Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10

Table of contents

List of cases Introduction Literal interpretation The mischief rule Golden Rule INTERNAL AID OF INTERPRETATION EXTERNAL AID TO INTERPRETATION PRESUMPTIONS Conclusion Bibliography 06 11

02 04

14 18 22 25 27 29

List of cases
Maunsell v Olins,(1975) AC 373 at 291.
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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Santi swarup Sarkar v pradeep kumar sarkar,(1940) AC 1014. Whiteley v Chappell,(1868-9) 4 LRQB 147. Black-Qawson Int. Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG,(1975) 1 A11ER 810, 836. Re Racal Communications Ltd, (1980)2 All ER 634. Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Harrow School (1979) QB 56, 70. Midland Trust Co Ltd v Green (1981) 1 All ER 153. London & North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946) 1 AC 278. Fisher v Bell (1961) 1 QB 394. Heydons Case (1584) 3 Co Rep (7a). Smith v Hughes (1960) 1 WLR 830. Elliot v Grey (1960) 1 QB 367. Royal College of Nursing v DHSS (1981) 1 AER 545. Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries (1940) AC 1014, 1022. River Wear Commissioners v A damson, (1877) 2 App Cas 743, 764. Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh, AIR 1954 SC 749. Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay, (1953) S.C.R. 730. Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd2003) 2 SC 111. Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, AIR 1975 SC 428. Raghunandan Saran v M/s Peary Lal workshop Pvt Ltd, AIR 1965 SC 458. Re Kerala Education bill, 1997 (1) SC 112.
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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Manohar Lal v State of Punjab (1951) S.C.R. 671. Kashi Prasad v State, AIR 1955 All. 749. Durga Thathera v Narain Thathera ,AIR 2008 SC 32. Ramchand textiles v sales tax officer, AIR 1961 SC 1506. Dhulabhai v State of MP1968) 3 S.C.R. 662. R v Medical Appeal Tribunal (1994) Imm AR 513. Heathstar properties Ltd (1958) S.C.R. 595. State of UP v Mohammed Nooh ,(1966) 1 WLR 993.

Introduction
"Statutory language, like all language, is capable of an almost infinite gradation of 'register' i.e. it will be used at the semantic level appropriate to the subject matter and to the audience addressed (the man in the street, lawyers, merchants, etc). It is the duty of a court of
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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 construction to tune in to such register and so to interpret the statutory language as to give to it the primary meaning which is appropriate in that register (unless it is clear that some other meaning must be given in order to carry out the statutory purpose or to avoid injustice, anomaly, absurdity or contradiction). In other words statutory language must always be given presumptively the most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances.1 The term interpretation means To give meaning to. Governmental power has been divided into three wings namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Interpretation of statues to render justice is the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute. Thus it was also stated: "Legislation is the cornerstone of the modern legal system." 2 Although Parliament creates the texts, it says nothing about how they are to be interpreted. The so-called Interpretational Acts are no more than devices for shortening language. This was admitted in the long title of the first of them. As Lord Scarman said in 1980: 'It has been axiomatic among lawyers and, indeed, in our legal professional thinking for a very long time that the interpretation of statutes is a matter for the judges; it is not a matter for legislation.3 Yet the judges are denied by the nature of their function the opportunity of drawing up satisfactory rules. The court's duty is to apply the law in the case before it. A judge cannot easily essay general principles when anxious litigants, looking no further than their own case, stand before him. Fragmentary obiter dicta are the best he can manage. Some judges have given up altogether. Lord Wilberforce says that: Statutory interpretation is what is nowadays popularly called a non-subject.4
1

Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373 at 291. Honourable Justice McHugh ,High Court of Australia House of Lords Deb, 13 February 1980, col. 276. Page | 4

Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 But it is not a non-subject. There are mainly three rules for interpretation of statutes: The literal rule,
The golden rule and The mischief rule,

And that the Courts invoke whichever of them is believed to do justice in the particular case. But the most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in a harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together. The maxim A Verbis legis non est recedendum means that you must not vary the words of the statute while interpreting it. The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. In Santi swarup Sarkar v pradeep kumar sarkar,5 the Supreme Court held that if two interpretations are possible of the same statute, the one which validates the statute must be preferred. Besides these, there present internal and external aids to construction together with presumptions for the said purpose of interpretation. In this project paper all these topics are dealt with thoroughly, but the main emphasis is upon the three rules.

Literal interpretation
The literal rule states that if the words of the legislative text are plain they must be followed, wherever that may lead: 'If the words of the statute are in them precise and unambiguous, natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such a case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver
4 5

House of Lords Deb, 16 November 1966, col 1294

(1940) AC 1014
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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation or litera legis. It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be the consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law making body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has been called the safest rule because the legislatures intention can be deduced only from the language through which it has expressed itself. The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute and one need not probe into the intention of the legislature. The elementary rule of construction is that the language must be construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as litera legis or litera script. It is also commented about this rule that The Literal rule has been the dominant rule, whereby the ordinary, plain, literal meaning of the word is adopted. Lord Esher stated in 1892 that if the words of an act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to manifest absurdity There are, however, a number of disadvantages in using this rule. It is often called the dictionary rule, but dictionary definitions can attribute several meanings to one word. It also restricts judicial creativity and holds back development of the law in keeping with changing social conditions. With the literal rule- it must be remembered that in extreme cases the statute may be carelessly drafted where certain words in isolation can have several meanings. The Law Commission 1969 was very critical of the literal rule as it assumed that Acts of Parliament were perfectly worded. The Law Commission in an instructive and provocative report on the subject of statutory interpretation said of this rule that to place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words of a provision is to assume an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship.

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 The rule, when in operation, does not always achieve the obvious object and purpose of the statue. A classic example is Whiteley v Chappell (1868-9)6. In this case a statute concerned with electoral malpractices made it an offence to personate any person entitled to vote at an election. The defendant was accused of personating a deceased voter and the court, using the literal rule, found that there was no offence. A dead person was not entitled to vote or do anything else for that matter. A deceased person did not exist and could therefore have no rights. It will be seen, however, that the literal rule produced in that case a result which was clearly contrary to the object of Parliament. It is, says the literal rule, for parliament, and not the judges, to change the law if it leads to absurdity and Predictable construction. The citizen (or in practice his adviser) should be able to rely on the plain meaning. As Lord Diplock has put it, confirming Sir William Graham Harrison's playful point mentioned above: 'The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal consequences that will flow from it. Where those consequences are regulated by a statute the source of that knowledge is what the statute says. In construing it the court must give effect to what the words of the statute would be reasonably understood to mean by those whose conduct it regulates'.7 This vital principle could not be more clearly expressed. It may be referred to as the principle of predictable construction. Two cases illustrate the importance attached by the House of Lords to observing the principle. The cases are briefly described below. Re Racal Communications Ltd 8 Here concerned the interpretation of s 441 of the Companies Act 1948. This authorizes the Director of Public Prosecutions (among others) to apply ex parte to a High Court judge for an
6 7 8

(1868-9) 4 LRQB 147 Black-Qawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG, (1975) 1 A11ER 810, 836

(1980)2 All ER 634

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 order for inspection and production of a company's books. It ends by saying that the judge's decision 'shall not be appealable'. As Lord Diplock said, what could be plainer than that? Yet the DPP, faced by Vinelott J's refusal to make an order, defied these words and appealed. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Denning and his colleagues, relying on Lord Denning's remarkable dictum in Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Harrow School 9 that no court has jurisdiction to make an error of law, upheld the DPP's appeal. Unanimously, the House of Lords asserted the predictability principle and reversed this. Midland Trust Co Ltd v Green.10 Here for 1 a father gave his son an option to purchase the legal estate in a farm at a considerable undervalues. The option was registrable under the Land Charges Act 1925 as a class C land charge. But before the option was registered by the son, the father conveyed the legal estate in the farm to his wife Evelyne for 500, also a considerable undervalue. The money was actually paid over, and the legal title passed. The transaction was not a sham, and there was no fraud (though there was breach of contract by the father). Section 13(2) of the Land Charges Act 1925 deals with such a situation in language which could scarcely be plainer. It says that a class C land charge is void against a 'purchaser' of a legal estate for money or money's worth unless the land charge is registered before completion of the purchase. Section 20(8) defines 'purchaser' as a person who, for valuable consideration, takes any interest in land. How could it be denied that the son's option was void against Evelyne? She took the legal estate and she gave valuable consideration in money. Yet because the merits were against her, Lord Denning found arguments for departing from the literal meaning. To do this was described by Lord Wilberforce as 'muddying clear waters'. Delivering the only speech in a unanimous reversal of the Court of Appeal's majority decision, he set out the point at issue, and then said: 'Thus the case appears to be a plain one ... In my opinion this appearance is also the reality. The case is plain; the Act is clear and definite. Intended as it was to provide a simple and
9 10

(1979) QB 56, 70 (1981) 1 All ER 153

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 understandable system for the protection of title to land, it should not be read down or glossed; to do so would destroy the usefulness of the Act.' The predictability principle is important, but it does not amount to a rule that the literal meaning must always be followed. The idea of such a rule has become increasingly discredited. In introducing his 1980 Interpretation Bill, Lord Scar man said that the old habit of sticking to the literal meaning 'is still lurking in the back corridors of the legal system, and must be exterminated'11. The Law Commission argues that to place undue emphasis on literal meaning assumes an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship and ignores the limitations of language Professor Zander is particularly hard on the literal rule: 'The approach is mechanical, divorced both from the realities of the use of language and from the expectations and aspirations of the human beings concerned and, in that sense, it is irresponsible' Elsewhere Zander calls the literal rule 'defeatist and lazy'. It is, he rather mysteriously says, the intellectual equivalent of deciding the case by tossing a coin .These latter remarks were called forth by the decision in Whiteley v Chappell 12. A statute aimed at electoral malpractice made it an offence to personate 'any person entitled to vote' at an election. The accused was charged with personating a deceased voter. The court, with reluctance, found there was no offence. The personating was not of a person entitled to vote because a dead man is not entitled to vote or do anything else. He does not exist, and therefore can have no rights. It is a casus omissus. The draftsman has gone narrower than the object.

Further case involved London & North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946)13

11 12 13

House of Lords Deb, 13 February 1980, Col 279 (1868-9) 4 LRQB 147
(1946) 1 AC 278

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 where a railway worker was killed doing maintenance work and his widow tried to claim compensation as the company had not complied with the Fatal Accidents Act which states that a look-out man must be supplied for men working on or near the railway line for the purpose of relaying or repairing it, the court decided this did not include maintaining in its literal meaning so the widow should not receive compensation for her husbands death. Professor Michael Zander has criticised the rule for being too rigid and detached from the realities of language. Fisher v Bell (1961) 14 This is a case concerning the requirements of offer and acceptance in the formation of a contract. The case established that, where goods are displayed in a shop together with a price label, such display is treated as an invitation to treat by the seller, and not an offer. The offer is instead made when the customer presents the item to the cashier together with payment. Acceptance occurs at the point the cashier takes payment.

The mischief rule

The so-called mischief rule is otherwise known as the rule in Heydons Case 15. The court held that four factors must be considered: What was the common law before the making of the Act? What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? What remedy has parliament appointed to cure the mischief and defect? What is the true reason of the remedy? The ruling continued and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and
14 15

(1961) 1 QB 394

(1584) 3 Co Rep (7a)

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 evasions for continuance of the mischief, and ... to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act . . .'. After nearly four centuries, the ruling continues to be cited because it is a succinct statement of the general interpretative process. The references to the common law should now be widened to include statute law, but otherwise the language stands. Its importance lies in the fact that it requires the interpreter to look beyond the legislative text itself. In the absence of a preamble or purpose clause, the text will not fully reveal either the mischief or defect' or the 'true reason of the remedy'. The extent to which a court may look beyond the text is a question of vital importance, to which we return. A modern legacy of the final part of the ruling in Haydons Case is found in many Commonwealth Interpretation Acts (though not in the new British Act). It forms a minor exception to the principle stated in the opening sentence of this chapter. As adopted in New Zealand it reads: 'Every Act . . . shall be deemed remedial, whether its immediate purport is to direct the doing of anything Parliament deems to be for the public good, or to prevent or punish the doing of anything it deems contrary to the public good, and shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act . . . according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.' A similar, though briefer, provision is contained as s 11 in the Interpretation Act 1967-68 of Canada. The New Zealand provision, which originated in an Act of 1888, has been acknowledged to be a failure. It merely creates confusion. The problems of statutory interpretation are far too complex to be solved, or even assisted, by formulas of this kind. In truncated form the New Zealand provision found favor with the British Law Commissions. The draft bill on interpretation put forward by the Commissions in 1969 contained the statement that the principles to be applied should include the following: 'that a construction which would promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provision in question is to be preferred to a construction which would not'.
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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 The Commissions explained that they did not use the word 'mischief because they preferred to avoid words which for the layman have an archaic ring. Laymen do not however read Interpretation Acts; and the term is well understood by lawyers. Smith v Hughes (1960)16 Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 said "it shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purposes of prostitution." The court considered appeals by six different women who had been on a balcony or at the windows of ground floor rooms. In each case, the women were attracting men by calling to them or tapping on a window. They argued they were not guilty since they were not in the street. The court decided they were guilty. Lord Parker saying: "For my part I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows this was an Act to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in this way it can matter little whether the prostitute is standing in the street or in the doorway or on the balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open." Elliot v Grey (1960)17 The defendant's car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its battery removed. He was charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using an uninsured vehicle on the road. The defendant argued he was not 'using' the car on the road as clearly it was not drivable. The court applied the mischief rule and held that the car was being used on the road as it represented a hazard and therefore insurance would be required in the event of an incident. The statute was aimed at ensuring people were compensated when injured due to the hazards created by others.

16 17

(1960) 1 WLR 830 [1960] 1 QB 367. Page | 12

Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Royal College of Nursing v DHSS (1981)18 The Royal College of Nursing brought an action challenging the legality of the involvement of nurses in carrying out abortions. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 makes it an offence for any person to carry out an abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 provided that it would be an absolute defense for a medically registered practitioner (i.e. a doctor) to carry out abortions provided certain conditions were satisfied. Advances in medical science meant surgical abortions were largely replaced with hormonal abortions and it was common for these to be administered by nurses. It was legal for nurses to carry out such abortions. The Act was aimed at doing away with back street abortions where no medical care was available. The actions of the nurses were therefore outside the mischief of the Act of 1861 and within the contemplate defense in the 1967 Act

Golden Rule
The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. This interpretation is supreme and is called the golden rule of interpretation. The rule in Heydon's Case19 has been criticized for failing to reflect the importance of the text. It dates from a period when there was no science of exact drafting and judges were expected to use a wide discretion in moulding the law. As parliament's attention to detail grew, the judge gradually assumed his present role of textual interpreter. Legislative texts were still frequently defective however, and this fact had to be allowed for. Accordingly there grew up what has been misleadingly called the golden rule. The name is ascribed to the following classic passage from a judgment by Lord Blackburn: 'I believe it is not disputed that what Lord Wensleydale used to call the golden rule is right, viz, that we are to take the whole statute together, and construe it all together giving the words their ordinary signification, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use
18 19

(1981) 1 AER 545 For the mischief rule Page | 13

Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 them in their ordinary signification, and to justify the Court in putting on them some other signification, which, though less proper, is one which the Court thinks the words will bear'20 It is pretty clear that what might be termed the auriferous part of this statement was intended to be the first part, the phrase beginning 'unless when so applied' being a limiting provision akin to a proviso. The golden rule is that we are to take the whole statute together, and construe it all together, giving the words their ordinary signification. In other words, it is a rule of literal construction.

Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries,21 Here in this case, for example, Lord Simon said: 'The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning'. In other words the name 'golden rule' is ambiguous. Indeed a third meaning has been suggested for it by Max Radin, namely that it is to the effect that the legislator's intent governs the meaning of an enactment. Sir William Graham Harrison, a former First Parliamentary Counsel, playfully suggested a fourth meaning: 'the golden rule for the interpreter of Acts that they were not intended to mean what, to the plain man, they would appear to say'. It is plainly ridiculous that the name given to a rule of statutory interpretation should itself have several different meanings. All we can do now is discarding this unsatisfactory name, and adopt Shaw's wise conclusion that the golden rule is that there are no golden rules. It has been contended that in this connection the term 'absurdity' should be widened to include all the defects Lord Blackburn mentions, and indeed others. Thus Cross argues that such words as 'repugnancy', 'inconsistency', 'anomaly' and 'contradiction' can be properly subsumed under it. If this is so it would be better to refer to the so-called 'golden rule' as the absurdity rule. The only thing that distinguishes it from the literal rule is that it allows the literal meaning to be departed from where to follow it would produce absurdity.

20 21

River Wear Commissioners v A damson, (1877) 2 App Cas 743, 764.

(1940) AC 1014, 1022

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh22 Here the Election tribunal set aside the election of the appellant under s 123(7) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 on the grounds that the appellant had employed more persons than prescribed for electioneering purpose. The appellant contended that the excess employees were paid by his father and hence were not employed by him. The Supreme Court followed the grammatical interpretation of S 123(7) and termed the excess employees as volunteers.

Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay23 Here the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did not declare that he brought gold with him. Gold, found in his possession during search in violation of government notification, was confiscated under S 167 (8) Sea Customs Act, 1878. He was charged under s 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant pleaded that his trial under the Act was violative of Art 20(2) of the constitution relating to double jeopardy as he was already punished for his act by way of confiscation of the gold. It was held by the Supreme Court that the sea customs authority is not a court or a judicial tribunal and the confiscation is not a penalty. Consequently his trial was valid under the Act of 1947.

Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd, 24 Here it was held that according to the fundamental principles of construction the statute should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and then word by word.

22 23 24

AIR 1954 SC 749

(1953) S.C.R. 730

(2003) 2 SC 111 Page | 15

Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, 25 Here an application against the change of location of a bus stand could be made within 30 days of receipt of order of regional transport authority according to s 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must be read as 30 days from the knowledge of the order The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be made and hence rejected the application as invalid.

Raghunandan Saran v M/s Peary Lal workshop Pvt Ltd,26 Here the Supreme Court validated 14 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 and provided the benefit of eviction on account of nonpayment of rent. The Supreme Court adopted grammatical interpretation.

Exceptions to the rule of literal interpretation Generally a statute must be interpreted in its grammatical sense but under the following circumstances it is not possible:Logical defects A) ambiguity B) inconsistency C) incompleteness or lacunae
D) Unreasonableness.

25 26

AIR 1965 SC 458

AIR 1975 SC 428

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10

INTERNAL AID OF INTERPRETATION

Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority. The general rule of the interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given this ordinary meaning. If the words are clear, free from ambiguity there is no need to refer to other means of interpretation. But if the words are vague and ambiguous then internal aid may be sought for interpretation. Following are the internal aids: Context If the words of a statute are ambiguous then the context must be taken into consideration. The context includes other provisions of the statute, its preamble, the existing state of law and other legal provisions. The intention behind the meaning of the words and the circumstances which they are framed must be considered. Title Title is not part of enactment. So it cannot be legally used to restrict the plain meaning of the words in an enactment. Long title The heading of the statute is the long title and the general purpose is described in it. E.g. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the long title reads as follows An Act to make
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under

Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 provisions for the prevention of adulteration of food. In Re Kerala Education bill27, the

Supreme Court held that the policy and purpose may be deduced from the long title and the preamble. In Manohar Lal v State of Punjab28, Long title of the Act is relied as a guide to decide the scope of the Act.

Short Title The short title of the Act is purely for reference only. The short title is merely for convenience. E.g. The Indian Penal Code, 1860. Preamble The Act Starts with a preamble and is generally small. The main objective and purpose of the Act are found in the Preamble of the Statute. Preamble is the Act in a nutshell. It is a preparatory statement. It contains the recitals showing the reason for enactment of the Act. If the language of the Act is clear the preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the interpretation of an ambiguous act. In Kashi Prasad v State29, the court held that even though the preamble cannot be used to defeat the enacting clauses of a statute, it can be treated as a key for the interpretation of the statute. Headings A group of Sections are given under a heading which act as their preamble. Sometimes a single section might have a preamble. S.378-441 of IPC is Offences against property. Headings are prefixed to sections. They are treated as preambles. If there is ambiguity in the words of a statute, headings can be referred. In Durga Thathera v Narain Thathera30, the court held that the headings are like a preamble which helps as a key to the mind of the legislature but do not control the substantive section of the enactment.

27 28 29 30

1997 (1) SC 112. (1951)S.C.R. 671

AIR 1955 All. 749 Air 2008 SC 32

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Marginal notes Marginal notes are the notes that are printed at the side of the section in an Act and it summarizes the effect of the section. They are not part of the statute. So they must not be considered. But if there is any ambiguity they may be referred only as an internal aid to the construction. In Wilkes v Goodwin, the Court held that the side notes are not part of the Act and hence marginal notes cannot be referred. Proviso A proviso merely carves out something from the section itself. A proviso is a subsidiary to the main section and has to be construed in the light of the section itself. Ordinarily, a proviso is intended to be part of the section and not an addendum to the main provisions. A proviso should receive strict construction. The court is not entitled to add words to a proviso with a view to enlarge the scope. Definition/ Interpretation clause The legislature can lay down legal definitions of its own language, if such definitions are embodied in the statute itself, it becomes binding on the courts. When the act itself provides a dictionary for the words used, the court must first look into that dictionary for interpretation. In Mayor of Portsmouth v Smith, the court observed The introduction of interpretation clause is a novelty. Conjunctive and Disjunctive words The word and is conjunctive and the word or is disjunctive. These words are often interchangeable. The word and can be read as or and or can be read as and. Gender Words using the masculine gender is deemed to include females too. Punctuation

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Punctuation is disregarded in the construction of a statute. Generally there was no punctuation in the statutes framed in England before 1849. Punctuation cannot control, vary or modify the plain and simple meaning of the language of the statute.

Explanations In certain provisions of an Act explanations may be needed when doubts arise as to the meaning of the particular section. Explanations are given at the end of each section and it is part and parcel of the enactment. Exceptions and savings clause To exempt certain clauses from the preview of the main provisions, and exception clause is provided. The things which are not exempted fall within the purview of the main enactment. The saving clause is also added in cases of repeal and re-enactment of a statute. Schedules Schedules form part of a statute. They are at the end and contain minute details for working out the provisions of the express enactment. The expression in the schedule cannot override the provisions of the express enactment. Inconsistency between schedule and the Act, the Act prevails. 31 Illustrations Illustrations in enactment provided by the legislature are valuable aids in the understanding the real scope. Meaning of the words

31

Ramchand textiles v sales tax officer, AIR 1961 SC 1506

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 The definition of the words given must be construed in the popular sense. Internal aid to construction is important for interpretation.

EXTERNAL AID TO INTERPRETATION

Other than the internal aid to interpretation which are part of a statute itself there are other aids which are not part of the statute. These are known as external aid to interpretation. The court can consider recourse outside the Act such as historical settings, objects and reasons, bills, debates, text books, dictionaries etc. Recourse to external aid is justified only to well-recognized limits. Historical settings The surrounding circumstances and situations which led to the passing of the Act can be considered for the purpose of construing a statute. Objects and reason The statements and object cannot be used as an aid to construction. The statements of object and reason are not only admissible as an aid to construction of a statute. Objects and reasons of a statute is to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out the legislative intent, only when the language is obscure or ambiguous. Text books and dictionaries The use of dictionaries is limited to circumstances where the judges and Counsels use different words. In such cases the court may make use of standard authors and well known authoritative dictionaries. Text books may also be refereed to for assistance in finding out the true construction of a statute. International Conventions International conventions are generally not resorted to for the purpose of interpretation, but it helps as an external aid for the purpose of resolving ambiguities in the language.
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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Government publications They are: Reports of commissioner or committee Other documents. Only if the above documents are expressly referred to in the statute, they can be looked at for the purpose of construction. Select Committee Report To ascertain the legislative intent of a doubtful meaning of a statute, report of legislative committee of the proposed law can be referred. The report of the Select committee can be looked into from an historical angle to find out what was the previous law, before and at the time of enacting the statute. Debate and proceedings of the legislature A speech made in the course of a debate on a bill could be referred to find out the intent of the speaker. Speeches made in the parliament can also be referred. History of legislation The history of legislation usually denotes the course of events which give rise to enactments. The court may refer historical facts if it is necessary to understand the subject matter. Extemporaneous exposition In interpreting old statutes, the construction by the judges who lived at the time of the enactment could be referred as 9it is best to understand the intentions of the makers of the statute. Judicial interpretation of words It is an accepted principle of law that if a word has received clear judicial interpretation, then the word is interpreted according to the judicial meaning. E.g. Rule in Ryland v Fletcher, absolute liability has become a fixed and standing rule. If definition is not given, popular meaning must be construed.
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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10

Previous English law It is not legal and correct to apply decisions of English acts to the construction of an Indian statute. Others external aids include interpretation by the executive, foreign decisions which include policy of the legislature and government policy, purpose of the Act conventions and practices.

Spirit and reason of law. The purpose of a statute is the reason of enactment, but the spirit or reason of law is connected with the legislative intent.

Acts in Pari material When a statute is ambiguous, the intention of the legislature may be gathered from statutes relating to same subject. The definitions cannot be generally imported. Other external aids include interpretation of later Acts with the help of

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10

PRESUMPTIONS
The general presumption is that ordinary courts of law namely the civil courts, criminal courts, high courts and Supreme Court have jurisdiction over people. Any statute which takes away the jurisdiction of ordinary courts must be rarely resorted to, as people have the right to have free access to all the courts. Jurisdiction of civil courts The basic presumption of law is that all civil courts are empowered to decide all suits of civil nature. The basis of this presumption is that civil and criminal court have general jurisdiction over people and they have right to have free access to both civil and criminal court. Section 9 of CPC It was emphasized by the Supreme Court that the rule prescribed by section 9 of CPC is that the court shall, subject to provisions contained in the code, have jurisdiction to try al suits of civil nature excepting suits in which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The law further presumes that a remedy in the ordinary civil courts must always be available to citizens. Legal provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil courts and conferring jurisdiction to tribunals must strictly interpreted in such a way that as far as possible, the jurisdiction of civil court are not taken away. If the statute contains two interpretations, then the one conferring jurisdiction will prevail. Exclusion of jurisdiction must be expressed or clearly implied. Jurisdiction of other courts The general presumption is that a statute should not be given such an interpretation as to take away the jurisdiction of the court unless the language of the statute is unambiguous and clear. Since jurisdiction has been given to court by legislation, it is the legislation alone which can take away the jurisdiction.If any statute provides for an express bar of jurisdiction of a civil or other court, then the scheme of the particular Act must provide adequate alternative remedies. If the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, the writ of certiorari is the only recourse.
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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 There is no sympathy for legislative provisions which oust jurisdiction of courts, because of the fact that the subjects are deprived of a remedy. If jurisdiction is conferred to a tribunal, the intention of the parliament is presumed to have jurisdiction to correct the decision of inferior tribunal. Finality clause Many modern statutes contain provisions which attempt to take away the jurisdiction of courts by making the decision of the tribunal final or conclusive. The remedy by certiorari is never to be taken away by any statute except by the most explicit and clear words. The word final means without an appeal. It does not mean without recourse to the writ of certiorari. It makes the decision final on fact but not on law.In Dhulabhai v State of MP32, the Supreme court held that if a statute gives finality to the orders of a special tribunal, the jurisdiction of civil court must be held to excluded only if there is an adequate alternate remedy similar to what civil remedy would be. In R v Medical Appeal Tribunal33, Lord Denning said the word final only means without appeal and the remedy of certiorari cannot be taken away because it is not an appeal. Creating new and enlarging existing jurisdiction It is presumed that a statute does not create new jurisdiction or enlarge existing jurisdiction. Express language is required if an Act is to be so interpreted, as to create new jurisdiction or enlarge existing jurisdiction.In Heathstar properties Ltd34, A statute giving power to grant relief on being satisfied on certain facts, does not confer on it any power to grant interim relief until such fact had been fully ascertained. In State of UP v Mohammed Nooh35, Ina departmental enquiry against the constable, the person holding the trial offered to be a witness and prosecuted the constable. There was a gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The court held that it can issue a certiorari.

Conclusion
(1968) 3 S.C.R. 662 [1994] Imm AR 513 34 (1966) 1 WLR 993 35 (1958) S.C.R. 595
32 33

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 What practical rules are available now to assist the courts in statutory interpretation? We first need to understand that we are in a situation different from that in which many of the dicta shaping existing rules were delivered. The main difference lies in the nature and quality of modern type legislative texts. These are composed in a highly sophisticated way. They are drafted by skilled people, whose aim is to spell out in a logical and consistent manner the full detail of the legislative scheme. The common-law draftsman of today works under the literal view of interpretation. He aims to provide a text which contains the answers and can be obeyed as it stands. It follows that the general rules and presumptions we have been discussing are now of little value. Either the meaning is plain or it is not. If it is not, then there is a doubt situation. The doubt cannot be resolved by a general rule. We have left behind the era when the answer about any oddness was the letting of blood, and the leech was always the convenient instrument. What is first needed now is a skilled diagnosis. What is the nature of the doubt? Exactly how does it arise? What is its cause? What principles apply to the resolution of doubts of that nature? We shall find in this project work that there are answers to these questions. We have moved from the general to the particular. But we recognize that each particular rule must sub serve the generality of the predictability principle that answers should lay in the text, and not in the opinion of a judge or official. The main body of the law is to be found in statues, together with the relevant statutory instruments, and in a case of law as enunciated by judges in the courts. But the judges not only have the duty of declaring the common law, they are also frequently called upon to settle disputes as to the meaning of words or clauses in a statute.
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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Parliament is the supreme law-maker, and the judges must follow statutes. Nevertheless there is a considerable amount of case law which gathers round Acts of Parliament and delegated legislation since the wording sometimes turns out to be obscure. However, the rules relating to the interpretation of statutes are so numerous, have so many exceptions, and several are so flatly contradictory, that some writers hold view that there are in effect no rules at all. Statutes are extremely complex legal documents and no parliamentary draughtsman can anticipate future contingencies; neither can they always accommodate the natural ambiguities of our language. As a result, judges are often called upon to interpret a word or phrase which can be crucial to the outcome of a case.

Bibliography

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Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,20 10 Books referred AB Kafaltiya, Interpretation of Statute, 2008, Universal Law Publishing Company, Justice G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 11 Edition, 2008, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur. Avtar Singh, Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes, 2nd Edition, Reprint 2008, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur, 2008

Websites Referred http://www.gdrc.org http://www.ifad.org http://indiabudget.nic.in

http://www.wikipedia.com

http://practicalaction.org http://www.undp.org http://www.unpei.org

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