Bartosz Brożek, Phillosohy in Neuroscience

J63 P h i l o s o p h y i n N e u r o s c i e n c e
Bartosz Broek
Jagiellonian Uniersity
Copernicus Center or Interdisciplinary Studies
Philosophy in Neuroscience
In this essay I would like to consider some relations between philoso-
phy and neuroscience. I begin by criticizing the much celebrated concep-
tion o Maxwell Bennett and Peter Iacker, deeloped in 1be Pbio.obica
ovvaatiov. of êvro.cievce
1
. I posit that their account o the relationships
between neuroscience and philosophy is not only too limiting, but also
based on unacceptable assumptions ,Section 1,. Next, I attempt to apply
to neuroscience the methodology o philosophy iv science`, proposed by
Michael Ieller
2
. In doing so, I deelop urther Ieller`s conception ,Sec-
tion 2,, and try to illustrate how it may help us to renect oer the neurosci-
entic theories and methodology ,section 3,.
It must be stressed that the term neuroscience` is understood ery
broadly here and reers to all kinds o interdisciplinary study o the ner-
ous system, embracing arious aspects thereo, rom molecular to beha-
ioural, and including, ivter aia, behaioural neuroscience, cellular neuro-
science, clinical neuroscience, cognitie neuroscience, computational neu-
roscience, cultural neuroscience, deelopmental neuroscience, molecular
1
See M.R. Bennett, P.M.S. Iacker, Pbio.obica ovvaatiov. of êvro.cievce, \iley, Black-
well, Malden, Oxord 2003.
2
See M. Ieller, or i. Pbio.ob, iv cievce`Po..ibe., this olume, pp. 13-24.
philosophyinscience.indd 163 2011-10-04 12:05:46
J64 B a r t o s z B r o e k
neuroscience, neuroimaging, neuroengineering, neuroinormatics, neuro-
linguistics, social neuroscience and systems neuroscience. Ioweer, I be-
liee that my conclusions are applicable, vvtati. vvtavai., to any renement
o the term, i.e. to any reasonable rendering o neuroscience .ev.v .tricto`.
J. The Apriorization Iallacy
At the session o the .vericav Pbio.obica ...ociatiov which took place in
2005 in New \ork a discussion was held around Maxwell Bennett and Peter
Iacker`s book Pbio.obica ovvaatiov. of êvro.cievce published in 2003. 1he
disputants were the authors as well as Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two
philosophers whose conceptions are subject to seere critique in the book.
1he goal o Bennett and Iacker`s book is described in the ollowing way:
|1he book| is concerned with the conceptual oundations o cogviti
re neuroscience - oundations constituted by the structure relation-
ship among the psychological concepts inoled in inestigations
into the neural underpinnings o human cognitie, aectie and
olitional capacities. Inestigating logical relations among concepts
is a philosophical task. Guiding that inestigation down pathways
that will illuminate brain research is a neuroscientic one
3
.
1he authors careully introduce the basic assumptions o the method o
conceptual analysis which they use to assess neurobiological theories. In par-
ticular, they clearly distinguish between conceptual and empirical questions:
Distinguishing conceptual questions rom empirical ones is o the
rst importance. |.| Conceptual questions antecede matters o
truth and alsehood. 1hey are questions concerning our orms o
representation, not questions concerning the truth or alsehood o
empirical statements. 1hese orms are presupposed by true ,and
alse, scientic statements and by correct ,and incorrect, scienti-
c theories. 1hey determine not what is empirically true or alse,
but rather what does and what does not make sense. Ience con-
ceptual questions are not amenable to scientic inestigation and
experimentation or to scientic theorizing. lor the concepts and
3
M. Bennett, D. Dennett, P. Iacker, J. Searle, êvro.cievce ava Pbio.ob,: raiv, Miva, ava
avgvage, Columbia Uniersity Press, New \ork 200, p. 3.
J6S P h i l o s o p h y i n N e u r o s c i e n c e
conceptual relationships in question are presupposed by any such
inestigations and theorizing
4
.
\hat needs to be stressed here is the a riori character o concepts. Con-
cepts are not subject to empirical study ,at least in the contexts that inter-
est Bennett and Iacker,. 1hey constitute a network or a scheme akin to the
structure o the Kantian 1ranscendental Lgo: it is within this scheme that we
comprehend the world ,interpret` our experiences,. 1hus, the questions per-
taining to the relationships between the concepts as well as the criteria o their
applicability are rior to any empirical problems. 1he ery possibility o posing
an empirical question is conditioned on the correct application o concepts.
Bennett and Iacker maintain that the eitvotir o their project is to iden-
tiy a undamental allacy, one that has ar reaching consequences, and is
common in the work o neuroscientists and some philosophers o mind.
1he allacy was described already by Aristotle who obsered that: to say
that the soul is angry is as i one remarked that the soul weaes or builds.
lor it is surely better not to say that the soul pities, learns or thinks, but that
a man does these with his soul`
5
. Ience, Bennett and Iacker speak o Ar-
istotle`s Principle which reads: it is a mistake to ascribe to an animal`s soul
properties which are correctly predicable o an animal as a whole only
6
.
In the context o contemporary neurobiology, the analogue o the Ar-
istotle`s Principle is what Bennett and Iacker call the Mereological lallacy,
which consists in ascribing to the brain - i.e., a part o an animal - attri-
butes that are literally predicable o an animal as a whole
. 1hey claim that

the Mereological lallacy is surprisingly common. In the neurobiological
literature there are hundreds o claims that the brain thinks`, perceies`,
is intelligent`, ormulates hypotheses`, etc. As Bennett and Iacker put it,
talk o the brain`s perceiing, thinking, guessing or belieing, or o
one hemisphere o the brain`s knowing things o which the other
hemisphere is ignorant, is widespread among contemporary neuro-
scientists. 1his is sometimes deended as being no more than a triial
faov ae arer. But that is quite mistaken. lor the characteristic orm
o explanation in contemporary cognitie neuroscience consists in
ascribing psychological attributes to the brain and its parts in order to
4
biaev, p. 4.
5
biaev, p. 131.
6
biaev, p. 132.
biaev.
explain the possession o psychological attributes and the exercise ,and
deciencies in the exercise, o cognitie powers by human beings
8
.
Bennett and Iacker consider this approach criptocartesian`. Cartesianism
posits a strict distinction between mind and body as two separate substances
and claims that the psychological attributes may be predicated o the mind
only. Criptocartesianism o the contemporary neuroscience, on the other
hand, replaces the mind-body dualism with the brain-body distinction, and
urges us to use psychological predicates exclusiely in relation to the brain.
One may ask whether the problem Bennett and Iacker identiy is
a real one. One may argue, or example, that such claims as the brain
thinks` or the right hemisphere is responsible or decision-making` are
not to be taken literally. Some undamental linguistic intuitions and the
basic knowledge o language are enough to realize that such an utilization
o the words think` or decide` is metaphorical or analogical. Bennett and
Iacker are ully aware o this strategy to deend the existing neuroscien-
tic idiom. 1hey elaborate it urther claiming that the strategy may be used
in our dierent ways. lirst, one may insist that psychological concepts
used by neuroscientists, e.g. to think`, hae a dierent, deriatie mean-
ing to the meaning o the terms in the ordinary language. Second, the
neuroscientic meaning` o a term may be analogical or constitute some
other extension o the meaning o the corresponding ordinary language
concept. 1hird, it may also be treated as a homonym: to think` or to de-
cide` in a description o brain unctions may hae an altogether dierent
meaning than the corresponding ordinary language terms. linally, such
concepts in neuroscience may be treated as metaphorical expressions.
Bennett and Iacker beliee, howeer, that the aboe described strate-
gies ail. 1hey put orward a number o arguments to back this claim, the
most important o them, one that is applicable to all our strategies, is the
ollowing. According to Bennett and Iacker there exists a criterion that
suces to show that the use o psychological terms in neurobiology is
neither a case o taking adantage o deriatie meaning, nor o analogi-
cal, homonymous or metaphorical. 1he criterion in question is the analysis
o covcv.iov. that the neuroscientists draw rom the claims such as the
brain thinks`. Let us hae a look at an example.
8
biaev, p. .
Colin Blakemore notes:
\e seem drien to say that such neurons |as they respond in a highly
specic manner to, e.g., line orientation| hae knowledge. 1hey hae
intelligence, or they are able to estimate the probability o outside
eents - eents that are important to the animal in question. And
the brain gains its knowledge by a process analogous to the inductie
reasoning o the classical scientic method. Neurons present argu-
ments to the brain based on the specic eatures that they detect, ar-
guments on which the brain constructs its hypothesis o perception
9
.
In this passage Blakemore claims that neurons possess knowledge`.
Ioweer, he does not end here, on the basis o this obseration he con-
structs a complex conception o the interaction between neurons and the
brain, which utilizes almost exclusiely psychological terminology ,intel-
ligence`, inductie reasoning`, construction o a perceptual hypothesis`,.
But why can`t we consider this evtire passage as one complex metaphor
Blakemore, in a dierent context, obseres:
laced with such oerwhelming eidence or topographic patterns
o actiity in the brain it is hardly surprising that neurophysiologists
and neuroanatomists hae come to speak o the brain haing maps,
which are thought to play an essential part in the representation
and interpretation o the world by the brain, just as the maps o
an atlas do or the reader o them. |...| But is there a danger in the
metaphorical use o such terms as language`, grammar`, and map`
to describe the properties o the brain |...| I cannot beliee that
any neurophysiologist beliees that there is a ghostly cartographer
browsing through the cerebral atlas. Nor do I think that the em-
ployment o common language words ,such as map, representa-
tion, code, inormation and een language, is a conceptual blunder
o the kind |imagined|. Such metaphorical imagery is a mixture o
empirical description, poetic license and inadequate ocabulary
10
.
Iere, howeer, Bennett and Iacker launch their counterattack. 1hey ask
how one should understand such claims as the brain interprets the world`.
1hey suggest that Blakemore`s use o metaphorical` expressions such as
a map` leads directly to the utilization o inadequate terminology in the entire
argumentation. 1his shows, as they beliee, that there is no metaphor here,
rather, Blakemore commits the Mereological lallacy. In addition, they obsere:
9
biaev, p. 16.
10
biaev, p. 32.
whateer sense we can gie to Blakemore`s claim that brain-maps`
,which are not actually maps, play an essential part in the brain`s
representation and interpretation o the world`, it cannot be just as
the maps o an atlas do or the reader o them`. lor a map is a picto-
rial representation, made in accordance with conentions o mapping
and rules o projection. Someone who can read an atlas must know
and understand these conentions, and read o, rom the maps, the
eatures o what is represented. But the maps` in the brain are not
maps, in this sense, at all. 1he brain is not akin to the reader o a map,
since it cannot be said to know any conentions o representations
or methods o projection or to read anything o the topographical
arrangement o ring cells in accordance with a set o conentions.
lor the cells are not arranged in accordance with conentions at all,
and the correlation between their ring and eatures o the percep-
tual eld is not a conentional but a causal one
11
.
Bennett and Iacker`s position is that the eidence that neuroscientists
commit the Mereological lallacy does not lie in the act that on occasions
they use inadequate` psychological terms to describe the unctioning o the
brain, which may easily count as taking adantage o analogy, metaphor,
homonym or using a concept with a deriatie meaning. 1he Mereological
lallacy results when neuroscientists transer entire complexes o concepts
rom the psychological discourse` to the neuroscientic` one, and - on the
basis o such inadequate attributions - they draw conclusions.
Bennett and Iacker`s theses were seerely criticized by Daniel Den-
nett and John Searle. Dennett`s critique ,or at least the part o it that inter-
ests us here, is well encapsulated in the ollowing passage:
Iacker`s insistence that philosophy is an a riori discipline that has
no continuity with empirical science is the chie source o the pro-
blems bedeiling |his| project
12
.
1hus, Dennett seems to beliee that the key assumption o Pbio.obi
ca ovvaatiov. of êvro.cievce is wrong. It says that conceptual analysis is
a riori, i.e. that the conceptual scheme and, what ollows, language - are
logically prior to the empirical studies. According to Dennett, an answer to
the question o whether the rules o language are used correctly is by no
means absolute. 1here exists no collection o absolute meaning rules or
any language. Dennett is anything but gentle when he obseres:
11
biaev, p. 33.
12
biaev, p. 80.
I Iacker were able to show us the rules |o the correct use o words|,
and show us just how the new uses connict with them, we might be
in a position to agree or disagree with him, but he is just making this
up. Ie has no idea what the rules` or the use o these eeryday psy-
chological terms are. More tellingly, his insistence on an a prioristic
methodology systematically blinds him to what he is doing here
13
.
I the conceptual scheme is not a riori, Bennett and Iacker`s remarks
turn into a nae anthropology, nae, as it is based on their intuitions and
linguistic habits only. 1o put it dierently, anybody who thinks that phi-
losophers hae ound a method o grammatical inquiry that is somehow
immune to ,or orthogonal to or that antecedes`, the problems that can arise
or that anthropological inquiry owes us an apologia explaining just how the
trick is turned`
14
. Bennett and Iacker proide no such explanation.
Dennett comments also on the alleged Mereological lallacy. Ie sees
no danger in ascribing psychological attributes to the brain as a whole, or
een to its parts. Moreoer, he stresses that such metaphors play an emi-
nent role in the neuroscientic discourse, as they help us - or een enable
us - to understand how consciousness is possible:
lar rom it being a mistake to attribute hemi-semi-demi-proto-qu-
asi-pseudo intentionality to the mereological parts o persons, it
is precisely the enabling moe that lets us see how on earth to get
whole wonderul persons out o brute mechanical parts
15
.
John Searle is also sceptical as to the importance o the Mereological
lallacy. lirst, he obseres that it is improper to use the term mereologi-
cal` in this context. A vereoogica allacy consists in ascribing attributes that
are predicable o a whole to some parts thereo. Meanwhile, brain is a
part o a body, not o a person, and such predicates as to think` or to
decide` are used in the ordinary language to relate to persons, not bodies.
1hus, it would be more appropriate to speak o a category mistake rather
than Mereological lallacy. Ie claims urther that such allacies` bring no
danger - it does not seem possible that they caused conusion. 1hey are
rather useul analogies and metaphors
16
.
13
biaev, p. 85.
14
biaev, p. 82.
15
biaev, p. 88.
16
C. ibiaev, p. 10.
Searle dismisses also the undamental assumption o Bennett and
Iacker pertaining to the method o conceptual analysis. Ioweer, he
does not question the a riori character o the conceptual scheme, but
concentrates on a dierent aspect o their methodology:
1he allacy, in short, is one o conusing the rules or using the words
with the ontology. Just as old-time behaiorism conused the eiden-
ce or mental states with the ontology o the mental states, so this
\ittgensteinian criterial behaiorism construes the grounds or ma-
king the attribution with the act that is attributed. It is a allacy to say
that the conditions or the successul operation o the language game
are conditions or the existence o the phenomena in question
1
.
1hus, Searle beliees - covtra Bennett and Iacker - that language ,or
the reconstructable language rules, does not determine any ontology. In
other words, Searle takes ontology to be independent o language. 1he sole
act that we use the expressions to think` and to decide` mainly in relation
to persons does not mean that these words are strictly attached` to some
phenomena by some metaphysical glue`. \e use language to describe the
world, howeer, there is no one-to-one correspondence between words and
objects in the world. \hen we say that the brain thinks` or that neurons
are intelligent` we also try to describe some phenomena. 1o do so, we take
adantage o the existing ocabulary, which in the ordinary language is used
in dierent contexts, as we hae nothing better at our disposal.
I ully agree with Dennett`s and Searle`s critiques. Ioweer, I would go
een urther and say that, by inoking the Mereological lallacy, Bennett
and Iacker themseles commit a grae mistake, which I call the Aprior-
ization lallacy. 1hey claim that the conceptual scheme o the ordinary
language is a riori relatie to the neuroscientic practice. 1his is trouble-
some or two reasons.
lirstly, it is dicult to understand why Bennett and Iacker put so
much emphasis on ordinary language ,or, as Dennett terms it, on olk
psychology,. Such sciences as anthropology, deelopmental psychology,
eolutionary psychology or neuroscience aiv at eaivivg the origins and
the eolutionary success` o the ordinary language. 1hus, it seems odd
that the ery subject matter o neuroscientists` research is something
which is a riori relatie to their practice. Bennett and Iacker`s claim may,
1
biaev, p. 105.
J7J P h i l o s o p h y i n N e u r o s c i e n c e
howeer, be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, their position may
be that the ontology encoded in the ordinary language is tbe ovtoog,, a iew
o the world that cannot be altered by the discoeries in the biological sci-
ence. 1his stance seems plainly alse ,and here I concur with Searle,. On the
other hand, the more modest interpretation is the ollowing: Bennett and
Iacker claim that in order to covvvvicate the results o their work neurosci-
entists should obey the rules o the use o expressions in the ordinary lan-
guage. It is not surprising that neuroscientic theories are expressed largely
in the ordinary language. 1he controersy is to what extent this language
may be used metaphorically or analogically. Now, it seems that Bennett and
Iacker`s constraints here are too rigorous. Consider arious interpretations
o quantum mechanics: they oten utilize ordinary language concepts in an
extraordinary way. \et would we say that the discussions between Bohr and
Linstein on the oundations o physics, or the debates pertaining to the
unication o quantum mechanics and the general theory o relatiity are
senseless as they ail to obsere the rules goerning the usage o the ordi-
nary language expressions Such a stance is nonsensical. Moreoer, Bennett
and Iacker ail to realize the heuristic role o metaphors. \hen Blakemore
says that there are brain-maps or that the brain interprets the reality, he is in-
oking a picture that is not only inormatie, but also may lead to urther hy-
potheses and discoeries. Certainly, it may also lead to blind alleys yet there
is little danger that the consequences o such a way o expression will be
daring. 1he reason is that neuroscience, as any other science, has some built-
in correctie mechanisms that ultimately help us to distinguish progress and
ruitul hypotheses rom mere mistakes and useless conjectures. 1hat this
mechanism is present is eident once one considers the recent successes o
neuroscience. A science which oeruses metaphors and leads to no serious
predictions or explanations is simply a bad science, the mere act o com-
mitting or omitting the Mereological lallacy is o no signicance here.
Secondly, the problem with Bennett and Iacker`s critique is that it as-
sumes that there is something a riori relatie to the neuroscientic practice.
In other words, they are rm belieers in oundationalism. Accidentally, it
is well illustrated by the act that they quote Aristotle when justiying the
idea o the Mereological lallacy. \hen Aristotle obseres that to say that
the soul is angry is as i one remarked that the soul weaes or builds, or
it is surely better not to say that the soul pities, learns or thinks, but that a
man does these with his soul`, there is a certain metaphysical iew standing
behind his claim. Aristotle`s metaphysics is essentialist: he beliees that e-
ery entity belongs to some natural category, one determined by the entity`s
essence ,orm,, moreoer, he beliees that the essences may be captured
by the so-called essential denitions
18
. 1hus, the incorrect or metaphori-
cal use o words is not a mere mistake - it is an error that may eectiely
ruin our attempts to construct oundations o knowledge, captured by the
essential denitions. 1his doctrine is ar rom the actual scientic practice.
1he history o science shows clearly that no such oundations should be
assumed as they are most likely to ban scientic progress.
All in all, it shows that Bennett and Iacker`s analyses miss the point.
1hey adopt a suspicious metaphilosophy as their point o departure, which
leads them to alse conclusions. It does not seem likely that anyone may
hae any problems to realize the metaphorical character o such claims as
the neurons know, are intelligent, and assess probabilities`. In other words,
Bennett and Iacker act as i they were ghting or deckchairs, when their
1itanic is heading towards an iceberg. 1o say that the ordinary language is
a riori, when we may well be witnessing a reolution regarding our under-
standing o what language is, is nothing more than a useless pedantry.
It does not mean, o course, that neuroscience has no ties with phi-
losophy, to the contrary, it is fea ritb a bio.obica oaa. Ioweer, one
must realize that we are not talking o some philosophical theses that are
rior to neuroscience, what is philosophically interesting, lies ritbiv it. It is
not philosophy before science, but philosophy iv science.
2. Philosophy in Science
In his seminal paper, or . Pbio.ob, iv cievce` Po..ibe., Michael Ieller
obseres that
bio.ob, iv .cievce grew out o practice. Its most symptomatic in-
carnation is the phenomenon known as philosophizing physicists`.
Len though the philosophical renection o the representaties o
the empirical sciences oten alls short o the proessional philoso-
phical standards, it remains true that the so-called particular scien-
ces are lled with philosophical issues
19
.
18
See K.R. Popper, 1be Oev ociet, ava t. vevie., ol. II, Princeton Uniersity Press,
Princeton 1966, p. 1.
19
M. Ieller, or . Pbio.ob, iv cievce` Po..ibe., o.cit., p. 13.
Philosophy in science should be careully distinguished rom philoso-
phy of science. 1he latter aims at reconstructing the scientic practice,
the structure o scientic theories, and is concerned with the criteria o
justication in science. It is much more dicult to dene philosophy in
science`, een though |it| was practiced rom the ery beginning o the
empirical sciences. lor example, when one considers the work o Newton
it is dicult to say whether it was still science in philosophy, or rather al-
ready philosophy in science`
20
.
Ieller does not try to codiy philosophy in science`, rather he identi-
es some typical problems it deals with, problems, which are highly char-
acteristic, although not denitional. lirst, he obseres that philosophical
ideas oten innuenced the deelopment and eolution o scientic theo-
ries. It suces to recall Kepler`s neoplatonism or Linstein`s aith in the
deterministic unierse to illustrate the possible extent o such innuences.
Second, traditional philosophical problems are intertwined with empiri-
cal theories. 1here are innumerable examples: space`, time`, mind`, ree
will` - to mention but the most obious. 1hird and nally, philosophers
renect upon the presuppositions o the empirical sciences. In this context,
Ieller speaks o the ollowing assumptions o physics: the mathematicity
o the unierse, the idealizability o nature, the elementary character and
the unity o the laws o nature
21
.
I beliee that while Ieller`s examples are instructie, some methodologi-
cal rigor is needed to proide a more comprehensie picture o philoso-
phy in science`. 1hereore, I would like to propose a typology o problems
that are dealt with within this discipline. I do not consider it nal, rather, it
should be regarded a proposal or urther discussion. Moreoer, I would like
to stress that the our leels o analysis I identiy are not mutually exclusie,
in other words, when considering philosophical issues in science, one usually
operates at more than one o the below presented leels and the analysis at
one such leel may be strictly connected to problems arising at another.
I distinguish our types o problems that lie within the interest o the
philosophy in science. 1hey belong to the conceptual leel, the presupposi-
tional leel, the problem-leel and the unctional leel. Both philosophy and
science oten take adantage o the same covcet., such as time`, space` or
20
biaev, p. 15.
21
biaev, pp. 20-24.
emotion`. Strict methodological isolationism would lead to a conclusion,
that een i these words look identical, they designate completely dierent
ideas: emotion` in philosophy has nothing to do with the neuroscientic
understanding o emotions. 1his iew seems plainly alse. It is relatiely
easy to indicate such concepts ,among which there belong space`, time`
and emotions`, whose philosophical` and scientic` semantic elds oer-
lap. Moreoer, philosophical concepts oten vigrate to science, and rice rer.a.
A nice example is proided by the ery concepts o space` and time`.
It is well known that Newton belieed space and time to be ab.ovte. 1his
was, howeer, a purely philosophical iew. It was demonstrated that the
Newtonian mechanics does indeed require the absolute time ,or more pre-
cisely: classical mechanics is a physical model o the doctrine o the ab-
solute time`,, but it does not require absolute space
22
. Similarly, the general
theory o relatiity concerns - in some sense - the philosophical concepts
o space and time. Ioweer, it no longer speaks o them as separate pa-
rameters or entities: it is a model o space-time. Interestingly, the space-
time o general relatiity is neither purely relatie nor purely absolute, the
dichotomy o relatie - absolute` turns out to be a alse one
23
. Len more
abstractly: in some recent attempts to reconcile general relatiity with
quantum mechanics mathematical models are constructed ,with the use
o non-commutatie geometries, which suggest that at the undamental
leel o reality there is no time ,i.e., there is no parameter corresponding
to time,, but the model inoles some dynamics
24
. Now, such consider-
ations which consist in interpreting the mathematical structures o empiri-
cal theories lead us back to philosophy and enrich our understanding o
the concepts o space and time. 1hey may also help to deelop new philo-
sophical theories - a well known example is \hitehead`s metaphysics.
Apart rom the vigratiov o concepts one can also point out to the de-
elopment o new or renements o old philosophical concepts ri. a ri. the
achieements o science. Again, examples are many, rom some interesting
renderings o the notions o superenience` and emergence`, inspired by
the adancements in biology, to such concepts as paradigm` or scientic
research program` resulting rom the renection oer the scientic practice.
22
C. D.J. Reine, M. Ieller, 1be cievce of ace1ive, Pachart, 1uscon 1981, pp. 5-81.
23
C. M. Ieller, or . Pbio.ob, iv cievce` Po..ibe., o.cit., p. 18-20.
24
C. iaev, Ca. i r,c,voroc, 1owarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Lublin 2002.
1he second leel o philosophy in science` is that o re.vo.itiov..
Iere, the philosophical analysis pertains to presuppositions ,or, speak-
ing less ormally: assumptions, o scientic theories and - more impor-
tantly - the method o science. An interesting question in this context is
whether scientic theories presuppose the existence o the material world.
Michael Ieller makes an interesting suggestion:
1he tacit assumption o all the statements o science is not that the
material world exists, it is rather the addition o an antecedent I
the material world exists...` to each and eery ormulation o the re-
sults o empirical research. |.| 1he answer to the question whether
the material world exists does not belong among the assumptions
o the empirical sciences
25
.
1hus, Ieller claims that the implicit` structure o any law o science
is the ollowing:
,L, e t
where e is the proposition 1he material world exists`, and t is any gien scien-
tic law ,theory,. In this way, we are not entitled to say that science assumes
or presupposes the existence o the world, rather, it is neutral as to this
particular problem. Interestingly, Ieller`s proposal alls into serious troubles
once the Popperian conception o alsication is taken into account. As well
known, Popper argues that the scientic progress has nothing to do with
the erication o theories. Our theories are hypotheses that we should try
to alsiy. In other words, any theory - in order to be considered scientic -
identies a set o its potential alsiers. \hen one o the alsiers turns out
true, the theory proes alse and should be rejected. Let f1 and f2 stand or
potential alsiers o our theory t. 1hus, the ollowing holds:
,l, t ,~f1 ~f2,
Obsere now that when one o the potential alsiers is true, say
,C, f1
then - by applying voav. toev.:
,D, ~t
and by voav. toev. again:
,L, ~e
25
aev, Ovtoogicve aavgaoravia r./ce.ve; f,i, |in:| iaev, ioofa i r.ecbriat, Unier-
sitas, Krakw 2006, p. 146.
It means that av, alsication o a scientic theory leads to the e.tabi.bvevt
o the thesis that the material world does not exist, which is paradoxical.
1his shows that Ieller`s conception is nawed. I shall not ollow this line
o argument here
26
. Ioweer, what has been said suces to show that
the analysis o presuppositions or assumptions o scientic theories is a
legitimate eld o philosophical study.
An een more instructie example is the problem well encapsulated by
Lugene \igner`s amous astonishment oer the unreasonable eectieness
o mathematics in the natural sciences
2
. 1he success o the empirical sci-
ences which began with Newton and has continued since turns our atten-
tion not only to the method o physics, but also to its presuppositions and
assumptions. Among them, one can identiy the idealizability o nature. It
may be speculated, e.g., that the material world is idealizable because it is
vatbevatica in character. Ioweer, it is possible to imagine worlds which are
vatbevatica in a certain sense, yet non-idealizable. Michael Ieller considers a
hierarchy o such worlds. 1he most non-mathematical` is a world in which
no mathematical and logical principles are obsered ,including any stochas-
tic or probabilistic laws,. Next, he suggests considering a simplied model
o the world: let us assume that the world in question may be in one o only
two states, represented by 0` and 1`. Now:
1he history o this world is thus a sequence o 0`s and 1`s. Assume ur-
ther that the world had a beginning, what may be represented by a dot
at the beginning o the sequence. In this way, we get, e.g., a sequence:
.011000101011...
1he task o a physicist is to construct a theory which would enable
to predict the uture states o the world. Such a theory would amount
to the encapsulation` o the sequence o 0`s and 1`s in a ormula
,which is shorter than the sequence it encapsulates,. Such a ormula
may be ound only i the sequence o 0`s and 1`s is algorithmically
compressible. But this leads to a problem. Such a sequence may be
interpreted as a decimal expansion o a number in |0,1| and - as well
known - the set o algorithmically compressible numbers belonging
to |0,1| is o measure 0 |.|. 1hus |.| there is zero chance that a
sequences o 0`s and 1`, representing our world, belongs to the
26
See B. Broek, A. Olszewski, .tvievie riata a vava. Kovevtar ogicv,, |in:| Povaa aevar
ac;, eds. \. Kowalski, S. \szoIek, Biblos, 1arnw 2008, pp.103-114.
2
C. L. \igner, 1be |vrea.ovabe ffectireve.. of Matbevatic. iv tbe âtvra cievce., Com-
munications on Pure and Applied Mathematics` 1960, ol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1-14.
set o algorithmically compressible sequences and so the physicist,
who inestigates such a world, may hae no rational expectation to
discoer the theory she is looking or
28
.
1his obseration has ar-reaching consequences. In particular, it shows
that the act that we succeed in constructing mathematical models o re-
ality is miraculous indeed, but also that it should be subject to insightul
philosophical renection.
1he third perspectie o philosophy in science` lies at the robevere.
1here are many classical philosophical problems that hae been elucidated
with the help o the scientic methods. One such problem is causality and
determinism. 1he wae o enthusiasm generated by the successes o the
Newtonian physics led Laplace to his amous reply to Napoleon that the
hypothesis` o God is not needed in the ully deterministic world o the
modern physics. O course, it turned out that the problem is much subtler.
lor example: the deelopment o special relatiity theory led to an intrigu-
ing reormulation o the concept o causality: causal relations between an
eent X and some other eent \ are possible only when the eent \ be-
longs to the light cone o X. lurther complications were brought about by
the discoery o quantum mechanics. 1he problem o the indeterministic
nature o the physical world resulting rom quantum mechanics has caused
innumerable discussions and philosophical conceptions, ranging rom the
amous debate between Linstein and Bohr
29
to Karl Popper`s theory o the
open unierse
30
. It seems impossible today to discuss the problem o cau-
sality and determinism without a solid grasp o the contemporary physics.
Science has also generated a number o problems that were taken
up by philosophers. Arguably, the most important such cluster o prob-
lems is connected to Darwin`s eolutionary theory. 1hey include more
specic issues, such as the question what are the units o natural selec-
tion, but also innuence the discussions pertaining to such undamental
problems as human nature
31
, the nature o morality
32
, origins and nature
28
M. Ieller, C, riat ;e.t vatevat,cv,., |in:| iaev, ioofa i r.ecbriat, o.cit., pp. 51-52.
29
See, e.g., N. Bohr, Di.cv..iov. ritb iv.teiv ov i.tevoogica Probev. iv .tovic Pb,.ic., |in:|
.bert iv.teiv: Pbio.ober - cievti.t, ed. P.A. Schlipp, Open Court, Chicago1949.
30
See K.R. Popper, 1be Oev |virer.e: .v .rgvvevt for vaetervivi.v rov tbe Po.t.crit to 1be
ogic of cievtifc Di.corer,, Cambridge Uniersity Press, Cambridge 1982.
31
C. \. ZaIuski, vvav âtvre .fter Darriv, Copernicus Center Reports` 2011, ol. 2,
pp. -90.
32
C., e.g., R. Joyce, 1be rovtiov of Morait,, 1he MI1 Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2006.
o language
33
, etc. Moreoer, the ormal aspects o the mechanisms o
eolution led to the deelopment o new philosophical ,sub,elds, such
as eolutionary epistemology or eolutionary game theory
34
.
linally, at the fvvctiova ere, the relationship between science and philoso-
phy may take one o the ollowing orms. lirst, it is sometimes argued that
some scientic theories hae taken up the roles traditionally resered or phi-
losophy. lor example, Michael Ieller claims in this context that the contem-
porary physics proides the best ontology o the physical world we hae had
so ar
35
. It is not to say, o course, that the equations o the general theory o
relatiity orm an ontology in the same sense that the Aristotle`s our causes
- the material, the ormal, the ecient and the nal - do. 1he mathematical
structures o the physical theories must be ivterretea to sere as a ull-blooded
ontology. Ieller speculates, howeer, that the admissible interpretations o,
say, quantum mechanics, must hae something in common`. Ie says:
Let us consider the set o all the possible interpretations admissible
by the gien empirical theory. 1he passage rom one such inter-
pretation to another must exhibit certain elements which remain
unchanged, they are the interpretation ,or ontological, inariants. I
there were no such inariants, any interpretation would be admis-
sible, when in act among the admissible interpretations there are
those which are consistent with the ormalism o the theory and
its empirical predictions. Moreoer, the interpretation inariants are
dierent rom the ormalism and the empirical predictions as they
belong to the interpretation layer` and not to the calculations or the
possible experimental outcomes. 1hus, the proposal is that the set
o all interpretation inariants constitutes the content` o an empi-
rical theory, or what the theory says`
36
.
I do not want to suggest that Ieller`s claim is indisputable. Ioweer, I be-
liee it shows clearly that it is possible to construct ontologies which are based
on empirical theories, but also that such a task is nontriial. Moreoer, it seems
that any attempt at the construction o the ontology o the physical reality
which does not take into account the adancements o physics is misguided.
33
C. M. 1omasello, Cov.trvctivg a avgvage. . |.agea.ea 1beor, of avgvage .cqvi.itiov,
Iarard Uniersity Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2003.
34
C. M. Brady, ...e..ivg rovtiovar, i.tevoog,, Biology & Philosophy` 1986, ol. 1,
no. 4, pp. 401-459.
35
C. M. Ieller, Ovtoogicve aavgaoravia..., o.cit.
36
biaev, p. 155-156.
Secondly, some philosophical theories or arguments may play the role o
.eectiov vecbavi.v. in science. O course, science has its own criteria o the ac-
ceptance o hypotheses, built into the scientic method itsel. Ioweer, the
history o science brings many examples o situations in which a hypothesis
deeloped according to the scientic standards was rejected or modied in
light o some other ,philosophical, considerations. One such notable example
is Linstein`s cosmological constant. linally, philosophical doctrines may sere
as ,positie and negatie, heuristics in the process o scientic discoery.
1he aboe presented perspecties do not exhaust the typical problems
o the philosophy o science. I beliee, howeer, that the typology is in-
structie: it is a contextual ,and partial, denition o philosophy in sci-
ence` and may sere as a point o departure or urther discussions.
3. The Structure of Neuroscience
1he aboe described conception o philosophy in science, illustrated
with the examples taken mainly rom physics, may easily be applied to
neuroscience. Beore embarking on this task, howeer, I shall concentrate
on some peculiarities o neuroscience. 1he problem o the structure o
neuroscientic theories, as well as o the criteria o justication used by
neuroscientists is o ital importance. It is clear that the structure in ques-
tion does not correspond to what philosophers o science call a theory`.
1o substantiate this thesis, it suces to realize that neuroscience .ev.v argo
includes behaioural, cellular, clinical, cognitie, computational, cultural,
deelopmental and molecular neuroscience, neuroengineering, neuroim-
aging, neuroinormatics, neurolinguistics, social neuroscience and system
neuroscience, it ollows that neuroscience takes adantage o arious
methods, justication criteria and theory-construction rules
3
.
Naturally, one may reply that at the most general leel neuroscientic
theories do not dier rom any other scientic theory: a hypothesis must
be stated, one that is subsequently deeloped into testable sub-hypotheses,
then, the experiments are carried out and their results lead to the rejection,
modication or urther elaboration o the hypothesis
38
. 1he problem is
3
See the discussion in P. 1hompson, 1be trvctvre of ioogica 1beorie., State Uniersity o
New \ork Press, Albany 1989.
38
C. V. Iardcastle, êvrobioog,, |in:| 1be Cavbriage Covaviov to tbe Pbio.ob, of ioog,, eds.
D. Iull, M. Ruse, Cambridge Uniersity Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 25-291.
that such an understanding o the structure o neuroscientic theories ex-
plains little. Any research practice may be so reconstructed that it ts some
structural ramework, be it a scientic research program as understood by
Lakatos, or a Kuhnian paradigm.
1he interesting thing about the contemporary neuroscience is that it is
an umbrella term that coers wide range o inter- or multidisciplinary en-
deaours. 1his interdisciplinary character maniests itsel at many leels.
lirstly, all the neuroscientic subdisciplines take adantage o numerous
research techniques, oten imported` rom other sciences. lor example,
a relatiely new discipline, social neuroscience, utilizes hormone analysis,
LMG, LPR, MRI, articial neural networks, the methods o molecular
biology, comparatie anatomy, deelopmental psychology, etc
39
.
Secondly, the construction o at least some neuroscientic theories
is interdisciplinary`. lor example, the theory o the deelopment o lan-
guage proposed by Michael Arbib is based on the ndings o neurobiol-
ogy, deelopmental psychology and primatology
40
. 1here are three criteria
that play an important role in theory-construction in neuroscience: em-
pirical adequacy, conergence and coherence. 1he concept o empirical
adequacy in neuroscience is much less clear than in physics. In particular,
it is ery oten the case that the same set o experiments may gie rise to
dierent interpretations which, in turn, support competing theories. As a
result, neuroscientists must also take adantage o other justication cri-
teria: conergence and coherence.
Covrergevce pertains to a situation in which biological data coming rom
dierent experiments ,or some lower-leel theories, simultaneously sup-
port the gien theoretical hypothesis. lor example: it is argued that the
human capacity to imitate signicantly exceeds the corresponding capac-
ity in other primates. 1his hypothesis is supported not only by the results
o experiments on children and chimpanzees, but also by a comparatie
analysis o the human and other primates` brain anatomy
41
. 1he criterion
o coberevce, in turn, may be dened as ollows: one can say that the more
39
C. Metboa. iv ocia êvro.cievce, eds. L. Iarmon-Jones, J.S. Beer, 1he Guilord Press,
New \ork 2009.
40
C. M. Arbib, 1be Mirror ,.tev, vitatiov, ava tbe rovtiov of avgvage, |in:| vitatiov iv
.viva. ava .rtifact., eds. Ch. Nehani, K. Dautenhahn, 1he MI1 Press, Cambridge 2002,
pp. 229-280.
41
See Per.ectire. ov vitatiov, ol. I-II, eds. S. Iurley, N. Chater, 1he MI1 Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass. 2005.
J8J P h i l o s o p h y i n N e u r o s c i e n c e
two biological theories are mutually coherent, the higher is the degree in
which they ull three conditions: o consistency, inerential relations and
unication. A gien set o sentences is coherent to a high degree i it is
consistent, the sentences it is comprised o may sere together to draw
new, nontriial consequences and it cannot be easily diided into two sub-
sets with no signicant loss o inormation
42
. An instructie example is the
eolutionary theory o the emergence o language which posits that the
key adaptation leading to the deelopment o linguistic skills is mimesis,
which is a rened kind o imitation
43
. 1his theory is coherent with some
conceptions pertaining to the role o mirror neurons in the deelopment
o such capacities as imitation and language
44
. 1hese examples illustrate
that, in addition to empirical adequacy, conergence and coherence are es-
sential criteria o justication in neuroscience.
1his outline o the structure o neuroscientic theories is urther com-
plicated by the act that theory-construction in neuroscience requires ivter
retatiov .cbevata. An interpretation schema is a set o directies or under-
standing the results o experiments, oten based on some .eectea theories or
hypotheses o quite general character. 1here is no place in this essay to de-
elop a theory o such schemata. Instead, let us hae a look at two examples.
Various methods o brain imaging aim at establishing that during the
perormance o certain tasks ,e.g., soling moral dilemmas, some brain re-
gions display increased actiity. On the traditional approach, separate brain
areas were inestigated: when perormance o a mental unction was cor-
related with an increased actiity o such an area, the conclusion ollowed
that the gien region is ,partly, responsible or the corresponding unction.
1he problem is that in case o most ,i not all, mental operations there is
an increased actiity o rariov. brain regions. 1hus, the question emerges as
to how to interpret the experimental results which point out to a complex
brain actiity correlated with the perormance o the gien tasks.
McIntosh and Korostil present three interpretation rameworks that
help to deal with this problem
45
. lirstly, one can speak o the covvectirit,
paradigm. 1here are two types o connectiity: unctional and eectie. In
42
C. L. Bonjour, 1be Coberevce 1beor, of virica Kvoreage, Philosophical Studies` 196,
ol. 30, no. 5, pp. 281-312.
43
C. M. Donald, vitatiov ava Mive.i., |in:| Per.ectire. ov vitatiov, o.cit., ol. II, pp. 283-300.
44
C. M. Arbib, o.cit.
45
C. A.R. McIntosh, M. Korostil, vterretatiov of êvroivagivg Data a.ea ov êtror
Covcet., Brain Imaging and Behaior` 2008, no. 2, pp. 264-269.
case o the ormer, two elements o a neural system ,neurons, brain regions,
are said to be unctionally connected when they are actiated simultane-
ously ,or almost simultaneously, in a statistically signicant way. Lectie
connectiity, on the other hand, requires cav.a reatiov. between the actiity
o dierent brain elements. Secondly, there is an interpretation paradigm
which takes neural covtet into account. A gien brain area may be actiated
in arious, similar and dissimilar, circumstances, and what distinguishes the
operation is not the inolement o the area er .e, but rather the status o
other areas during that unction. 1his dependence o the contribution o a
region on other connected regions has been reerred to as neural context.
Neural context allows the response properties o one element in a network
to be prooundly aected by the status o other neural elements in that
network`
46
. In other words, a small ariation in the perormed task may lead
to the actiation o dierent neural contexts. In such cases, simple connec-
tiity analysis, unctional or eectie, leads to no signicant results. 1hirdly
and nally, the concept o small-world networks enables the analysis o the
capacity o a gien neural system to integrate inormation. Such networks
are characterized by aerage node-to-node distances and high clustering co-
ecient. 1here is a number o data backing the thesis that a number o sys-
tems ,biological and social,, including neural systems, hae the characteristic
eatures o small-worlds. 1his may explain the brain`s capacity to strike the
balance between modular processes and inormation integration, as well as
its stability in ace o perturbations. Obsere that the acceptance o such an
interpretation schema puts emphasis on other aspects o the neuroimaging
data than in the case o connectiity and neural context paradigms.
1he methods o the interpretation o neuroimaging data is an exam-
ple o a relatiely simple ,albeit important, interpretation schema. Much
more spectacular is the case o eolutionary psychology, which may een
be dened as a complex interpretation schema or explaining the results
o experiments and other biological data. 1he basic assumptions o eo-
lutionary psychology are:
both our biological and mental mechanisms are eolutionary adaptations
generated by the natural selection in the ancestral enironments,
our mental mechanisms are domain-specic calculation modules. 1hus,
human mind is not a tabva ra.a. It consists o mechanisms ,modules,
which are dedicated to soling specic adaptie problems.
46
biaev, p. 266.
Both these claims are controersial. 1he ormer says that our basic mental
mechanisms were ormed in the ancestral enironments, i.e. in the Pleis-
tocene ,2 million - 10 thousand years ago,. 1his is ollowed by the claim
that the mechanisms in question hae remained airly unchanged and they
will not change in the uture. Such an account minimizes the innuence o
culture on human behaiour, although it does not exclude it altogether
4
.
1he aboe examples show clearly the high leel o theory-ladeness o
experiments in neuroscience ,and other biological disciplines,. 1his claim
is based both on the analysis o justication criteria used by neuroscien-
tists as well as the utilized interpretation schemata. It is philosophically
ery interesting as it illustrates that neuroscience is ar rom a model sci-
ence` discussed by the philosophers only ty years ago. 1his is extremely
important or someone who sets out to analyze philosophical issues in
neuroscience`. On the one hand, the philosophical load` o neuroscience
seems, at least riva facie, much more substantial than in physics. On the
other, the conergence and coherence, as well as the utilization o theory-
laden interpretation paradigms contributes to the blurring o the borders
between neuroscience and philosophy.
4. Philosophical Issues in Neuroscience
Now, let us consider philosophy in neuroscience`. Once again, we can
trace philosophical issues in this discipline at our dierent leels: the con-
ceptual, the presuppositional, the problem and the unctional. 1he most
interesting aspect o the conceptual leel is the migration o concepts.
Numerous examples may be cited here: mind`, reasoning`, intuition`, in-
sight`, eelings`, emotions`, etc. O course, it neer is a simple migration:
a philosophical concept, when utilized in neuroscience, is enriched in new
connotations and its understanding is oten sharpened or altered. 1his is
the case with emotions`. 1he category o emotions has played an impor-
tant role in many philosophical conceptions, to mention but Iume, Sche-
ler or Sartre. Ioweer, once taken up by neuroscientists, it has become a
subject o empirical studies. It turned out that emotions play an essential
4
C. L. Cosmides, J. 1ooby, êvrocogvitire .aatatiov. De.igvea for ocia cbavge, |in:|
rovtiovar, P.,cboog, avaboo, ed. D.M. Buss, \iley, New \ork 2005, p. 52.
role in our perception o the world and in our decision-making processes.
New denitions and new typologies o emotions were proposed
48
. 1hese
newly rendered concepts are reintroduced in philosophy where they gie
impetus to the ongoing philosophical debates
49
.
1he next aspect o neuroscience that belongs to philosophy in neu-
roscience` is the leel o presuppositions. One may look or such philo-
sophical presuppositions o both neuroscientic theories and the meth-
ods o neuroscience. 1he latter case is especially intriguing. 1he question
is, whether the methods used in neuroscience presuppose any concrete
philosophical stances. A case in point is the problem o whether the meth-
ods o neuroscience ,and o biology in general, assume the reavctiovi.t
thesis, i.e. that all mental phenomena may be reduced to chemical and
physical ones. 1his is a ery complex issue, in particular, the ery notion
o reavctiovi.v requires urther explanation. It is usually claimed that one
should distinguish between three kinds o reduction in biology: ontologi-
cal, methodological and epistemic. Ontological reduction is the idea that
each particular biological system ,e.g., an organism, is constituted by noth-
ing but molecules and their interactions`
50
. In turn, methodological reduc-
tion is the idea that biological systems are most ruitully inestigated at
the lowest possible leel, and that experimental studies should be aimed at
uncoering molecular and biochemical causes`
51
. linally, epistemic reduc-
tion is the idea that the knowledge about one scientic domain ,typically
about higher leel processes, can be reduced to another body o scientic
knowledge ,typically concerning a lower and more undamental leel,`
52
.
1hus, it is possible to hold ontological reductionism, and - say, due to the
complexity o molecular interactions inoled in the unctioning o a bio-
logical system - to reject methodological or epistemic reduction. On the
other hand, methodological and epistemic reductionism seems to assume
the ontological one. Still, it is possible to dene methodological reduction-
48
C. J. LeDoux, 1be votiova raiv: 1be M,.teriov. |vaerivvivg. of votiova ife, Simon
& Schuster, New \ork 1996, A. Damasio, De.carte.` rror: votiov, Rea.ov ava tbe vvav
raiv, G.P. Putnam, New \ork 1994.
49
lor an oeriew see R. de Sousa, votiov, |in:| tavfora vc,coeaia of Pbio.ob,, online
edition.
50
I. Brigant, A. Loe, Reavctiovi.v iv ioog,, |in:| tavfora vc,coeaia of Pbio.ob,, online
edition.
51
biaev.
52
biaev.
ism in such a way that it becomes logically independent o the ontological
iew: it suces to add the clause as i ` to the aboe ormulated deni-
tion: methodological reduction is the idea that biological systems should
be inestigated at the lowest possible leel, a. if there were no other than
molecular and biochemical causes inoled.
1he same manoeure is inadmissible in the case o epistemic reduction.
Ioweer, there are many problems connected to this concept. On the one
hand, one can speak o theory-reduction. \e shall say that a higher-leel
theory, 1I, is reducible to a lower-leel theory, 1L, i 1I ollows logically
rom 1L voavo a translation unction l ,i.e., a unction that translates the
language o 1I into the language o 1L,. In other words, this type o
epistemic reduction requires what Lrnest Nagel calls briage .tatevevt., which
sere to connect` two theories expressed in dierent languages
53
. It seems
that the idea o theory-reduction is, at best, a regvator, iaea, in the sense
that it is a distant, currently unrealizable goal. 1hus, more oten than not,
epistemic reductionism is expressed by the concept o eavator, reavctiov,
which is conned to ragments o theories or some generalizations there-
o, and assumes that reductie explanation is causal explanation, where a
higher leel eature is explained by the interaction o its constituent parts`
54
.
In my iew, the problems surrounding arious kinds o reduction in bi-
ology may be ill-stated. I am reerring not so much the widely debated idea
o downward causation
55
, but rather to the aboe-discussed structure o
neuroscientic theories. I it is true that justication in many biological sci-
ences ,neuroscience included, takes adantage o such criteria as coherence
and conergence, then oundationalism expressed by the idea o reduction
is at odds with the scientic practice. In this context, a more intriguing prob-
lem is that o inter-theoretical relations, i.e. relations that hold between di-
erent theories ,e.g., some neuroscientic hypotheses and the ndings o
deelopmental psychology,. Such relations are not necessarily accounted or
by logical entailment ,or: in a reductie way,. 1hey may also be rendered
with the use o the logic o presuppositions, or some nonmonotonic logic.
1his discussion illustrates that reductionism is not a necessary assumption
53
1h. Nagel, 1be trvctvre of cievce: Probev. iv tbe ogic of cievtifc avatiov, Iarcourt,
New \ork 1961.
54
I. Brigant, A. Loe, o.cit.
55
See the discussion between L. lox Keller and J. Dupre in: Covtevorar, Debate. iv Pbi
o.ob, of ioog,, eds. l.J. Ayala, R. Arp, \iley, Blackwell, Malden, Oxord 2010, pp. 13-4.
o the method o neuroscience, i at all, it may be treated only as a regula-
tory idea, but one with little practical signicance.
At the problem-leel, neuroscience oten addresses old philosophical con-
troersies. Arguably, the most spectacular example o such a problem is the
amous experiment o Benjamin Libet o 1983. Libet asked the participants
to moe their ngers at a chosen moment and remember the time when they
become conscious o the decision. At the same time, the so-called readiness
potential o the participants` were measured ,the brain actiity that pre-
pares` the gien action, here: nger moement,. 1he results indicated that
the readiness potential emerges some 550 milliseconds beore the motor
action and some 330 milliseconds beore the decision to moe the nger is
consciously entertained. According to some interpreters, this may be an ar-
gument against the existence o the ree will. Libet does not go that ar. Ie
obseres that the decision to act enters` consciousness some 220 millisec-
onds beore the execution o the action, which enables to ormulate the hy-
pothesis that we can reto an action ater the readiness potential emerges, but
beore the action is scheduled` to be executed, in other words, our ree will
may object` to the execution o an action preceded by the gien readiness
potential
56
. 1his interpretation may be criticized in many ways. I would only
like to point out that Libet ivicit, assumes a certain particular conception o
the ree will. lirstly, his iew o the ree will is incompatibilist
5
, secondly, he
identies the decision to act with the conscious entertaining thereo.
1here are also new philosophical problems generated by the adances
in neuroscience. A nice example pertains to the human decision-making
processes. It is argued that a majority o human actions are regulated and
executed at the unconscious leel. In this process, the key role is played by
our emotions. Ioweer, it is also stressed that much o our regular beha-
iour is inculturated`. lor example: in an oten quoted article, 1he Lmo-
tional Dog And Its Rational 1ail`, Jonathan Iaidt speaks o the intuitie
character o the ast majority o human morally releant decisions
58
. Ie
beliees that our moral intuition` is not innate: it is rather shaped by social
56
B. Libet, C.A. Gleason, L.\. \right, D.K. Pearl, 1ive of Cov.ciov. vtevtiov to .ct iv
Reatiov to Ov.et of Cerebra .ctirit, ;Reaaive..otevtia). 1be |vcov.ciov. vitiatiov of a ree,
1ovvtar, .ct, Brain` 1983, no. 106,3,, pp. 623-642.
5
C. I.G. lrankurt, .tervate Po..ibiitie. ava Mora Re.ov.ibiit,, Journal o Philosophy`
1969, no. 66,3,, pp. 829-839.
58
J. Iaidt, 1be votiova Dog ava t. Ratiova 1ai, Psychological Reiew` 2001, no. 108,4,,
pp. 814-834.
interactions and consists in re-enacting learned patterns o behaior. 1he
conscious or renectie use o moral rules is rare - reasoning seres rather
or an e o.t factvv rationalization o the decisions made unconsciously.
A similar story may be told in relation to embodied` language and com-
munication rules, tool-use, etc. In a natural way, these conceptions innu-
ence the philosophical debates oer decision-making, such problems as
intuitie judgment, moral dilemmas, or rule-ollowing, while remaining
ully legitimate subjects o philosophical renection, cannot be responsibly
addressed without some reerence to the ndings o neuroscience.
linally, at the unctional leel, neuroscientic theories ,.ev.v argo, begin
to play the role traditionally resered or philosophy. Such contributions as
Joseph LeDoux`s votiova raiv or 1be ,vatic ef, or Antonio Damasio`s
eeivg of rbat aev. or ef Cove. to Miva are but selected ew examples o
a more general phenomenon: neuroscientists ,as well as psychologists and
primatologists, hae begun to write popular books in which philosophical
renection occupies a designated place. It ery much resembles the much ear-
lier phenomenon o the philosophizing physicists`. Naturally, I do not want
to suggest that the results o such renection belong to neuroscience a. .vcb.
Ioweer, there is no denying that it is a kind o philosophy that is embed-
ded` in neuroscientic practice and that it draws heaily on neuroscientic
hypotheses ,e.g., the somatic marker hypothesis o Damasio,.
Still, philosophy can play a heuristic role in the neuroscientic practice.
An interesting story o such heuristic ,in this case: negatie, innuence is
told by Joseph LeDoux and Antonio Damasio, and pertains to Cartesian
dualism and the separation o emotions and reasoning. In particular, it
is argued that this philosophical doctrine has led the emotion-research
astray: psychologists and early neuroscientists ollowed philosophers and
ailed to recognize the constitutie role emotions play in our cognition
59
.
***
1he aboe examples illustrate clearly that neuroscientic theories as well
as neuroscientic practice are intimately intertwined with philosophy. Philoso-
phy is present iv neuroscience. O course, I do not pretend to hae coered
eerything ,or een a large part, o what may be said on the topic. Ioweer,
I beliee that what has been presented warrants the ollowing conclusions.
59
C. J. LeDoux, o.cit., pp. 34-39.
lirstly, philosophy iv neuroscience diers rom philosophy of neuro-
science. \hen the latter concentrates on the structure o neuroscientic
theories or the criteria or justiying neuroscientic hypotheses, the ormer
aims at uncoering philosophical issues present in neuroscience at our di-
erent leels: conceptual, presuppositional, problem and unctional. Second-
ly, philosophy iv neuroscience is not conned to the analysis o the roavct.
o neuroscience. It is rather a renection oer the neuroscientic practice
and what lies ritbiv it. 1hirdly, due to the complexity o that practice the
interconnections between neuroscience and philosophy are richer - and less
clear - than in the case o physics and philosophy. 1his act calls or a more
detailed elaboration o the methods o philosophy in neuroscience`, in par-
ticular some ormal rendering o the structure o neuroscience as well as
the relations between dierent neuroscientic and philosophical theories.

Bartosz Brożek, Phillosohy in Neuroscience

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. 1hey claim that

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