Sterpan, Ionut. 2011. Libertarianismul. tr. by Catinca Hanganu, Libertarianism.

In Dreapta Intelectuala: Teorii si scoli de gandire ale dreptei contemporane occidentale (The Intellectual Right. Theories and Schools of Thought of Contemporary Western Right), edited by Ionut Sterpan and Dragos Aligica. Bucharest: Humanitas.

Libertarianism
Libertarianism and classical liberalism.......................................................... The historical beginnings of libertarianism.................................................... An intellectual history with a focus on disciplines.......................................... An intellectual history with a focus on stages in the development of libertarianism................................................................................................. An intellectual history with a focus on types of libertarianism....................... An intellectual history with a focus on arguments......................................... A synthesis of libertarian political philosophy................................................ Anarcho-capitalism and libertarianism; anarcho-socialism and left libertarianism................................................................................................. Criticism......................................................................................................... Libertarianism today...................................................................................... References.....................................................................................................

Libertarianism and classical liberalism

Libertarianism is a systematic and extensive reformulation of classical liberal ideas1. The libertarian doctrine adheres to a significant degree to the values of individual freedom and private property and it is more consistently anti-statist than classical liberalism. The difference in degrees of adhesion can be reduced to precise differences of notion in certain given contexts. It is more likely that someone who describes herself as a classic liberal will agree to some public services administered by the state, with a small redistributive tax or with a tiny intervention meant to make life in communities more uniform, than someone who declares herself a libertarian. The bulk of classical liberalism is made up of a network of ideas that we generally call today libertarian, due to semantic developments in America, even if in the 19th century these ideas were called liberal. Liberals in the United States gave up on the term liberal as a result of attempts by the Left to take it over in order to profit from its prestige. This
1 I would like to thank Professor Mihail Radu Solcan for thinking in a certain way. Many of the ideas present in this chapter were clarified in the discussion workshops of the Evolutionist models of the emergence of social interaction norms Project, hosted by the Center for Research in Applied Ethics at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest

change was also occasioned by the fact that many American classical liberals started to call themselves conservatives, leaving the term liberalism up for taking. In the United States today, the term liberal is short for modern liberalism, the European equivalent of this being social democracy. A lot of European intellectuals resist the change in terminology and use liberalism in the sense of classical liberalism. Their resistance to the American semantic evolution has the disadvantage of confusing the layman. This ambiguity is mostly speculated by European liberal parties, which, while supporting social democratic measures, attract sympathizers of classical liberal ideas because of their name.

The historical beginnings of libertarianism

The intellectual history of libertarianism can be seen as a bundle of histories of ideas which are nowadays systematized in libertarianism but which are older than libertarianism. How old? An incipient form of the idea that political power should be limited is present in the epic of Gilgamesh, a king who becomes unbearable by being neither bad nor incompetent. It is suggested that the solution to arbitrary expression of power is jurisdictional competition ordered by the free choice of those involved. The idea that men can live according to the law, orderly and prosperously if they deprive themselves of the institution of political authority gets a religious foundation in Samuel 8 in the Old Testament. Rights claims to political authorities begin to be supported by nonreligious theories which show that fundamental social rules can develop and resist the test of time independent of political power. Lao Tsu claims that social harmony is preexistent to political authority and lays the groundwork for natural rights theory; and Justinian theorizes that the correct law is not created but discovered through social interactions. These are the beginnings of the evolutionist interpretation of norms. The idea that it is not the authority that rules but rather the law itself is used against commands of central political authority in the West starting with the Magna Charta in the 13th century, when the content of natural law is imposed on the king by the independent local barons. The document states that no one will be imprisoned, no ones property will be confiscated and everyone will be prosecuted according to the law of the land. John Locke writes that the role of the law is not constraint but protection against constraint (Locke 1999, chapter VI). The right of the individual to equal treatment before the law, to life, liberty, property and the right to pursue ones goals, along with the right to defend the above which includes the right to abolish governments which erode them are all abstract formulations detached from an evolutionist process of law in a legal system based on precedent. The idea of entrepreneurship has a famous root in John Miltons critique of

censorship from 1644. Individuals must be left free to express their opinions, to propose and adhere to ideas because an individual expression carries their life (Milton 2006). Similarly, an investment can be considered an expression of ones life. They must be left alone to win over supporters.

An intellectual history with a focus on disciplines

We can reconstruct the libertarian doctrine from various perspectives of social disciplines. Libertarian ideas expressed in each of these disciplines would have a starting point and an evolution formulated within each branch. From a political science perspective, in the 16th century, Etienne de la Boetie deplores and explains the phenomenon of pyramidal control of political authority which keeps citizens in a state of voluntary servitude. From a political philosophy perspective, in the 17th century, John Locke develops a model of the state of nature, in which the four fundamental negative rights remain the same before and after a social contract; better management is the sole reason for the contract. Locke gives a libertarian twist to contractualism by stating that the correct social rules are those which are voluntarily decided upon or would be voluntary decided upon in a collective contract under certain conditions. From the perspective of political and social philosophy, David Hume continues the evolutionist conception of norms. The rules which stimulated mutually advantageous activities come out of repeated attempts of each individual to interact with others by pursuing their own interest. The successful ones are those which are not blocked (Hume 1978). From the perspective of philosophy of law, during the 19th century, Albert Venn Dicey restates David Humes arguments and explains the advantages of precedent-based English justice system compared to a centralized legal system. It is not the command-type of laws of the central political authority which are a source of law but the patterns of free interaction between people and the solutions given to private disputes. We know that certain outcomes are satisfying solutions when we observe that in time, under the assumption of liberty, they are copied in similar cases: they prove acceptable to all those involved (Dicey, 1986). From the perspective of economics, Gustave de Molinari (2011), also in the 19th century, observes that competition improves economic services and the production, application and interpretation of law are also economic services, and wonders why we shouldnt introduce competition in these fields as well. The idea that justice can be privatized will be the focus of an anarcho-capitalist research program within economics starting with the 1970s. What is at stake is protecting the right of individuals to choose the rules which govern their lives.

An intellectual history with a focus on stages in the development of libertarianism

The theoretical boundaries of each discipline impose theoretical limits to the doctrine formulated within it. The approach above is useful primarily for sketching the outline of the doctrine. Its main substance is however, made up of intersecting arguments coming from more perspectives. Sometimes, the arguments formulated in one social discipline manage to transform and enrich other contemporary disciplines. These arguments create the stages of libertarian intellectual history and give birth to more types of libertarianism. We can distinguish between four historical phases or strata in crystallizing libertarianism. The first stage is condensed in the arguments formulated in the 18th century by the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution; they are building on the intellectual foundations set by John Locke, the Scottish Enlightenment, on the foundations of the civilizing effect of liberty proven by states such as England and The Netherlands, and on the historical and political foundations left over by the freedom movement of the Levellers. The second stage takes place in the 19th century, at the intersection of three major phenomena: classical liberalism, radical individualism and the Austrian School of economics. The third stage, with its center of gravity in the middle of the 20th century, comprises three major authors: Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek on one side and Milton Friedman with another type of libertarianism, on the other. The fourth stage occurs in the latter half of the 20th century and is made up of a plurality of thinkers who begin calling themselves libertarians. This plurality comprises the vast majority of types of libertarianism.

An intellectual history with a focus on types of libertarianism

The types of libertarianism available today can be differentiated using three criteria: first of all, libertarians can be ranked according to their methodological profile. Robert Nozick comes from analytical philosophy; James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock support libertarianism by using the Virginia School public choice theory. David Friedman and Steve Pejovich use the tools of the Chicago School, which is neoclassical theory, Coasian analysis of property rights and the economic analysis of the law; Murray Rothbard, Israel Kirzner and Roderick Long use the Austrian School method. A second criterion usually used for classification is the ethical theory employed. Some of them opt for deontology and radically individualist thought (Murray Rothbard, Ayn Rand, Robert Nozick), others choose consequentialism, particularly the utilitarian branch (David Friedman), while others opt for contractualism (James Buchanan). Another criterion for classification refers to the legitimate limits of the state; this distinguishes between libertarians who are in favor of a minimal state

(Robert Nozick, Ayn Rand, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock) and the anarcho-capitalists (Murray Rothbard, David Friedman).

An intellectual history with a focus on arguments

From now on I shall opt for a presentation of libertarianism with a focus on theoretical arguments. The main disadvantage of this option is the incomplete description of the lineage and connection of ideas with the historical and political events. The advantage is training in libertarian thought. James Madison formulates a pro-liberty argument from the perspective of political theory. The solution he comes up with against the tyranny of majority is the right to free association. The greater the freedom to associate and dissociate, the larger the number of factions or interest groups and more diverse their purposes. But the larger and more diverse they are, the more difficult it will be to put aside differences and reach a majority in order to follow a common interest against the minority (Federalist 10). Together with George Mason, Madison manages to attach a Bill of Rights to the American Constitution. Besides explicitly formulating concrete rights which manage to slow down the process of state growth, the amendments impose a particular interpretation of rights. The 9th Amendment stipulates that the enumeration of certain rights within the Constitution shall not be interpreted as proof that those are the only rights or that the un-enumerated ones are not important. The 10th Amendment stipulates that the powers not delegated explicitly in the Constitution to the federal government are reserved to the states or individuals. This conception reflects the assumption of liberty, of a default state in which everyone can do anything, until someone proves that a certain action harmed someone else. It is only now that the particular action entails a limitation of rights. By contrast, the predisposition of authorities to restrict social and economic activity ex-ante, though framework legislation, pinpoints to an assumption of coercion and regulation. The cost of framework legislation is the loss of a wide variety of productive actions, most of which are not even imagined. The argument in favor of assumption of liberty is similar to the argument of assumption of innocence. Lets assume that trials would start from the assumption that the accused is guilty of a long series of charges, to be dismissed one at a time. Trials would never end. By comparison, it would be impractical to dismiss all accusations before living peacefully (Palmer 2009, 27). The liberties stated in the Constitutional amendments, most of which were won during a long evolutionist legal process in England could be effectively preserved in the United States by creating a particular type of political power. Madison and Thomas Jefferson managed to disperse power through a constitutional definition of patterns of interaction between state authorities. To prevent one group of individuals from taking control over the state apparatus, the Founding Fathers used the Constitution to block

the possibility of someone being part of more than one of the following groups: one group invested with the power to produce law (the legislature), one group with the power to interpret the law in particular cases (the judicial system), and one group with the power to apply the law (the executive). Because, constitutionally, major decisions taken by one group depend one way or the other on the approval of the other groups, the abuse of one of them can be sanctioned not only by civil society, but also by the other two groups. The roots of the doctrine of separation of power are found in the philosophy of the Baron of Montesquieu, in the republican model of Ancient Greece and Rome, and in the model of the medieval experience of the separation of power and jurisdictional competition between the Pope and the Emperor. The works of Adam Smith (1759, 1776) and latter on of David Ricardo, Jean Baptiste Say, Alfred Marshall, supported by the utilitarian moral philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, lay the foundations of classical economic science. Adam Smith explains how the nature of competition-based capitalist economy actually eliminates conflicts and promotes cooperation without any need of moral sentiments on behalf of economic agents. The rules of free enterprise and competition make the self interested baker sell good bread, regardless of his benevolence towards his consumers. Smith is fascinated by the way in which large scale economic cooperation facilitates more efficient production than usual manufactures. To produce a needle, one uses miners and carriers from across the border, if mining is cheaper there. The division of labor increases productivity; in other words, generalized cooperation helps individuals to combine resources for their mutual advantage. David Ricardos argument (1817) in favor of free exchange, also known as the law of association, deepens Smiths intuition. If people in one state produce all services (and goods, which seen from the perspective of value are just flows of services) easier than in another state, it might be said that the people of the first state dont need exchange relations with the ones from the second one. Wrong, Ricardo says. Why? Lets assume that one fast student can make a salad in 10 minutes and one serving of French fries in 15 minutes. His neighbor needs half an hour for the salad and half an hour for the fries. Students want as many full meals as possible. To determine if cooperation is advantageous, we need to look at the opportunity cost of each student, the cost of one activity compared to the other available activities. For the fast one, the cost of producing French fries is equal to the cost of producing one salad and a half (there is nothing else that he can do with the 15 minutes). For the slow one, the cost of making fries equals the cost of making two salads. In terms of fries (the only alternative value available) the second student produces salads cheaper. In a state of isolation, the fast person will use 250 minutes for ten full meals, 150 for fries, 100 for salads. If instead he will use the time invested in making salads to make fries, he will produce 6 more servings of fries. With how many salads can the slow students pay for the 6 servings of fries? More than 10? Yes, because he can use the 6 hours which, spent in isolation, would have been enough to prepare 6 sides of

fries. But in 6 hours, the slow student can produce 12 salads. He can give the fast student 11 and he will still have an extra one. Trade relations are mutually beneficial. What mattered was the fact that the slow student had a lower cost than the fast student in terms of available activities: to him, one salad cost half a serving of fries and to the fast student it meant 3 quarters. Globalization can advantageously include Somalia not because Somali people can produce milk cheaper than the United States (although this can also be true) but because Somali people produce milk cheaper compared to the alternative activities available. The implication of the law of association is that, the higher the degree of commercial interconnections, the more obsolete isolationism, war and poverty become. Tariffs and trade barriers are economic errors and increase the danger of violent conflict. In light of this, Destutt de Tracy celebrates exchange as the most relevant aspect in human society: society is a long series of exchanges; this series of events is beneficial for all because both parties in a contract benefit from it. Jean Baptiste Say (2011) insists however on the distinction between society and state. Those who want to live at the expense of others make deals with political authorities to suffocate or keep off economic competition. These agreements or exchanges block other mutually advantageous exchanges. With the help of politics, the nonproductive class receives a privilege at the expense of the community. The ideas which support laissez faire economic policies will keep their popularity one generation after Jean Baptiste Say. Frederic Bastiat, a precursor of the Austrian School, draws attention to the hidden costs of the state. The state is that fiction by which everyone thinks that they can live at the expense of everyone else (2011a). He ridicules state projects aimed at job creation by showing that taking money out of the economy through taxing destroys jobs and economic activities with a value at least equal to that produced by the state project. The fact that people are so easily impressed by the mirage of the state is explained by a particularity of costs compared to benefits: benefits are visible while costs are invisible. It is in the nature of the cost of a choice to signal lost and undetermined opportunities. John Stuart Mill (2011) formulates the principle according to which self defense is the only purpose which legitimates intervention in someone elses life. A lot of libertarian arguments can be traced back to On Liberty. Generally, no one is more suited to run a business than the person directly interested in its success, due to incentives and contextual knowledge. But even in exceptional cases the state must refrain from intervening. Individuals must be left alone to find solutions because freedom can be maintained in those cases in which it is the best option only if the expectation that the state will not intervene is maintained. By exceptional intervention the state feeds the antithetical rule of liberty, the rule of the safety net. Actually, any function which is taken by the state or the government from the individual and the voluntary social networks turns that active and ambitious part of the citizenry into dependent individuals,

looking up to the state leadership or to the group which aims to take control of the state. This is the argument of infantilization. Mill takes up on John Miltons argument against censoring free expression. It is only a widespread process of experimenting by trial and error which can bring about innovation. What is marginal today can be accepted by the majority tomorrow if it is let to prove its efficiency. While governments try to operate everywhere in the same way, individuals and voluntary associations, when their activity is deregulated, tend to try a wide variety of experiments, the result of diverse experiences. The only role for the state is diffusing the solutions so that all those who experiment can reap, if they so desire, the benefits of all the others who experiment. This is the argument of diversifying experiments. In the 19th century, the first generation of Austrian School Economists, Carl Menger, Eugen von Bohm Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser revolutionize economic methodology. Classical economist understood that the exchange value of a class of goods, transparent in the prices, should reflect what they called the value of use of that class of goods. But then why did diamonds, which had a lower use value than water, being less vital, had a higher exchange value? The temporary explanation was that diamonds are harder to produce. In other words, the price of diamonds depended on the cost of production. The explanation was not comfortable: it could be seen that the increase in the cost of production is not always followed by an increase in value. Menger (2007) solved the problem by unifying the theory of prices and value. The valorization is not that of classes of goods but of actual goods: we valorize concrete units of goods which are effectively the object of choice, and price is reflected only through relative valorization to other goods. The first unit of a certain economic good, in other words the first unit of a rare good at my disposal, will be employed to satisfy the most intense desire, compared to the multitude of ends that it can serve. If there is a second unit available, this one will be used to satisfy the next hierarchical need and so on. Because the first need is more intense, the value of the first unit is higher, even if in terms of physical characteristics or production processes it is similar to the second or the fifth. The phenomenon of valuation always applies to the units of goods placed at the outer limits of already available goods. The marginal units, added at the limits, always have a smaller utility than the last unit already in use, simply because the first units have been employed to satisfy the most urgent needs. The price of units reflects the marginal value. A marginal unit of water is cheap for me while I am living in Bucharest simply because water is an abundant resource and I have already satisfied the most urgent needs. The marginal value of a glass of water is small. Id rather have a diamond. However, after one week, abandoned in the desert, Id be willing to give my diamond to a Bedouin in exchange for a glass of water. It would be the rational choice in my case, a marginal unit of water is more valuable to me than the diamond. The subjective theory of marginal utility also explains the phenomenon of price formation of the factors of production. If the source of value for the consumption good is the valuation of the consumption good, what is then the source of value for capital goods? It depends on the value of the final

consumption good. The valuation of the capital good is an input of the valuation of the consumption good, not the other way around, as the classics claimed. Why are the subjective scientific revolution and the marginal theory important to libertarianism? Because they offer a libertarian solution to political debates on the usage of resources. The unification of the value theory shows that the valuation of individuals involved in politics is not different from the valuations of ordinary people. Should we then pay special attention to them? The allocation of resources according to the hierarchy of preferences of individual actors seems the only rational solution. And the science of economics identifies the free market as that mechanism which is capable of constantly allocating resources according to the desires of participants. The operational assumption is that the intensity of these desires is measured in the price per unit of resource which the participants must forgo in exchange for units of other resources. Bohm Bawerk (1890) develops the theory of capital and finds an economic justification of the phenomenon of interest. Lending money with interest was forbidden during the medieval period but the interest reflects a general human preference: one unit of a good available today is more valuable than then same unit available five years from now. The phenomenon of time preference explains why wages do not fully reflect the profit of long term projects, without this being about exploitation. Lets assume that a certain project will start bringing a profit after five years of activity. Even if the actual work happens now, the value of labor which brings in a profit five years from now is lower than the value of labor which brings an immediate profit. The exchange between money and labor reflects present values. Bohm Bawerk also explains how equilibrium prices are formed. Buyers which are able to pay the most will easily find sellers in a crowd of sellers made up of both people that can sell at lower prices but also of people that can only sell at a high price. Individuals capable of selling at the lowest price find buyers the quickest. Transactions continue in an area whose ceiling reflects the price level above which the remaining buyers choose to not go up and the floor level, under which sellers choose not to sell. Prices are determined strictly by the valuations of participants on a market, as manifested in their choices. Equilibrium prices on a free market reflect mutual beneficial relations between self interested agents. There are at least two links that connect Bohm Bawerk to libertarianism. Firstly, he legitimates the free formation of interest. Secondly, he proves that the supporters of fair prices as different from those formed on the market, actually support forced transactions which harm one category of participants in the exchange of values. In the 19th century, radical individualists Henry Thoreau, Herbert Spencer, Albert Jay Nock, Lysander Spooner and Benjamin Tucker begin seeing the state as the main opponent of contractual freedom and the main threat to private property. The state, which is founded on coercion, is a way of organizing which cannot be reduced to the mechanisms of civil society a complex network of voluntary relations. If, reduction ad absurdum, the legislative authority is also mandated by me, I can theoretically withdraw my support. If I am told that I must conform to the constitutional principle

of majority, to which I have agreed, I will ask how I can withdraw my delegation to the authority which adopted the constitutional rule of majority and not unanimity. What is the accepted way in which I can withdraw the consent given to the public authority and to reserve my right of decision making without further delegating it? These authors set out to prove that the idea of state building through social contract is a fiction that benefits the public authorities. Not only have individuals not voluntarily agreed to join the state authority but political authorities do not allow them to step outside the state unless they forfeit all their mutually beneficial relations with partners of their own choosing (Spooner, 1870). The individualist position is strengthened in the 20th century by the moral philosopher John Simmons (1976). He criticizes the vast array of justifications for the individual to be bound to the political authority that were put forward by Joseph Raz, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Jeremy Waldron and others. The sociologist Franz Oppenheimer claims that the de facto origin of political authority lies in subjugation, conquest, submission and is maintained by the domination and exploitation of those who obtain their goods through economic means (work and voluntary exchange). The state is primarily an aggressor of its own citizens, states Murray Rothbard (1998) in a categorical interpretation of natural law. Domination, exploitation and aggression are skillfully hidden from the public eye and maintained by fraud. The fraud is present in both the ideological formulas meant to legitimize power and also in the various ways of hidden taxation. But besides exploitation and fraud, the state provides protection services. Why? Mancur Olson compares the state with a sedentary predatory organization, which protects its pray from bandits that are travelling around, robbing. The reason for this is that in the long run, it is in the interest of the dominant predatory organization to cultivate a climate of trust in which the robbed ones keep producing more, both for themselves and for the organization. Douglas North and John J. Wallis (2010) explore today a theory of the state as an organization capable of organizing the other organizations with the purpose of rent seeking, and gaining benefits at the expense of others. Together with Gordon Tullock, James Buchanan develops a theory of behavior which applies to individuals who hold office. The theory of public choice shows how peoples attempt to appropriate resources concentrated in the center of state administration and meant for redistribution (a type of rent) bring about large, dispersed costs. It will be rational for those who want to appropriate rents to invest in this a value almost equal with the value of the rent. However, if there are ten competitors, the net social cost will be almost ten times greater for a net social benefit equal to the concentrated benefit of the rent. The success of public choice theory in explaining and predicting political activity is due to forfeiting the assumption that politicians have different incentives than regular individuals. Politicians rationally seek their own interest; they make deals with various organized groups of interests, which make financial contributions to political campaigns, in exchange for legislative favors

which harm dispersed and weak groups. Politicians come up with new ways of hiding the deals and the real underlying working of the legislative activity from the eyes of these groups, especially those with electoral power. The mechanism of public choice explains how legislative products are hard to monitor and also their tendency to impose costs on dispersed individuals. This situation is described with the help of economic analysis in the framework of given constitutional rules (rules of the game). How could they be improved? In the Calculus of Consensus, Buchanan and Tullock (1995) lay the foundations for economic constitutional analysis, the analysis of constitutional rules. They produce a theory of constitutions on the basis of a small number of variables on one hand, the external costs, by which they understand wrongdoings coming from other people; and on the other hand, organization, negotiation and informing costs which we face in order to defend against external costs. If the end goal is to ensure consensus between as many of those affected as possible and if a central system of representation is inevitable, a bicameral system is recommended. The second chamber should be structured on different grounds than the first, otherwise those who win in the first chamber will automatically win in the second one. Robert Axelrod (1984) shows, with the help of game theory, that the mechanism of reciprocity, answering bad with bad and good with good is the most successful strategy (brings the maximum of benefits to those who adopt it) in repeated games. Axelrods contribution is subscribed to the evolutionist theory of social behaviors. Individuals produce moral order without aiming to do so through the fact that the members of a group that respect cooperation norms prosper visibly and, in time, manage to attract members of other groups which were following other rules. Axelrod solves the problem of moral order raised by Hobbes and which the latter resolves by postulating a social contract as the basis of the state. Through the strategy of reciprocity, individuals not bound by a common external agent of coercion produce social norms of trust capable of sustaining an extensive civilization. Ludwig von Mises (1996) suggests a deductive methodology a priori which aims to unify the humanities. If we analyze the contradictory viewpoints expressed in social sciences, we discover certain common ideas which do not need empirical grounding. The sentence people act implicitly contains two ideas: the idea that peoples preferences are visible in their actual choices and that people will act in order to satisfy the desire which is felt most urgently at a certain moment. These two ideas assume in turn the subjective theory of value (the theory according to which something is good as long as it is chosen) and the law of marginal disutility (the law according to which the second unit of a good will be automatically used to satisfy the next desire in a descending series of emergencies. From a praxeological perspective, or human action theory, Mises employs a spectacular mechanism of economic analysis which helps him rewrite classical liberalism. Mises brings two major contributions to libertarianism. The first contribution is the discovery that in an economy in which the means of production are common property and production and distribution are left to central planning, prices cannot be set rationally. There can be no exchanges in the absence of a multitude of economic actors that own

the means of production. Without actual exchanges, we have no exchange rates, or relative prices. Without relative prices on a market, no one, not even state agents can know how much more desirable is one resource compared to another. Therefore, the command center is in danger of blindly channeling productive efforts and wasting valuable resources by pursuing non-valuable goals. This version of the knowledge argument, the argument of economic calculus can be applied to all types of interventionism. The state blocks free transactions of relevant goods, to the extent that it gives orders. But only those transactions would reveal the useful information for a productive rational process. The free market offers information on efficient courses of action and state intervention in the market is culpable of chaos in terms of allocation. The second contribution is the theory of the economic cycle, explaining the phenomenon of economic cycle exclusively as an effect of the inflationary policy of credit expansion. State intervention in the monetary market and diminishing interest rates by the state through the Central Bank is actually an alteration of relative prices, aiming to favor long term projects. Easy credit makes entrepreneurs want to invest in long term projects. Will these projects be profitable? True profitability of a certain level of long term investments depends on the level of savings economic agents make available for entrepreneurs. If the interest rate is manipulated by the state, the opposite occurs: easy credit leads to inflation and, in the likelihood of currency devaluation, economic agents will decrease the level of real savings. There will necessarily be a point at which the waves of investments will collapse. To conclude, state intervention is directly responsible for economic depression. Friedrich von Hayek (1945; 1973) wonders how an extensive market order can be possible if there is no committee to plan, design and supervise the entire process of channeling resources in various areas. He explains that the multitude of voluntary spontaneous adjustments of some agents to others leads to a global result determined by the theory of knowledge. Each agent connected to the market has limited knowledge but the bulk of their knowledge, connected through the market, manages to answer at all times the complicated question What services are desired and which are the means least desired which can be utilized for each of them, in each area and each stage of each particular process of providing each service? How do agents on a market produce information, make it circulate and utilize it? The conditions which determine a certain local process are complex and can be fully known only by the provider. He is capable of making use of his talent and his ability to solve production problems but not of communicating the steps of the solution, because a significant part of the relevant knowledge is not explicit for the reflexive mind, but inbred in the ways of successful action. The type of knowledge held by the providers cannot be communicated to any central planer who might want to take over this task or to any other agent on the free market. However, once the service is provided, the market transaction reveals explicit information which spreads rapidly through the market and can be used by anyone: local prices. The generalized freedom to sell high, buy low and provide services activates a dense network in which price-related

information travels rapidly and invites agents from other areas to provide it more cheaply. The market allows every agent to put his share of knowledge in connection with the contextual knowledge of other agents. The market is a huge collection of trial and error processes, led by profitseeking entrepreneurs, through which both the desires of agents and the cheapest ways to fulfill them are revealed. But if contextual knowledge and creative virtues cant be put to use unless the decision belongs to the owner of the knowledge and creative virtues, then centralized intervention is irrational. Interventions or strategies planned by a central committee are irrational because the economically relevant decisions of the planning center are deprived of a part of economically significant knowledge. Explicit cost-benefit analyses done by commissions of state experts will inevitably be less complete and more deformed than the analyses done by the sum of agents connected on a market, even if the latter ones cant be made explicitly. Israel Kirzner (1976) shows that the market is also the best discovery procedure of what exactly are resources. Entrepreneurial processes show that something which was previously not considered a resource is now made valuable through a new project. Because the market is a discovery process of the fact that certain objects are valuable, any balance of national wealth made by the state is incomplete. Kirzner elaborated on Joseph Schumpeters vision (1934), according to which a multitude of entrepreneurial projects are set free on the market, all of which are permanent attempts to innovate one way or the other. The state can invest in research and development but the knowledge utilized by the team of researchers will be limited. By contrast, all the free entrepreneurs which hold different positions and benefit from the knowledge associated with their position will permanently and responsibly search for new ways of innovating. Their knowledge is linked together via the market process. In The Road to Serfdom Hayek (1997) criticizes representative democracy because it leads to interventionism. Why do the worst get on top? Because given the possibilities associated with power positions, they are more motivated to reach them. The Road to Serfdom shows that since the forces of spontaneous order tend to produce corrections to the results of state interventions, maintaining the effects of intervention will ask for a progressive extension of the controlled areas. If, for instance, owners are forced to extend the time given to their renters by means of legislative interventions, the housing offer will decrease and the increase in cost will fall on the renters. New interventions will be required, such as subsidizing housing projects. The market mechanisms through which the market facilitates the production of services and corrects mistakes are dealt with extensively by Henry Hazzlitt, Geoge Reisman and others in the modern theory of prices. Without being a libertarian, Karl Popper discovers ideas which support libertarianism. First of all, Popper (1993) criticizes the assumptions of methodological collectivisms in explaining social phenomena, and normative collectivisms in justifying certain political decisions. It is not the

Romanian people that act, suffer or evolve, but individuals which, according to one rule of description or the other, we call Romanian. Popper transports in the realm of social philosophy an idea with which helped him make a career in philosophy of science, the idea according to which our theories can be contradicted by experience. If history shows that power can be misused by anyone, then the problem of political philosophy is not who should rule? but rather which are the institutional ways in which we can limit power, regardless of the source, so that leaders are unable to do a lot of evil. Milton Friedman (1962) shows that the freedom of the consumer to move to a different provider, the freedom of the employee to find another job, the freedom of the employer to find another employee, will protect everyone from unfavorable treatments. Competition based capitalism (as opposed to corporate capitalism, in which the state partners various companies) is equivalent with the institution of competition, of the freedom to enter and exit any sector of the market. Government agencies, special commissions or special state organisms which are given the power to license economic activities only end up complicating regulation and enforing barriers to competition, to everyones damage. Health, education, the monetary sector, should all be privatized within the framework of market liberalization, and victimless crimes like prostitution and the selling of drug should also be liberalized. In Capitalism and Freedom he also explains why the Central Bank is a wrong institution. Before the 1920s, a bank that was facing massive currency demands could borrow from other banks. If there was trust, the lenders would pool their resources and voluntary make the loan in order to prevent a widespread panic that the entire bank network is insolvent. A widespread withdrawal of deposits must be avoided as it prevents an economic a standstill for all entrepreneurs which operate with money borrowed from the banks. Federal banks were established with the purpose of offering last resort lending to banks facing massive and rapid withdrawal of deposits, and their solution was printing more money with government approval. Soon enough, the Federal Bank ended up being a state lender, and in this way the state was allowed to spend more money than it had collected through transparent taxes. If in the 1920s, under the leadership of a well known New York banker, the Central Bank managed to fulfill the fine tuning function of economic cycles, during the Big Depression it aggravated things to a catastrophic level by strangling the money supply. Today its main functions is crediting the state and financing government spending through inflation. The subsequent generalized rise in prices is actually hidden taxation. The libertarian type of conclusion is that we must give up the institution of the Central Bank and favor free monetary production. Milton Friedman also shows why political freedom (authentic participation in democratic decisions) and civil freedom depend on economic freedom and private property. Lets assume that socialism allows for freedom of speech in good faith. How will people launch and spread institutional ideas contrary to the system? Such a person will need resources to support a magazine or to purchase time on TV or radio. When operating the means of production is an attribute of the state, the decision of how to use the

resources will belong to public officials. They will find it difficult to justify using the resource to undermine their position and the positions of those within their network. In her novels, Ayn Rand illustrates the idea that the only driving force of civilization and innovation is individual effort directed towards ones own wellbeing, while respecting other peoples rights. These aspects of social reality legitimize unrestrained competition based capitalism and an ethic in which selfishness is a virtue and altruism, through its effects, is a vice. Like Robert Nozick, and coming also from a philosophical perspective, Ayn Rand is a supporter of a minimal state and advocates for ideas introduced by previous libertarians Rose Wilder Lane and Isabel Paterson, and, even earlier than that, for ideas present in the work of Herbert Spencer. Ayn Rand wins back the Kantian perspective of autonomy for libertarianism. The rational individual is capable of creating laws for him to obey and he should be left to do just that; each individual is inviolable world in himself. Why does the market ensure a never ending flow of services? The key element according to Isabel Paterson (1943) is the creativity of the human mind. State intervention in a free society weakens and deactivates this element: one man can truly think and work only for himself. The approach favored by Robert Nozick belongs to analytical philosophy, the attempt to try to solve philosophys problems by analyzing the logical relationships between concepts and the clarification of formulations. In Anarchy, State, Utopia, Nozick explores the logical consequences of accepting the assumption that the fundamental negative rights of individuals are inviolable. If no person or group of persons can undermine the liberty, property, health of someone who has not undermined anyone elses in turn, then taxation is forced labor. In theory, it serves to redistribute wealth. In order to force egalitarianism to clarify the limitations of free exchange in relationship with the value of equality, Nozick constructs a mental experiment: if in a egalitarian state of 10000 people, each having one hundred dollars, 9999 wish to offer one dollar each to basketball player Wilt Chamberlain for slam dunk demonstrations, Chamberlain will be one thousand times richer than everyone else. At what number of spectators should access to the stadium be denied so that the level of inequality is acceptable? These conceptual investigations lead Nozick to distinguish between two incompatible ways of understanding justice (Nozick, 1999, 149-74). The egalitarian tends to see justice as a target or a pattern to be fulfilled for instance, a certain ratio between the wealth of the rich and poor should be taken as a goal. The libertarian tends to see justice not as a goal, but as a set of restrictions which need to be upheld by any given action, regardless of the resulting wealth ratio. What Nozick suggests in the end is not adjusting actions in order to realize a uniform world, characterized by a sole vision of justice, but a world of worlds, a framework-world in which individuals are free to imagine worlds and invite others to take part in them. These worlds can be characterized by systems of diverse rules, which would have to respect the meta-rule of free movement of individuals. It is from here that we understand that libertarianism is not an ideology amongst others, but a neutral framework

for ideologies. The libertarian order, which for Nozick represents the minimal state (the state whose sole prerogative is to make sure that others dont infringe negative rights) is not an utopia but a framework for voluntarily chosen utopias. The anarcho-capitalist libertarianism of Murray Rothbard, Walter Block, Herman Hoppe, Linda and Morris Tannehil is supported by two axioms: people act, an axiom of economic science as Ludwig von Mises understands it, and a moral axiom, called the non-aggression axiom (Rothbard 2002, Tannehil 1970, 4; Block 2003): everyone is free to do as they wish as long as they do not initiate or threaten with the initiation of physical force. This has to be understood taking into account two ideas. The first one is the idea of exclusive property over ones own body taken from Richard Overton. If I am my sole owner then both the fruit and the exercise of labor is emanated from me, then also the fruit of my labor is mine. As a consequence I am the legitimate owner of the services I provide and I can sell them freely. The second idea is the theory of initial acquisition or homesteading as seen by John Locke. A resource which is not owned by anyone initially becomes mine by mixing my labor with it. Both the right to free exchange and private property are natural rights or in the nature of things. The existence of the state, of an external agent of constraint cannot be justified. The degree of popularity which libertarian ideas received in the 1960s and 1970s is due mainly to the simplicity and elegance of the methodology and of the penetrating formulation which both Rothbard and Rand give to libertarian principles. Bertrand de Jouvenel (1998) criticized redistributive policy by showing its practical effects. The state is not a simple transparent mechanism that redistributes money but rather an organized group which produces public services for everyone by taxing unequally. What occurs primarily is not a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor but a redistribution of decision making power from the rich and poor to the political class. One can observe two things. Services become more costly and of worse quality so that the lower and middle class would have been more satisfied in the absence of redistribution. Also, the new class that holds control over resources uses its ascendancy and knowledge position over the channels of public resources in its own interest by trying to compensate its own fiscal burden. The demand for equality only creates a perverse inequality. The arguments of Alfred Venn Dicey and Friedrich Hayek are continued by Bruno Leoni. Leoni (1991) contrasts the evolutionary jurisprudence with centralized representative democracy. The role of the state must not be that of legislator but at best that of guarantor of last resort for contracts. At first hand, civil institutions chosen freely by the parties involved have to administer, interpret, guarantee and enforce freely signed contracts. Freedom of contract is limited only when a third party acts and proves in a court of justice that it has incurred. Rather than having legislation define the allowed types of activity and having judges apply that legislation, a certain type of activity becomes of interest to judicial arbitrage after a conflict has risen. Only after a potential annulment by a court of a

particular contract signed beforehand, the state ceases to guarantee that particular contract. The law is formed when an unfavorable resolution is proposed as a precedent and creates the shadow of doubt over similar future contracts. The idea of law of the land and the precedent based legal system of AngloSaxon tradition can be understood with the help of a historical illustration. In the 17th century, during an intellectually and politically coherent movement in favor of individual freedom, the Levellers John Lilburne and Richard Overton support not only the abstract values of religious tolerance, private property, true freedom of exchange, including abolishing state monopolies, the voluntary character of army enrollment but also procedural rights: the right of the accused to face their accuser and, interestingly enough, the right of the jury to judge not only the facts but also the existing law. If the correct law emerges out of the repeated interaction between individuals and creates habits in a certain place, then the members of the jury, the common participants of the social game are the most apt to recognize and evaluate legal norms. This idea works in favor of gaining recognition for the right to free speech. In a time when criticizing the political authority (of the king) was illegal and prosecuted as libel and incitement to rebellion, in 1735 Peter Zenger manages to get acquitted as a result of his lawyers defense that criticizing government should not be an offence when the criticism is true (Schmidtz and Brennan 2010, 173). The combination between the right of the individuals on the jury to judge the rule itself and restricting the decision making process to a single particular case allows for both maintaining the legal traditions, fine tuning the law to particular aspects of unique cases and suggesting juridical innovations at a local level. According to David Friedman, the anarcho-capitalist order, liberalizing or privatizing all economic sectors of activity, including the provision and administration of law and order, constitutes a preferable, more efficient economic order than the one we have today. His theoretical sources are neoclassical economics, economic analysis of the law (the attempt to detect the effect of legal rules with the help of rational choice theory) coming from Richard Posner and the analysis of property rights inaugurated by Coase, Alchian, Demsetz and continued by Steve Pejovich (1998). David Friedman (1973; 1996) offers an institutional model for an anarcho-capitalist order, an order characterized by freedom of legal contract. Each protection agency offers a package of legal codes and services for administering the law, which is applicable to the interaction between its clients and a different package, negotiated with a another agency, which is applicable to the interaction between clients of the two agencies. Pairs of clients of different agencies subscribe and buy the package they agreed on. In their turn, the protection agencies and the pairs of protection agencies buy legal codes and arbitrage services from private courts of justice. The social order will have three characteristics. First of all, the peaceful resolution of disputes will be cheaper for the protection agencies, compared to the violent resolution. Clients will not want to finance other peoples private wars. Secondly, even if each

individual will be free to live according to different law in pair with any other individual, the costs of negotiation will create pressure to make uniform legal codes. Third of all, to prevent costly ad-hoc negotiations, individuals will prefer multiple bilateral agreements, signed beforehand. The legal market will take the shape of todays insurance market. It will be in the best interest of agencies to produce any legal change imagined by its clients as long as they are willing to pay for their preference and there will be no third parties willing to pay more to preserve the status quo. If information is present and negotiation is easy, any change that can produce a net benefit will occur. A historical intuitive yet imperfect illustration of the idea of jurisdictional competition guided in one way or the other by the freedom of clients to choose between the competing authorities is the state of rivalry between the Pope and the Emperor after 1073. Taxing and coercion functioned in parallel from both authorities yet neither had the capacity to subordinate the other. The presence of the other authority makes each occupant of an authority position have a raised interest in maintaining the loyalty of subjects. Since the subjects could find refuge and support with the rival authority in case of abuse, the absolute level of coercion was maintained at an acceptable level. The key to social order lies in tolerating anothers liberty to choose his life style and in mutual tolerance between parallel providers and administrators of codes of law and order. Probably the bloodiest historical illustration of the way in which the tolerance solution emerges is that of the religious wars. It was only the mutual exhaustion of parties that led to a libertarian type of solution. The less bloody solution was given at that same time by the free Dutch cities. The welfare of traders was dependent on the institution of religious tolerance capable to increase the number of buyers and business partners. Today libertarianism plays an important role in the economic science of development. Hernando de Soto (2000) offers an explanation for third world poverty: at first sight, dispersed individuals own significant amounts of basic resources. But without having private property legally protected, de facto property is uncertain. This prevents investments and the capitalization of resources. Without legal property and the rule of law, the citizens of the underdeveloped world cannot buy franchises, do not have access to bank loans, police or justice in case the authorities make pressures or confiscate their property. The role of state law in the third world and to a smaller extent in the second world, the one in which we live, is to protect a certain groups power over people rather than to protect the property rights of individuals in relation to others. Hernando de Soto is part of an empirical line of research that deals with the consequences of libertarian institutions. Heritage Foundation and Property Rights Alliance annually calculate the indexes of economic freedom in the world and publish the correlations between property rights and economic well-being. The difference between Hong Kong and China is an illustration of the force of these correlations.

A synthesis of libertarian political philosophy

One must perceive any attempt to synthesize a complex political doctrine in a small number of words in light of these arguments. With these precautions in mind, we can say that an economic, social or political measure is libertarian if it will reduce, for all individuals involved, the level of constraints from others, including the state. An economic, social and political order is libertarian if it allows for a maximum level of permissiveness from others so that each can follow his or her own goals, employing his or her property as he or she sees fit. Libertarianism is a political philosophy, not a moral one. The fundamental preoccupation in political philosophy is not limiting morally reprehensible activities, but establishing political obligations. The question that libertarianism answers is What can the state legitimately coerce me to do or not do?; it does not answer the question What is the aggregate of good behaviors?. The answer it gives is supported not only by a plurality of moral theories but also by a plurality of arguments from social philosophy (concerning fundamental aspects of social behavior) and from social sciences (concerning regularities of social interaction). These arguments are the fruit of concerns regarding how to achieve social order and cooperation. The libertarian answer to the question of political philosophy is that only initiation of physical coercion, threat with initiation of physical coercion, theft and eventually fraud should be punished by law. They are the only illegitimate acts. In the words of Leonard Read, anything that is peaceful should be tolerated by law. Denying to effectively contribute to others health, education and protection could be immoral but should not be punishable by law. Libel, consensual activities like prostitution or drug selling are legitimate acts also. Acts that are legitimate but morally reprehensible must be discouraged through the mechanisms of civil society which do not employ physical coercion, like excluding one from social and economic networks and banning ill reputed individuals from private properties by the lawful owners of those properties. What is illegitimate for one individual is illegitimate for a group, therefore for the state as well, with the exception of the tax which finances the services of guaranteeing private property and freedom of contract. Generally, taxes and duties against individual consent are extortion and are illegitimate. Imposing regulations on individuals activities against individual consent represents infringements of freedom to peacefully interact and are illegitimate. In the language of political philosophy and the philosophy of law, libertarians consider that the acts that should be punished by law are those which infringe on negative rights. Rights in general represent demands from others, whose realization by the force of law is morally justified. Positive rights are demands to concrete actions from others while negative rights are demands of non-actions from others, in other words

demands to refrain from certain actions. According to libertarians, the fundamental rights of individuals are negative, rights to not be treated in certain ways; or, which is extensively the same thing, obligations, rules or fundamental constrains are ensure that others are not treated in certain ways. Following Lockes classification, these are four: the right to not be deprived of life (equivalent to others duty to refrain from murder), the right to health (the duty of others to not inflict harm), the right to freedom (the duty of others, including the state to not engage in illegitimate imprisonment or kidnapping) and the right to property (the duty of others to not resort to theft or fraud). Libertarians are not hostile to the idea of positive obligations as such. The institution of contract forces parties to engage in specific positive acts. By contract, the parties obtain voluntarily and knowingly positive obligations correlated with positive rights. The libertarian doctrine generally rejects the idea of fundamental positive rights, in other words of rights administered by the force of law in the absence of contract or previous consent. These are allowed only in exceptional cases, like life-threatening situations or those which ordain the special relations between parents and children. It would be incoherent that the obligation to contribute through concrete actions to the life, health, liberty (like to help one get rid of the constraints of illegitimate governments), or property of others would reflect rights, because to admit fundamental positive rights means to diminish negative rights. For instance, administrating by the force of law a positive right to property would have to be correlated with diminishing the negative right to property of someone else. Kant expresses the same conception according to which only negative rights are fundamental, claiming that individuals should be left to decide when and how they will fulfill their imperfect duties like the duty of charity. From an economic perspective, the libertarian order guarantees everyone, by law, a maximum level of freedom to sell and buy. The law will guarantee maximum freedom of contract, of private enterprise and of exchange (laissez faire), as long as these do not infringe on the rights of third parties. All goods and services which are nowadays provided by the state like health production, education, various social nets, infrastructure services, currency production, and as much as possible, law production, legal arbitrage and administration of protection services can and must be provided on the free market by voluntary associations. Instead of political decision having a monopoly over the conditions in which private and public goods and services are provided, and instead of the barriers to market entry and exit, libertarians suggest maximum equal freedom of enterprise and contract. The role of the state and of political associations in general is at best a last resort guarantor of contracts. The libertarian order can be described as cannibalism, with the mention that it is a capitalism of the maximum free competition in all sectors, not corporate capitalism, in which some companies benefit from certain forms of preferential partnership with political power. We must mention that the

libertarian economic order describes a private property and free market order, regardless of whether or not individuals chose to accumulate capital. From a social standpoint, the libertarian order guarantees everyone, by law, a maximum level of civil freedoms. Victimless crimes like prostitution or drug trade are not criminalized. The state should refrain from discouraging or supporting certain lifestyles on behalf of other ones as long as they are not identifiably infringing on other peoples rights. The role of the state is that of a neutral guarantor of the freedom to live in a traditional or eccentric way. From a political standpoint, the libertarian order is characterized by a law of maximum freedom of association and dissociation. Individuals are free according to the law to associate in groups or dissociate from others in order to produce common, collective or public goods. Secession at the limit, understood as an individual declaration of independence, is considered legitimate. This means that preventing someone from exiting a political association as long as that exit is not infringing on a previous, voluntarily assumed and explicit contract is considered aggression or rights infringement. This perspective recommends libertarianism as a doctrine of maximum individual freedom and maximum personal autonomy. It is true that libertarianism forbids individuals from engaging in certain activities which are allowed by democracy, for instance participating in groups of political decision which have legislative consequences and which lead to some people being constrained to contribute to others wellbeing. However, since the impact of these measures would mean an increase in the total degree of constrain all would have to bear, they do not increase the level of freedom. We can also call it the doctrine of maximum personal autonomy as the person has the right to decide on a wide variety of things which concern only himself. In a libertarian order, it is the person that sets his own norms, not the state, the collective or the group.

Anarcho-capitalism and libertarianism; anarchosocialism and left libertarianism

Even if a lot of anarcho-capitalists are libertarians and the anachocapitalist institutional solutions focus on protecting individual rights as seen by libertarians, libertarianism and anarcho-capitalism describe different institutional categories. Libertarianism describes an order of freedom of all contracts and activities which do not lead to the physical coercion of others. Libertarianism is a concept that deals with legitimacy or at least a particular set of preferences dealing with rights. On the other hand, anarcho-capitalism describes an order of freedom of legal contract and protection which allows for rights allocation according to individual preferences, measured by the willingness to pay for them. The legal

preferences of individuals could, for instance, refer to legal protection from the proximity of drugs. If the total willingness of drug consumers and users to buy legal protection for this type of commerce would be smaller than the total willingness of conservatives to pay for a code which criminalizes it, the anarcho-capitalist who is dedicated to the value of efficiency would be pleased by the result. It must be said though that today drugs and prostitution are criminalized because the mechanisms of collective decision making manage to aggregate the preferences in a distorted way. They favor groups of interests which are placed so that they can take advantage of the status quo. It is in the interest of the chief of police to have more tasks and therefore to receive more budget resources and it is also in his interest to obtain privileged information on the commercial channels of the black market and to share any benefits that might come from here with political authorities. By eliminating the monopoly on law and order, anarcho-capitalism would eliminate distortions, treating impartially two groups of preferences which are similarly dispersed. A much simpler distinction lies between anarch-capitalism (anarchoindividualism or market anarchism) and the utopian anarchism and the revolutionary, socialist type of anarchism. The utopian anarchism of William Godwin and Josiah Warren is guided by an aversion to private property and economic inequality and presupposes a world dominated by altruism, comunitarianism and resource abundance, ignoring the results of the humanities. The revolutionary anarchism of Mikhail Bakunin is guided by the same double aversion and recommends using violent means to destroy the state, a guarantor of private property, exploitation and inequality. These forms of anarchism reject the essence of the anarchocapitalist doctrine and do not share its methodology (Boettke 2005). Left libertarianism, despite its name, also denies the essence of the doctrine of libertarianism. Left libertarianism favors collective decision in administrating natural resources, denies the institution of inheritance, sees free labor contracts as exploitation and is anti-globalization. From a methodological standpoint, left libertarianisms interest in the labor-value theory rather than a subjective value theory disconnects it from contemporary economic science. It would however be hasty for anyone to consider libertarianism a rightleaning doctrine even if there are semantic pressures from the doctrine which considers itself left libertarianism. From a doctrine point of view, the right harbors also traditionalist and authoritarian accents, which are incompatible with libertarianism. From a methodological standpoint it is not very useful to give a precise answer making use of something which is relatively vague or imprecise as the left-right axis. What we can say is that in todays political configuration, both in Europe and in the United States, libertarianism is more of an inspiration for the forces of right, than for those of the left.

Criticism
A first category of criticisms against libertarianism are the ones referring to indetermination. What kind of foreign policy is libertarianism advocating for? It is unclear. On one hand, a libertarian society with a noninterventionist foreign policy seems a risky choice: sometimes preemptive strikes are rational. But preemptive strikes are forbidden by the nonaggression principle. A non-interventionist policy of alliances with political elites from other traditional countries (elites which are considered themselves aggressors of their citizens) means complicity to aggression. How can libertarians solve the situations in which only a large scale draft would be capable of stopping an invasion which would otherwise destroy civilization? A doctrine which is centered on the absolute value of property does not yet have a coherent answer to the problem of intellectual property rights. The extension of the principles of private property faces a problem from the perspective of libertarian values. The free diffusion of more intellectual products seems to increase the degree of cooperation and innovation. In the absence of a state regulation who would be the ultimate judge in matters which deal directly with a child? For instance, who decides what the appropriate age is at which children can start working for their own income? Does property over my own body give me the right to sell my organs on a free market? Does my freedom to decide include also the freedom to sell myself into slavery? My answers have to balance two shortcomings: on one hand, the arbitrary nature of principles, and on the other, the non-intuitive character from the perspective of common morals. Another category of objections deals with the economic limitations of private property regimes. A doctrine which is centered on the value of private property seems to have a hard time with the special characteristics of natural resources like air or ocean waters. Both polluted air and fish banks move uncontrollably. Can natural resources be parceled out? Are there ways of privatizing them which take into account these difficulties? If they dont exist, can libertarian principles be compatible with certain regimes of commonly ownership of marine resources? If so, in this case is the regime of open access more efficient than that state property? Another group of criticism refers to the fundaments of moral philosophy within libertarian political philosophy. Are these moral fundamentals solid enough? On one hand, the concept of natural law seems covered in mystery. In the realm of sciences, natural refers rather to the regularities which are manifested uniformly everywhere. What is so natural about the natural law, about the absolute right to private property and contract when we can see so many societies where these events are not regular at all? On another hand, utilitarianism seems to allow for situations in which the freedom, property and sometimes even the lives of others can be used only as means towards achieving general utility. Is a strong formulation of the doctrine incoherent? Does the aggressor who is yet unproven have the right to a reasonable legal procedure for judgment before being punished?

If so, isnt this right conflicting with the right of the victim to punish her aggressor without any other obligations towards society? From the perspective of social philosophy, there is a suspicion that a global order in which market rules dominate will lead to atomized individuals, the break of family ties and break up of communities which have been traditionally responsible for education and knowledge transfer necessary for civilization. The fragmentation of society could lead to the dissolution of civilization and to autistic isolation of the individual and this fear is shared by both left communitarians and the conservative right. Also, local cultures and the western civilization as we know them could end with the complete liberalization of immigration policies. From a conservative perspective, advocates of legalizing the drug and sex trade in the name of individual responsibility are rather uncaring and irresponsible moral-wise towards the fragility of lives. Other objections target the moral limitations of libertarianism, testing it against common moral intuitions. It is not necessary to be an egalitarian to honestly ask whether in a world without forced distribution, the voluntary mechanisms of civil society will be enough to ensure a minimum level of living or at least the subsistence of those incapable to participate in trade. Assuming optimistically that this will be solved, will the assisted ones not receive also the stigma of humiliation? The problem is at a deeper level: in a world in which no one is forced by law to pay for the services received by others, what will happen to the innocent and those who are defenseless and cannot insure their own property again aggressors? These questions are usually shrouded in suspicion, especially because the normative individualism practiced by libertarians is quite close to selfishness. Moreover, from a psychological or meta-theoretical perspective, isnt serving the will of the rich the main practical reason why one should support an anti-redistributionist doctrine, without thought of how they obtained their wealth, but with a focus on maintaining and strengthening their advantageous position? Could it be that the focus on capitalism, even if in theory we are talking about competition based capitalism and deregulation, is working to maintain the status quo of corporate capitalism in which state authorities give privileges to big business, damaging competition and consumption? Libertarians support a theory of exploitation, in which the state organization maintains servitude in civil society. But this model does not respect reality. If we look at democracies today, the dominant opinions in civil societies are statist. How can libertarians explain this situation, in which civil society, the assumed victim, does not want to rebel, even though freedom of speech and peaceful demonstrations are allowed?

Libertarianism today

We can find directions for answers for these questions in the activity of a wide range of libertarian authors. David Friedman and Hernando de Soto are just two examples from a long list. This is just a short list of names and research themes addressed. Randy Barnett argues in favor of an anarchocapitalist polycentric constitutional order, John Hasnas stipulates the possibility of a smaller-than-minimal state which leaves the production of law and order to the market but which allows for subsidies through vouchers given to consumers; Jan Narveson critiques the ethics of redistribution, David Schmidtz combines economic analysis with moral philosophy, Roderick Long employs praxeology for achieving market anarchism; Tyler Cohen shows why culture, including high culture, flourishes in conditions of freedom and is weakened by subsidies. People such as Wendy McElroy, Ralph Raico, Ronald Hamowy, David Boaz, Tom G. Palmer, Lew Rockwell and Leland Yeager represent both academic and think-tank figures. There are a few libertarian research centers at George Mason University, the Cato Institute and the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama. Starting with the meeting in 1947 at Mont Pelerin, libertarianism is the most solid intellectual and civic movement. Atlas Foundation in Washington DC is an umbrella organization and the main router of a network of hundred of libertarian think-tanks all over the globe. Examples of libertarian publications are The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Reason, Liberty, LewRockwell, The Orange County Register, The Freeman, the mailing list of The Liberator Online (all in the United States), Spiked (Great Britain), Western Standard (Canada), Next Magazine (Hong Kong and Taiwan). In the United States, the Libertarian Party is third in terms of size. It functions as a platform which advocates for tax decreases and deregulation of economic activities, deregulation of foreign trade, liberalization of immigration policy and the decriminalization of prostitution and drug use. The 14% of the libertarian voters (Kirby and Boaz 2006) are shared with the Democrat and Republican Parties, each of them harbouring libertarian factions. It must be said that despite the fact that the libertarian intellectual movement witnessed a constant development, that public choice theory is an ever growing research program, and that the economic perspective on human behavior and the evolutionist perspective are already changing the shape of humanities, the power of the state has constantly grown at the expense of individual freedom and private property in the United States. Bary Goldwater, the conservative libertarian candidate (not only a suporter of economic freedom and gay rights but also a critic of the religious right) lost the presidential race in 1964 but opened the road for Ronald Reagan. Another famous comeback of free market ideas in politics was acheived by Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain. However, neither Ronald Reagan nor Margaret Thatcher managed to do more temporarily slow down the growth of the state. On our continent there are a few examples of political personalities known for their libertarian convictions put into practice, like Czech Republic President Vaclav Klaus and Georgian

Prime Minister Kakha Bendukidze but it is obvious that they are exceptions. Today, neither the United States nor Europe are putting libertarian ideas into practice.

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