An excerpt from

The

Science of Ethics

By

Rev. Michael Cronin, M.A., D.D.

Professor of Ethics and Politics University College, Dublin National University of Ireland

Volume II Special Ethics

Dublin M. H. GILL AND SON, L. And Waterford

Whether it is Lawful to put Criminals to Death?

We think it well to quote the words of St. Thomas Aquinas in answer to this question. It is lawful to kill brute animals in as much as they are naturally meant for the service of man, the imperfect being a means to the perfect; now every part is referred to its whole as the imperfect to the perfect; and, therefore, every part naturally exists for the whole (as means to its realisation). Hence we see that if it be expedient for the welfare of the whole body that some member should be amputated by reason of its being bad and corruptive of the rest of the body, the removal of that member is praiseworthy and salutary. But every individual person is related to the whole community as part to whole; and hence if any man be dangerous to the community and is corrupting it by reason of some crime then it is right and wholesome that he should be put to death for the sake of the common good.* This argument brings us a certain distance on our way, but it requires to be supplemented by another which is also to be found in St. Thomas work. No doubt the reason why a criminal may be put to death is because he is a corrupt member of society, and through him the whole community is injured. But still we are left face to face with the diculty that a human being even when he commits a crime does not cease to be a human being. Now, as we saw before, a human being though he is naturally a member of society, is not to be regarded as a mere member, or a mere part, and though as part he is a means he is not a mere means to society. On the contrary, he is a person, sui juris and as St. Thomas declares, propter seipsum existens, in the sense that he is not a mere means to anything else in nature. But by putting a criminal to death for the common good, society treats him as a mere means, as a mere member of the organism, to be sacriced for the good of the organism. How is this possible? We answerit is as a rational being that man is a person, sui juris, propter seipsum existens, and not a mere means to anything else. But by oending against the law of reason man withdraws himself from the order of reason, falls below that order; and society is empowered to withhold from such an individual the rights of
*

S. Theol., II. II ., Q. LXIV. Art. . Vol. I. p. . Q. LXIV, Art. , ad .

 an independent person, treating him as a mere part of society, and may for the sake of the common good put him to death. In this deep and far-reaching answer we are given the reason not only why a criminal may be put to death, but why also an innocent man whose life is a menace to society (for instance because he is diseased in body, or because a foreign ruler has decreed to destroy the whole community if a certain innocent man is not put to death) must still be treated as one who has a right to his life. Such a one has not receded from the order of reason, and, therefore, he still retains the privileges of a rational being, and cannot be treated as a mere means to the community in which he resides. He cannot, therefore, be sacriced for the good of the community by being put to death. St. Thomas merely lays down the abstract principle that a criminal may be put to death because as a diseased member he is corruptive of the whole of which he is a part. He does not say in what cases he may be put to death. There is really no general rule assignable, and the cases in which society will put a subject to death will vary with the temperament and traditions of peoples and the needs of States. Two things, however, may be noted in this respect. One is that a subject can only be punished for an external act; for it is through their external acts that men communicate with their fellow-men, and act as part of the community. Another is that even though now-a-days States will only put a man to death for crimes which manifestly and directly aect other parts of the community, e. g. murder, still this prerogative of the State could be exercised even where the direct eects of the crime which is committed do not extend to other individuals, where, in other words, the crime is private and where the only eect on society is that a part of it (the oending member) has gone bad. A corrupt member, even though its corruption does not extend outside itself, is a derogation to the dignity and worth of the whole body politic. Only the public authority can inict death. For the killing of a criminal is lawful only in as much as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community; from which it follows that the iniction of death appertains to him only who has charge of the welfare of the community, just as the amputation of a limb is performed by the surgeon to whom is committed the welfare of the whole body, or by another deputed by him. Now it is to the public authority that the care of the community is entrusted, and, therefore, only the public authority or some one commissioned by that authority may lawfully put a person to death. Also, a particular individual, when commissioned by public authority to put a criminal to death, can do so only as representing public authority and the whole

 community. It would not be lawful for him, even when so commissioned, to slay a criminal for any private end such as vengeance. By harbouring such an intention he would incur, internally at least, the guilt of homicide.