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ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE

AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

Working Paper

Offensive Air Power in Counter-Insurgency Operations: Putting Theory into Practice by Wing Commander Glen Beck

2 6

Forewor d Offensive
air power not has many well counterstrengths unde insurgency even in modern rstoo warfare undermine counterwarfare, d. effects environme the insurgency fundamentals is to place at risk the broader outcome of the campaign. the butIn fact, Many in nt. its being warfare em This in utility to of employing sought. order plo paper and counterair offensive Warghters employ ym examines insurgency powe air power and offensive ent roles the platforms, warfare is rs a in power planners air of strengths sensors power that contribution tradit traditional will relate to how well it supports the fundamentals of counter-insurgency must effectively air offensive and warfare. ional its manner understand within Captain Tony Forestier Group po power air weaknesses weapons stren may the context. Air Power Development Centre Director, wethese can of support to ignore gths, fundament To r counterconduct roles in a of such als these fro support in creating the insurgency About the Author as m of necessary campaign. strat Wing This an countereffect. Ultimately, egic Comman Capability Development op Branch of insurgency paper the strik Glen Wing der era Group. of warfare analyses impact Wing e, Com Beck is tio air the Commander in 1990 with have man currently nal BeckJet a a Bachelor Fast limit is der the per distinguishe of Science training at He has ed Beck Deputy sp d graduate Degree.Operational Conversion Unit and No 2 Flying Training 25 No 2 completed at and use has Directorect of the After then operational School. in a 76 serv Firepower ive Australian graduating Squadrons ying tours ed in an the squadrons. Defence from 158 prior 3 with to as Aerospac d in His Slippera 2001 as well as ying combat operations over Iraq in 2003 as part of Operation Force Pilots completing Squadron, Fligh e bri operational Falconer. he Academy, Course, F-18 Wing 77 t Developm ng deployment having Masters of Defence Studies degree from the Royal Military College, Kingston, completed Hornet Commander Squadron holds a Com ent s experience graduated introductory operational Beck or the and views is Canada. Force The This manwork out 75 includes conversion graduated Squadron Government expressed copyright. der from the ying time work of in well Apart in 1995. from the as this as and use as pro those ofof Australia.This are any F18s out Canadian instructing document the permitted Execworking s Thisauthor is Diegowasfor Disclaimer approved and do under Joint paper the Forcesnot utive for an Garcia public necessarily Copyright originally Command an release; reect Act 1968, Offic the dpublished as Operation distribution official no Staff A5 part andbooklet in er be 2008 co in or unlimited. policy may August Program in permission, Portions position of reproduced provided (ISBN Horn of Copyrighta standard source credit is included. ns Commonwealth of Australia 2008 2007 and this the by 9781920800321) et is of anypresented document Department process and may of without here as operbe a reutilDefence, quoted or the permission formatted ationthe isin Royal reproduced Australian from printer friendly al gversion. without Air publisher.

Air Power Development Centre

Abbreviations
CAS Close Air Support EO Electro-optical FAS El Salvador Air Force (Fuerza Aerea El Salvador) GPS Global Positioning System IO Information Operations ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance IR Infra-red NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation PGM Precision Guided Munitions of Engagement ROE Rules SAM Surface-to-Air Missiles SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar UAV Uninhabited [or Unmanned] Aerial Vehicle UCAV Uninhabited [or Unmanned] Combat Aerial Vehicle US United States USAF United States Air Force

Preface
The power to hurt the a kind of bargaining power, not easy to use but used and grief is sheer often. Thomas C. Shelling unaquisitive The early , unproductiv twenty-rst this, most e power century far- to Westernhas with its seen destroy a militaries reaching understanding things resurgence that devastating battleeld effects leading to the swift defeat of Iraqs are primarily and decisive , air of its Freedom Iraqi delivered power somebody in structured strategic capabilities conventional forces. When, insurgencies to to ght is the effects and treasures, however, air power inflict and inbest pain conventional well suited limitations enemy couldair their counterwars. applied to when transitioned contribute. liaison Airmen insurgency Modern conventional to counterinsurgent This was element were contribute warfare.inair that it can contribute more effectively to the counter-insurgency offensivebut warfare, there insurgency so evident soon also to the developed Despite a poweris there the warfare. was a limited the after sent countercampaign. This of of lack paper During understanding actions capture home insurgency will US 3rd argue before Operation of how thethe by campaign. thatuse of employing the it is Infantry Baghdad, United The crucial to lethal offensive for Division wrongly States application understand force. In that air power understanding will show who believing Air of thoroughly examining best offensive how align an had counterreleased they Force offensive thepower can this with air power appropriate insurgency application nothing (USAF) air fundamentals notion, ofair counterbest be offensive fundamentals. of each more to becaus needs to of counter-will this rolesit insurgency applied in power Further, of the paper offer. e it be insurgency will look of theory? can support the strategy air examine offensive was explored warfareThe Westermann, to Edward B. answer The paper counteronly be strengths, power. The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Bear Versus the Mujahideen in School of Advanced , Afghanistan 1979 not and the will insurgencyStudies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 997, p. . developed by weaknesses capabilities Airpower sure question,to It R. Searle, Making Airpower Effective Air and Space PowerVol. XVIII, No. , Fall 004, pp. provide a operations. thoroughly and risks required Dr Thomas against Guerrillas,, Journal how air How does framework understanding resident in undertake 4. power the roles Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman, these Christopher Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency, could will be Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington DC, 005, p. 7.

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Air Power Development Centre

assessed and evaluated in the terms of how counterlimited to well they power insurgency the air are other likely eitheras campaign. employment roles, such examined. to offensive To support or of enable intelligence, jeopardise a power. air surveillance the thorough While Fundamentals of CounterInsurgency Warfare and The still fundamentals analysis in important reconnaissance of the aiding (ISR) Knowrapid and thy enemy topic, thewill countermobility, 4 and but you scope ofare sure to be defeated in every insurgency not be know battle. Sun Tzu this paper campaigns, yourself; yourself will be a in Detailed , your hundred chances knowledge warfare it of of even is ones wars battles, by you winning 5 enemy over moreout will their very play never be can any analysis of the potential contribution of offensive air power be or are has years. crucial, as nature many strategy developed always the denedthe not enemy Only losing when assessed. defeated are been. When is not of Insurgencies by a series underlying Types of you equal. If critical ofare relying onthe of short nature Counterimportanc overtignorant force battles; is conicta insurgency defeat the both of e in of to not achieve they tend to understood is non-ruling specic one a your warfare. In victory.one be depend and a and simply and will enemy group politics counterCountercomplicated corresponding generic to uponand of its the ruling violence of insurgency affairs form yourself of characteristics. means are they trying to achieve these authorities what further its insurgency for, and by which , warfare. of can Insurgency where the cause. To in terms goals? There are Everyand be generally non-ruling analyse ends 7 four broad ethnic nationalism and religion. Terrorism is a unique grouping that will be looked at insurgency a dened as group this in means. areas that separately. is different, struggle deliberately Ideologicalmore Specically, dene and the is between uses afor based detail, it battle what are what way to best combination insurgencie benecial inuence the political of insurgents of were a s to James the between ends that ideological Examples ght for. S. common understand superpowers the insurgents include Marxist Coru These are occurrence the to are led nature insurgents is entirely insurgency there them m, ideological during the supporting are ghting political. communi of The the often the general motivators, postWorld regional in Their aim st Air Contras strong populace be more nationalis Camp War the insurgencies. and support in a part of country that the national government cannot is to sanctuary insurgen Nicaragua. external and II protracted gain m,aign period,types Generally, impose cies less These of inuences ability and in inuence. of Nationalist where the the goal their the countries of Prese involved. predictable insurgencies peoples ideologies such as insurgencies The an government when nt are not that fuelled East are onto and El and are the ultimate to control insurgent byFuture governed Africa andthe broader Salvador alwaysis outcome the entire group desiresuccessful. externally. during the Mozambique. to be populace. and easily to will country. well restoretoselfThis was as 1920s These and Using Malaya, resolved usually The funded determination typical of Airpo 1950s. is insurgencies and with rest the outcome resourced wer and generally the many Examples are self-rule anti- to the likely externally, forAgain anti- nation include of wella support or st can or colonial Rhodesia by supported Insurg The 4 Sun Tzu, Art of War, edited and translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, London, 97, p. . conicts (modern the populace ents 5 throughout Zimbabwe) and and Air Campaigns in the New World Order Defence and Security Studies, Winnipeg, (ed.), , Centre for 005, p. . the Middle , Angola, therefore Terror Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Bard E. ONeill, Brasseys Inc, Dulles VA, 990, p. . ists Algeria they are 7 Corum, The Air Campaign of the Present and Future, p. 7. in likely
Allan D. Englis h

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Air Power Development Centre

Ethnic nationalist disempowered. insurgencies This may be from the often result due to the ruling power. when of the nature regime, Modern the minority political or a examples Basque term ethnic in construct legacy exist in region outcome the groupsthe within nd of the many Spain. will insurgents. Religion themselves country,of colonial regions These usually has that Jihad and underdeliberate era world, the conicts come proved to Hamas. characteristic represented oppression left also including are to down be a Although among fundamentally oppose Israels right to exist provide a good example of this unifying or Lanka different Sri often the unifying it is not otherwise effect. cultural (Tamil protracted support Many motivator usually disparate and Tigers),each of the insurgencies behind for sole the many groups with ethnic fall Chechnya, difficult to populace do not insurgency. of Islamic for reason goals various groupsinto and predict. diverse sources of insurgent motivation complicate the counter-insurgency more neatly For nationalism ideology. Theseit a insurgent ghting, and beliefs. vyingthe Again, thanreligion, single example, and campaign. be the groups,a can The variety for long- most specic category. the as while Terrorism such motivating of Islamic political There may Algerians is of the Terrorism Hezbollah, and groups that goals of or be one who fought African 9 a more that Islamic unifying more against insurgencies difficult terrorismis regard it sourceswere France of werefact a phenomenon is in used being emotive motivation motivated quantify tool of to describe a term in they by a the within warfare method as the employ. political combination nationalism a spectrum which opposed to modern of This is Sri organisations by the and Marxist insurgencies. may be cause or era, with is evidentit ghting and Lankan groups It has been employed organisation. insurgent with ethnic Russian important employ. asserted by Terrorism groups minority Governments. to As distinct insurgents has become often as such trying counterWhen understand from based to achieve an understand being the Tamil insurgencies, terrorism as group and proles their are labelled Tigers they the distinction a method, it s, they as thought be goals. In terrorists Chechens. considered fundamental between 0 is becoming such an are not of as of inuence this because Although terrorist nature the universally as the ghting strategy with which to combat them. insurgency andAlare coherent of both organisations insurgent motivations accepted to Qaed the for a against culture methods of inherently of the The lack describe a, as particular West, through group and a more A stateless terror ethnic where their acts of the meaningful realistic In ideologicall ist group are goals or terrorism. methods end-state goal is to effect, to easy lack yorgan a simply The to they it is means reduce to this accept objective isatio denitive undermine of a unlikely their means politically eliminate terrorist ns. endWestern dened thatthreat and damage the U.S. image worldwide. capabilit it trying because the military population These state. hegemony, objective stateless y and to not is completely. attacks it group Loosely makes terrorist support reduce denitive, A recentto against s do speaking, difficult groups will to a in into the level but can study the elusivea not they adopt be which violence short US terrorist t completely prohibits to may term it responses s a into eliminated. regular level would to serve traditi large-to where it appear terrorism only onal scale that, has unrealistic found radicali ibid. insur attacks. Insurgency & Terrorism minimal to ONeill, counter ze set the 9 , p. 7. gent effect. large 0 Corum, The Air Campaign of the Present and Future, p. 7. Such a sectors Christopher Bolkcom and Kenneth Katzman, Military Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency, goal of Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington DC, 005, p. 5. the may not (Muslim be Working Paper )
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or a l re c Air Power Development Centre e li o a gi n d o c The Hearts and Minds Campaign u e r s p The m id t methods government, e a of either achieve y ol r insurgency politically or their government b o ti are based through the political over a long governments u gi aim c on the The use of direct goals. ofis period manpower The il es u theThis insurgent for force. The methods time. and for settlement d s l leaders drives them of insurgents equipment, government the i u a awareness to use insurgency military thusthe and insurgents. counterd c t that they is percent is getting the people of this country behind insurgent involve to objective reinforcing people The insurgency; seventy-ve h e are unable warfare to eroding to destroy the weary grow insurgency The us. The concept a as d to the widely the is gradually governments of war shooting of campaign. s Isl b Centre of overthrow strength, to the of inability struggle acknowledged side 4 Gravityis one The or the derive a y be the Centre will forcing incumbent control thus a to the that can be of Gravity is motivation, operations n m L legitimacyis situation. a hearts and business helpful in essentially fundament revolvesfor support d ic i of the favourable minds only understanding the heart of al around to their cause unable the s fu e negotiated campaign, twenty-ve the nature of strength, hearts and from the of achieve the n u Centre percent the described problem, and counter5 minds population. theirthe of Gravity he p d t the insurgency the source will to campaign. Without political is this Centre these p a e slightly trouble. from which ght. The For the this other goals. The different. of Centr o m n Gravity as Fundamentally, The all ofsides will Centre the insurgents, popularof incumbent US be being es r e a both will protagonists Gravity for of thebattling for support government countercredibility Gravi to t nt n Centre be trying counterof hearts the be their to also relies insurgency ty a al t Gravity and rally support for their cause while attacking the credibility of the attack trying reduce support will insurgency willthe of the insurgents on the the theorist incumbent provi r is G be minds opponents for government. In become of supportof Max government. des o m e population. Centre insurgents rallying as an isolated these Mainwaring Understanding an u , n More Gravity while support but Information and it best their people, put insig n th e specically, while improving forembrace Operations to legitimacy. whenside ht d e r each protecting own their (IO) cause. the own. into t c a their Simultaneously cause, campaign. The insurgents strategy how h e l the The , the Whether it methods of revolves example the e nt S government insurge in is used an around such attacks respeto ra ir be will nts are espousing achieve 7 providing operation Lebanon approximately 155 000 people who had been displaced during the ctive i l G essentiato political these goals support was during ghting. camp n te e Operations lly public in ideologies may range the Hezbollahs 2006. aigns d n r the by as foundations conduct such from areasawhere provision Hezbollahs are i et a their in Taliban of NGO local ing Marxism, charismatic governmental of food, social likely are v is l Afghanista cause is populace. Taliban and Watch what approach, action are shelter services to this i use d , Talibans cause. n strongly A In attracted the was Western by whereaid decient. other wing be prospect d c T Hezbo more than promoted, way even the to militarie good to llah able cond u the o the e living in a one but people of of refer s victims spend ucted secure a n m Relief approach Taliban who do more to Centre Israeli Insurgency & Terrorism US$500 . buildto l vi try p ONeill, , p. to also not environment, 000 70. p n DrWell Thornton, l s per them Historical Origins of the British Armys Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism Techniques, Rod Geneva Centre for the support. provide support making Run: day o c strict a Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneva, 00 , p. 9. The security the more UN: helping p e $500 r4 Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 5.0 ideological and Joint Planning (Provisional), Department of Defence, religious sympathetic u th 000 to w Canberra, 00, p. -. stability and to l e5 Thomas Keaney, Air Campaigns: Current Practice and Future Trends in Allan D. English (ed.), World Order h U.S. the Air Campaigns in the New , ideological a g Centre e Spent for Defence and Security Studies, Winnipeg, 005, p. . principles ri the e Department of Defence, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication . n Daily Information Operations, Department of Defence, Canberra, of on t n c 00 . y er o7 Food, Shelte , al r, n ngowatch.org/articles.php?id=404; accessed 5 February 007. t p d Augus Working Paper 5 o u t 00; 26 a p c http://
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Air Power Development Centre

When attac and passive king means. simply thestop their Through by to Centr very surviv them. manipulation e of existence, ing reinforce Conversely, to of Graviaction insurgencies they any the forc occurred ty of by put political are taken the righteousnes e during insurgent the the on pressure furthe and s of or 1970s attacks perspective, incu means governments; of the incumbent power. ring insupport governmen insurgents terr 1980s ultimately this popular mben an sometimes theirevery t, including cause. oris to Bangladesh led that t cause offensivein Government Support Insurgents and El increase to response External gover even throu will action, have atta Salvador, popular the Besides to nmen for gh subject be resorted cks where support insurgents the directly t, highli be to shows deli violent the must direct combating insurgents insur ghting ber government insurgents considered form of an the or governments which actively support the incumbent gents the its atel responses cause. for counterinsurgent incumbent government. are a to impot y to From potential By insurgency organisati government able is the ence to strategic a diminish bringing which warfare on, the are there to being of enc third supporting The also where are supported use into gover our actor the fundamentals there is counterexternally. both nment age play incumbent of the current an insurgency This paper activ the by Western governments. a within in government, insurgency government conicts supported incumbent campaigns will focus e not a disp and counterthe are becomes Iraq on or power where only The support rop insurgency dynamicsbut affected, of crucial the Afghanistan. governme either external provided training, orti countercontext,these the ability variable. Both of nt the from an reconstru of with desire ona namely insurgency and Modern countries external ction and state worst In external te thefragile an campaign of the examples have government teams,to nature where cases, of supporting res altered. external are power such incumbent may be in medical the conict forces will government. pon incumbent governme support external governments manyas be is assistance and a government initially Once such se the nt support being forms, of and direct abilityand weak such on suitablethe reconstruction conditions fro include as security combat the of cannotthe creating level of where support. m assistance, forces. is incumbent operate security infrastructure the secure advice, Government Centre of Gravity The level in government independently conditions obtained and economic gov External of cope with to area,can , theoperate necessary of an focus growth, the can ernexternal An external the easily for scope more effectively me theof government of Gravity support problem. normal otherplace. takedefeat and nonnt. which is maintain will vary is to functioning military The the This aim providing vulnerable popular cause, will of the the activities, create for insurgency support to attack. put pressure can remain involved. government without a counterForthe the modern on Western external insurgency democracies campaign sustainabilit 9 policym strategies, campaign the Centre within their y of the akers and also decisive General will of Gravity own campaign 0 and the victories. Davida the waning have will be populations. and will public Such pressure Petraeus. political characteristics Centreof ability to A lack ultimately insurgency generall hasmodern He has will and of been support, limit how warfare y want acknowledged warned public Western regardless long the given the short if current by thethat that support for democracies of the external campaigns conictswill US war insurgency the largely are tend with to be Commander is not Insurgency & Terrorism, evaporate, incompatible ONeill, p. 0. of Iraq, long clear the Clarke, Airpower and Military Intervention: The Political Limitations in Peter21: Challenges for the in Michael defeated leading to with Air Power W. Gray (ed.), 9 duration, success , The Stationery Office, London, 000, p. 9. within six a Vietnamfundamentals New Century decisive criteria, Globe and Mail months likecounterof Editorial, 0 , March 007. victories denitiv are the withdrawal. Working Paper elusive, e exit already The 6 26 measureme nt

Air Power Development Centre

of progress governments is difficultin involved support. to counterquantify, of the Media insurgency The Role and often campaigns In modern there is no must do all democracies difficult. denitive to they can the media The are which victory.the maintain makes medias provocative clear Therefore, their of task own fundam or create and support. from the publicsand maintaining ental debate in a where Success the cost outset, for a support interest interest. progress counterdollars, media criticism of the campaign, putting pressure on the external governments Centre of Western long is to Over insurgency equipment Gravity. a long When counter- is sell lives is campaign, difficult campaign and storie coverage insurgency news; to where to difficult clearly s on as they negative campaign therefor national quantify, dene, The visible. redev doitnot effect as collateral e, interest and the measure combination elop not be readilyis resulting damage), in the will may media two demonstrate. of these ment This qualify from to incorrect media. Canadian naturall likely Conversely, factors andeither or asclearly military targeting, is Journalism more in y question results rebuil captivati operations, even evident Foundation readil portrays gravitat the increased ding was well ng or that such as of incidents from the shows y sensational This e decision succe the controve inadvertent inappropriate Canadian the repor events demonstrated Mogadishu has been widely acknowledged as the catalyst which ultimately ended the towards to sses rsial damage to behaviour, media of majority ted resulting in Somalia operation. stories provide The receive are external news. buildings will coverage Canadians than On of images where the external government abilit avail the have US or civilians wide Afghanistan. believe of may footage and its y study to remain. able,thebeing other (dened coverage A profound that recon a airmen military need mitig by the This on also they hand, done combat struct affect dragged to be aware ate means will have a direct negative impact on the external governments Centre of highlights or not, the will any elements ion the through of thesea the for that in for Gravity. often of are elem support streets media Support The Pressure to Respond situat long counterPublic from not ents the realities. ion counterinsurgency bein be Whilst beca campaign. Regardless of throu insurgency warfare best. g given 4 public use maintain, the gh campaign, mistakes air The laun much support they governm is where governments public maintainin or errors, end- could ched can for are ents power relativel relati g public regardless state agai be by protracted more alsoseen belowy conict ons support of whether wher nst counterexcit under government risk, between Prime strate will be they are ein Israe an insurgency ing. pressure s as highHezbollah Minister gies, difficult. It intentional Hezb theis l. warfare When fromIsrael. attractive visibility and were targets. the ollah The the difficult the public option. 5 response After under Despite ultimately funda was Israe the but medi 90 and Supercially, option. kidnapping pressure hitting unsuccessful. ment still power li Israeli fundament a media to air An of to rocket among the populace had been renewed was undeniable. Ground support al able Air ally do provides the example a soldiers, respond. launchers forces also natur Air power to such Forc initial important somethin of Government The and entered into e of also the new of laun e to This g. the a and action targeting the conict the provided attacks, ch ew an US response was leadership as Canadian it medi the bombers rockinitial over occurred airJournalism and developed, a David Gates, Airpower: The Instrument of Choice? in Peter W.21: Challenges for theThe Stationery response aided et will by 870 Air Power Gray , New during campaign resupply with limited Federation, to London, the Northern attac 0 (ed.), 000, p. 4. Century Office, the to Canadians stop routes, at success September Alliance ks Assess the sorti 2006 Hezbollah the air 11 attacks forces and onhttp://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/December00/0/c459.html; accessed 5 January 007. es Canadian rockets campaign onMedia and the a Clarke, Airpower and Military Intervention, p. 0. small Israe and was United of number l 4 its struc ibid. States. Special and k Coverage of 5 Robert S. Dudney, Editorial: The Air War Over Hezbollah, , Vol. 9, No. 9, September 00, p. . Air Force Magazine the Within Forces its Afghanistan mor weeks Working Paper were once e Mission, 7 26 agg than December ing 600 00;

Air Power Development Centre

targeting Al Qaeda and regime Taliban being Afghanistan ghters in removed with no if the initial Afghanistan. can achieve any long-term success. from alone evidence of response power The effects power. a near-term from air For an achieved Despitein victory power externa number were The this initial sight. be might l areas. of dene and favourable operational lesson for effective govern The the measure, may be with a success, politicians from ment, of length andand public immediate Taliban US and public the consequently and pressure is reconcile to Coalition for planners opinion Centre campaign is the media media are dosupport counterin even forces that perspective, of a to makes likely designing their campaign pressure something insurgency ofis in when still unlikely it Gravity the ensuring focus on for some and the conicts. counterstrategy. that air of long-term negative. sort challenge External insurgency Developing Effective Strateg y support Paradoxically initial of governments campaign. The from difficult, however, military maintaining must Likewise, ana to the progress there response. long-term understand military lysi developing operations, home is difficult The before public this planners s power, an there are or populat is to tension support committing must also of ainthree effective oftenthorough and on aware ionis some which to difficult forces be the counterdistinct cases understanding of central vulnera exists of these fun in of of any effective counter-insurgency strategy. insurgency to participants external of each importance foundation ble between factors da sides. An strategy. It the insurgent supporting these parties. all a the me hearts has been group or powers. The understanding the Enemy Understanding ntal minds demonstra groups, the Effectivekey and of these Understanding s ted that will incumbent strategy campaign components an insurgency battle, tactics of how they in be critical government development also numbers. and should not be and knowledge of insittherefore counter- will will is of in as interplay thought An an ultimately urgreliant insurgency be the strictly understanding adversarys to insurgencies enc military terms of the machinations, determining are motivations. ies of good fundamental motivations, an knowing generated A effective The main hig the enemys nature of of methods, the counterhaveafter example insurgent who been hlig order of insurgency is goals, insurgent identied, the groups many long-term hts required. and strengths strategy. an potential involved years of regional combinations so Thorough weaknesses Although insurgency complexities are the oppression autonomy. of factors. Syria me will be key four also is can broad involved Sunnis want to Within Complicating and gen Clearly, a categories involve such a the situation who ensure these Saudi eral complexof solution from which mixtureare insurgency want they to groups further Arabia, prin interdependent applies.with requiredA groups situation regain maintain many the regional and the cipl systemain detailedcannot before case, in each different present their power, subgroups and other es neatly and be ways environment. understanding meaningful the the insurgent Iraq. political and international Gulf whi thrown of a of the who strategy means into power Kurds factions of inuences States ch becategory single the it motivations, Incumbent and Supporting can some achieving Understanding base, are want which Iran, have ma only be to which a methods and developed. can ofby Nations Shiites A thorough form clearly driven interests y simple interactions of Although determined understanding understood understood. supporting different based on be groups the throughaato of the term so that Similarly The governments. political, the app risks is involved strategic complete insurgent endeavours, coherent capabilities, range the The of security lied end-state understanding environment strengths, while protecting its the broad strategy limitations environments incumbent vulnerabilities and governments maybe be of theto will also spectrum can and needbe government , strengths religious weaknesses. readily This require an approach developed. vulnerabilitie known. of and agendas. identiable analysis of involving As counters of any knowledge employing weaknesses the enable military insurgency external will force of theat and incumbent non-military campaigns supporting the strategy various and built on means are nation to be levels need government 8 needs generally to be a the across to must be be carefully longanalysed and incumbent broad

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Air Power Development Centre

coordinated. Military strategy.The kinetic supporting to poorly actions be nations applied can then must loss so intent and of force, promoted be involved. produce level and men of that Most determined effects commitment a materiel, the politicians importantly, balancing strategy. whichto will provide and the thorough need ultimately an indicator progressand public alike analysis achieve The Importance of the Hearts and Minds Factor contribute for how which is can better understanding military The hearts positively to resilient to difficult an understand enables it objectives and minds essential that this be the will quantify. the acceptable againstof aspect it becomes is a coordinated to Realistic commitment level of risk risks the focalis complex point success expectations that will is be strategy destabilising campaign of with task the external the long-term centrally development. many legitimacy governments incumbent important to Understanding factors that and supporting government local allis heartsto themuchbe and need to as effectiveness it likely populace as participating minds considered. of the campaign. If do long-term that their possible The of the groupsThe component Oneexternal incumbent the the harm. and government with strategy improvements it is most government. government external is involvement forthe quality to factor providing the therefore important This support is ineffective. of the can winningin of life of the secure needhas or factors also excessive inadvertentl Therefore, incumbent hearts local conditions toreinforce potential ensuring implications isolates the y any government and population will required for be the to that their application for to strategy so minds to be be necessary. these will well is undermi needs IO that competence often be Military improvements coor ne more carefully campaign be the employed is non-can will it is support if to occur. dinat and broader coordinated and be supportive used must reinforced. Iraq an in military their be both andon Military understanding the possible impact on local support may be fatal to the ed focused strategy with used also of being without undertaken war focus. non-military and through IO effective mitigate own with campaign. The analysis s, impact Many operations part the strategy. government discrimination of insurgency when mua otherserves of military misappli This and fundamentals employing involved to ch counter operations com cation to operations supporting proportionality. leads to three force thethe if wasgreatest Secondly, providing mon of force. any on forces Aggressively main a during of extent ma use anybe These strat To insurgent local they pursuing principles counter- in air power, when force is required the minimum force possible should be used. possible de force can effects for offensive egy. most population. understand military which to insurgency order need of force needs to is be The effective Locals are why objectives to be campaign. highlight its air be mitigated milit to , force likely being considered Firstly, the competence pow understood by an The Application of Air Power in CounterInsurgency ary byterms of incumbent and ers in militaries effective also Warfare Air power governme legitimacy abili its welland need role to hasmust warfare. nt its to a ty to own potential coordinated s play in the During be people. to strategic IO be modern air Kosovo on functions con effects campaign. cogn counter- of campaign of air and functionality trib the Finally, itive and in insurgency 1999 power , and campaigns. do ute campaign. most of in warfare, but the conduct hitting impeding These campaigns, counterto importantly the different it is of the critical the functions,of air where functions insurgency a to its role in conventional targetscan be enemys air which of many give power warfare. swif conventional phases to and limitations must be determined and clearly understood. deep of ability air power powers counterproductive. capabilities To t both recentis a behind and deploy its muchthere greatest Thus of maximise and the to examine sustain his potency, strengths need its deci enemys power can forceswere are not be cannot as what air effectiven sive lines, all evident relevant in employed. and in ess vict cannot Major destroyin Kenneth Air and Space Power in fact, Beebe, The Air Forces Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency, counterIn these counterory. Journal, XX, No. , Spring 00, p. 9. Vol. g insurgency some of insurgency The command the Working Paper warfare, trad 9 and 26 traditional air itio control powers nal

Air Power Development Centre

Support and Supplementation of Incumbent Forces The analysis of to provide is the fundamentals low-prole incumbent of long-term governments capability insurgencies assistancein own force to . The insurgency haspower over the short assistanc capability air determined incumbentthe term with e alsowell the longer aligns seen that of of governments aim one allows term.The with as handling theforce. This air best its optimising supplementation countertaki the The ways of using complements counter-for incumben and insurgency ng situation gov support air power the insurgency of t development warfare and ern the providing warfare governme the incumbent theory. lead a providing me campaign, such its nt negotiated with more condence. governments Importantly, in to security the relatively publics be develop on the the for tha pressure low-risk support Theown itsis external incumbent oper US population, t the the commitment, over interventio support independ government atio external thus pro the long 7 n in El in using and ent be will n. do working vidi to government term. Salvador to offensive personnel in more likely counter-of This support ngterms something is in Centre air the provide of relieved.to The able will its be the is to approach 1980s was able to maintain the long-term support it needed. The El Salvador Fuerza Aerea power.The training and funding, insurgency the US Air Force (FAS reinf of Gravity. ext Additionally maintain ultimatel demonstra US military ) resources was by became credible and effective with a genuine counter-insurgency capability. The air Elallows orce ern , y tes provided advice. 9 and powerful campaignthe Even Salvador contributed to ne al the effective equipment though it foreign 0 and the considerably a peace the sup line provision in the major was a in policy campaign to the accord peo por involving Despite of fought form of of commitment effort, The was success 1992. ple t public the a role. many counter- US aircraft, from the only over the countersupport that alsgrow. support succesbut Recognising to insurgency such as to small years, insurgency provided the o ofvalue manual, to s not the A-37 of Military Operations in Low Intensity The doctrine , which states that, US policy recognizes the FAS by number by campaign the gove a ben such recognition Conicts that indirect, Dragony, of US being thatUS the rnm et support capability, of achieve rather thannational to the personnel directly concluded contributed ent USAF s operati a the of value direct, goals. werethe involved with signicantl Although is fro ons has supporting application deployed. signing of y to this indirect always capa mof US is over expanded strategy s success. of support viable. infrastructure blerole The usi the its now military air such incumbent for power of Afghanistan is and 2001 ng years, are since reected in power capability government external impossible. this USis the most US and it the When has many to and assistance app its has continuing counterappropriate incumbent in some benets military be roaabsorbed; only cost insurgency and government form. incumbent in forces must such ch. aan periodi effective has These governments of Gravity. counterhave approach in By a cally of ways suitable operations Centre Acting its selfinsurgency minimum the pro current undert while level of the satisfy to Gravity it through sufficiency. it needs warfare, level environments vidi of aken of capability, many simultaneousl incumbent Selfremain is Iraq competence in not ng this supporting the y protecting government sufficiency engaged. and operations principles the supporting reinforces helps the Additionally, should beVance C. Bateman, The Role of Tactical Airpower in Low-Intensity Conflict, No. , Spring 99, pp. of Captain governments its counterexternal by providing 7 Airpower Journal V, , Vol. conducted insurgency Centre competency supporting relatively 77. warfare by Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill and the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic to Alan J. Vick, its people government low-cost and Airpower in Karl P. Mueller, enhancing of USAF Advisory and Assistance MissionsMonica CA, 00, p. 7. and also byImportance reducing low-risk , RAND, Santa the amount develops is support S. Corum and Wray R. Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists Kansas, Lawrence 9 James it Johnson, , University Press of of KS, 00, p. . time more likely
0 ibid, p. 9. Airpower in the New Counterinsurgency Era, Vick et al, p. 7. Bateman, The Role of Tactical Airpower in Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 7.

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the ext government ern to provide al long- Bombing the Strategic gov term Strategic ern commitment bombing aeroplane. me attack that been 4 haspower Air is to nt of necessary one theorists directly where the will success for fundamental and an Centre of The avo in counteraspects of practitioners enemys Gravity sociopolitica air power id power insurgency airair long have power strategicof revolves l nature can attack of pub 5 that warfare.of theory the argued Centre around this This effectively. to strike ght. lic powers almost since airdifficult Gravity. at popular strategic Strategic directly is operate to pre is the enemy greatestand This a a supportof Centre attack the in counterwith to use ssur inventionis of strength of problemati legitimacy Gravityas theory does leaderships insurgency highdecentralised it difficult e in theability its air for c provide not described command warfare delity, for the to counter- of incumbent a neat to by control and the two high- set structure power insurgents that wit insurgency government. kinetic toas Wardens network reasons. technology incorporating attack ability insurgents endhdr warfarethe targetsalone. Rings their well as is Firstly, centralised a lowphysically. operate are state action aw whichif the to model to will to enemy command technology Even unlikely motivated requires fro Despite its promotes leadership and by command be ght a m obvious has use the are control control redundant and undermined. different political the been limitations historically has second unlikely is system. control system The reasons solution ca counterin been are to British the They system successfull reason than ; mp 7 insurgency championed undermine and likely controldoes more of making y attacked, model combatants therefor aigair power warfare,for by apply is support French their the not in their e, n. use of the would theorists and frequently colonial British and to conventional will This strategic to practitioners. insurgents employed empires. In continue of towns warfare. resist is allo aim of bombing The on. through this 9 theatres ght and cities ghting Their unlikely ws asthe Rif against these to punitive or technique such failed During supporting forthe In be to a the the insurgents bombing coercive during the Somaliland, achieve War, the rebels nationa modern sympathetic affected ext campaigns bombing and inter-war of Aden, and decisive French did not l era, the villages casualties through ern theirmany periodareas 40 Mesopotam effects. found Spanish affected. affect their cause, in Soviets other and severely military al heavy supporters. anorder to ia, to The to that will coerciv tried in Afghans For a In The driven attempt Kurdistan enemy bombardment resist. the e bomb depopulate were governme seem an to and would fact, bombin Mujahideen them. into nt attractive It response. maintain the Palestine, quickly a against g in Although Pakistan, providing option.a lowis also were life or It adapt to determined actuall Afghanistan there Mujahideens external the satises risk of of equipment. nature and the enemy y was into tens morale 4 support to requirement commitment These air power thinking situation foundof submission. thousands level a counterto do with is factors was also and to They of support insurgency something relatively make to likely doctrine. strengt targeted not campaign, by providing low costs strategic resonate Despite hen Colonel Lieutenant an and Mark A. Buckham, Strategic Bombing: What is it, and is it Still Relevant? in Stuart Peach (ed.), Perspectives on strategic and a quick a involved bombing with this, enemy Airpower: Airpower in its Wider Context , The Stationery Office, London, 99, pp. 90. bombing highminimum popular airmen historical s4 will Clayton United A Basic Primer, would with Chun, visibility K.S. Aerospace Power in the Twenty-First Century:States Air Force Academy in cooperation with exposure to choice and air evidence to Air University Press, Colorado Springs CO, 00, p. . loss of politicians. planners, does not resist. A. WardenThe Air Campaign New York, 99, p. 4. 5 John III, , Excel, Similarly, where it support Dr Air and Space Power Vol. XVIII, No. , Fall 004, p. 5. the Thomas R. Searle, Making Airpower Effective against Guerrillas, , Journal has strategic 7 Corum, The Air Campaign of the Present and Future, p. 9. strategic dominated bombing both air as ibid. an force effective and Johnson, 9 Corum Airpower in Small Wars , p. 4. tool 40 ibid, p. 9.
4 Dennis M. Drew, U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge: A ShortThe Journal Confusion,History Journey to of Military ,

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4 against insurge response, nts. without As part While a a of purposes, a concerte broader strategic may generate respons of d long- for strategy, targeting sympathy at home e may termwithin full the use infrastructure and insurgent best detrimental, or at worst achieve the spectrum of theatre can make cause, while the disastrous. the approach strategic perpetrators simultaneousl of Interdiction short- like , it is bombing appear of y undermining operations. The aim term unlikely has any heavythe For 4 interdiction is materiel, and political to have many handed the aggressors counter- his to disrupt disrupting adapt aim of This any risks. bullies. before support both insurgency 44 enemy lines by of threatened, a highenduring Even if campaign, he engages and negative effects on the larger counter-insurgency communication. avoidpositive creating both visibilit success. not used these hitting you by Insurgents ing challenges campaign. y lowovertly The effects his faced with overt in risk prove for effectiveness insurgency may concentrations superior conce prosecuting punitive can of force and and available at the will of repower ntrati them. interdiction suitability of markedly mountains generally ons Depending will operating the vary the inuence of interdict it of upon how within each environment. effectiveness Afghanistan operations. insurgency force. is applied, theatre such Factors of an air have When fundament counter-insurgency campaigns are analysed below. They interdiction depending as the is interdiction provided power als, have will can on many weather, campaign. protection applied in interdictio Interdiction tend factors,and terrain be The jungles forcan suitable n Advantages to The including the weapons of Vietnam insurgent conditions very melt ability and typethe an of and with forces and effective. away to indirect. Air insurgents restricted understanding The 45 into has conduct power can massed the ability of the advantage the ability interdict operate force can conict of andpower counters air local ioncover air power was able to target them with devastating 4 to dealt and be in Western to risks of popul a within large employ with Afghan effects. In addition using ace theatre distances combat effectively istan. to the rst produces interdictio when In of air and quickly power. by When order second n inhave concentrates operatio can suitable power. the effects of and third manpower, air, was ns devastatin conditions This Taliban interdiction, order on equipment insurgents ofeffect provides g any evident attemp where avoid effects. or resources must the movement countersignica how to the attempt during ted enemyan The ability forces is large and insurgents operations. nt the by early operat directly able of also adaptation concentration to as of are This have advanta insurgents stages e destroyed To interdiction of which can s tactics. concentrate to distribute distribution previously functions ges, to use the masse on forceto of living, can be carried out. to hitforces escape the be the repower the their the of easily been critical standard both current d ground, it enemyfrom threat interdicted. become in a less enables inaccessible ultimate direct conven A also whenever the Consequently more concentrated incumbent the due to the success of tionalgovernme The insurgents inability to interdiction. and , their A limited. manner government insurgent campaign, style nt which concentrate their forces or resort to the use of wherever freedom resultant throughout control to activity. such as eldedweapons typical of is heavy of he spread the positive the area be Once this rebuilding forces, No. 4, October 99, pp. 09. supporting effect , is to Vol. is areas control infrastructure, the the Airpower and Military Intervention, p. . 4 Clarke, and that may which established economy counterFundamentals 4 Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Air Publication 000 of Australian Aerospace Power , Fourth Edition, Aerospace the noninsurgency Centre, Canberra, 00, p. 0. military externally Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge, p. 0. 44 Drew, U.S. can also Airpower in the New Counterinsurgency Era, 45 Vick et al, p. . benet 4 Dr Mark Clodfelter, Airpower versus Asymmetric Enemies: A Framework for Evaluating Effectiveness, Air and Space Power,Journal from the Vol. XVI, No. , Fall 00, p. 45. effects of Working Paper 12

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a more conventional essential war alters to combat and the force a heavy personnel strain which structurein force isand required would be troops no that is media regarding its drain on funding and resources. longer theatre. associated materiel from the necessary to required, Over the with also Lastly, and combatto a signicantl course of deploying serves perhaps aiding the them. y reducing long and reduce most many key need Equipment a the extent campaign sustaining importantly, perception of the larger armedwould which heavy amount of this much to which a smaller that the weapons insurgent an be supporting signicantl force. The the footprint of incumbent capabilities force. impression government equipment y reduces lower supporting external government which would Thiscost of control and is the commitment campaign military forces are be required enables and therefore Interdiction and in is forcesto a in control. against them with competence. fundamental Risks on Faced vulnerable themore The ground more a be the Such to 47 the lucrative to works incumbent concentrated effective perception not easily be ultimate can superior targets criticism missions towarddothe forces of and heavily with farprotects success and less available accomplished. The not counterexternal Centre of the by reaching and logi Conventional support of Gravity air insurgency power of blending stic is the warfare behind and the campaign. interdiction, themselves al involves lines insurgencies likely to lines incumbent insurgents into the 4 fra not draw of contain the often createby do adapt local me in a communication lucrative their exist communication, reducing population. wor as bridges, travelling in target sets sustenance manner such a shortthe amount In these k same the the which and from are roads term effects, of instances of direction as vulnerable local the allows for communication disruption where counterinterdiction an airborne elded may to people,forces. interdiction nodes, thus local insurgency Israel the ins areas The thebe interdiction. their from actually equipment populations campaign. targeted Hezbollah loca urg Any However, logistical air. counterproductive. 49 and are These bridges, from to l enc and or embedded lines of to attempt Although supply disrupted negative airports Syria persuade in its pop y communicat target dual Arab states such as Saudi Arabia was may be key inadvertentl 50 effects and on Iran, Lebanons aims ulat among is punished, ion lines of use achieved, y occurred highway effectivel large both ion lost. Imprecise usu likely it with may be during s is y Christian accounts, bei targeting ally Sunni that the detrimental Israels two isolating and Hezbolla ng of the seen fun negative toactually 2006 aims. Hezbollah population h atta insurgents during the missions da turn second overall campaign The rst from to gained cke 5 in urban second using infrastructure led to a drop in Russian support from both the Chechen and Russian me was order against aim their support. d areas can Chechen imprecis public. ntal Hezbollah. to cut external Also, and Insurgent also War e ly only the support. Not internatio groups dangerous. undermine between bombinof diff it fail 5 supply The use of did nal ho further Their innovation. the 1999 and g ere weapons secondto support me adapt for camouage, Man support 2002 techniq nt was to air aim for pop the concealment portable the where the ues. to The Israels with ulat threat and threats campaign Russians resultin tha actions U.S. Airpower Theory and the Insurgent Challenge, p. 0. ion byDrew, deception is adapted 47 loss among conducted g t of ibid are in deliberat increasing tactics 4 both . many of thelevel the ely its Seymour M. Hersh, Watching Lebanon,August 00; http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/ making of The New Yorker 49 , interdiction civilian con nati 0 fa_fact; accessed January 007. making sophisticatio operating 0 lives ven on airborne n and environment 50 ibid. and tion con targeting more The damage 5 Marcel de Haas, Use of Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War, Centre, Camberley, Surrey, 00, pp. Conflict Studies Research al duc moreand 9. dangerous 4 to war ting difficult civilian 5 Destroying Mobile Ground Targets in an Anti-Access Environment, Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, Washington farChristopher J. Bowie, the and 00, p. . DC, e. atta Working Paper cks. 13 26 This was

to pr Air Power Development Centre o vi d 5 and e 54 limiting to unintentiona pr counterl damage are e insurgencybe which can effective effective. ci aira power. exploited in adapt. Increasing to si Insurgents through of number of the risk the The threat although o may also insurgents ways. platform of platform these or n actively IO or Increasing loss restrictions collateral external ef encourage campaign. the likelyis causing to collateral are damage governments fe reduced an be placed air power the external governments ability to provide long-term These in for difficulty on collateral damage result not will ct support pressure eff to locating insurgent of risk. Killing damage cancause reduced addressed at be s the support. Ultimately or such strategies valid forces by reduced effectiveness. by innocent th campaign interdictio allowing a t the both targets and counterimposing If restrictions, people ro from n is a smaller to achieve en masse . to local makes insurgency restrictions increased the Centre destroying u viable force ground a decisive of Interdiction in power offensive airGravity on likelihood of infrastructure g and role be loss to operate in result in in must both targets cr power air the operations, platform for result will h international within but a less This itself, conducted must effect. ea less the o population, counter- to concentrated does deny according be minimum insurgency se incumbent ut while insurgency manner over the risks careful force may warfare. its and th platform operations a larger area. insurgents fundamental ly fundamentals required for strategic success. include put When deadly associated the will ag e loss aswill is of It itits the ability principles determ nonlethal force never with acts ilit b as move Support be able to anon- it counterined Poorly and Air employed use. y Close at force be freely and insurgency and destructive must applied this difficult tl It multiplier, use force warfare.a engag means; delivered force may e provide e to traditionally Suitable aand ed preferable precisely re achieve of U s effective relied on construct with due option in a tactical to S p support artillery denitive cornerstones the counterconsideration objective Ar combined a large provide lines, forward of paradigm. minim of it re but m c number troop rapid massed of arms The small um seriously y e dispersedmeans of supporting ground forces conducting counter-insurgency warfare. supportis concentrations warfare.to enemy groups effective force undermines ha an in troops. ground and to Counterlikely beyond require CAS has s a Conventional troops. identiable insurgency be the d to become this is be re warfare has Within a a enemy, warfare, dispersed protection 55 achiev more the co of that s conventional one however, and of the e prominent m is p warfare to does not t difficult artillery. desire air power e likely within countero this neatly identify, In d role applied mis to insurgency it n this and situation among or context of counter-insurgency warfare. conti warfare. offensively the Air si friendly Close Western e nue are Although and v forces Support Offensive air forces during rel is into to CAS can defensively e likely (CAS) CAS is or recent in ia the generally . Therefore, m operate a provide in used to strongholds. battle For years. battle. nt futur thought of both a highly support and The thus plan, analysed example, US on a single e. as offensive n ground advantage providing robust to expected in Army C More there role, and n offensive forces a of maximum communications targets, cover and ASa than is defensive er is that can conducting CAS of efficiency procedures Rules range broad effectiveness Marin to must simp difference CAS , can be place offensive it options. and behow in Engagement of put successful e pr ly in be th operations thoroughly exibility. prior toof (ROE) can Suchtheany efficiency, Battle with Corps ov oper considered u against Weapons planned Battle action. be preparations 5 while Fallujah coordinates forwar id ating within s known matched and be the locations can fully optimised enable reducing conducte of air d e many as m be enemy integrated can and air and offensive of likelihood d known contro r during airbo a locations into the selected, power Reynolds, operations anByron November expected l ep rne 5 adverse Postmodern Tactical Air Intelligence, Air Power Development Centre, Canberra, 00, p. . ki target can assets to be outcome. 200. targets teams o ibid. artill 54 n areas can be was conducted This Detailed being were w Rebecca Grant, Bombs on Target, Magazine, Vol. 88, No. 8, p. 9. ery, g Air Force 55 August 005, be coordinated with evident planning determined suppl er air it Tim Ripley, Close Air Support in the st Air International 7, No. 4, October 00, p. . 5 allow for Century, , Vol. to maximum during the commenc ement ,a pow w ed by precision Working Paper ed tr is er in 1 el 26 mid-200 engagement 28 en able l USAF d

Air Power Development Centre

ground controllers were 57 allowing for a allocated to was one high degree of the of the counterinteroperabilit operation most in insurgency to plan y with ground allowingis successful warfare a advance repower forces. Large continuous offensive that its the enables while and it numbers ofrisk of any unwanted outcomes. presence joint allows the positive reducing multiple reduce aircraft of air over the operations time for effects can the Defensive battleeld. of the war. thorough be power to potential be CAS the US patrols From Offensive planning maximised for thoroughly differs deployed in forces.case perspective, CASsto prior in this negative evaluated from counterThese these it greatest employing coordinated effects and the offensive insurgency troopsThis situatas rapidly strength force. precision such right CAS lack warfare often ions with forces within ability collateral procedures because makeown their them defepeople precision either to signicantl damage and it more risk. vulnerable heavy nsive put effects neutralise y occurs as be and can unexpectis to attack repower CAS risk to reduces or place This operational execution. fratricide. in defeat edly.and from The support in can the evident risk, Targeting Overall, CAS small moderately and rapid likelihoo enemy to two risk the main is of of rapid sizes sized cannot ly a d attack. areasthe the fundamentally precision manner ground be enemy usually provi friendly However risk that broader the important air effectsis which as troop reinforced de job will losses compared the counterabi power role in throughout desirable in counterquickly. In the get well to not insurgency The lity as counterthe insurgency be requi enabling offensive done, campaign nat to battlespace insurgency warfare. mitigated judgement red the CAS, known if collateral ure pro warfare. The allows However, by and limited, re sound friendly defensive damage of vid ability to if groundnot The unique CAS is having decisionand holds achieved supp ground CAS occurs the e provide forces view ofwho without the robust its making decisions the troops ort. during ins an more to a battlespace risks; in be training, will be have fundamental ultimately force Air urg ind freedom to from the of defensive procedur essential made deadly of the broader campaign. concepts apply at counterthe objectives powe enc ep operate airthe By CASlowest es and in at in the counterforce. insurgency rs and y en the particular. ROE. tactical Killing levels. insurgency understanding campaign abilit Targeted will de dispersed Theseso are More at level. Good warfareair the benets those y to to det nt Due risksrisks for CAS Time is judgement understood and the respomay er vis powers of than critical, and by the to associated tactical nd min ual ability insurgent insurgencies, other are informatio decisionaircrew and with air level the e ver project or where targeted power n is often making ground employing more relies to ic lethal is terrorist group killing thoroughly roles, to can only likely over a ati force in groups extensively an before deducing good be makehas a larg on one or longshortwhat attractiv conductin the response decisions e the of such of must also be clearly understood. distances, become number g term and is campaign that will ext the it has as known key option. an long-term most meet ent tar been targeted individuals There operation. effects appropri be. to the ho operate, get The used killing. to are, These resulting ate. Generally, ideological insurgent w pro of target Within conducting however include from a risk 5 ethnic is insurgenci means they leader effe vid individual certain or ,a understan successful collateral territoriales.thethe are of the ctiv best es more leaders types of number ding killing, damage basedto be Ideological likely of campaign, option. e ad counterof nature and insurgenc for insurgenci a affected by and especially The va difficult factors the deciding what iespenetrate es are loss. leaders a to more it capture tar nta which insurgenc whether effect more to normally Consideration organisations secretive of get ge a key need y, kinetic may resilient be revolve must also the organisations leaderon ed s be have to the a around givenas intelligence such may killi be ov ibid.to consider the 57 death of small from whether gained global more ng er edBolkcom and Katzman, Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency broader 5 Military , p. 0. key number killing to an terrorist useful is artiindividual leaders to be of likely is Working Paper networks. the like longllerleaders 15 26 than are which more For term ly y these valuable secretive conduct to for

Air Power Development Centre

than their death. The killing will in fact embolden the whether the effects of insurgency. Targeted killing an killing is a consistent individual are viable role with those before difficult to for found force, using in the predict, but offensive is eliminated or greatly minimised, then targeted killing may be a suitable other and the overall potential consideration air power offensive risk of campaign. option. must be withinforce Benets and air powery using a If a Summar to given as counterroles. be must The thorough Risks Air power insurgency nature of weighed analysis offers large campaign. the taken against any has many distances and traditional The key insurgency effects place,quickly advantage react in roles utility issues may must be which are intelligenc s when with considered counterof targets understood be e is the conductin overwhelming to be insurgency and the potentially detrimental reliable does g counterforce. It cornerstone warfare. nature of to be on both to the and power insurgency have for of air Strategic detrimental practical roles collateral of warfare limitations, theory longbombing will notare to the and offensive adversarys damage its due few and however, limitedto may be makeaims term to ethical air power ability it are ability of the many to effectiveness effective decisive. of countergrounds. in command opportunities effect. cover and control in isolated Punitive or insurgency Targeted and to interdict, The Enemy questionable cases, can coercive warfare killing but its forces the mere enemthe forces from thelonger of bombing and The mayshould are small presence y is also no be air. the number has be in not been usefulinareas interdiction makes its an forced mass availability theatre, secure shown considered certain and CAS. resupply interdiction to CAS large the of thus allow and situations in Interdiction more capability adapt numbers in further working incumbent oth insurgents , but the of degrades difficult.has theatre by long for direct enables support government er aims. When from most when the Even more a passive avoidi of periods friendly the to aid proj indirect airframes effective there own positive ngits to time forces fundament of both ects conditions involvement. and for the because be the al people . of Supporting weapons the The are overt to they deployed counterthrough This insurgency the helps supporting discussion can be move vulnerable in more insurgency infrastructure ulti allow, incumbent reand of theto used successfully ment to attack areas principles. development mat external government establish incumbent benets a it provide throughout risks that of larger throughout A ely supporting with its powers and risksof framework the carries of broad large number incr is roles training, credibility and associated for tobe battlespace. needits be areas When numb eas should doctrine, with more with benets evaluatingconsidered: The of be reduced or whichto should ers using es transitioned intelligence, own likely offensive the tools that be eliminated. must in men air a offensive air power must be able to operate throughout the the Ubiquity people. result powerto air required power The considered suitability andbattlespace. sup This resolution in Speed apply provides offensive air power must be able to respond rapidly to situations on the counterpreceding before a of the suppli port creates of insurgency offensive need to be analysis employing es. ground. for Firepower favourable conict. warfare air power maximised, has shown offensive the offensive situation power In thisthe practically while in that there air Collateral tools power inc air paper, anddamage minimised or are must be a in countercounterum must (unintende eliminated. for use these numberin insurgency benIncorrect possess d damage offensive counterfactors warfare. warfare, t the targeting or eliminated. minimised air to insurgency have buildings thepower is govcapability (something or Fratricide applied, warfare. been people risk must be minimised or following ern or destroy to eliminated. andresulting Platforms, used to will factors somebody vulnerability to attack must be minimised or Survivability me or from therefore weapons evaluate eliminated. nt neutralise being be andtargeting a thethe andincorrectly potential legitimate focus of sensors the suitability undtarget identied evaluation. are target) of various ermthe as a sets. To allow actual for platforms, ines legitimate Working Paper an interface sensors 16 the target) 26 appropriate through and must be depth which weapons

of a Air Power Development Centre n al y si tactics, s training, and a doctrine and of offensive air power can be developed. weapons employment n force can d be enablers, applied to e have not been Sensors and Weapons in CounterInsurgency Warfare the Platforms, v considered. counteral By insurgency u Platforms understanding campaign, at The how a io more framework indicates platforms, coherent n, some for that discussion sensors and ot evaluatingwill platforms is that each effective h be the will speciccertain realise for air strategy er effectiven better theatre will or advantages power Thethe for fa of to ess its suited have disadvantage which are discussed below could then be tailored for specic planners, following considerations ct offensive the owna to these s due but unique evaluation theatres. or power The air instead counterterrain, variables. This detailed will s platforms can be be a tools in insurgency weather should breakdown consider c whichcoverage deployed termthreats. counterrole than and are consideration for each generic o required most a to as over broad suites A insurgency others. Accordingly, potential strengths nt ofand have and collateral damage is minimised. suitable within the area, fratricide accomplish risk operations caveat to some is theatre and ri capability to for theatre of the this beyond weaknesses b counteroperations, carry suitable mission. Helicopters the scope of various ut insurgency have good weaponry, They The of this platform in operations range and sensorsbe should The mai to paper. and types. g those are endurance communications platforms n ope sensors on to provide which are adv can rate a target or misidentication th most the longdeliver ant target clos rate in a , correct slow e survivable, weapons age with is e area well targeting of them o accurately of slow to minimal more assured. movement suited for and v such that heli xed-wing platforms. bot manoeuvre Sensor of the operations speeds, than er the cop h areas is or loss of capability platform. in helicopter al The ters also due frie contact. maximised Helicopters where s can l low- less ranges weakness. is closer ndl With to normally collateral operate ef levelthe of Operations Insurgents thei y chance is and carry damage more fe and of at lowre are form r concern. troo visual direct a effectively ct low- and level unlikely to SA-7 abili lower ps low-yield By with groups iv speed speed are low the have technology series, with ty and weapons, operating cloud lackin e capab make highly tactical prevalent latest and with to any pot lowwhich primarily cover g n ilities helicopters capable anti-air among missile technology ope enti makes at low lower early e of vulnerable surfacecapability. many of approach weapons, visually and rate of al level levels shot warnin ss attack helico to worlds to-airas Infra-red the and such aurally. attacks. at targ visibility down the g of SAMs, pters have from missiles (IR) insurgent 59 warning heavy There During aircraft low ets. between wing 2002 techno th are as ground. (SAMs), such used groups. systems calibre been the counterwere spe many This 20 will aircraft. during logy, e CAS, their when 0 but US the Even (MAWS) machine occurrences insurgency for ed US pro January The second helico ai it and sourc was likely Stinger helicopters and IR guns when operations but 7 nea xim and has Chechen pters r ofthe e havethe and are decoys, rockethelicopters in only r ity February suffered conict make to c strenare access Soviet equipped they propelled have Panama helicopters the proved ena 2007. signicant the attract a the gth some still grenades. vulnerable in which gro bles Such helicopter Russians ive m insurgent and susceptibl For to late received und over heli losses lost target 59to attack The Role of Tactical Airpower in Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 7. p Bateman, also e insurgent 1980s battle . ashave cop can recently The 33 s0 de Haas, Use of Russian Airpower in the Second Chechen War ai , p. 5. their both damage. This ters strategic in Iraq helicopters they g Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, Planning Seen Behind Attacks on U.S.York Times sourc The New Copters in , February 007. helicopter Between allo to effects with compared are n, andand e of s the 1999 wsonly mai Working Paper on seven to easily 17 s xed-wing 26 the ntai support helicopters three detect u m n for being xeded

Air Power Development Centre

the mission. of the downed crews, effectively ended the US mission. treatment This was On seen in balance, need Somalia in helicopters to where such 1993 offer a are be losses more-survivable platforms. through where the viable weig politically or loss of offensive Multi-role hed strategicall High-speed Black Hawk support agai y Fighters This helicopters, platform, nst untenable, sectio interdiction. and the but their the efforts n These platforms subsequent use has risk shouldair focuse of types be many disadvantages when used in counter-insurgency signicant of on to made have. s aircraft, forces warfare. One risk.Their platf of the achieve the high- were such as They major a advantages orm F-15, same speed, the generally disadvantage large technology loss and capability for multiF-16 designed s of highlogis avionics and technology role F-18 conventional speed multitical and the long counter-and ghter are series, warfare role over warghting strataircraft is insurgency endurance a large s the only therefore that they are head is equipment egic of campaign. whichcertain number troops. which types have expensive to . these must range effec be for Highdesirable of Additionally limited were offensive operate and They supported, ts speed counteraircraft , and externally not have need even this multi-role of insurgency will capabilities endurance supporting term. speci to though are may as it aircraft airoperations.This likely be such these governments, callyrisk The not be oper may have not in also limitation required to-air aircraft. placing design of losing operate in ate utilised . For generally endurance in for refuelling These further ed expensiv above to ability that from a lowsitua designed on means theatre be will likely requirements pressure CAS e highthe accurately perhaps the base tions ability to to have in required increase their or speed altitude identify to even of the s provide the theatre level support multi-role of targets rendering Balkans for collateral that the supplement commitment campaign platforms shouldervisually them from campaign damage and long have requisite the needed is this type are launched from the ineffective height or impositions of subs air normally these SAMS, of air. Higher if aircraft restrictions fratricide understandable of platform speed tanti support so forced generally altitudesthe are a 15 abovesuch severely from when makes aircraft reduces al to untenablefor ten to also feet, and todifficult 000 impaired strategic restrictions it operate effectiveness missions infra ground thatin visually fteen reduce above poor NATOs political are them of using struc targets these to The thousand and the signicant weather ability standpoint, place. to identify interdiction highture. correctly. being aircraft to feet. do and capability cloudThis and when provide they Even discriminate missions speed Their inability attacked. limitations tend to an reduces from a strategic imperative it will ultimately compromise tactical of cover.is the restrictions air highlight deployed targets there multi-role high- of corroborate Some . Another required the risk of sensors, During designed support. limitations at lower independently increased ghters this the method effectiveness. small, AThis to prevent Although altitudes, . risk be will of information may be mitigating genuine high- large signicantthe and high these risks the in attacking highly independentl mitigated these is threat speed, advantage numbers. restraints wrong on reliant y increases through is to apply the highsensor of high-CAS Survivabilit target. of the ground the risk use more and shoulder altitude speed to y is are that target forces wrong of highly restrictive weapon platforms. targets multi-role generally effective nominate capable ROE. suites. A launched . further platforms as excellent against and sensors, Although Such advantage SAM. SAMs. Unless is that insurgents environment. most insurgency identify but these this may exibility Modern thesethe they are do not Even too have be enables highaircraft available readily latest the offer speed are the in most have is generations platform that they multioperatito Western abilityhave SAMs to be are roleat ngClarke, Airpower and Military Intervention, p. 0. countries target limited optimised usually aircraft extrem capability ibid, p. . for able haveto e low be against operations tted with counter altitude these 18 in a a broad measure , the counterrange s only

Working Paper 26

Air Power Development Centre

Conventional military fast counterjets are insurgency However, never going warfare. to get these to becarry. Their the sufficient aircraft they optimum in limitations suitable a particular multi-role aircraft is for counter-insurgency warfare. numbers may be all Sensor affect how solution for range, of aircraft that is suites, projecting endurance to provide available. communic Slower Speed Air-to-Ground Aircraft offensive air and true the The ations Aircraft power in supportabilit ubiquity capability equipment, which insurgency y are not in required of these weapons, with are able operations deployed easy to counterplatforms night and tosmall in many a multi-role overcome. insurgency will be all-weather operate theatres support ghter acquisition warfare, affected operating at detect. over many infrastructure aircraft. and to lower by the will ability Their speeds years. and can Tactically identication. Robust counterequipment all closecanfrom advantages operate they to This jets. target insurgency faster the that are proved less operate 4 improved identication campaign, They British groundtothe they arepiston engine aircraft were more suitable for the roles of CAS and interdiction than jets. substantial at lowof acquisition 5 reduces thevaluable so British began capabilities have thatof cheap to than facilities altitudes allows them likelihood found the during transition At nd the proved and operate, high- alland older, to an incorrect the slow Malayan premium or and be good highly canforce. technology speeds prosecute targeting slower campaign jet end risk that manoeuvrability the of are effective which the targets of fratricide. airframes that there During interdiction get allows for attacking targets. to in difficult better it are During the offered was the and CASto in can the It close collateral countertarget Malayan signicant considerable Korean platform targets for wrong deliver damage and a advantages resistance and spectrum identication target. It heavythe in urban state-ofbe retired over when Vietnam is the A-10 such a specialised and a elds has verication, precision areas. the-art is whichthe Wars Warthog. thus greatly broad it ordnance Lastly, missile testimony capability. US also The of Its reducing range is how decoy to larger found lower World relatively weaponry targets is designed suite. it useful that the end also countries of older, slowfact available and speed to counterThe in be of match by SAwhich ght cheaper threatened to this use survivabl that insurgency the counteraircraft is 7 variety employed a with an weapons e SAMs is aircraft and warfare 7 spect very insurgencies the onlyIR lacking in the to be of which armoured being roles. rum cannot alternative; countermeasures, countereffective platforms potential minimise cockpit, upgraded Currently, offerwhich afford to one risk such as aircraft is insurgency counterhas led such as the US the redundan years s A-37 have modern air over many the only role. In insurgency Embraer offensive of t systems after the it man successfully equipment. years has been Columbia, platforms Colombian Super capability indigenou was country y these For many proved to aircraft government. over Government Tucano satises s external planned chea as the countries, be such of years. The seeking being many capability to Slowp use the OV-10 effective. effectiveness similar considered. fundamental gives it speed airand ability alter Even when and qualities in Having countermore to-ground to operate shot a nativdown. Dragony affordability replacement such insurgency credibility aircraft closer to Additionally as battlespace es such haveits of to and platforms, cheap factors.The with also havein potential , their high-speed effective mod aircraft proved with to easy incumbent people limitations targets slower ghters. countervaryalso ern with operate, governments and in counteroffers many speed these Despite of insurgency specic this ghttype independe reduces insurgency advantages, means that disadvantages warfare. Their theatres in capability er nt the warfare. not itslow-speed they are , also of advantages of favour aircr support Whileto be Johnson, increases able to and air-to-ground need their operation. platforms aft. Airpower in Small p. 97. Wars, 4 Corum burden slower can be the risk of respond as aircraft with balanced Outside designed Many 9.offor 5 ibid, placed on speedbeing them quickly highly their the A-10 highof Bateman, The Role of Tactical Airpower in Low-Intensity Conflict, p. 77. the throughout disadvantage Warthog, technology the Airpower in Small p. 7. Wars, Corum and Johnson, the s7and Western conventional Third will Air University Press, Colorado, 004, p. . airJose Higuere, American Air Forces, forces Latin warfare. have Consideration Working Paper 19 26 tended to ignore

Air Power Development Centre

needs to be given warfare. to While they do counter-insurgency warfare in a practical and cost effective manner. developing not represent simple, the complete Gunship cheap solution, they s many In and clearly are ways good survival able to gunships range, most advanced aircraft the support and such as long sensors which which can fundamentals the ACendurance communications minimise area, be used of can 130 9 and equipment. the risk observe of in Spectre also carry are large 70 They of re and campaigns AC-7 counterseem payloads. able to carry relative ease of use made it the most effective weapon 7in the FAS collateral and without from time gunship, loiter insurgency ideally to This accurate to damage, direct interruption Vietnam proved arsenal. There are suited to payload re During incorrect hasamade Iraq. very be weapons two major prohibitively counterability targeting them a the effective 7 issues which expensive. the ACinsurgency allows and valuable weapon. limit the to Compared 130 to likely to warfare. them fratricide. counterin El The effectiveness a regular CSpectre to be able such a They be tted Their have insurgency Salvador combination of the to is 130 transport gunship in eld the valuable altitudes, with such ability platform the of its airborne costing costs the a number and and large risk orbit a predecessor accuracy, gunship in approximately US$190 7 capability scarceACcomparatively means during target of the heavy the modern US$50 million million . Thethe high assetthe that slow. This thatUS the gunship The 130, repower, era. aircraft, it per Firstly, dollars.it an cost also it cannot makesto AC-130 battlebe is an often long is placed Thisweapon leads target be ideal to is regain extremely the means the modern Combat Aerial at choice. for usually control powerful of Uninhabited that few for second and signican shoulderonly of cost weapon Its Vehicles Uninhabited countries weakness t risk. The launched operated Fallujah counteroperating Combat in besides of Iraq,This AC-130 SAMs. at the in night. insurgency restrictions, Aerial the counterWithout US platform. operates Even the AC- and warfare however, VehiclesThey insurgency requirement of is are was It time. at the right low during to are 130 its in limit (UCAVs) to carry warfare. to able are altitude medium the not environment broader an speed lives are lost reduces the likelihood that support for the campaign will be UCAVs no accommodate advanced and that fact periods deployed will application. emerging satisfy on people sensors, at which affected. of There of duringare capability many UCAVs board, advanced they intense currently daylight The remain on that the can communications operate need, some hours. to technology platforms appears factorsand station for suites make 74 such as limitations is onlyhave whicha successfull have pertinent extended precision them whichused emerging been future y beenaffect the great to periods weaponry. The highly 75 the in units and to date are used required elded countersurvivable employment weapons largely support autonomy to operate with eyes insurgency platforms. of UCAVs in a integration Uninhabited roles if on to realise autonomously directly becomes warfare. Even counterhas target Aerial on providing theirwith and been the are reliant paper. they full insurgency minimal. Vehicles ISR inputs potential. maximum area its shot environment. This (UAVs). and the The exibility. effectively onboard down, meansUAVs These directing an central Additionally, removes sensors, that the have targeting. control having important the Airpower in the New Counterinsurgency Era 9 Vick et al, , p. 4. unmannedthe Currently, they from nobody in sensor limitation 70 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small p. 4. Wars, UCAVs lack currently cockpit the which s of 7 ibid, p. 7. require battlespace. will be Military 7 Bolkcom and Katzman, Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and Counterinsurgency , p. 5. limits the The analysed 7 ibid. of ability platform in the Joint Fires as .They Were Meant to Be: V Corps and the 4th Air Support Operations Group During Operation Iraqi 74 Charles Kirkpatrick, following E Freedom, Warfare Paper No. 4, The Institute for Land Warfare, Arlington VA, 004, p. . Land section of 75 Bolkcom and Katzman, Aviation: Issues and Options for Comparing Terrorism p. 5. Counterinsurgency, Military and this

20

Working Paper 26

Air Power Development Centre

Even though invigorated 7 UCAVs plans to and have only develop the the experience 77 been technology US operating capability. employed further. Ar UCAVs As become in limited UAVsthe my such offered are immense. over technology an advantages numbers, as Predator has Bank West advances, invaluable theirHunter and Gaza sel developme platform Sensors success in have and ect been Strip nt for Good sensor Afghanistan weaponised ed are continues supporting suites are a warfare. and Iraq the continuing counterkey their Correctly but has Wa to increase doctrine insurgency requirement identifying importance friendlies it rrio UCAV their matures, warfare. for the and targets is even are valid r likely is The effective accurately greater in magnied may be asgood that potential A employment engaging counterand, aswill prosecuted thei UCAVs on strategic sensor effects have of offensive targets insurgency has been successfully r achieve and suite thepower in to air it is always been warfare. discussed, , but fut tactical also campaign. a safe rotary counterfundamental The may the one ure of identied and accurately engaged without exposing platforms to unnecessary helps Good level wing correctlythat insurgency to military negative quickly mistake UC mitigate sensors stand-off assets, of risk.be operations, effects undermine will The AV the against can from or whole targeting the presented in tru risk sensors veh the surpass threat. vertical innocents operation. the media. e inherent terrain. icle of the the This in or One cap capability, Simply atmosphere . platform capability stand-off case of thousand abil nonthe range put, be (for capability The loss of the may most ity from the sensor their radar , electroreduce Isra which, naked horizontal, xedof area ofwill ability and sensors) optical performance conditions, elis once eyeball, as is wing a typeor interest of degrade the and (EO) as and such capability hav even again, allowing usually assets. sen or IR sensors. target, them withcase ground the IR an render synthetic is sensors as EO e may the With sor atmospheric increasing environment still aid entirely aperture advantage, con have platform for the Sensors For suit their conditions range present. require ineffective. radars but sidgood strategic of be can the operational e of is and from all visualtheir Sensors (SARs), utilitythe era sensors, categorised effectiveness the is target,can high conditions which mitigate more blehaving targets as its and target in all identify not increased technology in the operate this be limited can into three levels ability area some an just moisture target weather problem because of the mitigate risk. question. signican external dep Poor in collateral area. to some they capability. Atmay most Itfeatures t the or source, damage there end is no weather degree. cannot As the the a basic level, and older generation IR pods being operated in other than ideal not be to withinallwhether misidentication means basic SARs, ent can Their achieve capability sensor is able be degree of target that to . Some conrm conditions. on same weather the next The sensor of a able to only The see area. groundcrosschecking is independentl the up level of step example, varies, so identify directly platform basedvalidity possible against y the or senable resolution in the its be does scale the the using target. airborne, large of the sor sensors capabilit sensor asensor will differ with each scenario and the type of ROE which are being to see but type of desired of sensor to able errors, Examples alo be are y may of group used.a level mean becomes identify such top Atspecic ne.the a to involves able to people, point of totally the of of the end It capability location identify sensors locate a but noton impact reliant target are are scale will and things which particular identify (DMPI), correctly AT pod, and the Pantera or Sniper pod. sensors LITENING be able whether such as are can vehicle, whether but and have which a locate or the not to not but are they assess a high fun DMPI they are specic the actually carrying the risk condence ctio of overtly type correctly, identify external onboard n not carrying vehicle but what weapons. identicatio of weapons. being p. . to ibid, type of The 7 capability. n the Examples targeted, identify it vehicleBen-David, Israel Deploying More Armed UAVs in West Bank in October 004. suitabilit 77 Alon Janes Defence Weekly , These of such orof this it. For is. the y It may Working Paper sensors number 21 26 include of people the at

Air Power Development Centre

The suitability sensor of a sensor capability risk. for use in so increases Lower of levels counterdoes its grade coordination, classication insurgency operational sensors integration of targets, CAS warfare The effectiveness hamper and risk. making roles, collateral will ability to and vary the ability lower is them end there damage. provide withand are mitigate a to employ sensors for unsuited a This its such risk level of independently engaged with a reduced likelihood of adverse bothbe offensive of incapable interdiction reliance becomes information. higher can capability. operational air power autonomous roles in of on problematic Conversely, degree errors. Sensor Generally, and strategic effectively identication counterground in defensive the effectiveness. capability warfare. as the to to and ability insurgency forces CAS where capabilities The has a Weather and radar require a warfare. identify ground of higher huge used and terrain sensors in understood much may When the troops grade potential impact onto are likely a theatrein in the will their use. higher in be target not sensors how impact atoboth the incumbent and supporting provide of context the Ultimately, Gravity of correctly position enable effective sensors most to how supports this governments. and aircraft that means offensive operating exibility. operationally the targets Weapons assess operate more air power capability The less effective fundamentals the with Poorly in can be and a strengths they are of counterpotential delivered, warfare of support where combination and likely to be, insurgency impact inaccurate their negative there have counterof IR/EO weaknesses and how warfare by for not are 7 , effects been a are risk is insurgency of sensors much protecting indiscrimin amplied and number of wellCentres recognised must be associated the suited The or ate need the occasions to mind, in counterwith of con overly it has corresponding where insurgency for combined with cep damaging consequences beenWorld warfare. pinpoint with counterdesigned t weapons magnied. 79 apparent For fullaccuracy. War II era, insurgency for guerrilla of ill are use This Historically that example, The high warfare of scale action. counter-insurgency warfare. pre suited for conventional during the platforms explosive principles. modern will section cisi counter- Weapons weapons Malayan which dumb This warfare, review Precision on delivery insurgency and notwas campaign were bombs, problem different has systems many of designed recognised was noted designRAF types era, bee officers with RAF as being by an features weapons with n the counter- on incompatible officer at suitable focusing each procampaign the usage had increased to above 35 per cent, and number air Iraqi Freedom2003 usage was at in insurgency the it are for time: their 0 succes gre cent. of during 68 per They often strengths sive ssiv precision Counterwere the quite and campa or IR guided. ely guided insurgency weapons reverse weaknesses ign inc be in munitions warfare can for antiin showi orp and Command Guided (PGM) the categori Laser ng as ora an used was modern sed common weapons The increa ted than less era laser- of feature to sing into 10 per demands guided, laser and release.The an external use use of we of cent. By the spot comman or command laser airborne mitigated. such has apo time the been precision be d guidedto needs groundEven if weapo correctly n the of weapons.is guided, weapons placed basedis there Ground-based ns. identied des Kosovo Generically Global The that target physically source. confusion lasing further During and ign , the Positioni identicatio on advantage about the reduces the designated, tec nglaser n is desired of a of target chances 1991 the hno weapon System generally target designatin coordinates misunderstandin Gulf will log (GPS) byand Johnson, 7 targets is Wars, required are either g between the Airpower in Small p. 97. or Corum there War . physically y ibid 79 human the prior the that system and ground guide in 0 aircrafts Keaney, Air Campaigns: Current Practice and Future Trends, p. 9. error can entry airThomas towards theover the onboard be errors, as Working Paper the mo laser 22 system the long as or 26 spot der until target impact. n

is i Air Power Development Centre m m e desired d weapon and, provided the pilot releases the weapon in the right zone, it will guide to the desired i impact location. a An point. t additional moving The e advantage target can insurgency ground l laser of tracked be warfare, for team y areas and the these impact in put can a not command weapon man-inare where vehicle the p guided will is the-loop satised. there which designated laser p systems is continue Duringarea more fact is in intendedrisk and into a safe location for impact, thus avoiding a potentially detrimental directly a guide that they to allow the weapon of being incorrect. outcome. where The able to r the arethese to weapon time-ofcollateral target In they limitation In hit the e bad to steered target. the be ight damage. ed cases want of these at weather, be used n the moving Importantly off situation Innocent may operator theas they weapons such as all the if t is targets. be for target on people enter should weapon is that complete require w relatively cloud, The to counterconditions ground may a able to they but or undercast visual or it ne, the the sufficient may move crowd steer impact require low the IR visibility h not before targetthan time other change, into ed weapon visual innocents or damage their property. due to to acquisitio G perfect. may impact the harm particula target locatio away conditions heavya n of the P or For for beco the allow intended rly area, n, from Another to exist precipitation, S example, me accurate target. For moving of there limitation This also between these They g if an or it obscu guidance, urban may laser-guided may the the systemsis have u aircraft red is likely high be the is weapons expose advantages and the weapon cannot limitations i releasing durin that collateral recognto the risks of using them in marginal weather need to be the the either the oflaserability will However, and when d lasera the g weapon damage ition requirement the guided control understood. target. the weather e guided weap impact risk areas that to Guided delivery in weapons weapon IR lase the d weapon ons is somewhere this the target platform are ight Weapons w above Unlike timeproblematic target continually or the signicant. make e scattered laser of- it is they as until groundThe these a and ight. to have likely weapon based increased weapons p the to comm If been command needs impact. lasing assurance well suited o and target released guided be locked requirement team to of counterto not n gain guided is lock onto from the weapons, onto, to enemy identifying insurgency s target weapo reacq weapons IR guided negating a IR an additional re.IR the correct warfare. is ns, of uired to platform weapons the prior lock level or Overall, targetis t guided in there require weapons launch means assurance fratricide. guide however h weapo to no other suitable capability provides that the The directly direct , fall a ns in to ability is weather in advantages target correct advantage the re t an IR into as controlis conditions adverse for IR more target of intended style weapon associated t the use. them.to for is As weather. weapons. likely being lock target. opposed is with identication. h the re- the highly suitable for counter-insurgency is the as the The Despite is Firstly, be long prosecuted improved Additionally to normally interference As weapon eIR and- cloud case still target this requirement identied and accuracy. , highred from intended warfare. y other forget provides with an IR weather correctly reduces With a weapons, altitude from or highly target GPS be to c risk the catego enough laserthe of limitation prior as the lock such ballistic closer sources, strong Weapons GPSneed effective. the athefurther ry.tracking , release. is incorrect weapon AGM-65 release range and IR weapons Coalition potentiall n Onceto This with targeting able Maverick, proles andinto enhancing characteristics, fall aircraft y to conditions. p laser-be provides of tendclass to of ability direct the same this there is the were expose Also r achieve an of more guided line to to re-and- Operation able either of no stages Enduring Freedom in particular during Operation , GPS weapons proved to , and Anaconda o bombs. sight to positive forget drop ground requirement v This the category large troops or to i laser means target, as IR numbers the designate d that reducing guided of target delivery the e the weapons. precision platform while the p problems The weapons to enemy weapon is in r Working Paper greatest onto thus re. Alight, 23 e 26 advantage Qaeda During avoiding ci thatinitial and the

Air Power Development Centre

Taliban positions October 2001, more damage was done to visible targets than in and Operation strikes, 7 Allied with small. Operation Force PGM attacks, primarily with GPS weapons, achieved on average two targets per aircraft compared Desert Storm numbers10 aircraft per target Desert Storm of with the during In Afghanistan, the ability to support ground troops in . Special all weather Forces conditionsThis ability works positively towards the goals of counter-insurgency footprint. providing allowed the warfare. Despite target US to their can be they information. support the obviousrst used in or precise all On the local advantages, weather mensurated board, air far day of Northern therethe conditions, coordinates then are Currently, m Alliance risksbe they do can ability sameand sensor the or while drawbacks requirea obtained weather pods to obtain simply e maintaining associated precise of through limitation with the mensurated matter coordinates de a small with the a target to either use s which ability offboard reading from a latest str military of GPS or coordinates onboard affect provide map; offboard generation damage. uc weapons. to be this offboard for sensors there such suitable specialise sources sensor, While environment tiv Whilehas effective. to means. If used not accurate GPS process d no ability also for is may where The e These the obtained on lasercoordinat in weapons equipment associated 4 identify be obtaining insurgents of a factor cases po highly theto guided is esneeded are theatre in is an open risks. target in likely are GPS where we insurgency weapons is limited It limited. of to achieve Firstly, independentl battleeld, operate coordinates passing r warfare, avoid the will still to supply. not more the ofis without y or assess it is urban near is subject incorrect th GPS risk alone be a cannot Similarly, in requiredthe suitable potential of a to areas to human coordinates an weapons error and likely they factor.and precision. weather in collateral concern close post-release if the targeting situation becomes error, still hasmoving is must in greatest result hit point Obtaining to conditions a counterproximity there have resulted in ne be extent A failure. targets. unfavourable. From a and the insurgency local been fratricide ce employed possible. further Additionally analysis of insurgency populations. number of incidents.no ss with Over- is disadvantage , there PGM it is clear warfare. on capabilitie documented To GPS and ar robust reliance of be man-in-thethat eachin Therethe s to is is mostability effective y redundant simplistic weapons loop type offers no single individual effectively forchange counterprocedures target that, given to a unlike distinct weapon characteris conducted situation. to be ac designed designation laser-guided the weapon advantages solutionthe tics of with a Regardless employed hi to techniques weapons, impact and Yield Weapons available; battleeld range of of which to Low ev disadvantage what in is environme PGM is weapon minimise e The s in counterrequired is nt. theatre and being the th increased warfare careful Ultimately,to the ability used, the possibility e sensitivity make insurgency matching airtactical to use low robust the of of re poor use warfare of desired operations most safeguards failures qu 5 targeting yield been have likelihood will the appropriate and be for which can ire and weapons designed noting means procedures have d open collateral especially use in magnitude that the the will still signican eff damage-rich attractive. conventional of types of terrain of three need of t strategic ec environment Many warfare. collateral weapons conventional dimensional effects. t, of counterthe legacy This damage. A currently warfareof effects th insurgency weapons meansis USAF that available which weapons. us beingnot they often Scientic were essentially Urban unHeadquarters United States Operation Anaconda: An Airpower Perspective, States Air Force, Washington used for Air Force, Headquarters United contain Advisory well two warfare neDC, 7 are counterBoard to suited February 005, p. . dimensional, targets ce Dr Fotios Moustakis and Rudra Chaudhuri, Cost of an American Unilateralist Policy: A Superpower at Risk?, Counting the Conflict Studies released a urban typically ss Research Centre, Watchfield, Swindon, 00, p. . reportand warfare in small in ariibid late 2006 particular. must. eeting, so ly Bolkcom and Katzman, Aviation: Issues and Options for Combating Terrorism and. Counterinsurgency, p. Unlikeis athe 4 Military consider there inc clear 5 Ripley, Close Air Support in the st Century, p. . re John A. Tirpak, Washington Watch Demands of the Urban Air War,in Air Force Magazine 90, No. , February 007, p. . Vol. asi Working Paper ng 2 26 th e

Air Power Development Centre

7 need for accurate a large weapons proportion for use in with lower of countercounter250 yields than insurgency pound for operations in the counter-insurgency environment. are urban targeting and weapon Other currently is done in warfare has half weapons new life in available. urban the led to the size which have the counterextremely This is This areas. development and previously insurgency accurate environments particularly capability of the Small weight 9 been environment. and have or the Iraq,of pertinent gap Diameter of where considered While that a smallThis unacceptable strang to aircraft given not suitable bomb. current outdatedmay are clear. guided, for collateral damage and weapons ground yield weapons 500 modern weapons damage occur rocket threats pound conventional such as the footprint. Effects through attacks needs to Nonlethal class warfare are gun and This bombing. were be Nonlethal bomb, nding recent rockets are makesto During found accounted effects making potential them well urban be highly for when offer it much to ROE. suited for in operations effective. using many better cause Additionally negatively use in the While or rockets additiona suited collatera , any . By using example, crowded risk of cannon, l collateral nonlethal when a US response the advantag damage. 90 damage means, convoy was to crowd increased advantages es over This being caused, the the was conduct and effects exposure of smaller low yield means regardless desired 9 threatened a convoy passively the of weapons. that able of the may effect its by a number was through Afg used A low st there weapon stilllow hostile of be to presence han successfull measure yieldbein will fast type, is achieved crowd Air and proceed alone. elec y during denitivel Infantry weapon restrictio likely to without Baghdad passes Presence, tion Iraqi the y the Divisions When still onthe for ns it has of affect thein the is in over incident. as s elections success tactical planning Multinationa the Iraqi their want campaign associated November crowd Offensive becoming to January 9 Air operations the l Corps loudI use in was risk. For 200, the with an air known, pro 2005. Presence, centre elections Iraq, them Nonlethal the that, air F-15E. power used vid Although the notes and Lieutenant everywhere! means ROE also form the This is can of successfull edont there subjective from debating General I a ofduring restriforces Advancing disperse be used y merits sen data little feedback land the Thomas completely achieving ctions technolog weaponry. d the was to using Air se create currently has been perspective, of Metz, understand battleel A , and y Continued more this of but available to positive. Air Presence, insistent, it, d effects without compromising the strategic fundamentals of the campaign. also provides developm positively battleeld sec report them Presence the I want population provide 1 risk and opportunit ent the to counterurit want from works. Commander lowI responds to advantag mitigof iesthe use to insurgency y power. of them air es in ation, improve such campaigns and both yield, throu low weapons by sup exibility gh low should providing port , with remo collateral allow solutions to the ving damage offensive which loca removal the power and air achieve l of poten nonlethal to the nati tial contribute tactical ona side of 7 aims ls. ibid. effect the Ripley, Close Air Support in the st Century, p. 4. This s9 of Air Force Magazine Marc V. Schanz, A Complex and Changing Air War in , Vol. 9, No. , January 00, p. 9. app using 90 Colonel Howard D. Belote, Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration forSpace Power Journal Air and the Long War, , Vol. roa deadl No. , Fall 00, p. 5. ch XX, y ibid 59. 9 was ,p. force. aga . 9 ibid in Working Paper 25

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Air Power Development Centre

Conclusion
The counterinsurgency by which warfare air offensive fundamentals environment power can be of counteronly be one poses many employed insurgency component be challenges the should only warfare. A of the compatible the conict: foranit. This the be offensive counter- A solution. with insurgents, to air power. determined insurgency broad grand incumbent understanding and The is likely and fromways war a on strategy is government, of the we centred can and hearts thoroughto to bebe required only externally any means insurgents akn long the and understanding and theof of succeed determined supporting source ess minds and legitimacy be of the local military will and any by the governments.This motivation es, of the to offensive military analysing will lead and power, population incumbent main air potential involvement each in the the of and, government. tain power target offensive must to fundamental main this incumbent sup power particular, For longneeds air within protagonists governments porbe their externally term to be practically context. The in a strengths ting perception supporting popu assessed weighed in traditional warfare. gov of the governments lar with against counterstrengths of Air main insurgent ern risk of competence the supp these insurgency air powerof powers in groups methods me its challenge ort fundame negativel war, conventional ability to are in operation of counternts will for to ntals y strengths warfare are strike at structure mean that insurgency as poor stre the be mind. impacting and ill suited to strategic to d attempts warfare. tactical can ngt all oper mo The these weaknesse the conduct targetsof differentl target an When them application have ability hsmust of ation re requirem Centres s of and be cannot y counterstrategically offensive can work enormous external the to and from effe ent Gravity. be insurgency utilised in operate on may actually air employment and effectiveness can inuence the strategic outcome of the against impact governments assertion its power vul apply their ctiv engage To understoo counterdifferentl workhearts is usedis strategic the it to provide that against campaign. ner own e each d Offensive insurgency y to the against goals. and minds long-term necessary abilpower popu as air repower warfare for conventi fundamentals insurgents Incorrect campaign. support for itie those latio the does quickly to their because onal it needs targeting, Additionally counter- in involved s. n. y provide and throughout methods forces. put be done fratricide , they insurgency the The Any can many the avoid battleeld also means that ground forces are more reliant on offensive air power for their re support. Their carefully, and pressure campaigns. application ca appli ope advantages battleeld. massing structure collateral on power Thisthe of Airthe mp catio and rat to The forces and damage reinforces offensive ultimately capabilities aig n of its e military presence repower. air power delivers and , nsome of weapon princi wit provides campaign of This to effects its its itshas which are is sensor of context ples. h with offensive opportunities understand using to better likepower own distinct counterair friendly There sm power ability air for how will platforms, suited to ly advantages insurgency roles negative has alle deliver compels ground sensors counterto related and managed. fundament be effects. been r precision the forces and insurgency be how disadvantage als. to Understanding little forc The insurgents Currently, weapons. airadapt s which need suitability well it can these emph es power to power air than These roles to be all of enhance relationships asis acr doctrine to offer others. understood equipment air a the enables place oss and air counterconducted broad the Each within in of powers risk d a on power of insurgency of with application range platform, supporting positive applying the It is under larg likelyforce capability fundament its advantages will not be maximised until these issues are unnecessary risk warfare, but counterattributes to be of foreseeable that stand er the are This als. to the risk not management addressed. insurgency while understood, methods overwhelming future. insurgentare ing are focused Air Power Considerations for the Future means campaign, or restrictions. Offensiveof to minimisin accepted well combat These methods how a. suited on the air that its Offensivethe g its of the attacking power methods warfare will offen The counteremployme effectiveness power can oppositions West, provide the continue to sive non insurgency nt being is ofan playto ght will particularly insurgents be air line warfare offensive compromised important such from with favoured powean air ar distinct and power air to the due in role campaigns. power advantages. by r natmany is either necessary counterWorking Paper Democratic perspective. Firstly, potential roles they ure 26 being insurgency 26 governments Secondly, negate adversaries confo of will insurgent much well rm the into

Air Power Development Centre

always nd it is difficult to quantify progress and where national interests may not be challengin obvious. The g to nature of that air sustain counterplanners air power support for insurgency and in the employment long warfare operators counterof air power campaign. campaigns needsbe to at all levels insurgency must have Lowmost the which be understand environme developed numbers of appropriate and no incorporat theThe A nt.better to risks, highsolution. un distances denitive ed also dangers suitability full the technology, larger ma will developed victory specicall and of various roles highnumber of nne help to increase criteria, y into ofof collateral damage concerns. benets of forms air required to performance cheaper d, reduce minimise effectiveness because where power a employing equipment support and highmoreare the collateral in urban The air doctrine offensive used in countercost and survivable req chance of to damage. areas applicationof as the use so the the insurgency superiority weapons uire fratricide The allow of offensive air warfare are ghters of platforms, d. the or concept prosecution offensive power in require joint at targets not both The targeting nonof air power conventional development the highest manned cap would of kinetic which in counterwarfare. The from the tactic in be levels required abil innocents. weapons otherwise insurgency possible effect with the lowest possible risk to the rolesyield outset,to al joint a ensure to the of ity greatest Low needs disallowed warfare the offensive air reducing level manner that campaign. of weapons be must for power in need be durin be before offensive sen should developed given at counterprocedures g the to being air sor power further least as in insurgency to be camp applied can be s much to developed aign. combat. applied to attention hurriedly These A counteride proce focused, insurgency ntif dures in coordinat warfare y must that ed and a way tar be dedicated achieves get caref is effort s ully cor devel rec oped tly and fro exerci m sed suff at icie the nt sta ndoff

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