Battle of the Bulge: The Crisis in the Ardennes

By Thomas V. Barbarie

Presented April 22, 1998 To: Military Affairs 121, Capt. Dwyer

August 1944 had been a very bad month for the German army. On the eastern front the Germans had been overrun by a Soviet offensive, in Italy the remnants of two German armies were fleeing north, and in the west the Allied breakout at Normandy had caus ed major confusion and the defeated German army was in a general retreat. Then, in early September, all three fronts came to a surprising halt. The Allied supply lines could not keep up with the advancing armies. The Germans, to the surprise of all, re grouped, reorganized, and began a counter offensive.

On 16th September, 1944, the idea of a major counter offensive was planned in German Fuhrer Adolf Hitlers field headquarters in East Prussia(see figure 1.). Hitler, showing enthusiasm not seen sin ce a failed assassination attempt in August, proclaimed that an offensive through the Ardennes with the objective of Antwerp shall begin in December with the code name "Watch on the Rhine". The plan was that if Antwerp (the largest shipping por t used by the Allies) was seized, the Allies would run out of supplies. Preparations for the assault began immediately with a German troop and supply buildup starting as early as October. General Dwight D. Eisenhower (supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force) had received information about the German movement in early December and moved some troops from the Southern front to Belgium. He wasnt, however, expecting the attack to come during the dead of the winter through a heavily forested area. He also was unaware as to the total amount of buildup and exact l ocation. On 16th of December 1944, the German Army had concentrated a total of twenty divisionswith over 400,000 men, more than 2,600 pieces of artillery, and 1,400 tanks and assault gunson a 110 kilometer front facing the US Army. The offensive began with SS-Oberstgruppenfuhrer (General) Josef Dietrichs Panzer divisions as spearhead through the Ardennes. The first SS-Panzerkorps were to move rapidly through a dense part of the Ardennes forest in the middle of winter. They were to move using t he five "paved roads" in the area. These roads however, were not well

kept and often not paved, causing problems for any non-tracked vehicles. On December 19th, after three days of intense fighting, two Allied regiments were surroun ded, and German forces had moved more than 30 miles into Belgium and Allied positions. The divisions on the northern and southern flanks encountered considerable Allied resistance, while Peipers Panzer division on the center of the attack rolled swiftly through the Allied front, to find itself cut off from supplies several days later. The most successful German attack occurred near the Luxembourg border. By December 19th, the German 5th Army (10 divisions) was advancing upon Bastogne, which was defended by two US Airborne divisions. The US divisions (101st and 82nd) withdrew into the city of Bastogne and were promptly under siege from the larger German army. With the help of airdrops, the 101st was able to with stand the German assualt and held out untill December 26th, when troops under the command of General George S. Patton came to the relief of Bastogne (See figure 2).

But the Battle for Bastogne continued well into the first week of January, with the 101st pl aying an important role in the Allied counter attack. The Germans had began the offensive under thick cloud cover that had aided them. However, the days became clearer around the 29th of December and soon the Allied fighters were able to create air superiority, and the Allied bombers began to enact a devastating toll on the German divisions and specially supplies. This slowed the German offensive, so that by January 4th, the German offensive had been stopped after going 50 miles into Belgium. The remnants of the two Panzer divisi ons that had

spearheaded the attack were retreating, and the British and American reinforcements had reached the front. The Allies planned and executed a pincer attack that squeezed the bulge while at the same time continued massive air bombardment of su pply lines (See figure 3). This caused the German armies to crumble and on 24 th January, 1944 the Germans had been driven back to the west wall.

In December 1944, an almost defeated German army was able to surprise the Allies and create a "Bulge" in the line that reached more than 20 miles past Bastogne. More than one million men fought in t he Battle of the Bulge, making it the largest land battle of World War II. Over 500,000 Germans, 600,000 Americans, and 55,000 British took part in the fighting. In total the Germans had 3 armies, 10 corps (the equivalent to 29 divisions), while the All ies had 3 Armies, 6 corps (the equivalent to 31 divisions). Casualties on both sides added up to almost 200,000 people with 100,000 German casualties, 81,000 American casualties and 1,400 British. Eight hundred tanks were lost on each side and over 1,00 0 German aircraft were destroyed in the air or on the ground. The German application of the principles of war allowed them to advance very quickly through the Allied defenses and create the bulge. The Germans effectively used maneuver with the concentration of troops in the Ardennes area, and mass with the main assault. They applied the principles of objective offensive, and surprise with their attack in the dead of winter in an area the Allies didnt not expect to be assaulted. The Germans use of security was demonstrated by there ability to concentrate most of

their armies on the western front in a small area. They also used unity of command effectively because the plan and all details were worked out by the German Generals with Hitler as the chief commander. The Germans however failed to effectively use e conomy of force because they left the flanks of the bulge vulnerable, which turned out to be their downfall. The Allies effectively used maneuver, mass and objective in the well planned and executed pincer attack. Although at the beginning they had failed to use economy of force and offensive, with the counter attack they began effectively applying those pri nciples. They also had unity of command with Eisenhower in command. However, they lacked the security because they werent expecting the German attack. With the German army almost defeated, the Battle of the Bulge was Hitlers last gamble. The Germans were losing the war and the offense had the potential to cause the war to last much longer, and with a lot of luck actually win the war, or cause a dra w. The Allied response to the German offensive was extremely effective and was the reason the Ardennes offensive failed. Had the Allies not responded as quickly and effectively, the German offensive might have reached its objective of Antwerp and the wa r could have lasted much longer.

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