Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
This question centres around the debate of free will vs determinism. On this subject there are
three main standpoints: that of the libertarian, that of the hard determinist, and that of the soft
determinist – or compatibilist. The libertarian believes human beings have free will to do as
they wish and that their actions are not the result of past causes, and therefore that they should
be held morally responsible for their actions. The hard determinist on the other hand believes
that every event is purely the result of past causes and therefore it is not logical that human
beings are held morally reponsible for their actions as they have no choice, although they may
believe that they do. The third argument is that of the compatibilist. The compatibilist
believes that most, or even every action is caused, but that we still have free will to an extent.
This medium is probably the most popular viewpoint held in society.
In philosophical debates about free will and determinism, libertarianism is generally held to
be the combination of the belief that free will is incompatible with determinism, that
determinism is false, and that human beings do possess free will.
All libertarians subscribe to the philosophy of incompatibilism which states that reality is
indeterministic. A free action is considered to be one which is not determined, and which
could therefore have been different. Traditionally, this has meant that there is no causal chain
that necessitated the action prior to the agent freely choosing it; the agent herself is an
originator of causal chains.
However, because of metaphysical worries about this "godlike power" (Stanford University),
there has arisen the alternative idea that, although the universe is indeterministic, an agent's
choice is nevertheless caused by previous events, but those events only assign certain
probabilities to her choice (e.g. a 30% chance she will do act A, a 70% chance she will not).
The major objection to libertarianism is that it remains a mystery why an agent makes the
choice she does - any explanation of the choice (beyond a probabilistic one) would seem to
make it determined. However, according to David Hume, if a choice is not determined then it
is simply a random event, which is problematic since such a choice would lack purpose.
Although quantum mechanics provides some reason for thinking that determinism may
indeed be false, Roy C. Weatherford (in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy) echoes Hume
on randomness:
“The random behaviour of atoms certainly does not by itself make for the freedom and moral
responsibility asserted by libertarians.”
Determinism is the theory that all human action is caused entirely by preceding events,
and not by the exercise of the Will. In philosophy, the theory is based on the metaphysical
principle that an uncaused event is impossible. The success of scientists in discovering causes
of certain behavior and in some cases effecting its control tends to support this principle.
Some critics of determinism argue that if people are incapable of independent choice there
can be no basis for morality, and therefore some aspects of criminal and civil jurisprudence
and legislation are left without their necessary foundation. Others, more recently, have
interpreted the developing field of quantum mechanics as being consistent with the argument
that some basic events may be truly random and non-deterministic.
Determinists have responded to the first critique by distinguishing between normative and
objective claims, arguing that statements of fact can and should be made independently of
their consequences. Thus, even if determinism is inconsistent with the idea of a moral
universe, that does not necessarily invalidate its conclusions.
The opposing view, that free will cannot be consistent with determinism, is
sometimes called incompatibilism. The pessimistic version, sometimes known as
hard determinism, is that neither determinism nor indeterminism permit free will;
Hume also considered free will inconsistent with indeterminism. One incompatibilist
position holds that "free will" refers to genuine (e.g. absolute, ultimate) alternate
possibilities for beliefs, desires or actions, and that such possibilities are absent from
the compatibilist definitions. In the absence of such possibilities, the belief that free
will confers responsibility is held to be false. However, one compatibilist counter-
argument is that such absolute alternate possibilities could only have random causes,
which would actually diminish responsibility.
If an act is free, then its agent could have done something else (could have avoided
doing this act). If the act is unavoidable, then it is not free. Free actions must be
avoidable but some acts are not avoidable.