Analysis

October 12, 2011

Summary: Many in Turkey and abroad try to analyze the new activism in Turkish foreign policy. Just when the Arab revolts led many to declare the heyday of the ruling AKPs zero problem with neighbors principle over, and pointed at the inconsistencies of the Turkish governments initial positions in Libya and Syria, these activist moves attracted quite a lot of attention. The United States had viewed Turkey as a regional part of the global U.S.-led order, and not a regional challenger. Things started to look slightly more problematic as the AKP government increasingly challenged the U.S. policy of favoring the interests of Israel, and sought to steal center stage from Israel in regional developments. The Obama administration must now choose between forcing Turkey to yield, which would eradicate whatever tenuous goodwill the United States had managed to build in the Arab street, or trying to change the Israeli attitude, which could damage Obamas prospects for reelection.

How Will the United States Avoid Paralysis with Turkey?

by Soli zel and Mehmet Ali Tutan
Turkish foreign policy appears to be on a roll. Soon after the rapid deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan went to Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya to reiterate his support for the Arab revolts in person. Everywhere he went, he got the attention and enthusiastic support of the crowds, possibly annoyed some of the elites, and outright confronted the Islamists by staunchly defending the principle of secularism, all the while never dropping the Israelbashing ball. Then came his visit to the United States, when he met with President Barak Obama for nearly 90 minutes, continued to denounce Israel, toughened his stance against Syria, unreservedly supported the declaration of a Palestinian state, and called for a new UN system where emerging powers would be better represented, all in the space of a week. Despite the prime ministers bellicose rhetoric about the goals of Western diplomacy in the region and his uncompromising stance vis a vis Israel, Turkey accepted the deployment of a radar system for NATOs missile shield project on its territory. Since this was the result of long negotiations between the United States and Turkey, this new understanding between the two allies must put to rest the polemical discourse about an anti-Western, Iran-friendly Turkey. Many in Turkey and abroad try to analyze this new activism in Turkish foreign policy. Just when the Arab revolts led many to declare the heyday of the ruling AKPs zero problem with neighbors principle over, and pointed at the inconsistencies of the Turkish governments initial positions in Libya and Syria, these activist moves attracted quite a lot of attention. The talk of Turkey going wayward for ideological reasons or the image of a country that lost its bearings can no longer be satisfactorily defended. While Turkey may have bitten off more than it can chew, there should be no doubt that the multifaceted policy of the government deserves proper scrutiny and analysis. When examining developments in Turkey during the last decade, most analysts concluded that this was a classic case of a transition from a militarist-authoritarian government to a civilian-democratic one. Few, if any, paid attention to the warning that this transition also involved a radical change in the governing elite

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and hence potentially a shift in the political culture of the country. At the end of a decade-long transition, AKP and its forcefully popular leader stand at the pinnacle of power: The bureaucracy with its civilian, military, judiciary and administrative branches have all pledged allegiance to the democratically elected government. Moreover, most of the civilian bureaucracy, the police force, and the intelligence units have personnel affiliated with groups that are steadfast allies of the AKP government and a proven menace to any who oppose them. This seemingly unassailable base of institutional power is beefed up by the support of nearly 50 percent of the electorate from below, and the office of the presidency, occupied by a former colleague, Abdullah Gl, from above. Such a constellation allows Prime Minister Erdoan to be increasingly bold and assertive in pursuing his political goals domestically and abroad. In domestic politics, with the ongoing monopolization of power, the prime minister attacks his opponents, intimidates his critics, and charges forward; in foreign policy, he calls for a major overhaul of the institutional arrangements in the international system. He frequently assumes the role of champion of the Muslim world as well as of the right of rising powers to a place in the sun, as it were. He holds the European Union primarily responsible for the lack of progress in the long-ongoing Turkish accession talks. There is undoubtedly a logic to Erdoans foreign policy moves that cannot be reduced to his ideological background or his sentiments towards the region and other powers. To build analyses of Turkish foreign policy solely on old allegiances or ideological commitments misses two important parameters: On one hand, such approaches underestimate the role of Turkeys economic and social transformations in fostering an activist and at times abrasive foreign policy. On the other hand, they fail to place Turkish foreign policy moves in the context of new regional balances and power struggles between the main actors of the region and with the United States. The lynchpin of AKPs foreign policy is the desire to become the predominant power in the Middle East as well as assume a leadership position in the larger Muslim world. The architect of this grand design is Foreign Affairs Minister Prof. Ahmet Davutolu. He laid out the blueprint for a Turkish return to the former Ottoman territory in his voluminous book Strategic Depth. This return, he argued, would not be based on imperial nostalgia or use of force, but the gradual and patient construction of an economic, political, and social texture that would eventually weave together those peoples with common historical and cultural backgrounds. Be that as it may, Turkeys return to the Middle East actually precedes the ascent to power of AKP. The initial U.S. encouragement for this new orientation was articulated by U.S. President Bill Clinton in his much-lauded speech to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1999. And despite tense relations with the country because of the National Assemblys refusal to go along with the deployment of U.S. troops in Turkey to open a northern front in Iraq, the George W. Bush administration in broad terms continued Clintons policy. More enthusiastic than its predecessors on that score, the Obama administration welcomed the rise of AKP as a Muslim-democratic role model. At a time when the United States sought to mend fences with the Muslim world in the wake of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, Erdoan began to build an unusual profile in the Middle East for a Turkish prime minister. He was popular in the Arab Street as it turned out, more popular than their long-standing authoritarian leaders. Turkey made great efforts to play a constructive role in the development of the fledgling Iraqi democracy, and tried (in its own way) to mediate between Iran and the UN Security Council 5+1 group. Though bitterly criticizing Israels

There is undoubtedly a logic to Erdoans foreign policy moves that cannot be reduced to his ideological background or his sentiments towards the region and other powers.
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conduct in the occupied territories, the AKP held on to the vestiges of the Turkish-Israeli alignment it had inherited from previous governments. Turkey remained a member of NATO, continued accession talks, and maintained a customs union with the EU. It conducted fair democratic elections on a regular basis and proceeded with the implementation of the Copenhagen criteria the EUs political blueprint for candidate countries admission conditions. The U.S. administration remained oblivious to the aspirations for regional leadership of the AKP and certainly did not see in these much about which to be concerned: As Davutolu rightly argued, the United States viewed Turkey as a regional part of the global U.S.-led order, and not a regional challenger. Things started to look slightly more problematic as the AKP government increasingly challenged the U.S. policy of favoring the interests of Israel, and sought to steal center stage from Israel in regional developments. This process started with Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008-2009 and the consequent breakdown of the Israeli-Syrian proximity talks that had been facilitated by Turkey back in 2007. It came to a head in the stormy Davos encounter between Erdoan and Israels Nobel Peace Prize Laureate President Shimon Peres in January 2009. Finally, in May 2010, the Israeli commando raid against the Gaza flotilla and the resulting deaths of eight Turkish citizens and one TurkishAmerican clearly set Turkey and Israel on a collision course. Prime Minister Erdoan considered Operation Cast Lead to be a personal affront because it took place only days after Prime Minister Olmert visited Turkey and had a five and a half hour-long meeting with Erdoan, including telephone conversations with Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Even in the wake of Cast Lead, though, relations remained where they were diplomatically. Indeed, only days prior to the attack against the aid flotilla, Ankara resisted Palestinian pressure to veto Israels admission to OECD and cast its vote in favor of admission. Bilateral negotiations to find an appropriate formula under which Israel could apologize for the incident failed because the Israeli prime minister changed his mind, although there was agreement on the wording for this apology. According to sources close to the prime minister, the Turkish addition of the lifting of sanctions as a condition to normalize relations came only after Erdoan was convinced that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not honor his word for domestic political reasons. This refusal and Turkeys negative reception, indeed rejection, of the Palmer Report, which found Israels raid lawful, presented a new watershed. The Turkish reaction, outlined by a five-point action plan against Israel, has effectively damaged the U.S. regional hegemony that rests on three pivotal states: Turkey, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Now, the United States is trying to avoid being put in the undesirable position to choose between Israel, whose security is a long-standing priority of U.S. administrations, and Turkey, who demands to be recognized by the United States as the leading actor in regional matters even if at the expense of Israel. This is quite a dilemma for the Obama administration. No matter how incensed the president might be with Prime Minister Netanyahus stonewalling and defiance, he cannot ignore the domestic political realities of the U.S system. Unfortunately, there is no easy way out. It is well nigh impossible to convince Israel to accept being relegated to a partner of secondary importance or to change its current

Now, the United States has found itself in the undesirable position to choose between Israel, whose security is a long-standing priority of U.S. administrations, and Turkey, who demands to be recognized by the United States as the leading actor in regional matters even if at the expense of Israel.

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course when it comes to the comatose peace process. Domestically, the siege atmosphere in Israel, combined with recent social turmoil would not permit such a radical selfcriticism on the part of the political elite. Internationally, the time-tested presence and influence of the pro-Israeli political coalition in Washington renders the uncompromising position of the Netanyahu government relatively secure. The European Union, Israels biggest trading partner, would not be able to assert itself over Israel or use its presence in the Quartet to rekindle the peace process. (In a surprising move, however, France ultimately came out in favor of the Palestinian State at the UN.) Across the divide, as outlined above, Erdoan stands at the pinnacle of political power. Internally, he enjoys vast electoral support and commands the loyalty of the bureaucracy while the opposition is thoroughly marginalized. Externally, he basks in the admiration of the Arab-Muslim world for being the man who dares to stand against Israel. And Turkeys recent tough line on Israeli-Cypriot exploration of oil and gas in Eastern Mediterranean further complicates matters. The dilemma faced by the Obama administration is the following: On one hand, forcing Turkey to submit or to yield would eradicate whatever tenuous goodwill the United States had managed to build in the Arab street. Combined with the democratizing effect of the Arab Spring, this would threaten a popular backlash that could push both the United States and Israel into an even more untenable position. On the other hand, with elections looming next year, and the already bleak electoral outlook in view of sluggish economic growth, trying to change the Israeli attitude could damage Obamas prospects for reelection. If this is the case, the Obama administration would seem to be left with a difficult choice: act decisively to force both governments to yield in a manner that would leave no victors by also no vanquished; or postpone any action on the crisis until after the 2012 elections. But the worst choice might be to freeze in paralysis, suffer a moment similar to what U.S. President Jimmy Carter suffered with Iran, and, consequently, be hammered by the unfolding of events.

About the Authors

Soli zel teaches at Istanbul Kadir Has University. He is a columnist for the national daily Haberturk and is senior advisor to the chairman of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmens Association. Mehmet Ali Tutan is an assistant professor in stanbul Bilgi Universitys Department of International Relations.

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