Pasagui vs Villablanca Facts: On February 4, 1963, appellants Calixto Pasagui and Fausta Mosar filed a complaint with the

CFI at Tacloban, alleging that on Nov 15, 1962, for and in consideration of P2,800.00, they bought from appellees Eustaquia Bocar and Catalina Bocar a parcel of agricultural land situated in Hamindangon, Pastrana, Leyte. That the corresponding document of sale was executed, notarized on the same date, and recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Tacloban, Leyte on November 16, 1962. That during the first week of February, 1963, defendant spouses Ester T. Villablanca and Zosimo Villablanca, "illegally and without any right, whatsoever, took possession of the above property harvesting coconuts from the coconut plantation thereon, thus depriving plaintiffs" of its possession; that despite demands made by the plaintiffs upon the above-mentioned defendants "to surrender to them the abovedescribed property and its possession" the latter failed or refused to return said parcel of land to the former, causing them damage; and that Eustaquia and Catalina Bocar, vendors of the property, are included defendants in the complaint by virtue of the warranty clause contained in the document of sale. Plaintiffs prayed for a decision ordering defendants to surrender the possession of the parcel of land above-described to them and to pay damages in the amounts specified. On Feb 21, 1963, Villablanca moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action being one of forcible entry. Pasagui opposed the Motion to Dismiss asserting that the action is not one for forcible entry inasmuch as in the complaint, there is no allegation that the deprivation of possession was effected through "force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth." CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, it appearing from the allegations in the complaint that the case is one for forcible entry which belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal Court) of Pastrana, Leyte. ISSUE: WON the case is under the jurisdiction of CFI. Whether the rule that execution of public instrument is equivalent to delivery absolute. I. What determines the jurisdiction of the municipal court in a forcible entry case is the nature of theaction pleaded as appears from the allegations in the complaint. In ascertaining whether or not the action isone of forcible entry within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court, the averments of thecomplaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. In the present case, thecomplaint does not allege that Pasagui and Mosar were in physical possession of the land and have beendeprived of that possession through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.In order that an action may be considered as one for forcible entry, it is not only necessary that the plaintiffshould allege his prior physical possession of the property but also that he was deprived of his possession byany of the means provided in section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation,threats, strategy and stealth. For, if the dispossession did not take place by any of these means, the courts offirst instance, not the municipal courts, have jurisdiction. The bare allegation in the complaint that theplaintiff has been deprived of the land of which he is and has been the legal owner for a long period hasbeen held to be insufficient. Though it is true that the mere act of a trespasser in unlawfully entering the land,planting himself on the ground and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would imply the use of force, nosuch inference could be made as Pasagui and Mosar had not claimed that they were in actual physicalpossession of the property prior to the entry of the Villablancas. The case is, not the summary action of forcible entry within the context of the Rules; as Pasagui andMosar are not only seeking to get the possession of the property, but as an alternative cause of action, theyseek the return of the price and payment of damages by the vendors in case of eviction or loss of ownershipof the said property II. The execution of the deed of absolute sale in a public instrument is equivalent to delivery of the landsubject of the sale. This presumptive delivery only holds true when there is no impediment that may preventthe passing of the property from the hands of the vendor into those of the vendee. It can be negated by thereality that the vendees actually failed to obtain material possession of the land subject of the sale. In thepresent case, Pasagui and Mosar had not acquired physical possession of the land since its purchase on 12November 1962. As a matter of fact, their purpose in filing the complaint in Civil Case 3285 is precisely toget the possession of the property. WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal is hereby set aside, and the case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. Costs against defendants-appellees.

Balatbat vs CA Doctrine: Double Sale Facts: A certain parcel of land was acquired by plaintiff Aurelio Roque and Maria Mesina during their conjugal union and the house constructed thereon was likewise built during their marital union. The spouses had four children, who are the defendants in this case. Maria Mesina died on August 28, 1966. The ownership of the house was then left to the husband (50% pro indiviso) and the other half to be divided to the plaintiff and defendants. On June 15, 1977, Aurelio A. Roque filed a complaint for partition against the four children before the CFI of Manila. Defendants therein were declared in default and plaintiff presented evidence ex-parte. On March 29, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Aurelio A. Roque: Aurelio A. Roque - 6/10 and the four others with the share of 1/10 each. On April 1, 1980, Aurelio A. Roque sold his 6/10 share in the property to spouses Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan for 50,000php as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. On July 21, 1980, Aurora Tuazon Repuyan caused the annotation of her affidavit of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title. Aurelio filed a complaint for Rescission of Contract against spouses Aurora Tuazon-Repuyan and Jose Repuyan before the CFI on the ground that buyers failed to pay the balance of P45,000.00 of the purchase price. On September 5, 1980, spouses Repuyan filed their answer with counterclaim. In the meantime, the trial court issued an order in the Partition case dated February 2, 1982, to wit: ordering the Deputy Clerk of this Court to sign the deed of absolute sale for and in behalf of defendants pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in order to effect the partition of the property involved in this case. A deed of absolute sale of the whole land was executed again on February 4, 1982 between the family and Clara Balatbat, married to Alejandro Balatbat. Clara Balatbat filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession which was granted by the trial court on September 14, 1982 subject, however, to valid rights and interest of third persons over the same portion thereof, other than vendor or any other person or persons privy to or claiming any rights or interest under it. The corresponding writ of possession was issued on September 20, 1982. On May 20, 1982, petitioner Clara Balatbat filed a motion to intervene in the civil case between Aurelio and spouses Repuyan for non-payment of the remaining balance which was granted as per courts resolution of October 21, 1982. However, Clara Balatbat failed to file her complaint in intervention. On April 15, 1986, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and rendering the contract of sale valid. Balatbat then filed a case for the recovery of the duplicate title of the said land sold to them. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Aurelio. Balatbat went to CA which in turn affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: WON there is a double sale HELD: Petitioner Balatbat is stating that the transaction with Repuyan was merely executory for the reason that there was no delivery of the subject property and that consideration/price was not fully paid, we find the sale as consummated, hence, valid and enforceable. The trial court rendered the sale as valid (Aurelio vs Repuyan) Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an immovable property, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. In the case at bar, vendor Aurelio Roque sold 6/10 portion of his share to private respondents Repuyan on April 1, 1980. Subsequently, the same lot was sold again by vendor Aurelio Roque (6/10) and his children (4/10), represented by the Clerk of Court pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on February 4, 1982. Undoubtedly, this is a case of double sale contemplated under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code. This is an instance of a double sale of an immovable property hence, the ownership shall vests in the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Evidently, private respondents Repuyans caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the subject property denominated as Entry No. 5627/T-135671 on July 21, 1980. The annotation of the adverse claim in the Registry of Property is sufficient compliance as mandated by law and serves notice to the whole world. As between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in his favor, has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property. Further, even in default of the first registrant or first in possession, private respondents have presented the oldest title. Thus,

private respondents who acquired the subject property in good faith and for valuable consideration established a superior right as against the petitioner. Evidently, petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. In the complaint for rescission filed by vendor Aurelio Roque on August 20, 1980, herein petitioner filed a motion for intervention on May 20, 1982 but did not file her complaint in intervention, hence, the decision was rendered adversely against her. In fine, petitioner had nobody to blame but herself in dealing with the disputed property for failure to inquire or discover a flaw in the title to the property, thus, it is axiomatic that - culpa lata dolo aequiparatur - gross negligence is equivalent to intentional wrong. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, this petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.