kills hegemony and US-EU Relations veto kills flexibility and rapid response of US forces, and encourages unrealistic expectations which hurt relations more Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations & Contributing Editor @ LA Times, 2004, Power, Terror, Peace and War, p. 130-134
Bush administration answered correctly has to do with the emerging relationship between Europe and the United States. While matters were not always handled well, the administration is right to believe that American foreign policy can no longer be Eurocentric.
Another big question that the
Despite the considerable political successes the Europeans have had in the construction of the European Union, and despite the great wealth and technological prowess these societies continue to show, Europe is unlikely to be the center of world politics in the twenty-first century. It is not simply that Europe is in demographic decline, that the remaining population
The real factor driving the decline of Europes prominence in world affairs will be the rapid development of the non-Western world, especially East and South Asia. Increasingly, the United States will be turning away from Europe toward new partners and, sometimes, new rivals in the developing world. There will always be a special place in American foreign policy for our European allies, but they will have to learn to accept us for what we are. As long as we face the threat of grand terror, the United States cannot suppress its Jacksonian instincts, for example, in order to spare European sensibilities. Nor can we grant Europe a veto over American foreign policy, and if that is the price or Europes help, we must learn from time to time to do without. Ironically, turning away from Europe may be the best way to build a better relationship with it. Europeans have overestimated the political price the United States will pay for their help. Since the world remains a dangerous place, and Europe is
is aging, that it has difficulties assimilating immigrants, and that its pension and medical obligations are ticking time bombs. unwilling (and perhaps unable) to arrange for its own defense without American involvement, it may be that in the future Europe will lower its price and place fewer demands on the United States than in the past. It was bruusquely done, and the timing was poor, but the administration was probably also right to dispel European illusions about the prospects that the United States would ratify the Kyoto Protocol, join the International Criminal Court as currently established, or more generally accept the European program of gradually subjecting Americas freedom of action through institutions in which European states possessed one or more vetoes. While President Clinton was in the White House, the Senate rejected the Kyoto Protocol (by 95-0) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There is no prospect that the Senate will ratify the treaty to establish the International Criminal Court in its present form. Partly because it needed European cooperation in the Balkans, partly because ideologically many Clinton era officials agreed with European positions on issues like Kyoto and
out of habit of consultation and deference that grew up during the cold war, the Clinton administration never quite made clear to Europeans how unreasonable their hopes were. At the same time, most American diplomats and the broader
the ICC, and partly
interlocutor class of experts who specialize in transatlantic relations are generally more sympathetic to the European approach than they are to the red state, red meat approach of the American Jacksonians and the Revival Wilsonians who, since September 11, have figured so prominently in the politics of American foreign policy. The Bush administration made the strategic decision that is no longer made sense to encourage
Europe in illusions about the direction of American policy. Whether Europe liked that policy or disliked it was less important than that Europe understood it. Moreover, stroking Europe only seemed to increase Europes already inflated sense of its importance in the world of American foreign policy. This transition was a necessary and normal one, and it ultimately does offer the prospect of a more realistic but still very close relationship among the Cold War allies. If the Clinton
administration and the broader American foreign policy establishment had done a better job of communicating the changing American approach in earlier years, the transition might not have been so painfulbut it is also true that the Bush administration could and should have done more to cushion the shock for what, after all, are some of our closest and most important allies in a dangerous world. The bitterness of the
it was probably on balance a good thing to remind Europeans in general and Germans in particular that transatlantic crises have a way of turning into European crises. With
controversy was regrettable, and. hasty remarks by Bush officials exacerbated it, but
Germany, France, and Russia locked in an anti-American alliance, Poland understandably becomes nervous, and rightly so. When Russia and Germany get close, Poland has a way of getting smaller. A good German relationship with the United States remains the best basis for continuing progress toward European integration. The shift away from institutions toward coalitions of the willing is another aspect of Bush administration policy that is likely to last. As they exist now, most (though by no means all) international institutions are deeply dysfunctional. The UN General Assembly, whose one-state-one-vote policy means that, officially in the UN system, India (population 1.07 billion) is more or less equal to Liechtenstein (population 33,000), has been completely irrelevant for decades.* The Security Council is increasingly crippled because, with three of the five veto wielding permanent members coming from Europe, it is too much of a retirement home for former world powers while major powers like India (with 17 percent of the worlds population) and Japan (which accounts for 14.3 percent of world output)* are excluded. To be effective, institutions must reflect power realities; neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly now do. The WTO has achieved what many political scientists might have thought impossible, and found an even more absurd and unworkable form of governance than the UN General Assembly. Carefully preserving the one-state-one-vote principle so that countries responsible for an infinitesimal proportion of world trade have equal weight with the trading superpowers whose policies actually matter, the WTO has added a political principle last enshrined in the eighteenth-century Polish Diet. Every member, however small and weak, can veto any agreement. The WTO is a perverse cross between the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. Let us hope that private industry never discovers that the votes
institutions, at are oriented toward achieving consensus through a process of deliberation, usually a very slow and thorough process of deliberation. The decisions they take are likely to be based on compromise, and whether they are security alliances like NATO or political organizations like the United Nations, there is a tendency to move at the speed of the slowest and most reluctant member. Such institutions are very unlikely to provide the kind of rapid response that conditions in the twenty-first century will require. This is especially true of universal institutions like the UN
and the vetoes of some WTO members just might be for sale. But beyond the specific problems of specific institutions, there is a broader issue. International
least as we know them
or the WTO, institutions that aspire to include all states. The cultural and political divisions among human beings are too great for such institutions to be able to agree on more than a handful of issues, especially quickly. Inevitably, much of the work of the world will have to take place outside ofthough not necessarily againstsuch institutions. The Clinton administration went outside the UN system to fight the Yugoslav war over Kosovo; future American administrations may eschew some of the rhetoric that the Bush administration has used about international institutions, but no American president can ever accept a situation in which France pretends to an ability to veto American actions deemed necessary to the national security. Nor can future presidents entrust the defense of vital American interests to the institutions that move
at the pace of the slowest (and perhaps most anti-American) member.
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( ) If the counterplan solves, it hurts relations EU rubber stamp of yes is a green-light for US to shatter relations Judy Dempsey, Correspondent, 2-13-2002, Fin. Times, p ln
European politicians are in a US-bashing mood. Whether it is the Afghan detainees held by Washington in Guantanamo Bay, President George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech, or his foreign policy in the Middle East, there has been criticism of the world's only superpower from many of the EU's 15 capitals. If there were ever a moment when the EU might find a single voice, this was surely it. And yet, despite all the tough talking, the Europeans are in disarray. And without a common policy, EU diplomats say Europe can have no influence in Washington. "We say we have a common foreign policy," says an EU diplomat. "But do we? Take this week. Britain and Germany separately send their foreign ministers to the Middle East. Other countries pursue their own US policies. You call that a common voice?" Tony Blair has been the loudest voice in support of the US, but his critics say his close relationship with Washington has damaged European solidarity. Lionel Jospin, the French prime minister, last week urged the US not to define its policy uniquely in terms of a single goal. "The problems of the world cannot be reduced simply to the struggle against terrorism, however vital that struggle may be," he said. Hubert Vedrine, French foreign minister, went even further, complaining that Mr Bush's "axis of evil" speech was "simplistic" and "absurd". Washington shrugged off the criticism. It made its mind up about France in 1966 when de Gaulle withdrew from Nato's integrated military structure. Paris, says a US diplomat, is "an ambiguous" ally. Chris Patten, the EU's external affairs commissioner, joined the criticism of Mr Bush's speech. "However mighty you are, even if you're the greatest superpower in the world, you cannot do it all on your own," said Mr Patten. Steven Everts, of London's Centre for European Reform and author of a new pamphlet, "Shaping a credible EU foreign policy", says the predictability of European views has actually perpetuated difficulties between the EU and US. "When it comes to foreign policy, as long as the Europeans keep whingeing without presenting a common front, they will have little chance of influencing Washington," Mr Everts says.
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Consultation is irrelevant for US-Europe relations Richard N. Haass, director of Policy Planning at the US State Department, June 10, 2002, to the Centre for
European Reform, http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/10968.htm Given the rapid pace of change and the complexity of the challenges, its not surprising that there are frictions in the transatlantic relationship. From Europe, we hear rumblings about unilateralism, even arrogance. From our side of the pond, there are complaints about European self-absorption, along with open irritation with Europeans who complain about American predominance, but are unwilling to spend more to close the gap in military capabilities or to exercise greater global leadership. Both Europeans and Americans find fault with the others trade policies. Such frictions are hardly surprising, in particular at this juncture in history. Without the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union, differences over other issues are naturally more exposed. But these frictions are not due to lack of consultation. The Bush Administration has tried to consult fully and to bridge differences. We have consulted intensively with Europe the EU, NATO, and bilaterally on the global war on terrorism, environmental policies, missile defense and weapons of mass destruction, peace in the Balkans, and the situation in the Middle East. Where the United States could not go along with a proposed approach, such as the Kyoto Protocol, we put forward alternative proposals to address the underlying concern. The same will be true with respect to our position on the International Criminal Court. On some social issues, like the death penalty, the United States and Europe will simply have to agree to disagree. As the United States and Europe continue to cooperate in transforming Europe and collaborate increasingly on global issues of mutual concern, they will inevitably, as in the past, have to manage disagreements large and small. Sometimes differences are just that differences over priorities, policies, perspectives and even values. Sometimes, these differences require that the United States act on its own. It would be wrong to label such differences as American "unilateralism." Just as Europeans can disagree among themselves without threatening the viability of the EU, we can disagree with some or all Europeans without weakening the transatlantic bond. The bottom line is that there is virtually nothing we can do alone that we cannot do better together with our allies and partners in Europe.
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( ) CP would be delayed process is flawed Alan P. Larson, Assis. Sec. of State, 10-15-1997, Press Briefing,
www.fas.org/news/usa/1997/10/97101502_wpo.html
No, I think we have two ideas on the questions that you've raised. One idea is that there is in the OECD something called an Instrument on Conflicting Requirements. It's an instrument that grows out of a great deal of experience in the area of conflicting requirements and extraterritorial jurisdiction and recognizes the fact that there are many areas in international economic policy where all states exercise jurisdiction in a manner that's extraterritorial. Everyone who was watching the newspapers this summer understands that competition policy, for example, is an area where the European Union asserts a right to extraterritorial jurisdiction, as does the United States. This is something where both of us say that we have the ability and the right to look at things in an extraterritorial fashion. So, what we have seen, and this is the issue of competition policy is not unique. There many other areas where countries exert jurisdiction in a way that extends beyond their borders. So what we have suggested is that this OECD instrument and the measures that are associated with it, including consultative measures, might well be incorporated into this OECD investment treaty as to give them enhanced prominence and strengthen the way that they operate. In addition, we've argued that the root causes of some of the differences that we've had on foreign policy sanctions issues, issues that I would describe as threats to shared interests and values, have come about
arguably because of imperfect consultative mechanisms, consultative mechanisms that weren't quick enough off the mark, that didn't result in a shared assessment of how serious a threat to interest in values the situation really represented, didn't result in a concerted response to that type of situation. And when, as a result of that imperfect process, you sometimes have had in the past, disparate responses that affect each other's interests. Sometimes the disparate response might be inaction in a situation that would seem clearly to call for action. In other cases it might be action that's taken that adversely affects the interests of some of the other major parties, including European friends. So, we think that this type of enhanced, more high-level
consultations, could be part of the answer to avoiding these types of problems in the future.
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( ) EU consultation goes through a three-tier process EU Homepage, 2005, Decision-making in the European Union europa.eu.int/institutions/decisionmaking/index_en.htm, accessed 9-12-05 Under the consultation procedure, the Council consults Parliament as well as the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Committee of the Regions (CoR). Parliament can: * approve the Commission proposal, * reject it, * or ask for amendments. If Parliament asks for amendments, the Commission will consider all the changes Parliament suggests. If it accepts any of these suggestions it will send the Council an amended proposal. The Council examines the amended proposal and either adopts it or amends it further. In this procedure, as in all others, if the Council amends a Commission proposal it must do so unanimously.
( ) This takes at least a year European Report, 10-4-1997

The Commission aims to push the proposal through the legislative process by January 1999. However, delays are likely, as the Commission plans as a first step to hold a consultation procedure, in order to determine whether any further amendments should be added to the proposal in its present form. In addition, the measure will have to be adopted jointly by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament under the co-decision procedure before it can be implemented, which presents a more serious obstacle.
( ) EU consultation is slow Suzanna Nossel, Dep. To Ambassador for UN Management and Reform, Winter 2002, National Interest
The strength of such groups means that an American appeal to a bilateral relationship-for instance, with the United Kingdom or Mexicomay not lure the ally away from an opposing EU or Rio Group position. While many U.S. foreign policymakers have long advocated a common European foreign policy-a single phone number to call, as Henry Kissinger once famously put it-at the UN, the reality of European coordination is slow and cumbersome decision-making that often culminates in lowest common denominator positions dictated by Germany or France. On UN dues, as long as the French held the EU presidency and were determined to oppose the U.S. plan, private sympathy from Great Britain, Sweden, Portugal and others did little good. In the world of bloc politics, the United States must go beyond gaining the backing of friendly delegations to wrest them out of the grip of opposing group positions.
( ) EU consultation is time-consuming because of coordination with member states John R. Crook, editor, Jan. 1996, Am. J. Intl Law, p ln
In general, the enhanced EU role is welcome and positive. However, it inevitably leads to difficulties to which Union members and their presidency must be alert. The demands of intra-European coordination can result in disregard of the concerns of other traditional partners (like the United States and other non-EU Western countries) in formulating [*138] key policies. Once set, EU negotiating positions are not easily changed. And, for EU delegations, vast amounts of time are consumed in coordinating positions.
( ) EU takes forever to make collective decisions Insurance Day, 6-27-2002, p ln

The directive, which in the words of the Commission constitutes a "key element in improving the internal market in retail insurance services", was successfully concluded on June 13 by members of the European Parliament. For a lobbyist working in Brussels the speed of this EU decision is unprecedented and also unexpected. Usually EU decision-making processes are slow and frustrating, but not this time.
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***Consult Japan***
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( ) Consulting Japan causes delay Japan Times, 10-28-2002, Economic policy adrift, ln
However, Mr. Takenaka and his task force of private specialists should avoid unnecessary friction with politicians. Members of the ruling parties are understandably angry that they have been left completely out of the loop. Some have even demanded his resignation. Opposition parties have introduced a censure motion against him. After all, this is Japan. Nothing can get done without an effort to foster consensus. Even though Prime Minister Koizumi favors the top-down approach, a certain amount of coordination with the governing parties is essential. Mr. Takenaka and his team seem to have gone a bit too far in bypassing the usual route of prior consultation.
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2AC Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient

( ) U.S. Japan Alliance resilient Joseph Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 7-142009, Will the US-Japan alliance survive?, Business Day, http://www.businessdayonline.com/index. php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=3739:will-the-us-japan-alliance-survive&catid=138:co mmentary&Itemid=358
In the early 1990's, many Americans regarded Japan as an economic threat. Some people - in both countries - viewed the security alliance as a Cold War relic to be discarded. These trends were reversed by the Clinton administration's 1995 "East Asia Strategy Report." In 1996, the Clinton-Hashimoto Declaration stated that the US-Japan security alliance was the foundation for stability that would allow growing prosperity in post-Cold War East Asia. That approach has continued on a bipartisan basis in the US, and polls show that it retains broad acceptance in Japan. Most close observers of the relationship agree that the US-Japan alliance is in much better shape today than 15 years ago. Nonetheless, the alliance faces three major challenges in a new external environment. One is North Korea, whose recent behavior has been clever and deceptive. The North Koreans have violated their agreements, knowing that China, the country with the greatest potential leverage, is most concerned about regime collapse in North Korea, and thus the threat of chaos on its borders. Japan officially endorses the objective of a non-nuclear world, but it relies on America's extended nuclear deterrent, and wants to avoid being subject to nuclear blackmail from North Korea (or China). The Japanese fear that the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the US decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China. It is a mistake, however, to believe that extended deterrence depends on parity in numbers of nuclear weapons. Rather, it depends on a combination of capability and credibility. During the Cold War, the US was able to defend Berlin because our promise to do so was made credible by the NATO alliance and the presence of American troops, whose lives would be on the line in the event of a Soviet attack. Indeed, the best guarantee of American extended deterrence over Japan remains the presence of nearly 50,000 American troops (which Japan helps to maintain with generous host-nation support). Credibility is also enhanced by joint projects such as the development of regional ballistic
missile defense. Equally important are American actions that show the high priority that the US gives to the alliance, and its guarantees not to engage in what Japan fears will be "Japan-passing" in its relations with Asia. That is why it was so important that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's first trip was to Asia, and her first stop in Japan. It is also
why it is mistaken to speak of a formal G-2 with China, rather than multilateral cooperation. A second challenge for Japan is the dramatic rise of China's economy. Although an important trade partner, China's growing power makes Japan nervous. When renegotiating the US-Japan security alliance in the 1990's, Japanese leaders sometimes privately asked me if the US would desert Japan in favor of China. I responded then (and today) that there is little prospect of such a reversal, for two reasons. First, China poses a potential threat, whereas Japan does not. Second, the US shares democratic values with Japan, and China is not a democracy. Moreover, China's internal evolution remains uncertain. While Chinese are more free today than at any time in their history, China's political evolution has lagged behind its economic progress. Unlike India, China has not solved the problem of political participation. There is always a residual danger that China will embrace nationalism to ward off domestic problems. At the same time, it is in the interest of the US, Japan, and China that China's rise be peaceful and harmonious (in the words of Chinese leaders). Treat China as an enemy, and you guarantee enmity. That is why the strategy of integration, plus a hedge against uncertainty, makes sense for both the US and Japan. Indeed, there are strong grounds for the US, Japan, and China to engage in areas of trilateral and other regional cooperation. Third, the US-Japan alliance will have to face a new set of transnational challenges to our vital interests, such as pandemics, terrorism, and human outflows from failed states. Chief among these challenges is the threat posed by global warming, with China having surpassed the US as the leading producer of carbon-dioxide emissions (though not in per capita terms). Fortunately, this is an area that plays to Japan's strengths. Although some Japanese complain about the unequal nature of the alliance's security components, owing to the limits that Japan has accepted on the use of force, in these new areas, Japan is a stronger partner. Japan's overseas development assistance in places ranging from Africa to Afghanistan, its participation in global health projects, its support of the United Nations, its naval participation in anti-piracy operations, and its research and development on energy efficiency place it at the forefront in dealing with the new transnational challenges. Given today's agenda, there is enormous potential for an equal partnership, working with others, in the provision of global public goods that will benefit the US, Japan, and the rest of the world. That is why I remain optimistic about the future of the US-Japan alliance.
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2AC Consult Japan No Impact Empirically Denied

Empirically denied the US has totally punked Japan over consulations on more important issues Brad Glosserman, director of research for the peace forum CSIS, January-March 2004, STAYING THE
COURSE COMPARITIVE CONNECTIONS A few clouds spotted this sunny horizon. Reports that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld decided to abandon plans to move the Futenma Air Station to Nago City in northern Okinawa and instead relocate it in Kadena Air Base ruffled feathers in Japan. While the move might have appealed to peace and environmental activists, the seemingly arbitrary fashion in which it was announced - the product of a helicopter flight that opened the secretary's eyes to the danger of continuing operation of the air station made a mockery of Japanese claims that it was being consulted on alliance matters. It also scared Okinawans who look to the relocation to provide political cover for a healthy infusion of funds from Tokyo. The reports were denied by U.S. and Japanese government sources. In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee at the end of the quarter, commander of the U.S. forces in the Pacific Adm. Thomas Fargo said the U.S. remains committed to the Special Action Committee Okinawa (SACO) process. A second "hiccup" occurred when Japan reportedly turned down a U.S. request to move the U.S. Army/Corps HQ from Washington State to Kanagawa Prefecture.
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Japan has stated that it doesnt want to consult on bigger issues than plan Japan Policy and Politics, 11-8-2004, Japan Plays Down, p ln
The government on Friday played down the effects on Japan of the planned realignment of the U.S. military in Japan, saying it sees no need for prior consultation on the issue under the framework of the bilateral security pact. The government said it is ''hard to assume'' that U.S. military functions in Japan will be reviewed in a way that requires prior consultation, which is stated in a document attached to the 1960 Japan-U.S. security treaty. The government's position was endorsed by the Cabinet on Friday, which issued a statement saying Tokyo does not consider the envisaged change of the U.S. military deployment in Japan a major one that requires prior consultation. Seiichi Kaneta, a House of Representatives member of the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan, urged the government last month to clarify whether it believes the overhaul will require formal consultation as stipulated in the treaty. Kaneta's action came amid concerns the military realignment could force Japan to host a wider range of U.S. military operations that could go beyond the scope of the security treaty. The treaty says the U.S. military can use land and facilities in Japan for peace and security in the Far East. But the reported proposals include a transfer of the U.S. Army First Corps headquarters from Fort Lewis in the state of Washington to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture. The command's operation is believed to extend to areas including the Middle East. Japan and the United States agreed that ''major changes'' in the deployment to Japan of U.S. forces and their equipment should be subject to prior consultations stated in the document called an ''exchange of notes incorporating agreed consultation formula.'' The two countries also agreed that the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations from Japan should be subject to consultations, which neither side has done up to now.
Attempts to rejuvenate the alliance put too much strain on Japanese politicians, destroying the alliance. Brad Glosserman, Director of Research for the Pacific Forum CSIS, January-March 2001, Pacific Forum CSIS,
Comparative Connections, A False Start?, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/0101Qus_japan.html Japan's second concern is that Washington will expect too much of Tokyo. The Nye-Armitage report, issued late last year and bearing the name of a key player in the new administration, seemed to do just that with its call for Japan to assume new responsibilities within the alliance. Japan's political class still prefers not to deal with security issues directly. The topic of security is too contentious and the political consensus that exists is fragile. Rejuvenating the bilateral alliance will oblige Japanese decision makers to address that subject head-on. Given the domestic political environment (discussed below), there is little inclination to spend the political capital required to do just that. Some Japanese supporters of the alliance now worry that U.S. expectations will be dashed, which could be an equally devastating blow to the alliance.
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A. Setting up a future framework for genuine consultation with Japan undermines air power and tanks relations theyll take time during a crisis, angering the US Ashley J. Tellis et al, Chung Min Lee, James Mulvenon, Courtney Purrington, and Michael D. Swaine, sources of conflict in the 21st century, availible via the rand website @ rand.org. chapter 3, 1998
Current political trends in Japan are highly critical for the U.S. Air Force, because they could both diminish the deterrent effectiveness of a U.S. presence and constrain U.S. en-route and in-theater operations in the event of a major regional conflict. As a result, Japans ability to respond to an international crisis in a timely fashion and render assistance to its ally, the United States, will be affected by todays political trends. Even more problematic, political turmoil could affect whether Japan insists on prior consultations in the event of a breaking crisis in the Far East, thereby imposing severe constraints on the ability of U.S. aerospace power to function as a rapid reaction force. Any prolonged delay by the Japanese government, any attempt to place limitations on the use of U.S. military capabilities, or any exercise of veto rights in a worst case scenario would have critical consequences for the U.S. Air Force war-fighting capabilities and hence the outcome of a crisis. Political instability, in conjunction with the Japanese publics strong allergy to Japans involvement in armed conflicts, could therefore have a decisive impact on whether Japan could be expected to insist upon prior consultations in the event of a crisis requiring the deployment of U.S. troops stationed in Japan; what types of logistical and other indirect support Japan would likely provide; whether Japans Self-Defense Forces would themselves directly participate in such a conflict; what types of participation could be expected (minesweeping, escort duties, direct combat roles), if Japan responded positively to a crisis overseas; and what calculus potential military adversaries of the United States, its allies, and its friends would make in a crisis, given the uncertainty about how Japan would respond. Japans response in the event of another major regional conflict in the Persian Gulf or in East Asia would also have great political significance. In the event Japans future response were seen in the United States as too little, too late, as it was during the Gulf War,28 strains on the alliance relationship would become severe. Repetition of a Gulf War situation would likely undermine American public support for the alliance if Japan again were seen to contribute little in human terms, while at the same time U.S. forces were sacrificed while defending Japanese security interests in the Middle East, Strait of Malacca, South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and especially Korea. Moreover, in the context of ongoing economic friction and the lack of an overarching threat that the Soviet Union posed during the Cold War, the alliance relationship itself could prove domestically unsustainable in the United States. U.S. troops would be seen by the U.S. public as performing mercenary tasks for Japanese interests with few tangible benefits for the United States. This view in turn would also have devastating consequences for U.S. strategy in East Asia.
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Air power key to military effectiveness and deterring war with China which causes extinction Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force, 9-2006, Americas asymmetric
advantage, Armed Forces Journal, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/09/2009013 So where does that leave us? If we are smart, we will have a well-equipped high-technology air power capability. Air power is Americas asymmetric advantage and is really the only military capability that can be readily applied across the spectrum of conflict, including, as is especially important these days, potential conflict. Consider the record. It was primarily air power, not land power, that kept the Soviets at bay while the U.S. won the Cold War. And it was not just the bomber force and the missileers; it was the airlifters, as well. There are few strategic victories in the annals of military history more complete and at so low a human cost as that won by American pilots during the Berlin airlift. Armageddon was avoided. And the flexibility and
velocity of air power also provides good-news stories in friendly and low-threat areas. For example, huge U.S. transports dropping relief supplies or landing on dirt strips in some area of humanitarian crisis get help to people on a timeline that can make a real difference. Such operations also illustrate, under the glare of the global media, the true American character the world needs to see more often if our strategic goals are to be achieved. Air power also doesnt have the multi-aspect vulnerabilities that boots on the ground do. It can apply combat power from afar and do so in a way that puts few of our forces at risk. True, occasionally there will be a Francis Gary Powers, and certainly the Vietnam-era POWs mostly
if America maintains its aeronautical superiority, the enemy will not be able to kill 2,200 U.S. aviators and wound another 15,000, as the ragtag Iraqi terrorists have managed to do to our land forces. And, of course, bombs will go awry. Allegations will be made (as they are currently against the Israelis) of targeting civilians and so forth. But
airmen became pawns for enemy exploitation. Yet, the nature of the air weapon is such that an Abu Ghraib or Hadithah simply cannot occur. The relative sterility of air power which the boots-on-the-ground types oddly find distressing as somehow unmartial nevertheless provides greater opportunity for the discreet application of force largely under the control of well-educated, commissioned officer
The precision revolution has made it possible for air power to put a bomb within feet of any point on earth. Of course,
combatants. Not a total insurance policy against atrocity, but a far more risk-controlled situation. Most important, however, is the purely military effect. having the right intelligence to select that point remains a challenge but no more, and likely much less so, than for the land forces. The technology of surveillance is improving at a faster rate than is the ability to conceal. Modern conveniences, for example, from cell phones to credit cards, all leave signatures that can lead to the demise of the increasing numbers of adversaries unable to resist the siren song of techno-connection. Regardless, eventually any insurgency must reveal itself if it is to assume power, and this inevitably provides the opportunity for air power to pick off individuals or entire capabilities that threaten U.S. interests. The real advantage for the moment anyway is that air power can do it with
The advances in American air power technology in recent years make U.S. dominance in the air intimidating like no other aspect of combat power for any nation in history. The
impunity and at little risk to Americans. result? Saddam Husseins pilots buried their airplanes rather than fly them against American warplanes. Indeed, the collapse of the Iraqi armed forces was not, as the BOTGZ would have you believe, mainly because of the brilliance of our ground commanders or, in fact, our ground forces at all. The subsequent insurgency makes it clear that Iraqis are quite willing to take on our ground troops. What really mattered was the sheer hopelessness that air power inflicted on Iraqs military formations. A quotation in Time magazine by a defeated Republican Guard colonel aptly captures the dispiriting effect of high-tech air attack: [Iraqi leaders] forgot that we are missing air power. That was a big mistake. U.S. military technology is beyond belief. It is no surprise that the vaunted Republican Guard, the proud fighting organization that tenaciously fought Iran for years, practically jumped out of their uniforms and scattered at the sound of approaching U.S. aircraft. This same ability to inflict hopelessness was even more starkly demonstrated in Afghanistan. For a millennium, the Afghans have been considered among the toughest fighters in the world. Afghan resistance has turned the countryside into a gigantic military cemetery for legions of foreign invaders. For example, despite deploying thousands of troops, well-equipped Soviet forces found themselves defeated after waging a savage war with practically every weapon at their disposal. So what explains the rapid collapse of the Taliban and al-Qaida in 2001? Modern air power. More specifically, the marriage of precision weapons with precise targeting by tiny numbers of Special Forces troops on the ground. The results were stunning. Putatively invulnerable positions the Taliban had occupied for years literally disappeared in a rain of satellite-directed bombs from B-1s and B-52s flying so high they could be neither seen nor heard. This new, high-tech air power capability completely unhinged the resistance without significant commitment of American boots on the ground. Indeed, the very absence of American troops became a source of discouragement. As one Afghan told the New York Times, We pray to Allah that we have American soldiers to kill, adding disconsolately, These bombs from the sky we cannot fight. Another equally frustrated Taliban fighter was reported in the London Sunday Telegraph recently as fuming that American forces refuse to fight us face to face, while gloomily noting that [U.S.] air power causes us to take heavy casualties. In other words, the Taliban and al-Qaida were just as tough as the mujahideen who fought the Russians, and more than willing to confront U.S. ground forces, but were broken by the hopelessness that American-style air power inflicted upon them. MORE THAN BOMBS Today it is more than just bombing with impunity that imposes demoralization; it is reconnoitering with impunity. This is more than just the pervasiveness of Air Force-generated satellites. It also includes hundreds of unmanned aerial vehicles that are probing the landscape in Iraq and Afghanistan. They provide the kind of reliable intelligence that permits the careful application of force so advantageous in insurgency and counterterrorism situations. The insurgents are incapable of determining where or when the U.S. employs surveillance assets and, therefore, are
The mere existence of the ever-present eyes in the sky no doubt inflicts its own kind of stress and friction on enemy forces. In short, what real asymmetrical advantage the U.S. enjoys in countering insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan relates to a dimension of air power. Strike, reconnaissance, strategic or tactical lift have all performed phenomenally well. It is no exaggeration to observe that almost every improvement in the military situation in Iraq and Afghanistan is attributable to air power in some
forced to assume they are watched everywhere and always. form; virtually every setback, and especially the strategically catastrophic allegations of war crimes, is traceable to the land forces. While it will be seldom feasible for America to effectively employ any sort of boots-on-the-ground strategy in current or future counterinsurgency situations, the need may arise to destroy an adversarys capability to inflict harm on U.S. interests. Although there is no perfect solution to such challenges, especially in low-intensity conflicts, the air weapon is the best option. Ricks report in Fiasco, for example, that Iraqs weapons of mass destruction program never recovered from 1998s Operation Desert Fox and its four days of air attacks is interesting. It would appear that Iraqs scientific minds readily conceded the pointlessness of attempting to build the necessary infrastructure in an environment totally exposed to U.S. air attack. This illustrates another salient feature of air power: its ability to temper the malevolent tendencies of societies accustomed to the rewards of modernity. Given air powers ability to strike war-supporting infrastructure, the powerful impulse of economic self-interest
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American air power can rapidly educate cultured and sophisticated societies about the costs of war and the futility of pursuing it. This is much the reason why air power alone delivered victory in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, without the need to put a single U.S. soldier at risk on the ground. At the same time, Americas preeminence in air power is also the best hope we have to dissuade China or any other future peer competitor from aggression. There is zero possibility that the U.S. can build land forces of the size that would be of real concern to a China. No number of troops or up-armored Humvees, new radios or advanced sniper rifles worries the Chinese. What dominating air power precludes is the ability to concentrate and project forces, necessary elements to applying combat power in hostile areas. As but one illustration, think China and Taiwan. Saddam
complicates the ability of despots to pursue malicious agendas. might have underestimated air power, but dont count on the Chinese to make the same mistake. China is a powerful, vast country with an exploding, many-faceted economy with
It will take focused and determined efforts for the U.S. to maintain the air dominance that it currently enjoys over China and that, for the moment, deters them. Miscalculating here will be disastrous becasue, unlike with any counterinsurgency situation (Iraq included), the very existence of the U.S. is at risk.
strong scientific capabilities.
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2AC Consult Japan Russia/China DA

( ) Stronger US-Japan Alliance causes Russia-China Alliance Evan Feigenbaum, exec. Dir. Asia-Pacific Security Initiative @ Harvards Kennedy School of Gov, 12-282000, The United States is Driving Russia and China Together Again, IHT,
www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/opeds/2000/feigenbaum_russia_china.htm
In this, China and Russia have some important common goals, rejecting the use of military "diktat" as a principled response in some key external contingencies. Such trends are hardly new, and strands of American strategic analysis have wrestled in recent years with the prospect of a renewed China Russia "alliance" relationship. Such a notion is ironic indeed, not least because both countries have increasingly rejected the very notion of alliances on grounds of principle. Four months ago, General Ivashov claimed that "military alliances have no future." His view jibes neatly with a Chinese view of the world that increasingly sees alliance structures as a threat to peace and intrinsically aggressive in nature. NATO strategy in Kosovo reinforced Chinese and Russian perceptions that America's alliances in Europe and Asia have evolved away from original concepts of cooperative defense toward more expansive definitions of alliance roles and missions. Above all, it was Kosovo that demonstrated to Chinese, Russian, and other strategists that the United States and its allies were prepared to circumvent the United Nations and the norms of international law that China, in particular, views in inflexible terms. All of this supplements the shared concern about American missile defense plans. China may yet discover that its Russian partner will abandon its shared principled stance in favor of a closer working relationship with Washington, particularly on anti-ballistic missile norms. But Beijing will continue to reject the NATO notion that defense is always benign in nature, a form of deterrence plus. Shared Chinese and Russian perspectives on world affairs, therefore, suggest the possibility of greater coordination. Yet whatever principles the two countries may share derive from very different concerns. For China, all such issues almost entirely derive from the Taiwan problem. Beijing worries that the US-Japan alliance may take on new
roles and missions in a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. Its opposition to missile defenses, especially theater systems, reflects a broadly political concern that the United States is reviving its former military alliance with Taiwan. What is required is an approach by American and European states that seeks to delink the big questions of international politics, such as intervention and alliances, from a view of the world that sees many such questions through the prism of national problems and national pride. This is especially true of China, whose foreign policy on nearly every strategic issue is now inseparable from the Taiwan question. Without such an effort, Chinese and Russian perspectives will move closer together.
( ) Hurts Heg Bruce Elleman, Assistant Prof Russian & Chinese history @ Texas Christian, 1997, Imperial Decline: Russias
Changing Role in Asia, p. 118
As happened during a short period in the 1920s and then during a much longer period in the 1950s, Russia
and China might decide to form a political and/or military alliance directed against the United States. This possibility is of much greater concern today than it was a year ago because both Moscow and Beijing have a long list of grievances against
Washington; in Moscows case, this includes Bosnia and NATO expansion, while, for Beijing, in includes a more vocal human rights policy by the United States, a wide variety of trade frictions, and Washingtons decision to issue Taiwans president, Li Teng-hui, a visa to visit the United States. If such a Russo-Chinese alliance were ever concluded, the United States might soon
discover that it would hinder American foreign policy worldwide.
( ) Nuclear war Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and lowlevel conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
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( ) Japan says no and theres massive delays they dont want outreach Hisahiko Okazaki, former Japanese ambassador to Thailand, 7-2-2009, Japans Obama Opportunity, WSJ,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124647214945581613.html Now the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance rests not on the Washington but on Tokyo. This is not a new problem. In the early years of the Bush administration, most of the East Asia-related posts were dominated by friends of Japan. But that didn't matter: although then-Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage proposed a strategic dialogue with his Japanese counterparts, he was soon frustrated by the tepid response from Tokyo. In contrast, Mr. Armitage's successor, Robert Zoellick, started a strategic dialogue with China and won an immediate and resounding response. It's hard to understand why efforts to reach out to Tokyo failed where olive branches to Beijing succeeded. China has an autocratic system capable of producing charismatic leaders and making quick and authoritative decisions. Japan's democratically elected politicians tend to make decisions by consensus. It may be the lingering influence of leftist anti-American propaganda of the Cold War time, taking advantage of the postwar Japanese pacifist tendencies. Cooler relations may also simply be a product of personal characteristics of the individuals involved at the time. Whatever the reason, Japan's response to America's outreach has usually been excruciatingly slow. This trend looks likely to continue. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party is trailing in election polls, and the most likely outcome that can be expected for the country is political paralysis.
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1AR Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient

US-Japan security alliance is unbreakable and relations are resilient National Journal, 9-1, Japanese Elections Complicate East Asia Policy, ln
For starters, the DPJ win isn't a rejection of Tokyo's cozy relationship with Washington. More than 73 percent of Japanese feel very warm or somewhat warm towards the U.S., according to a poll conducted last year by the Japanese government, and in Pew's Global Attitudes survey from July, 59 percent of Japanese respondents viewed the U.S. favorably -- up from 50 percent a year before. More than that, a rising China, Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions and a renaissance of Russian power all provide incentives for the DPJ to keep U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in good working order. "Under these conditions, the alliance is like an insurance policy for which the premium is relatively modest -- a good deal for both parties," said Michael Armacost, who served as ambassador to Japan from 1989 to 1993. President Obama's relationship with Japan started with a speed bump over his pick for ambassador,John Roos. The Japanese often judge the health of the U.S.-Japan relationship by the seniority and gravitas of our ambassador, explainedEdward Lincoln, the director of the Center for Japan-U.S. Business and Economic Studies at New York University. Tokyo was "tickled pink" by past envoys like former Vice PresidentWalter Mondaleand former Senate Majority LeaderMike Mansfield, D-Mont., he said. But Roos, a Silicon Valley lawyer and Democratic fundraiser, has no obvious Japan credentials or political experience. The appointment of Republican superstar (and whispered 2012 presidential contender)Jon Huntsman, the former Utah governor, as ambassador to China only intensified Japan's "ambassador envy," Lincoln explained. But Tokyo has slowly come around on Roos. And the Obama administration has meanwhile sought to continue the Bush policy of making the Japan alliance the cornerstone of American East Asia policy. Outgoing Japanese Prime MinisterTaro Asowas the first foreign leader received by the Obama White House, and high-level talks are planned for the upcoming months. "The Obama people have really gone out of their way to show that Japan is our key ally in the region and we're not going to shift our attention away from them," saidMichael Green, a senior director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council during the Bush administration. Financial market reforms and global warming are two of the most obvious areas of collaboration for Tokyo and Washington, but China is the elephant in the room on both issues. Still, American relations with Beijing improved during the Bush years, according toLarry Diamond, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. "My sense is that U.S.-Chinese relations have never been better since [Henry]Kissingermade his secret visit to Beijing to meetMao[Zedong] and open the door," he said. That offers Obama a rare chance to work with both countries, which could be helpful in nuclear negotiations with North Korea. "Historically, when U.S. relations with Japan have been tight, ties with China have often been difficult, and vice versa," Armacost said. "There is now an opportunity to sustain close links with both." But perhaps the biggest reason U.S.-Japan relations aren't primed for a shift is because the DPJ has enough on its plate domestically. Hit hard by the economic downturn and saddled with an aging population, Japan needs to offset declining revenues, deregulate agricultural industry and introduce more competition in the marketplace, Green argued.
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( ) US-Japan alliance is unbreakable Yukio Okamoto, president of Okamoto Associates and special adviser to Japanese PM, 2002, Japan and the
United States, Washington Quarterly 25.2, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v025/25.2okamoto.html Given the magnitude of the danger that an end of the alliance would pose to both Japan and the United States, both sides will likely want to maintain their security relationship for many years to come. A completely new world would have to emerge for Japan and the United States to no longer need each other. Despite frictions over trade, supposed Japanese passivity, purported U.S. arrogance, and the myriad overwrought "threats to the alliance," the truth is that this military alliance between two democratic states is well-nigh unbreakable--because there are no acceptable alternatives.
( ) US-Japan relations are resilient Consulate General of Japan in Seattle, 1-1-2008, Greetings, http://www.seattle.us.embjapan.go.jp/about/consul.htm I trust that you are all in good health in welcoming the New Year. The relationship between Japan and the U.S. has reached a new era in regards to leadership as of last November, when the new Prime Minster Yasuo Fukuda met with President George W. Bush. At this meeting, the two leaders confirmed the solid and resilient Japan-U.S. alliance, which has been built over the course of more than half a century, overcoming occasional challenges through mutual cooperation. The leaders also agreed upon recognizing the fact that the Japan-US alliance plays a crucial role in tackling a variety of global issues.
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( ) US is consulting Japan now alliance is strong Hiroshi Hiyama, 8-31-2009, Japans victorious Democrats, AFP, ln
The DPJ has signalled a solid but less subservient partnership with traditional ally the United States and a desire to boost its regional ties, promoting a European Union-style Asian community and common currency. In Washington, President Barack Obama's White House said it expected a "strong alliance" with the DPJ and hoped to hold early consultations with Tokyo, including on the stand-off with nuclear-armed North Korea. "We are confident that the strong US-Japan alliance and the close partnership between our two countries will continue to flourish under the leadership of the next government," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said.
( ) US will consult Japan on a wide range of issues alliance is unbreakable M2 Presswire, 8-31-2009, US Department of State, ln
We congratulate Japan on this historic election and join the people of Japan in reaffirming the strong democratic tradition that we share. The United States looks forward to early and close consultations with the new government on a wide range of global challenges and opportunities. The U.S.-Japan partnership is key to pursuing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and in promoting shared values around the world. We will work closely with the new Japanese government in moving toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, addressing the threat of climate change and increasing the availability of renewable energy, bringing stability to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and addressing international humanitarian and health issues. These are but a few of the issues confronting this generation of Japanese and American leaders. As Secretary Clinton has said, the U.S.-Japan alliance is strong and remains a cornerstone of peace and security in East Asia. We welcome the opportunity to work with the new government in Tokyo to build upon our past successes and further cement this indispensable alliance.
( ) Consultation channels now Michael Richardson, visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies, 8-3-2009,
Nuclear deterrence in Asia: Unfolding drama of that US umbrella, Straits Times In March, Yukio Satoh, a leading Japanese strategic thinker, said that Japans adherence to these principles depended largely on the credibility of the US-Japan Security Treaty and Americas He added: A unique feature of the Japan-US security arrangements is that there have been no consultations on how American extended deterrence should function, nor even any mechanism put in place for such consultations. To arrest this dangerous drift, Washington sent senior officials to Tokyo for talks last month. They gave an assurance that the US commitment to protect Japan was absolutely unshakeable. The two sides also agreed to establish an official framework for discussions on how the nuclear umbrella should function and other deterrence measures. A similar consultation channel is expected to be set up by the US and South Korea.
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1AR Consult Japan SQ Solves

Weve already consulted Japan over IPR Wendy Cutler, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative, Japan, Korea and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Affairs
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Statement to House ways and means: U.S.-Japan trade issues Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony September 9/28, 2005 In particular, the United States and Japan are working together to help ensure China's integration into the global economy is a smooth one. One of the ways we have been doing this is by working closely together to strengthen intellectual property rights protection and enforcement in China and around the region. Over the past year, officials from the U.S. and Japanese Governments have met on numerous occasions to discuss this topic. Those discussions have led to Japan's endorsement of an important new IPR initiative we have been promoting in APEC.
Weve already allowed Japan to say no Kunihiko Saito, former Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., May 3, 2004, International Herald Tribune
Q: What are the differences in Japan-U.S. relations during the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush? A: Both administrations regard Japan as an important ally to the United States, and the basic situation hasn't changed much since my time during the Clinton administration, although I see more Japanologists in the current administration than in the previous administration One thing that disturbs me in the United States today is that the tendency toward unilateralism is growing stronger I'd trace the start of that tendency to not right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, but to after President George W. Bush took office in 2001 and opposed ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on nuclear weapons, or even March 2001, when the United States withdrew from the Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) Some say we are only following what the United States does, but that is certainly not the case. Through my experience, I know that we often say no'' to the United States. I heard that the Japanese government advised the United States to seek more international understanding before it decided to attack Iraq. But these things don't surface to the public, I'm afraid
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Consultation with Japan is time-consuming Thomas Foley, US Ambassador to Japan, 5-14-2000, CNN Sunday Morning, p ln
MARINA KAMIMURA, CNN CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Whether he was making the rounds on the diplomatic circuit or trying has arm on the baseball mound, Keizo Obuchi was never one to throw curves. His power came doing things the Japanese way. THOMAS FOLEY, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN: Thats the result of constant attention to individual and personal relationships, constant consultation. It is a time consuming and difficult way to conduct politics, but its a very effective way.
CP goes through the treaties bureau Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2001, www.mofa.go.jp/about/hq/org.html
Treaties Bureau (Organization) The Treaties Bureau is divided into the Treaties Division, the International Conventions Division and the Legal Affairs Division. (Functions) The Treaties Bureau takes charge of the conclusion of treaties and other international agreements, and matters of international law and legal matters concerning foreign relations.
Theyre incompetent and slow Yoichi Funabashi, 7-30-2002,

During this time, the Foreign Ministry dissolved the United Nations Bureau and created the Foreign Policy Bureau. At the time it was established, the bureau was supposed to take the lead in enhancing the ministrys policy-making ability. However, it failed to cope
with crisis management on numerous occasions and remains dysfunctional. Even so, it is outdone by the Treaties Bureau in that respect. Incidentally, both Dennison and Baty were legal advisers. No matter how high the rank,
ministry bureaucrats had no choice but to rely on foreign experts when it came to legal matters. This is partly because the ministry had few officials who were well versed in international law and fluent in English. But more importantly, Japanese diplomats lacked international experience and personal networks outside Japan. It was an earnest wish of the Meiji government to revise unequal treaties with major Western powers. Once that goal was met, Japan suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat at the Paris Peace Conference. (It was dubbed a silent partner.) The Foreign Ministry, which felt an urgent need to train professional negotiators for signing treaties, established the Treaties Bureau in 1919. The Treaties Bureau was positioned as the final stronghold of Japanese diplomacy, which gave rise not only to a strong sense of mission but also a kind of elitism. During the Cold War, under the Japan-U.S. security system, the Treaties Bureau became the last bastion in Diet deliberations on security matters. Working on treaties, North America and security became the shortcut to the top of the bureaucratic ladder in the Foreign Ministry. Perhaps paying tribute to Dennison and Baity was also a symbol of pride and tradition in the Treaties Bureau. At the same time, however, it developed an organization culture of Treaties Bureau-like rigidity, as former Japanese ambassador to France Moriyuki Motono put it. Its excessively legalistic thinking tends to suppress such diplomatic attributes as imagination, creativity, strategic intelligence, awareness of the importance of the situation at hand, perceptiveness in public relations and an
understanding of human nature.
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1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Air Power High

Air power strong No challengers Roscoe Bartlett, 3-11-08 Bartlett Opening Statement for Joint Hearing on Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request for
Tactical Aviation Programs. Lexis. "Today, the United States' airpower is unrivaled. It allows us to hold virtually any fixed surface target and many moving or buried targets on the planet at risk. While we used to require many planes to service a single target-or at least one plane per target-now a single aircraft can perform multiple missions. Indeed, we are no longer constrained by the physical location of the pilot. With the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles, which, of course, cannot replace manned aircraft in all circumstances, we are able to command and control aircraft around the world from air bases in the United States. In fact, it is these very advances which have led me to question, as have Admirals Stansfield Turner
and Art Cebrowski, if the day of the aircraft carrier has come and gone.
( ) Airpower high Peter Juul, Research Associate at American Progress , 9-18-2009, Pushing Back On U.S. Air Dominance
Alarmism, Think Progress Wonk Room, http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/2009/09/18/pushing-back-on-u-s-airdominance-alarmism/ However, Deptulas assertion that Russia and China are developing fifth generation fighters with near F-22 performance that will be produced en masse in the near future warrants skepticism. The
most immediate example, the Russian PAK-FA hasnt yet flown, has been repeatedly delayed in its first flight (it was to have flown last August but didnt), and no one really knows what it really looks like or what its performance will be. By comparison, it took the USAF six years to get from the concept YF-22 to the first production-type airframe in 1997, and then another 8 years to get to initial operating capability in 2005. The F-35 had its first production-style airframe flight in 2006, and wont reach IOC until 2012 according to current projections and plans about 6 years of projected development to get to an operational aircraft, even with the experience with similar systems on the F-22. Being generous, the PAK-FA is probably looking at at least another 10 years before it enters service with the Russian air force if ever. By which point the United States will probably be working on whatever will replace both the F-22 and F-35. At the same time, the Russians continue to invest in upgrades to their highly capable current-generation frontline fighter, the Su-27 Flanker which indicates Russia probably doesnt have a whole lot of confidence that the PAK-FA will be coming online anytime soon. And then there are measures beyond sheer platform performance. Things like pilot skill, tactics and integrated strategy, and especially training which is extremely important, as it doesnt matter how sophisticated planes are if your pilots never are able to fly and develop tactics for them are all areas where the U.S. Air Force is far ahead of potential challengers and competitors. These are all areas where the likes of Hugo Chavez who has bought advanced Su-27 derivatives simply cannot compete with the United States. And the Russian air forces performance in last years brief war with Georgia doesnt paint a positive picture of Moscows ability to conduct an integrated air campaign. Surface-to-air missiles are different animal, and are cheaper and easier to use in isolation from an integrated air strategy than high-performance fighters. Gen. Deptula is right to worry about the threat from the current generation of Russian SAMs, but unless he thinks they can target the F-22 and F-35 and therefore that the U.S. government has wasted huge sums of money in an effort to make these two planes as stealthy as possible it seems unlikely the United States will be in danger of losing air dominance as the F-35 begins entering service in quantity over the next decade. While we should exercise caution about the F-35s development schedule and acknowledge geopolitical uncertainties, its unclear as to who or what the United States will be fighting over the next ten years that will make its current and projected mix of conventional and stealthy aircraft so vulnerable as to erode its current air dominance. According to the Air Force itself, the United States currently has far more F-22s in service (134) than Venezuela does Su-27 derivatives (24). Irans top-line fighters are 25 aging MiG-29 Fulcrums, a type repeatedly bested by American pilots since the 1991 Gulf War. Other countries who have bought upgraded Su-27s like China and India are unlikely to become threats in the near future and in any case, it will be extremely difficult for tactical fighters like the F-22 or F-35 to be involved in an air campaign given the distances from the closest land bases.
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( ) Air Power High NowIraq War Spurring Massive Upgrades
James Kittfeld, 1-31-2004, National Journal With Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy pilots having returned from Iraq and Afghanistan as part of an integrated air power component, the aviators are demanding training that reflects the way they are expected to fight in wartime-working together in close support of ground troops. In the future, says Nash, major service training rotations will increasingly reflect this philosophy of joint operations. "In many ways, our forces can fight together better than they train together, because they fight jointly and tend to train unilaterally." WAR AND OPPORTUNITY Look an echelon higher still, and the engine of the rapid change rippling down through U.S. military ranks becomes even clearer. In their first eight months in the Pentagon, Rumsfeld and his staff in the Office of the secretary of Defense were largely stymied in their efforts to "transform" the U.S. military into a more agile and rapidly deployable force. Initially, the individual armed services resisted fiercely, viewing "transformation" as a stalking horse for further cuts in personnel and budgets. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, however, Congress has appropriated $289 billion more for defense than would have been spent had the defense budget been held to the inflation rate, according to Steven Kosiak, a defense analyst with the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Meanwhile, just in the nine months since major combat operations ended in the Iraqi Freedom campaign, Pentagon civilians have ordered the launch of a series of ambitious initiatives that, taken together, represent a fundamental makeover of a U.S. military that was already recognized as the world's best. Those initiatives include rewriting the strategic war plans that directly influence the size of the U.S. military; reconfiguring both the global footprint of U.S. military bases and the deployment and rotation models that lay at the center of military life; recalibrating the mix between active-duty and reserve forces; and reforming the process by which the Pentagon's weapons-buying plans are vetted for relevancy to "joint" war plans. QUICK TURNAROUND: The 3rd Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade, which led the U.S. victory in Baghdad, is already back in the California desert for training as the prototype for a reformed brigade structure. Retired Navy Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski is director of the Pentagon's Office for Force Transformation. "You never want a war, but if you're an advocate for military transformation and a war occurs, it can prove a powerful catalyst and opportunity for transformation. I think the U.S. military is seizing that opportunity," Cebrowski told National Journal. "You can call it necessity being the mother of invention. But under the kinds of stress that wars create in military organizations, a certain open-mindedness appears. Essentially, no one thinks of new ideas quicker, or learns faster, than someone being shot at."
( ) Air Power High Now Base Closures Nelson F. Gibbs, Assistant Secretary, Air Force, 2-12-2004, FDCH, p ln
The Secretary of the Air Force views the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure process as a unique opportunity to reshape Air Force infrastructure to optimize military readiness and to ensure the Air Force is most efficiently postured to meet new security challenges. Air Force leadership of the BRAC 2005 process starts at the topboth the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff are members of DoDs Infrastructure Executive Committee, and I serve along with the vice Chief of Staff on DoDs infrastructure Steering Group the ISGalong with counterparts from the Sister Services. As an example of the level of commitment within the Department towards BRAC 2005, the ISG is meeting seven times in February to examine the military value methodology proposed by the Joint Cross Service Groups charged with examining multi-service and joint issues. The ISG generally meets every three weeks to guide the BRAC 2005 process. Cont. Air Force Progress with Prior Base Close and Realignment Actions The Air Force is disposing of over 87,000 acres at 32 locations.
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( ) U.S. Air Power Unparalleled Now gender modified
General John P. Jumper, 2-10-2004, FDCH, p ln Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and distinguished members of the committee, the Air Force has an unlimited horizon for air and space capabilities. Our Service was borne of innovation, and we remain focused on identifying and developing the concepts of operations, advanced technologies, and integrated operations required to provide the joint force with unprecedented capabilities and to remain the worlds dominant air and space force. Throughout our distinguished history, Americas Air Force has remained the worlds premier air and space power because our professional air[people]men, our investment in warfighting technology, and our ability to integrate our people and systems together to produce decisive effects. These Air Force competencies are the foundation that will ensure we are prepared for the unknown threats of an uncertain future. They will ensure that our combatant commanders have the tools they need to maintain a broad and sustained advantage over any emerging adversaries.
( ) Air Power Kicks AssAfghanistan and Iraq Prove General John P. Jumper, 2-10-2004, FDCH, p ln
In 2003 U.S. and coalition military operations produces unprecedented mission successes across the spectrum of conflict and around the globe. The joint warfighting team demonstrated combat capability never previously witnessed in the history of conflict. Integrating capabilities from air, land, sea, and space, the U.S. and coalition allies achieved considerable progress in the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. In our most recent engagements, our armed forces fulfilled our immediate obligations to defend America, deter aggression, assure our allies, and defeat our enemies. The foundation of these achievements can be found in the Department of Defenses (DoD) commitment to teamwork and excellence. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was a joint and coalition warfighting effort from planning to execution. Air, ground, maritime, and space forces worked together at the same time for the same objectives, not merely staying out of each others way, but orchestrated to achieve wartime objectives. Our air and space forces achieved dominance throughout the entire theater, enabling maritime and ground forces to operate without fear of enemy air attack. Our air[people]men demonstrated the flexibility, speed, precision, and compelling effects of air and space power, successfully engaging the full range of enemy targets, from the regimes leadership to fielded forces. When our ground and maritime components engaged the enemy, they were confident our airmen would be thereeither in advance of their attack, or in support of their operations. And Americas Air Force was there, disciplined, dominant, and decisive. These operational accomplishments illustrate the growing maturation of air and space power. Leveraging the expertise of our airmen, the technologies present in our 21st century force, and the strategies, concepts of operation, and organizations in use today, the U.S. Air Force continues to adapt to meet the demands of this new era, while pursuing the war on terrorism and defending the homeland.
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( ) Air Power RocksNew Transformations
General John P. Jumper, 2-10-2004, FDCH, p ln Armed with the heritage of air and space power in combat, the lessons learned from our most recent conflicts, and the powerful advances in technology in the 21st century, we stand ready to deliver decisive air and space power in support of our nation. Whether clled to execute a commanding show of force, to enable the joint fight, to deliver humanitarian assistance, or to protect our nation from the scourge of terrorism, we will deliver the effects required. Our ability to consistently answer the call is our dividend to the nation, a result of our sustained investment in people, technology, and integration. Our portfolio of advantages provides dividends on the battlefield. We bring to bear a diversified collection of capabilities, which answer the needs of a spectrum of combat and humanitarian operations. As one would with any incestment, we will monitor, maintain, and adjust our investments as needed to reflect the demands of a dynamic environment. Transformational initiatives in the way we organize, train, and equip reflect such adjustments, changes that will result in significant gains for our force, for the joint team, and for our nation. Yet, we will not shift our focus from the core competencies that have provided the foundation for our success and continue to do so. The success of the Air Force resides in the airmen who employ the technology of warfighting through integrated operations with our joint and coalition partners.
Air Power HighSpace Capabilities and Innovation Keith Stein, 2-17-2004, Space And Missile
Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. John Jumper, told a congressional committee last week that the U.S. must be prepared to deprive an adversary the benefits of space capabilities when American interests and lives are at stake. The Air Force has an unlimited horizon for space capabilities, Jumper said, and the U.S. remains the worlds dominant space force. Jumper, along with service chiefs from the Army, Navy, and Marines, provided testimony last week to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Defense Authorization Request for fiscal year 2005 and the Future Years Defense Programs. With space systems providing the capability for precise bombing, weather monitoring, all-weather navigation, global communications, missile warning, and surveillance, Jumper warned that todays aging systems need to be replaced to remain dominant in space. Access to satellite communications, imagery, and use of the Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) signal for navigation are now available for anyone willing to purchase the necessary equipment or services, Jumper told the committee. With this relentless technological progress and the potential parity for foreign nations, as well as their potential application in future threats, the mere maintenance of our aging space systems will not suffice, Jumper said. Simply stated, our current fleet or legacy systems cannot always ensure space dominance in future engagements. One space threat surfaced during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For the first time, an enemy deployed jammers against the GPS system. GPS is a constellation of 24 Earth-orbiting satellites that help military and civilian users navigate across the globe and drop bombs on designated targets. U.S.-led forces successfully destroyed all six GPS jamming systems it said Iraq deployed. Air Force assets destroyed the ground jammers, in some cases, using the very munitions the jammers attempted to defeat, Jumper said. As the Department of Defenses Executive Agency for Space, the Air Force is working on innovative solutions for improved systems and problems.
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( ) Flexible rapid reaction of US airpower is crucial to averting and de-escalating WMD conflicts in the Persian Gulf, Koreas, South China Seas and between India and Pakistan Zalmay Khalizad and Ian Lesser, Senior Analysts at RAND. Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998,
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR897/MR897.chap3.pdf
This subsection attempts to synthesize some of the key operational implications distilled from the analyses relating to the rise of Asia and the potential for conflict in each of its constituent regions. The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This argument is justified by the fact that several subregions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuous on the Korean peninsula and, to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of these areas, such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and, therefore, has preplanned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, U.S. air power would be at the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service; (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capabilityfighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J-STARS, and tankersare relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve armed operations against large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case in Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf. In addition to conventional combat, the demands of unconventional deterrence will increasingly confront the U.S. Air Force in Asia. The Korean peninsula, China, and the Indian subcontinent are already arenas of WMD proliferation. While emergent nuclear capabilities continue to receive the most public attention, chemical and biological warfare threats will progressively become future problems. The delivery systems in the region are increasing in range and diversity. China already targets the continental United States with ballistic missiles. North Korea can threaten northeast Asia with existing Scud-class theater ballistic missiles. India will acquire the capability to produce ICBM-class delivery vehicles, and both China and India will acquire long-range cruise missiles during the time frames examined in this report. The second key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that air and space power will function as a vital rapid reaction force in a breaking crisis. Current guidance tasks the Air Force to prepare for two major regional conflicts that could break out in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula. In other areas of Asia, however, such as the Indian subcontinent, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar, the United States has no treaty obligations requiring it to commit the use of its military forces. But as past experience has shown, American policymakers have regularly displayed the disconcerting habit of discovering strategic interests in parts of the world previously neglected after conflicts have already broken out. Mindful of this trend, it would behoove U.S. Air Force planners to prudently plan for regional contingencies in nontraditional areas of interest, because naval and air power will of necessity be the primary instruments constituting the American response. Such responses would be necessitated by three general classes of contingencies. The first involves the politico-military collapse of a key regional actor, as might occur in the case of North Korea, Myanmar, Indonesia, or Pakistan. The second involves acute politicalmilitary crises that have a potential for rapid escalation, as may occur in the Taiwan Strait, the Spratlys, the Indian subcontinent, or on the Korean peninsula. The third involves cases of prolonged domestic instability that may have either spillover or contagion effects, as in China, Indonesia, Myanmar, or North Korea.
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( ) Air Power Key to Overall Deterrence David E. Thaler and Daniel M. Norton, analysts at RAND, 1998, Air Force Operations Overseas in
Peacetime, RAND Project Air Force Since Operation Desert Storm, the NCA and the CINCs have called upon assets of the United States Air Force to participate in a wide array of operations overseas. These operations have included peacekeeping, exercises with foreign militaries, humanitarian missions, and operations to deter. Forward basing and forward deployment of military forces have been and will remain a critical element in the attainment of U.S. national security objectives. USAF assets will continue to be a key ingredient in the successful pursuit of U.S. interests.
Air Power Key to Deterrence JROTC, 1998, http://www.jrotc.org/air_power.htm

Now as the Air Force shapes its vision for the 21st century, Montgomerys observations are valid even today. However, we have expanded what airpower contributes to the joint team. These contributions are: conventional and nuclear deterrence,
long-range, sustainable, lethal combat power, rapid global mobility, information dominance, worldwide engagement. Today I will talk about each of these contributions and how they form the building blocks for planning and programming our future forces. Nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of our national security. Americas triad of bombers, land-based missiles, and sea-launched missiles remains the strongest and most adaptable form of sustained deterrence. The Air Force contributions to this triad are our nuclearcapable, long-range bomber force, a ready and responsive force intercontinental ballistic missiles; a reliable warning network; a secure and survivable command and control capability; an effective capability to assess attacks; and dependable strategic reconnaissance platforms.
( ) Air Power Key to Effective Nuclear Triad and Overall Deterrence Integrated Publishing, 2003, http://www.tpub.com/content/advancement/14145/css/14145_15.htm
Today, the United States deterrent to the Soviet Unions threatening array of nuclear capabilities is a TRIAD of strategic nuclear forces. These forces consist of BALLISTIC MISSILES, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMs) and LONG-RANGE BOMBERS. The unique qualities of each leg of the TRIAD combined provide a level of flexibility that cannot be attained by each alone. The TRIAD enhances our employment
options and complicates enemy defensive and offensive planning. It serves as a hedge against possible violations of arms control limitations and reduces the impact of new technological advances. The U.S. Air Force, with its long-range bombers and ICBMs, and the U.S. Navy, with its sea-launched ballistic missiles, provide part of the TRIAD. U.S. AIR FORCE ROLE Our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are unsurpassed in readiness and immediate reaction capability. They can be launched quickly, and their capability to survive is very high. The Strategic Air Commands (SAC) intercontinental ballistic missile force consists of Minuteman missiles and Peacekeeper ICBMs, which are deployed in Minuteman silos. SACs manned bombers are the most flexible element of the TRIAD. SAC can use bombers as a manned penetration, as a cruise missile launch platform, or in support of conventional operations. It can use B-52 G/H and B-1B bombers to penetrate defenses. U.S. NAVY ROLE Deterrence of war has been the sole mission and basic reason for the existence of the fleet ballistic missile submarine since its inception in 1960. The submarine program is the Navys highest priority program. As an essential cornerstone of the national security policy, this program functions as a survivable and dependable leg of the strategic deterrent TRIAD. The submarine leg of TRIAD consists of older fleet ballistic missile submarines (nuclear propulsion) (SSBNs) armed with Poseidon C-3 or Trident C-4 missiles and new Trident submarines carrying Trident C-4 missiles. Remaining at sea about 55 percent of the time, these submarines have their missiles targeted at sites in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Tridents carry 24 submarine- launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) compared with 16 in earlier submarines. The United States now has 20 Trident submarines scheduled for construction. The carrier task group, and essential element of power projection. 1-3 Privacy Statement - Press Release - Copyright Information. - Contact Us Support Integrated Publishing
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Effective Air Force Key to US-Russia Relations Olga Oliker, Intl Policy Analyst @ RAND, and Tanya Charlick-Paley, Russian Analyst @ RAND, 2002,
Assessing Russias Doctrine, RAND, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1442/MR1442.ch10.pdf The U.S. Air Force has a role to play in the effort both to broaden cooperative ties with Russia and to assist in planning for various types of crisis response. The Air Force would undoubtedly be tasked with carrying out significant portions of such missions should they emerge. It is therefore very much in its best interests to begin identifying and thinking through possible scenarios. It is also in the Air Forces interests to ensure that it has its own ideas and approaches, which can then be factored into the planning of the regional unified command(s) with respect to Russia. In this way, the Air Force can ensure that it is well-prepared to successfully carry out any missions it might be assigned. The U.S. Air Force should maintain its current key role in efforts to build ties with Russia, including high-level and professional exchanges, exercises, and visits. It should take the lead in working with Russian counterparts to think about possible contingencies, in Russia and globally, and how the United States and Russia can cooperate to respond to them, recognizing the primary role of air power (particularly airlift operations) in many contingencies. The Air Force should pursue the design and implementation of military exercises with its Russian counterparts in joint operational environments. One possibly fruitful area to explore might be counter-terrorist operations, perhaps in conjunction with Central Asian or South Caucasus military forces. Air Force personnel should also continue to take the opportunities presented by cooperation with Russian counterparts to hedge against future downturns in relations to gather information that will support a range of contingency planning in the future.
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( ) Air power key to effective counterproliferation Michael A. Levi, Dir. of Strategic Security Policy Project, Nov. 2002, Global Policy Program Working Papers,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp31.pdf A large part of the rationale for an opponent's use of asymmetric capabilitieschemical and biological weapons, and HDBTis that the dominance of American airpower makes aboveground conventional targets excessively vulnerable. Thus when developing approaches to defeating chemical and biological weapons and HDBT, we should take full advantage of American airpower dominance. Since the target set is not numerous and not mobile, high-capacity delivery vehicleslike B-2, B-1B, and B-52 bombers need not be discounted in favor of smaller and cheaper vehicleslike F-16 or F-18 fighters. We should also relax the requirement that a new weapon be able to complete target destruction in a single pass because we are very likely to be able to penetrate enemy airspace repeatedly. Thus, while a nuclear bomb can provide maximum destruction in a single pass, multiple conventional bombs, delivered in a sequence of sorties, may produce a similar effect. Airpower dominance also allows us to rely on special operations forces, which, under the protection of American airpower, might operate deep within enemy territory to conduct sustained and accurate destruction operations.
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( ) Effective Air power key to overall hard power and deterrence Eliot Cohen, Prof. Strat. Studies @ Johns Hopkins, Jan/Feb 1994, The Mystique of U.S. Air Power, Foreign
Affairs, p 120-1 RELIANCE ON AIR POWER has set the American way of war apart from all others for well over half a century. Other countries might field doughty infantry, canny submariners or scientific artillerists comparable in skill and numbers to America's. Only the United States, however, has engaged in a single-minded and successful quest for air superiority in every conflict it has fought since World War I. Air warfare remains distinctively American -- high-tech, cheap in lives and (at least in theory) quick. To America's enemies -- past, current and potential -- it is the distinctively American form of military intimidation. Air warfare plays to the machine-mindedness of American civilization. Aircraft can direct massive and accurate destructive force at key points without having to maneuver cumbersome organizations on land or sea. Air power can indeed overawe opponents, who know quite well that they cannot hope to match or directly counter American strength. On the other hand, these enemies will find indirect responses. The Saddam
Husseins of the world have surely learned that they need not take American children hostage to deter bombardment; they can take their own citizens' young with no less effect. When F-117s struck the socalled al-Firdos bunker -- a perfectly appropriate military target -- on February 13, they apparently killed the wives and children of Iraqi leaders using the facility as a shelter. For the next four days all air operations against Baghdad ceased, and when they resumed, politically motivated controls reduced the number of targets to the barest handful. Mobility, when abetted by camouflage and tight communications security, can also shield a potential opponent from harm. Publicly available evidence does not suggest that air attacks destroyed any Scud missile launchers, for example.
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( ) Lack of consultation wont affect NATO effectiveness or relations James Kwok, Harvard International Review Staff Writer, Summer 2005, Defining Power, Vol. 27(2), MENDING
NATO: SUSTAINING THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP The greatest misperception of the transatlantic relationship is that the United States is incapable of seeing eye-to-eye on any issue with Europe. The eminent political scientist Robert Kagan has pointed out that the prevailing attitude toward the transatlantic relationship is usually described as that between cowboys and stiff Eurocrats. That the two peoples are diametrically opposed is completely false. Both sides of the Atlantic have the same fundamental beliefs in free markets, liberal government, and democracy. This dedication to liberalism and open societies was not only evident in the joint NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Croatia, but also most recently in Ukraine. Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell worked closely with his opposite numbers in BrusselsNATOs headquartersto ensure that the elections occurring in 2004 went smoothly and according to plan. NATO, while playing no military role in the Iraq War, recently has spearheaded the Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, which seeks to create a self-sufficient Iraqi army. If argument has made the relationship tenuous, it certainly has not paralyzed NATO.
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( ) NATO consultations go through the NAC requires unanimity NATO Handbook, 8-21-2001, Ch. 7, Policy and Decision Making, The Principle Policy and Decision Making
Institutions, North Atlantic Council, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070101.htm The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has effective political authority and powers of decision, and consists of Permanent
Representatives of all member countries meeting together at least once a week. The Council also meets at higher levels involving Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers or Heads of Government but it has the same authority and powers of decision-making, and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets. The Council has an important public profile and issues declarations and communiqus explaining the Alliance's policies and decisions to the general public and to governments of coun-tries which are not members of NATO. The Council is the only body within the Alliance which derives its authority explicitly from the North Atlantic Treaty. The Council itself was given responsibility under the Treaty for setting up subsidiary bodies. Many committees and planning groups have since been created to support the work of the Council or to assume responsibility in specific fields such as defence planning, nuclear planning and military matters. The Council thus provides a unique forum for wide-ranging consultation between member governments on all issues affecting their security and is the most important decision-making body in NATO. All member countries of NATO have an equal right to express their views round the Council table. Decisions are the expression of the collective will of member governments arrived at by common consent. All member governments are party to the policies formulated in the Council or under its authority and share in the consensus on which decisions are based. Each government is represented on the Council by a Permanent Representative with ambassadorial rank. Each Permanent Representative is supported by a political and military staff or delegation to NATO, varying in size. When the Council meets in this format, it is often referred to as the "Permanent Council". Twice each year, and sometimes more frequently, the Council meets at Ministerial level, when each nation is represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. Meetings of the Council also take place in Defence Ministers Sessions. Summit Meetings, attended by Heads of State or Government, are held whenever particularly important issues have to be addressed or at seminal moments in the evolution of Allied security policy. While the Council normally meets at least once a week, it can be convened at short notice whenever necessary. Its meetings are chaired by the Secretary General of NATO or, in his absence, by his Deputy. The longest serving Ambassador or Permanent Representative on the Council assumes the title of Dean of the Council. Primarily a ceremonial function, the Dean may be called upon to play a more specific presiding role, for example in convening meetings and chairing discussions at the time of the selection of a new Secretary General. At Ministerial Meetings of Foreign Ministers, one country's Foreign Minister assumes the role of Honorary President. The position rotates annually among the nations in the order of the English alphabet. An Order of Precedence in the Permanent Council is established on the basis of length of service, but at meetings of the Council at any level, Permanent Representatives sit round the table in order of nationality, following the English alphabetical order. The same procedure is followed throughout the NATO committee structure. Items discussed and decisions taken at meetings of the Council cover all aspects of the Organisation's activities and are frequently based on reports and recommendations prepared by subordinate committees at the Council's request. Equally, subjects may be raised by any one of the national representatives or by the Secretary General. Permanent Representatives act on instructions from their capitals, informing and explaining the views and policy decisions of their governments to their colleagues round the table. Conversely they report back to their national authorities on the views expressed and positions taken by other governments, informing them of new developments and keeping them abreast of movement towards consensus on important issues or areas where national positions diverge. When decisions have to be made, action is agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority. Each nation represented at the Council table or on any of its subordinate committees retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions.
( ) NAC sucks Bruce W. Jentleson, Dir. of Terry Sanford Inst. Of Public Policy and prof. of Public Policy and Political Science @ Duke, Oct. 2000, Policy Papers
But the processes of getting firm statements through the North Atlantic Council and getting NATO started on planning and mobilization were difficult and drawn out, undercutting the credibility of NATOs overall posture. As for the United Nations, a resolution that finally passed the UN Security Council in October stated only that action may be needed and lacked the now customary all necessary steps clauseeven the milder all appropriate steps phrasing that had been in the draft resolution was deleted.
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NATO members are always in consultation. NATO, 01-Mar-2005, Consensus decision-making at NATO, http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/
Consensus decision-making means that there is no voting at NATO. Consultations take place until a decision that is acceptable to all is reached. Sometimes member countries agree to disagree on an issue. In general, this negotiation process is rapid since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and understand each other's positions in advance. Facilitating the process of consultation is one of the NATO Secretary General's main tasks.
NATO members are in constant consultation. NATO, 18-Feb-2005, The consultation process, http://www.nato.int/issues/consultation/index.html
Consultation between member states is a key part of the decision-making process at NATO, allowing Allies to exchange views and information prior to reaching agreement and taking action. The process is continuous and takes place both on an informal and a formal basis with a minimum of delay or inconvenience, due to the fact that all member states have permanent delegations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The practice of exchanging information and consulting together on a daily basis ensures that governments can come together at short notice whenever necessary, often with
prior knowledge of their respective preoccupations, in order to agree on common policies or take action on the basis of consensus.
Were consulting NATO on our foreign policy. Robert Bradtke, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, March 2, 2005, Panel Six Of A Hearing Of The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Federal News Service
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned President Bush's visit to Brussels and Bratislava last week, and they, these visits did provide us the opportunity to put into perspective our foreign policy successes in Europe and Eurasia, as well as the challenges that we still face there. Those successes could not have been achieved without the contribution of our foreign assistance. And, without the contribution of our foreign assistance, we will not succeed in addressing the challenges that we still face. In Brussels, the President consulted with our partners and friends in the EU and NATO. These two institutions have acted like magnets in recent years. Very powerful forces pulling countries towards democracy, free markets, the rule of law, the resolution of ethnic and territorial conflicts. In other words, towards the values consistent with American values, and favorable to our foreign policy interests.
The US actively consults with NATO. Robert Zoellick, deputy secretary of State, February 15, 2005, HEARING OF THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SUBJECT: NOMINATION OF ROBERT ZOELLICK TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, Federal News Service Third, the secretary has asked that I assist in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy abroad. When the secretary announced her first trip abroad, to Europe and the Middle East, she also announced that, if confirmed, I would visit all the other NATO capitals, so together we would be consulting directly with 26 alliance partners early in 2005. I also hope to arrange a session with the European Parliament, as I did shortly after becoming the U.S. Trade Representative in 2001, and will maintain my close ties of the various institutions of the European Union.
The US is consulting NATO over other issues William R. Timken, Jr. US-Germany Ambassador, July 2, 2007, Transatlantic Relations - Partnership in
Leadership, US Diplomatic Mission to Germany http://germany.usembassy.gov/timken_070207.html The United States is also in close consultation with NATO on the topic of missile defense. At recent talks in
Brussels, NATO defense ministers discussed the possibility of complementing the U.S. shield with NATO elements as well as Russian partnering options. An expanded strategic dialogue to give experts from the United States, other NATO countries, and Russia the opportunity to start talking about ways and means ahead has only just begun.
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( ) Genuine consultation with the EU or NATO kills hegemony and US-EU Relations veto kills flexibility and rapid response of US forces, and encourages unrealistic expectations which hurt relations more Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations & Contributing Editor @ LA Times, 2004, Power, Terror, Peace and War, p. 130-134
Bush administration answered correctly has to do with the emerging relationship between Europe and the United States. While matters were not always handled well, the administration is right to believe that American foreign policy can no longer be Eurocentric.
Another big question that the
Despite the considerable political successes the Europeans have had in the construction of the European Union, and despite the great wealth and technological prowess these societies continue to show, Europe is unlikely to be the center of world politics in the twenty-first century. It is not simply that Europe is in demographic decline, that the remaining population
The real factor driving the decline of Europes prominence in world affairs will be the rapid development of the non-Western world, especially East and South Asia. Increasingly, the United States will be turning away from Europe toward new partners and, sometimes, new rivals in the developing world. There will always be a special place in American foreign policy for our European allies, but they will have to learn to accept us for what we are. As long as we face the threat of grand terror, the United States cannot suppress its Jacksonian instincts, for example, in order to spare European sensibilities. Nor can we grant Europe a veto over American foreign policy, and if that is the price or Europes help, we must learn from time to time to do without. Ironically, turning away from Europe may be the best way to build a better relationship with it. Europeans have overestimated the political price the United States will pay for their help. Since the world remains a dangerous place, and Europe is
is aging, that it has difficulties assimilating immigrants, and that its pension and medical obligations are ticking time bombs. unwilling (and perhaps unable) to arrange for its own defense without American involvement, it may be that in the future Europe will lower its price and place fewer demands on the United States than in the past. It was bruusquely done, and the timing was poor, but the administration was probably also right to dispel European illusions about the prospects that the United States would ratify the Kyoto Protocol, join the International Criminal Court as currently established, or more generally accept the European program of gradually subjecting Americas freedom of action through institutions in which European states possessed one or more vetoes. While President Clinton was in the White House, the Senate rejected the Kyoto Protocol (by 95-0) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There is no prospect that the Senate will ratify the treaty to establish the International Criminal Court in its present form. Partly because it needed European cooperation in the Balkans, partly because ideologically many Clinton era officials agreed with European positions on issues like Kyoto and
out of habit of consultation and deference that grew up during the cold war, the Clinton administration never quite made clear to Europeans how unreasonable their hopes were. At the same time, most American diplomats and the broader
the ICC, and partly
interlocutor class of experts who specialize in transatlantic relations are generally more sympathetic to the European approach than they are to the red state, red meat approach of the American Jacksonians and the Revival Wilsonians who, since September 11, have figured so prominently in the politics of American foreign policy. The Bush administration made the strategic decision that is no longer made sense to encourage
Europe in illusions about the direction of American policy. Whether Europe liked that policy or disliked it was less important than that Europe understood it. Moreover, stroking Europe only seemed to increase Europes already inflated sense of its importance in the world of American foreign policy. This transition was a necessary and normal one, and it ultimately does offer the prospect of a more realistic but still very close relationship among the Cold War allies. If the Clinton
administration and the broader American foreign policy establishment had done a better job of communicating the changing American approach in earlier years, the transition might not have been so painfulbut it is also true that the Bush administration could and should have done more to cushion the shock for what, after all, are some of our closest and most important allies in a dangerous world. The bitterness of the
it was probably on balance a good thing to remind Europeans in general and Germans in particular that transatlantic crises have a way of turning into European crises. With
controversy was regrettable, and. hasty remarks by Bush officials exacerbated it, but
Germany, France, and Russia locked in an anti-American alliance, Poland understandably becomes nervous, and rightly so. When Russia and Germany get close, Poland has a way of getting smaller. A good German relationship with the United States remains the best basis for continuing progress toward European integration. The shift away from institutions toward coalitions of the willing is another aspect of Bush administration policy that is likely to last. As they exist now, most (though by no means all) international institutions are deeply dysfunctional. The UN General Assembly, whose one-state-one-vote policy means that, officially in the UN system, India (population 1.07 billion) is more or less equal to Liechtenstein (population 33,000), has been completely irrelevant for decades.* The Security Council is increasingly crippled because, with three of the five veto wielding permanent members coming from Europe, it is too much of a retirement home for former world powers while major powers like India (with 17 percent of the worlds population) and Japan (which accounts for 14.3 percent of world output)* are excluded. To be effective, institutions must reflect power realities; neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly now do. The WTO has achieved what many political scientists might have thought impossible, and found an even more absurd and unworkable form of governance than the UN General Assembly. Carefully preserving the one-state-one-vote principle so that countries responsible for an infinitesimal proportion of world trade have equal weight with the trading superpowers whose policies actually matter, the WTO has added a political principle last enshrined in the eighteenth-century Polish Diet. Every member, however small and weak, can veto any agreement. The WTO is a perverse cross between the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. Let us hope that private industry never discovers that the votes
institutions, at are oriented toward achieving consensus through a process of deliberation, usually a very slow and thorough process of deliberation. The decisions they take are likely to be based on compromise, and whether they are security alliances like NATO or political organizations like the United Nations, there is a tendency to move at the speed of the slowest and most reluctant member. Such institutions are very unlikely to provide the kind of rapid response that conditions in the twenty-first century will require. This is especially true of universal institutions like the UN
and the vetoes of some WTO members just might be for sale. But beyond the specific problems of specific institutions, there is a broader issue. International
least as we know them
or the WTO, institutions that aspire to include all states. The cultural and political divisions among human beings are too great for such institutions to be able to agree on more than a handful of issues, especially quickly. Inevitably, much of the work of the world will have to take place outside ofthough not necessarily againstsuch institutions. The Clinton administration went outside the UN system to fight the Yugoslav war over Kosovo; future American administrations may eschew some of the rhetoric that the Bush administration has used about international institutions, but no American president can ever accept a situation in which France pretends to an ability to veto American actions deemed necessary to the national security. Nor can future presidents entrust the defense of vital American interests to the institutions that move
at the pace of the slowest (and perhaps most anti-American) member.
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Status quo consultation mechanism solves the NB NATO countries wont be pissed about the lack of veto over the plan binding consultations risk say no and are extremely time consuming Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at FAS, and Ivan Oelrich, vice president of the Strategic Security Program at FAS, June 2009, Lots of Hedging, Little Leading: An Analysis of the
Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/KristensenOelrich
Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at FAS, and Ivan Oelrich, vice president of the Strategic Security Program at FAS, June 2009, Lots of Hedging, Little Leading: An Analysis of the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission Report, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/KristensenOelrich The report greatly skews the views of the allies by selectively including some but excluding others. Even those that are mentioned are portrayed only as opposed to deep cuts, even though the overwhelming majority of the allies in NATO have repeatedly and consistently called for the elimination of nuclear weapons and many allies have called for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe. In Germany, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier recently called for a dialogue on the withdrawal of nuclear U.S. weapons from Europe,[27] the Belgian Senate in 2005 unanimously called for a withdrawal,[28] and opinion surveys indicate that an overwhelming majority of Europeans want the weapons out.[29] Likewise, in Asia, Japan has long been a vocal advocate for elimination of nuclear weapons. On April 27, Prime Minister Taro Aso outlined an 11-point plan for global nonproliferation and disarmament. Unfortunately, the commission ignores these important allied voices. The report
recommends increased consultations between the United States and its allies on extended deterrence. All NATO member states except France already participate in ongoing and detailed nuclear consultations in the Nuclear Planning Group, which is the ultimate authority within NATO on nuclear policy issues. This consultation covers a broad range of nuclear policy matters, including the safety, security, and survivability of nuclear weapons, communications, and information systems, as well as deployment. It also covers wider questions of common concern, such as nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation. So why is there a need for more consultation? We agree that there is a problem in NATO's decade-long refusal to discuss in detail the future of
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe. Some NATO members, especially Canada and Germany, still have scars from the beating they received in 1998 when they dared propose that NATO reassess its nuclear policy. We do not believe the reluctance to
confront head-on the question of nuclear deployment in Europe reflects any uncertainty about U.S. guarantees. In our view, the main factor is a dread of the complexity of negotiating any change in the status quo.
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Article 4 is the only consultation mechanism in NATO Philip H. Gordon, Sen. Fellow FoPo @ Brookings, 2-24-2003, The crisis in the alliance, Iraq Memo #11,
http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/gordon/20030224.htm) One of the unexpectedand arguably unnecessarycasualties of the current transatlantic dispute has been NATO. Seeking to calm fears in Turkey about the effects of an Iraq war, and stung by the criticism that it snubbed its NATO allies during the Afghanistan operation the previous year, the United States in late 2002 asked NATO to consider planning for the defense of Turkey in case of retaliation by Iraq. Most of the NATO allies supported the preventive measure, but France, Germany, and Belgium argued that taking action at NATO would be a premature acceptance of the notion that war was inevitable, and blocked planning from taking place. After a nearly three-month standoff, and a request by Turkey itself under NATO's consultation mechanism (Article 4), Germany and Belgium finally agreed to let NATO plan for the deployment of NATO AWACS, air and missile defense systems, and chemical and biological weapons detection units to Turkey. France, not a member of the Defense Planning Committee where the decision was finally taken, stood aside.
Article 4 can only be used to consult when members are threatened militarily MSN Encarta, 2004, NATO, Encarta online,
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761573186/North_Atlantic_Treaty_Organization.html The North Atlantic Treaty consists of a preamble and 14 articles. The preamble states the purpose of the treaty: to promote the common values of its members and to unite their efforts for collective defense. Article 1 calls for peaceful resolution of disputes. Article 2 pledges the parties to economic and political cooperation. Article 3 calls for development of the capacity for defense. Article 4 provides for joint consultations when a member is threatened. Article 5 promises the use of the members armed forces for collective self-defense. Article 6 defines the areas covered by the treaty. Article 7 affirms the precedence of members obligations under the United Nations Charter. Article 8 safeguards against conflict with any other treaties of the signatories. Article 9 creates a council to oversee implementation of the treaty. Article 10 describes admission procedures for other nations. Article 11 states the ratification procedure. Article 12 allows for reconsideration of the treaty. Article 13 outlines withdrawal procedures. Article 14 calls for the deposition of the official copies of the treaty in the U.S. Archives.
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1AR Consult NATO Say No Rubber Stamp

( ) NATO will say no to avoid rubber-stamping US policy and the US will abandon consultation Margo Kingston, 2-21-2003, SMH, The crisis in NATO,
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/02/21/1045638474560.html?oneclick=true
The furious American response to Germany, France, and Belgium's refusal, under article 4 of the NATO treaty, to protect Turkey from an Iraqi counterattack because that would prejudge the Security Council's decision on war and peace is only a contrived reason for confronting fundamental issues that have simmered for many years. The dispute was far more about symbolism than substance, and the point has been made: Some NATO members refuse to allow the organisation to serve as a rubber stamp for American policy, whatever it may be. Turkey's problem is simple: The US is pressuring it, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion, to allow American troops to invade Iraq from Turkey and to enter the war on its side. The US wants NATO to aid Turkey in order to strengthen the Ankara government's resolve to ignore overwhelmingly antiwar domestic opinion, for the arms it is to receive are superfluous. But the Turks are far more concerned with Kurdish separatism in Iraq rekindling the civil war that Kurds have fought in Turkey for much of the past decade, and the conditions they are demanding on these issues have put Washington in a very difficult position from which - as of this writing - it has not extricated itself. Turkey's best - and most obvious - defense is to stay out of the war, which the vast majority of Turks want. It may end up doing so. America still desires to regain the mastery over Europe it had during the peak of the Cold War but it is also determined not to be bound by European desires - or indeed by the overwhelming European public opposition to a war with Iraq. Genuine dialogue or consultation with its NATO allies is out of the question. The Bush Administration, even more than its predecessors, simply does not believe in it - nor will it accept NATO's formal veto structure; NATO's division on Turkey has nothing to do with it. Washington cannot have it both ways. Its commitment to
aggressive unilateralism is the antithesis of an alliance system that involves real consultation. France and Germany are now far too powerful to be treated as obsequious dependents. They also believe in sovereignty, as does every nation which is strong enough to exercise it, and they are now able to insist that the United States both listen to and take their views seriously. It was precisely this danger that the U.S. sought to forestall when it
created NATO over 50 years ago. The controversy over NATO's future has been exacerbated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's attacks on "Old Europe" and the disdain for Germany and France that he and his adviser, Richard Perle, have repeated, but these are but a reflection of the underlying problems that have been smoldering for years. Together, the nations that oppose a preemptive American war in Iraq and the Middle East - an open-ended, destabilizing adventure that is likely to last years - can influence Europe's future development and role in the world profoundly. If Russia cooperates with them, even only occasionally, they will be much more powerful, and President Putin's support for their position on the war makes that a real possibility. Eastern European nations may say what Washington wishes today, but economically they are far more dependent on Germany and those allied with it. When the 15 nations in European Union met on February 17 their statement on Iraq was far closer to the German-French position than the American, reflecting the antiwar nations' economic clout as well as the response of some prowar political leaders to the massive antiwar demonstrations that took place the preceding weekend in Italy, Spain, Britain and the rest of Europe. There is every likelihood that the U.S. will emerge from this crisis in NATO more belligerent, and more isolated and detested, than ever. NATO will then go the way of SEATO and all of the other defunct American alliances. The reality is that the world is increasingly multipolar, economically and technologically, and that the US' desire to maintain absolute military superiority over the world is a chimera. Russia remains a military superpower, China is becoming one, and the proliferation of destructive weaponry should have been confronted and stopped 20 years ago. The US has no alternative but to accept the world as it is, or prepare for doomsday. The conflict in NATO, essentially, reflects this diffusion of all forms of power and the diminution of American hegemony, which remains far more a dream than a reality.
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Turkey would veto out of spite Stratfor, July 17, 2007, Turkey: Kurds, Iran and Prodding the United States
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on July 17 defended a preliminary natural gas deal with Iran to carry natural gas to Europe following strong criticism of the agreement from the White House. With U.S.-Turkish relations taking a serious hit from the Iraq war and its aftermath, Turkey is clearly sending a political message to the United States that it still has a number of ways to pressure Washington into cracking down on Kurdistan Workers' Party rebels in northern Iraq. Analysis Iran and Turkey have signed a preliminary agreement to pump Iranian natural gas to Europe via Turkey, a senior Turkish energy official who requested anonymity said July 16. A U.S. State Department spokesman criticized the agreement the same day, saying now is not the right time to invest in Iran's energy sector, and that Iran has not necessarily proved itself to be the most reliable partner in this regard. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded by defending the agreement, saying Iran had made an attractive offer. He added, "Should we not think of our country's interests at this point? Is the United States going to ask why we did not seek their permission? I believe [the United States] will understand." Turkey signed a deal with Tehran in 2001 to ship 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Iranian natural gas from Tabriz to Europe via Turkey. Washington greatly disapproved of the deal at the time, not liking the idea of a NATO ally defying its sanction strategy against the Islamic republic. Iran and Turkey now apparently have decided to take their energy cooperation a step further by signing an agreement to pump 30 bcm of natural gas per year to Europe via Turkey, leaving no need for alternative supplies to feed the Nabucco pipeline project. The European Union designed Nabucco to reduce its dependence on Russia for natural gas. Though clearly Europe will fund Nabucco, and Turkey makes the most sense as the primary transit point into Europe, there is still the question of which country actually will fill the pipeline with natural gas. In no particular order, the prospective suppliers for Nabucco are Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Complications attend each of these suppliers. Turkmenistan, for example, would have to violate existing energy agreements with Russia to become a dedicated supplier for this project. Iraq remains an incoherent mess. Egypt and Saudi Arabia would require infrastructure largely built from scratch to do the job. Finally, Iran has a wall of political sanctions that would have to be broken down through a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. In spite of this, Iran is probably best positioned to supply Nabucco. The 2001 Iranian-Turkish deal already allows about 10 bcm to be shipped into Turkey, and unlike Saudi Arabia or Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey share a border. Moreover, Iran also has larger natural gas reserves than all the other prospective suppliers combined. Turkey previously has talked about getting Russia to supply natural gas for the pipeline, which defeats the Europeans' original purpose of building it. By now saying Iran will be a major partner in Nabucco, Turkey appears to be sending a clear political message to Washington that Ankara is unhappy with the U.S. handling of Iraq and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish rebel group that focuses its attacks on Turkey -- using bases in northern Iraq as its refuge and a staging ground for operations. Turkey harbors deep reservoirs of resentment toward the United States. Turks at practically every level of society argue that the United States has done nothing to contain the PKK, while Washington hypocritically expects full compliance from Ankara to help calm the situation in Iraq. Ankara also fears that any political settlement the United States attempts to push through in Baghdad will allow Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to make considerable progress toward greater political and economic autonomy -- something that could encourage Kurdish separatism inside Turkey. As a result, Turkey has spent the past few months engaged in heavy military posturing to convince the KRG and Washington that Ankara will not hesitate to send troops into northern Iraq to take care of the PKK, even if this ends up derailing Washington's political negotiations over Iraq. Meanwhile, the Iranians are eager to take advantage of this deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations by forming a strategic partnership with Ankara. Turkey also steadily has improved relations with Syria and has sought to assume the role of mediator between Israel and Syria, despite Washington's wish to keep Damascus isolated. Iran, Turkey and Syria all find common cause in ensuring that Iraqi Kurdistan is boxed in by its neighbors. Iran also sees itself and Turkey as the rightful powerhouses of the Middle East -- as non-Arabs and as successors to the Ottoman and Safavid empires, respectively. Of course, plenty of divisive issues hamper such a partnership, including Turkey's secularist and Iran's Islamist ideology, as well as their opposing stances toward the West. But with the U.S.-Turkish relationship taking a beating, Iran sees a gap that it very much wants to fill. In fact, the Iranians already have begun to prove their worth to the Turks by launching cross-border operations against PKK rebels in northeastern Iraq. This explains why Erdogan rather cheekily ridiculed Washington's expectation that Ankara ask for the U.S. position before signing this deal with Iran. Erdogan's comments also come just five days before the July 22 Turkish parliamentary polls. The ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party wants to extract maximum electoral mileage by tapping the growing anti-U.S. sentiment within the Turkish public. Though Erdogan is relatively confident that the AK Party will hold onto its parliamentary majority, he also knows his party will lose some seats, and he is trying to minimize this loss as much as possible. This obvious political jab by the Turks intended to apply greater pressure on Washington to give into Turkish demands and crack down on PKK rebels in northern Iraq is sure to grab Washington's attention. The only way to break Turkey out of this growing strategic partnership with Iran and Syria will be through action against the PKK. In the interest of gluing Iraq back together, Washington does not appear prepared to take such action just yet -- meaning U.S.-Turkish relations are bound to suffer further as a result.
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All NATO decisions have to be unanimous any country could veto NATO, 11-28-2007, Consensus decision-making, http://www.nato.int/issues/consensus/index.html
All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent, a decision that is accepted by each member country. This means that when a "NATO decision" is announced, it is the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance. This principle is applied at every committee level, and demonstrates clearly that NATO decisions are collective decisions made by its member countries.
Even if theres no official veto, its de-facto consensus, which amounts to the same thing Ira Straus, US coordinator of Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO, 11-25-2002, Mending
NATOs Mess, Johnsons Russia List, http://www.cdi.org/russia/Johnson/6569-9.cfm There is a confusion behind the talk of a veto in NATO. It is usually said by NATO that all decisions are made by consensus, implying that each member has a right of veto. In reality there is no legal requirement of consensus, nor right of veto. Nevertheless the official view is partially true: the common NATO practice does try to reach a consensus at least for public consumption and so gives each member a de facto veto. The use of the veto is strongly discouraged, but it does retain a phantom existence as long as NATO retains the rhetoric of pure consensus. The ambiguous status of the veto makes the prospect of too many countries around the table a very real danger, but also a danger that can be overcome fairly quickly since no new treaty would be needed.
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( ) Consultation with NATO uniquely time consuming
William Drozdiak, 6-18-1999, Washington Post Foreign Service, Wash. Post The talks have dragged on in part because Albright and Cohen are striving to keep leading NATO allies informed of the negotiations. The alliance has divided Kosovo into five sectors controlled by the United
States, France, Britain, Italy and Germany, and U.S. officials said that any deal to implant a Russian presence on the Kosovo military map will require careful scrutiny by participating nations. Albright and Cohen have scheduled a meeting in Brussels Friday afternoon with the North Atlantic Council, the alliance's top decision-making body, so that all of NATO's 19 governments can be fully briefed. The slow pace of the NATO consultations was said to have frustrated Ivanov, who at one point wanted to break off the talks and fly back to Moscow. But after further consultations with Moscow, Ivanov and Sergeyev agreed to stay on. "We are in the final dash, and we are concentrating our efforts in order to achieve an agreement as we were instructed by our two presidents," Sergeyev said.
( ) Russia slows down NATO Washington Times, 5-20-2002

President Bush will begin his journey to Germany, France and Russia today, where he will discuss NATO policy with key allies and make official the administration's new love affair with Russia. At the top of the agenda for the trip will be how much power Moscow should receive in the new NATO-Russian Council, a decision which will reflect how relevant the Bush administration believes NATO to be. The greater the power Russia gets, the more irrelevant the alliance is. Mr. Bush must, at the very least, make clear that Russia will not have the capability to block decisions made by NATO members. Last week, at a NATO pep rally in Reykjavik, Iceland, the alliance's foreign ministers agreed to a proposal by the United States and Britain to create the NATO-Russian Council, which will be made official May 28 in Rome. NATO Secretary-General George Robertson boasted of the new arrangement, in which the 19 members of the alliance would sit together with Russia, as one which would consist of "20 equals." Back home, the
administration is trying to allay fears about the power this arrangement would give Moscow by saying that the changes are merely cosmetic - and that NATO members would be able to overrule Russia where disagreements arise. That is not what Russia is hearing, nor does it reflect where NATO policy is now. While America was sleeping, Russia was able to skip the entire membership action plan process all other potential new
members had to fulfill and was given a bigger voice in formulating policy on nine topics, including the war on terrorism, theater missile defense and crisis management. What exactly does Russia's "preferred status" mean for the United States and NATO? At best, it further contributes to the alliance's deterioration from a military alliance into a political one, adding another dissenting voice to slow down decision-making. Remember Russia's recent track record with NATO: It didn't support U.S. bombing in Kosovo, then it lied to NATO by saying it would wait until alliance troops entered the country and upstaged the alliance by claiming it had control of the Pristina airport before the alliance troops arrived. Moscow has tried to drive a wedge between NATO's European allies and the United States on missile defense, has nurtured ties with NATO enemies Iraq and Iran and attempted to block the alliance's expansion into Eastern Europe. Even if Russia is being invited into the fold to "expand democracy," NATO needs a reality check. It has politely shut its eyes to vast human rights abuses in Russia's war on the Chechens, and there is no guarantee that this inhumane behavior will stop now. And now, NATO - at the prompting of the United States and Britain - wants to reward Russia with virtual membership in the institution it has discounted as irrelevant on the one hand and reviled as imperialistic on the other.
( ) NATO works through the NAC requires 19 yes votes Weblearn, 2004, Module 1, http://www.weblearn.ca/teachersite/NATO/Readings/politicalstructure.htm,
accessed 11-15 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance, but in order to be effective it requires a high level of political
cooperation among the Member States. In order for any intergovernmental organization to run smoothly, clear decision making structures have to be created so that all members have a chance to present their views and to vote on proposals. The central governing body of the NATO alliance is the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Council is made up of representatives of all 19 NATO Member States. All Council decisions are taken by consensus, which means that for action
to be taken no Member State can object.
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***Consult South Korea***
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2AC Consult South Korea Consult Now

( ) We consult South Korea now Asia Pulse, 8-7-2009, S. Korean Pres, ln
The freeing of the U.S. journalists quickly became a source of anxiety here, especially for the families of those held in the North. "Saying the government is doing all it can means it has done so, is still doing so and that it will continue to do so in the future," the president's spokesman told reporters. The president stressed that Seoul was fully consulted on Clinton's trip by Washington. "Any contact between North Korea and the United States in the future will be conducted under such thorough coordination between the two countries (South Korea and the U.S.)," Lee said, according to the spokesman.
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US is setting up an official consultation mechanism with South Korea now over extended deterrence issues CP is totally unnecessary Canberra Times, senior research fellow @ Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 8-5-2009, N-Clouds Over A
US Umbrella, ln In March, Yukio Satoh, a leading Japanese strategic thinker, said that Japan's adherence to these principles depended largely on the credibility of the US-Japan Security Treaty and America's commitment to defend Japan from any offensive action, including nuclear threats. He added, ''A unique feature of the Japan-US security arrangements is that there have been no consultations on how American extended deterrence should function, nor even any mechanism put in place for such consultations.'' To arrest this dangerous drift, the US sent senior officials to Tokyo for talks last month. They gave an assurance that the US commitment to protect Japan was ''absolutely unshakeable''. The two sides also agreed to establish an official framework for discussions on how the nuclear umbrella should function and other deterrence measures. A similar consultation channel is expected to be set up by the US and South Korea.
US is already consulting South Korea over the DPRK Thai Press Reports, 7-29-2009, South Korea, ln
South Korea said on Monday it is not opposed to any form of dialogue between North Korea and the United States, saying the Obama administration has promised to pursue it while maintaining close consultations with Seoul. North Korea has been holding out hope for bilateral talks with the U.S., while making clear its rejection of the six-way
disarmament talks also involving South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. "There is a specific and reserved form of dialogue that can address the current situation," the North's foreign ministry said in a statement by an unidentified spokesperson. It was one of the most clear signals of Pyongyang's desire for talks with Washington in recent months, which have marked by a series of provocations by the defiant regime including its second nuclear test on May 25. In New York, the North's ambassador to the U.N., Sin Son-ho, called a rare interview with foreign media over the weekend and said, "We are not against dialogue. We are not against any negotiation on issues of common concern." He reaffirmed that his country will never return to the six-way talks, however. South Korea urged North Korea to rejoin the Beijing-based negotiations, which have been stalled for half a year. "We hope that North Korea will return to the six-way talks at an early date," Seoul's foreign ministry spokesman Moon Tae-young said at a press briefing. "We are not opposed to dialogue between North Korea and the U.S." Moon added that the U.S. has assured that it will seek talks with the North, if needed,
in close consultation with the South.
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***Consult Turkey***
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2AC Consult Turkey Lie Perm

( ) Iraq consultations disprove your net benefit a) US plowed forward with its support of an Iraqi Constitution Advertiser, 3-9-2004
With Iraq one of the top issues surrounding the US federal election, President George W. Bush is keen to have measurable progress to show there. Yesterday, Iraq's Governing Council signed a landmark interim constitution after resolving a political impasse sparked by objections from the country's most powerful cleric. The signing was a key step in US plans to hand over power to the Iraqis by July 1.
b) US consulted Turkey they said no and we did it anyway. Check this card out BBC, 3-8-2004, originally Anatolia news Ankara, p ln
Cicek said that Turkey considered the interim constitution of Iraq as an arrangement raising Turkey's concerns and uneasiness. Following the meeting of Council of Ministers, Cicek replied to questions of reporters about the interim constitution of Iraq. When a reporter noted, "Turkey has said that it will act together with Shi'i related with the interim constitution of Iraq. But, the Shi'i have signed the interim constitution today," and asked about his view, Cicek said: "On 5 March, the Foreign Ministry made a statement about the developments in Iraq and the law which is stated to be signed today and which is known as the interim constitution. And, in this statement, the Foreign Ministry expressed Turkey's concerns. Also, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul sent a letter to US state secretary in which he expressed Turkey's concerns and uneasiness." Cicek went on saying: "Therefore, this letter has been conveyed to the mentioned person and US state secretary spoke to Gul by phone today. Also, the Foreign Ministry is evaluating all aspects of this issue. Turkey is continuing consultations with the countries that are side to the issue through the Foreign Ministry." "This issue can come onto agenda of an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting if necessary after all its aspects are evaluated. As Turkey, we are sensitive about this issue. We consider the interim constitution an arrangement which doesn't satisfy us, which raises our concerns and uneasiness, and which will not help settlement of permanent peace and which will cause continuation of instability and lack of tranquillity in this country for a long time. We have tried to explain this to the concerned countries by letters or by other means. Our evaluations continue," Cicek added.
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Turkey will say no out of spite Stratfor, July 17, 2007, Turkey: Kurds, Iran and Prodding the United States
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on July 17 defended a preliminary natural gas deal with Iran to carry natural gas to Europe following strong criticism of the agreement from the White House. With U.S.-Turkish relations taking a serious hit from the Iraq war and its aftermath, Turkey is clearly sending a political message to the United States that it still has a number of ways to pressure Washington into cracking down on Kurdistan Workers' Party rebels in northern Iraq. Analysis Iran and Turkey have signed a preliminary agreement to pump Iranian natural gas to Europe via Turkey, a senior Turkish energy official who requested anonymity said July 16. A U.S. State Department spokesman criticized the agreement the same day, saying now is not the right time to invest in Iran's energy sector, and that Iran has not necessarily proved itself to be the most reliable partner in this regard. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded by defending the agreement, saying Iran had made an attractive offer. He added, "Should we not think of our country's interests at this point? Is the United States going to ask why we did not seek their permission? I believe [the United States] will understand." Turkey signed a deal with Tehran in 2001 to ship 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Iranian natural gas from Tabriz to Europe via Turkey. Washington greatly disapproved of the deal at the time, not liking the idea of a NATO ally defying its sanction strategy against the Islamic republic. Iran and Turkey now apparently have decided to take their energy cooperation a step further by signing an agreement to pump 30 bcm of natural gas per year to Europe via Turkey, leaving no need for alternative supplies to feed the Nabucco pipeline project. The European Union designed Nabucco to reduce its dependence on Russia for natural gas. Though clearly Europe will fund Nabucco, and Turkey makes the most sense as the primary transit point into Europe, there is still the question of which country actually will fill the pipeline with natural gas. In no particular order, the prospective suppliers for Nabucco are Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Complications attend each of these suppliers. Turkmenistan, for example, would have to violate existing energy agreements with Russia to become a dedicated supplier for this project. Iraq remains an incoherent mess. Egypt and Saudi Arabia would require infrastructure largely built from scratch to do the job. Finally, Iran has a wall of political sanctions that would have to be broken down through a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. In spite of this, Iran is probably best positioned to supply Nabucco. The 2001 Iranian-Turkish deal already allows about 10 bcm to be shipped into Turkey, and unlike Saudi Arabia or Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey share a border. Moreover, Iran also has larger natural gas reserves than all the other prospective suppliers combined. Turkey previously has talked about getting Russia to supply natural gas for the pipeline, which defeats the Europeans' original purpose of building it. By now saying Iran will be a major partner in Nabucco, Turkey appears to be sending a clear political message to Washington that Ankara is unhappy with the U.S. handling of Iraq and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish rebel group that focuses its attacks on Turkey -- using bases in northern Iraq as its refuge and a staging ground for operations. Turkey harbors deep reservoirs of resentment toward the United States. Turks at practically every level of society argue that the United States has done nothing to contain the PKK, while Washington hypocritically expects full compliance from Ankara to help calm the situation in Iraq. Ankara also fears that any political settlement the United States attempts to push through in Baghdad will allow Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to make considerable progress toward greater political and economic autonomy -- something that could encourage Kurdish separatism inside Turkey. As a result, Turkey has spent the past few months engaged in heavy military posturing to convince the KRG and Washington that Ankara will not hesitate to send troops into northern Iraq to take care of the PKK, even if this ends up derailing Washington's political negotiations over Iraq. Meanwhile, the Iranians are eager to take advantage of this deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations by forming a strategic partnership with Ankara. Turkey also steadily has improved relations with Syria and has sought to assume the role of mediator between Israel and Syria, despite Washington's wish to keep Damascus isolated. Iran, Turkey and Syria all find common cause in ensuring that Iraqi Kurdistan is boxed in by its neighbors. Iran also sees itself and Turkey as the rightful powerhouses of the Middle East -- as non-Arabs and as successors to the Ottoman and Safavid empires, respectively. Of course, plenty of divisive issues hamper such a partnership, including Turkey's secularist and Iran's Islamist ideology, as well as their opposing stances toward the West. But with the U.S.-Turkish relationship taking a beating, Iran sees a gap that it very much wants to fill. In fact, the Iranians already have begun to prove their worth to the Turks by launching cross-border operations against PKK rebels in northeastern Iraq. This explains why Erdogan rather cheekily ridiculed Washington's expectation that Ankara ask for the U.S. position before signing this deal with Iran. Erdogan's comments also come just five days before the July 22 Turkish parliamentary polls. The ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party wants to extract maximum electoral mileage by tapping the growing anti-U.S. sentiment within the Turkish public. Though Erdogan is relatively confident that the AK Party will hold onto its parliamentary majority, he also knows his party will lose some seats, and he is trying to minimize this loss as much as possible. This obvious political jab by the Turks intended to apply greater pressure on Washington to give into Turkish demands and crack down on PKK rebels in northern Iraq is sure to grab Washington's attention. The only way to break Turkey out of this growing strategic partnership with Iran and Syria will be through action against the PKK. In the interest of gluing Iraq back together, Washington does not appear prepared to take such action just yet -- meaning U.S.-Turkish relations are bound to suffer further as a result.
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( ) Turkish consultations take a long time Washington Post, 3-2-2003, p ln
Speaking after a meeting at the Foreign Ministry tonight, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Robert Pearson, expressed disappointment in the vote but said the United States would continue to consult with the Turkish government. Months of delays and tough bargaining by Turkish leaders have already strained relations between the United States and Turkey, a historic ally and a member of NATO.
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( ) US-Turkey relations are resilient and consultations are normal means Turkish Daily News, 10-8-2003, p ln
Long-standing friendship as the basis of Turkish-American relations is a constant in Turkish Foreign Policy. In the post-Cold War era, the progress and diversification of our bilateral relationship led to the upgrading of our relations to the level of strategic partnership. It has been through this strategic partnership that Turkey and USA worked together to maintain peace, stability and prosperity in the wider geographies of mutual interest. Our relationship has reached its zenith in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, when Turkey came forward with its genuine sympathy and unqualified support for the American people. Turkey and the US continue to consult, coordinate and cooperate with each other issues of mutual interest such as conflict prevention, crisis management, containment of regional disputes, curbing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and eradicating terrorism. To give concrete examples, the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, reform in the Middle East, unification of Europe, ending conflicts in the Caucasus, consolidating the independence of Central Asian republics and the stability of the Balkans are among the issues in which Turkey and the United States continue to share strategic vision and objectives. Our partnership has come stronger out of each challenge. Even on the question of Iraq, we differed on the means and not the purpose. This issue has not altered the basic nature of our relations, at least, not irreversibly. Indeed, Turkey made its best effort to help the US on Iraq even when this meant facing political and economic risks at home. The democratic decision of the Turkish Parliament may have caused disappointments in the U.S. Nevertheless, necessary steps were taken by both sides's in the U.S. Nevertheless, necessary steps were taken by both sides to eliminate the misperceptions stemming from these disappointments.
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( ) US-Turkey ties are structurally unbreakable Mark Parris, Former US Ambassador to Turkey, 3-26-2003, Starting Over, Policywatch #732, Washington
Inst. www.tusiad.us/specific_page.cfm?CONTENT_ID=345 Size, location, and demographics alone will ensure Turkey a place among those key countries that Washington cannot afford to ignore. Turkey, for its part, has no incentive to let the relationship fester. The Iraq experience may create a greater awareness in both Ankara and Washington that neither side can take the other for granted, and that each needs to make a more systematic effort to understand the needs of the other. That implies a post-Iraq war agenda different from that of classical "strategic partnership." It is too early to define that agenda with precision, but it is possible to identify issues that will shape it. Iraq is the place to start, since both countries' most vital interests are so deeply engaged there, and can be profoundly affected by how the story ends. What will be the relative importance Washington attaches to Turkey and groups inside Iraq (i.e., the Kurds) when it comes to rebuilding Iraq? To what extent will Turkey's value as a unique "paradigm" (Muslim, democratic, and secular) be affected by the appearance in Iraq of an Arab state with (if some Bush administration spokesmen are to be credited) many of the same attributes?
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( ) More evidence World News Connection, 9-13-2003, p ln
Noting that meetings with Americans and concerned officials continued with this aim, Erdogan said that the United States demanded Turkey to contribute to stability force that would be formed in Iraq to provide order and tranquillity. Erdogan said that they were evaluating the issue with all dimensions and General Staff Headquarters, government and Foreign Ministry sent delegations and some Iraqi delegations also came to Turkey. He added that negotiations would be made following the meetings and if it was necessary, the government would brought the issue to Parliament. Erdogan said that while doing this, Turkey did not want to go to Iraq as a police or gendarme. Emphasizing that Turkey-U.S. relations were alliance relations and they aimed to reach mutual interests, Erdogan said that the relations were so broad and long-term that they could not be reduced only to Iraq issue.
89

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2AC Consult CP Politics Links Political Capital................................................................23 ***Consult Australia***.............................................................................................................24

2AC Consult Australia Consult Hurts Relations...................................................................25

2AC Consult Australia Relations Resilient.............................................................................26

2AC Consult Australia Consult Now......................................................................................27

1AR Consult Australia Consult Hurts Relations...................................................................28

1AR Consult Australia Consult Now......................................................................................29

1AR Consult Australia Relations Resilient.............................................................................30

1AR Consult Australia Relations Resilient.............................................................................31 ***Consult Brazil***...................................................................................................................32

2AC Consult Brazil Consult Hurts Relations.........................................................................33

2AC Consult Brazil Relations Resilient..................................................................................34 ***Consult Egypt***...................................................................................................................35

2AC Consult Egypt Delay........................................................................................................36

2AC Consult Egypt Relations Resilience................................................................................37 ***Consult EU***........................................................................................................................38

2AC Consult EU Consult Now EU.......................................................................................39

2AC Consult EU Heg DA.........................................................................................................40

2AC Consult EU Relations DA................................................................................................41

SDI 2010 Consult Aff

2AC Consult EU No Impact.....................................................................................................42

2AC Consult EU Delay.............................................................................................................43

1AR Consult EU Delay.............................................................................................................44 ***Consult Japan***...................................................................................................................45

2AC Consult Japan Delay........................................................................................................46

2AC Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient............................................................47

2AC Consult Japan No Impact Empirically Denied...........................................................48

2AC Consult Japan Consult Bad Hurts Alliance................................................................49

2AC Consult Japan Air Power DA..........................................................................................50

2AC Consult Japan Air Power DA..........................................................................................51

2AC Consult Japan Air Power DA..........................................................................................52

2AC Consult Japan Russia/China DA....................................................................................53

1AR Consult Japan Say No/Delay...........................................................................................54

1AR Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient............................................................55

1AR Consult Japan No Impact Relations Resilient............................................................56

1AR Consult Japan SQ.............................................................................................................57

1AR Consult Japan SQ Solves.................................................................................................58

1AR Consult Japan Delay........................................................................................................59

SDI 2010 Consult Aff

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Air Power High..........................................................60

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Air Power High..........................................................61

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Air Power High..........................................................62

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Air Power High..........................................................63

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA War..............................................................................64

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Deterrence...................................................................65

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA US-Russia Relations...................................................66

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Prolif............................................................................67

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Heg...............................................................................68 ***Consult NATO***..................................................................................................................69

2AC Consult NATO Generic...................................................................................................70

Consult CP Aff SDI 2010 BBHS.............................................................................................1 * Consult General 2AC*........................................................................................................6

2AC Consult CP Say No Generic.........................................................................................10 Consult Perms..................................................................................................................11

Lie Perm AT: Lies Immoral....................................................................................................14 Generic Consult DAs......................................................................................................15

2AC Consult CP Politics Links Political Capital................................................................23 Consult Australia.............................................................................................................24

1AR Consult Australia Relations Resilient.............................................................................31 Consult Brazil...................................................................................................................32

2AC Consult Brazil Relations Resilient..................................................................................34 Consult Egypt...................................................................................................................35

2AC Consult Egypt Relations Resilience................................................................................37 Consult EU........................................................................................................................38

1AR Consult EU Delay.............................................................................................................44 Consult Japan...................................................................................................................45

1AR Consult Japan Air Power DA Heg...............................................................................68 Consult NATO..................................................................................................................69

1AR Consult NATO Delay.......................................................................................................79 Consult South Korea.......................................................................................................80

1AR Consult South Korea Consult Now.................................................................................82 Consult Turkey.................................................................................................................83

* Consult General 2AC*

Generic Consult DAs