Linguistic

Stratification and the tri-unity MatterSubstanceForm: A Functional Discourse Pragmatics perspective In memory of Eli Fischer-Jrgensen (1911-2010) a true heroine, a great scientist, and a fine artist Abstract In this paper linguistic stratification, i.e. the conception that language and speech are stratified, or, organized on different strata, or levels of representation, will be dealt with. Linguistic Stratification is originally a structuralist notion, dealt with by i.a. de Saussure (1916), where the distinction is between form and substance. These terms, of course, originate in Aristotelian philosophy, where, however, the distinction was triadic rather than dyadic: form, substance, and matter (hyle). Hjelmslev (1943), confusingly, wavers between the dyadic and the triadic conception, with a bias towards the former (Dahl 1998). This paper will argue for the triadic conception within a Functional Discourse Pragmatics theory of language and speech (Nedergaard Thomsen 2006, 2009). 0. Introduction: the distinction between form and substance in language some questions and some preliminary answers My conception will be summarized by answering the following seven questions, Q1-Q7: Q1. Is it at all plausible to conceive of language and speech as stratified, i.e. as organized on different strata, or levels of representation? If answer in the affirmative, then Q2. Which strata are to be recognized?; how are they to be characterized?; and how are they interrelated (semiotically)? And, Q3. Are the strata (psycho- and/or socio-, or other) linguistic realities (realism) to be observed, described, and explained?; or are they, rather, handy presentational tools for describing language and speech (nominalism, instrumentalism)? If answer affirms the first alternative, then Q4. Are the strata mental (cognitive) phenomena, related to memory and consciousness? If answer in the affirmative, then, Q5. Are the strata implemented/(caused by and) realized in the brain? And if so, how? Furthermore, Q6. How are the strata related to the extra-linguistic context the exterior of language and speech? Q7. What are the purposes/functions of linguistic stratification, epigenetically and evolutionarily (biologically)? To these questions Functional Discourse Pragmatics tentatively answers, A1-A7: A1. Language and speech are (said to be) stratified, as amply demonstrated throughout the history of linguistics, both within the functionalist and the formalist paradigms (e.g. Saussure 1916; Hjelmslev 1935, 1943, 1954; Fischer-Jrgensen 1966; Coseriu 1954; Chafe 1970; Andersen 1984 [1975]; Chomsky 2000;

Jackendoff 2002; Lamb 1999; Fawcett 1983, 2000; Halliday 1961, Halliday & Matthiessen 1999; Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008). However, no consensus has been reached yet as to the precise characterization of stratification. Perhaps needless to mention, some approaches do not recognize the concept of representation altogether, e.g. connectionism and some linguistic approaches inspired by Husserlian phenomenology, because in these approaches the concept of representation is taken to be closely allied with algorithmic, symbol-manipulating computationalism. I believe the natural way to deal with the problem is to claim that, insofar as it is rather obvious that we have to distinguish between e.g. phonemes and allophones, it should be just as evident that there are (at least) two levels of representation in the linguistic expression, a phonemic (form) and a phonic (substance) one representations being simply, in this instance, the phonemes and the allophones. We have to either dismiss any discussion of what it is that these representations represent, or claim that they represent neurolinguistic phenomena in mental form. A2. There are six qualitatively different strata (1, 2, 3; -1, -2, -3), plus an interface-stratum (0), listed sequentially: 1. Content Matter (contextualized meaning; discourse pragmatics, usage) realized from: 2. Content Substance (normo-pragmatics) conventionalized by: 3. Content Form (functional semantics [systematic pragmatics]) 0. , i.e. Symbolized by: -3. Expression Form (functional phonology [systematic phonetics]) conventionalized from: -2. Expression Substance (normo-phonetics) realized in: -1. Expression Matter (contextualized sounding; discourse phonetics, usage) Evidently, this description implies an assumption that the stratification is a symmetrical cross-tabulation between an axis of formality/substantiality and an axis of signification. Thus, one would deduce parallel behaviors of e.g. the matter of content and the matter of expression, like, for instance, being input/output strata in production and reception compare i.a. Chomskys (2000) characterizations: intentional- conceptual (cp. Content Matter) and articulatory-perceptual (cp. Expression Matter) interfaces to the exterior of language and speech. As to the axis of formality/substantiality, many non-structuralist theories do not employ the terms form and substance (and matter), but the topic they describe is similar. Some use the term structure for form and some the term function for substance, which may be perplexing. There is also some unfortunate confusion as to the nomenclature of the axis of signification, in that esp. US American linguistics seems to prefer the terms form and function for expression and content, interfering with terms used for the formality/substantiality axis. A3. The strata are mental (cognitive) realities they are mental levels of representation (cf. de Saussures 1916 cognitive terms: image acoustique vs. concept, for the distinction expression vs. content).

A4. They are, more precisely, mental levels of representation in the psyche of each individual natural language user i.e. they are psychologically real and they are historical entities. They are operative in speech production and reception, which are evidently individual communicative activities. A5. The question about the neural implementation cannot be answered exhaustively yet. Note, though, that the humanistic mind (1st2nd personal) cannot be reduced to the (3rd personal, or apersonal) brain of the natural sciences, and vice versa. I believe that the mind and the brain constitute an integral phenomenon: in Aristotelian terms, the naturalistic brain is matter and the mind is form as well as causa finalis (function). However, I do not subscribe to any Cartesian dualism. Thus, I conceive of a unity of the naturalistic brain matter and the humanistic mind form in terms of an Aristotelian substance, a unification or concretum, or Brain/Mind. Per implication language being a mental organ , language too is, complementarily, neural matter and cognitive form, as well as their unity as a substance, as a neuro- cognitive phenomenon. For instance, with respect to Expression Matter, one part of physiological phonetics will then concern i.a. the mental representation of the instructions to the organs of speech (articulatory phonetics) as well as the construction of the mental representations of what is heard (auditory phonetics). This way Expression Matter is a mental form phenomenon with respect to implementing neural matter (to be dealt with by neurolinguistics). Seen from the unitys vantage point the Brain/Mind , one may choose to investigate the neural matter, or the mental form, but neither can do without the other. In von Uexkllian cognitive-semiotic biology, the brain part is our Innenwelt (e.g. Central Nervous System), whereas the mind part is our Eigenwelt occupied by schemas (form). A6. The question about the relation of language and speech, as mental phenomena, to the external world, including the socio-cultural world, has not been answered definitively yet. Note, though, that I do not endorse the sociological conception that language and speech exist monolithically out there, between, and presupposed by, the natural language users in a third world of their own (immanentism), as in Luhmannian Systems Theory. Rather, I believe that language is a psyche-internal phenomenon on the one hand, it is ontogenetically internalized as a resource in each individual language user (by being acquired and learned from the surrounding models in the Mitwelt), but on the other hand, it is a phylogenetically inherited communicative faculty of the human species (universals). Speech, linguistic (inter-) activity performed by individual natural language users, is user-bound and only externalized (on the expression side) as e.g. acoustic (and optic) signals, i.e. produced and perceived by concrete, historical natural language users. The external signals (or, Sinsigns) are natural objects that are (to be) studied using the methods of natural sciences. In von Uexkllian cognitive-semiotic biology the acoustic signals as produced and perceived would belong to our subjective Umwelt, showing traces of their production relevant for their perception. The signals in themselves are only potential signs (or, Qualisigns, in Peirces terminology) in our objective Umgebung. On the content side, language and speech are related to a language-external referential subject matter (Stoic tynchanon fact) by way of referential intentionality; even social facts are created by playing performative-declarational language games, like e.g. the creation of an open meeting, or, more fatally, the creation of a condition of war. The subject matter referred to is semiosis-internal, or, an Immediate Object inside our Umwelt, but mediately it is a semiosis-external Dynamical Object (in our Umgebung). A7. The question about the purpose/function of the stratification of language and speech (evolutionarily) can be answered functionalistically, e.g. in terms of efficiency of processing. Ill come back to that later.

1. MatterSubstanceForm, a linguistic tri-unity of both language and speech The strata, or representational levels, of language and speech, should be understood in the sense of Aristotle and Peirce: 1. Matter, qualitative immediacy, amorphous purport (firstness) 2. Substance, concrete palpability or functioning (secondness) 3. Form, typicality or generality, habituality, conventionality, constitutivity, order, systematicity (thirdness) It should be noted that, according to Coseriu (1954), form (3) is correlated with the linguistic system, substance (2) with the norms of usage, and matter (1) with usage (understood as stylistic competence). System (3) and Norms (2) are held together via the linguistic type. This way they come to function as a coherent idiomatic competence. (Inside the idiomatic competence the Norms would correspond to firstness, the System to secondness, and the Type to thirdness.) Form and Substance are connected via a process of manifestation, regulated by a system of manifestation rules (concerning normalization). The idiomatic (secondness) and stylistic competences (firstness), in their turn, are held together on a universal level via mans elucutional competence (thirdness; cf. Coseriu 1985). Substance and Matter are connected via a process which I shall term realization, regulated by a system of realization rules (concerning contextualization). All of the above amounts to the architecture and infrastructure of the human communicative competence. The sides (or planes) of language and speech plus their interconnection, understood as an interface- stratum, are, according to linguistic structuralism (Saussure; Hjelmslev; Jakobson): 1. Expression (image acoustique; form), the sign, or signans (Representamen; firstness) 2. Content (concept; function), the signatum (meaning/sense: Interpretant; thirdness) 3. , Semeiosis (the semiotic process), or mapping: the sign function obtaining between Content and Expression; termed symbolization when connecting Content Form with Expression Form; it is dynamic and unidirectional, an implication (asymmetrical and transitive). Firstly, it should be underlined that Expression Matter is indeed a mental representation: in the productive mode it forms input to articulation it is an articulatory plan; in the receptive mode it forms output of perception i.e., it is a representation in terms of auditory percepts. Similarly, Content Matter is a mental representation intentionally related to, i.e. directed at, a referential subject matter (secondness) outside language and speech. Secondly, it should also be emphasized that linguistic Content (Interpretant) is a two-fold category: on the one side, it is the sign-internal representation of the extension (or, reference, Immediate Object) of the sign it is a perceptual image (Durst-Andersen 1992, 2011); on the other side, it is what is traditionally

termed the intension (or, meaning) of the sign it is a conceptual idea (in Durst-Andersens terminology). In Peircean terms the image would originate in a first-order sign, or Representamen, of an original experiential situation; the idea would then be a second-order sign, or Interpretant, in the original situation (in Ancient Greco-Roman linguistics, the prima positio): seeing a tree in the garden means having a sense impression (Representamen) of the tree (Immediate Object) as a tree (Interpretant); using the word tree describing this situation means activating the (linguistic correspondent of) the sense impression (image) and the category (idea) of the tree the tree out there in itself is the Dynamical Object. (This exposition is revision of Durst-Andersens 1992, 2010, 2011 theory, the difference being that he has the Immediate Object as part of the Content, equating it with the image.) Substantial evidence is that in the linguistic situation there is activation in the Innenwelt (CNS) of the same parts that are activated in the original experiential situation in the presence of the Dynamical Object (the chair) roughly a sitting experience is activated when hearing the word chair and when seeing the corresponding physical object in the Umgebung, thus construing an opposite number Immediate Object in the Umwelt. Figure: Stratification, Peircean semiosis, and von Uexkllian cognitive-semiotic biology (ethology)

Thirdly, it should be underscored that, contrary to received opinion, I conceive of the semiotic process, or Semeiosis, as a level of a specific kind, not as a process per se. Thus, e.g. with respect to the mental lexicon, I conceive of Semeiosis as an addressing system, a rule or procedure (thirdness) inadvertently connecting Content (secondness) with Expression (firstness): Content Expression. Only in processing is Semeiosis actualized as a process (secondness). This level may be conceived of as the Code of the language.

Semeiosis is a complex mapping function: out of language transcendentally it maps, on the expression route, onto the physical reality of the sign Representamen (e.g., the acoustic signal, as articulated and/or perceived in Peircean terms, the Sinsign; irrespective of provenience, it is a mere Qualisign), and, on the content route, it maps onto the language-external referential subject matter, Peirces Immediate Object (within the reach of the sign) and his Dynamical Object (outside the reach of the sign). Immanently, it maps between Content and Expression. Expression is the Peircean Legisign (e.g. a lexeme-expression in the mental lexicon; a phoneme in the mental phonologicon). Expression is tri-stratal: form, substance, matter. This means that there are three levels of the Legisign the type per se (systematic form), a normative token (substance), and contextualized token (matter/usage). A Peircean note on the Content plane: it seems to be the case that the Content Form would, on the one hand, correspond to Peirces Immediate Interpretant (firstness, the meaning of the sign in itself, as a linguistic potentiality). The Content Substance and Content Matter would seem both to correspond to his Dynamical Interpretant (secondness, the actual intention of, or effect on, the interpreter in language, productively, the Speaker; receptively, the Hearer). Alternatively, Content Substance would correspond to the Dynamical Interpretant in the sense of actual illocutionary intentions and effects, whereas Content Matter, in the sense of ultimate perlocutionary intentions and effects, would correspond to Peirces Final/Ultimate Interpretant. In another analysis Content Substance/Matter are Emotional Interpretants (feelings, firstness), Energetic Interpretants (volition, secondness), and Logical Interpretants (habits, thirdness). A further Peircean note on the Content plane: take the sentence Cain killed Abel. The external, referential subject matter (Dynamical Object) is constituted by the real historical persons Cain and Abel, and the killing of the one by the other it is a fact (tynchanon) in the nebulous past. The Immediate Object is the object as it is construed within the biblical domain of the utterance sign (in the biblical signification sphere, cf. Brier 2008). Note that the Immediate Object is correlated with the mediate Dynamical Object outside of the purview of language and speech, as in the figure above. In terms of Maturana & Varelas cognitive biology (and Varelas Enaction Theory), the Dynamical Object is related to the Innenwelt by way of perturbations, whereby the cognitive domain (Umwelt) is construed by the structure of the Innenwelt (CNS) and Eigenwelt (mind). I find that the distinction between Dynamical and Immediate Objects is crucial if, for instance, you think of the biological species elephant and a concrete specimen out there (Dynamical Object), this would count as a holy animal (Interpretant) in India and be treated accordingly (Immediate Object). Only the Form strata constitute the grammar (System) of a natural language users language, whereas the strata of Substance (Norms) and Matter (Usage) constitute his pragmatics. In another sense, even the formal strata are pragmatic (pragmalinguistic), i.e. related to linguistic activity, dialogicity, implying a speaker and a hearer the reason why I term my model Functional (Discourse) Pragmatics. Accordingly, Content Form may be viewed as systematic pragmatics (locutionarity), whereas expression form would be systematic phonetics (phono-pragmatics). Then, articulatory and auditive phonetics are also pragmatic disciplines, in this (inter)actional sense of pragmatics. Acoustic phonetics (and gestural optics) is the physics part of linguistics.

With respect to semantic-pragmatic content, I shall characterize matter as perlocutionarity, substance as illocutionarity, and form as locutionarity (introduced above). Parallel with the Expression side, perlocutionarity and illocutionarity constitute the (socio-)pragmatics of the language, locutionarity (pragmalinguistics) the grammar. Note that the illocutionary acts (substance) that can be performed in a given language are constrained by the locutionary possibilities of its grammar (form), as for instance in the case of performatives where the socio-linguistic state of affairs created is determined by the signification of a performative verb (e.g. the declaration of a meeting as open). I mentioned above that Form and Substance are connected via a system of manifestation rules and that Substance and Matter via a system of realization rules. The character and function of these rules differ according to which side of language and speech we consider: with respect to Content, the manifestation and realization rules are Formation rules (Andersen 1984), reducing referential subject matter to semantic representations, e.g. delicate substantial items and relations to lexemes plus grammemes and syntactic relations, and reducing or compressing/telescoping e.g. argumental signs (logically connected states of affairs; thirdness) to dicent signs (propositions; secondness), and dicent sign to rhematic signs (terms; firstness); and various kinds of perlocutionary and illocutionary intentions via literalization to locutions (wording). With respect to Expression, the manifestation and realization rules are Implementation rules (Andersen 1984) which add phonic information, e.g. contextualizing features, as they convert a phonemic representation (phonemic oppositions) into a phonetic (allophonic) representation (phonetic differences). When producing speech, one reduces content information (typification; categorization), but augments expression information (tokenization); when receiving speech it is vice versa: reducing expression information (typification; categorization) and augmenting content information (tokenization). (This must be the linguistic kind of entropy/negentropy. Popularly speaking, the world out there is a chaotic mess, but to cope with it, we have to make the world in here a cosmic order! Uniformity increases when going from content matter to content form, but decreases when going from expression form to expression matter, in producing speech.) Given that the activities of speaking, and of understanding speech, are mental, or cognitive, processes and that language is a procedure for speaking/understanding, then this language could only be an individuals, though social-collective (i.e. not private), phenomenon, a so-called functional language, not a monolithic language of a given speech community (in that I do not recognize such phenomena as macro-minds and masse parlante). The union set of individual functional languages constitutes an Idiom (or, community language). Figure. The distinction between an individuals functional language and the historical language of a speech community (Idiom) Functional language (individual) Idiom (historical community language)

Figure. The three modes of being of language (individuals functional language vs. speech communitys historical language, or Idiom) Elocutional competence Universals Idiomatic competence (individual) Type System Norms of usage Expressive Competence Usage Speaking/Understanding Speech Discourse processing Text (discourse) Idiom (speech community, union set)

Synchronous corpus of texts of a speech community

2. Semeiosis as an independent interface-levelthe seventh stratum In Saussurean linguistics the sign function is commonly seen as the transparent boundary between Content and Expression. In Functional Pragmatics, this is not so: semeiosis (symbolization) is an inter-level, a kind of mediating syntax between Content and Expression. This level is i.a. obvious in the case of word order processing, where the content-syntactic (and expression-syntactic) structures are quantified (e.g. the measuring of the complexity of the sentence members) as input to performance-based linearization rules (cf. Hawkins 1994 Performance Theory of Order and Constituency). On the universal level of language (understood as a competence-to-perform) are found: universal principles of processing (e.g. the law of increasing complexity of constituents; Early Immediate Constituents; principles of proximity; economic vs. iconic motivation), which are operative in word order processing, i.e. determinant of the actual order in an actually occurring text utterance, even in cases with no conventional regulation. The upshot of the above conception is that we have three levels of representation on the content side, three levels of representation on the expression side, and one orthogonal level in between content form and expression form, termed symbolization above. This picture should be revised, though: not only the two forms of language and speech, i.e. Content Form and Expression Form, are connected, or mediated, via Semeiosis, but also the two substances and the two matters. For instance, perlocutionary mental states (Content Matter) are indicated (diagrammed) by e.g. voice quality and facial expressions (Expression Matter). The above description may be represented by the following table. Table. Semeiosis as a seventh (macro-)stratum Content Form Substance Matter Semeiosis Symbolization Expression Form Substance Matter

3. Stratification in Language, Discourse Processes, and Text In Hjelmslevian Glossematics language is basically a paradigmatic resource presupposed by the linguistic text, which is a syntagmatic sequence (termed process). In Peircean phaneroscopic semiotics, a natural language users language would be a tri-unity, i.e. occurring in three modes of being: thus, it occurs not only as a resource or technique (thirdness, 3), but also as a discourse process (secondness, 2), and a product, the text (firstness, 1): 1. Product (Aristotelian ergon opus): Text: finished product (past; left behind) 2. Process(ing) (Aristotelian energeia actus): Discourse Processes: here-and-now speech activity (present; progressive) 3. Pattern of behavior/procedure, a resource, competence, instrument of communication (Aristotelian dynamis potentia, Peircean mediator): Language: (Lexico-) Grammar and Semantics-Pragmatics, Phonology-Phonetics; general applicability (including the future) These modes of being are interrelated such that the Pattern/Procedure is a constraint upon the (creativity of) ongoing Discourse Processes the Text is the ensuing incremental Product. In Systemic-Functional (and Jakobsonian) terms, the Pattern is a potential, the Process is the choosing (selection, combination, and projection), the product is the choice instance. (One can see the Pattern as an Aristotelian form operative in the Discourse Processes as matter, yielding the Text as a concretum, or substance, but in Peircean terms the Pattern is a habit of thirdness mediating between processual secondness and (yielding) textual firstness.) Notice that the Text is directly related to the stylistic-expressive competence (Usage, concerning matter, the contextualizing level), indirectly to the higher-level competences, in that the competences are successively nested: UsageExpressive Competence < [Norms < System < Type]Idiomatic Competence < UniversalsElocutional competence With respect to language as a resource, or competence, Functional (Discourse) Pragmatics, in accordance with Coserius Integral Linguistics, operates with three levels of competence: a universal (elucutional); a historical (idiomatic); and an individual (expressive). The historical level corresponds to the stratum of Substance Norms of usage, and of Form functional System. The individual level corresponds to Matter Usage. The expressive competence of Usage contains i.a. paradigms of stylistic variants of pronunciation, realized in the concrete Text. It is evident, though, that not only language as a resource but also language as a product is stratified: a given utterance (or, discourse act) is stratified as a locution (form: a realized sentence type; e.g. a declarative sentence an indicative with direct word order), an illocution (substance: a realized speech act type; e.g. an assertion), and a perlocution (matter: e.g. convincing). Given that speech is the primus inter pares mode of being of (a) language, the stratification of the text corresponds to the stages in the encoding and decoding processes. Stratification in discourse processing is then foremost stratification in monologic discourse processes: productive vs. receptive. It should be stressed that productive discourse processes are basically deductive (secondness), whereas receptive discourse processes are basically abductive (firstness).

Productive stratification starts out with the interiorization from referential subject matter to the Content stratum (what the speaker wants to say); next is formation (dematerialization) from Content Matter to Content Form over Content Substance; thereafter symbolization (encoding) from Content Form to Expression Form; next materialization (deformation) from Expression Form to Expression Matter over Expression Substance; and last, exteriorization from Expression Matter to e.g. acoustic and visual signal. Receptive stratification takes its point of departure in the last mentioned acoustic signal which is interiorized into Expression Matter; then comes the formation (dematerialization) of Expression Matter into Expression Form over Expression Substance; thereafter decoding from Expression Form to Content Form; next, materialization (deformation) from Content Form to Content Matter over Content Substance; and last, exteriorization from Content Matter to referential subject matter (corresponding to intentionality). This description may be represented as in the following table (for the relationship between reception and production, see Keenan & MacWhinney 1987): Table. The Functional Discourse Pragmatics model of language and speech Referential subject matter 1. Content Matter 2. Content Substance Formation rules 3. Content Form 0. Symbolization rules -3. Expression Form Implementation rules -2. Expression Substance -1. Expression Matter Medial/modal matter Production Dynamical Object Immediate Object I. Interiorization/Inventio Communicative Function II. Dematerialization III. Formation/Literalization Productive Function 0. Encoding Productive Form (Legisign) -III. Deformation -II. Materialization Articulatory representation -I. Exteriorization/Articulation Sinsign (output) Qualisign (e.g. acoustics) Reception (Comprehension) Dynamical Object Immediate Object I. Exteriorization/Reference Communicative Function II. Materialization III. Deformation/Indirection Receptive Function 0. Decoding Receptive Form (Legisign) -III. Formation -II. Dematerialization Perceptual representation -I. Interiorization/Perception Sinsign (input) Qualisign (e.g. acoustics)

What is termed referential subject matter in the above table is the referential domain of a given utterance, or what Bhler (1934) termed Zeigfeld, (i.e. indexical field). It contains all the Immediate Objects of a given utterance, and is correlated with the deictic center of the utterance (Dik 1989). Any text and its discourse processing occur in a situational context (i.a. containing correlated non-linguistic behavioral events), and the operative functional language that generates the text functions with respect to a culture (i.a. containing social habits and ideologies). This way language and speech are the twin-part of a sym-praxis of language/speech and culture/situation (life forms). We may say that, as the text is an instance of the language, so is the situational context an instance of the culture. According to Uldall (1967:29f), the speech situation unity and the language culture unity share a stratum of content substance (i.e. Content Matter in our terms). However that may be, the interactive relation

between thinking (-for-speaking) and speaking/communicating as well as between thought (cognition) and language/communication is involved: thinking as a behavioral event may be partly formed (construed or structured) by the speaking habits of ones language (e.g. thinking in terms of evidentiality in a speaker- oriented language like Turkish; cf. the Relativity Hypothesis of Sapir-Whorf), partly only regulated by a universal Language of Thought. Above, I proposed to consider Semeiosis as (also) a separate level of i.a. symbolization rules, and also that the manifestation and realization processes be considered as governed by formation and implementation rules. This amounts to an opposition between process as process (!) and process as a potential/resource/ technique seemingly a contradictio in adjecto! However, I believe that a language (communicative competence) is both a communicative competence (to perform) per se and a performance (system; thus, Chomsky). The actual running of the system is the Discourse Process. 4. Critique of Hjelmslevian Glossematics from a Coserian Integral Linguistics point of view It should not go unnoticed that form in this model is not pure form (schema) as in Glossematics (Hjelmslev 1954; Fischer-Jrgensen 1966), i.e. neutral with respect to the physical medium (mode of materialization) used. That is, in my point of view, linguistics is multimodal/multimedial, and Expression Form is modal/medial, e.g. phonic (vocal language) or optical/manual-brachial-facial (sign language). Thus, rather than operating with a Hjelmslevian, immanent amodal/amedial stratum of a schema, my Functional (Discourse) Pragmatics operates with a Coserian Integral Linguistics, transcendental level of modal/medial form (e.g. Coseriu 1954; also found in Jakobsonian functional structuralism and Danish structural functionalism Danish Functional Linguistics including Functional Pragmatics). Thus, language and body language are integrated into total, or integral, multimodal/multimedial communication. Natural language embodies a more symbolic form of thinking, whereas body language embodies a more iconic- indexical form of thinking. They are united into an integral thinking-for-communication (McNeill 1992). Glossematics views the Content side as non-psychic, implying an ontology with an immanent semiotic world of pure relations and structures, which is inhabited by semiotic systems only, whereas Functional (Discourse) Pragmatics views the Content side as e.g. also operating with (formed) encyclopedic knowledge. 5. Language and speech as belonging to the symbolic order, the semiosphere The study of language and speech crucially involves all four major scientific disciplines: physics (the physics of speech: acoustic phonetics); biology (i.a. genetics; ethology; behavioral neuroscience; physiology: articulatory and auditory phonetics; neuro-linguistics; biolinguistics; biosemiotics); individual and social psychology (i.a. psycholinguistics; cognitive linguistics); and sociology (i.a. sociolinguistics; communication studies; ethnolinguistics; anthropological linguistics; ethno-methodology; cultural studies), but can be reduced to neither one of them (Cassirer 1945). We will say that language and speech belong within an emergent order of things, the symbolic (semiotic) order, i.e. the semiosphere. (This order is thus, in Hjelmslevs terms transcendental and not immanent, as he would have had it.)

6. Stratification of language and speech in Cybersemiotics The present model of Functional (Discourse) Pragmatics is a contribution to the transdisciplinary theory of Cybersemiotics (Brier 2008).

physical

biological

psychological

socio-cultural

Biological

Physical

Knowing

Psychological

soio-cultural

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