Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Drilling
EP 95-0210
HSE
MANUAL
2.2 Relationship Between the Chapters....3 4.1.2 Road vehicles and mobile plant. .45
4.1.3 Camp sites..................................46
3 Drilling HSE Management System 5
4.2 Preparation Offshore........................48
3.1 Leadership and Commitment..............5
4.2.1 Location preparation offshore.....48
3.2 Policy and Strategic Objectives..........6 4.2.2 Structural integrity of jack-ups.....48
3.3 Organisation, Responsibilities, 4.2.3 Precontract assessment of semi-
Resources, Standards and submersibles and drill ships. .50
Documents............................... ........8
4.2.4 Tender assisted operations..........51
3.3.1 Organisational structure and
responsibilities.........................8 4.3 Materials Procurement......................52
3.3.2 Management representative(s). . .10 4.3.1 Hazard data.............................. ...52
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives
This document is a development of EP 55000-34 'Safety in Drilling' revised in July 1991 which it now
supersedes. It is aimed at both Company and contractor staff involved in drilling operations. It is intended
to:
• identify health, safety and environmental hazards in the drilling operation and provides guidance on
how risks can be reduced
• provide guidance on drilling HSE related issues
• describe how to develop the essential core of a HSE Management System (HSE MS) appropriate to
drilling operations
• enable an assessment to be made of a contractor's approach to HSE which will assist in the contractor
selection process and facilitate better control of HSE in the drilling operation.
1.2 Background
Activities on drilling sites and rigs present potential major hazards to health, safety and the environment.
This is exacerbated by the diversity of the personnel involved resulting from the use of contractors and
subcontractors and the international nature of the business.
Despite our best endeavours accidents still occur, people are injured, the environment may be damaged
and Company assets put at risk.
The basic cause of accidents can be frequently identified as a lack of effective planning or a failure to
train personnel to achieve competence. The recognition of all the potential hazards of a drilling operation
during the planning stage is essential so that they can be eliminated or at least controlled. Similarly,
attention shall be paid to the programme for training personnel to a standard which enables them to
perform competently the requirements of their job function and duties.
2 OVERVIEW
The HSE Management System (HSE MS) for a drilling operation has effectively the same components as
the overall system for the Opco which are described in EP 95-0100 and other referenced parts of Volume
1. This section describes many of the requirements of an HSE MS as they relate to a drilling operation.
The remaining chapters provide guidance on drilling HSE related issues that might be encountered and
may be useful in the development of hazard registers associated with an HSE Case.
It is not the objective of this document to provide comprehensive guidance on the development of an HSE
Case. A great deal of guidance is provided, however, on the management of hazards. Much of this advice
is a distillation of experience gained by many knowledgeable staff over a long period.
Chapter 3
Preparation
This chapter provides guidance on HSE requirements associated with site preparation, materials
procurement, transportation to site, and moving the rig.
Equipment
Hazardous zone policies are detailed, and the background to personal protective equipment requirements.
A good deal of information is provided on hardware. Drilling equipment is primarily under the control of
the contractor but the Company Supervisor shall be aware of the HSE related matters in order to verify
that proper control is being exercised.
Operations
This chapter covers the HSE aspects of executing the drilling operation.
Associated activities
The operation of drilling a well entails the use of other services such as wireline logging and well testing
services. This chapter gives guidance on the hazards associated with such operations and on the
responsibilities of the drilling department when such activities are taking place.
In essence, an HSE Management System is a reflection of the objectives of an enterprise and the manner
in which these objectives are to be met as laid down by its senior management. Achievement of the hazard
management objectives will be realised through the setting up of an organisation in which responsibility is
assigned and to which resources are provided. The standards and procedures through which the objectives
will be met are defined by those with the necessary expertise. The implementation of standards is
monitored through performance indicators and assured through periodic audits. Such audits are reviewed
by management who may initiate system changes to facilitate improvement. The system is additionally
made live through loops which feedback improvements and corrections at all stages.
The system incorporates the eleven elements of enhanced safety management (ESM) and increases their
effectiveness through the structured improvement process. The quality management structure and the
ESM relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
In this chapter it is intended to provide guidance on how Drilling Engineering Departments should
structure their HSE MS in a way which is fully compatible with Group guidance. Drilling Engineers will
then be in a better position to assess the completeness and compatibility of a contractor's HSE MS and
also the rig HSE Case which defines the controls that assure safety in a drilling operations project.
Particular attention is drawn to the importance of senior management providing a visible expression of
commitment. Failure to do so will undermine the credibility of HSE policy and objectives. Demonstrations
of commitment to the HSE MS at different management levels include, amongst others:
• allocating the necessary resources, such as time and money, on HSE matters
• setting a personal example in day-to-day work
• putting HSE matters high on the agenda of meetings, from the Board downwards
• being actively involved in HSE activities and reviews, at both local and remote sites
• communicating the importance of HSE considerations in business decisions
• recognition of performance when objectives and targets are achieved
• encouragement of employees' suggestions for measures to improve HSE performance
• participation in internally driven and externally driven initiatives.
Management leadership is also necessary to promote a Company culture conducive to good HSE
performance, in which the HSE MS can function effectively. Senior management can foster active
involvement of employees and contractors in improving HSE performance by encouraging a culture of
belief, motivation, participation and commitment:
• Belief in the Company's will to improve its HSE performance - essential in particular to open, blame-
free incident reporting, and in general to effective HSE MS implementation.
• Motivation to improve personal HSE performance - based on awareness and understanding, and
positive recognition to reinforce desirable attitudes and behaviours.
• Participation of staff at all levels - through seeking their views and involvement in HSE MS
development, and energetically pursuing suggestions for improvement.
• Commitment of staff at all levels is essential if the HSE MS is to be fully effective, and should follow
from firm belief, personal motivation and active participation.
Figure I.1 shows the Group policy guidelines on health, safety and the environment as endorsed by the
committee of managing directors in June 1991.
Likewise, contractors are required to support policies which advise that the health and safety of all
persons on the installation or worksite, and all others who may be affected by its activities, together with
the protection of the environment:
• are of prime importance to the contractor who will seek to maintain the highest practically achievable
standards in respect of these
• have equal status with the other primary business objectives
• are line management responsibilities which form an integral part of the duties of all supervisors.
The policy shall also confirm that the contractor will ensure that employees have the required skills and
support to meet this commitment, by providing, where necessary, appropriate training and opportunities to
gain competence. It shall also state that:
• the contractor promotes active participation of all in its employ in the establishment and observance of
measures to safeguard their health and safety at work and to protect the environment
• it expects its subcontractors to work to similar high standards and achieve comparable performance.
To assure the above, it is necessary to perform an HSE assessment at the precontract stage. This may take
the form of a questionnaire in the tender document, but will increasingly take the form of reviewing the
contractor's HSE Case for the installation or operation. This and other aspects of HSE in the management
of contractors is fully described in EP 95-0100 HSE Management Systems and EP 95-0110 Management
of Contractor HSE.
The objectives which underpin the health, safety and environmental protection policy can typically be
summarised as follows:
• to prevent all workplace injuries, by encouraging active workforce participation in all aspects of safety
including participation in the hazard management process
• to provide a safe and healthy workplace
• to eliminate environmentally damaging discharges and emissions through the implementation and
monitoring of an effective waste management programme
• to comply with all statutory obligations, through the fulfilment of management responsibilities
• to provide properly engineered and well maintained facilities
• to work with external agencies such as certifying authorities to promote improvements
• to ensure all employees are competent to fulfil their duties
• to prevent use of alcohol or abuse of substances on location
• to prevent vehicle accidents.
Increasingly, companies and contractors are developing substance abuse policies. A model Company
policy statement, taken from Group guidelines on the subject, is shown in Figure I.2. Industry guidelines
are described in 'Substance Abuse Management Strategies' (Ref. 2).
The success of a substance abuse policy depends on the commitment and leadership of management. For
the purpose of the policy, management is treated in the same manner as those employees holding safety
and environmentally sensitive positions.
The responsibility for health, safety and the environment in the well operations process is vested in the
Head of Drilling Engineering. In practical terms, elements of this responsibility are delegated through the
line.
Operations, in this sense, cover the complete process from planning, through execution, to review and
improvement. Thus, for instance, the writer of the drilling programme is responsible for the accuracy and
completeness of that programme in the same way as a Driller is responsible for the safe execution of drill
floor operations.
Well drilling operations consist of the following main activities in most Opcos:
Plan well operations Drilling Engineering staff need to be involved in the earliest phases of
planning. The contribution made to feasibility studies and evaluating
development options can lead to significant cost and HSE benefits.
Other areas of planning include:
• the preparation of the short term drilling sequence on the basis of the
exploration, appraisal, development or workover portfolio
• acquiring the necessary services
• planning for the transport of equipment and personnel.
Prepare for well Prepare a well design and detailed drilling programme or workover
operations programme covering contingencies and emergency procedures and obtain
required internal and external approvals. Order all necessary materials and
complete site preparation.
Execute well operations Secure adjacent wells and facilities as required. Move in, rig up, drill and
complete or workover wells according to programme, rig down and move
or demobilise as appropriate.
Report and analyse Prepare an end of well report which will enable an in-depth analysis of the
operation. Apart from being an important record, the report will facilitate
cost and HSE improvements in later wells.
The conduct of operations in a manner which takes full account of the health and safety of personnel,
protection of the environment and local culture and circumstances is the responsibility of all involved,
with each layer of supervision being responsible for their subordinates in accordance with the principle of
line responsibility.
Contractor responsibilities
The main contractor is responsible for:
• implementing a management system directed at providing a safe worksite
• implementing an on-site HSE programme
• providing for the safety of contractor and subcontractor personnel
• controlling work and health conditions at the rig site
• training contractor personnel to ensure safe operations
• providing contractor personnel with necessary protective and safety equipment and appropriate
training in the use of such equipment
• ensuring that all contractor and subcontractor furnished machinery and equipment is fit for purpose
and properly maintained
• developing on-site emergency contingency plans for major scenarios such as blowout fire/explosion,
toxic material release, man-overboard, stability control, heavy weather, etc
• liaising with the Company in the development of plans for emergencies which require the intervention
of outside resources
• complying with all applicable laws and regulations
• complying with Company HSE guidelines, policies, procedures.
Company responsibilities
The Company is responsible for:
• verifying that contractors' HSE policies, standards, and procedures are acceptable to the Company and
conform with applicable laws and regulations
• verifying that contractor's HSE programme is accomplishing the desired HSE objectives
• reporting any hazards to appropriate contractor supervisors when situations exist where safety has
been compromised and following up to ensure that appropriate action has been taken to correct the
situation
• requiring the Company's subcontractor's personnel to observe the rig contractor's HSE programme and
co-ordinating activities between rig contractor and Company subcontractor personnel to avoid conflicts
• identifying responsibility for third party equipment maintenance and operability and ensuring that such
responsibilities are discharged
• emergency contingency plans requiring co-ordination of third party groups. Such plans will include
responses to oil spills, rig evacuation, etc
• monitoring contractor and Company personnel HSE performance and assisting in the implementation
of improvement initiatives.
HSE training
• Assist in the identification of HSE training needs
• Develop and conduct specialist HSE training as required
• Assist in on-the-job HSE training programmes
• Provide HSE awareness material, and training aids
• Contribute to HSE meetings
• Arrange defensive driving training
• Maintain a record of HSE related courses attended by drilling staff and notify refresher requirements.
In some areas this responsibility is retained by the line department.
3.3.3 Resources
The changing roles of both Company and contractor staff with the advent of integrated engineering and
incentive contracting strategies need to be addressed in the planning stages of operations. The decision
making process shall be agreed prior to start-up and both the numbers and calibre of contractors' staff
shall be commensurate with the demands and objectives of the job. HSE audits and operations reviews
have frequently found that the demands on the contractor's Toolpusher have been underestimated.
Responsibilities should be agreed and matched by levels of authority. Staff should not be held responsible
for areas where they do not exercise control.
In this respect, job descriptions for supervisory staff enables both numbers and competencies to be defined
in the contract rather than being modified on an ad-hoc basis after commencement.
A clear job description will also assist in facilitating a smooth transition with respect to the changing role
of the Company Drilling Supervisor.
3.3.4 Competence
General
All staff shall be competent to discharge the responsibilities of their jobs or be in the process of gaining
such competence in a supervised manner. Work roles that are key to the HSE management of the operation
shall only be performed by those persons who can discharge their responsibilities safely and effectively.
The contractor's Base Manager is responsible for ensuring that all HSE critical activities are covered by
standards of competence and an assessment scheme to assure continuing competence is in place. He shall
fulfil this requirement in accordance with corporately defined standards.
The contractor's Rig Superintendent is responsible for ensuring that all personnel on the rig (other than
those undergoing training who will be under direct supervision) are competent to carry out tasks without
risk to the health and safety of themselves and others.
The contractor's capability to provide competent staff is assessed during the prequalification appraisal
stage of the contract process and by continuous assessment throughout the course of the contract.
Company management is responsible for the provision of personnel who are competent to perform their
defined roles and will monitor continuing competence through the formal annual performance appraisal
review.
Qualifications Contracts should define the qualifications of staff holding key HSE and
operational responsibilities. Where such responsibilities include the control of
significant hazards, the qualifications shall include a tested practical element
(e.g. for a Driller, the possession of a well control certificate which includes a
successful simulator exercise endorsement, for a Barge Engineer skills in
ballasting and rig stability).
Increasingly, the demands of senior rig supervisory jobs require skills not
formerly required of contractor's staff. Contracts should explicitly state the
scope of senior job positions and verify that incumbents are qualified to hold
them.
Training
Safety training should be based on competence requirements, and take into account development plans.
The effectiveness of training will need to be assessed through observation and drills. The Company
Drilling Supervisor on contractor rigs has an important role to play in verifying that contractors fulfil
their obligations in the above. Some specific requirements are suggested below.
• The contractor's Rig Superintendent and the Company Drilling Supervisor have undertaken technical
and managerial training in accordance with local legislation and contractual requirements. All
supervisory personnel have undergone a programme of training and assessment in dealing with
emergency situations, supplemented by a programme of drills and exercises on the installation
• All persons involved in permit-to-work procedures are trained, satisfactorily examined and authorised
for the specific worksite.
• Job specific safety training shall be provided for all personnel in safety critical roles
• Everyone working at the site shall have attended an induction briefing covering key HSE procedures
and, where necessary, survival training
• Specialist emergency response training shall be carried out for all personnel with specific duties (e.g.
fire team training, H2S training, etc). This subject is further discussed in 6.5.9, also in EP 95-0260
Logistics.
Offshore survival Persons working offshore shall have a valid offshore survival course
certificate in accordance with Company regulations. The nature of the
course will depend upon the area of operation but classroom instruction
should include:
• methods of escape from a rig
• use of lifeboats
• use of lifejackets and survival suits
• boarding helicopters
• escape from a helicopter
Induction training
Employee induction Every contractor shall have an induction programme for new rig
programme employees. This programme shall be carried out regardless of prior
experience to ensure awareness of current standards and practices. In
addition to emphasising the responsibilities employees have for their own
safety, they shall be instructed on work procedures, safe practices, the
station bill and any emergency responsibility associated with their position
on the station bill, and the use of personal protective equipment.
Guidelines should be in place for key contractor personnel to observe the
new employee's work performance until they are satisfied that the
employee can fill the position in a safe and effective manner.
The induction programme shall also provide service contractor personnel
and Company visitors information and instruction commensurate with
their duties and length of stay.
Visitors and new crew Newly arriving visitors and crew members shall be met by a responsible
members induction person designated by the OIM who shall update the POB list, assign
(offshore) muster points and allocate lifeboat stations. The OIM or his appointee
shall then perform a general safety briefing.
This briefing shall cover essential safety and survival features of the
drilling unit plus general safety practices, rules and procedures. It will at
least cover the following:
• alarm signals and how to respond
• lifeboat stations and location of survival equipment
• escape routes and signs
• information about the main hazards (e.g. fire/explosions, falling into
sea, gas/oil under pressure, dangerous work areas, H2S presence, etc)
For those personnel unfamiliar with the drilling unit or its operations, and
who will be staying onboard to work or who will be staying onboard
overnight, a brief trip around the installation should be arranged. The trip
should cover:
• lifeboats, life rafts and survival equipment
• restricted areas
• escape routes
• emergency telephones
• rig office
• radio office
• sick bay
• alarm systems and procedures.
An induction booklet is useful both for detailing the above information and
for reference.
Visitors and new crew Appropriate parts of the above requirements relating to offshore operations
members induction also apply to land operations. Of particular concern here is mustering
(onshore) procedures, which are complicated by the ease of access to land rigs and
the distribution of staff between rig and camp. There should be no free
access to rig sites. A reporting procedure should be in place which tracks
the movement of personnel. A 'T-card' system to aid tracking and facilitate
the rapid identification of missing personnel is a good method of achieving
accurate mustering.
Experience Previous relevant experience is an important factor in accepting the
nomination of contractor's personnel for key positions. The required level
of experience will vary with the seniority of the position and shall be
determined prior to contract. Any subsequent substitution of personnel by
the contractor shall be subjected to the same criteria.
3.3.5 Contractors
All offshore rigs have an operating envelope which determines the limits of operation. This operating
envelope takes into account water depths, environmental conditions and operating loads. It is therefore
important to determine these parameters prior to inviting rig tenders.
The importance of preliminary well planning to determine drilling unit specifications cannot be
overstressed if the appropriate rig requirements are to be stated in the tender documents. The application
of the Hazards and Effects Management Process during the planning stage is important to help identify
such requirements.
Health and environmental issues should also be addressed here, for instance:
• the requirements for 'no negative impact' discharge
• the limiting of noise to below levels known to cause hearing loss
• the provision of mud storage, mixing and treatment systems that minimise the exposure of staff to
safety and health hazards
• the provision of adequate recreational facilities, etc
It is important to ensure that the rigs being bid enjoy staff continuity. This will ensure that operations do
not start at the bottom of the learning curve. Where a 'mothballed' rig is being contracted, contractor
supervisory staff assigned to it should at least have previous experience on a similar unit.
Where possible a straightforward 'shake down' well should be programmed for a newly contracted rig
prior to it engaging in more technically difficult and challenging work such as high pressure/high
temperature drilling.
Agreement should be sought from Tender Boards to enable proven good performance to be a selection
criteria.
Since the HSE MS is a 'living' document the last element above is particularly subject to change.
Performance monitoring, audit programmes and HSE Case reviews are all vehicles by which HSE Case
deficiencies may be identified. Where such deficiencies are assessed by management as necessitating
remedial action, the strategy described in 3.7 should be followed.
Reporting relationships
A combined organogram which integrates the individual Company and contractor organograms is a clear
way to depict the reporting relationships between the various parties.
Once established, it is important not to circumvent the agreed reporting route other than in a previously
documented manner such as, perhaps, the Emergency Procedures. This can often prove difficult in
practice due, for instance, to drilling contractors being unable to get telecommunications licences from the
host government. Proper planning may not overcome such difficulties, but it will allow the procedures and
organograms to reflect the realities of the situation rather than being in conflict with practice.
Subcontractor HSE
All service and subcontracting companies and their staff are required to work to similar consistent high
HSE standards, and achieve comparable levels of HSE performance as the drilling contractor. They will
be assessed accordingly. Monitoring of subcontractor's HSE performance is continuous and integral with
the monitoring of the drilling contractor's own performance.
Service and subcontractor employees who work at the site are exposed to risk, both as a consequence of
the potential hazards of the site and from specific work activity performed. They should be advised of
significant location hazards identified in the risk assessment or hazard register, how these are controlled or
mitigated, and the emergency procedures and muster arrangements.
All new employees shall attend a HSE induction course prior to commencement of work.
Contractor should specify training, competence and experience requirements for each specified position,
together with the responsibility of the contractor for fulfilling and maintaining such requirements.
Contract holders are responsible for these specifications and for verifying that the contractor meets this
obligation. Line supervision has the responsibility for monitoring work performance.
On large, long term contracts, service and subcontractors are required to provide strategies which identify
the methods for assessing staff competence, determining training needs, and defining the system for
maintaining the currency of training and competence.
Given the principle that the drilling contractor's senior site representative is responsible for safety on the
rig, other line supervisors, including Company staff, shall report to him on safety issues. Service and
subcontractor staff shall also fall under his authority in this respect. The face that they may report to the
Company Drilling Supervisor, as the contract holder, on technical performance matters does not
undermine this principle.
The proper exercise of the drilling contractor's authority and responsibility requires that he includes
service and subcontractor facilities in his inspections and ensures that they maintain high HSE standards.
When the Company is the contract holder, their representative also has responsibilities in this respect and
should ensure that high personnel and equipment standards are maintained.
Joint inspections of service contractor operations will both demonstrate the common cause held by the
Company and the drilling contractor, and improve the drilling contractor's understanding of hazards
associated with operations where he has traditionally had little involvement.
The Company shall make clear to all their service contractors that they endorse the drilling contractor's
authority on HSE matters and shall uphold disciplinary measures taken for HSE transgressions.
In integrated engineering contracts where the drilling contractor is not the lead contractor, the most senior
person on site shall be ultimately responsible for on-site HSE, in line with the principle described above. If
this person does not have a drilling operations background, particular care will need to be taken to ensure
that he is equipped to handle all facets of his responsibility, and that the line structure on site is such that
he is properly supported.
3.3.6 Communication
Daily on-site co-ordination meetings are an effective forum for eliminating unwanted simultaneous
operations and minimising disruption to operations. Access to information is particularly vital to staff with
a planning function, the corollary of this being that they should be able to influence decisions being made.
The advent of integrated engineering services should improve information flow, but care needs to be taken
that contractors who are not part of the integrated engineering services package are included in this flow.
It is vital that staff at the rig site and in base offices have a common understanding of ongoing operations
and that the quality of information is not compromised through any filtering process. To this end daily
reporting should be a joint effort with both Company and contractor line supervisors being present at both
ends when operational (including HSE) information is being communicated and decisions being made.
At meetings between contractor and Company management, HSE issues should always be on the agenda.
The rig HSE committee should meet (preferably weekly) and be attended by the contractor's Rig Manager
who will provide a communications link between site meetings and management meetings.
Regularly scheduled HSE meetings are required. These meetings and any specially convened meetings
should be led by appropriate line supervisors. They should ideally be conducted in the language of
personnel in attendance, though necessity might dictate the involvement of an interpreter.
HSE meetings should have a structured form with the provision of HSE themes and suitable support
material. They should be action oriented, relevant and should encourage participation. A base supervisor
should be a regular attendee and report between HSE meetings held in the field and at the base office.
They should include a review of any recent incident and HSE procedures implemented to prevent its
recurrence. Every individual shall attend a HSE meeting at least once per crew cycle. Rig site weekly
meetings should not be protracted to the point where attendees lose interest. Crews should be given the
opportunity to provide input to the agenda.
Each meeting should be documented, and the minutes should include a listing of those in attendance,
topics covered and any HSE concerns raised. Minutes should be copied to the Company Drilling
Supervisor and posted on notice boards in relevant languages.
Of critical importance is the resolution of recommended actions. Explanations should be promptly given
should recommendations be considered inappropriate or unnecessary. Agreed recommendations shall be
followed-up, with actions being monitored, closed-out and assessed for fulfilling the desired aim.
Pre-job, or 'toolbox' meetings, are particularly effective and recommended for the purpose of discussing
HSE concerns specific to a particular job. Such meetings should be attended by all those involved,
including service contractors.
Refer to the document 'Guidelines for Single String Venture Drilling Operations' (Ref. 3) for a typical
HSE meeting structure.
Scope of standards
Standards lie at the heart of an HSE Management System and can be divided into four groups:
Management standards Set the framework in which the Company operates and deals with
corporate policies, objectives, accountabilities and controls.
Engineering, equipment Set the standards by which equipment and materials are procured and by
and material standards which the control of change is effectively managed.
Working standards Set down the way in which day to day work is carried out, monitored and
inspected. They include work procedures and particularly those which
relate to HSE critical activities.
Competence standards Describe the competencies needed in a variety of Company and contractor
work roles and how competency is assessed.
Standards provide a means by which performance can be measured and evaluated, and enable corrective
action to be identified and executed.
So far as possible, internationally recognised external standards should be used, as this is the best way of
achieving consistency through the Group and throughout the industry.
Implementing standards
The management process includes:
• The auditing of contractor rigs, contractor management and, where appropriate, the rig HSE Case, to
ensure these conform with Company standards and operational safety objectives.
• Preparing the drilling programme and associated documentation, which shall contain information such
as:
– environmental factors for both rig and location
– well data and objectives
– well design including casing programme design criteria (for instance H2S), kick tolerance, drilling
fluids, well evaluation requirements, well steering requirements (well path, targets and potential
hazards), equipment requirements, BOP requirements, reference documentation and standards, well
testing requirements and completion, suspension or abandonment requirements
• agreeing with contractor's Rig Managers a HSE Plan and the monitoring of performance against this
• reviewing incidents with Rig Managers and agreeing and implementing preventive measures
• defining authority levels
• defining and implementing auditable change control procedures
• progressing waste management programmes
• promoting workforce involvement in HSE.
All parties involved in the well operations process exercise their responsibilities and attain their safety
objectives by managing the activities described in the drilling contract. They will invariably have their
own HSE Management Systems, which will be documented either in a Safety Policy and Procedures
Manual, or increasingly, in their rig specific HSE Case. Provided these systems meet the Company's
requirement for quality and completeness, it is recommended that they be followed.
The contractor's understanding, commitment and compliance with their own system will be stronger than
one imposed upon them. Further, the contractor's knowledge and experience should be utilised during well
planning and programming stages.
Contract documents shall include the necessary obligations relating to health, safety and protection of the
environment.
Control of standards
The Head of Drilling Engineering is responsible for the specification, maintenance and monitoring of
appropriate standards and for specifying their scope and application. Any planned deviation from Group
standards shall be approved at Group level and documented.
Reference should be made in this chapter to the standards and reference material to which the Drilling
Engineering department conducts its business.
Appropriate, controlled documents should be available on all rigs and in the base offices of Company and
contractors.
Company standards should be reviewed and updated in line with changing technology and practices.
Amendments shall be approved by the Head of Drilling Engineering.
Any change occurring to either the organisation described and its responsibilities, the management
controls or the installation hardware, will be evaluated to assess the implication of such change on the
HSE Case and the conclusions documented.
In the event of any proposed modifications of a substantial nature which constitute material revision,
irrespective of whether such modifications may decrease current levels of risk, then such proposals will
need to be justified in a revised HSE Case. This will incorporate the proposed revision and be submitted
for Company approval prior to implementation.
Examples of modifications to the management system, the structure of the rig or to plant and equipment
which could impact safety and which would normally merit a revised HSE Case submission are:
• changes of operatorship, ownership or the contracting out of the management function
• significant changes in the rig's organisational structure or staff numbers not already allowed for in the
HSE Case
• as a result of an unsatisfactory audit of the HSE Management System leading to significant changes or
remedial work. This refers to the system itself rather than the effectiveness of implementation
• the conclusions of an investigation into an incident where the actual or potential consequences were
significant, which recommend significant changes to the HSE MS or facility design
• the introduction of any major new activities on the rig or in connection with it not already considered in
the HSE Case
• major extensions in the scope or volume of work associated with activities not considered in the HSE
Case
• modifications to the rig, or the programme of work it is required to undertake, which has or may have
a major impact on safety
• if the rig is to be working alongside or above another installation, a bridging document shall be
produced.
The process is applied by asking a series of questions of each activity. This document lists the drilling
activities in sequence although the Drilling Engineer shall ensure that the list includes all activities which
are likely to occur during the operation being considered. Refer to EP 95-0300 and EP 95-0310 for further
details.
If the answer to any of these questions is positive the activity is then regarded as safety critical.
These activities will then need to be addressed at a level which assures effective control. The involvement
of staff working with the hazards is important, if the controls developed are to be effective.
3.5.1 General
For the planning phase of an operation to be effective it should concern itself with the prevention of
incidents through the elimination or control of hazards and the mitigation of consequences should the
hazardous event occur.
It follows that a process needs to be followed to systematically identify and assess hazards and develop
the controls to manage those which cannot be eliminated. This can be achieved by:
• use of Group or locally developed policies, standards and procedures
• making a scouting visit to assess the situation on the ground
• study of legislation and supporting approved codes of practice (where these are available)
• a thorough analysis of the particular operation (see 3.4)
• a study of accident, incident and ill health data from previous operations. For the drilling phase of a
new venture, such data may be available from the seismic acquisition phase
Other narrative in this chapter considers the HSE considerations in the well planning process.
Effective planning is essential for all aspects of the business, with plans based upon known and researched
information, and reasoned assumptions. In established Companies, much of the known information is
based upon experience. Plans for sustained improvement is contained in the Drilling Engineering
Department's HSE Plan.
This plan is prepared annually as part of the Company's total HSE Plan and its implementation is
reviewed periodically by the Company's Management HSE Committee. The plan sets out the department
HSE objectives and the methods by which it will achieve them, lays down a time scale for implementation,
identifies action parties and establishes a review process, both to monitor implementation and to modify
the plan according to needs.
HSE targets It is essential to set HSE targets that are accepted by management and
employees as achievable. Typically, a progressively reducing target is set,
which in the long term will lead to accident free performance. Realistic
targets can only be set after assessing the scope of work for the period
under review and allocating tasks to manage such work. The only way to
reach a HSE target is to manage effectively risks which threaten its
achievement. Effective management demands that hazards and their
controls shall, so far as possible, be addressed in the planning process.
Staff reports shall include HSE-related targets or tasks against which
performance can be measured. These should be cascaded down from
department and Company targets. Performance
improvements should not be 'demanded' without giving individuals the
tools to do the job, such as training and proper equipment.
It shall be verified that drilling contractors and lead service contractors
commit themselves and their subcontractors to a programme that enables
staff to achieve the performance standards aimed for.
Site selection The Exploration Department or Development sections of Petroleum
Engineering will determine the sub-surface target of the well to be drilled
and sometimes also the well trajectory to reach the target. This should be
challenged if proposed site conditions so dictate. Aside from considerations
such as access, topography, submarine cables obstructions, etc the hazard
of shallow gas and seabed or soil conditions shall be taken into account.
Shallow seismic run at the time of site surveying will give a good (but not
infallible) indication of shallow gas in the area. Where practicable, drilling
locations shall not be sited where there is a risk of encountering shallow
gas. Where this is not practicable, additional measures to assure the safety
of the operation shall be taken.
Procedures to be followed are referred to in 'Shallow Gas Procedure
Guidance Manual' (Ref. 4).
Likewise, shallow seismic will give indications of the competence of the
seabed to support a jack-up rig or anchor a floating vessel. Soil boring
may be required to assess this.
For insurance purposes, drilling contractors require the agreement of a
warranty surveyor, acting on behalf of the rig insurers, before siting an
offshore drilling unit on location. See 4.2.1 for details of offshore location
preparation.
Permit-to-work
A permit-to-work system shall be in place which includes procedures for non-routine and critical
operations such as hot work, heavy lifts, electrical work, confined space entry and the handling of
radioactive materials and explosives. On contracted drilling units working in isolation, the contractor's
procedures should be adopted with any necessary changes. They shall define the individuals responsible
for authorisation, for verifying specified controls are in place and for co-ordination of the system. The
permit shall include space for restrictions and controls to be applied while the specified work is being
undertaken. When a permit is issued, all relevant personnel shall be informed when the work has started
and when it is completed.
Planned work which requires a permit shall be discussed at the daily rig site co-ordination meeting.
Concurrent operations
Concurrent operations (also referred to as simultaneous operations) pose problems which demand high
levels of co-ordination to control effectively. Detailed hazard identification and risk assessment are
required during the planning phase of such an operation. Such assessments will invariably lead to a
manual of permitted operations (MOPO) which will define which operations are permitted to be
conducted simultaneously and which are not.
Before commencing any contract with a mobile offshore unit, the responsibility for decision making in the
event of heavy weather, or the forecast of heavy weather, shall be clearly defined and known to involved
parties.
There are three phases in safety planning during heavy weather when using a floating drilling installation:
Phase I Stop drilling operations, make the well safe, hang off drill string and make
preparations for disconnecting.
Phase II Disconnect the Marine Riser, which may involve:
a) Controlled disconnection
b) Emergency disconnection
c) Move the rig away from the wellhead and orient it to a heading
which minimises weather affects on stability. In some cases towing the rig
out of the path of the storm may be necessary
Note: As well as minimising the effects of the weather on the vessel, this is
intended to avoid the possibility of the Lower Marine Riser Package
(LMRP), or in shallow water the pontoons, hitting the top of the BOP
stack due to rig heave. If an emergency disconnect has taken place, the
direction in which the rig is moved away should take account of the water
depth to ensure that the LMRP does not hit the seabed.
Phase III Evacuate personnel from the drilling vessel
The change of personnel relates largely to issues of competence and will involve both an assessment of
competence and, where necessary, training followed by a handover period. The change of personnel should
be controlled to minimise the disruption caused by loss of continuity.
In making hardware changes the integrity of the original design shall be ensured with respect to equipment
and the fitness for purpose assured with respect to additions. This requires that appropriate expertise is
applied to the change. For instance, the modification of a piece of equipment shall require a review by a
suitably qualified 'in-house' engineer, and often need the approval of the equipment manufacturer. A
procedure shall be in place which assures that all hardware changes are approved at the appropriate level
before being implemented. This may involve external parties such as classification societies.
Changes to programmes and procedures shall be agreed at the level of original approval and involve the
input of those affected by the change.
All changes shall be assessed to ensure that they do not inadvertently introduce other hazards. Changes
and their consequences shall be documented and disseminated to ensure all involved are fully aware both
of the change and its implications. Such documentation will also provide an audit trail.
The recommended contents of the Company's Emergency Procedures document are given below as is a list
of the hazards which may need to be addressed.
It is the responsibility of the person in charge (generally the contractor Toolpusher on a land rig or
Offshore Installation Manager [OIM] on an offshore rig) to ensure that the emergency response facilities
and materials as specified in the contractor's Emergency Procedures are available and fit for purpose at all
times. Emergency response procedures shall address the action to be taken on the drilling unit and the
responsible persons in the event of an emergency. It is also essential to identify alternative individuals to
assume key duties should normal incumbents be incapacitated. Station Bills shall be posted detailing the
action to be taken by all personnel in emergency situations.
Co-ordination between the contractor's and the Company's Emergency Procedures is required to avoid
conflict of actions. This applies primarily in the base offices where support services (helicopter, medical
back-up, notification to official organisations, etc) will be arranged.
In principle, the contractor should take the lead on the rig in combating the emergency. For contract and
resource reasons, the Company will normally co-ordinate logistics, liaise with outside agencies and
otherwise provide intervention needs. The Base Manager of the main contractor and other relevant
contractors should always be included in emergency control teams. The co-ordinating link between rig and
base office will normally be the Company Drilling Supervisor on the rig.
These arrangements shall be documented and signed by both contractor and Company. An emergency
exercise shall be performed to test the procedures prior to commencement of the operation. Further drills
and exercises shall be performed, particularly during the early stages of a contract, to verify that the roles
and responsibilities of all staff (on all shifts) are understood and effectively discharged.
The action to be taken by Company base office staff with regard to support services (e.g. helicopters) and
notifications (e.g. coast guard, hospital government) shall be detailed for each type of incident.
When documents are normally stored electronically, hard copies of key procedures should be available and
the storage system should be connected to an uninterruptable power supply.
• loss of aircraft
• fuel/chemical spillage
• hydrocarbon spill
• extreme weather conditions
• fire and abandonment
• loss of well control
• H2S release
The service may well be provided by a contractor who will have clean-up equipment and his own
procedures for its operation.
Company procedures shall detail the notifications necessary and provision of other contracted services
(e.g. supply vessels) and materials dependent on the scale of the spill.
Well control
The latest version of the 'Pressure Control Manual for Drilling and Workover Operations' (Ref. 5) shall be
used.
H2S procedures
Each Company shall prepare its own procedures based on local conditions and incidence of the gas. Refer
to 6.5 for further discussion on the subject.
Shallow gas
The document 'Shallow Gas Procedures Guidance Manual' (Ref. 4) shall be used by the Company as the
basis for establishing a procedure for dealing with shallow gas.
Drills should be based upon realistic criteria and carried out, so far as possible, as though the emergency
existed. They shall not, however, expose personnel to unwarranted risk.
The frequency of the drills should be established in the annual HSE Plan, but should be sufficiently
frequent to assure the competence of all staff.
All drills, whether onshore or offshore, shall include contact being made with base to verify the
effectiveness of communications. This shall periodically include the requirement for duty staff to contact
the rig to confirm their contactability.
A timed log of events should be kept by supervisors acting as observers. These logs should be
consolidated into a drill report and used for the debrief, and for disseminating information on corrective
actions to staff. A copy of the report shall be sent to the base offices of both the drilling contractor and the
Company. Supervisory visits should occasionally include the observation of a drill.
3.6.2 Monitoring
This chapter discusses various arrangements that are employed to monitor the implementation of the
health, safety and environmental policy at the installation.
Performance monitoring and review will be a key element of the HSE Plan and the part which facilitates
enhancement of the plan's quality by highlighting areas for improvement. The HSE performance can be
assessed against the criteria considered below.
Occupational health
Performance in relation to occupational health is measured against Company standards which shall at
least meet legal requirements and in any event ensure the prevention of adverse health effects due to
working conditions.
Occupational health issues in drilling operations shall include the safe handling of chemicals, the use of
oil-based muds (OBM), the use of radioactive substances, exposure to H2S, ergonomic issues, protection
against the elements and noise control. All of the above should be dealt with through the Hazards and
Effects Management Process.
Performance indicators can be derived through the analysis of medical referrals. A typical analysis at a
drilling location would be the frequency of skin rashes which may reflect on work practices and
compliance with protective equipment requirements. Another longer term indicator would be the number
of persons showing evidence of hearing loss.
The analysis of some of these indicators will need the support of specialist services.
Safety monitoring
The measurement of performance in relation to safety is based on such things as injury statistics, the
incident potential matrix, TRIPOD DELTA sensing exercises, unsafe act auditing, feedback from drills
and exercises and feedback from audits and inspections.
Environmental protection
A waste management programme shall be part of the HSE Plan and be aimed at achieving short and long
term reductions in the volume and toxicity of waste generated. Within drilling operations, reductions can
be achieved by such things as slim hole drilling (SHD) and the substitution of chemical products, e.g.
using water based mud instead of OBM.
SHD offers onshore the additional and substantial advantage of reducing the location footprint,
minimising road construction and upgrade work, reducing overall drilling associated costs and disturbance
of the environment. Reference should be made to 'Making the Most of Drilling Waste Management' (Ref.
6).
Review
The review process will address the meeting of targets documented in the annual HSE Plan. It will also
address the success of implementing the action items arising out of all activities which produce
recommendations, such as HSE meetings, inspections and incident investigations.
Individual HSE performance targets, normally developed during the annual staff reporting cycle, should
also be assessed and, where necessary, further action to achieve attainment agreed.
Reviews shall also be carried out on all contracts against the contractor's HSE Plan. The reviews should
be jointly held and any remedial action jointly agreed.
Performance indicators
The measure of HSE performance can be obtained by the use of suitable indices which will:
• provide a consistent method for collecting and communicating data on incidents
• show by comparison the effectiveness of the HSE management programme, both within the Company
and with other companies
• enable an assessment to be made of a contractor's HSE performance relative to the industry
• indicate whether an operation is being managed well or whether management is driven by events.
For performance monitoring to be useful it is essential that all incidents are reported. Appropriate
measures to assure this shall be put in place. Performance criteria with respect to Lost Time Injuries
(LTIs) and Total Recordable Case Frequency (TRCF) are set at the beginning of each year and detailed in
the HSE Plan. Some proactive indicators would be produced by:
• monitoring compliance with the plan
• monitoring compliance with corrective action requirements arising as a result of HSE meetings, audits,
etc
• monitoring changes in the drilling sequence which may have a significant impact upon effective
planning.
Trends indicated by periodically auditing against predetermined criteria, such as those provided by the
International Loss Control Institute (ILCI), are being used by some drilling contractors.
The Company and contractor should assess and record the potential outcome of all incidents (including
near misses) as a means of reviewing them in terms of 'what might have been the consequences'. Results
are presented on an incident potential matrix. Incident report action items together with action parties and
completion dates are recorded on the rig HSE information data base and monitored on a regular basis.
Tripod-DELTA may be used as a proactive human factors diagnostic tool for assessing the resistance of a
rig to accidents and for identifying those problem areas which, if not attended to, are most likely to cause
accidents in the future.
Rig inspections are also used to measure performance. This is achieved using a programme of inspections,
against predetermined standards and improvement targets. These inspections are carried out both
internally, by rig supervisors and members of the workforce, and externally by base management
representatives of the Company, the drilling contractor and services contractors.
An example of such an inspection is that made by the site supervisors. This inspection is conducted by
both contractor and Company personnel against a check list and progressively covers all areas of the
installation including service contractor facilities. Each inspection report is reviewed by the base line
managers so that appropriate resources can be made available, and any corrective action requirements be
given the priority required.
For further information on the subject of performance indicators refer to 'Guide for Safety Performance
Reporting' (Ref. 7).
The following three paragraphs suggest an appropriate structure and give guidance on how to develop it.
One of the objectives is to minimise extra administration and to reduce the seemingly never ending job
lists which act as demotivators to both Company and drilling contractor site staff.
Planning Inspections made shortly after start-up will place the main emphasis on
verifying the effective close out of deficiencies, particularly those
associated with HSE management, identified in the pre-start-up audit. The
focus will change as the drilling project progresses.
The importance of hardware inspections should not be underestimated.
Appropriate and well maintained hardware is essential for the safe conduct
of operations and such inspections are also essential to allow a reasoned
judgement to be made on such things as:
he is working rather than negligence. Whatever the reason, there is a need to be proactive in removing the
basic causes of accidents and to carry out an audit of any unsafe acts which still occur.
The process of unsafe act auditing is fully described in 'Unsafe Act Auditing' (Ref. 9). Many Shell
Companies and contractors have adapted the technique to suit their mode of operation and the culture of
the host country. The objectives, however, remain the same.
3.6.3 Records
See EP 95-0100 HSE Management Systems.
EP 95-0100 HSE Management System Chapter 6 and the document 'Incident Investigation and Analysis
Guide' (Ref. 10) are useful references.
For investigation purposes, with the exception of a fatality or a serious lost time injury, the level and depth
of the investigation should be based on the incident's potential rather than the actual consequences. The
document 'Incident Potential Matrix' (Ref. 11) provides guidance.
The Company Drilling Supervisor at drilling locations shall assist in assessing the potential of all
incidents occurring on site and should verify the adequacy of their investigation. This will require that he
takes part in the investigation of incidents which fall into an area of the incident potential matrix that has
been defined as requiring Company participation in the investigation.
Except where the seriousness of an incident dictates otherwise, the drilling contractor should lead the
investigation and Company base management verify that corrective actions are appropriate and sufficient.
Responsibility for follow-up action shall be identified. Any changes in procedures, rules, equipment
replacement, etc which arise as a result of the investigation, shall be documented in the report and shall be
discussed during appropriate HSE meetings.
Clearly, a degree of common sense needs to be applied if staff are to be motivated to report all incidents,
including near misses. Fear of the investigative and administrative workload should not inhibit staff from
making such reports.
This may initially result in lower potential incidents merely being logged. If a recurring trend is noted
further investigation may well be warranted to eliminate underlying causes. As performance improves, the
'goal posts' can be narrowed to address lower potential incidents.
It is essential that the senior supervisors are appraised of all incidents so that they can assess potential and
decide necessary corrective action to be taken. Equally importantly, they can ensure that relevant
information is disseminated to others who may benefit from the knowledge.
Detailed guidance on incident reporting and investigation is given in the documents 'Accident
Investigation' (Ref. 12) and 'Guide for Safety Performance Reporting' (Ref. 7).
A reporting procedure might the take the following form for non-critical incidents:
1. The drilling contractor Toolpusher leads the on-site investigation into the incident and prepares the
report which includes remedial action requirements. The Company Drilling Supervisor takes part in
the investigation and countersigns report as accurate and sufficient.
2. The report is sent to drilling contractor Rig Manager who adds his comments and signs his
agreement to the recommendations. He can also recommend further investigations if necessary at this
point, perhaps with a higher level team.
3. The report is sent to relevant Company Senior Drilling Engineer (Rig Superintendent) who adds his
comments and signs the report. He can also recommend further investigation
4. The report is then sent to the contract holder (Head of Drilling Engineering) who follows the process
previously described.
5. Parallel with this process the HSE Department will review the report as received from the rig and
provide any input they may have to the Company Senior Drilling Engineer.
6. A copy of the finalised report is returned to the rig for implementation of the agreed remedial actions.
While the above describes auditable, procedural aspects of the incident reporting process, normally
communication channels keep relevant issues alive while this is ongoing.
3.7 Audit
Technical HSE audits assess the effectiveness of the controls in place to manage HSE aspects of activities.
As proper HSE management is a quality inherent in the way the Company conducts its operations, it is
essential that the audit team has members familiar with the process being audited. It is also important to
be able to make an objective assessment. This makes it desirable that the team includes members without
direct responsibility for the operation. In small Companies and ventures, this may not be possible.
Operations associated with the installation shall be subject to a programme of audits under the Company
and contractor audit plan. This subject is addressed below.
General
It is a requirement that drilling contractors and associated service contractors have an effective system in
place for managing HSE. The assessment and approval of this system shall be part of the tender
evaluation process. So long as major contractors apply corporate requirements to their world-wide
operations, the work load for performing this task should diminish quickly with time. The HSE
department should have the expertise to assist with this task.
The effectiveness of the system cannot be assessed, of course, until the unit has been manned up for
operations. This implies that ideally, a HSE management audit should be carried out while the rig is
working for another operator, such that deficiencies can be rectified prior to the start of contract. Where
this is possible, and the system is found to be effective, assurance should be gained from the contractor
that staffing, at least at the supervisory level, will not be significantly changed without prior agreement.
Where agreement from the previous operator cannot be gained, or where the rig is being mobilised from a
stacked condition, assurance should be gained from the drilling contractor that supervisory staff are
familiar with the requirements of the HSE Management System. This shall then be assessed upon start-up
of operations.
When properly structured, the Company's assessment of the contractor's HSE Management System also
provides a useful insight into how effectively the contractor manages other aspects of his business.
Schedule
The following offers advice on a suitable schedule of audits and inspections of drilling operations.
New venture
Characterised by small Shell team with limited manpower, and a high reliance on contractor resources.
Small Opco
Characterised by limited manpower and by discontinuous drilling operations which may lead to loss of
expertise between drilling campaigns.
Audits generally include service company, transport, supply and associated field engineering activity.
HSE audits should form part of the annual HSE Plan and in some larger Companies will be part of an
integrated audit plan. Staff should be keenly aware of the difference between audits and inspections. The
audit process is one of verifying the effectiveness of HSE management and is not a detailed hardware
inspection.
It is particularly important to emphasise to all concerned that a drilling audit is not simply an audit of the
drilling contractor. It will cover all aspects of the drilling operation including those aspects controlled or
managed by the drilling contractor, the Company and service contractors.
Audit frequency is somewhat dependent upon the length of contract but a start-up audit is particularly
valuable as it emphasises the HSE principles upon which the operation is founded.
As with all other aspects of the business, audits need to be planned and team members prepared, such that
the scope of work is effectively covered. In this planning stage the expertise requirements is identified and
will dictate the audit team make-up.
External audits are led by an experienced SIEP technical auditor, generally with wide drilling operations
experience. They should include representatives of both Company and drilling contractor line staff. Team
members should be of a seniority which empowers them to agree to the main findings. So long as findings
are based on objective evidence, agreement should not be difficult to reach.
An internal management HSE audit should be conducted once a year by a team typically consisting of the
contractor's Area Manager, contractor Local Manager, the Company Senior Drilling Engineer and
Company's HSE Adviser. The audit should be similarly structured to that of an externally led audit and
review the application of the system in place to manage HSE issues as well as other organisational and
hardware issues.
The implementation of HSE Cases should aid the auditing process by more clearly focusing on the
management of hazards associated with the operation.
Copies of previous inspection records should be kept on the rig to document findings noted during earlier
inspections and follow-up action taken to correct the problem.
It is important that the audit report is a balanced document giving credit where credit is due and not just
highlighting deficiencies.
A review should be carried out near the end of a contract to assess the effectiveness of HSE management
throughout the contract period. Performance trends should be identified and an end of contract note
written to use as an input into any future tender exercise in which the contractor is involved.
SIEP will provide a guidance package for the audit of drilling operations upon request.
3.8 Review
This subject is divided into three parts and describes the corrective action process for audit
recommendations, HSE Case recommendations and HSE Management System remedial action
recommendations.
A monitoring system should be instituted to track completion of action items in the indicated time frame.
The audit should be closed out with a listing of the status of action items.
Actions should be agreed, a party responsible for implementation nominated, a completion date fixed and
a progress monitoring system put into place.
Monitoring system
For each recommendation, action parties and completion estimates are established and entered onto the
Remedial Action Plan. The status of all action items are reported at regular intervals to a review
committee of senior managers in order that progress is effectively monitored and expedited as necessary.
It is logical that a common system should be set up to monitor the implementation of action items arising
out of all four of the subjects discussed. The HSE department, when properly staffed, should be the
guardian of such a system, though responsibility remains with the line who should follow up and keep the
system guardian regularly appraised of status.
From this corporate document will be generated an Operations HSE Plan and subsequently a Drilling
Engineering HSE Plan. These plans will for a large part be a development of the previous years plan, but
may also include new ideas and procedures brought in from outside. Staff new to the area can have an
important role to play in this respect.
The targets set out in plans shall be monitored for achievement by periodic review. The plan should
remain a living document with amendments initiated when benefits to performance can be seen.
The implementation of the plan is a line responsibility and line supervisors should be allotted HSE tasks
and targets based on the plan's requirements. The achievement of such targets should also be part of the
annual performance assessment process.
Improvement strategy
Company The Company's improvement strategy should be set against the outcome of
the review process and the long term targets of zero accidents and zero
negative discharges to the environment. To this end five year reducing
targets should be set and performance reviewed periodically to monitor
achievements and identify actions for further improvements.
As performance improves, the 'goal posts' tend to narrow and new
strategies are required to continue the improvement trend. The drilling
contractors have a particularly valuable role to play here as they have been
exposed to ideas from outside the Company which may well offer fresh
insights.
The annual plans are developed with all of the above in mind so that
lessons learned are incorporated into successive year's plans.
The HSE MS is reviewed periodically (approximately every three years)
and a revision and improvement programme developed based upon:
• examination of performance indicators to see where HSE MS
improvements are necessary
• review of audits and incident reports to identify areas where enhancing
the HSE MS will facilitate performance improvement
• reviewing the adequacy of the HSE MS documentation.
For the HSE MS to achieve its desired objective it is vital that staff at all
levels understand its aims and their role in its effective implementation.
The system therefore needs to be transparent and 'user friendly'.
Contractor The contractor HSE improvement strategy, likewise, is set against the long
term targets of zero accidents, zero negative impact to health and zero
negative discharges to the environment. To this
end, reducing targets are set for the occurrence of recordable accidents by
the contractor Base Manager. These are reviewed annually.
The improvement strategy is based on the identification of key corporate
HSE issues periodically, and addressing them in the rig HSE Plan by a
series of actions. The issues will continue to be addressed in annual plans
until conditions have been improved as far as reasonably practicable.
The rig HSE Plan is developed with the above in mind and the lessons learned from each year's operations
are reflected in next year's plan and programmes.
Both the HSE Management System and health, safety and environmental performance are subject of a
number of formal reviews:
• the Company Operations/Drilling Manager monitors HSE programme progress and reports status at
the Company's quarterly HSE management overview committee meeting
• the contractor Base Manager reviews and summarises the overall health, safety and environmental
performance for the installation in his monthly report
• HSE performance is discussed at the installation HSE meetings giving the opportunity for comment
and feedback.
Where such reviews identify concerns or trends which merit immediate attention, appropriate action is
initiated.
4 PREPARATION
4.1.1 Locations
Siting
Wells should be located at least the height of the mast away from public roads, railways, public works,
houses or other public places. Safe distances from any radio transmitters need to be established so that the
use of explosives and detonators may proceed without danger of external activation. Where this is not the
case, enforceable control procedures shall be established, or detonating systems not affected by stray
electrical currents should be used.
Sites close to overhead and underground power lines should also be avoided. Not only do they pose a
threat to the safe use of explosives, but also to the safe operation of cranes and other equipment that can
potentially come into contact with them.
All practicable means shall be taken to minimise or avoid detrimental effects on the surrounding
environment by virtue of the construction of the location or the operation of the drilling rig. For specific
sites, advice should be requested from the HSE Department.
Size
The site should be sized to contain all equipment and buildings, storage, workshops, etc using distances
between various rig components in line with existing rules and regulations for the area of operation and
the hazardous area drawing of the drilling rig. Within the above constraints, it shall be sized to minimise
environmental impact.
Sources of ignition
Naked lights, unprotected electrical equipment, smoking and all other sources of ignition shall be
prohibited on all drilling/well sites. When internal combustion engines are permanently used within a
hazardous area they shall be protected. Petrol driven engines are not to be permitted on the worksite. See
5.2.2 and Appendix V for further details.
Telecommunications
Telecommunications equipment such as telephones, radios and talk-back systems located in hazardous
areas shall be suitable for Zone 1 application. Instances have occurred where radios operated in the SCR
cabin and the Driller's control cabin have interfered with SCR systems. Radios should not be operated in
these areas unless it is determined that the SCR system is not affected by to the electromagnetic radiation
generated by them.
Drainage
Drilling sites and camps should have an adequate drainage system so that potentially harmful effluents are
contained and can be carried clear of the site to a point where they are unlikely to cause harm. Means
shall be provided to trap any escape of oil before it can leave the site. Drains and bunds should be sized so
that they can contain two to three times the maximum storm rainfall expected over a two-hour period, plus
the liquid inventory they are designed to contain. Surface drains should be adequately graded and kept
debris free to ensure quick disposal of their contents.
Waste oil from pumps or other machinery should be trapped, collected and disposed of properly.
Excavation
Excavation work shall be carried out under the permit-to-work system and in such a manner that the
collapse of side walls is precluded. Measures shall be taken to prevent persons and livestock from
accidentally falling into an excavation. They should be properly illuminated at night.
Site access
Only authorised persons shall be admitted to a drilling site. This may need to be enforced by enclosing the
whole or parts of a site. Openings in enclosures should be permitted only under authority, and after
adequate steps have been taken to control entry and exit. Approved personal protective equipment shall be
worn when visiting or working on a drilling rig or on a well servicing hoist.
Road vehicles shall not be permitted to enter or operate in a hazardous zone, except by special permits
which will take into account necessary precautions to ensure no flammable vapours will be present during
the duration of the work in the area.
Vehicles should not be parked within the location perimeter. Adequate parking facilities will need to be
provided outside the location. Before entering a location, vehicle drivers should report to the site
supervisor for instructions. On location vehicle speeds shall be limited to walking pace.
Provided below are topics directly associated with drilling camp construction, layout and operation, which
technical HSE audits highlight as requiring particular attention. Access control at the camp site should
provide immediate information for newcomers or visitors to inform them:
• where to park their vehicles
• where to report their arrival and nature of business
• who will brief newcomers/visitors on site rules, hazards and emergency response in case of alarm.
The person often designated the above duties is the camp boss or the medic.
Fuel storage
Fuel storage shall be segregated away from the general accommodation area and adequately marked with
hazard signs and cautionary notices (e.g. 'no smoking'). Fuel tanks should be bunded and situated on the
low side of the location so that fluid run-off will be directed away.
Potable water
Potable water shall be regularly checked for possible contamination and, if stored in tanks, shall be
chemically treated to prevent growth of potentially harmful organisms. Where tests indicate that water
supply is unsuitable for human consumption, bottled water from a reliable source shall be provided.
Food storage
Food storage, handling, preparation and messing facilities shall be controlled by regular inspections. Such
inspections shall be made at least weekly by the medic and camp boss. The quality of these inspections
should be periodically verified by contractor management and specialists. The medic/medical officer shall
be responsible for verification of adequate health checks for catering staff, particularly those engaged in
food handling.
Fire extinguishers
Fire extinguishers shall be provided for all accommodation units including kitchens, mess room, recreation
rooms, clinic and radio room (if applicable). Further fire fighting facilities shall be provided around fuel
tanks, vehicle parking areas and the camp generator.
Fire drills
Fire drills in the camp site shall be held at least during every crew work cycle and shall involve all
personnel at the camp site, including subcontractors, visitors and catering personnel. Required response to
the general and fire alarm(s) shall be known by all personnel on site. Drills held in the camp must be
reported, and deficiencies which are noted shall be corrected. They should be co-ordinated with muster
drills at the rig site so that the adequacy of the system which accounts for the whereabouts of personnel
can be checked.
Electrical systems
Electrical systems in the camp shall comply with a recognised standard. All lighting, heating and
accommodation power circuits shall be fully protected by all or a combination of the following:
• miniature circuit breaker (MCB), with thermal magnetic over-current release
• fuses
• overload trip switches
• 30 mA earth leakage circuit breaker (ELCB)
Full earthing shall be provided, verified and documented. An earthed system is considered acceptable for
temporary purposes, if the resistance between ground and any part of the earth system is maximum 160
ohms and the system is protected with a 300 mA residual current operated circuit breaker (RCCB).
An earth resistance of much less than 160 ohms, typically 4 ohms, can usually be obtained easily with two
or more electrodes. Any type of conducting material should prove sufficient for the electrodes, though
copper is preferred. The opportunity should be taken to place earth electrodes around the camp, especially
in the vicinity of major electrical loads.
Power distribution cables shall be UV protected if strung above ground and if buried shall be contained in
a marked conduit, otherwise armoured cable shall be used.
It is recommended that following the arrival of a camp to a new area or venture, a full inspection of the
electrical generation and distribution system is carried out by a specialist, so that adequate protection,
earthing and operating standards can be verified. Audits have indicated a high incidence of potentially
dangerous electrical systems in seismic and drilling camps. This topic therefore deserves particular
attention.
Medical facilities
The clinic is the usual base for the medic and is normally situated at the camp site. In case of emergency
call-out it is essential that adequate means of communication exist between camp site and rig.
Transportation for the medic shall also be available 24 hours per day, as shall a vehicle suitable for
carrying a patient on a stretcher from the rig site to the clinic. In remote areas the provision of a helipad
should be considered. Where this is not a viable proposition, the provision of a doctor and facilities to
stabilise and treat patients during the period needed to evacuate, should be considered.
Security
In areas where security risks are an identified hazard, advice, either from the local authorities or from
Group security advisers, should be sought.
The verification of the structural adequacy of a jack-up involves three key activities:
• site specific structural analysis
• condition assessment
• condition monitoring.
The first two activities (structural analysis and condition assessment) shall be completed before award of
contract and/or prior to mobilisation. Condition monitoring should preferably be the continuation of
contractor's normal practice, but shall commence at least at mobilisation and should continue until
completion of the operations.
The site specific analysis may be carried out in-house or by a consultant, but shall be carried out in
accordance with the above referenced document. Required data include jack-up structural data (usually
obtained from the drilling contractor during tendering) and site specific data including water depth, 50-
year return period storm wind, wave and current, seabed, and soils data. Some of the same information
will also be used to assess overall safety conditions such as seabed hazards (e.g. old footprints, pipelines,
etc), drilling hazards, or presence of shallow gas.
The engineering requirements and scope of work for jack-up condition assessment and condition
monitoring are summarised in the document 'Jack-up Structure Condition Assessment and Condition
Monitoring' (Ref. 16) This information has also been published in 1991 as SPE/IADC paper number
21979 'SIEP Practice for Site Specific Structural Fitness for Purpose Assessment of Jack-up Rigs' (Ref.
17) and therefore is available to drilling contractors. In general terms condition assessment (and
subsequent condition monitoring) should address certification, general condition of the structure, the
condition of leg-hull interface, leg spud can connection and aspects of the spud can foundation.
Confirmation is needed that there is no structural damage, that topside weight is in accordance with
operations manual and that level of corrosion and marine growth do not exceed prescribed limits. Signs of
deterioration, such as major mechanical damage (from accidents; local overload), existing fatigue cracks
and severe corrosion are relevant and shall be recorded for future reference. It is noted that significant
deterioration of components which are not essential for the ultimate strength of the jack-up may not be of
importance when deciding if a jack-up structure is acceptable.
Existing inspection/maintenance records held by the drilling contractor should be the primary source of
information. Additional data may be obtained from a general visual inspection, which is usually carried
out in conjunction with the drilling, marine, aviation and HSE audits. In some cases, there may be a
requirement for an additional detailed inspection by a third party consultant.
These inspection/monitoring activities should be carried out by the contractor and verified by Shell. It
should be recognised that the contractor is responsible for maintaining his unit at a minimum acceptable
level as specified in the contract and as required to remain in class. Condition monitoring by Shell may
inadvertently take on the assumption of liabilities assigned to the contractor in the contract and should be
avoided.
The guideline titled 'Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) Technical and Research
Bulletin 5-5' (Ref. 18) describes the philosophy for site specific assessment of jack-ups and is in complete
agreement with Group practice. Currently the joint industry project is finalising the recommended practice
which will contain the detailed engineering procedures and acceptance criteria. It is scheduled that this
document will be published in May 1994.
The following aspects are important to the structural reliability of semi-submersibles and drill ships:
Structural strength
Most modern vessels are designed for world service and so are designed with adequate strength. However,
some older semi-submersibles may only be suitable for mild environments. Degradation of design strength
through corrosion, damage or fatigue cracking is the main structural threat to all semi-submersibles and
drill ships and requires assessment.
Station keeping
The station keeping performance of a vessel, by dynamic positioning or more usually an anchoring
system, depends on the environmental conditions, the water depth and the soil conditions at the selected
location. This should be assessed on a site specific basis although this need not be on a per well basis if
the conditions over the whole area of a drilling campaign are considered together. Analysis of the
anchoring pattern and assessment of the condition of the anchoring equipment are both required. The
requirements for mooring of mobile units are given in the document 'Mooring Standards for Mobile Units'
(Ref. 19).
these more stringent requirements. Ballast systems designed to the latest code requirements shall be
stipulated in all new contracts.
Most semi-submersibles and drill ships are classified with one of the major classification societies and, in
conjunction with the vessel owner, they monitor the condition of the vessel in respect of the aspects
mentioned above. These inspection/maintenance/repair records should be the primary source of
information in assessing a vessel and shall be made available for inspection by Shell.
Additional data can be obtained from a general visual inspection, which may be carried out in conjunction
with the drilling, marine, aviation and HSE inspections, by an appropriate specialist. In some
circumstances, for example if the vessel is old or the existing records are of a poor quality, there may be a
need for a further more detailed inspection.
The onus to provide a site specific anchoring analysis showing compliance with current codes, together
with evidence of satisfactory stability characteristics, should be placed on the drilling contractor in
consultation with the relevant classification society or certifying authority. Similarly, inspection,
monitoring and repair activities to maintain the vessel at a safe and satisfactory standard are the
responsibility of the contractor and so should be undertaken by the contractor in consultation with the
classification society. Shell's primary role should be one of verification but may include independent
inspections.
The classification societies have standards which differ in some aspects between themselves and also
change with time. Whilst there is a movement towards harmonisation of standards in the industry, this has
not yet been achieved. Consequently SIEP may be consulted, if required, to advise on appropriate
standards for the integrity assessment of semi-submersibles and drill ships.
A draft procedures guide for the Safety and Integrity Assessment of MODUs is available from SIEP.
Emergency response plans in case of severe weather, platform fire and damage control in the event of a
collision shall be in place. All tenders should have emergency anchor release capability which can be
controlled from the Bargemaster's or Toolpusher's office.
Before commencing operations on a new platform the anchor release mechanisms should be verified as
functioning correctly. Similarly the remote platform/well shutdown function shall also be tested as well as
the bridge/umbilical release system if used.
The remote BOP control panel on the tender shall be tested as part of the normal BOP test routine. Other
emergency functions commonly activated from the Bargemaster's or Toolpusher's office are the generator
shutdown and the air fans to the generator and mud room areas of the barge. These should also be tested
as part of fire drills.
It is the responsibility of the OIM to ensure that at all times there are personnel available to launch and
operate the lifeboats should the need arise for a general evacuation.
4.3.2 Inspection
The requirements for inspection of materials and equipment to be procured for an operation should be
considered prior to ordering and the inspection programme clearly stated on the order.
Shell Quality and Inspection Requirement (SQAIR) exists for many items of drilling equipment and
materials and should be specified on purchase orders.
Only genuine spare parts, purchased from original equipment manufacturers or their authorised agents,
should be used for the maintenance or refurbishment of safety critical equipment.
The stacking and de-stacking of pallets in the correct manner should be planned and only pallets in good
condition used. The operation of fork lift trucks shall be restricted to designated personnel who have
demonstrated competence.
Required driving skills will depend on the local environment and may include considerations such as
desert terrain, dust, ice, fog, water crossings, etc. It is recommended therefore that prior to commencing
operations, all Company and contractor drivers should attend defensive driving courses addressing local
hazards and on-road/off-road driving regulations and techniques. If subcontractors such as caterers, civil
engineering contractors, etc are utilised, they should also be included in the training scheme as a
contractual obligation.
Compliance with Company driving rules shall be verified by the contract holder through spot checks and
audits. Compliance checks should include:
• review of maintenance practices
• observation of speed limits
• day/night driving limitations
• the use of seat belts for front and rear seats
• minimum hardware requirements in place, e.g. first aid box, fire extinguisher, roll bar, etc
• radio communication system in good working order
• installation of tachographs to monitor speed, etc
• verification of driver qualification requirements
• journey monitoring/logging
• alarm conditions and emergency response plans.
The carriage of goods by air is covered by air transport regulations and the final decision on whether any
particular item will be carried rests with the helicopter pilot.
• repair facilities
• supervisory staff
• communication
• emergency response
• escorts.
During rig moves, the drilling contractor should have a senior supervisor at both the old and new locations
to ensure the safe loading and unloading of vehicles. These supervisors should be in radio contact with
each other so that information on awkward loads or special handling precautions can be communicated.
Road and load safety matters should be addressed and included in the drilling tender and contract
documents. Police escorts may be required for traffic control. In populated areas there may be local rules
and regulations which should be observed. Refer also to EP 95-0260 Logistics and Appendix III 'Land
Rig Move Plan'.
Following a rig move, a report should be made to provide an analysis of key aspects of the move.
A detailed rig move plan shall be prepared and should outline such aspects as:
• move programme, contingency plan, responsibilities
• weather forecast
• sea bed survey
• surveying method
• rig position on new location
• anchor pattern and test tension
• pennant and chaser combinations
• communications responsibilities
• selection of anchor handling tugs.
When moving on to producing facilities, well close-in and production shutdown requirements shall be
discussed and agreed by production and drilling staff. Verification prior to move-on shall be via a
documented handover procedure.
During anchor handling operations, the crew on the deck of the rig and anchor handling vessels shall be
kept to a minimum and crew members shall be positioned to minimise the risk of injury should there be an
equipment failure. Failures of very heavy hooks and anchor pennant lines have resulted in fatalities.
Hydraulic release mechanisms (shark jaws) should be used wherever possible instead of pelican hooks.
Anchors shall be laid in such a way as to avoid any possibility of damaging pipelines or any subsea
equipment either during anchoring or subsequent operations.
Following a rig move, a report should be made to provide an analysis of all aspects of the move, a log of
events including weather conditions and a list of recommendations on procedures and equipment
performance. The rig mover should note any matter that could lead to a safer and improved method of
work.
Refer also to report 'Offshore Rig Move and Anchor Handling Operations' (Ref. 22) and EP 95-0260
Logistics.
5 EQUIPMENT
5.1 Maintenance
It is in the interest of safety and the prevention of time loss to ensure that all the equipment is properly
maintained.
Spare parts for equipment essential for the safe operation of the rig shall be carried by the drilling
contractor. The contractor shall give an undertaking to use the original equipment manufacturer's spare
parts or those from a supplier approved by the manufacturer.
Following commencement of the contract, the effectiveness of the contractor's programme for preventive
maintenance of the rig equipment should be evaluated by selective verification. When precontract audits
are performed on rigs (generally by third party consultants), the effectiveness of the preventive
maintenance system (PMS) should be part of the scope of work. All items of equipment in the rig's asset
register shall be included in the PMS.
Various systems of hazardous area classification exist. The system adopted and recommended by SIEP is
'Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations' (Ref. 23). This Institute of Petroleum (IP) code
should be taken as the basis for ignition control criteria used in rig selection, equipment specification and
hazardous zone dimensions. Some essential elements of the code are presented in Appendix IV.
Another system of hazardous zone classification is based on 'Classification of Areas for Electrical
Installations at Drilling Rigs and Production Facilities on Land and/or Marine Fixed and Mobile
Platforms' (Ref. 24) and is largely applied in areas closely associated with the USA. Its main drawback is
that the system allows potential sources of ignition closer to the wellhead, bell nipple and active mud
system. This system should only be adopted if it can be shown that conversion to comply with the IP code
would involve expenditure not justified by the risk reduction achieved.
Electrical equipment for use in hazardous zones shall be selected in accordance with the following criteria:
• the type of protection shall be compatible with the hazardous zone classification
• the surface temperatures of the apparatus shall be lower than the ignition temperature of the gas and
vapours that will be encountered
• the apparatus construction shall be able to withstand the environmental conditions.
The hazard may be in the form of gas, vapour, mist, dust, fumes, liquid, solid, high or low temperature,
radiation or under pressure.
Based on the hazard and risks, consideration is required concerning the degree of protection needed for
special situations.
Full details for the selection of PPE are contained in 'Personal Protective Equipment Guide' (Ref. 25).
The requirement for the provision of breathing apparatus for use in atmospheres containing H2S are given
in 6.5.
All drawworks shall be fitted with a secondary braking device (e.g. eddy current or hydromatic).
Drawworks fitted with an eddy current brake (e.g. Elmagco) should have an auxiliary powered back-up
supply in the event of a main power failure. An emergency stop device shall be provided for the
drawworks, within easy reach of the Driller. This device shall be tested regularly.
There shall always be a sufficient number of wraps of hoisting line remaining on the drum to eliminate
any strain being transmitted directly to the fastening device. The minimum wraps for a given drawworks is
given in the manufacturer's operating manual. The installation of a top drive will require additional wraps.
Past incidents involving brake handle and brake linkage failure indicate the need for a rigorous inspection
schedule, including NDT, of the main drawworks brake.
Main brake failures have also occurred due to the failure of the brake cooling system. Fitting a flow
sensor and temperature alarm to the cooling water return line is recommended. As a minimum, loss of
cooling water pressure should be indicated by an audio-visual alarm on the Driller's console. A low level
alarm on the cooling water tank is recommended.
• follow pulsation dampener manufacturer's instructions for charging the dampener unit.
To balance further derrick and mast loading, the dead line and fast line should be on opposing sides.
5.5.4 Foundations
The bearing capacity of all soils decreases as the moisture content increases. Proper drainage should be
provided and the foundation inspected after heavy rains to ensure that derrick corners have not settled
unequally, thereby causing the derrick to be out of plumb. Civil engineering advice should always be
sought and matting or concrete pads will generally be used.
5.5.5 Masts
Written procedures shall be provided and enforced by the contractor when raising or lowering a mast. The
type of weight indicator used shall indicate the correct number of lines strung to the block.
Lock pins, or other locking devices for holding the upper sections of a telescopic mast in place, shall be
inspected to ensure that they are seated before any additional work on the structure if performed. Any
alteration to the securing pins or positive locking mechanisms shall be made only after authorisation by
the manufacturer and application of change control procedures.
No other work should be performed underneath the derrick while it is being erected or dismantled, or
under the mast while it is being raised or lowered. The cellar should be completely covered during these
operations. Wells within the mast radius shall be closed-in and isolated prior to mast raising or lowering
operations.
Guy lines shall never be removed during operations and shall be subjected to the same inspection
procedures as other wire rope devices.
Jumper bars to prevent drilling line from jumping out of the crown sheaves shall be installed so that no
section more than 100° of arc is unprotected.
Failure of the welding of the drilling deadline anchor has occurred during jarring operations. Critical
welds or other securing devices shall be regularly inspected.
A weight indicator shall be installed on every drilling and workover rig and it shall be maintained such
that it registers an accurate indication of the hook load suspended (within 5 per cent at maximum hook
load). The weight indicator shall be checked regularly for calibration by comparing its reading with the
calculated drill pipe or tubing string weight. The load cell gap should be checked every shift. A closed load
cell will not indicate additional loading.
The stabbing board shall be regarded, for the purpose of inspection and testing, as lifting equipment. It
shall be subjected to the same rigorous inspection and certification process as other hoisting equipment,
with particular attention to its man riding function. Stabbing boards shall have a positive mechanical
locking device in case of hoist failure. Friction devices alone are not acceptable. Stabbing boards shall be
included in the rig's preventive maintenance procedures.
Controls of the stabbing board winch shall be fail-safe and of the dead-man type of action.
Any maintenance work done on the stabbing board shall be concluded by a complete system function test
to verify that all controls work correctly. The function testing should be done under the permit-to-work
system.
Some rigs are equipped with a so called 'cherry picker' which is a mechanised pipe handling tool. This and
other types of mechanised systems shall be included in the preventive maintenance procedures and be
additionally subjected to pre-job safety checks.
5.6.1 General
Of all the hardware subjected to inspection during audits, this is the area where most deficiencies are
found. All deficiencies are the result of a lack of effective control systems. Below are listed groups of
deficiencies with recommended controls.
Hoisting of heavy equipment, tools and tubulars is a major cause of injuries. Only experienced persons
from the rig crews should be authorised to operate hoisting equipment. The use of 'home-made' lifting
gear, unless properly engineered, designed, tested and certified and thereafter regularly inspected, shall be
prohibited.
All hoisting equipment shall be adequately guarded. Components used for lifting such as sheaves, hooks,
shackles, wire slings, etc shall be marked with the safe working load (SWL). The safe working load for a
system of interdependent equipment shall refer to the weakest component of the system, e.g. winches,
wire, hooks, pulleys, etc.
Lifting machinery such as cranes, fork lift trucks and gin pole trucks shall be appropriately inspected and
certified for hoisting/lifting with a clearly displayed SWL. It is recommended that the Toolpusher
maintains a list of authorised operators of hoisting machinery. The quality of inspections performed by
junior staff should be verified on a selective basis by supervisors.
Whenever lifting equipment has been subjected to high dynamic loading, e.g. jarring or working stuck
pipe, immediate inspection is required. This also applies to the derrick or mast after such operations.
Particular emphasis should be given to the inspection of top drive equipment, in accordance with the
manufacturers recommendations.
Slings
Slings should be tested and tagged on a six monthly basis and marked with SWL and inspection date.
They shall be visually inspected by a competent member of staff before all lifting operations.
• termination damage
• severe corrosion (be aware of the possibility of internal corrosion)
• no SWL indicated or last inspection date/colour code missing.
Winches
• Check condition of wire - look for kinks, broken wires, flat spots, visible core, etc Ensure that wire
runs freely in the mast
• Check condition of eye - a thimble should be used. Check condition, spacing and correct installation of
bulldog clips
• Check condition and operation of brake - brake rims and bands shall be in good condition and the
linkage operating freely. Avoid bands becoming contaminated with oil or mud or water
• Check hook and safety catch are in good condition and the swivel is operating freely
• Perform MPI inspections on winch pedestals and securing mechanisms (bolts or welds) at six monthly
intervals
• Winches with a free wheeling device should not be used
• The safe working load of the wire and the winch securing mechanism shall be greater than the
maximum winch pull (stall at overload).
5.6.4 Elevators
Use on the correct size and type for the pipe being run. Physically check by using a joint of pipe for the
correct lift profile of the elevators. Inspect latch, hinge pin and body for any defects. For single joint
elevators ensure latch has a retaining split pin in good condition and of the correct size, securely attached
to the elevator body.
Check that shackles are not worn and that nuts have retaining pins - see notes on shackles. Check pick-up
strops for damage and make sure swivel is in good condition - see notes on wire rope slings.
Safety factor
Safety factor is the ratio between the nominal strength of wire rope and the calculated load.
Field operations indicate that the following safety factors should be used.
Drilling line
When slipping or cutting the drilling line, the following points relating to this operation should be
considered:
• the operation should preferably be carried out when the bit is inside the casing, near shoe depth on the
trip in. This is to ensure that the maximum amount of pipe is in the hole, should the well start to flow.
At this stage the well has been observed stable during most of the trip
• slipping the block line shall never be carried out during any of the following conditions:
– drill pipe out of hole on a non-cased well
– drill pipe is in open hole
• a kelly cock in the open position shall be installed
• before starting, the drill floor shall be cleared of all personnel not associated with the operation
• safety harnesses shall be worn by persons working on the travelling block
• during slipping use the dead line anchor brake. While cutting the line, the travelling block shall be hung
off or otherwise secured
• slipping and cutting operations shall always be supervised by the Driller on shift. Close inspection by
the Driller of end clamps on the fast line and dead line anchor clamp equipment is mandatory. There
shall be no delegation of this task to staff of lesser experience and responsibility.
The drilling line should be subjected to a systematic slip and cut programme. After this operation, the
crown-o-matic shall be reset and tested.
The recommended slip/cut procedures are given in the Driller's Handbook issued by SIEP Training
Division (HRTH/5) to all drilling staff.
Man riding winches are used to move personnel to otherwise inaccessible places both above and below the
rotary table. Any other operation which may interfere with the movement of the winch, i.e. hoisting or
rotating, shall be discontinued until the operation involving the use of the winch is completed.
The winch shall be under the control of a fully competent member of the crew instructed on the correct
procedures to be followed and the safety precautions to be observed.
When using a bosun's chair, a safety belt shall be worn and attached to the winch wire at a level
independent of the chair. Good communication is required at all time. This may require the use of radios
and the placement of an observer in a position where the safety of the operation can be effectively
monitored. (e.g. at the monkey board level where the height of the operation effects the judgement of the
winch operator). Non-routine operations shall be carried out under the permit-to-work system.
All other operations are non-routine and will require a work permit.
The BOP stack in use shall be pressure tested initially before drilling out of the casing shoe and thereafter
weekly. Should a sequence of successful tests indicate that greater confidence can be placed in the stack
and control equipment, then the testing interval can be extended up to a maximum of two weeks. Water,
not mud, shall be used for testing BOP stacks.
All pipe fittings, valves and unions placed on or connected to blowout prevention equipment, well casings,
casing head housing, drill pipe or tubing shall have a working pressure rating at least equivalent to that of
the component to which it is fitted. Drilling or workover operations shall not proceed until blowout
prevention equipment is found to be serviceable by visual inspection and appropriate pressure testing.
Suitable lifting equipment to handle BOPs is essential. Bridge crane, overhead crane or lifting rings with
cable attachments shall be properly designed and functional.
Working platforms should be built around the BOP stack. Safety lines, safety nets and work vests shall be
used as appropriate during BOP handling.
When failure of the BOP equipment or its control system is detected, operations shall cease for repairs.
When using ROVs to assist with BOP operation, confirm that the ROV is fully functional before the job
starts and that all personnel involved are fully briefed on job requirements.
Chiksans and lines used for potential high pressure applications shall be snubbed and anchored. Chiksan
hoses shall not be used for operations where reciprocation under pressure is required as they are not
designed for this purpose.
All such equipment of 2'' diameter and above, which is used for service above 13,800 kPa (2000 psi),
shall have unions of welded or integral construction (see 6.4). The use of equipment with metal to metal
seals is recommended.
6 OPERATIONS
Prior to every usage, tubulars handling equipment should be cleaned and inspected, generally by the
Assistant Driller, to ensure serviceability. Refer to 5.6 for details.
Threaded lifting subs/plugs/buttons/caps used for handling drill collars shall be manufactured from
suitable material. In general, will have the same properties as drill collars and conform with 'Rotary
Drilling Equipment' (Ref. 29) They are considered to be items of lifting gear and shall therefore be
subjected to the same inspection schedule as other items of loose lifting equipment.
Pipe bundles
All bundles shall be lifted and transported horizontally, supported at each end. Lifting bundles (and/or
suspending them) from one end only is prohibited. The most widely used method is with a crane and wire
rope slings on each end of the bundle, secured with bulldog clips.
An alternative method, when an 'outline' is in use between a drilling tender and a jacket, is to suspend the
bundle with two wire rope slings and raise or lower with an air winch.
When using a forklift truck, be aware of maximum load rating to avoid overturning forces being applied.
When transporting pipe with a forklift, a securing device shall be used to prevent the pipe rolling off the
forks.
Drill collars
Drill collars size 6.25" and smaller should be bundled in groups of not more than three. All other sizes of
drill collar should be handled by crane one at a time.
Two slings should be used, one at each end and the drill collar(s) will be lifted horizontally. Tag lines
should be used to steer and steady the load.
Extreme care needs to be taken in removing the bundling slings to avoid trapping feet or hands
Drill pipe
For manual handling of singles of drill pipe, use a lifting cap with a shackle installed in the eye or bail, or
use an appropriate single joint elevator under the tool joint box.
Drill collars
All sizes (9.5"/ 8.25"/ 7.25"/ 6.25"/ 4.75") can be picked up by crane using a two-point lifting sling
keeping joints horizontal and presenting them to the derrick floor where they can be taken over with a full
strength elevator, either a centre latch DP elevator when a lifting sub is used, or a side door elevator when
a lifting plug is used.
Remember that the lifting sub/plug should first be torqued-up before the drill collar is added to the drilling
assembly and subsequently the full assembly is lifted out of the slips and run in the hole. This requires that
the single should first be set in the mouse hole for torquing up.
Small sizes (6.25" to 4.75") can also be picked up using a suitably rated air winch, either attached to a
lifting cap with a shackle, or using an appropriate single joint elevator under the shoulder of a lifting
sub/plug/button.
Do not use two winches to pick up heavy drill collars. If one winch is inadvertently slacked off, the rating
of the other may well be exceeded.
In many cases, drill collars are provided with elevator recesses at the box-end (normally square-
shouldered). In this case, either a full strength or a single joint elevator should be used on these recesses,
but ensure that the recess shoulders are indeed square and do not impose loads on the elevator latch. They
should also be dimensionally checked periodically to ensure that they have not become worn below the
diameter at which they can be adequately supported by an elevator.
Casing
For picking up singles of casing, use a single joint elevator. For certain types of casing (e.g. flush wash-
over pipe) it is necessary to use lifting nipples. Alternatively casing joints can be presented to the derrick
floor suspended horizontally from a crane with a two-point lifting sling, and then be taken over using
either a single joint elevator or a full strength side door casing elevator.
If quick release pin protectors are not being used, verify that steel pin and box protectors are properly
installed. Improperly installed protectors may drop off during transit to the rig floor and frequently
become cross threaded and difficult to remove.
Tubing
Same as casing, though small size tubing joints or externally flush pipe (such as blast joints) can also be
picked up by an appropriate single joint or full strength elevator under the shoulder of a lifting button.
Conductor
Conductor joints are normally presented to the derrick floor whilst horizontally suspended from a crane
with a two-point lifting sling, and then picked up by a purpose built full-strength elevator (e.g. a MACK
elevator) either under the shoulder of a coupling, or under pre-installed pad eyes.
Short conductor strings (depending on their weight) can be picked up by lifting slings suspended from the
travelling block or hook, attached to a pair of pre-installed lifting pad eyes (welds to be checked for
cracks).
Marine riser
Marine riser joints are normally presented to the derrick floor while horizontally suspended from a crane
with a two-point lifting sling, and then picked up by a full-strength elevator latched around a lifting sub
(or nipple) which is part of the marine riser running tool. When handling the telescoping joint, ensure it is
locked in the closed position.
Hold a pre-shift safety meeting to ensure that all personnel are aware of the operation to be carried out
and of their duties. Do not compromise on safety. During the early stages of running, allow the team to get
into the swing of the operation before increasing the pace.
Preparation
• Ensure there is an adequate weather window to complete the job.
• Ensure that slings and shackles are compatible and of a similar rating.
• Secure shackle pins with wire.
• Never use a transit strop for any purpose other than securing the load in transit.
• When rigged up, take the time to double check lifting equipment. If in doubt, ask.
Below are listed some basic safety points to bear in mind when carrying out this operation.
Check the SWL of each sling. The SWL shall never be exceeded. The approximate weight of various sizes
of drill collars (DCs) are given below for guidance.
Allow for the angle of the wire when estimating the load. Note that when lifting or laying down DCs to or
from the end of the catwalk using the deck winch and the V-door winch, the load on the V-door winch
increases by approximately half as much again due to the angle of the wire. An 8.25" collar weighing
approximately 2.5 tons, pulled to the end of the catwalk and suspended just above the catwalk will be
exerting a load of approximately 3.75 tons on the V-door winch wire.
Lifting caps shall be in good condition and hammered up tight. Lifting lugs on handling subs are for lifting
the subs themselves and not for lifting tubulars.
If the use of two winches or a crane with a winch cannot be avoided, clear communications between all
parties involved is essential.
Do not stand on the catwalk or the V-door stairs when tubulars are moving up or going down from the
drill floor. Do not allow yourself to be trapped if the pipe breaks free; always have an escape route.
When using the winch ensure the winch wire is spooled onto the drum properly. This will prevent the wire
from being crushed and avoid shock loads when improperly spooled wire jumps free.
Elevators should be maintained in accordance with 'Specification for Drilling and Production Hoisting
Equipment (Ref. 28) and 'Hoisting Tool Inspection and Maintenance Procedures' (Ref. 30). Latches, latch
springs, hinge pins and elevator shoulder should be inspected before use.
Jarring with the elevator is potentially dangerous. Jarring should be carried out using the kelly. If possible,
after removing the kelly spinner.
Following any prolonged jarring operation, an inspection of the hoisting equipment shall be carried out.
Manufacturers of top drive systems have documented procedures governing such inspections.
Use the correct size and type of elevator for the items being handled.
For picking up casing and tubing use single joint casing/tubing elevators. Never lower the first or
subsequent joints in the hole with a single joint elevator.
Tongs
A high proportion of accidents on the drill floor involve the use of tongs. Injuries result from being caught
between tongs and being struck by swinging tongs. All tongs should be securely attached and anchored.
Tong safety lines should be of sufficient length, preferably allowing a 90° breakout angle between the
lines, but short enough to prevent over rotation of the tongs.
The tong jaws including the dies should be inspected regularly for size and condition. Tongs shall be
maintained and replaced well before they become worn to the point of being unsafe. Hinge pins should be
secured by a nut which should itself be locked in place by a device such as a split pin.
All tong counter balances and parts thereof shall be so restrained, guarded, or located as to prevent them
falling or striking crew members if the suspension line breaks. Remember that suspension lines are
classified as lifting devices and should be inspected, certified and colour coded in the same manner as
slings. Their history should be recorded in the sling register.
Back-up post failure has potentially serious consequences. A systematic approach to back-up post
inspection and planned preventive maintenance is required which includes MPI inspections on a six
monthly basis. They should also be included in the weekly/monthly drilling equipment inspection check
list.
Tripping
Ensure that the crew is up to strength and individuals are aware of tasks to be carried out. A
communication system should be operational between rig floor and monkey board. Note the following:
• before starting a trip, ensure that the equipment required is in a serviceable condition
• avoid using the rotary table to spin out pipes. Use a pipe spinner
• never make up a connection with rotary table while using a tong as back-up, the shock loading could
result in breaking of the back-up wire
• never attempt to stab a single into the mouse hole when the Driller is lowering the travelling block
• ensure the crown safety device is correctly installed and adjusted at the start of each tour and following
drilling line slipping or cutting operations
• monitoring of mud levels, flow checks and use of the trip tank should be part of the routine tripping
procedures in and out of the hole
• do not install wipers until, the Driller is satisfied with the hole condition. they act as obstructions to the
visual checking of mud levels
• while pipes are being moved from or to the rig floor the catwalk should be kept free of personnel
• when hole conditions allow, pump a heavy pill to avoid pulling 'wet' pipe.
Make-up torque values should be checked in the Driller's Handbook to ensure that only the correct torque
loading is applied, taking into account the correct friction factor. The make-up sensators shall be
maintained in good working order and final torque should be applied with a 900 angle between the tong
arm and the make-up line.
Crew members shall never stand behind tongs when assemblies or tubulars are made up or broken out.
Once the strain is taken on the tongs when making or breaking a connection, the clutch shall not be
engaged fully until the floor crew are at a safe distance from the tongs.
During back-off operations, slips are often used to transmit the required back-off torque. It is mandatory
that slips are properly secured with a wire sling to prevent them from being thrown out of the rotary if the
drill string jumps during this operation.
Use the kelly or top drive whenever possible. Where height above the tool joint prevents the operation of
the kelly through the rotary table, consider an initial blind back-off such that the kelly or top drive can be
installed prior to attempting further releasing operations. Consider severing drill collars (at the stress
relieving recess in the pin) as an alternative to backing them off.
All hazardous substances shall be stored in proper containers and properly labelled in languages
understood by all on the rig site.
The rig medic shall hold copies of all Material Specification Data Sheets (MSDS) and the clinic shall be
equipped to neutralise the effects of skin contamination, swallowing or inhalation of harmful chemicals.
Rubber gloves, goggles, protective apron or other protective equipment shall be worn as appropriate when
handling chemicals that may irritate, be injurious to the skin, or harmful if ingested.
In view of the similarity of atapulgite salt water gel to asbestos, the use of this mud additive is not
permitted.
Solid free or low solid completion brines such as zinc bromide, calcium bromide, calcium chloride, etc
shall be handled with extreme care and only under supervision, as these chemicals may burn skin and
damage eyes.
Skin/barrier creams shall be used by personnel who actually come into contact with muds and brines.
Prolonged use of coveralls contaminated with oil based muds should be avoided. Slicker suits shall be
used for zinc and calcium bromide brines, in addition to goggles and gloves.
Valve outlets
• Combustible gas cylinders are screwed left-hand (anti-clockwise to close) and non-combustible gas
cylinders are screwed right-hand (clockwise to close)
• Never open a valve more than three revolutions. One full turn is usually enough.
This applies particularly to the use of nitrogen to charge high pressure systems (e.g. pulsation dampeners).
Portable analysers are available which indicate any Oxygen contamination. Failure to verify the purity of
nitrogen has resulted in explosion and fatality. Oxygen shall never be used to fill, drive or purge any
system.
Movement of the BOP stack on a production platform, for example, presents the hazard of damage to, and
loss of containment of, wellhead, flowlines, pipework and vessels under pressure. Similar hazards exist
when raising and lowering masts on land.
The risk can be reduced by closing in the relevant wells and depressuring the lines and vessels.
The operation of carrying out a heavy lift requires a work permit which will stipulate the appropriate
precautions to be taken.
6.4.1 General
• Ascertain the maximum working pressure rating of the weakest section to be tested, this determines the
maximum test pressure which can be applied. Where possible avoid changes of specification (spec.
breaks) in a connected system. Where spec. breaks occur in a closed system, appropriately set pressure
relief devices shall be incorporated.
• Pressure relief or limiting devices on the pump shall be verified as operational, at the appropriate
pressure before the test begins.
• Visually inspect all equipment to be tested prior to testing.
• Cordon off work area, post 'DANGER' notices (if applicable).
• Announce testing is to take place over the public address system (if applicable).
• Never attempt to tighten, slacken or hammer any item under pressure.
• All hose connections shall have a back-up jump chain or sling secured across them to restrain the hose
in event of connection failure.
• Chiksan runs shall be avoided where possible and otherwise properly secured.
• All non-essential personnel shall be evacuated from the vicinity of equipment to be tested.
• The potential energy level of compressed fluids shall be minimised by purging air/gases from the
system. Also the volume to be tested should be kept to a practical minimum.
Cup-type testers should be suspended from drilled-out plug-type testers. If for any reason the test tool is
suspended on drill pipe, the tensile load applied shall be within its load rating.
Prior to applying test pressures, ensure that no dummy components (e.g. thread protectors, corrosion
caps) are still installed on the equipment.
All wellhead connections, valves and fittings subject to pressures above 13,800 kPa (2000 psi) shall be
flanged, clamped or welded. Though screwed line pipe is covered by an API code up to 34,500 kPa (5000
psi), past experienced of failures due to corrosion, fatigue and other factors, has resulted in the Group
recommendation that they should not be used in applications above 13,800 kPa (2000 psi).
6.5.1 General
During drilling and workover operations the consequences of leaks or kicks with sour gas or crude can be
very serious. Personnel can be incapacitated by relatively low concentrations of H2S in a very short time
and equipment can suffer catastrophic failure due to H2S embrittlement.
The video 'The Silent Sniper', available through SIEP, provides a powerful H2S awareness aid when
training personnel.
A study should be made of the geological and geographical features of the area, in order to predict the
expected areas where H2S may be encountered or may accumulate. Information about the area and known
field conditions, including temperatures, pressures, proposed well depth and H2S concentrations, should
be obtained and taken into consideration. The drilling programme shall highlight this hazard and give
details of controls and recovery measures in place.
A mud programme should be drawn up which will cater for the pressures expected to be encountered, but
should also include the use of an H2S scavenger and/or inhibitor to reduce the reaction of H2S on the drill
string and related equipment.
In the pre-spud meeting, the Company Drilling Supervisor should review the drilling programme with the
drilling contractor and service contractors, outlining each party's responsibilities.
All personnel shall be fully trained in the use of H2S-related equipment. Procedures should be in place
350 m above and/or one week prior to the anticipated encountering of a hydrogen sulphide zone.
Be aware that H2S can arise from stagnant mud (sulphate reducing bacteria) and may be found in little
used tanks and in casing annuli.
6.5.3 Equipment
The vent outlet on the vacuum degasser shall be extended so that the extracted gas can be routed to a
remote area for flaring or connected into the atmospheric mud-gas separator line. A mud-gas separator
used to extract gas containing H2S from drilling fluids should be tied into a vent line for burning, so as not
to release the gas into the atmosphere close to the rig. This requires that the line terminates away from the
rig and not at the top of the mast. Vent lines shall be sized so that the back pressure they impose upon the
separator vessel does not cause the mud leg to be evacuated at designed operating conditions. Note that
H2S is denser than air and if not flared will still pose a hazard in low lying areas.
Experience has shown that weighted drilling fluids heavily contaminated with H2S cannot be successfully
treated. Disposal of such contaminated fluids in suitable ventilated locations with appropriate hazard
warnings is therefore required.
Flare lines
Flare lines should be installed from the degasser, choke manifold, and mud-gas separator according to
'Safe Drilling of Wells Containing Hydrogen Sulphide' (Ref. 33). All flare lines should be equipped with
the means for constant or automatic ignition.
Drill pipe
Lower grades of drill pipe, or pipe made from steel with anti-corrosive properties, should be used in order
to minimise hydrogen embrittlement of sulphide stress cracking. Means to minimise hydrogen
embrittlement and sulphide stress cracking or drill pipe can also be found in 'Safe Drilling of Wells
Containing Hydrogen Sulphide' (Ref. 33)
6.5.4 Monitoring
Each drilling facility shall have a fixed H2S monitoring and detection system that activates audible and
visual warning alarms at a level of 10 ppm H2S in the air. It is recommended that this system should have
emergency battery power back-up, capable of keeping the system operational for 12 hours without re-
charging.
H2S detection heads require regular calibration to retain their accuracy. The equipment manufacturers
instructions should be known and followed. Calibration checks shall be logged.
• Driller's console
• mud tanks
• shale shaker
• ventilation system of living quarters
• wellhead cellar
Detection devices should be available for use by all personnel on site. Such devices shall be regularly
checked and calibrated to provide a clear audible alarm at a level of 10 ppm in air.
At least one portable instrument should be available for the detection of SO2.
For equipment selection, refer to 'Guidelines for Detection and Control of Hydrogen Sulphide During
Drilling Operations' (Ref. 31).
The audible warning should be a yelping-type electronic siren, in order to establish a universal H2S
warning system, and be connected to the fixed H2S sensing system.
Amber warning lights should be of a rotating or flashing type. All warning devices located in hazardous
zones shall be appropriately rated.
Because of potential language barriers and the possibility of misunderstanding by drilling crew personnel,
everyone shall be trained and conditioned to react to the audible and visual alarm system. Personnel
designated as 'essential' should move to assigned stations or job functions after having put on their
breathing apparatus. Non-essential personnel shall, at the first warning, move to the pre-designated
briefing areas after having put on their breathing apparatus.
Warning lights on offshore rigs/platforms should be shielded from the outboard view so as not to be
confused with navigational aids and lights.
The use of chemical cartridge respirators is prohibited for service in H2S environments in drilling
operations.
The storage locations of all protective breathing apparatus shall be such that the equipment can be quickly
donned and is readily available to all personnel on and around the rig. Locations for breathing apparatus
should include:
• rig floor
• derrick monkey boards
• mud logging unit
• shale shaker unit
• pump rooms (mud and cement)
• crew quarters
• Toolpusher's and Company Drilling Supervisor's office
• each designated briefing area
• heliport
• standby vessels.
• wind indicators
• bug blowers
• hazard warning signs
• first-aid kit
• stretcher
• blankets
• eyewash station.
Tripping
Every effort should be made to pull a dry drill string. If it is necessary to pull the string wet after
penetration of H2S - bearing zones, increased monitoring of the working area should be provided and
protective breathing apparatus should be on standby and if necessary worn.
Breathing apparatus should be worn by personnel in the working area prior to circulating bottoms-up in
case H2S is indicated in sufficient quantities to require the use of breathing apparatus.
During the above operations, warning signs indicating 'DANGER - POISON GAS' shall be displayed in
languages understood by all personnel on the rig. On land rigs, flags at the location entrance gate are to be
used to indicate that a hazardous situation exists.
When drilling in an area where hydrogen sulphide gas might be encountered, training specific to the H2S
hazard in the area shall be carried out. The following guidelines are recommended for the training of
personnel.
The H2S training programme shall be developed prior to the commencement of drilling operations and
should include:
• a new employee/visitor H2S induction training programme to be presented to all personnel arriving on
site for the first time
• the use of self contained breathing apparatus and emergency escape equipment
• procedures for operating conditions:
– pre-alarm condition
– moderate danger to life
– extreme danger to life
• responsibilities and duties of personnel for each operating condition
• search and rescue procedures with designated staff
• briefing areas, or locations for assembly of personnel during extreme danger condition, should be
designated. At least two briefing areas shall be established on each drilling facility. Of these two areas,
the one upwind at any given time is the safe briefing area
• evacuation plan
• agencies to be notified in case of an emergency
• a list of medical personnel and facilities, including addresses and telephone numbers.
After training is completed, drills for H2S emergency conditions shall be carried out once each week or
more often if conditions warrant. Records will be kept of drills and personnel that participated. The
purpose of the drill is to rehearse emergency response procedures and verify that all personnel on site
know their duties according to the plan.
6.5.11 Personnel
Physical examinations
All employees who are to work on a well site, which may expose them to H2S, should receive a physical
examination. This examination should address conditions associated with respiratory problems and
hypertension.
Any individual with facial hair (beard) that could interfere with a complete mask seal is not permitted to
work in an H2S environment as equipment leakage could prove fatal.
Dentures
Personnel wearing dentures, while working in an H2S atmosphere, should be advised that they are to be
worn at all times while they are exposed to the hazard, including rest periods. Dentures should only be
removed for cleaning purposes. If dentures are removed from the mouth, the face takes on a different
configuration, and it is possible that breathing apparatus will no longer fit. This could prove fatal.
In particular the rig floor should be kept clean of any equipment which is not in use unless it is required
for safety reasons (e.g. the inside BOP assembly).
Stairways, ladders, ramps, walkways and platforms shall be kept free of objects or substances which may
create a tripping or slipping hazard or hinder or prevent emergency egress of personnel, or access to
emergency equipment.
The acceptable noise dose limit of 85 dB(A) is applicable for shift lengths of eight hours/day or more, 40
hours/week, or in case of occasional overtime work, provided the exposure time over one year does not
exceed a total of 2000 hours. Local legislation may demand a lower limit in some areas.
Levels in accommodation used for off-duty activities shall not exceed 70 dB(A). However, this level of
noise can interfere with mental concentration and certainly with sleep. It is therefore recommended that
noise levels in sleeping areas are below 45 dB(A).
In practice, control of noise and the requirement for hearing protection can only be effective if a noise map
of the worksite is prepared with all machinery running under normal operational load. From such a map,
areas of noise over 85 dB(A) can be identified. Areas less frequently used, such as the cementing unit also
need to be mapped.
Once identified, high noise levels can be addressed in three ways listed in order of preference:
• the use of better engineered equipment
• the use of noise reduction techniques (sound insulation, mufflers, etc)
• the use of hearing protection.
Signs indicating noise hazards shall be posted and appropriate hearing protection equipment shall be
freely available for all personnel working in the high noise area.
Contractors should have an occupational health programme in place in accordance with legal requirements
and Shell Company guidelines. Companies should ensure that the contractors' occupational health
programmes are managed in a way that is compatible with Company standards by specifying these
requirements in contractual arrangements and by regular monitoring and auditing the contractors'
performance regarding occupational health.
In general, contractors should apply the same principles as are contained in Shell's Occupational Health
Management Guidelines with emphasis being given to the following aspects:
• identification of all health hazards (covering health hazards at work, and those associated with life
style and the environment
• assessment of risk to health to determine the need for and type of control measures (e.g. engineering
controls, work procedures, use of personal protective equipment, vaccination programmes and
employee assistance programmes)
• planning and implementation of control measures and preparation of in-house guidance on procedures,
practices and programmes
• informing, instructing and training of the workforce
• health surveillance
• record keeping
• first-aid and medical emergency response procedures.
Each drilling contractor should appoint an occupational health focal point with the task to co-ordinate the
implementation of the occupational health programme. Appropriate records should be held in order to be
able to monitor the performance of the occupational health programme and to identify problem areas
requiring more attention. Sufficient resources (expert advisers, facilities and budgets) shall be available to
ensure that the implementation of the occupational health programme meets legal and Company standards.
6.7 Permit-to-work
The permit-to-work is a written document authorising persons to carry out a specific task, warning them
of the possible dangers and spelling out precautions needed for the job to be done safely. It ensures that
proper consideration is given to the risks and that they are dealt with prior to work commencing. The
objectives are:
• to ensure the proper authorisation of non-routine or hazardous work
• to make clear to the person(s) carrying out the job the risks involved and precautions to be taken
• to ensure that the person responsible for an area of the installation is aware of all work being done
there
• to provide a record showing that the method of work and the precautions needed have been checked by
the appropriate competent person.
All personnel shall have a good understanding of the permit system which should define:
• the types of work requiring permits
• documented procedure covering the permit system
• clear definition of authority levels for permit issue and authorisation
• checking of workplace conditions by the competent party
• centralised holding and control of live permits
• permit close-out system
• permit handover mechanism
• mechanism for checking effects of changed conditions on permit validity
The permit-to-work is authorised by the senior person on site after he has assured himself that all
necessary precautions have been taken and that all those working in the area on other duties are aware of
the activity. Where simultaneous production and drilling operations are taking place the Company Drilling
Supervisor shall be a signatory to the permit.
6.8.1 Noise
When working in the vicinity of housing or other areas sensitive to noise levels below the threshold where
hearing damage occurs, extra precautions will be necessary to reduce it to levels at which it ceases to be a
significant nuisance. These levels will vary depending on location.
The rig contracting strategy should include an assessment of the planned programme of work with respect
to the environmental issues and define such things as noise limitations in the tender documents. Noise
maps of rigs being bid should be requested.
A structured waste management strategy is important from a cost standpoint and for environmental
protection. The elements of such a strategy are:
• Reduction of waste through good operating practices, changes in technology and changes in products
• Reuse by returning the material to the process in its original form
• Recycling material for resource recovery or as a by-product
• Recover by incineration and making use of the energy developed
• Residue is the final resulting waste material which cannot be managed by any of the previous four
methods and is either used as landfill, incinerated, diluted or concentrated, or stabilised physically,
chemically or biologically.
The strategy can be applied to drilling operations to deal more effectively with waste.
The above referenced document (Ref. 6), which contains many recommended practices on drilling waste
management should be used by the Company as a planning tool to develop an effective programme suited
to the operation.
7 ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES
7.1.1 Responsibilities
The senior person on site, generally the drilling contractor Toolpusher on land rigs or OIM on offshore
rigs, retains overall responsibility for all site activities. He shall be provided with an inventory of all
explosives and radioactive sources on site, which shall be updated whenever changes take place.
With respect to radioactive sources, he shall also be provided with storage details, which includes a
diagram indicating the rate of radioactive emissions at the edge of the container and the distances, in all
directions, at which the rate of emissions are measured at 1 micro-sievert/hr and 2.5 micro-sieverts/hr. See
7.1.10 for further details.
Throughout wireline logging activity the Driller on shift remains responsible for overall safety on the rig
floor and for maintaining primary pressure control over the well. Continuous monitoring of well fluid
gains or losses during logging operations is his prime responsibility.
Non-essential equipment such as bits, bottom hole assembly components, lifting plugs, etc shall be cleared
from the drill floor area. Rotary tongs are to be secured away from the rotary area and cover plates are to
be installed over the single hole, rotary bushings and any other open spaces. The rig floor is to be cleaned
of mud, grease or other extraneous material.
The Logging Engineer is responsible for ensuring that all wireline operations are performed to the
technical and safety standards laid down by legislation, his employer and the Operator. He shall inform
the senior person on site and the contract holder of any precautions that need to be taken to assure safe
operations and of any eventuality which impacts upon safe operations.
7.1.2 Rigging up
When the Driller is entirely satisfied that the well is stable, and that the rig floor is cleared of non-essential
material and equipment, the logging contractor can commence rigging up.
It is essential that there is sufficient lighting available for the logging winch man to clearly see the drill
floor area. In addition a two-way intercom shall be installed to enable good communication between the
logging winch operator and the operators on the rig floor. The intercom shall be certified suitable for zone
1 hazardous area use.
The upper and lower sheaves, together with other equipment suspended in the derrick, shall be considered
as lifting equipment and shall therefore have the safe working load clearly marked on each item. Only
certified slings, chains and shackles are to be used to secure the upper or lower pulleys. If the upper pulley
is to be secured on the elevators, ensure that the elevator latch closes properly and that the swivel on the
travelling block is locked. A secondary safety sling should be used at all times.
The lower sheave is attached to a main substructure member by chain. The chain shall be in visibly good
condition, less than three years old and a minimum of 5/8" diameter with a SWL of 22,000 lb.
Such chains shall be tagged to clearly show the age and rating of the chain. The chain eye should be
secured to the lower sheave shackle by a single chain which is attached to a main member of the rig
substructure. If the fixing point is a pad-eye, then it shall have been welded by a coded welder and
certified free from any defect. The pad-eye shall also be load certified and inspected (NDT) annually.
The lower sheave shall be fitted with finger and spoke protectors. When the travelling block has been
raised to position, ensure the brake is securely chained down. Ensure that the logging wire does not foul
the derrick.
The Driller shall monitor the status of the well and maintain adequate fill-up on the hole at all times.
Crane operations shall not be conducted over or close to the logging cable.
General
All operations involving the use of explosives are to be performed under the permit-to-work system. Prior
to starting work, a safety meeting shall be held to include as a minimum:
• Driller and assistant on shift
• Senior Toolpusher/Offshore Installation Manager
• Logging Engineer
• Well Site Drilling Engineer
• Company Drilling Supervisor
Work requiring the use of explosives shall be carried out only by authorised specialist personnel (usually
the Logging Engineer). During the job, personnel working in proximity of the device shall be kept to a
minimum. All other persons are to be excluded from the working area throughout the operation.
A register of explosives shall be kept on site by both the Logging Engineer and the Person in Charge
(usually the OIM offshore and contractor Toolpusher on shore).
Explosive storage
The local laws and regulations governing the storage and handling of explosives shall be observed,
however in all cases, explosives and detonators shall be transported and stored in separate containers.
On land, buildings constructed to contain explosives shall be completely separated from living and work
areas and well separated from other stores containing flammable material. For more complete coverage of
this subject refer to EP 95-0200 Survey Operations.
The following is a guide to the safety precautions which should be taken when operating with electrically
fired perforating guns, charges and other explosively activated devices such as packers.
1. Guards and warning signs shall be placed around the working area to prevent unauthorised access to
the work area by personnel and vehicles.
2. Unless using a detonating system which is impervious to stray electrical currents, guns shall not be
armed while an electrical storm is in the vicinity, or forecast, during perforating operations.
3. The logging unit is to be grounded to the rig, the rig grounded to the wellhead by grounding straps,
and the source of any AC or DC voltage, which results in stray voltages in excess of 0.25V, shall be
eliminated. Such sources of voltage include:
– cathodic protection
– electrical welding
– non-destructive testing
– top drive systems
– static electricity
– radio transmitters including microwave transmitters.
4. Restrictions applied when running explosives shall also be applied during retrieval operations, even
when positive indications of firing have been seen.
On land, road signs are to be placed at a minimum distance of 150 m from the location, to prevent the
access of vehicles possibly using mobile transmitting equipment (e.g. taxis).
If the presence of large commercial transmitters pose a hazard, the Logging Engineer shall request
computation of a safe field zone prior to undertaking any work with electrically detonated explosives.
Emissions from high tension lines either carried by pylons or buried can constitute a radio frequency (RF)
hazard.
Offshore, the control of radio silence shall be maintained to a distance of not less than 500 m. Offshore
vessels shall therefore be notified in adequate time to stand off from the location. The standby boat is
required to maintain station at stand-off distance and warn any approaching shipping of radio silence
requirements on the installation.
Two hours before each gun run the Company Drilling Supervisor or Wellsite Drilling Engineer shall
communicate to the base office the estimated time of commencing 'radio silence'. Actual times are to be
advised by the installation radio operator. In some areas third parties such as the coast guard and the
military authorities may have to be informed. The notification procedure should cover this.
Helicopter flight control will also require sufficient notice to reschedule/divert flights so that aircraft do
not arrive at the installation during radio silence. Offshore, the co-ordinator for the 'radio silence'
procedure shall be the OIM.
The Institute of the Makers of Explosives (IME) gives recommended minimum distances between 'shot
point' and 'transmitter' as indicated in Table 7.1. The table is modified to give transmitting power in watts.
Table 7.1 Recommended minimum distances between shot point and transmitter
After isolation of all sources of stray current, the casing-to-rig voltage shall be observed by the Logging
Engineer in the presence of the Drilling Supervisor or the Wellsite Drilling Engineer and verified less than
0.25 V (DC or AC). In the event that the observed voltage exceeds 0.25 V, all sources of electrical supply
may have to be switched off. This may preclude such operations as perforating during the hours of
darkness.
It is emphasised that these relaxations (i, ii and iii) are only permitted when the explosive device is more
than 75 m below ground or sea bed, and only one may be applied at any one time.
Explosive backing-off operations are not subject to any restrictions once the gun is 75m below ground or
sea bed since detonation is unlikely and would not result in any damage to personnel or property.
The design of these detonators is very similar to conventional detonators except that no primary explosive
is used. These systems require a minimum voltage of 150 to 200V DC at the cable head to operate the tool
and to produce the 2500 to 3000V DC to which the capacitor will be charged. This compares with 10V
AC or DC required for standard detonators and 1V for high temperature detonators, which do not contain
internal safety resistors. Testing of the systems has shown them to be incapable of unintentional initiation
even when exposed to powerful electrical and magnetic fields.
The early reliability of these tools is less than that of conventional detonators and there is a substantial
additional cost per run. It is anticipated that with time, the additional costs will fall and the reliability will
improve. Their use should be considered where radio silence is difficult or expensive to achieve.
It should be stressed that when introducing such systems, a high level of awareness must be maintained
regarding the precautions required in the use and handling of explosives, particularly in areas where
conventional systems are also used, as operating procedures may be confused.
The precautions specified by the manufacturer shall be fully understood and stipulated on the permit-to-
work. In addition, due to the need for close operational co-operation between the TCP contractor, drilling
crew and rig supervisory staff, a full safety meeting prior to the operation is essential.
Various methods for firing the detonator of a TCP gun have been developed to enable reliable firing of
guns in wells with differing geometry, mechanical configuration, and borehole conditions. These can be
grouped into four main types, which are:
• drop bar actuated systems, in which a metal bar is dropped from surface and free falls under gravity to
mechanically initiate the firing head
• hydraulically fired systems, in which fluid pressure is applied from surface to tubing or annulus to fire
the gun
• electrically actuated systems, in which the current is sent from the surface via an electrical cable to fire
the gun
• electrically actuated systems, in which a detonator and shaped charge are lowered from surface on
wireline to fire the gun.
When planning a completion which includes a TCP gun the following safety aspects should be considered:
1. The firing head should only be armed when the gun is in place below the rotary table. This often
means a considerable extension above the explosive charge and may not be practicable.
2. During assembly and arming of the gun all personnel shall be cleared from the area beneath the
rotary table, around the riser and BOP stack. Warning signs shall be posted at all accessible deck
levels to ensure that no personnel approach the wellhead area. No one is allowed to work above drill
floor level. The above restrictions can be relaxed when the entire gun is below ground (or sea bed)
level.
3. There should be no possibility of the drop bar hanging up in any of the tubulars prior to detonation.
Provision shall always be made for retrieval of the drop bar in case of doubt.
4. TCP guns shall never be pulled to surface without first retrieving the detonating device (drop bar or
battery pack).
5. If it is not possible to verify that the TCP gun has fired and the firing head cannot be disarmed by
retrieval as in 3), then there shall be provision for dropping the gun. Only disarmed guns are allowed
to be pulled to surface.
6. If the provisions for either dropping the gun or safe disarming of the gun cannot be met, then proper
consideration should be given to perforating by conventional guns.
7. Never trust or rely on self-deactivating TCP systems. They are intended to provide extra safety. Full
precautions should be taken if a TCP gun has to be pulled.
In essence personnel, other than those classified as radiological workers and subjected to special
monitoring precautions, shall not be exposed to radioactive emissions in excess of 2.5 micro-sieverts/hr.
Barriers shall be erected to prevent access to areas where this rate of emissions is exceeded, and the areas
where the rate of emissions falls between 1 and 2.5 micro-sieverts/hr shall be designated as no stay and
marked accordingly.
All radioactive logging sources are housed in dedicated carrying shields. Carrying shields are to be clearly
marked with the Transport Index (TI) number. Where dedicated transport containers are in use, the
transport container shall be labelled with a TI equal to the sum of the source TIs contained therein.
Upon arrival of radioactive source materials at the rig site, the source materials in their carrying shields
shall be immediately transferred from the transport container to the logging contractor's source store. This
task is only to be done by specifically authorised personnel, e.g. the Logging Engineer on site.
In the absence of such authorised personnel, the transport container shall be placed in a segregated area
away from personnel and chain barriers erected at a distance around the container determined by the
Transport Index (TI) marked on the external surface of the transport container.
Allowance shall be made for a possible requirement for barriers above and below the container where
there are working or living areas in proximity to the storage area.
1 2.0
3 3.5
5 4.5
10 6.3
15 7.7
20 8.9
25 10.0
Note: Typical full complement of sources (density, neutron, calibration, etc)
The radiation dose rate at the periphery of the segregated area shall be less than 2.5 micro-sieverts per
hour and where practically possible below 1.0 micro-sieverts per hour.
Given the space limitations at offshore locations, the segregated areas may be difficult to achieve for
transport containers. When this is the case, an authorised person shall be available to transfer sources into
a suitable protected store upon receipt.
The register shall be kept by the Logging Engineer and the most senior person on site.
The Logging Engineer is responsible for the supervision of all work involving ionising radiation. He shall
ensure that exposure to such radiation is kept to a level which is as low as reasonably achievable. In
addition the Engineer will check that all logging contractor personnel working near source materials wear
both gamma and neutron personal dosimeters that are valid for the period of work involving ionising
radiation. In any segregated or classified work area, with instantaneous dose rates in excess of 2.5 micro-
sieverts per hour, the Logging Engineer will ensure that only authorised personnel are allowed in the area
and then only within the framework of a written system of work procedures.
Carrying shields are only to be removed from the designated store area under the direct instruction of the
Logging Engineer. The carrying shields shall be transported to and from the designated store area by the
shortest possible route and the route shall be kept away from rig personnel as far as possible. Moving of
source materials is to be covered by a permit-to-work.
Before handling any radioactive source the Logging Engineer shall ensure that all possible open floor
areas are securely covered. In the working area the Logging Engineer shall ensure that adequate notices
displaying the trefoil (three-leaf) symbol are in place. Access points are to be chained off to establish a
controlled work area. The controlled work area shall be defined as where exposure of more than 2.5
micro-Sieverts per hour exists, albeit temporarily.
The Driller's doghouse is exempt from the 'controlled work area' status for the reason of maintaining full
surveillance on the well. However, during handling of the source by the Logging Engineer, the Driller
should keep well clear of the radioactive source - the distance to be advised by the Logging Engineer.
The Logging Engineer is the only person authorised to remove sources from their carrying shields. The
Engineer shall endeavour to keep collimated (directional) sources pointing away from personnel on the rig.
The transfer of sources between carrying shields and logging tool shall be completed in the shortest
possible time.
7.1.11 Fishing
A logging tool fishing operation is never routine. It is essential, therefore, that a pre-job safety meeting is
held prior to embarking on a fishing job so that all involved are fully aware of the potential hazards of the
operation.
The prime objective of a fishing operation is the safe and complete recovery of the downhole tool. Good
communication between the Company Drilling Supervisor, Well Site Drilling Engineer, Toolpusher,
Logging Engineer, Driller and wireline winch operator is of utmost importance.
Once a logging tool is stuck or lost in the hole decisions concerning fishing operations shall be agreed by
the Company, not just the logging company and the drilling contractor. The logging company provides
advice on how the tool might best be recovered and should be able to furnish the fishing tools required for
the job. For stuck tools, the preferred fishing technique is the reverse cut and thread method. Breaking the
weak point, prior to the logging tool being latched into the fishing overshot, shall never be the method used
for fishing operations involving radioactive sources.
To break the weak point, the cable clamp and travelling block shall be used. Never use the logging
contractor's winch (the upper sheave becomes a high stress point and the cable is likely to break around
the sheave).
When attempting to fish a tool containing a radioactive source be it either wireline run or LWD, it is
important to monitor mud returns to detect any possible increase in radioactivity.
Detailed information on radiation safety can be found in 'Radiation Safety Manual for Well Logging
Operations' (Ref. 44) as well as the previously referenced 'Ionising Radiation Safety Guide' (Ref. 43).
7.2.1 General
All equipment used in well testing shall be fully certified for the purpose intended. The document 'Area
Classification Code for Petroleum Installations' (Ref. 23) shall be used to define hazardous zone
requirements.
The appropriate authorities shall be notified prior to any production testing, especially where it is
performed near populated areas. The requirement for such notification is often defined by government
legislation.
After perforation, the opening of the well to unload the tubing contents and the initial flow through the
separator shall be carried out in daylight. Thereafter the production test may continue during hours of
darkness.
Burners of the type that minimise oil drop out should be utilised.
Noise should be monitored and hearing defenders issued as necessary (see 6.6.2 for further information).
The production test (onshore/offshore) shall only be commenced under the following conditions:
• all test facilities are fully pressure tested and checked
• fire, H2S and abandon location drills are held
• adequate weather window forecast
• shipping and aircraft warned to stand clear during flaring
• standby boat advised that this operation is to take place, and the action and precautions necessary until
the operation is completed
• verify that the wellhead and production valve ESD systems function correctly and that emergency
shutdown activating buttons are manned in a safe area throughout the test whilst flowing formation
fluids to surface
• check that all Weco type hammer unions are properly matched and according to agreed standardised
type.
• a pre-job safety meeting has been held to discuss the test and ensure all personnel are aware of their
responsibilities and any restrictions imposed.
All hot work shall cease during the production test. Cranes shall not be used over or near wirelines,
flowlines, separators, heater or choke manifold.
Personnel not directly involved with the operation shall stay well clear of production lines.
When methanol is used as an agent to prevent/dissolve hydrates, a supply of salt should be kept close by
to spread on any spillage. This will produce a visible flame should the methanol be ignited.
Cooling water hoses shall be laid out on the flare side. In the event that the ambient temperature drops
significantly below zero, and icing problems are observed to be occurring as a result of the cooling spray,
testing operations should be terminated, possibly being restarted using brine as a cooling fluid.
Glycol/water mixture and low freezing point hydraulic fluids should be used in all critical lines/ systems.
Aviation fuel tanks and all pressurised bottles shall be located away from radiant heat and cooled, if
required.
Lines from steam generators shall be clearly marked and guarded to prevent burning injuries.
A close check shall be kept on the casing/tubing annulus pressure. If this pressure increases it should be
bled off (noting the volume and type of fluid bled off) and the annulus pressure checked for the rate of
build-up. If the annulus pressure cannot be bled off the well shall be squeeze killed or reverse killed,
depending on circumstances.
Gas explosion meters, hydrogen sulphide detectors and sets of breathing apparatus shall be available. Gas
shall be checked for the presence of hydrogen sulphide. Contingency plans in the event of significant H2S
production shall be in place.
Equipment and material to fight oil spills should be available on site in the areas where such spills could
give rise to a hazardous situation or have detrimental environmental effects.
After production testing all lines containing oil shall be flushed with water, brine or mud prior to
disconnecting.
An independent air supply, not connected to the rig air system, shall be used to ensure that this system is
not contaminated with hydrocarbons. Do not interconnect air/oil/gas lines.
Refer to the document 'Guidelines for Production Testing of Wells up to 103,000 kPa (15,000 psi) Using
Temporary Equipment' (Ref. 45). for detailed procedures and information. Volume 6 of the Production
Handbook 'Production Operations' (Ref. 46) also contains useful information.
7.2.2 Fracturing
The equipment up to the last wellhead valve should be hydraulically tested to a pressure above the
expected fracturing pressure. This pressure shall not exceed the safe working pressure of the weakest
component in the system. A check valve or other device shall be installed in the system to prevent
backflow should a leak in the system occur.
All piping, including vent lines, shall be adequately anchored. They should not transmit hydraulic
vibrations to the wellhead.
Firefighting equipment shall be placed at strategic locations and be easily accessible. Receiving vessels for
relief or bleed-off lines from the wellhead or pumping equipment shall have adequate venting.
If crude is to be used as fracturing liquid it should be weathered for at least 24 hours to eliminate the more
volatile components.
A pre-job safety meeting shall be held to appraise personnel of their responsibilities and any restrictions
that may be imposed.
7.2.3 Acidising
Hydrochloric and other acids used for stimulating production from a well are corrosive and rapidly affect
skin, causing severe burns. Breathing of the fumes shall be avoided as even small quantities can damage
mucous membranes.
Personnel handling acid shall be equipped with protective clothing including respirator, goggles, gloves
and boots. An adequate supply of water and lime should be available to neutralise any acid spillage or
contact with skin.
Acid inhibitors are toxic. It is essential to obtain full HSE information before execution of any acid job.
Lines from the pumping unit to the wellhead shall have a non-return valve installed in them as near to the
wellhead as practicable. A pressure test of not less than the maximum expected treating pressure shall be
made on the discharge lines to the wellhead.
Personnel not directly involved in the operation shall stay well clear of the discharge lines during the
pressure test and acid pumping operations. Pump operators should remain alert for communications from
the Toolpusher or Company Drilling Supervisor throughout the acidisation.
All equipment through which acid is handled shall be thoroughly washed inside and outside with water
upon completion of the operation.
A 'hose down' team should be on standby properly kitted out to deal with any spillage.
A pre-job HSE meeting shall be held and the job performed under permit-to-work system controls.
Liquid nitrogen
Liquid nitrogen is hazardous because of its low temperature (- 195°C) and because it can displace air in
gas form and cause suffocation.
Contact of human tissue with severe cold will destroy tissue in a manner similar to high temperature
burns. Freeze burns will result from contact with the cold surfaces of piping and equipment containing
liquid nitrogen. Eye damage caused by liquid nitrogen is usually permanent. Wearing full eye protection is
essential. An increasing dimension of hazard is added when liquid nitrogen is under pressure. These facts
emphasise the need for protective clothing and a high standard of safety by the nitrogen operatives.
Avoid skin contact (as liquid nitrogen causes immediate damage) from:
• liquid leaking from equipment
• cold equipment surface.
Allowing liquid nitrogen to be spilt on carbon steel or structures is dangerous as carbon steel becomes
brittle at approximately -40°C. Whenever such a spillage has occurred the area should be checked for
cracks.
Boiling occurs when the saturation vapour pressure equals the line pressure. Therefore the line pressure
must be maintained at as high a level above the saturation pressure as possible.
Non-cryogenic materials
These will become critically brittle if subjected to exposure to very low temperatures. They include:
• carbon steel
• low alloy steels
• most rubbers
• most plastics.
Liquid nitrogen containers shall be fitted with a safety relief valve set at the safe working pressure (SWP)
of the container, and a bursting disk which fails at 1.33 times the SWP. In addition a manually operated
valve shall be available to vent the unit if necessary.
Oxygen deficiency
Whilst using nitrogen, there is always the possibility that gaseous nitrogen dilutes the oxygen around the
area of operation. Operators shall brief all personnel of the potential hazards of oxygen starvation.
A slight oxygen deficiency results in deeper respiration, faster pulse and poor co-ordination. As oxygen
deficiency increases, judgement deteriorates quickly, so that the importance of moving to a well ventilated
area may not be understood.
Also note that one full breath of pure nitrogen will strip blood of necessary oxygen resulting in a loss of
consciousness.
It is a rapidly developing area of the business and it is important for users to stay abreast of changing
methods, techniques and controls as technological improvements widen the scope of applications.
The company providing coiled tubing services shall be fully involved in the planning of operations and
verify that the CT unit to be used is suitable for the application planned and that the operational
procedures provide a level of control that assures the safe conduct of the operation.
A number of hazards associated with CT operations have been identified. Any operations with CT in a
potentially live well shall be treated in the same way as any conventional well control requirement along
with its associated BOP equipment.
Any CT operation with other adjacent wells producing shall be treated as a concurrent operation and
subject to concurrent operational restraints and safety precautions. CT fishing operations shall be detailed
in a clear CT programme specific to the application and site conditions.
Every CT unit shall maintain and have available for inspection a full 'Reel Utilisation Data Sheet', which
includes the following historic data:
• type of work done
• depths run
• number of cycles (tubing passed through gooseneck)
• welds.
All welding carried out on CT shall be fully documented giving details of subsequent X-ray results and
Rockwell hardness tests. Complete and detailed procedure are required for CT welding.
A full toolbox meeting shall be held prior to each CT operation identifying responsibilities, channels of
communication and emergency response in case of equipment failure or local alarm. Any non-routine
repair work to coiled tubing during operations shall be covered by a permit-to-work, with potential
hazards identified before work starts. Particular care should be taken when working on systems where
there is relative movement between the injector head and the rig.
The incorporation of a mechanical locking device on the main CT reel is recommended so that undesirable
reel movement can be positively prevented in the event of power failure.
During CT operations, non-essential personnel shall be kept well clear of the CT and unit. It should be
pointed out to all personnel working in the area that CT can fail causing potential sprays of high pressure
acid if the tubing busts or unpredictable whiplash movement if the tubing parts at surface. This is a
particular hazard during fishing operations.
Surface facilities, BOPs, lines and Xmas tree shall be tested to at least the maximum anticipated operating
pressure prior to commencing operations.
7.4.1 General
Concurrent operations are defined as the simultaneous execution of two or more risk activities which, due
to their interaction, result in an increased operational complexity and enhanced level of risk.
Any combination of the risk activities is considered to increase the probability of incurring risk
consequences when carried out concurrently. Such activities would include the following:
• production
• construction
• maintenance
• drilling
• workover
• well testing
• well services
• diving
• heavy lifts
• transport operations.
This subject is summarised below but prior to any concurrent operations being undertaken, reference shall
be made to the local concurrent operations manual. Where no manual exists, SIEP can assist in one's
development, generally by supplying examples from other Opcos.
While this process is ongoing, specific controls shall be agreed by relevant supervisors at co-ordination
meetings and approved by department heads.
The advice given in this sub-paragraph is particularly aimed at operations involving an independent rig
working alongside a production platform.
7.4.2 Procedures
Clear written instructions and plans are required in order to limit the extra risk associated with concurrent
activities.
An operations plan shall be prepared for each location where concurrent operations are to take place
stating the conditions to be met and procedures to be followed. This plan shall cover at least the following
areas:
• a narrative description of all operations
• individual duties and responsibilities
• arrangement and location of equipment
• integration of alarm and emergency systems between rig and platform
• integration of mustering system between rig and platform
• routing of all pipelines and their service
• integration of hazardous zone delineations
• periodic special testing and drills of safety systems and devices
• conditions for securing and restarting of activities
• communication procedures and reporting lines
• escape routes
• contingency plan
• dissemination of information to all involved parties
• on-site containment, rescue and evacuation training
• an activities matrix determining permitted, conditional and prohibited concurrent activities.
7.4.3 Supervision
Principle
Concurrent operations necessitate optimum co-ordination of activities and defined lines of responsibility to
ensure operational efficiency and the safeguarding of personnel and equipment. To this end, the OIM, or
person in charge, shall chair a daily, minuted co-ordination meeting attended by all on-site department
heads and others necessary for the effective conduct of the meeting.
The meeting should cover the planned operations for the day, any hazards which may arise out of the
individual operations or their concurrency with other operations, and permits or other requirements
necessary for their safe management.
Overall supervision
Single point responsibility for management of the location where concurrent operations are being carried
out shall be maintained at all times. The responsible person will be the Offshore Installation Manager
(OIM) or his equivalent in an onshore facility.
Each individual activity shall be supervised by a competent supervisor, who has the responsibility to
verify that the activity is adequately protected by a minimum of two barriers with proven integrity. He is
also responsible for reporting status, and change of status, to the single point co-ordinator.
Communication
Regular meetings should take place between the supervisors to discuss HSE issues and the planned work
programme. Changes from a previously agreed programme shall be highlighted and adequately discussed
with all involved parties.
Permits-to-work
All concurrent activities other than routine production, drilling, maintenance or construction operations
shall be rigorously controlled by the use of work permits signed by supervisors of the individual activities
and the supervisor/manager responsible for the overall operation.
Personnel arriving at the installation shall be provided with any required personal protective equipment for
transit from the arrival point to the accommodation and report immediately to the OIM or his nominated
deputy.
Barriers
Each individual activity is protected by barriers (protection mechanisms) which would have to fail before
control is lost. Operations may proceed if each individual activity is protected by a minimum of two
independent and tested barriers, with the provision that neither of these barriers becomes nullified by
virtue of the concurrent activity. Where a barrier fails, immediate action shall be taken, within the
constraints of concurrent operations, to restore two barrier integrity.
For completion and workover operations the following barriers once tested may also be considered:
• deepset wireline plug (below production packer)
• drilling or completion fluid in the well of sufficient density to overbalance formation pressures. The
fluid shall be subject to continuous monitoring to qualify
• Xmas tree
• a two way check valve is installed in the tubing hanger
The safety of the drilling or workover operation may be threatened by events occurring in other concurrent
activities.
Well interference
Attention should be paid to sub-surface cones of uncertainty of adjacent wells, with travelling cylinder
collision plots being produced for critical situations. The criteria for terminating as mentioned in the
'Borehole Surveying Manual' (Ref. 47) should be expanded to include consideration for:
• the situation where well bore paths are converging
• actual survey depths which are frequently 10-15m off bottom
When the well being drilled is on a converging course with an existing production well and the criteria
mentioned above apply, the production well shall be closed-in and equipped with an inflow tested
downhole plug located below the packer.
Conductor driving operations also require special attention which shall include monitoring the conductor
path and closing-in wells within the cone of uncertainty.
A pre-move meeting attended by drilling, production and marine staff shall be held to plan the move and
assess the risks. An effective well handover procedure shall be in place which details the status of wells
and other production facilities on the platform. See 4.4.5 for additional information.
Normally the wireline retrievable SCSSV will be pulled (or when using a tubing retrievable sub-surface
safety valve ( TRSSV) it will be hydraulically maintained open) during wireline operations, so that a
downhole barrier will not be available. For this reason wireline work in live wells requires special
attention. Wireline work may have to be interrupted and well made safe to allow other critical work to
progress.
The appropriate operating procedures and equipment shall be used as mentioned in 'Well Services
Guidance Manual'(Ref. 48). Selected safety precautions from the referenced manual (chapter 8) are given
here to emphasise their importance:
• A wireline blowout preventer shall be used for work on all wells capable of flow
• Control of the SCSSV and surface safety valve shall be transferred to a remote panel operated by the
wireline crew during wireline operations
• Where possible, when depressuring lubricators, gas should be vented through existing facilities
• Depressurisation of a lubricator shall be confirmed by opening the second 1/2 inch connection in the
lower section of the lubricator to check that hydrate blockage of the primary depressurisation needle
has not occurred
• After installation on the wellhead, the lubricator shall be pressurised and tested according to
procedures.
During concurrent operations the work shall be discussed at the daily co-ordination meeting and
appropriate controls put in place to assure its safe conduct.
The same guidelines as listed above are valid for non-rig assisted logging work.
During any wireline operations the Driller on shift is responsible for the overall safety on the rig floor and
for maintaining primary pressure control over the well.
When a Christmas tree is installed, the wireline operator shall use wireline blowout preventers and a
lubricator. Pressure integrity shall be confirmed prior to running tools in the hole. Operational safety
procedures are similar to electric logging operations, see 7.1.
The following guidelines are taken from the document 'Diving Operations Management Guidelines' (Ref.
50):
• seek to minimise the need for exposure of personnel to hyperbaric (i.e. raised pressure/underwater)
environments
• contract all diving work as a service
• invite bids only from those diving contractors with a good record of capability, health and safety in all
aspects of diving
• apply as a minimum contractual standard the UK legislation for diving operations (and require
contractors to adopt the guidance, recommendations and instructions contained in the UK Health and
Safety Executive Diving Safety Memoranda) as the underwater service industry consensus of the 'state
of the art' for diving operations
• require contractors to utilise underwater service industry accepted techniques to monitor and protect
the health of divers. In this context 'monitor' means to record both the time/depth exposure of divers
and any chemical and physical factors which may be hazardous to health
• inspect/audit the personnel, equipment, procedures and controls against contract conditions
• require contractors to demonstrate proper functioning of critical systems
• require all diving operations to be carried out under appropriate Work Permit procedures.
• In shallow waters visibility under water can be very poor which can be made worse by the dumping of
mud or cement. This should therefore be avoided.
7.6.2 Restrictions
No diving operations shall be carried out during the following operations:
• top hole drilling
• during total losses or dump flooding the well from the sea bed
• well control activity, well under pressure
• pressure testing sub-surface equipment (floating drilling operations)
• during heavy lifting
• loading/offloading supply boats
• emergency alarm status, e.g. H2S or fire
When the dive is carried out, the following operations shall cease:
• movement of equipment outboard
• use of thrusters, except on DP vessels
• ballasting or de-ballasting
• dumping of mud
• sea suctions shall be isolated as required, though the firefighting system should not be incapacitated
The standby vessel shall be informed that diving is being carried out.
In some areas, rules and regulations govern the construction, survey and operation of standby vessels.
Typical are the documents 'Assessment of the Suitability of Standby Vessels Attending Offshore
Installations' (Ref. 51). and 'Offshore Installation (Emergency Procedures) Regulations 1976' (Ref. 52).
The vessel shall be classified as capable of carrying the total number of personnel on the installation and
shall be equipped to provide first-aid treatment.
Fast rescue craft shall be kept on board the standby vessel, which shall be immediately available for
launching to rescue personnel.
7.7.2 Duties
The main duties are:
• to rescue personnel who have fallen into or deliberately entered the sea to escape from the installation
• to assist in the evacuation of the installation and accommodate rescued personnel
• to provide first aid to survivors
• to monitor the safety zone of 500 m around the installation and to warn vessels to stay outside this
zone
• to maintain close observation of personnel working over the side of the rig
• to provide radio communications with rescue facilities in an emergency situation.
In lieu of legislative requirements in some areas, the following details some other standby vessel
requirements:
7.7.3 Responsibilities
The standby vessel shall be under the authority of the senior person on the installation (the contractor's
Senior Toolpusher or Offshore Installation Manager).
If the standby vessel is contracted by the Company, the Company Drilling Supervisor on the installation is
required to ensure that contractual obligations are fulfilled.
Regular 'man overboard' drills shall be performed and logged. These drills shall not be conducted when
weather conditions present unacceptable hazards to standby vessel personnel. Likewise, routine work on
the rig, which requires the support of the standby vessel shall not be undertaken if conditions are such that
attempts to rescue a man overboard place the lives of would be rescuers in jeopardy.
7.8.1 Training
All personnel travelling by helicopter to and from an offshore installation are required to be briefed on
safety procedures prior to boarding the aircraft.
The drilling contractor is required to train and properly equip helideck firefighting crews, one of whom
shall be present at every landing and take off. Additionally a Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) shall be
appointed and appropriately trained.
In addition certain rig crew shall be trained in helicopter marshalling for the handling of slung loads, and
where appropriate, in refuelling procedures.
APPENDIX I
POLICIES
Figure I.1 Policy guidelines on health, safety and the environment
It is the policy of Shell companies to conduct their activities in such a way as to take foremost account of the
health and safety of their employees and of other persons, and to give proper regard to the conservation of
the environment. They aim to be among the leaders in their respective industries in these matters.
Health
Shell companies seek to conduct their activities in such a way as to avoid harm to the health of their
employees and others, and to promote, as appropriate, the health of their employees.
Safety
Shell companies work on the principle that all injuries should be prevented and actively promote amongst all
those associated with their activities the high standards of safety consciousness and discipline that this
principle demands.
Environment
Shell companies:
• pursue in their operations progressive reductions of emissions, effluents and discharges of waste
materials that are known to have a negative impact on the environment, with the ultimate aim of
eliminating them
• aim to provide products and services supported with practical advice which, when used in accordance
with this advice, will not cause injury or undue effect on the environment
• promote protection of environments which may be affected by the development of their activities and
seek continuous improvement in efficiency of use of natural resources and energy.
APPENDIX II
RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY STAFF
• making suitable arrangements for consultation with line supervisors, employees and service and
subcontractors' representatives on health, safety and environmental matters
• making certain that all incidents involving injury to persons, damage to property or the environment,
and those having potential for serious effect are thoroughly investigated and that effective follow-up
action is taken by:
– establishing remedial action requirements
– identifying action parties
– establishing completion targets
– regularly reviewing progress.
• establishing and discussing with subordinates individual responsibilities, targets and accountabilities
for health, safety and the protection of the environment and confirm these during performance
appraisal
• setting a clear leadership example by his own actions.
The contractor Rig Superintendent is responsible for the execution of all well and associated work
programmes. This includes, rig moving, the drilling, completion, perforation and testing of new wells, the
repair of existing wells by workover and the maintenance of the drilling facility, safety of the installation
and all personnel on board.
• drilling and associated equipment is inspected and maintained in accordance with the inspection
programme and the preventive maintenance system
• all accidents causing injury to personnel or damage to equipment and all significant near misses are
reported in accordance with procedures and are investigated at the appropriate level, in the appropriate
depth and that remedial actions are implemented
• employees use personal protective equipment as necessary
• hazardous work is performed under the permit-to-work system
• all relevant information is communicated between personnel at shift change.
II.2.4 Driller
As the first line in the supervision of personnel, the Driller's prime objective is to ensure that instructions
are carried out competently and therefore safely.
He is to verify that crew personnel are competent to carry out their work and use safe working practices.
He disseminates to his crew information on HSE and new safety procedures. Additionally he is to inform
senior staff of safe working procedures suggested by his crew and other personnel. The introduction of
any consequent change in procedure should be implemented under the direction of the Driller with
guidance and approval from the Rig Superintendent if appropriate.
APPENDIX III
LAND RIG MOVE PLAN
This appendix details the actions to be taken at each stage in a typical land rig move.
APPENDIX IV
CLASSIFICATION OF HAZARDOUS AREAS
The classification of hazardous areas with respect to electrical equipment shall be in accordance with
the Institute of Petroleum (IP) Area classification Code for Petroleum Installations (Ref. 23). The
following is only a summary of the requirements of the Code and is provided to give a ready
appreciation but should not be used as a substitute for the Code.
Hazardous zones defined under the IP or any similar code should not be confused with any other type of
hazardous area established, e.g. sour gas, high tension (HT) overhead no-go areas, radioactive store
hazardous area.
Primary sources are those which can release flammable vapours or gases in normal operation. Primary
sources include vents and active mud tanks, ditches and mud treating equipment. Particular caution in the
mud-gas separator piping is necessary due to the potential of high volumes of primary gas released both
through the vent pipe outlet and via the mud drain.
Secondary sources are those which do not release flammable gases or vapours normally but can do so
under abnormal (i.e. failure) circumstances. This includes minor and temporary containment failures such
as occur from day to day, not catastrophic failure such as vessel rupture, burst pipes or blowouts.
The parts of the facility which are not classified as hazardous zones can be designated non-hazardous but
may still contain a flammable mixture under calamity conditions.
Hazardous zone classification depends on the grade of release and the ventilation available as shown in
Table IV.1:
Grades of Open air situation and Restricted ventilation, e.g. No ventilation, e.g.
release adequately ventilated spaces inside modules with inside tank
with unrestricted air ventilation stopped or less
movement, i.e. at least 12 than 12 changes per hour
changes per hour
Continuous Zone 0 Zone 0 Zone 0
For land rigs, the open air situation is the norm, with restricted ventilation only present where the drill
floor is shrouded, or inside the free space of active mud tanks, ditches and well cellar areas. There should
be no Zone 0 areas on any drilling rig installation. Outside Zone 0, 1 or 2 the worksite is 'non-hazardous'.
For the purpose of ignition protection against small releases of flammable fluids around the rig floor area,
the interior of the derrick or mast structure is classified as Zone 2. All purge air, cooling air and internal
combustion engine air intake shall be taken from well outside Zone 1 and 2, i.e. from a designated non-
hazardous zone. Equally, all electrical equipment in the derrick shall be suitably protected. Requirements
are defined in the IP Code.
Cellars or pits below ground level in a Zone 2 space should be classified as Zone 1. Any enclosed
premises, containing source of hazard which may give rise to a dangerous atmosphere under abnormal
conditions should be classified as follows:
The interior of the enclosure Zone 1; the surrounding space in open air within a 7.5 m radius from any
point of egress from the premises as Zone 2. Any enclosed premises not containing a source of hazard but
located in a Zone 2 space should be classified as Zone 1, unless entry of a dangerous atmosphere is
prevented by, e.g. fire walls, ventilation, etc where the enclosure may be classified as a Zone 2 or even as
a safe zone if the space is ventilated and over-pressurised.
In naturally well-ventilated conditions (e.g. offshore) outside the limits of the derrick or mast, the vertical
extent of the 'hazardous zone' above the highest source of hazard may be reduced to 3 m and extends over
the whole classified area and below the source of hazard to ground level, except as described in the cases
above. For full details refer to IP15 Chapter 6.
It must be clearly emphasised that the dimensions and conditions quoted are to be considered as the
minimum case, and where any doubt exists, the dimensions (or even classification) of the hazardous zone
should be increased by appropriate degree.
APPENDIX V
OPERATION OF DIESEL ENGINES IN HAZARDOUS AREAS
The following data is taken from the document' Recommendations for the Protection of Diesel Engines
Operating in Hazardous Areas' (Ref. 13)
V.1 Introduction
There are considerable problems in providing assured protection to diesel engines for use in hazardous
Zones 0, 1 and to a certain extent in zone 2 as defined by the document 'Electrical Safety' (Ref. 54) and by
'Code of Practice for Selection, Installation and Maintenance of Electrical Apparatus for Use in
Potentially Explosive Atmospheres' (Ref. 55).
The use of permanently installed diesel engines in Zone 0 is unacceptable, and the use of permanently
installed diesel engines in Zones 1 and 2 should be avoided wherever possible.
Note: The effectiveness of protective devices is dependent upon a high standard of maintenance and
inspection of the equipment; certain items need to be checked regularly.
Table V.1 Recommendations for protection of diesel engines on drilling rigs which are
permanently installed in hazardous Zones 1 and 2
Table V.1 Recommendations for protection of diesel engines on drilling rigs which are
permanently installed in hazardous Zones 1 and 2 (continued)
Overspeeding of the engine due to A means shall be provided to stop the engine when flammable gas or
induction of flammable gas or vapour vapour in the atmosphere can cause the engine to overspeed.
For a complete specification, discussion and explanation of the above requirements, reference to the
original document is recommended.
The document 'Area Classification of Flammable Gas Atmospheres' (Ref. 56) is also used as a source to
define the principles of diesel engine operation in hazardous zones.
Fixed diesel-engine equipment shall be located outside a hazardous zone, unless adequate and effective
protection to all electrics, hot surfaces, exhaust systems, etc can be achieved, in which case it may be
located in Zones 1 or 2. Such protection should normally include the provision of an air source from a
non-hazardous zone. However, if this is impracticable, the engine shall be fitted with an automatically
operated combustion air cut-out to prevent engine runaways in the event of flammable vapour ingestion.
Mobile diesel-engine equipment should preferably not be used in a hazardous zone, but if this is
unavoidable it should be fully protected as for fixed diesel installations or have a minimum of protection
and operate under a permit-to-work system. The minimum protection should be spark arrestors, hot
surface cooling and, in addition for Zone 1, an automatic air cut-off.
Rigs which have been designed and equipped with diesel engine power supply to the drawworks, rotary
table and mud pumps according the document 'Classification of Areas for Electrical Installation at
Drilling Rigs and Production Facilities on Land and/or Marine Fixed and Mobile Platforms' (Ref. 24) do
not always comply with hazardous zone restrictions as defined under the IP Code. As it is costly to retrofit
diesel engines on rigs, they should, in relation to the document 'Recommendations for the Protection of
Diesel Engines Operating in Hazardous Areas' (Ref. 13) preferably be selected for conformity with the IP
Code.
ABBREVIATIONS
BOP Blowout Preventer
CT Coiled Tubing
DC Drill Collar
DP Drill Pipe
DP Dynamically Positioned
EPBM Exploration and Production Business Model
ESM Enhanced Safety Management
HEMP Hazards and Effects Management Process
HP/HT High Pressure/ High Temperature
H2 S Hydrogen Sulphide
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
HSE MS Health, Safety and Environmental Management System
LMRP Lower Marine Riser Package
LWD Logging While Drilling
MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
MPI Magnetic Particle Inspection
NDT Non-Destructive Testing
OBM Oil based Mud
OIM Offshore Installation Manager
PMS Preventive Maintenance System
POB Personnel On Board
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
SCSSV Surface Controlled Sub-surface Safety Valve
SCR Silicon Controlled Rectifier
SMS Safety Management System
SO2 Sulphur Dioxide
SWL Safe Working Load
TCP Tubing Conveyed Perforating
TRSSV Tubing Retrievable Sub-surface Safety Valve
GLOSSARY
A glossary of commonly used terms in HSE is given in both EP 95-0100 HSE Management Systems and
EP 95-0300 Overview Hazards and Effects Management Process.
REFERENCES
1 EP 92-2195, E&P Business Model, SIEP EPD/75, November 1992.
2 Report No. 6.23/173 Substance Abuse Management Strategies, E&P Forum, July 1991.
3 EP 91-0725, Guidelines for Single String Venture Drilling Operations, EPO/51, April
1991.
4 EP 88-1000, Shallow Gas Procedures Guidance Manual, EPO/515, July 1989.
5 EP 89-1500, Pressure Control Manual for Drilling and Workover Operations,
EPO/515, 1989.
6 EP 93-1760, Making the Most of Drilling Waste Management, SIEP EPO/512,
September 1993.
7 Shell Safety and Health Committee, Guide for Safety Performance Reporting, August
1993.
8 Management Safety Inspections, SIEP, April 1987.
9 Unsafe Act Auditing, Shell Safety Committee, June 1987.
10 Incident Investigation and Analysis Guide, Shell Safety and Health Committee, August
1993.
11 Incident Potential Matrix, Shell Safety and Health Committee, October 1991.
12 Accident Investigation, Shell Safety and Health Committee, January 1994.
13 Publication 107, Recommendations for the Protection of Diesel Engines Operating in
Hazardous Areas, Engineering Equipment and Material Users Association (formerly
OCMA MEC-1).
14 EP 88-0550, Marine Safety of Mobile Offshore Units, EPO/5/6 and EPD/11, March
1988.
15 EP 89-0550, Practice for the Site Specific Assessment of Jack-up Units, EPD/5, May
1989.
16 EP 90-3490, Jack-up Structure Condition Assessment and Condition Monitoring,
EPD/51, November 1990.
17 SPE Paper No. 21979, SIEP Practice for Site Specific Structural Fitness for Purpose
Assessment of Jack-up Rigs, SPE/IADC, 1991.
18 Technical and Research Bulletin 5-5, Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers
(SNAME), 1993.
19 EP 93-0473, Mooring Standards for Mobile Units, EPD/53, 1993.
20 Road Safety Management, Shell Safety Committee, December 1987.
21 Seat Belts, Shell Safety and Health Committee, September 1989.
22 EP 46804, Offshore Rig Move and Anchor Handling Operations.
23 Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 15, Area Classification Code for Petroleum
Installations, Institute of Petroleum, March 1990.
24 Recommended Practice 500, First Edition, Classification of Areas for Electrical
Installation at Drilling Rigs and Production Facilities on Land and/or Marine Fixed
and Mobile Platforms, API, June 1991.
25 Personal Protective Equipment Guide, Shell Safety and Health Committee, June 1989.
26 Drilling Manual, Section L3, Derricks and Masts Report of Visual Field Inspection of
Derrick or Mast and Substructure, IADC.
27 Specification 4E, Third Edition 1988 and Specification 4F, Third Edition 1985
Specification for Drilling and Well Servicing Structures, API.
28 Specification 8A, 12th Edition, Specification for Drilling and Production Hoisting
Equipment, API, June 1992.
29 Specification 7, Rotary Drilling Equipment, API, 1990.
30 Recommended Practice 8B, Fifth Edition, Hoisting Tool Inspection and Maintenance
Procedures, API, October 1992.
31 EP 53738, Guidelines for Detection and Control of Hydrogen Sulphide During Drilling
Operations, EPO/51, 1981.
32 Hydrogen Sulphide, Shell Safety Committee, December 1986.
33 Recommended Practice 49, Second Edition, Safe Drilling of Wells Containing Hydrogen
Sulphide, API, April 1987.
34 EP 53777, Contingency Plan for Drilling Sour Oil and/or Gas Wells, Shell Oil Company
(USA), 1981.
35 Recommended Practice 53, Second Edition, Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for
Drilling Wells, API, May 1984.
36 Specification 6A, 16th Edition, Valves and Wellhead Equipment, API, 1989.
37 Noise Guide, Shell Safety and Health Committee, December 1991.
38 Management Guidelines for Hearing Conservation, Shell Safety and Health Committee,
December 1991.
39 Environmental Management Guidelines, Shell Product Safety and Environmental
Conservation Committee, May 1992.
40 EP 94-1980, EP Environmental Assessment Guide, November 1994.
41 Report No. 2.58/196, Exploration and Production (E&P) Waste Management
Guidelines, E&P Forum, September 1993.
42 Environmental Auditing Guide, Shell Product Safety and Environmental Committee, June
1989.
43 Ionising Radiation Safety Guide, Shell Safety and Health Committee, November 1993.
44 EP 91-1645, Radiation Safety Manual for Well Logging Operations, September 1991.
45 EP 93-1300, Guidelines for Production Testing of Wells up to 15000 psi Using
Temporary Equipment, EPO/53, December 1993.
46 Production Handbook Volume 6, Production Operations, EPO/53, 1991.
47 EP 59300, Borehole Surveying Manual, Volume 1, EPO/51, October 1984.
48 EP 87-1006, Well Services Guidance Manual, EPO/53, 1987.
49 EP 93-0777, Underwater Handbook - Diving, EPF/52, 1993.
50 Diving Operations Management Guidelines, Shell Safety and Health Committee,
December 1991.
51 Assessment of the Suitability of Standby Vessels Attending Offshore Installations, UK
G
Deadline anchor................................................. .............60
Hazardous zones.....................33, 45, 56, 81, 97, 103, 122 Location, offshore..................................... ......................48
Noise.................................................................... ...........87
Incidents.................. .....................6, 10, 18, 22, 32, 35, 41
Noise control........................................................... ........85
Induction programme.......................... ..............14, 83, 116
Rig................................................................................... 37 V
Rig assessment...................................................... ....48, 50
Visitors............................................................. ...14, 46, 83
Rig moving, land........................................................ .....53
Rig moving, offshore................................................. ......54
W