Volume 2. Operations. Chapter 1. Tactics.

WARNING: It is not the intent of this text to describe the legality of what is expressed on this text. The text in the content should not be considered as legal advice. The reader is responsible for ensuring any action taken in relation to this document's content is legal in the reader's jurisdiction. The document is written for research purpose.

Terms defined -Operator: Operator refers to a person who is engaged in a combat operation. Operators' action is the subject of this text. The term was chosen partly because of lack of better words to describe the subject person of this text. Shooter only means a person who is engaging in a shooting activity. Also, the person had to be distinguished from military definition of combatant.

1. Tactics Definition: Systematic, logical approach to control probability. This section will deal maximizing the probability of operators safety by controlling factors that affect combat operations. Operator should create conditions, manipulate or utilize environment, so that events will occur in a manner that is favorable while denying the opponent from achieving the same. Before contact, tactics will be primarily involved with keeping operators from danger, and if contact with opponents could not be avoided, making the contact occur in a manner that the operators has maximum advantage. Major tactical factors are as follows: Information Operation objective / background All parties involved or potentially involved Tasking characteristics / efficiency Human factor Information processing efficiency Precision and speed of action Capabilities and limitations of human body Equipment factor Characteristics of equipments Limitations / Vulnerabilities Location of all parties Effectiveness of gunnery Utilization of terrain / structures / objects for protection, or other advantage. Maneuver and positioning Emission control Legalities Large part of tactics will involve getting these major factors to be in operators favor while denying opponents to achieve the same.

1.1. Analysis of major tactical factors.

1.1.1. Information. Basic desired informations: - Before operations: Potential problems and potential solutions are the primary concerns. Operators needs to consider who can be potential opponents, and potential methods the opponents might use to endanger the operator. Situation awareness, ability to examine surrounding and recognize things of significance to security is required. Equipments needed to deal with potential and identified threats needs to be identified. What kind of approach should be taken to deal with likely threats should be identified and studied. -During operations: Environment: -POEZ -Shielding: This is an object that can protect you from an opponent's physical attack or an object that lowers the probability of being detected by an opponent. -Obstacles -Terrain and structures -Possible paths for approach to a target area or for escape. -Hazards(presence of flammable, explosive material, fall hazard, etc.) -Artificial device threat(motion sensor activated light, etc.) Opposition: -Location -Actions -Number -Weapons -Equipments(Sensors, communication devices, etc.) All the above information should be integrated to create a "big picture" view of the environment which is "situation awareness."

Collection method: -Direct: collection through human body sensor, such as eyes, ears. Also from mechanical

sensor devices that are carried by operators. -Indirect: information sent to operator through communication from remote source.

Information Load Balancing: Work load balancing regarding information processing involves planning to reduce the probability of information overwhelming an operator and prioritizing in information filtering, information device operation, and communication to increase operator safety. There are limitations on amount of information that can be collected from sensors. However, even the amount of information from limited sources can exceed the amount that an operator's mind can properly process in a given time frame. Operators need to give consideration to load balancing and screening of information. The speed of action has to be controlled to limit the information input rate so that sensors would not miss critical information. For example, maneuvering faster would increase the rate of information from new areas revealing in an operator's path and increase the probability of not immediately recognizing a threat within field of view. Another problem is dealing with information coming from multiple sources. If an operator recognized multiple threats emerging through vision, the operator may have less efficiency receiving information also coming through audio communicated by anther operator. If an operator is dealing with visual detection information through eyes and more detection information through IR or thermal imaging devices, then there are also problems with integrating, reconciling the information and also problems with switching input source back and forth from eyes to such mechanical devices. When audio communication is involved, there can be problems with operating a radio which can take up processing resources. Plan should be designed in a manner that such manipulation of communication equipment is kept to a minimum. Naturally, operator would shift attention to deal with what is critical that it needs to be worked on as soon as possible, such as an opponent that is an immediate threat. When operator is working on that task, operator's attention and capacity to process any information that has less relevance to that task would diminish. That means, an operator should recognize that there can be information the operator failed to recognize during that task and the operator may have to examine the situation to see if any information is missed as soon as the critical task in hand is complete. Simple example is is an operator scanning an area to see if there is any other threats after handling a contact with an opponent with gun fire and checking if another operator was trying to tell the operator something if the operator heard a shout. This also means operators should expect delays in receipt of communications by another operator and plan accordingly, such as not making procedures that works under the assumption that no communication is ever missed.

There are also problems with the burden of communicating information an operator has to another operator while processing information and receiving new information at the same time when it is required. There is a mistaken belief that communication is a benefit. Communication is not a benefit, the information received through communication is a benefit under the assumption that it is relevant and accurate. However, communication itself is a burden. Any burden should not exceed the amount that is necessary. Operators should minimize reliance on receiving information through communications. Individual operator taking action to process what is most critical to one's own safety, such as attacking an opponent that is an immediate threat, would take priority over communicating information to other operators. Because of these limitations, there should not be any assumption that any information would be communicated immediately or be communicated at all. Communication equipment can fail, and communications can be misunderstood. An operator may not recognize that something is trying to send information, and information can be inaccurate. Another aspect of load balancing is filtering out unnecessary information. Use of hearing protection equipment such as ear muffs that filter out excessive noise not only provides hearing protection, but also help operators recognize audio signals that is relevant. Also, discomfort and fatigue are items that causes distraction, and distraction places operators in danger. Those should be kept to a minimum.

Countering opponents' information collection efforts: Misdirection, misinformation, decoy, false alarms, etc. Communication jamming. Operators should also take caution against remote detection devices, this includes equipments such as surveillance cameras, motion detectors, and other alarm systems. This does not necessarily have to be operated by opposition. Automatic light connected to motion detectors installed in many houses in U.S. that an operator was not aware of can expose an operator and put one in risk. Information about these should be collected as much as possible.

1.1.1.1. Information Security. Operators need to take caution against any information about them being collected or communication being intercepted by opponents. Information related operator's safety should be guarded from any person who does not have a legitimate need to know. Processing/transmission of information through electronic equipment may have vulnerabilities that needs to be guarded against. Non-encrypted radio transmissions can be relatively easily

intercepted.

1.1.2. Tasking efficiency

1.1.2.1. Human factor. Operator capabilities required: -Information collection / processing. -Weapon skills -Tactical knowledge -Mental: Operator must have the mental capability to collect information, examine the situation, determine best course of action, and use deadly force if needed. Operator needs to be able to perform those actions while enduring stress of life threatening danger.

1.1.2.1.1. Mind process and limitations. A person's sensors like eyes, ears, etc., gets signal input from the environment it is interacting with. It takes time for the person's mind to get that signal and interpret what it means to the person. It also takes time for the person to then decide a course of action based on that input. And, it takes an additional time for the person to physically move his or her body to take physical action such as moving or talking, etc. That is a very simplified model of how information that initiate a task get processed through the mind, and the purpose of it is to illustrate that it time it takes for a person to take action from the time the person perceived the information that triggered the response. Another thing to mention is that although the process of sensor input, perception/ interpretation, decision making, and response action flow is a consecutive process, each of those process is continuously running. That means the person may be in the course of taking action that is proper based on a perception / interpretation of information recognized certain time ago while the person is in the process of perceiving and interpreting new information. And, the current action being taken may not be the best course of action to take based on the new information which the person did not finish perceiving and interpreting yet. So, although each process runs continuously, information from an interactive entity resulting in a response from a person takes time. For that reason, it takes time for a person interacting with the entity to change one's response, when a change in response is warranted by the

entity generating new information. Being aware of this aids operators' realistic assessment of response time when interacting with threat. It also gives knowledge that one party's delay in response for mental process can be used to another party's advantage.

There are mental and physical tasks that need to be processed during the operation. These processes require control. Because the control system of human body being an analog system that allows interaction between information and control signal process allocated for each task, other sensor input, other mental process or state can interfere with critical tasks. To deal with such interference, more mental effort to maintain critical processes and to suppress processes causing interference may be required. The operator should monitor what tasks are running in the mind. Unintended mental process must be suppressed. The causes of unintended processes are various. It can be something simple as irrelevant thoughts. However, it can also be learned responses that are triggered by certain conditions, according to how the operator's mind is conditioned. The learning may have been done either consciously or subconsciously, but the unintended response is subconscious which the operator has less control over. Since human mind does not provide a function to erase discrete range of data, the problematic process data has to be rewritten or overpowered by another process. Or the trigger that causes the process to run can be nullified by changing association. If the process is not accessed for a long period, the "imprint" of the data can fade. For similar reason, some learned techniques may require repeated training in order to prevent the process data from fading. For fine control of a weapon, or other physical and mental tasking, the ability to relax the body and maintain calmness to a certain degree while being alert is important. The ability to do so under stress of life threatening danger differs in degree from individual to individual. Because of the probability of more effort being required for fine control under stress, some may choose to use techniques that are more forgiving to coarse movements or requires less or no fine movements. It is possible to select only the techniques that have less or no fine movements, and expect success, for reasons such as close distance or other factors in a particular situation that reduces the necessity of motions with more precision. However, an operator who chooses to do so is not likely to handle a situation where precision required is above the level of precision the techniques the operator is used to provide. The operator who has stronger control over ones mental and physical state and is able to stay clam will have more range of techniques that can be employed, and also have more precision and flexibility with the techniques employed.

1.1.2.1.2. Maximizing information process efficiency.

-Simplify task: Task should be simple as possible. Any step of action on the process should have a justification for the inclusion in the process. More steps or actions means increased effort or time consumed which increases the risk for the operator. If any action that increases effort or time consumed is added to the task, it must be something essential or have a benefit that outweighs the risk. -Minimize number of task at a given time: Attempt to control the speed, probability and frequency of events that require attention emerging. For example, slow movement for maneuver may make unrevealed area reveal slowly, making new elements of concern appear at a slower rate. Trying to keep number of tasks processed at the same time to a minimum, by selectively executing limited number of tasks at a time, may increase efficiency of mental process.

1.1.2.1.3. Precision, speed, effectiveness of task. Both precision and speed are necessary depending on the situation at hand, but sometimes one decreases the other. The goal is not a concern of what is most precise or what is fastest. Its a question of what is most effective in achieving a desired state. Less complex or less fine actions can be executed quicker. Effort should be made to make task, techniques, or other motions less complex and require less fineness. However, this does not mean all complex or fine motions should be eliminated. It still needs to contain all steps or actions required to achieve the objective of the task or action, and if speed affects precision required to achieve the objective, the speed needs to be controlled to optimum level. Whether if a certain task that require complex or fine action is justified or not depends on certain factors: -Ability: Is the operator able to execute the task? -Necessity: Are there easier, and at least equally effective alternatives? -Benefit: What benefit does the technique that may be difficult to execute gives the operator? For example, some claims using a sight is too complex of a task. But, if precision shot is called for, use of the sight may be the only viable option in certain situations. If the operator does not have the ability to properly use the sight, techniques involving the use of sight may be of no value to the operator. But, that does not relieve the operator from the problem of having to make a precision shot. -Adaptability in technique design: Unnecessary actions need to be minimized and unnecessarily going through resistance or awkwardness, etc, should be avoided. There is a question of what is the best way to move

one's body to do a certain task. The answer lies in a given situation, intended goal, and principles applied. As far as moving body goes, for the most part, it's a question of how fast the body gets into the intended position with with minimal unnecessary movement and be ready to do what it is required once it gets to the position. If there is a task that can only be properly completed by doing subtasks in specific sequence, then memorizing and ingraining that subtasks in sequence will be beneficial. However, the procedure should not be more specific than it needs to be. There is a tendency for many people or organizations to create scripted motion sequences that is to be followed for as many tasks they can think of as possible. The problem with that approach is that a certain scripted sequence of motions efficient in one situation may not be feasible in other situation when performing the same task. And, some times they create scripted motion sequence just for the sake of having one. One prime example is feet and leg movement for turning motion when operator responds to detected opponents to one's side or rear for aiming. I recommend to NOT script entire leg motion sequence for that purpose. In operations, operator may find oneself standing on variety of different surfaces. Those surfaces may not be even, may contain obstacles, may only provide vary limited area for the operator to place one's foot. It's not feasible to script a foot work for every conceivable surface conditions, and even if it is attempted, it is unlikely that anything worth the effort will come out of it. When someone plans to always turn with the support arm side foot first, the person may later find oneself standing on a place where doing so would be inefficient, dangerous, or simply impossible because of obstacles restricting movement. If an operator is following a rule of always stepping toward the direction the operator turns to, the operator will likely slam one's knee into a fire hydrant if there was one right behind the operator as the operator responded to a threat emerging from the rear. Most adult people's mind have stored data regarding how to move one's leg to turn in variety of different circumstances. A few scripted sequence in mostly suited for a flat ground with no obstacles is highly unlikely to be of any better quality of a control software than the control software most adults already developed through decades of their lives. The above example illustrates that when considering scripted sequence of motion for developing technique to perform a task, potential benefit and risk involved should be examined.

1.1.2.1.4. Physical capability and limitations of human. Physical characteristics:

For example, human eyes can only see things within certain field of view, and objects in peripheral vision are not clearly recognized. Also, it takes less time for an operator to shift focus from one object to another if the angular distribution of objects are less. Increased weight of the gear may reduce effectiveness and cause fatigue faster. These limitations should be considered while selecting course of action. Energy preservation: Keep energy expenditure for only the actions that are necessary. More the speed and number of actions, higher the energy consumption rate. Keep the speed and number of actions only to a level that is necessary. Fatigue affects overall efficiency of actions. An operator must not be too fatigued for effective reaction to contact at any point, and any technique or plan employed that does conflicts with this should be avoided as much as possible. This also applies to equipment selection. When a carried or use of an equipment causes fatigue, there should be a plan to control the the length or manner of carry and use of that equipment to keep the degree of fatigue to a level where operator can still operate with effectiveness. Environmental control and comfort: One often overlooked aspect is comfort. This is often mistakenly seen as luxury, it is actually an important item. Discomfort is a signal input that can interfere with sensing necessary information unless that input itself is relevant. Discomfort is distraction, and distraction is a danger to operators. Ability to work with certain level of discomfort is a necessity, but not getting rid of any unnecessary discomfort when there is an opportunity is nothing short of stupidity. There is a limited range of environmental condition where human can be effective. More the environment deviates from that range, the effectiveness gets affected and probability of harm rises. If the degree of deviation is high, then there is a probability of injury or death from environmental effect. Planning and equipment readiness includes consideration about how to keep an operator in the optimal environmental condition and how to protect the operator from it when the environment deviates from it. ******More details in Volume 1 Equipments section.

1.1.2.1.5. Control of mental/physical interference generated from perceived threat: Perception of a threat that may cause harm causes stress. The level is higher when the threat is associated with physical harm, death, or loss of anything that is important enough for someone to engage in combat to guard it at the risk of physical harm or death. The stress caused by it can interfere with efficient mental information processing or control over body movement. This warrants a look at measures to reduce the stress to reduce the interference

and overcome existing interference. Any movement control of the body part is done by determining target movement, issue control signals to move, track the movement with sensors, and send necessary signals to correct errors of the movement as the mind determines. This is a continuous feed back loop. All process is run constantly, but it will take time for a determination in mind to go through the loop and result in motion of the actual target body part. Problem with the analog control system our body has with conducting a certain process is that it allows signals generated by mind or sensor input that is irrelevant to the process to interfere with it. By the analog nature, signals need to track and command fine movements will be affected more. This problem has to be dealt with. More reliance on less error prone sensor is one. For tracking a movement or location, the visual sensor is the most accurate and reliable. That is the reason why motions that requires precision, such as aiming a weapon, are done visually. More mental effort for issuing command signals and receiving tracking signals, by concentrating on the fine motions required, may also work, with certain limitations. However, that may consume additional mental resources. Also, unintended command signals generated must be suppressed. Flinching upon weapon fire may be one example of such command signal. Some of those are spontaneous actions with low probability of repeating. However, those unintended command signals can be from a learned response that is triggered by certain conditions. Operator should be able to detect, diagnose, and fix the problem. Having prior knowledge and preparation for potential threat can reduce the stress response, because it gives the operator more probability of control over the threat situation. It also makes it possible for the operator to associate the perception of threat with a proper response, and utilize the signals generated from the perception of the targeted threat as a stimuli for a proper response. Controlled breathing at moderate phase may also help reduce tension and gain sense of control over physical excitement. Mental tension under threat may cause a person to subconsciously pause breathing. Body's reaction to holding breath may cause additional mental and physical tension which can be reduced by controlled breathing. Conditioning oneself to scan surroundings in proper frequency for situational awareness, unless there is a specific thing that warrants attention, can help counter the effect of stress causing people to get their attention overly fixated on limited scope and losing situational awareness. 1.1.2.2. Equipment factor For example, a firearm can usually attack only one target at a time, but has the ability to attack opponents at a distance. The maximum effective distance varies by type of weapon

and the operators ability to use it. Operator must have an understanding of these characteristics and limitations. ******More details in Volume 1 Equipments section. 1.1.3. Effectiveness of combat gunnery Operators need to be able to correctly assess how effective their gunnery would be in a given situation. ******More details in Volume 1 Combat Gunnery section.

1.1.3.1. Effective Range. Operators need to have an accurate assessment of what kind of standard for gunnery effectiveness is required with a specific firearm and gunnery effectiveness operators can actually achieve at the current time. Maneuvering and positioning decision is affected by how to place operators where their gunnery would be effective while that of the opponent would be low as possible, a process which would be hindered if operators do not have a clear picture of their gunnery capabilities. For example: If operators are expected to fight opponents that are 100m distance, operators would be required to hit targets at 100m distance with sufficient accuracy to deliver hits to part of the target that would likely be incapacitating. Using a target that is a size of a fully exposed man facing the shooter would not be a good indicator of whether if operators have this capability if opponents are expected to be exposed to the same degree. If some operators are determined to be capable of effective gunnery range up to 100m based on their ability to hit any part of a fully exposed mas size target, then the effective range they are capable would have to be rated lower with opponents wearing body armor that effectively protects some part of the opponent's body. Military organizations such as that of United States of America have rifle qualification programs that shoot up to 250m~300m, and rate their standard issue rifle range even further than that distance. However, realistic method of assessing effective range would bring the actual effective range very short compared to those distances.

1.1.4. Utilization of protective objects. There are many types of protective objects. Some are specifically designed and placed in location for the purpose of providing protection, and some are objects that are not designed for that purpose but can be utilized or manipulated for that purpose. Some types of barrier objects are mobile, some can be worn, and some are stationary. An object may provide protection under certain conditions, but not in another. For example, certain body armor may protect against most pistol fired projectiles, but not against more powerful ammunition fired from other types of firearms. The protection effect also depends on the geometrical relationship of the operator, the object, and the opponent. There are following factors to consider: -Material and structure of a protective object. -How much area of the operator is blocked by the object from an attacker's weapon point of view. -Opponents firearm type and ammunition type -How far the opponent is from the protective object Operator needs to know what kind of firearm and ammunition opponent is using in order to know what kind of object can be used to shield oneself against it. This is not always possible, so the operator needs to be aware of penetration capabilities of most type of firearms and ammunition combinations the operator is likely to encounter in addition to known opponent weapons and consider object that can provide protection from those as what to use for protection. However, its also necessary to have a plan of action for when the operator discovers that opponents have more powerful weapons than anticipated. Distance from opponent's weapon to object used for protection determines how much energy of the bullet fired by the opponent is lost before it reaches the object. As a bullet travels through the air and other materials, it continuously loses velocity which decreases its kinetic energy based destructive power used for penetration. If the bullet also possess destructive power based on something other than kinetic energy, such as chemical energy from explosive, that wont be affected.

1.1.4.1. Utilizing stationary objects for protection. If the operator does not know where the opponent is, the operator cannot know where to maneuver to in relation to a protective object. The ideal case would be finding a protective object which can cover the operator from all POEZ, which in most situations is not likely to happen. If there are multiple POEZ in the area, and estimated probability of opponent appearance of each POEZ is about the same, an operator placing one self so that a protective object will provide security from most of the POEZ may be the best course of action.

If probability of opponent appearance of certain POEZ or group of POEZ is higher than the others, the operator may have to adjust priority of POEZ the operator want to be protected from accordingly. However from the safety of the protective object from high priority POEZ, the operator will have to also watch those POEZ that the protective object is not covering. However, operators would need to keep a certain distance away from the protection object. One reason is because of individual space needed for an operator to execute essential functions such as gunnery process or maintaining a ready posture. If an operator has one's torso in contact with a wall in front of the operator, there would likely be a problem with the operator getting the gun in firing position. Another reason is the related to the effect of incoming rounds fired by opponents. If a bullet goes through the object, it still may cause a deflection in the bullet's flight path. The deflection may be large enough to miss the operator if the operator kept certain distance away from the object and kept the operator's exposure behind the object to a minimum. It is usually the edge of a protective object that the operator utilize for protection while shooting at opponents, and the edge on a protective object may be relatively weaker compared to other part of the object. Near that edge the operator is exposed from will be shot at the most. Same applies to any secondary projectiles created by incoming rounds hitting the protective object. In order to have time to react to an emerging opponent, the operator needs to keep distance from potential danger area, such as POEZ. However, an object that can be utilized to shield an operator may not only cover the operator from the opponents point of view, but it can also hide an opponent behind it at the same time. So, if an operator is using an object as a shielding, such as using a corner of a wall for cover, the operator needs to keep some distance from what may appear behind the object, and at the same time be close enough to the object to use the object as a shielding. This is a requirement that contradicts one another. So, the exact distance from the object has to be decided by assessing the risks and benefits involved with being closer or being farther. Considering opponents with weapons that are not designed to be used at a distance, such as blunt force or edged weapons, the operator would prefer to have a distance that will give the operator enough time to respond before the emerged opponent can advance to the operator and make physical contact. More distance will be better. The problem is when opponents have firearms. If both parties are using the same object between them as a cover, the object may provide better cover for the party that is closer to it, if other geometrical relationship to that object is the symmetrical. So, the distance to object used for protection need to be close as possible for countering opponents with firearms with some distance kept that would allow operator room to perform necessary tasks and time to react to any opponents with contact weapon that may emerge from behind the object.

-Momentary exposure technique: If observation is needed, it is better if it can be done with protection from a shielding object. However, observation or gunnery process may require exposure from the shielding. The operator can choose to expose only the necessary portion of the body for a brief period for the observation, being ready to pull it back quickly behind shielding objects. This utilizes the response lag, the time it takes for opponents possibly present to perceive the operator and react to it. Examples of situations where this technique may be required are when an operator has to be exposed into OAZ or opponents' view in order to observe an area, or when an operator is exposing oneself from protected area to unexamined area that is so directionally dispersed that operator would be exposing oneself to part of that unexamined area that the operator did not see.

-Technical concerns, side of weapon mount: When utilizing stationary objects for protection, such as corner of a wall, while attacking an opponent or examining an area, the operator may need to expose a part of ones body and the weapon beyond the side edge of the object used for protection. Efficiency of the use of protective objects may be less with the weapon positioned on the side of the operators body that is opposite of the side where the edge is on the shielding object. For example, an operator may have more difficulty utilizing a corner on the left side of a wall when a long gun is positioned with the stock contacting the operators right side shoulder.

The best way to maximize the use of the corner is to match the side the weapon is mounted to the side the corner is on, but that may require switching the side the weapon is positioned. There are arguments against switching the side weapon is mounted on, in order to maximize utilization of shielding, when those two sides do not match, which is: a) Operator may become vulnerable while the switch is being executed. b) Operator is less accurate while shooting with the weapon mounted on the side the operator is less accustomed to. The first one is a valid argument. However, I find the second argument invalid. In order utilize the corner of a protective object with a weapon on the side of the body that is opposite to the side the corner, the operator has to use a technique that requires awkward positioning of the weapon, or form a very awkward posture. In worse case, operator in that situation insisting on not changing weapon positioning to maximize protection would not be getting any protection at all. Depending on the situation, shooting accuracy with the awkward technique may not be any better than shooting with the weapon positioned on the side the operator usually does not position the weapon. Also, operator should train to shoot with a weapon positioned on either left or right side for various reasons, although it may not be necessary for the skill shooting from either side be equal. Pistols can be retained on hand of the same side with more ease because it is not requires to be fixed on one side of the shoulder, and can be aimed with either eye.

Analysis of object to be utilized for protection: Most objects often available in environment to be utilized for protection do not have simple solid structure. Some part of it will be constructed of materials with not enough density or thickness for protection, and it may also have materials that are presents potential hazard to operators. Thickness of the material regarding protection from gun fire would be assessed by the length a bullet has to travel through the material in order to reach the target, fired from a given direction, so it will change according to what direction the bullet was fired from into the object that consists of the material. How a given object is to be utilized will be decided with all the above points in consideration. For example: A vehicle has parts that bullets can easily penetrate and parts that most pistol and rifle bullets would not be able to penetrate. Most vehicle also have a lot of glass parts which would create a large volume of secondary projectiles when hit by a bullet, and anyone in the the volume of area such secondary projectiles would cover can be harmed by it. Gas tank contains fuel and gas vapor filled air that is flammable. So, a vehicle should be utilized in a way that the part with sufficient density and thickness would be positioned between an operator and opponents, but areas where secondary projectiles would be a threat need to be

avoided. Another problem to consider is a material that provides protection being utilized covered by material that would not provide protection when operators are using momentary exposure technique or exposing themselves for a certain duration to observe or attack opponents. The extra thickness of the material that does not provide protection requires additional exposure, corresponding to the thickness of the non-protective material, of the operators, in order for them to observe or attack opponents. That also mean additional movement distance when using momentary exposure technique. Proper way to utilize a given object according to such analysis can often be different from how people with less knowledge imagines how it should be done. *****Refer to Volume 3 "The Tactical Critic" section for more details.

Mobile/portable objects for protection: Certain objects that can provide protection may be portable. Using them for protection during maneuver or fortifying position to improve protection in an area can be an option. However, risk associated with effort required to move such objects should also be considered.

1.1.4.2. Utilizing body armor for protection. Balancing degree of protection and weight and bulk: For reasons that will be explained in Volume 1 Equipments section, armor with least wight and bulk should be selected as long as it provides necessary function and protection. One problem with body armor selection is that higher the level of protection it provides usually the heavier and bulkier it is. There is a limit to how much weight a human can bear and there is more limit when the person bearing the weight has to preform physical operations. Increased weight and bulk would lower mobility and increase fatigue. Also, the bulk may restrict movement range of an operator's body. All that is a risk.

Role policy: Another aspect of body armor use to consider is to define what tactical role it has. Tactics and type of body armor that is desirable change according to what kind of role the user considers a body armor has. There are following different approaches:

- To consider it as a failsafe layer of protection when all other means to protect the operator from gun fire, maneuver and positioning, gunnery on opponent, utilization of other objects that provides shielding, etc., has failed. - To consider it as a protection that should be intentionally utilized to give operators an option to expose themselves to gun fire. If first approach is taken, there is no significant change in what operators do to conduct operations except that operators have added protection when when operators unexpectedly receive gun fire in part of the body that is protected by the armor. Assuming proper measures are taken to properly manage possible fatigue and restriction of movement range by body armor, etc., this approach significantly increases benefit at the cost of negligible risk. The second approach is taken mostly when operators intends to enter areas where they cannot avoid being exposed to opponents' attack, usually because something about their objective requires it. For example, some operators in certain position may enter ares that will expose them to opponents' attack in order to quickly reach a room containing a hostage to give the hostage taker minimum opportunity to harm the hostage. Soldiers may be expected by their organization to enter a room, occupied by alert and ready opponents, in order to clear that room. No matter how much armor protection an operator has, any exposure is an unwanted risk. Body armor usually does not cover all part of the wearer's body that would result in serious injury or death if it is hit by gun fire. That makes it very risky to use the second approach. And, that is also the reason why when such approach is taken, operators would choose to take additional measures to lower the opponents' probability of successful response when they are exposed, such as use of distraction device, etc., when given the option. But, it is usually uncertain if those measures including body armor itself would be effective. For those reasons, the approach is usually not acceptable unless there is an operational objective an operator is willing to risk death for. When the second approach is taken, often heavier armor that covers more area compared to body armors used in connection with the other approach are used. Preferably, that is with the assumption that duration of operations will be short, but operations may take longer time than expected. As a standard, the fist approach that consider body armor as failsafe layer when all other protection measures failed should be taken. And, there should be no assumption in tactics or planning that body armors give operators ability to do something that they were not capable of without the body armors. However, if operators involuntarily got in situation where exposure to opponents' attack has already occurred or cannot be avoided, consideration should be given to how to maximize the effect of body armor worn.

In some circles, people would advocate taking posture to make part of the body armor covering the front torso in a manner that the line from operator to opponent shooting at the operator would be perpendicular to the armor. The argument in support of the measure is that presenting maximum surface covered by the armor to the opponent the operator is exposed to provides maximum protection. However, the effect and the risk such measure has needs to be examined. First, changing posture to place armor in certain direction may prevent the operator from forming a shooting platform most suited for maximum gunnery efficiency. If the torso is positioned so that its front will be directly pointed at an opponent, it will require the operator aiming a rifle at the opponent to straighten the support arm more to hold a same spot on the rifle compared to when the torso is an an oblique angle to the opponent which would make the support arm side shoulder closer to where the support hand holds a rifle. That may result in hindering the shooter from getting efficient shooting platform, depending on the type of shooter and weapon. Although the impact would not be as great in case of using pistol, such method still

can prevent an operator from forming a shooting platform the operator is most efficient with.

Also, the front side of torso that has maximum armor coverage facing a direction oblique to the operator to opponent line may be beneficial depending on the circumstances, especially when operator is utilizing objects that provides protection that only makes part of the operator exposed. Body armor does not stop an opponent from attacking an exposed operator wearing it. Only, incapacitation of the opponent would. So, decreasing efficiency of incapacitating opponent in order to maximize body armor coverage is a significant increase in risk that needs to be compared carefully to what benefits it would bring. However, if the adjustment in shooting posture can be done to maximize armor coverage with no significant impact in gunnery efficiency, such as when an opponent the operator is exposed to is very close, then it may be worth doing so. Like anything else, situation changes according to risk to benefit analysis.

1.1.5. Signature Control. This will mostly involve minimizing any signature that will give useful information to opponents while trying to detect opponents' signatures as much as possible. Examples of signatures are as follows: -Visual appearance -Audio -Radio communication signals -Infra Red -Heat Reducing detectable signature is usually done by utilization of concealment or lowering the amount of signature itself emitted from the operator. Concealment can be anything that hinders the opponent's ability to detect the operator's signature. Most frequently utilized type is visual concealment, and the word usually refers to that one. Since there are ways other than eyes for a human to detect signatures, measures against audio, pressure, or temperature sensors can also be concealment. So, concealment work in one of two ways: Blocking or reducing a signal from getting to the opponent's sensors, or interfering or saturating the opponent's sensor with noise signals. One of the things that should be considered while utilizing concealment is that once an operator's position is discovered opponents can attack the operator's suspected position even if the opponents cannot directly observe the operator. Operators may have to move to position where there is protection or move sufficient distance to make opponent hard to estimate the operators new location to avoid such attack. Signature control also means revealing that of the opponent. Methods involve reducing noise to better detect audio visual signature of opponents and employment of equipments to detect signatures not detectable by human senses or creating a condition that makes opponent's signature detectable by human senses.

1.1.5.1. Visual signature. Optical Barrier: An opaque object can block the opponent's view, concealing the operator. This is the type that is most referred to. Partial optical barrier: Some objects have spaces that allow some light to go through which will result in not completely blocking the view of an object behind it. Depending on the geometrical

relationship between a parties involved and the object, one party may easily detect another party by seeing through the opening of that object when that object is hindering the other party's ability to detect the party that can easily observe that party. One example of object that can be a partial optical barrier is vegetation. A person standing by a plant may be able to see through the open space in the space the plant body occupies to see an opponent, but the probability of for the opponent standing farther from the object to do the same to detect the person may be low. This type of object presents a problem that whenever such object is present, the person who is exposed to that object is potentially exposed to any opponent that may be concealed by that object. This lowers the accuracy of operators risk assessment when analyzing environment for maneuver or positioning, etc. For example: Operations in wilderness where there are lot of plants throughout the area. Even if only one opponent is observed, any plant in the area can be concealing an opponent who can immediately attack the observing operator as soon as the operator expose oneself by shooting the observed opponent. This brings great ambiguity for making threat assessment.

Color and contrast: Lower the light level where an operator is, harder for an opponent to detect. The person who is seeking concealment do not have to be in total darkness for it to work. If the relative ambient brightness of the surrounding area is brighter than the operator's location with enough difference to significantly overpower the light signature of the operator, it can still work. Even if an operator's light signature is detected, opponents still have a problem of recognition. That means even if an observer detects an object, it is harder for the observer to decide what to do about it if the observer cannot identify what it is. Clothing and equipment colored with similar color to the background is harder to identify. If the outline and other shape feature is harder to distinguish from the background, it is also harder for an observer to recognize. The problem with selecting equipment color to minimize detection is that a color and its pattern that blends well with a surrounding changes from area to area and even according to time and light conditions. There are multiple problems and methods to manage that problems, and let's examine a few. One approach to selecting a color and texture similar to multiple environmental background is to get a color and texture that represents a median average of the color and texture of all expected operation area. This approach is commonly used for many military organizations that has a very wide range of operation area to cover. However, this method has a problem that the median the average color and texture does not particularly blend in well with any particular environment if that of the environment differs greatly from one to another. However, it is likely to blend in well compared to a color and texture that is developed for one particular environment used in an environment that is different from the environment it was

designed for. Another approach is to use darker color to help blend in behind a brighter object and attract less attention. Any color that does not commonly exist in the background should be avoided. Colors that has a tendency to attract attention should also be avoided, unless it is necessary to make an operator less distinguishable. If an observer has objects in foreground and an operator moving in the background in area, operator appearing less brighter the foreground objects would likely lessen the probability of the operator being detected. However, if the operator with dark color equipment gets into a bright area, the dark color would have better contrast against the background, making the operator more detectable. The reason why darker color compared to median average color may be desirable, even with that risk, is because that risk can be controlled and there may be a great benefit because of the manner of maneuver and positioning required in operations. For low detection probability, operators may often plan to use darker area and avoid being contrasted against bright color background for maneuver and positioning. Especially when objects to protect operator from exposure is utilized, operator would like to find oneself with an object covering the operator in the foreground from opponent's point of view with operator in relative dark if the operator is observed. This would mean it would be beneficial to use color that is darker than the average color brightness of the entire area. However, this is if there is a dark area or objects that can be used to shield operator available. Some times, there are no such things. Also, surface color patterns and attachments to distort the outlines and visible features appearance so that it would look different from what is expected are also used. All of these methods are often used in combined manner. Once equipments with certain color and its pattern are selected, operators' positioning and maneuver plan should incorporate measures to place the operators where it is harder for observers to distinguish background from the selected equipments. Operators also must control any alterations to area view operator may cause or reflections. Shadows operators casts, or operator's image being reflected on reflective surfaces can be a problem. Active light source needs to be controlled. LED or LCD screen on equipments emitting light should be controlled. Equipments should be configured in a way that it would not emit light when user does not expect it to. Light emission from illumination devices should be allowed only when necessity out weighs the risk.

Use of light: Any light emitting from equipments carried by operators increase risk of detection. In order to minimize such light emission, operators need to use existing ambient light as much as possible. Next thing to consider is activating light devices that are already in the environment. Both the light from a devices carried by an operator or that from other illumination deivces in the area may be seen by opponents, but opponents cannot predict operator's movement pattern by observing light that does not change with operator's movement. Also, illumination devices that originally existed in the area may draw less attention than a flashlight that appears to be held by a person. Regardless of which illumination device that is used, it should be used in a way that would result in illuminating the area opeators need to see while illuminating oeprators as less as possible. Degree of light on surfaces in surrounding area, not only the degree of light on operators, also affects probability of operators being exposed. Even if operator is not illuminated, operators' outline can be clearly visible by contrast if the background of operators are bright enough from observer's point of view. Opponents may also use the light conditions to their advantage. Operators need a plan and equipments necessary to handle encounters with areas where light condition does not allow operators to see what is inside.

Use of flashlight: Simple and most common method involves use of illumination device such as hand held flashlight. To use it for aid in area observation is a simple matter of turning a flashlight on with the beam pointing at the area the operator intend to observe. Most common method is to direct the beam so that the part of the area an operator wants to observe is directly illuminated by the beam. However, there is also a method of indirect illumination. When intensity of the light illuminating target object is too bright, hindering observation, indirect illumination can be used. Indirect illumination can also be used for illminating objects that opeartors cannot directly do so directly. Indirect illumination can also be used to illumnate an area much wider than the width of the beam if the intensity of the beam reflected from the object the beam is touching is bright enough. Beam of light would also illimunate particles in the air in the path of the beam. This lowers the visibility of any object operator is trying to illuminate with the beam. However, if the flash light is placed more offset from the operator's ling of sight to the object, so that the operator's line of sight would have less convergance with the beam, operator would have less

illuminated particles in the line of sight. Another hinderance to observation is illuminating object behind a transparant andreflective object such as glass wall. Part of the beam would be reflected, and any beam reflected

towrds the operator would hinder observability. Operator would have to control the position of the flashlight being used, so that the beam would be offset or in an angle that reflction would not directly get into the oeprator's eyes. Another method is to place the flashlight lens close or directly on the glass so that flahslight itself would cover most of the reflected light. Most significant risk use of flashlight poses is that it can alert any opponent that can see the light from the flashligth either directly or indirectly that operators are present in the area. For this reason use of light should be minimized to when it is necessary.

If a beam illuminates an object near by operators, it can result in the operators being indirectly illuminated. So it must be avoided as much as possible.

Moving with a flashlight on may advertise to a person who can see the light of movement pattern of the flashlgiht bearer. If it is feasible, operators should cosider moving away from the point where a flashlight was turned on after turning the light off. Operators can keep moving in that pattern to make it difficult for an observer to predict operator's location by observing light from flashlight. If a flashlight used by an operator have enough brightness, operators can use indirect lighting method to illuminate areas they intend to observe. That method will make it difficult for opponent's possibly observing the beam to predect the exact location of the operator by tracing the beam. Remote light sources: Remote light sources can be used to illuminate an area without the light source constantly being carried by operators while it is on. A lighting device can be delivered to area with insufficient light where operators intend to observe by any means feasible. As a simplified example: An electrical lantern that emits omni-directional light can be thrown into dark area an operator wants to observe. Another example is a large flood light placed to illuminate an area operator needs to observe while operator maneuvers some distance away from the light

source.

Countering exposure: For previously mentioned reason, moving with a flashlight or any other device that emits signatures contiously on or too frequently on should be avoided as much as possible. However, there are situations where it is not avoidable. In complete darkness or when there is too low light from other light source, turning on an illumination device may be the only way operator can see things to do other necessary tasks. There are also situatons where operators cannot avoid being exposed to light. If exposure is not avoidable, there is an option of also lighting up dark areas that operators are exposed to. Destroying lighting devices not working in operators' favor is another option to consider.

1.1.5.2. Audio signature. Audio signature also needs to be minimized. But, it is not practical to expect any operator can be perfectly silent. Even a completely silent object can alert a person because the object being introduced into a space would alter the way ambient noise is propagated in the space, which is one way a person feels another person's presence even when the person did not hear anything that signifies a human approaching. Ambient noise should be utilized to conceal sounds made by operators as much as possible. Means to generate ambient noise can also aid in concealment. However, such noise can also hinder operators' ability to hear sounds generated by opponents.

Equipments should be configured in a way that it would not emit sound when user does not expect it to. Alarm or feature that makes beeping sound every hour on watches should be disabled. Operators need to be cautious for noise generated from radio, if radios are in use. Equipments that need frequent adjustment that generates noise should be avoided. If an equipment has a speaker, standard plan for operating such equipment should be to have its volume as low as possible or speaker kept off except for moments when a sound from the speaker is needed. Operating such equipments with plan of normally keeping volume loud and turning the volume down when needed has a high likely hood of operators forgetting to lower the volume or getting in situations where there is no opportunity to adjust the volume. Use equipments such as of ear piece or headphones that focus sound near user's ears that makes sound audible without high volume helps minimize sound signature if there is a need to monitor audio signals or communications through electronic equipments. This where ear

muffs with headphones that provides sounds from surroundings and audio signal or communication from radio to the user is also useful.

1.1.5.3. IR signature. IR imaging devices are getting more and more affordable. Thermal camera, although not as affordable as IR devices, are being offered on the market for general public in certain areas. I anticipate complex surveillance and electronic warfare devices that are now made man portable to be increasingly involved in individual level small arms combat. In the military sector, man portable radio transmission detection device is now a reality. The basic principle to counter to minimize signatures in regards to IR or thermal devices are not so different from that of minimizing visual signatures. The main difference is that those mechanical devices see things in different range of frequency. Most of them do not give the user the ability to distinguish color. Which limits the ability to recognize object by color contrast on the screen only. Most principles in dealing with visual signature apply the same. Since most light source that emits visible light also emits IR, shaded area is also harder to see with IR devices, although a lot easier than naked eye. It works by detecting ambient IR reflected from objects, so there must be a source in the environment, such as moon or star light, emitting IR that creates ambient IR or an artificial IR emitter device. That means in absence of IR emitter device, it will not work where there is nothing to provide ambient IR, such as most cases of being inside of a structure with no lights on and no opening for IR from outside to come in. A beam of light directed to IR sensor can be effective in jamming IR observation devices. It can create glare. Also, it can also trigger a protection mechanism of certain IR devices to reduce input so that the light too bright for the devices would not damage it, which would result in reduced detection capability. Thermal devices works by detecting IR light generated by heat of the object itself. Because of that, it does not require any ambient IR light for it to operate. It is relatively more difficult to protect operators being detected by it, because simply having an object block a direct line of sight would be insufficient. If body heat warms up the operator's surrounding object, it will be detectable, even if the object blocks direct line of sight from the device. And, the type of IR light is also capable of going through things that would block visible or IR range light used by regular IR devices, giving the user to see through certain type and degree of smoke or some type of fabrics. However, using objects to block detection will work, if the object is dense enough and operator affecting the temperature of the object, like warming the object with body heat, can be prevented. It can detect very minimal heat generated by interaction between objects. For example, very minimal heat on a road caused by vehicle being driven over it may leave a heat trail on the

road visible to thermal devices for certain duration even after the vehicle has moved away. It can tell if a car engine is warm or not, and detect heat transferred from an operator 's hand on objects when the operator touched the object. This means leaving any heat signature behind is also a concern. However, the device do require the background heat picture to be somewhat monotonous to work better. For example, detecting a person walking in a desert at night would yield better result than trying to spot someone in a busy street of a heavily urbanized area. So, camouflage principles to work, although it would be a pattern of heat combined with outline contrast of surrounding objects at work. Thermal devices can require higher work load compared to IR devices. Since it requires users to recognize objects by contrast created in a different manner from how regular or IR light create contrast, there are more options to display the image to aid in recognition. One example of most often used option being switching between "White Hot"(Objects displayed brighter represents hotter object) and "Black Hot"(Objects displayed darker represents hotter object) mode. Also, although it has great detection capability regarding heat signature, the way it generates image makes it less efficient for user to recognize details of the features of objects. Another restriction is that with head worn types, such devices limit the user's peripheral vision, and may cause loss of situational awareness if the user moves through a series of different light condition quickly, such as running into a dark room to a brightly lit room. Even with all the problems, IR devices may bring a great advantage in situations where users are fighting against opponents without such equipments in environment where objects of tactical significance cannot be observed with just human eyes. Rural area at night time where no artificial lightings are installed can be a good example. However, light conditions often change, especially in urban environment. When lighting condition change, it will also change whether if using IR observation device is an advantage or disadvantage. And, the change can be very quick and frequent. Even at night time, there are often a lot of light sources in areas that have artificial structures creating direct and ambient light in dynamic manner. That means operators with IR devices may not be the only ones that can see objects of tactical significance. And, considering the problems associated with use of IR devices, whether if use of it is an advantage can be very uncertain. Even in low light, not limiting peripheral vision and motion range with IR observation devices may be of advantage as long as there is enough amount of light to observe what is needed to be seen. If opponents suddenly turns on a visible light and illuminates operators, the IR device advantage is taken away, and operators using IR devices are only left with the limitations it imposes which hinders operators' ability to respond even if the opponents expose themselves with the visible light in the process. So, operators using those devices should be aware of the risk and be prepared to respond to opponents' attack when their area suddenly being lit up by visible light.

Interference caused by IR observation devices: Most head harness or helmet mounted IR devices have limited adjustment range for the angle the device can be set, usually only up or down. The view direction is fixed with the direction the user's head is facing. This becomes a problem when user's face is not facing the direction an object the user is trying to see. When aiming a rifle, a shooter may tilt one's head to one side from upright position while eyes are facing toward the intended target. Shooter's head is usually tilted downwards in many circumstances, and especially so while in prone position, with eyes rotated upwards to look toward the front. When all parties are on a horizontal plane, that results in the eye facing the target with the IR device mounted on shooter's head pointing downwards. Mechanical arms that hold IR devices on head harness or helmet can be adjusted to alleviate that problem; but as mentioned before, the adjustment range is limited. This also greatly hinders a shooter's ability to execute effective gunnery or even observe a target when head mounted IR devices are used. The shooter will likely have great reduction in the ability to effectively use any iron or scope sights on guns. Even if the user is able to get a gun's sight in the device's view, when a person attempts to view a target aimed with a gun sight through video camera, that person may have problems with making the camera display both the sight and the target which are at different distances with enough clarity, mostly due to optical focus limitations. Some electro-optical devices do not properly recognize objects at very close distance. And, use of regular IR or thermal optics can present the same problems. There may also be a problem with forming a shooting platform that is effective. Aiming devices such as laser sight that does not require the user to see the aiming device in line of sight to the target is often utilized in conjunction with IR observation device to alleviate this problem. However, it does not completely eliminate the problem. Such problem will make a person relying on head mounted IR observation devices to favor postures with the upper body or head in somewhat upright. Use of laser presents a problem that operator would be emitting a detectable signature. Use of laser in IR light sepctrum would make it indetectable to naked eyes, but not to IR observation devices, depending on what IR light frequency range the laser is on. Laser aiming devices add additional weight, requires electrical power, and additional effort to zero the device often set offset to the bore axis in both horizontal and vertical plane. If IR observation device is mounted on a gun, the user has less problem pointing the device toward where the user's eyes' orientation. But, if that is the only device available, then it has a problem with the user always having to keep the gun in aiming position and scan every area the user wants to observe with the gun when the device has to be relied on.

Weapon mounted observation aids:

Operators should try to have observation aids that is separate from ones mounted on weapon for aiming. For example, operators should have hand held flashlight that is separate from weapon mounted flashlight, so that weapon mounted light does not have to be used as a primary illumination device. The reason is that devices such as flashlight needs direct line of sight to any object it is aiding in being observed. That results in the flashlight or similar devices being exposed first to unexamined area along with operator's eyes. Also, such device may have to be positioned in various position to aid in observation that might make operator get a weapon in position that would hinder operators from effectively using it in shortest time possible if the decvice is attached to the weapon. That makes it harder to guard the weapon from being grabbed by opponents in unexamined area and use the weapon effectively when situation requireing its immediate use arises.

1.1.5.4. Other signatures -Radio signal: Control emission from communication equipments if radio emission would expose operators.

1.1.5.5. Remote exposure devices These are devices that are set up in a location to expose opponent by creating signatures detectable to operators away from the location upon any interaction with a possible opponent. There are wide range of such devices, many of which can be improvised. Example of such a device can be something simple as objects that makes noise when stepped on. More elaborate form would be a trip wire that causes a flare to be launched when a person moves the wire. Such devices were used in war to help soldiers detect enemies who were unaware of the device tripping the wire. In addition to purpose built remote detection sensor devices for organizations like military, there are many battery operated compact motion detection devices available for general public now. A motion sensor activated light small enough to be carried in a pocket can be placed at locations to expose or surprise an opponent. At the same time, operators should also be aware of such devices working against them. Many areas, especially urban areas, have large amount of motion detection activated devices that can alert an opponent. Although those devices can be set up by opponents, it is mostly set up by people who are not a hostile party for utility purposes. Some utility lighting fixtures are motion sensor activated. There are many automated doors that are activated by proximity detector or pressure pad. There also can be alarm sensors installed in a building for burglary deterrence. Any of those can accidentally expose an operator's presence.

1.1.5.6. Jamming. Visual: -Light source: Strong light source that can overpower light signature from operator placed in front of operator from observer's point of view can provide concealment for the operator. Strong burst of light can saturate the light input a human can handle, temporarily hindering ability for the person exposed to the light to see. However, the light has to be very intense. Such light can be generated from dedicated noise flash devices. However, how much effect it has is affected by amount of ambient light the person the light is used against is adjusted to. If the ambient light opponent's eyes are adjusted to is very bright, such as area illuminated by sun light at day time, the effect may be too low to have any significance. But, if opponents vision is adjusted to darkness, even beam from hand held flashlight directed on opponents eyes can be effective. -Smoke: Smoke generated from fire or chemical devices, etc., can be used as visual screen.

Audio: -Loud noise can distract or disorient people. Noises from explosives or gun fire, or from dedicated noise flash devices are used for that purpose, but it's effect should not be relied on. The effect varies greatly depending on how much sound pressure actually reaches the person targeted. Also, since disorientation is linked to mental state, the targeted person's mental state also affects the outcome. Disorientation effect is reduced when opponent is alert, and it is reduced even more when the opponent anticipates such measures. Radio: -Purpose designed jamming devices: Although not commonly available to operators out side of government capacity at the time of this writing, if purpose designed communication jamming devices are available operators should consider its use. -Area selection: Making opponent's get into areas where there are barriers that radio signals are hard

to propagate through can be of help. Being inside certain type of structures can make radio communication difficult for both operators and their opponents.

1.1.6. Maneuver and positioning. *****More details in Maneuver and positioning Section.

1.2. Utilizing, prioritizing of major factors. The problem with increasing operator security regarding tactical factors is that actions taken in order to increase positive effects in regards to certain factor conflicts with what is beneficial in regards to some other factors. An action that may have a positive influence on certain factors and negative influence on other factors at the same time. Primary method to determine the benefit of certain action when such conflict exists is through prioritizing. Each factor has different level of influence in different situations. Evaluation of soundness of certain action should be assessed based on its influence on overall security, not just one tactical factor. Recognizing what tactical factor has more significance is a given situation allows operators to choose action that would benefit the operators in regards to those factors that have more significance, allowing them to assign priority. Affect on probability of achieving security by certain action = (Probability increase by positively affected factors)x(significance of positively affected factors) -(Probability decrease by negatively affected factors)x(significance of negatively affected factors) For example: A gunnery process will expose the operator. If the operator incapacitates the opponent, the security will increase greatly. So, if the operator has high probability of success with the gunnery process, the probability of gaining security may increase. However, if the operator has a low probability of success, the consideration to avoid the negative effect of exposure to an opponents observation and attack will prevail. But, if the operator is already exposed to attack, withholding attack to avoid exposure will no longer be a consideration. In that case, the operator may initiate a gunnery process, or maneuver to an area that is shielded, or do both. Gunnery process in many cases means at least some part of the operator's body being exposed to an opponent. And in some situations, to utilize a certain shielding object may hinder effective use of the operator's weapon. An operator's evasive maneuver to make it difficult for opponents to aim the operator would lower the probability of operator being hit by opponents gun fire, but it also decreases the operator's gunnery effectiveness. If the operator can incapacitate the opponent before the opponent can have effective hits on operator, and the operator moving affecting operator's gunnery effectiveness would make it fail, then operator's gunnery process is more of a significant factor. If the operator is not likely to get effective hits on the opponent before the opponent can get effective hits on the operator, and evasive maneuver can get an operator to protected area, then evasive maneuver to the protected area has higher significance; and anything that hinders it, such as slowing down that maneuver to execute a gunnery process on the opponent may be unsound.