1

Intro
This is a reprint of a guide called What is Security Culture? published by the CrimethInc collective. As far as we know, it first appeared in their book Recipes for Disaster: An Anarchist Cookbook and then appeared in a slightly updated form in 2009 on their website, Crimethinc.com. Were reprinting this because the information contained within cannot be shared enough within our communities. Over the past several years, weve seen various instances of anarchists getting serious federal charges. Eric McDavid was entrapped by a federal informant Anna with whom he hatched a plot to blow up a dam and was later sentenced to several years in prison. At the 2008 protests against the Republican National Convention (RNC), several folks were entrapped by federal informants Bradley Crowder, David McKay, and Matthew Depalma. While one certainly cant say that more easily accessible information on security culture would have prevented these situations, it seems that the more widely available the information is the safer we will all be. We chose to reprint this guide specifically because it focuses on general principles rather than specific tactics necessary to building secure communities of resistance. Please read this guide, share it, enact these principles in your life, and explain them to people who arent familiar with them. Most importantly, please, please take security culture seriously. Finally, folks would also do well to do some additional research on the subject of social networking and computer security. As computers dominate more and more of our lives, it is important that folks think about the risks that their use can pose for those in conflict with the state.

What is Security Culture?

A security culture is a set of customs shared by a community whose members may be targeted by the government, designed to minimize risk. Having a security culture in place saves everyone the trouble of having to work out safety measures over and over from scratch, and can help offset paranoia and panic in stressful situationshell, it might keep you out of prison, too. The difference between protocol and culture is that culture becomes unconscious, instinctive, and thus effortless; once the safest possible behavior has become habitual for everyone in the circles in which you travel, you can spend less time and energy emphasizing the need for it, or suffering the consequences of not having it, or worrying about how much danger youre in, as youll know youre already doing everything you can to be careful. If youre in the habit of not giving away anything sensitive about yourself, you can collaborate with strangers without having to agonize about whether or not they are informers; if everyone knows what not to talk about over the telephone, your enemies can tap the line all they want and it wont get them anywhere.[1] The central principle of all security culture, the point that cannot be emphasized enough, is that people should never be privy to any sensitive information they do not need to know. The greater the number of people who know something that can put individuals or projects at riskwhether that something be the identity of a person who committed an illegal act, the location of a private meeting, or a plan for future activitythe more chance there is of the knowledge getting into the wrong hands. Sharing such information with people who do not need it does them a disservice as well as the ones it puts at risk: it places them in the uncomfortable situation of being able to mess up other peoples lives with a single misstep. If they are interrogated, for example, they will have something to hide, rather than being able to honestly claim ignorance.

Dont ask, dont tell.

Dont ask others to share confidential information you dont need to know. Dont brag about illegal things you or others have done, or mention things that are going to happen or might happen, or even refer to another persons interest in being involved in such activities. Stay aware whenever you speak; dont let chance allusions drop out thoughtlessly. You can say no at any time to anyone about anything. Dont answer any questions you dont want tonot just with police officers, but also with other activists and even close friends: if theres something you dont feel safe sharing, dont. This also means being comfortable with others not answering questions: if theres a conversation they want to keep to themselves, or they ask you not to be part of a meeting or project, you shouldnt take this personally its for everyones good that theyre free to do so. Likewise, dont participate in any projects you dont feel good about, or collaborate with anyone you feel ill at ease with, or ignore your gut feeling in any situation; if something goes wrong and you get into trouble, you dont want to have any regrets. Youre responsible for not letting anyone talk you into taking risks youre not ready for.

Dont ever turn your friends over to your enemies.

If captured, never, ever give up any information that could endanger anyone else. Some recommend an explicit oath be sworn by all participants in a direct action group: that way, in a worst-case scenario, when pressure might make it hard to distinguish between giving up a few harmless details and totally selling out, everyone will know exactly what commitments they made to each other.

Dont make it too easy for your enemies to figure out what youre up to.
Dont be too predictable in the methods you employ, or the targets you choose, or the times and places you meet to discuss things. Dont be too visible in the public aspects of the struggle in which you do your most serious direct action: keep your name off mailing lists and out of the media, perhaps avoid association with aboveground organizations and campaigns entirely. If youre involved in really serious clandestine activities with a few comrades, you may want to limit your interactions in public, if not avoid each other altogether. Federal agents can easily get access to the phone numbers dialed from your phone, and will use such lists to establish connections between individuals; the same goes for your email, and the books you check out from libraries, and especially social networking sites like Myspace. Dont leave a trail: credit card use, gas cards, cell phone calls all leave a record of your motions, purchases, and contacts. Have a cover story, supported by verifiable facts, if you might need one. Be careful about what your trash could reveal about youdropouts arent the only ones who go dumpstering! Keep track of every written document and incriminating photocopykeep them all in one place, so you cant accidentally forget oneand destroy them as soon as you dont need them. The fewer there are in the first place, the better; get used to using your memory. Make sure there arent any ghosts of such writing left behind in impressions on the surfaces you were writing on, whether these be wooden desks or pads of paper. Assume that every use of computers leaves a trail, too.

Dont throw any direct action ideas around in public that you think you might want to try at some point.

Wait to propose an idea until you can gather a group of individuals that you expect will all be interested in trying it; the exception is the bosom companion with whom you brainstorm and hash out details in advancesafely outside your home and away from mixed company, of course. Dont propose your idea until you think the time is right for it to be tried. Invite only those you are pretty certain will want to join ineveryone you invite who doesnt end up participating is a needless security risk, and this can be doubly problematic if it turns out they feel your proposed activity is laughably dumb or morally wrong. Only invite people who can keep secretsthis is critical whether or not they decide to participate.

Develop a private shorthand for communicating with your comrades in public.

Its important to work out a way to communicate surreptitiously with your trusted friends about security issues and comfort levels while in public situations, such as at a meeting called to discuss possible direct action. Knowing how to gauge each others feelings without others being able to tell that you are sending messages back and forth will save you the headache of trying to guess each others thoughts about a situation or individual, and help you avoid acting strangely when you cant take your friend aside in the middle of things to compare notes. By the time you have convened a larger group to propose an action plan, you and your friends should be clear on what each others intentions, willingness to run risks, levels of commitment, and opinions of others are, to save time and avoid unnecessary ambiguity. If you havent been part of a direct action planning circle before, youll be surprised how complicated and convoluted things can get even when everyone does arrive prepared.

Develop methods to establish the security level of a group or situation.

One quick procedure you can run at the beginning of a larger meeting at which not everyone is acquainted is the vouched for game: as each person introduces himself, all who can vouch for him raise their hands. Only vouch for those you are confident are worthy of your trust. Hopefully, each person is connected to the others by some link in the chain; either way, at least everybody knows how things stand. An activist who understands the importance of good security will not feel insulted in such a situation if there is no one present who can vouch for him and the others ask him to leave.

Meeting location is an important factor in security.

You dont want a place that can be monitored (no private residences), you dont want a place where you can be observed all together (not the park across from the site of the next days actions), you dont want a place where you can be seen entering and leaving or that someone could enter unexpectedlypost scouts, lock the door once things get started, watch out for anything suspicious.[2] Small groups can take walks and chat; larger groups can meet in quiet outdoor settingsgo hiking or camping, if theres timeor in private rooms in public buildings, such as library study rooms or empty classrooms. Best-case scenario: though he has no idea youre involved in direct action, youre close with the old guy who runs the caf across town, and he doesnt mind letting you have the back room one afternoon for a private party, no questions asked. Be aware of the reliability of those around you, especially those with whom you might collaborate in underground activities. Be conscious of how long youve known people, how far back their involvement in your community and their lives outside of it can be traced, and what others experiences with them have been. The friends you grew up with, if you still have any of them in your life, may be the best companions for direct action, as you are familiar with their strengths and weaknesses and the ways they handle pressureand you know for a fact they are who they say they are. Make sure only to trust your safety and the safety of your projects to level-headed folks who share the same priorities and commitments and have nothing to prove. In the long term, strive to build up a community of people with long-standing friendships and experience acting together, with ties to other such communities.

Dont get too distracted worrying about whether people are infiltrators or not; if your security measures are effective, it shouldnt even matter.
Dont waste your energy and make yourself paranoid and unsociable suspecting everybody you meet. If you keep all sensitive information inside the circle of people it concerns, only collaborate with reliable and experienced friends whose history you can verify, and never give away anything about your private activities, agents and police informers will be powerless to gather evidence to use against you. A good security culture should make it practically irrelevant whether these vermin are active in your community or not. The important thing is not whether or not a person is involved with the cops, but whether or not he constitutes a security risk; if he is deemed insecure (double meaning intended), he should never be permitted to end up in a situation in which anyones safety depends on him.

Learn and abide by the security expectations of each person you interact with, and respect differences in style.
To collaborate with others, you have to make sure they feel at home with you; even if youre not collaborating with them, you dont want to make them uncomfortable or disregard a danger they understand better than you. When it comes to planning direct action, not abiding

by the security culture accepted in a given community can wreck not only your chances to cooperate with others on a project, but the possibility of the project happening at allfor example, if you bring up an idea others were planning to try in a setting they deem insecure, they may be forced to abandon the plan as it may now be associated with them. Ask people to outline for you their specific security needs before you even broach the subject of direct action.

Let others know exactly what your needs are when it comes to security.
The corollary of abiding by others expectations is that you must make it easy for others to abide by yours. At the beginning of any relationship in which your private political life may become an issue, emphasize that there are details of your activities that you need to keep to yourself. This can save you a lot of drama in situations that are already stressful enough; the last thing you need on returning from a secret mission gone awry is to end up in a fight with your lover: But if you trusted me, you would tell me about this! How do I know youre not out there sleeping with! Its not a matter of trustsensitive information isnt a reward to be earned or deserved.

Look out for other people.

Make explicit to those around you what risks you may pose to them with your presence[3] or with actions you have planned, at least as much as youre able to without violating other precepts of security culture. Let them know to the extent youre able what risks you run yourself: for example, whether you can afford to be arrested (if there are outstanding warrants for you, if you are an undocumented migrant, etc.), what responsibilities you have to keep up with, whether you have any allergies. Dont imperil others with your decisions, especially if youre not able to provide concrete support should they somehow get arrested and charged on account of your behavior. If someone else drops a banner in an area immediately adjacent to a fire you set, the police might charge them with arson; even if the charges cant stick, you dont want to risk their ill will, or accidentally block their planned escape route. If you help initiate a breakaway march that leaves the permitted zone, try to make sure you keep your body between the police and others who have come along but dont necessarily understand the risks involved; if you escalate a spontaneous parade by engaging in property destruction, make sure others who were unprepared for this are not still standing around in confusion when the police show up. Whatever risky projects you undertake, make sure youre prepared to go about them intelligently, so no one else will have to run unexpected risks to help you out when you make mistakes.

Security culture is a form of etiquette, a way to avoid needless misunderstandings and potentially disastrous conflicts.
Security concerns should never be an excuse for making others feel left out or inferiorthough it can take some finesse to avoid that! just as no one should feel they have a right to be in on anything others prefer to keep to themselves. Those who violate the security culture of their communities should not be rebuked too harshly the first timethis isnt a question of being hip enough to activist decorum to join the in-group, but of establishing group expectations and gently helping people understand their importance; besides, people are least able to absorb constructive criticism when theyre put on the defensive. Nevertheless, such people should always be told immediately how theyre putting others at risk, and what the consequences will be should they continue to. Those who cant grasp this must be tactfully but effectively shut out of all sensitive situations.

Security culture is not paranoia institutionalized, but a way to avoid unhealthy paranoia by minimizing risks ahead of time.
It is counterproductive to spend more energy worrying about how much surveillance you are under than is useful for decreasing the danger it poses, just as it is debilitating to be constantly second-guessing your precautions and doubting the authenticity of potential comrades. A good security culture should make everyone feel more relaxed and confident, not less. At the same time, its equally unproductive to accuse those who adhere to security measures stricter than yours of being paranoidremember, our enemies are out to get us.

Dont let suspicion be used against you.

If your foes cant learn your secrets, they will settle for turning you against each other. Undercover agents can spread rumors or throw around accusations to create dissension, mistrust, and resentment inside of or between groups. They may falsify letters or take similar steps to frame activists. The mainstream media can participate in this by reporting that there is an informant in a group when there is not one, or misrepresenting the politics or history of an individual or group in order to alienate potential allies, or emphasizing over and over that there is a conflict between two branches of a movement until they really do mistrust one another. Again, a shrewd security culture that fosters an appropriately high level of trust and confidence should make such provocations nearly impossible on the personal level; when it comes to relations between proponents of different tactics and organizations of different stripes, remember the importance of solidarity and diversity of tactics, and trust that others do, too, even if media accounts suggest otherwise. Dont accept rumors or reports as fact: go to the source for confirmation every time, and be diplomatic about it.

Dont be intimidated by bluffing.

Police attention and surveillance is not necessarily an indication that they know anything specific about your plans or activities: often it indicates that they do not and are trying to frighten you out of continuing with them. Develop an instinct with which to sense when your cover has actually been blown and when your enemies are just trying to distress you into doing their work for them.

Always be prepared for the possibility that you are under observation, but dont mistake attracting surveillance for being effective.
Even if everything you are doing is perfectly legal, you may still receive attention and harassment from intelligence organizations if they feel you pose an inconvenience to their masters. In some regards, this can be for the best; the more they have to monitor, the more thinly spread their energies are, and the harder it is for them to pinpoint and neutralize subversives. At the same time, dont get caught up in the excitement of being under surveillance and begin to assume that the more the authorities pay attention to you, the more dangerous to them you must betheyre not that smart. They tend to be preoccupied with the resistance organizations whose approaches most resemble their own; take advantage of this. The best tactics are the ones that reach people, make points, and exert leverage while not showing up on the radar of the powers that be, at least not until it is too late. Ideally, your activities should be well known to everyone except the authorities.

Security culture involves a code of silence, but it is not a code of voicelessness.

The stories of our daring exploits in the struggle against capitalism must be told somehow, so everyone will know resistance is a real possibility put into action by real people; open incitements to insurrection must be made, so would-be revolutionaries can find each other and the revolutionary sentiments buried in the hearts of the masses find their way to the surface. A good security culture should preserve as much secrecy as is necessary for individuals to be safe in their underground activities, while still providing visibility for radical perspectives. Most of the security tradition in the activist milieu today is derived from the past thirty years of animal rights and earth liberation activities; as such, its perfectly suited for the needs of small groups carrying out isolated illegal acts, but isnt always appropriate for more aboveground campaigns aimed at encouraging generalized insubordination. In some cases it can make sense to break the law openly, in order to provoke the participation of a large mass that can then provide safety in numbers.

Balance the need to escape detection by your enemies against the need to be accessible to potential friends.
In the long run, secrecy alone cannot protect ussooner or later they are going to find all of us, and if no one else understands what were doing and what we want, theyll be able to liquidate us with impunity. Only the power of an informed and sympathetic (and hopefully similarly equipped) public can help us then. There should always be entryways into communities in which direct action is practiced, so more and more people can join in. Those doing really serious stuff should keep it to themselves, of course, but every community should also have a person or two who vocally advocates and educates about direct action, and who can discreetly help trustworthy novices link up with others getting started.

When youre planning an action, begin by establishing the security level appropriate to it, and act accordingly from there on.
Learning to gauge the risks posed by an activity or situation and how to deal with them appropriately is not just a crucial part of staying out of jail; it also helps to know what youre not worried about, so you dont waste energy on unwarranted, cumbersome security measures. Keep in mind that a given action may have different aspects that demand different degrees of security; make sure to keep these distinct. Heres an example of a possible rating system for security levels:

1. Only those who are directly involved in the action know of its existence. 2. Trusted support persons also know about the action, but everyone in the group decides together who these will be. 3. It is acceptable for the group to invite people to participate who might choose not tothat is, some outside the group may know about

the action, but are still expected to keep it a secret. 4. The group does not set a strict list of who is invited; participants are free to invite others and encourage them to do the same, while emphasizing that knowledge of the action is to be kept within the circles of those who can be trusted with secrets. 5. Rumors of the action can be spread far and wide through the community, but the identities of those at the center of the organizing are to be kept a secret. 6. The action is announced openly, but with at least some degree of discretion, so as not to tip off the sleepier of the authorities. 7. The action is totally announced and aboveground in all ways. To give examples, security level #1 would be appropriate for a group planning to firebomb an SUV dealership, while level #2 would be acceptable for those planning more minor acts of property destruction, such as spraypainting. Level #3 or #4 would be appropriate for

calling a spokescouncil preceding a black bloc at a large demonstration or for a group planning to do a newspaper wrap, depending on the ratio of risk versus need for numbers. Level #5 would be perfect for a project such as initiating a surprise unpermitted march: for example, everyone hears in advance that the Ani DiFranco performance is going to end in a spontaneous antiwar march, so people can prepare accordingly, but as no one knows whose idea it is, no one can be targeted as an organizer. Level #6 would be appropriate for announcing a Critical Mass bicycle ride: fliers are wrapped around the handlebars of every civilian bicycle, but no announcements are sent to the papers, so the cops wont be there at the beginning while the mass is still vulnerable. Level #7 is appropriate for a permitted antiwar march or independent media video screening, unless youre so dysfunctionally paranoid you even want to keep community outreach projects a secret. It also makes sense to choose the means of communication you will use according to the level of security demanded. Heres an example of different levels of communications security, corresponding to the system just outlined above:

1. No communication about the action except in person, outside the homes of those involved, in surveillance-free environments (e.g. the
group goes camping to discuss plans); no discussion of the action except when it is absolutely necessary. 2. Outside group meetings, involved individuals are free to discuss the action in surveillance-free spaces. 3. Discussions are permitted in homes not definitely under surveillance. 4. Communication by encrypted email or on neutral telephone lines is acceptable. 5. People can speak about the action over telephones, email, etc. provided theyre careful not to give away certain detailswho, what, when, where. 6. Telephones, email, etc. are all fair game; email listservs, fliering in public spaces, announcements to newspapers, etc. may or may not be acceptable, on a case-by-case basis. 7. Communication and proclamation by every possible medium are encouraged.

If you keep hazardous information out of circulation and you follow suitable security measures in every project you undertake, youll be well on your way to fulfilling what early CrimethInc. agent Abbie Hoffman described as the first duty of the revolutionary: not getting caught. All the best in your adventures and misadventures, and rememberyou didnt hear it from us!

Building a Security Culture

This document is for general information purposes only

Introduction What is Security Culture?

A security culture is a shared set of practices and attitudes designed to minimize the legal risks associated with radical political activities and activism. In particular, security cultures diminish the ability of state authorities to spy on, harass, disrupt, entrap, and gather or manufacture incriminating evidence against individuals and groups. They therefore not only protect those engaged in political actions deemed illegal by the state, but also those who might falsely be accused of breaking the law. In an age when anti-terrorism and conspiracy laws are being used to suppress dissent, not even the law-abiding are immune from persecution.

Why Do We Need Security Culture? 1) Surveillance:

If authorities target you or your group for surveillance, they have the ability to monitor your conversations, phone, mail, email, instant messages, and text messages.

2) Infiltration:
Three kinds of informants are used by authorities: undercover law enforcement agents, outside individuals paid to infiltrate groups, and group members who inform on others, either voluntarily or due to coercion. Informants can serve two functions (often simultaneously): they can collect information, and they can act as agents provocateur. Some informants simply report on the activities they witness and take part in while others intentionally disrupt these activities or attempt to pressure members to commit illegal acts. Because most informants work for incentivesmoney, promotions, prison sentence reductions, etc.they are often motivated to create greater legal threats than would otherwise exist, for which they will then receive greater incentives for helping to expose. Even in the absence of a real threat, informants will sometimes fabricate evidence of one.

3) Slips of the Tongue:

Well-meaning individuals may inadvertently incriminate themselves or others in everyday conversations by sharing sensitive information or making up stories in order to appear cool.

What Are Some Examples of Infiltration and Entrapment?

New York City, 1915: An undercover agent of the New York Police Department infiltrates an Italian anarchist group and convinces two young members to help him build and plant bombs at St. Patricks Cathedral. After putting the plan into action the two anarchists are arrested and sentenced to six to twelve years in prison.[1] California, 2006: Three young environmental activists are arrested after an undercover informant known as Anna urges them to take more extreme actions, teaches them how to build explosives, supplies the necessary materials, and allegedly helps them plan the bombings of several targets. The three are arrested and one, Eric McDavid, is sentenced to nearly twenty years after the other two accept plea bargains and become informants.[2] Not much changed in the almost one hundred years separating the two incidents described above. In the 1960s, however, the FBI systematized these kinds of tactics in its secret Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) designed to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize radical groups. Thousands of COINTELPRO operations were run, including infiltration, psychological warfare, misinformation, false arrests, threats, illegal searches, and premeditated lethal violence.[3] Since 2001 the FBI has stepped up its use of similar tactics against suspected terrorists, and in 2005 it launched Operation Backfire against animal and earth liberation movements. So far, Operation Backfire has led to the arrests of dozens of activists, eleven of whom informed on others in hopes of reduced sentences.[4] Around a dozen cases of informants facilitating and encouraging illegal activities have come to light in the last few years, including that of Anna.[5] Most recently, in 2008, both the FBI and the Ramsey County Sheriffs Department placed four informants in groups planning to protest at the Republican National Convention in

St. Paul, Minnesota. As a result, eight members of the RNC Welcoming Committee, the group that organized logistics for the protests, were preemptively arrested and charged with conspiracy to riot in the 2nd degree in furtherance of terrorism and 1st degree conspiracy to commit criminal damage to property in furtherance of terrorism. The terrorism enhancements have since been dropped, but the RNC 8 still face conspiracy charges.[6] Additionally, two protesters were arrested for making Molotov cocktails on information provided by Brandon Darby, a longtime activist from Austin who offered his services to the FBI after reportedly becoming disillusioned with violent elements in the activist community. Questions remain, however, regarding Darbys own role in pushing the two young men to manufacture the explosives.[7]

What to Do Being Careful

No matter how careful and secure you are, there is always a possibility that you will be caught and prosecuted if you engage in illegal direct action. As recent events have shown, even if you dont take part in illegal actions, you might still be preemptively arrested and charged with crimes like conspiracy. Therefore, when you commit yourself to being involved in protest activities, civil disobedience, or direct action, you should be prepared to face the maximum penalty for any laws you will be breaking. Even if you do not plan on breaking any laws, it is important to prepare yourself to face investigation, subpoenas, and spurious charges. If you are involved in radical political activities, the authorities can, with little cause, place you under surveillance. Therefore, you should never discuss extralegal actions that you or others have undertaken or plan to undertake with outside individuals, or over email, text messages, or the phone. Remember, security culture isnt just about protecting yourself from others; its also about protecting others from yourself. You should not verbally discuss such things in activist spaces, your home, or your car, and should remove the battery from your cell phonewhich can be used to listen to and record your conversationsbefore doing so elsewhere. For the most sensitive information, the best method is to take a phone-free walk outside or write it down on paper and then shred or burn it afterwards.

without Being Paranoid

Just because a person is disruptive or violates security culture does not mean that they are an informant. Furthermore, just because a person is accused by someone else of being an informant does not mean that they are. The creation of mutual distrust through such accusationssnitch-jacketinghas been used by the authorities for more than a century. Suspected informants should not be publicly identified unless firm evidence is produced. Groups should therefore develop processes for dealing with individuals who are disruptive or violate security culture. Sometimes polite, private conversations with such individuals about security and group processes can help avert groundless accusations and maintain security culture. If unacceptable behavior continues, this still does not mean that an individual is an informant, but it does mean that a group is fully justified in asking such an individual to leave, regardless of the motives behind the individuals actions. Groups should develop processes for dealing with accusations that a member is an informant (see Dealing with Informants, below). However, there is always a danger that a security culture can be taken too far and lead to exclusion and the avoidance of diversity, through secretive practices that are not open to discussion. It is very unlikely that a group will always be able to identify an informant or know if it is under surveillance. Therefore, the best thing you can do is to assume that you are being watched, and that somebody involved in your protest or actions is an informant, and act accordingly:

Dealing with Law Enforcement Agents:

-Never provide information other than your name to police, the FBI, the Secret Service, or members of any other law enforcement agency without an attorney present. If you are approached by agents, get their names and badge numbers. -Do not lieyou can be charged with a criminal offence. Simply decline to answer questions without a lawyer. -Never allow law enforcement agents into your home without a warrant. If they knock on your door, speak to them outside and lock the door behind you. -In the event you are arrested, do not let authorities intimidate you into becoming an informant. Scary, outrageous charges used to pressure you to take a plea deal will likely be dropped later if you refuse. Cooperating will not guarantee a lighter sentence; in fact, on average, those arrested in the recent Operation Backfire who took plea deals and provided information on others actually served more time in proportion to their original threatened sentences than those who refused to do so.[8]

Dealing with Informants:

Have a process in place to deal with suspected informants. This could include: Asking for or otherwise obtaining information about their backgrounds, such as where they attended high school and college, their places of employment, and who their families and friends are.

Attempting to verify this information using public records, the internet, and references provided by the suspected individuals. If evidence is found confirming that individuals are informants: Have members of the group confront them with the evidence and ask them to leave the group. Share information about the identity of the informant, including photographs, with other groups. Consider contacting the press with evidence of the infiltration. If evidence is inconclusive but suspicions remain: Meet without the suspected informant to decide how to proceed. Possible options include asking the person to leave the group, or allowing them to remain in the group but with restricted access to sensitive material or participation in potentially illegal actions.

Dealing with Individuals who Violate Security Culture:

In many cases, individuals may divulge sensitive information or make up incriminating stories about actions in which they or others have participated or plan on participating. There are many possible reasons for this: personal insecurities, impulse to brag, the influence of intoxicating substances, or even a simple ignorance of proper security culture. In your own interactions with others, always make sure that: You do not share information about extralegal actions you have taken or will take with anyone who does not absolutely need to know. The only exception is if the statute of limitations for any possible charges has elapsed, or if you have already been convicted or acquitted of such charges. You do not make up stories about such actions, even in jesta joke about burning down a bank, for instance, could cause you serious trouble if it is quoted out of context in a courtroom. You do not ask others about actions they have undertaken or plan to undertake. If someone has been charged with a crime, do not ask them if they are guilty. If someone else engages in any of the behaviors described above: Privately take them aside and explain the importance of proper security culture for keeping both themselves and others safe (and give them a copy of this zine!). If the same individual repeatedly violates security culture despite such warnings, they represent a significant security risk and must be treated as such, whatever their motivations or intent. Possible options include asking the person to leave the group, or allowing them to remain in the group but with restricted access to sensitive material or participation in potentially illegal actions.

Dealing with Covert Harassment and Misinformation:

Dont believe everything you hear or read, especially if it seems suspicious or inaccurate. Check with sources you trust to verify disturbing rumors, materials, statements, and media stories. If you discover provably false statements, publicly disavow them and expose their true source, if possible. Document and publicize any threats, break-ins, or harassment you experience.

Meeting Space and Home Security Culture:

Dont leave sensitive material in places accessible to the general public or easily discovered during a police search. Be careful what you throw away. Shred or burn sensitive or incriminating material. Back up copies of important materials on disks or CDs stored at a secure location off-site. Report thefts of materials to the policeif you can document that evidence was obtained illegally, you may be able to have it excluded from court proceedings. If possible, document all known instances of surveillance and harassment. This information should be shared with fellow activists, and it may be useful to report it to the press. Lawsuits resulting from such evidence may also result in court rulings limiting law enforcements ability to spy in the future. Dont speak about possibly incriminating activities in meetings spaces, at home, in your car, or via electronic forms of communication.

Technological Security Culture: 1) Telephones:

Phone taps are virtually impossible to detect. Strange clicks or humming on your phone line is not evidence of a tap. If it is likely that your phone is tapped, act accordingly: Dont say anything over the phone that you wouldnt want to hear in open court.

2) Computers:
If your computer contains sensitive or possible incriminating data, require logins with a username and password for when your computer boots, and to unlock the screensaver. Choose a complex passwordthe longer the better, combining upper- and lower-case letters, numerical digits, special characters (e.g.

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@, #, $), and no names or proper words. Change your password regularly. Encrypt your data. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundations Surveillance Self-Defense Project (SSD)[9] aside from writing on paper and then destroying it, face-to-face oral communication is the most secure method of communicationabout 100 times more warrants were issued in 2007 for electronic wiretaps than for hidden recording devices (bugs). The next safest method is encrypted email, followed in order of security by landline telephones, cellular phones, unencrypted email, and finally text messages, which are the least secure of all forms of communication. The SSD therefore suggests: Think before you communicate!. Do you really want the phone company to have a record of this callwho you called, when, and how long you talked? Do you really want a copy of this email floating around in the recipients inbox, or on your or his email provider's system? Do you really want your cell phone provider to have a copy of that embarrassing SMS text message? Do you really want Google to know that you're searching for that? Delete emails from your providers server as soon as you first access the messages, and store your sent and draft emails locally in your email client software, rather than with your provider. In order to minimize the number of emails stored with your providerbe they received, sent, or draftavoid using webmail if at all possible, or, if you do use a webmail account, avoid the web interface and instead configure your email client software to send and receive emails directly via POP. Encrypt your emails whenever possible.[10]

RememberBe Safe, and Keep Others Safe!

[1] Paul Avrich, Sacco and Vanzetti: The Anarchist Background (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 100-101. [2] Support Eric McDavid, http://supporteric.org/ [3] See Ward Churchill and James Vander Wall, Agents of Repression: The FBIs Secret Wars against the Black Panther Party and the
American Indian Movement (Boston: South End Press, 1988); David Cunningham. Theres Something Happening Here: The New Left, the Klan, and FBI (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

[4] Green is the New Red, http://www.greenisthenewred.com; Crimethinc. Ex-Workers Collective, Green Scared? Preliminary Lessons
of the Green Scare, http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/recentfeatures/greenscared.php

[5] Thomas Cincotta, From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy, The Public Eye, Summer 2009,
http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques.html. On Anna http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/elle_anna/421/; http://milwaukee.indymedia.org/en/2006/06/205624.shtml

see

[6] RNC 08 Report, http://rnc08report.org/archive/542.shtml; Defend the RNC 8, http://rnc8.org/; Randy Furst, Terrorism Charges
against RNC 8 are Dropped, Star-Tribune, April 10, 2009, http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/conventions/42749517.html Brandon Darby: Proud Snitch, http://brandondarby.com/

[7] Colin Moynihan, Activist Unmasks Himself as Federal Informant in G.O.P. Convention Case, New York Times, January 4, 2009; [8] http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/images/green_scare_chart.gif [9] https://ssd.eff.org [10] See https://ssd.eff.org/tech/encryption

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Third edition prepared November 2001.

Introduction:
Resistance has been on the rise for the past few years, with activists adopting more and more effective tactics for fighting back. Our increased activity and effectiveness has meant that the RCMP, FBI, and local police have continued to escalate their activities against us. As well, the events of September 11th and ensuing state hysteria are no small footnote to the way that our radical and revolutionary movements have and will be targeted by repressive state forces. If we want our direct action movement to continue, it is imperative we start tightening our security and taking ourselves more seriously. Now is the time to adopt a security culture. Good security is certainly the strongest defense we have. This is a handbook for the Canadian activist who is interested in creating and maintaining security awareness and culture in the radical movements. We are always looking for contributions so please feel free to email securitysite@tao.ca with any images or text you think belong in a handbook such as this. This is the third edition of this zine that we have put out in order to add and improve on the original text (thanks for the work of the Collective Opposing Police Brutality in Montreal for their help). There will be future editions of this handbook so keep putting forward suggestions to us. We hope that you will put the material contained within to good use. Now more than ever is the time to act! Security Culture: What it is; why we need it; and how to implement it

ACTIVISM AND STATE REPRESSION

This pamphlet has essential information for anyone associated with groups advocating or using economic disruption or sabotage, theft, arson, self defence from police or more militant tactics. The advice that follows also applies to anyone associated with groups practising civil disobedience, especially since people often work in several groups at the same time and gossip travels freely between them. Even if youve never expressed your politics by doing property damage, pitching cobblestones, or getting arrested for civil disobedience; even if you think you have nothing to hide, these guidelines are presented here to enhance your personal safety as well as the overall effectiveness of our movements. The simple reality is that governments in industrialized countries target groups that advocate economic sabotage and groups that dont, movements that are militant and movements that are markedly pacifist. The governments security machinery serves the elitist political and economic objectives of capitalism. There are over 250 political prisoners in Canada and the US that can testify to this from firsthand experience. By adopting a security culture, we can limit or neutralize counter-intelligence operations meant to disrupt our political organizing, be it mainstream or underground. Peasant-rebels; communards; liberationists; abolitionists; labour organizers; revolutionaries; from large uprisings challenging the entire political structure, to isolated environmental and social struggles, people have constantly worked to create a better world. The response of government has always been repression to preserve the status quo. Historically, government surveillance and harassment has increased relative to the ascendancy of direct action movements. Minimizing the destructiveness of political repression requires that we implement and promote a security culture within our movements.

SO WHAT IS A SECURITY CULTURE?

Its a culture where the people know their rights and, more importantly, assert them. Those who belong to a security culture also know what behaviour compromises security and they are quick to educate those people who, out of ignorance, forgetfulness, or personal weakness, partake in insecure behaviour. This security consciousness becomes a culture when the group as a whole makes security violations socially unacceptable in the group. Security culture is about more than just targeting specific behaviours in individuals such as bragging, gossiping or lying. It is also about checking movement behaviours and practices as a whole to ensure that our own oppressive practices dont feed into intelligence operations being carried out against our community. For example, racism or sexism in the movement can help to spread division, make some people more open to infiltrators (those who feel marginalized by group practices), and create openings that can be used by state operatives. Obviously, our movements have a lot of work to do before we address the bigger questions whats important here is to recognize how oppressive behaviours play into bad security culture overall.

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(IN)SECURE PRACTICES
Activists like to talk, we generally can spend hours and hours discussing theory, tactics, and strategy. Mostly this is useful in building our analysis and our work, but in other cases this can be dangerous.

WHAT NOT TO SAY

To begin with, there are certain things that are inappropriate to discuss. These things include: Your involvement or someone elses involvement with an undergound group Someone elses desire to get involved with such a group Asking others if they are a member of an underground group Your participation or someone elses participating in any action that was illegal Someone elses advocacy for such actions Your plans or someone elses plans for a future action. Essentially, it is a bad idea to speak about an individuals involvement (past, present or future) with illegal activities. These are unacceptable topics of discussion regardless of whether it is rumor, speculation or personal knowledge. Please note: this is not to say that it is incorrect to speak about direct action in general terms. It is perfectly legal, secure and desirable that people speak out in support of mokeywrenching and all forms of resistance. The danger lies in linking individual activists to specific actions or groups.

THREE EXCEPTIONS
There are only three times that it is acceptable to speak about specific actions and activist involvement. The first situation would be if you were planning an action with other members of your small group (your cell or affinity group). However, these discussions should never take place over the Internet (email), phone line, through the mail, or in an activists home or car, as these places and forms of communication are frequently monitored. The only people who should hear this discussion would include those who are actively participating in the action. Anyone who is not involved does not need to know and, therefore, should not know. The second exception occurs after an activist has been arrested and brought to trial. If s/he is found guilty, this activist can freely speak of the actions for which s/he was convicted. However, s/he must never give information that would help the authorities determine who else participated in illegal activities. The third exception is for anonymous letters and interviews with the media. This must be done very carefully and without compromising security. Advice on secure communication techniques can be found at http://security.tao.ca. These are the only situations when it is appropriate to speak about your own or someone elses involvement or intent to commit illegal direct action.

SECURITY MEASURES
Veteran activists only allow a select few to know about their involvement with direct action groups. Those few consist of the cell members who they do the actions with AND NO ONE ELSE! The reason for these security precautions is obvious: if people dont know anything, they cant talk about it.When activists who do not share the same serious consequences know who did an illegal direct action, they are far more likely to talk after being harassed and intimidated by the authorities, because they are not the ones who will go to jail. Even those people who are trustworthy can often be tricked by the authorities into revealing damaging and incriminating information. It is safest for all cell members to keep their involvement in the group amongst themselves. The fewer people who know, the less evidence there is in the long run.

SECURITY VIOLATING BEHAVIOURS

In an attempt to impress others, activists may behave in ways that compromise security. Some people do this frequently they are habitually gossiping and bragging. Some activists say inappropriate things only when they consume alcohol. Many activists make occasional breeches of security because there was a momentary temptation to say something or hint at something that shouldnt have

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been said or implied. In most every situation, the desire to be accepted is the root cause. Those people who tend to be the greatest security risks are those activists who have low self-esteem and strongly desire the approval of their peers. Certainly it is natural to seek friendship and recognition for our efforts, but it is imperative that we keep these desires in check so we do not jeopardize the safety of other activists or ourselves. People who place their desire for friendship over the importance of the cause can do serious damage to our security.

The following are examples of security-violating behaviours: Lying: To impress others, liars claim to have done illegal actions. Such lies not only compromise the persons security as cops will not
take what is said as a lie but also hinders solidarity and trust.

Gossiping: Some people think they can win friends because they are privy to special information. These gossips will tell others about

who did what action or, if they dont know who did it, guess at who they think did what actions or just spread rumors about who did it. This sort of talk is very damaging. People need to remember that rumors are all that are needed to instigate an investigation or even lay charges.

Bragging: Some people who partake in illegal direct action might be tempted to brag about it to their friends. This not only jeopardizes

the braggers security, but also that of the other people involved with the action (as they may be suspected by association). As well the people who s/he told can be charged as accessories after the fact. An activist who brags also sets a bad example.

Indirect-Bragging: Indirect braggers are people who make a big production on how they want to remain anonymous, avoid protests,
and stay underground. They might not come out and say that they do illegal direct action, but they make sure everyone within earshot knows they are up to something.

They are no better than braggers, but they try to be more sophisticated about it by pretending to maintain security. However, if they were serious about security, they would just make up a good excuse as to why they are not as active, or why they cant make it to the protest . Concealing sensitive information from even trusted comrades is far better than jeopardising underground work.

EDUCATE TO LIBERATE
The unfortunate truth is there are some security-ignorant people in the movement and others who have possibly been raised in a scene that thrives on bragging and gossiping. It doesnt mean these people are bad, but it does mean they need to inform themselves and learn about personal and group security. Even seasoned activists make mistakes when there is a general lack of security consciousness in our groups. And thats where those of you who are reading this can help. We must ALWAYS act to inform persons whose behaviour breaches security. If someone you know is bragging about doing an action or spreading security-compromising gossip, it is your responsibility to explain to her or him why that sort of talk violates security and is inappropriate. You should strive to share this knowledge in a manner that encourages the persons understanding and changes her/his behaviour. It should be done without damaging the persons pride. Show your sincere interest in helping him/her to become a more effective activist. Keep your humility and avoid presenting an attitude of superiority. An insensitive approach can raise an individuals defences and prevent them from listening to and using the advice offered. The goal of addressing these issues with others is to reduce insecure behaviour, rather than showing how much more security-conscious you are. Share your concerns and knowledge in private, so that the person does not feel as if they are being publicly humiliated. Addressing the person as soon as possible after the security violation increases effectiveness. If each of us remains responsible for discussing security information with people who slip up, we can dramatically improve security in our groups and activities. When people recognise that lying, gossiping, bragging, and inappropriate debriefing damages both themselves and others, these behaviours will soon end. By developing a culture where breaches of security are pointed out and discouraged, all sincere activists will quickly understand.

DEALING WITH CHRONIC SECURITY PROBLEMS

So what do we do with activists who repeatedly violate security precautions even after being informed several times? Unfortunately for them, the best thing to do is to cut them loose. Discuss the issue openly and ask them to leave your meetings, base camps and organizations.

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With law enforcement budgets on the increase, new anti-terrorist laws that call for stiffer sentences for political actions, and with courts handing down long sentences for political crimes, the stakes are too high to allow chronic security offenders to work among us. By creating a security culture, we have an effective defence against informers and agents who try to infiltrate groups. Imagine an informer who, every time they ask another activist about their activities, receives information about security. It would frustrate the informers work. When other activists discovered that she/he continued to violate security precautions after being repeatedly informed, there would be grounds for isolating the person from our groups. And that would be one less informer for us to deal with! A brief primer on the Canadian state security apparatus Recent incidents of repression against activists in British Columbia illuminate the need for grassroots people to understand and practice movement security. Police monitoring, infiltration and agent provocateurs are routinely used by the state to collect information about our groups, or specific individuals in them, and to subvert our activities. For example, during the APEC hearings, it was revealed that over seventy groups and individuals were monitored before and during the APEC meetings in 1997. A paid industry informant/disruptor was identified at a wilderness action camp in 1999. Provocateurs also targeted some Vancouver activists, trying to convince them to disclose information and as well, to break the law. The Canadian security apparatus identifies a number of our groups and activities as a threat to national security. People and organizations are widely targeted; even avowed pacifists have been included in surveillance and repressive measures. According to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS) annual reports, activities targeted in the late 1990s included: native resistance, environmental & animal rights movements, anti-poverty, anti-globalization, anti police brutality, anti-racist, anarchist and communist groups. With the rise in militant First Nations struggles; covert direct action against corporations; the renewed militancy and strength of popular struggles; and the mass-medias increasing focus on anarchists and anti-globalization protests, there is also a growing level of police surveillance and repression. The need for security in our movements is obvious however, it is incredibly important that we dont fall into the trap of using our awareness of security issues to shut other people out of our growing movements. One of the key aims of the FBIs Counter-Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO) operations against the Black Panthers and American Indian Movement (AIM) was to spread distrust and paranoia so that these activists would be reluctant to integrate new people into their struggles. A security culture can exist in a large movement; indeed, it is one indication of a movements strength.Arming ourselves with knowledge about how the system works and works against activists is essential in building security culture. The aim of this section is to give a brief run down of the working of domestic intelligence in Canada. In this way, we can better understand how to avoid its traps.

AN OVERVIEW OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) is probably the best known of the security agencies that deal with activist threats. Its predecessor was the Security Service division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, (RCMP-SS). In 1984, following the MacDonald Commission on the illegal activities of the RCMP, the civilian spy agency CSIS took over RCMP spy work. That said, the RCMP did not abandon its intelligence gathering, its just that CSIS specifically gathers political intelligence. The split from the RCMP allowed the new spy agency to do legally what the Mounties had been doing illegally. At the operations level, the new agency was granted more leeway in terms of public accountability than the Mounties had ever had. CSIS carries out a wide range of surveillance activities. Since they are not a law-enforcement agency and since their evidence is not used in court, nothing stops them from contravening the few regulations that do exist regarding privacy rights. For example, CSIS is not required to inform people, as is RCMP, ninety days after a wiretap (or bugging) is over. Agents working for CSIS are allowed, with authorization, to enter peoples homes to plant bugs, wiretap phones, open mail and look into health, employment and government records without ever having to tell a targeted individual what they are doing. The information that they gather is used to build profiles and dossiers (files) on individuals, organizations, networks, etc. This information is also passed on to other wings of the federal security system who are responsible for law enforcement, and will then obtain whatever warrants are necessary for legal surveillance (to be brought into court as evidence). The National Security Investigation Service (NSIS) is the primary law-enforcement wing in Canada. The NSIS is a section of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Most major cities across the country have an NSIS office including Vancouver, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa, and Toronto. The NSIS maintains a computer database on activists, immigrants and so called terrorists which is housed in

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Ottawa. It is believed that the Vancouver NSIS employs between 12 and 18 members. Within NSIS there are several sub-groups called Team 1, Team 2, Team 3 etc. that have different investigative targets. They employ informants, infiltrators, personal physical surveillance, electronic surveillance including phone and room bugs and other means of investigation and research. The RCMP/NSIS also have other resources at their disposal during counter-insurgency operations. Special O is a team of surveillance specialists that may be called upon. Special I is a penetration team whose specialty is to break into homes, vehicles and other properties for investigative purposes. They are the team, which among other things, installs listening devices, photographs building interiors, etc. In a long-running case based in Vancouver, all of these methods of surveillance were used against several Vancouver activists. During the Vancouver investigation, house and vehicle bugs were located by some targeted individuals. The bugs had large battery packs attached to facilitate less frequent battery changes. The NSIS also visited several activists across Canada in an attempt to question them regarding the individuals under investigation.

THE GOLDEN RULE OF SILENCE

It needs to be stressed throughout our movements that no one is under any legal obligation to provide to the police anymore information than ones own name, address and birth date, and this only if one is under arrest. That is it! Saying anything more jeopardizes security. Even answering seemingly insignificant questions can assist the police in developing personality profiles on a range of activists. It may not be evidence but it is used to give police leads on other suspects and construct intent during legal proceedings. The only principled response to police questioning when under arrest is to say nothing more than your name, birth date and address. If questioned further you can simply say I have nothing to say (except in the presence of my lawyer. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is an agency of the National Defence / War department, which has been long clouded in secrecy. They collect and process telephone, fax and computer communications of foreign states, corporations and individuals. The federal government uses the intelligence gleaned from the data to support troops abroad, catch terrorists and further Canadas economic goals (what that means is up to them). Although the CSE is not technically allowed to collect the communications of Canadian citizens, it is known to be a partner in the Echelon project a multinational monitoring operation which sees CSE and counterpart agencies in the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand share intercepted communications of interest with one another, effectively creating a global surveillance web. The Terrorist Extremist Section (TES Unit) is British Columbias anti-terrorist unit. A joint Vancouver/Victoria Police Department/RCMP unit called the Organized Crime Agency (formerly the Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit CLEU), it is believed that the this unit employs two or three members only. Most activists will be intimately familiar with their local police forces. Be aware that cops do not only show up in blue uniforms but routinely practice crowd infiltration and carry out surveillance and investigative activities either alone or jointly with the RCMP depending on the type of case. Watch for them on demonstrations as they like to come along and take photographs and video for the record and they often appear in crowds as fellow demonstrators. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL

Most Western nation-states follow a model of counterinsurgency developed by a British intelligence expert named Kitson who wrote, Low Intensity Operations, after much field work in the colonies. He broke down movement development into three stages: The Preparatory Phase: The movement is small, tends to focus on education, publishing and groundwork. The Non-Violent Phase: The movement takes on more of a mass character. Large demonstrations are the norm. The Insurgency Phase: The movement has taken on a popular character. Perhaps a more assertive, guerrilla component has emerged.
Kitson advises that the primary work of the intelligence agency should occur during the preparatory phase. At this time the movements are most vulnerable. They have not experienced a high degree of repression. They consider talk of security as mere paranoia. As they are not breaking laws they believe that it is safe to organize completely openly. The intelligence agency is therefore able to exploit these conditions and develop detailed dossiers on a wide range of people. The information will be extremely valuable to them later on.

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Important historical revolutionary activities and groups began as small, serious-minded projects that grew in spite of surveillance and repression. It is therefore important to practice security at all points in the movements development. State agents gather more than just hard evidence; they are interested in knowing about radicals beliefs as well. Police try to control with fear; dont be intimidated. Remember If an agent comes knockin, do no talkin.

Everything you ever wanted to know about informers and infiltrators

Infiltrators seek information on most radical groups. The return of mass mobilizations and radical actions in anti-globalization, antipoverty, anti-racism and anti-police brutality demonstrations, as well as declarations to continue struggling in the streets and underground has drawn attention from the states secret police. More infiltrators will be sent into our ranks to try to bribe, entice or manipulate individuals. The extent to which they are able to infiltrate our groups depends on our seriousness and responsibility in learning about, promoting, and working within a security culture. Radical movements can learn to better identify covert enemies in our projects. Once identified, appropriate action is needed to undo, contain, or remove the danger. This section is intended to arm you with information on how to spot and deal with informers, infiltrators, and provocateurs in our ranks.

WHO IS AN INFORMER?
There are actually two kinds of informers. The deliberate informer is an undercover agent on the payroll of government or industry. The second type is the activist-turned-informer. Both kinds try to infiltrate our ranks and are equally dangerous to our movements. Lets discuss the deliberate informers first. They are often difficult to identify. Informers can be of any age and any profile, but they do have a few discernible methods or operation, or modus operandi. These are: *The hang around type they are persons who regularly show at meetings and actions but generally dont get involved. They collect documents, listen to conversations and note whos who. This observation role is relatively inactive. *The sleeper type is similar to the hang around modus operandi, except that their absorption of information is used to activate their role at a later date. *The novice type presents a somewhat more active role, but confines themselves to less prominent work. They dont take initiatives, but the work they do is valued. This helps them build trust and credibility. *The super activist type comes out of nowhere and all of a sudden, they are everywhere. Whether its a meeting, protest, or an action, this person will be right in the thick of it. Keep in mind however that this can also be the mark of a new activist, whose enthusiasm and commitment is so strong that she/he wants to fight the power every minute of the day. It should be said that with several of these modus operandi, the behaviour is hard to distinguish from a sincere new persons involvement. How do we tell them apart? Well, a planted infiltrator will ask a lot of questions about the direct action groups, individuals and illegal activities. She/he may suggest targets and volunteer to do reconnaissance as well as take part in the action. Infiltrators also try to build profiles on individuals, their beliefs, habits, friends, and weaknesses. At the same time, infiltrators will shield their true selves from other activists. Anyone who asks a lot of questions about direct actions isnt necessarily an infiltrator, but they ARE someone you should be careful with. At the very least, they need to be informed about security issues. New activists should understand that direct action tactics can be risky (though some risks are worth taking!) and that asking a lot of questions endangers people. If the person persists in asking questions, there is a problem and appropriate measures must be taken. Activists who cant understand the need for security should be shunned and kept away from the movement. Some types of infiltrators stay in the background and offer material support, other informants may have nothing to do with the group or action, but initially heard certain plans and tipped off the police. Among the more active types of infiltrators can be a gregarious person that quickly wins group trust. Some infiltrators will attempt to gain key forms of control, such as of communications, secretarial, or finances. Other informants can use charm and sex to get intimate with activists, to better spy or potentially destabilize group dynamics. Active infiltrators can also be provocateurs specializing in disruptive tactics such as sowing disorder and demoralizing meetings or demos, heightening conflicts whether they are interpersonal or about action or theory, or pushing things further with bravado and violent proposals. Infiltrators often need to build credibility; theymay do this by claiming to have participated in past actions.

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Also, infiltrators will try to exploit activist sensibilities regarding oppression and diversity. Intelligence organizations will send in someone who will pose as a person experiencing the common oppression of the particular activist group. For example, in the 1960 s, the Weather Underground (Weathermen a white anti-imperialist armed struggle in the US) was infiltrated by an ordinary Joe informant with a working class image. Black war veterans infiltrated the Black Panther Party. A fresh example of police infiltration and manipulation tactics is that of Germinal, a group targeted for arrest two days prior to the April 2001 anti-FTAA demonstrations in Quebec City. Five months prior, the police set up a false transport company and specifically postered opportunities for employment in the vicinity of a Germinal member seeking employment. The trap worked. Tipped off by an initial informant, two undercover cops worked for four months in the group. This operation resulted in the media-hyped dismantlement of the group on the eve of the summit. Seven Germinal members were arrested, 5 of whom spent 41 days in preventive custody, only to be released under draconian bail conditions. The polices covert action was in part about dismantling the group, but it was also about creating a media/propaganda campaign to justify the policestate security for the summit.

BACKGROUND CHECKS AN ESSENTIAL TOOL

What are some ways of looking into the possibility that someone is an informer? Firstly, unless you have concrete reasons or evidence that someone is an infiltrator, spreading rumours will damage the movement. Rumours that you do hear of should be questioned and traced back. A persons background can be looked into, especially activism they claimed to have participated in, in other places. Do your contacts in those places know of the person, their involvement? Did problems ever come up? One important advantage of having links with far away places is that it makes it more difficult for informers to fabricate claims about their activities. What are a persons means of living? Who are her or his friends? What sorts of contradictions exist between their pro fessed ideals and how they live? One of our strengths as activists is our ideas and values, our counterculture, our attitudes towards the dominant society. Our sincerity in discussing these things is also a way of learning about each other. When planning for new actions, care must be taken concerning who is approached. As little as possible should be said about the actual action plan until a persons political philosophy, ideas about strategy, and levels of risk they are willing to engage in have been discussed on an abstract basis. If there is a strong basis for believing this person might be interested in the action, then the general idea of an action can be run by them. Only when they have agreed to participate, do they come to the group to discuss action details. During the trials of activists, police often reveal the kinds of information that they have gathered concerning our groups and activities. Note what revelations come out of these trials. What are the possible and likely sources of the information? Speak to persons that have been arrested and interrogated to see what they may have said to the police, or discussed in their jail cell. Placing infiltrators in social justice and revolutionary movements is an established practice. It was done to the Black Panthers, AIM, the Front de Libration du Qubec (FLQ), and the peace/ anti-war/and anti-nuclear movements on a large scale. Small groups, such as affinity groups, or working groups of larger more open organizations, need to be especially careful with new members. Direct action organizing is ideally done with longstanding, trusted members of the activist community. This doesnt mean that no one else should ever be allowed into these groups. On the contrary, if our movement is to continue to grow, new people should be welcome and recruited; we just need to keep security in mind and exercise caution at all times. The Unwitting Informer Possibly an even greater threat to our movements than the covert operative is the activist-turned-informer, either unwittingly or through coercion. The unwitting informer is the activist who cant keep his/her mouth shut. If someone brags to you about what theyve done, make sure this person never has any knowledge that can incriminate you, because sooner or later, the wrong person will hear of it. These activists dont mean to do harm, but their bragging can be very damaging. It is your responsibility to instruct these people on the importance of security culture. The other type of activist-informer is the person who cracks under pressure and starts talking to save his or her own skin. Many activists get drawn into situations they are not able to handle, and some are so caught up in the excitement that they either dont realize what the consequences can be, or they just dont think theyll ever have to face them.

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Keep in mind that the categories of planted informer and activist-turned-informer can, and have been blurred. In 1970, during the height of the FLQs activities, Carole de Vault a young Parti Quebecois (PQ) activist was drawn to the FLQ, but then became a paid police agent. Her activism was with the PQ; she disagreed with the heavier FLQ actions since it threatened the legitimate work of the PQ. Her involvement with the FLQ was as a planted police informer.

KNOW YOUR OWN LIMITS

We have to know the possible consequences of every action we take and be prepared to deal with them. There is no shame in not being able to do an action because of responsibilities or circumstances that make it impossible for you to do jail time at this point in your life. As long as capitalism and all of its evils exist, there will be resistance. In other words, there will be plenty of great actions for you to participate in when your life circumstances are more favourable. If others are dependent on you for support, you arent willing to lose your job, or drop out of school or ruin your future career, DONT DO THE ACTION. If you are addicted to an illicit drug and/or have a lengthy criminal record, the cops will use this to pressure you for information. If you dont feel capable of detoxing under interrogation and brutality, or doing a hell of a lot more time than your comrades, DONT DO THE ACTION. Make certain that you talk with others in your affinity group about situations that make you uncertain whether you should be involved in particular actions, especially those that are at a high risk of being criminalized. Remember there is no excuse for turning in comrades to the police and those activists that do effectively excommunicate themselves from our movements. We must offer no legal or jail support to those activists who turn in others for their impact on our movement is farreaching and can have devastating effects.

COVERT ACTION OTHER THAN INFILTRATION

Covert (or Special) Action from police and secret service is also done outside of the group, with or without infiltration. These efforts include: intimidation and harassment, blackmail and manipulation, propaganda, informing employers and security checks, as well as physical sabotage like theft and arson. Intimidation and harassment can include visits from secret service agents, calling you or your partner by their first name on the street, thefts where obvious clues are left. Police will try to blackmail people if they want to recruit or neutralize them. Police uses propaganda in an attempt to poison the atmosphere and manipulate media and public opinion. In December 1971, when the FLQ was near its end and heavily infiltrated, the RCMP issued a false FLQ communiqu in the name of the Minerve cell. The communiqu adopted a hardline position, denouncing the abandonment of terrorist action by a well-known activist, Pierre Vallires, and urging the continuation of armed struggle. In Genoa, Italy, police played an active covert role in trying to discredit black bloc anarchists during the July 2001 meeting of the G8. Several reports reveal that Italian police masked as black bloc members attacked demonstrators and small shops. With a lack of public information, the police help manipulate public discourse along the lines of how do legitimate demonstrators isolate activist thugs? Slanderous propaganda can take the form of anonymous letters, or rumours aimed at the activist milieu. There are also examples where police will make uncorroborated, casual accusations to journalists that, to use two examples, a person is a drug dealer, or that at a demonstration, a person aimed a handgun at an officer. It is often for slanderous reasons that police charge activists with weapons possession for having a penknife, or charges of violence like assault. The growth of the anti-globalization movement has been accompanied by renewed anarchist-scare propaganda on the part of authorities. Politicians and police attempt to massage public opinion, preparing people for a crack down, in order to legitimate the use of heavier methods of social control, exclusion and repression. Manipulative disinformation spread through the media needs to be denounced as lies. There are activist-friendly lawyers who can help us demand retractions and corrections. Speak to the journalists involved, call them on their sloppy, dishonest work, expose their hypocrisy, and complain to the journalists ethics body. We can not rely on capitalist, private-media for any kind of fairness. It is valuable for us to learn more about the covert actions of the police. There exists a long and documented history. Factual information about police covert activities also comes out as evidence presented in court. An important, too often neglected part of our strength is our knowledge of, and our protection from, police action against us.

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MOVING AGAINST INFORMERS: CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

(Taken from PROTECTING OURSELVES FROM STATE REPRESSION: A MANUAL FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVISTS. Published in 1984 by the Anti-Repression Resource Team Jackson, Mississippi)

Assuming that the security people within the group have suspicions about a group member being an informer/provocateur, it is useful for security/leadership to resolve certain questions both before and after the investigation:

(a) How badly do you want to know whether the person is in agent or not? Clearly, if the person under suspicion is relatively important to

the groups functioning, then leadership must know one way or the other. The more important the person under suspicion is to the group, the more intensive the investigation. We may suggest methods of investigation which are unorthodox and from a certain point of view morally indefensible. But the question is always how badly the group needs to know. No group need use all or any of the methods we describe. But under the condition that the correct information is a life-and-death matter for the group, certain drastic measures may be justified.

(b) What will be done if the information is inconclusive? Often there is not enough evidence to confirm that someone is a police agent,

but there IS enough evidence to confirm certain suspicions. A great deal will depend upon what is at stake with the person under suspicion. In general, the choices come down to:

1) labeling the person a security risk and acting accordingly; 2) doing nothing outwardly but continuing the investigation; 3) isolating the person from sensitive work but keeping him or her in the group; 4) moving to a higher stage of investigation. (c) What will be done If the person does turn out to be an agent? While common sense dictates that the person be exposed and severed
from the group, other actions might be initiated. If the presence of the agent is a real threat to the group, then the agent should be neutralized in an effective manner. Usually wide exposure of the agent will accomplish an effective neutralization. But if the agent is no great threat to the groups functioning, the agent staying inside the group may be useful for other purposes. The group might decide that they prefer to keep the agent, rather than risk not knowing who would replace a known quantity. It the agent is not in a sensitive position, can be monitored and isolated from important work, the group may want to keep such an agent at a low organizational level. Or the agent might be given tasks that seem to be sensitive but are in reality not crucial to the group. Under the cover of doing sensitive work, false and semi-false information about the group can be relayed to the intelligence agencies that the agent belongs to. Or perhaps certain information that is in fact true about the group can be willfully discredited by creation of pseudo-events and/or false information. Remember that when the intelligence agencies have a great deal of contradictory information, it decreases their ability to act decisively against the group.

(d) What are the responsibilities to other groups of the groups knowledge of an informer? If the group makes a decision to sever

connection with the agent it is certainly the groups responsibility to quietly contact leadership in other groups to warn them about the agent. Often public exposure is done through the groups newspaper/newsletter/journal; in this case, the news article should be sent to a wide variety of groups. The more pressing problem is the instance where there are only suspicions but not decisive evidence. Experience has shown that suspicions are taken seriously only when then is a political bond that exists between persons with long movement experience. People who have been in the movement a long time, and who are known to each other and trusted as dedicated movement people, can convey agent suspicions that will get a favorable hearing or be readily believed. This old hands trust network is relatively independent of political point of view; veteran leaders of rival radical organizations can freely and easily exchange information on matters of security.

YOUR RIGHTS
(Remember, this was written in 2001 for Canadians. It is best to talk with a qualified lawyer to learn about your rights as they exist today in your nation. ~Ed.)

1. YOU DONT HAVE TO TALK TO THE POLICE OR INVESTIGATORS. You do not have to talk to them on the street, if youve been
arrested, or even if youre in jail. Do not talk about illegal actions with fellow inmates in holding as they may be plants.

2. YOU DONT HAVE TO LET CSIS OR THE POLICE INTO YOUR HOME OR OFFICE UNLESS THEY HAVE A SEARCH OR ARREST
WARRANT. Demand to see the warrant. It must specifically describe the place to be searched and things to be seized. It must be

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authorized by a judge and should bear a signature.

3. IF THE POLICE DO PRESENT A WARRANT, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO TELL THEM ANYTHING OTHER THAN YOU NAME,

ADDRESS AND BIRTH DATE. Carefully observe the officers; youre in your own home youre not required to stay in one room. You should take written notes of what they do, their names, badge numbers, and what agency theyre from. Have friends who are present act as witnesses. Its risky to let cops roam around alone in your place.

4. IF THE POLICE TRY TO QUESTION YOU OR TRY TO ENTER YOUR HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT, JUST SAY NO. The police are

very skilled at getting information from people, so attempting to outwit them is very risky. You can never tell how a seemingly harmless bit of information can hurt you or someone else.

5. ANYTHING YOU SAY TO THE POLICE MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU AND OTHER PEOPLE. Once youve been arrested, you cant
talk you way out of it. Dont try to engage cops in a dialogue or respond to accusations.

6. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO REVEAL YOUR HIV STATUS TO THE POLICE OR JAIL PERSONNEL. If youve been arrested you should
refuse to take a blood test until youve been brought before a judge and have a lawyer of your choice.

7. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO TELEPHONE A LAWYER OF YOUR CHOICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. This means after youve been arrested,

charged and booked into jail. This does not mean however, that youll be given the right to speak with you family and friends. This is left up to the discretion of the police involved in your case.

8. LYING TO THE POLICE IS A CRIME. 9. IF YOU ARE NERVOUS ABOUT SIMPLY REFUSING TO TALK, YOU MAY FIND IT EASIER TO TELL THEM TO CONTACT YOUR
LAWYER. Once a lawyer is involved, people will know more about your state i.e. charges, bail, court date, etc. ####
Related: Guerrilla Warfare by Che Guevara (1960) (Read Chapter I: General Principles of Guerrilla Warfare here or here.) For a more detailed discussion of developing an activist security culture in todays world, read Deep Green Resistance by Aric McBay, Lierre Keith, and Derrick Jensen. (Seven Stories Press, 2011, 556 pp.) Watch more videos from DGR at http://www.youtube.com/user/DeepGreenResistance Material collected by Rady Ananda.

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