Environmental impacts of nuclear power: past
experience and future prospects
P.R. Maul
W. Turner
I. Glendenning
Indexing terms: Environmental impacts, Nuclear power generation, Radioactivity risks, Safe limits
Abstract: The environmental impacts of nuclear
power generation are considered for the whole fuel
cycle, from the mining of uranium to provide fuel
for nuclear reactors right through to the disposal
of radioactive wastes and the decommissioning of
power stations. This is done for existing reactor
types and possible future developments. The
radiological impact of routine low level discharges
of activity into the environment is small compared
with that from natural background radioactivity,
while risks to operators arising from exposure
to ionising radiation are comparable with those
experienced in other safe industries. The quantities
of waste produced by the nuclear industry are
modest compared with many other industries, and
the disposal of most of it is a routine operation;
the decommissioning of nuclear power stations at
the end of their useful lives can be seen as a large
waste management exercise. The potential for an
accident in the UK, on the scale of the Chernobyl
incident, is remote. Overall, nuclear power is well
controlled and can be seen to have environmental
benefits compared with other forms of power gen-
eration. Its many advantages include the
reduction in greenhouse gases which contribute to
global warming and other atmospheric pollutants
which contribute to acid rain. Nuclear power adds
desirable diversity to electricity supply, increasing
the reliability of meeting energy needs.
1 Introduction
A full assessment of the environmental impact of nuclear
power must necessarily take into account the whole fuel
cycle from the mining of uranium through to the disposal
of radioactive wastes. Fig. 1 shows the main stages in the
fuel cycle for fission reactors, not all of which are relevant
to all reactor types.
The ‘front end’ of the fuel cycle includes all the stages
up to the loading of fuel into the reactors, First, the
Paper 9236A (Sl), first received 16th January and in revised form 11th
August 1992
P.R. Maul was at the Technology Division, Nuclear Electric plc and is
now at INTERA Information Technologies Ltd, Chiltern House, 45
Station Road, Henley on Thames, Oxon RG9 IAT, United Kingdom
W. Turner is at the Site Planning and Environment Department,
Nuclear Electric plc, Barnett Way, Barnwood, Gloucester GL4 7RS,
United Kingdom
I. Glendenning is a Technical Strategist at Nuclear Electric plc, Barnett
Way, Barnwood, Gloucester GL4 7RS, United Kingdom
I E E PROCEEDINGS-A, Vol. 140, NO. I , J A N U A R Y 1993
uranium ore is mined and processed, and for many reac-
tors it is necessary to increase the concentration of the
fissile uranium-235 isotope before the fuel is fabricated;
this is referred to as enrichment. The fuel is loaded into
the reactor where it remains for some years during which
time the nuclear fission process consumes much of the
uranium-235, producing a small quantity of highly radio-
active fission products contained inside the fuel cladding.
The stages involved in the management of spent fuel,
once it has been discharged from the reactor, are referred
to as the ‘back end’ of the fuel cycle. Spent fuel contains
at least 95% unused uranium together with small quant-
ities of plutonium and waste fission products. After any
interim storage, spent fuel can either be treated as a waste
product and disposed of or reprocessed to separate out
the reusable uranium and plutonium. Reprocessing pro-
duces high-level waste (HLW) which needs to be stored
and ultimately disposed of.
Environmental impacts are considered in three main
categories : health effects due to ionising radiation, land
use and exclusion, and impacts on the global environ-
ment. Many of the examples given in this paper are taken
from the operations of Nuclear Electric (NE), but the
conclusions drawn are relevant to the nuclear industry as
a whole. To put the radiological consequences of nuclear
power into perspective, the paper commences with a
short account of ionising radiation and its effects. This is
followed by a discussion of the impacts of each part of
the fuel cycle for current reactors, concentrating mainly
on health effects and land use. Reactor accidents and pos-
sible future developments are then considered. Finally,
the environmental benefits are considered, including a
discussion of global environmental impacts.
2 Ionising radiation and its effects
When the nucleus of an atom undergoes radioactive
decay three main types of radiation can be emitted: alpha
particles (helium nuclei), beta particles (electrons) and
gamma rays (high frequency electromagnetic radiation).
The unit of radioactive decay is the becquerel (Bq) corres-
ponding to one decay a second. In common with all suffi-
ciently energetic radiations, ionising radiations can cause
biological damage, and the sievert radiation unit (Sv)
takes account of the fact that the same degree of damage
is not necessarily produced by the same absorbed dose of
different types of radiation. For example, an absorbed
dose of one joule per kilogram (one gray) of alpha par-
ticles is twenty times more damaging biologically than
the same dose from gamma rays.
If the radiation dose received is large, there may be
immediate effects. Delayed effects can occur, whether the
13
dose is large or small. For single doses below 500 mSv
there are no observable immediate health effects. Massive
doses of, say, 10 Sv received within a few hours will, like
any other major trauma, result in major tissue damage
and almost certain death, Exposure to low level radiation
pendent authority on radiological protection. Their most
recent recommendations [2] for limiting radiation expo-
sure to workers and members of the public, and the risk
estimates on which they are based are given in Table 2.
ICRP recommend that dose constraints, below the dose

intermediate
plutonium
storage

I ldisposal of 1 I

Fig. 1 The main stages in the nuclearfuel cycleforfission reactors

* These wastes are also produced at other stagesof the fuel cycle
is a normal feature of human existence but is assumed to limits, are applied to individual sources of exposure. It is
increase the chance of the exposed person contracting worth noting that the exposure limit for members of the
cancer and passing on genetic defects to their offspring. public is less than the average exposure to background
Radiological protection principles are based on the radiation.
assumption that the additional risks are proportional to Over and above the application of limits to exposure,
the dose received. In fact there is no unambigous evi- radiological protection philosophy is based on the
dence to indicate the presence of genetic effects occurring requirement to keep exposures as low as reasonably
as a result of exposure to low-level radiation. achievable (ALARA). Nuclear Power Stations are
Table 1 (taken from Reference 1) summarises the designed to dose targets which are much less than the
average exposures in the UK from natural radioactivity. ICRP limits. A general principle in radiation protection
is that if man is adequately protected, then fauna and
Table 1 : Annual average radiation exposures in the UK from flora will also be protected. Studies of potential radiologi-
radiation of natural origin cal effects on aquatic populations confirm the applicabil-
Source Exposure, mSv
ity of this assumption (e.g. References 3 and 4).
Cosmic radiation 0.25
Earth gamma rays 0.35 3 The front end of the fuel cycle
Radon and thoron decay products 1.3
Other internal radiation (food) 0.3 All present uranium production is overseas. In terms of
Total 2.2
land use and other 'conventional' environmental impacts
uranium extraction is no different from other mining
operations but, because the energy released per unit mass
Table2: ICRP risk estimates and recommended limits t o of fuel is far greater for uranium than coal, the overall
exposure impacts are far less than for coal-fired generation.
Risks for Risks for Risks for Exposure When the uranium is extracted from the ore, most of
fatal non-fatal heritable limit, the ore material becomes a mill waste or tailings, com-
cancer, cancer, effects, mSv/y monly a slurry of finely ground solids in waste solutions.
perSv per Sv per Sv The tailings slurry is pumped to a waste retention system
General 0.05 0.01 0.013 1 where the solids settle out and accumulate. It is necessary
public (averaged over 5 y) to ensure the stability of the tailings, and this is usually
Workers 0.04 0.008 0.008 50 accomplished by the construction of an embankment
(<lo0mSv over 5 y) system. Although no radioactivity has been produced in
the extraction process, the natural long-lived radioac-
The first two sources, cosmic and terrestrial radiation, tivity which is present in the tailings is potentially more
result in external exposures (where the radioactive decay readily accessible than in the original ore, and it is neces-
takes place outside the body) and the second two result sary to manage them in a way which ensures that there
in internal exposures (where it takes place inside the are no unacceptable radiation exposures to members of
body). Radon and thoron gases escape from the ground the public [SI. The most significant pathway for radi-
and their inhalation results in the exposure of the lung. ation exposures is usually the production of radon gas,
Other naturally occurring radionuclides can be ingested although this is at very low individual dose rates. Meas-
in food. Overall, individuals can experience a wide range ures which can be taken to reduce the environmental
of annual exposures from around 1 mSv to over 10 mSv, impact of the tailings include covering them with, for
partly due to the presence in some houses of high levels example, layers of soil and rock (which can help improve
of radon. stability and reduce radon emissions) and providing a
The International Commission on Radiological Pro- liner beneath the pile where necessary to prevent ground-
tection (ICRP) is the pre-eminent international and inde- water contamination.
14 IEE PROCEEDINGS-A, Vol. 140, NO. I, J A N U A R Y 1993
 Average occupational exposures of miners and mill the general public. Table 3 (taken from Reference 9)
workers have been estimated at around 10 and 3 mSv/y shows that no classified radiation worker received more
[SI; in most cases the risks of accidents are larger than than 15 mSv in 1990 (in addition, no nonclassified
the estimated risks from radiation exposure. Some UK worker received more than 5 mSv). The collective dose
miners in metalliferous mines receive radiation exposures
comparable with uranium miners. Table 3: Occupational exposure of classified workers a t
Fuel enrichment and fabrication is undertaken in the Nuclear Electric power stations in 1990
UK by BNFL at their Capenhurst and Springfields Dose range NE staff Non-NE staff
plants. The worker and public radiation exposures from Number Total dose, Number Total dose,
this part of the fuel cycle are small compared with those man-Sv man-Sv
from the back end of the fuel cycle, and will not be con-
<5mSv 11 908 7.0 5298 1.5
sidered separately here. 5-10mSv 157 1.0 47 0.3
10-15mSv 3 0.03 1 0.01
4 Reactor operations >15mSv 0 0 0 0
Total 12068 8.0 5346 1.8
The land required by a nuclear power station is no larger
than that for most other means of generating electricity. of 8 man-Sv for NE employees gives an average dose of
In fact, compared with coal-fired generation it is less less than 0.7 mSv per employee; using the ICRP risk esti-
because there is no need for large stockpiles of coal. mates from Table 2 this would correspond to a risk of
fatal cancer of around 3 x lO-’/y which compares
4.1 Radiation exposures for the general public favourably with risks from other industries.
Nuclear Electric reports all discharges of radioactivity to
the environment annually (e.g. Reference 7). Autho-
risations for discharges are made under the provisons of 5 Reprocessing
the Radioactive Substances Act (1960) by Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Pollution, HMIP, and the Ministry of At the reprocessing plant at Sellafield the fuel material is
Agriculture Fisheries and Food, MAFF (except in the dissolved in hot nitric acid. The solution is then fed into a
cases of Trawsfynydd and Wylfa power stations, when it solvent extraction plant where almost all the uranium
is the Welsh Ofice). Discharges of particulate material to and plutonium are separated from the fission products.
the atmosphere are very low due to the use of high efi- For the Sellafield site liquid discharges are more
ciency filtration. Liquid radioactive wastes arise from a important than gaseous discharges because the amounts
variety of sources, such as coolant gas driers, floor drains, of radioactivity involved are greater, as is the potential
radiation exposure of the public. All discharges are regu-
irradiated fuel cooling ponds and laundries. They are
lated in the same way as for NE stations, and environ-
batch collected, treated by filtration and, if appropriate,
by ion exchange. Finally, the treated liquid is added to mental monitoring takes place both by BNFL and the
the large volumes of station cooling water before dis- authorising ministries. Fig. 2 (taken from information in
charge, which is to the sea or estuary except in the case of Reference 10) summarises the historic levels of liquid dis-
Trawsfynydd which is situated on a freshwater lake. charges. Various steps were taken in the 1970s and 1980s
Nuclear Electric carriers out its own measurements to reduce discharges by installing additional effluent
programme to monitor the effect of its discharges on the
environment and independent measurements are made
by MAFF for both the aquatic and terrestrial environ-
ments (e.g. Reference 8). It is often not possible to deter-
mine any increased concentrations of radionuclides due
to discharges from the stations. At Trawsfynydd dis-
charges are made to a freshwater lake, and are therefore
of greater radiological significance than those for other
NE stations. The estimated radiation exposure of local
fish consumers in 1989 was about 0.09 mSv.
Another potential exposure route is from direct radi-
ation from the station; doses of 0.58 and 0.66 mSv were
estimated for a few residents close to Bradwell and 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990
Dungeness A stations in 1990 [7], whereas at all other years
stations estimated doses were less than 0.1 mSv.
Irradiated fuel is transported by road and rail in large
containers, known as transport flasks, which are specially 10000~
designed to provide physical protection for the fuel and
to shield personnel from the very high levels of radiation. 8000
Over loo00 fuel flask journeys have been safely under-
6000
taken. Direct radiation from irradiated fuel flasks is very
low; dose rates 1 m from a flask are in the region of
k.! 4000
10 pSv/h. Given the small amount of time any member of U

‘L
CI
the public will spend anywhere near a fuel flask, the total
2000
doses involved will be negligible.

4.2 Occupationalradiation exposure 1971 1975 1980 1985 1990

Staff working on nuclear power stations are subject to years
higher levels of radiation exposure than members of Fig. 2 Liquid dischargesfrom the Sellafield site

IEE PROCEEDINGS-A, Vol. 140, NO. 1, J A N U A R Y 1993 15

 treatment plants. Although calculated doses to the most
exposed groups rose as high as 3.5mSv in 1981, these
. have now come down to less than 0.2 mSv.
Levels of childhood leukaemia above those which
would be expected in the population as a whole have
been found in the Sellafield area [ll]. Studies of public
radiation exposure suggest that the direct exposure of the
individuals concerned is very unlikely to be the cause
[12]. Various other explanations have been put forward,
and recently Gardner has proposed that parental precon-
ception exposure could be significant [13, 141. However,
it has been shown [l5] that there is no such association
for the Japanese bomb survivors. The leukaemia excess
could be due to factors other than radiation exposure.
6 Radioactive waste management
All industrial processes result in the production of
unwanted waste by-products, some of which are hazard-
ous and must be handled and disposed of with care. A
few industries, such as the nuclear power industry, medi-
cine, defence and research, produce wastes which are
radioactive. In the nuclear industry the radioactivity
originates from three main sources: the uranium used for
fuel production, the fission of uranium and other ele-
ments within reactor fuel, and the induction of radioac-
tivity (activation) in otherwise nonactive materials as a
result of neutron irradiation. Radioactive waste is classi-
fied in the UK under three headings :
High-level waste (HLW): This consists of the waste
which originates from fuel reprocessing. It is highly
radioactive and gives off a lot of heat. In the UK, Gov-
ernment policy is for HLW to be stored for at least 50
years, during which time heat generation will reduce; dis-
posal is not likely to take place until late in the next
century.
Intermediate-level waste (ZLW): This material includes
filter sludges, and spent chemical resins which arise from
the purification of nuclear reactor process streams, and
the metal cladding surrounding the nuclear fuel which is
removed during reprocessing. It is far less radioactive
than HLW, but does require shielding to protect plant
operators and the public from radiation. It is presently
stored on site until an underground repository is avail-
able. UK Nirex Ltd is responsible for developing this
repository and has chosen to undertake further investiga-
tions at Sellafield.
Low-level waste (LLW): This consists of items such as
contaminated clothing, waste paper and plastics and
covers a wide range of activities from just below ILW to
just about the level which would allow the material to be
disposed of with household refuse. It represents the
largest volume of waste, but accounts for only a fraction
of one percent of all the radioactivity. LLW is generally
treated by incineration or compaction to reduce its
volume prior to disposal at BNFL‘s shallow repository at
Drigg in Cumbria. The Drigg site covers only 120 hect-
ares and has received waste from all over the UK since
1959. This facility developed along the lines of a modern
sanitary landfill with the tipping of waste into trenches,
although more recently changes have been adopted to
improve waste management practices. The first concrete
lined vault was put into use during August 1988. It is
likely to operate until the middle of the next century.
Over four million cubic metres of toxic waste is produced
each year in the UK and only one percent of this is
radioactive waste. A useful perspective is obtained by cal-
16
culating the volumes of radioactive waste associated with
a person’s lifetime supply of electricity. Typical figures are
given in Table 4; these illustrate that the volumes are
actually quite modest.
Table 4: Radioactive waste volumes for a lifetime‘s supply
of electricity
Waste type Volume for a lifetime’s electricity
supply, dm3 (litres)
LLW 16
I LW 4.4
HLW 0.14
The management of radioactive waste on nuclear sites
has a minimal effect on public radiation exposure. Wastes
are effectively immobilised before disposal, but some
radionuclides may find their way back into the environ-
ment many years after disposal (for the deep repository
this may be tens or even hundreds of thousands of years).
The assessment principles against which the safety of a
repository is judged are extremely demanding, and refer
to risks of only 10-6/y. Some groups have suggested that
radioactive waste should continue to be stored and moni-
tored at the surface, but disposal removes the need for
future generations to look after it.
7 Decommissioning
When nuclear power stations come to the end of their
useful life they have to be decommissioned; this can be
viewed as a large waste management exercise, although
only some of the wastes are radioactive. The area of land
associated with the station is small, so the environmental
impact due to the land being unavailable for alternative
use for the period until decommissioning is complete is
not a major concern. The environmental impacts can be
viewed in different ways. For example, dismantling the
station produces waste which has to be packaged and
transported for disposal. The disturbance caused to local
communities by the waste transport has to be offset
against the visual impact of residual structures left on
site. Nuclear Electric’s reference decommissioning strat-
egy, for which detailed plans are available, involves three
stages. Stage 1 commences at shutdown and involves the
removal of all the fuel from the reactors; this removes
99.99% of the radioactivity from the site. Stage 2 involves
the dismantling of all active and nonactive plant and
buildings outside the biological shields of the reactors
and results in most of the site being released for re-use.
Stage 3 is the final dismantling of the reactors, and there
are many advantages in delaying it as the radioactivity of
fairly short-lived activation products decays rapidly over
the first 100 years or so, as shown in Fig. 3; this decay
greatly simplifies the task of final dismantling.
Taking all financial and environmental considerations
into account, NE has recently proposed a modified
decommissioning strategy for its gas-cooled reactors
where Stage 2 dismantling does not take place imme-
diately after Stage 1, but a period of monitoring and sur-
veillance takes place, and after about 35 years most
buildings are provided with a containment to make them
weatherproof and maintenance free. This ‘Safestore’
approach defers the production of much of the waste
volume until Stage 3, and reduces the already small
radiological impact due to dismantling.
A possible alternative approach is so-called in situ
decommissioning. This would involve engineering a
stable mound over the buildings and, in effect, burying
them, albeit above ground. It has the advantages of not
IEE PROCEEDINGS-A, Vol. 140, NO. I , J A N U A R Y 1993
producing significant quantities of radioactive waste for
disposal, of avoiding worker radiation exposures associ-
ated with plant dismantling and providing a topographic
feature which could have amenity value for the local
.
ul
100
E 10
a-
+-
e 1
% Thyroid, lung, skin
8 0.1
5
E 0.01
-2
E
0.001
1
I I
niobium-94
I I I I
\
I I
0 40 ao 120
time after final shutdown, years
Fig. 3 Reduction of dose-rate with time inside a typical Magnox
reactor
population. It would, however, be necessary to ensure
that all possible pathways for public exposure far into the
future were acceptable since the mound would essentially
be a surface radioactive waste repository. In situ decom-
missioning is not part of NE’s decommissioning strategy,
but future generations may wish to pursue it, given its
environmental advantages.
8 Reactor accidents
For many people the source of greatest environmental
concern is the possibility of large scale accidents. Each
NE station is built and operated to the conditions of a
nuclear site licence issued by the Nuclear Installations
Inspectorate (NII), and the design philosophy employed
is based upon:
(i) ensuring that accidents which in practical terms
could conceivably happen (i.e. all credible accidents) have
consequences which can be accepted ; and
(ii) ensuring that accidents which could have unaccept-
able consequences in practical terms will not occur.
8.1 Credible accidents
For a significant release of radioactivity from a power
reactor to be possible it is necessary that there be a
failure in the barriers between the hazardous radioactive
materials present inside the nuclear fuel and the outside
environment. These barriers include the fuel itself, the
cladding material which surrounds the fuel, the coolant
circuit boundary and, in the case of the PWR, the con-
tainment building. Given that all these barriers are
breached, then some radioactive materials released from
the fuel could be transported out of the reactor and then
be dispersed into the environment, possibly triggering
countermeasures to minimise the radiological impact.
The National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB)
is responsible for providing advice in the UK on the
implementation of Countermeasures. It has published
emergency reference levels (ERLs) of dose at which it
recommends that specific protective measures should be
given consideration or implemented [161. The counter-
measures considered are evacuation, sheltering and
administration of stable iodine tablets, the consumption
of which can contribute to a reduction in dose to the
thyroid when exposure to radioactive iodine occurs. Ref-
erence is also made to withholding distribution of milk
and other foodstuffs. The ERLs are specified not as a
IEE PROCEEDINGS-A, Vol. 140, NO. I , J A N U A R Y 1993
unique value, but as a range between an upper and a
lower level of dose (see Table 5 ) ; these take into account
Table 5: Emergency reference levels
Countermeasure Body organ Dose equivalent
level, mSv
Lower Upper
Sheltering Whole body 3 30
Thyroid, lung, skin 30 300
Evacuation Whole body 30 300
300 3000
Stable iodine Thyroid 30 300
the potential health hazard or risk that is associated with
the radiation dose set against the potential risk that the
1
protective measures themselves might involve.
In preparing ‘emergency plans’ (EPs) for accidents
160 which could conceivably happen ‘reference’ accidents are
considered for each reactor type. For the early Magnox
reactors the area for which such detailed plans are pro-
vided is based on a radius of around 2.4 km from the
reactor. For the second generation of Magnox reactors,
the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors and the Pressurised
Water Reactor under construction at Sizewell, the
‘maximum credible accidents’ are less serious in terms of
the amount of radioactivity that could be released. Fault
analyses lead to the conclusion that the release could not
be sufficiently large to give rise to the lower ERL of dose
for evacuation being exceeded outside the station bound-
ary. For these stations emergency arrangements are
based on a radius of about 1 km from the site.
The PWR at Three Mile Island (TMI) in the United
States suffered an accident in 1979 which started with a
minor failure in the boiler feed water system and escal-
ated due to a series of operator errors and equipment
failures. Significant damage was done to the reactor core,
but releases of radioactivity to the environment were
minor (confirming the safety of the design) and the radio-
logical impact on the general public very small. Never-
theless, the lack of a clearly established emergency plan
led to a high degree of public distress. Lessons learnt
from TMI have been incorporated in NE’s emergency
plans, in particular changes were made to improve co-
ordination with the emergency services and local author-
ities and to ensure that local communities would be kept
informed at all times.
8.2 Low probabilitylhigh consequence accidents
The second aim is of ensuring that accidents that could
have unacceptable consequences will in practical terms
not occur. In meeting this, two features are important :
accident probability and accident consequence. However,
whereas the emphasis for design basis accidents is to
show acceptability of consequences, for accidents lying
outside the design basis the emphasis is on the unlikeli-
hood, that is the probability, of their happening. The
analysis of the probability and consequences of very
severe accidents is complex. For example, for degraded
core accidents it involves the identification of all the pos-
sible ways in which core overheating could occur and
estimating the probability of such events. The analysis is
then pursued further to assess how the core would
behave once its fuel temperature limits had been
exceeded and ultimately to estimate how much radioac-
tivity might be released to the environment.
By combining the results from the calculations of
accident probability and accident consequences for these
very unlikely fault combinations it is possible to derive a
17
figure for the risk to the public from these events. Such
risk estimates can never be precise but they do indicate
the broad level of risk and helpfully put a perspective to
the significance of extremely low probability events.
Table 6 [17] gives some calculated risks for the proposed
Table 6: Estimated maximum individual risk of death for the
Hinkley Point C PWR
Earlydeath, y-’ Fatal cancer, y-’
Normal operation (hypothetical 0 2 x 10-7
exposed individual)
Accidents: 0 9 x 10-l1
design basis*
Containment 1 x10-” 2 x 10-9
bypass
Degraded core* 2 x 10-9 2 x 10-’0
‘Everyday’ risk for 3 x 10-4 3 x lo-=
comparison (see note 1) (see note 2)
Notes:
1. This is the annual average risk of death in the UK from accidents
of any kind.
2. This is the annual risk in the UK of developing a fatal cancer aver-
aged over a person’s lifetime.
* These values are those for an individual assumed to live contin-
uously at a distance of 1 km from the reactor.
Hinkley C PWR. For all practical purposes these prob-
abilities are so low that the risk from all accidents is neg-
ligible.
At the Chernobyl RBMK nuclear power station in the
Ukraine the worst accident in the history of nuclear
power occurred in 1986. This accident was as severe as
many of the low probability/high consequence accidents
considered in designs for UK reactors. The reactor
involved was of a very different type from UK reactors
and had a design fault which would have ensured that it
could not have received an operating licence in the UK.
The chance of an accident on the same scale as that at
Chernobyl occurring in the UK is extremely remote.
Despite the catastrophic nature of the Chernobyl
accident, its consequences should not be overestimated.
About 30 people died soon after the accident, mainly as a
result of fires which raged during the first few hours, and
about 1OOOOO were evacuated from an area of 30 km
or so around the plant. The sterilisation of the land in
this area is, of course, a major environmental impact, but
Chernobyl is not unique in this respect; many large
hydroelectric schemes result in large areas of land being
inundated and large numbers of people being moved. The
radiation exposures of all except those closest to the
plant will have been small compared with background
levels; it has been estimated that over the next few years
throughout European Russia there will be one extra
cancer for each lo00 which occur naturally.
9 Future developments
9.1 inherently safe reactors
There are many proposals for developments of nuclear
reactors which further reduce the risk of major accidents
by relying less on the need for intervention to ensure
reactor safety and more on passive means of heat
removal in the event of an accident. Concepts presently
under consideration include the Process Inherent Ulti-
mate Safety Reactor (PIUS) designed in Sweden, and a
form of the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor
(HTGR); see, for example, Reference 18. It is not clear at
the present time whether these new concepts will be eco-
nomically viable and will find favour with electricity util-
ities, but they could, by relying on the laws of physics
18
rather than human engineering, gain the support of some
who find the environmental consequences of major
nuclear accidents (however unlikely) unacceptable.
9.2 Fast reactors
Although plutonium recovered by reprocessing can be
mixed with uranium and used as fuel in ordinary reac-
tors, it is more efficient to use it in a fast reactor cycle, so
called because ‘fast’ rather than thermal neutrons cause
the fissioning of nuclei. In a fast breeder reactor there is a
net production of fissile atoms, so that the amount of
useful energy which can be released from a given amount
of uranium is much greater (about a factor of 50) than in
the thermal reactors considered so far in this paper. The
fast reactor fuel cycle is much less dependent on the
mining and milling stages shown in Fig. 1, but depends
totally on fuel reprocessing.
Several fast breeder reactors have been operated,
including the Prototype Fast Reactor at Dounreay and
Superphenix in France. To date a fully commercial
reactor of this type has not been built, but given the
enormous potential for energy production from uranium
and plutonium stocks, it must be seen as a logical devel-
opment for the nuclear industry.
The environmental impacts of fast reactor operation
would be similar to those from today’s thermal reactors.
The major environmental advantage of the fast reactor
cycle is the reduction of impacts from uranium mining
and milling. One way of comparing thermal and fast
reactor cycles is to look at the collective radiation expo-
sures incurred by the public due to the various stages of
the cycles, and Table 7 gives figures taken from Reference
Table 7: Comparison of collective public exposures for
thermal and fast reactor fuel cycles
Regional exposures Thermal reactors Fast reactors
Mining and milling 0.4 0
Reactor releases 2.5 0.24
Fuel reprocessing 1.27 0.1 1
Transport 0.1 0.04
Total 4.4 0.39
Global exposure 3330 95
Note: All exposures are in units of man-Sv/GWy
19. The exposures are split into regional or ‘first pass’
doses, and subsequent global exposures for long-lived
radionuclides which can become widely dispersed
throughout the atmosphere or oceans. The global collec-
tive exposures are due to minute radiation doses to very
large populations over many thousands of years, largely
from radon from mill tailings for the thermal reactor
cycle. The overall conclusion to be drawn is that moving
from thermal to fast reactor cycles could possibly lead to
a reduction in the already small radiological environ-
mental impacts.
9.3 Fusion
All the power reactors considered so far have been based
on obtaining energy from the fission of heavy nuclei. A
totally different approach to energy production is based
on the fusion of light nuclei. A reactor based on this prin-
ciple would have to replicate the extremely high tem-
peratures found in the centre of stars. Considerable
progress has been made at the JET facility at Culham in
Oxfordshire, but any possible development of a com-
mercial reactor is many decades away. It is difficult at
this stage to assess the likely environmental impact of a
fusion reactor, but it has been argued that they have an
IEE PROCEEDINGS-A, Vol. 140, NO. I , J A N U A R Y 1993
inherently lower hazard potential than fission reactors,
although large quantities of radioactivity would be
involved because of the neutron activation of structural
materials [18].
10 Environmental benefits
The non-radioactive emissions from nuclear power are of
very low environmental significance. This offers major
benefits of avoiding the environmental impacts associated
with other means of electricity generation. Nuclear power
stations do not emit any sulphur or nitrogen oxides,
although very small quantities are produced by the use of
fossil fuels in the mining of uranium, refining and pro-
cessing of fuel and the construction of the power stations.
Hence nuclear power does not contribute to the forma-
tion of acid rain. Nuclear stations also avoid the more
local environmental effects associated with coal-fired sta-
tions of the disposal of ash and dust emissions from coal
movement, as well as the provision of limestone and dis-
posal of gypsum if flue gas desulphurisation is employed.
It must be borne in mind that producing electricity by
coal burning also leads to radioactive emissions.
Carbon dioxide is a major greenhouse gas that is fore-
cast to cause global warming. Small amounts of CO, are
emitted in the nuclear fuel cycle, but these are negligible
compared with the amount of CO, produced by fossil-
fired sources of generation [20]. If all the electricity gen-
erated by existing nuclear power stations were generated
by coal-fired power stations, Britain’s total CO, emis-
sions would increase by around 50 million tonnes a year
(nearly 10%) [21]. The worldwide saving of CO, emis-
sions by use of nuclear power instead of coal mounts up
to 1.7 billion tonnes a year. The large nuclear power pro-
gramme in France demonstrated an 80% reduction in
CO, emissions from electricity production by increasing
their nuclear power generation from 20 to 70% in just 7
years [22]. Strategies for global warming control, such as
those proposed by Krause et al. [23], require drastic cuts
in CO, emissions through the next century. It is hard to
see how these could be achieved without a major contri-
bution to electricity production from nuclear power.
When undertaking full fuel cycle analyses of gener-
ating technologies it is essential to recognise that the
nuclear fuel cycle involves handling much lower volumes
of material. It can be argued that one of the reasons for
the high cost of nuclear power is that it bears the
environmental costs of its fuel cycle, in particular the
costs of decommissioning and the safe disposal of its
waste. The relative economics of nuclear power would
improve if the environmental costs of fossil fuels were
more fully taken into account. The various proposals for
carbon taxes under consideration emphasise this point.
Nuclear power also give valuable diversity to fuel
resources. As the volume of fuel is relatively small it is
also possible to keep long-term strategic stocks. This pro-
vides a substantial and relatively inexpensive insurance
against unpredictable shocks to the economy from fossil
fuel supply interruption and world energy prices.
11 Conclusions
Nuclear power in the UK is well controlled and in
normal operation its environmental impact compares
favourably with other means of generating electricity.
Health effects from ionising radiations are small, very
modest areas of land are needed, and it has many advant-
ages in helping reduce the regional and global effects of
I E E PROCEEDINGS-A, Vol. 140, NO. I , J A N U A R Y 1993
the burning of fossil fuels. Nuclear power does, however,
have the potential for large accidents with major environ-
mental consequences as shown by Chernobyl in 1986.
The UK nuclear power industry has an excellent safety
record, and the chances of a large accident are remote.
Future developments in reactor design could make major
accidents essentially impossible.
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19