AOD Isolation Risk Assessment Rev D2

Advanced Online De-Sander
RBG Ltd Document No: AQD/AOD 006
Title: Advanced Online De-Sander Isolation Risk Assessment
Revision Revision Section(s) Changed Prepared Checked Approved

Status Date By By By
D2 11/10/05 Comments Incorporated CS DB
D1 10/10/05 Initial Preparation for CS
Comment
AOD Controlled Copy
Uncontrolled if Printed
/var/www/apps/scribd/scribd/tmp/scratch4/9146010.doc
CONTENTS
Introduction
Summary Comment
Scenario Worksheets
Blank Worksheet
The Assessment Model
Introduction
The Advanced Online De-Sander (AOD) is intended to be connected to the client process
vessel and perform ‘online’ de-sanding operations. The AOD effectively becomes a
temporary extension of the client process system.
There is a need to provide assurance to the client that in an emergency there is an

adequate isolation between the client process and the temporary AOD.
This assessment will test the ‘as built’ isolations for adequacy.
While the AOD is in service there may arise circumstances where a part of the AOD
needs to be worked on while the remainder of the AOD remains on line.
This assessment will test the available isolations for adequacy.
The model used to assess the adequacy of the isolations is fully described in the Oil
Industry Advisory Committee document “The Safe Isolation of Plant and Equipment”
published in 1997.
A single page ‘worksheet’ is included to allow easy working of the model and recording
of the results.
The assessment tool is reproduced at the end of this document for ease of understanding
this assessment and as an aid to carrying out further assessments.
Scenarios Considered:
1. Isolation from client vessel during rig up and rig down
2. Isolation between the client separator and the AOD Skid in an emergency S/D
3. Isolation between the client separator and the jetting unit in an emergency S/D
4. Isolation between client separator and jetting unit can’t be accessed in an
emergency S/D (manual valve)
5. Work on one hydrocyclone while the other two remain on line.
6. Work on a centrifugal pump
7. Changing a fine filter element
Summary Comment on Isolation Risk Assessments Considered:
Connection to Client Separators

Given the separator pressures that the AOD skid is designed to De-Sand (up to 40 barg)
the requirement for connecting to and disconnecting from such a separator is a single
valve. However, it is RBG’s requirement for the client to have a double valve
arrangement here as indicated on P&ID AQD/DSS/001 Rev 1 (6/10/05).
Isolation in Event of an Automatic / Emergency Shutdown

The AOD inlet S/D valve, BV3, is adequate for isolation purposes, though if time
permitted it would be expected that manual valve GV or BV2 would also be closed.
The concern here is that the hose from the separator to the AOD skid remains live,
potentially crossing module boundaries.
Ideally the separator mounted manual valves should also be closed.
Alternatively, an automatic valve functioning in a similar manner to BV3 could be
incorporated in the AOD set up for each of the separator connections.
A manual valve exists on the separator valve arrangement which is adequate for isolation
purposes. However, access to the separator is required to close this valve. Additionally,
before the valve can be closed the hydraulic ram must retract; withdrawing the ¾” jetting
hose and nozzle before the valve can be operated.
If the ¾” hose/nozzle becomes stuck a shear device is installed in the line which will
allow the isolation valve to be closed once the hydraulic ram retracts with the sheared
hose.
Careful consideration of the circumstances must be given prior to shearing the jetting line
as this will then require a vessel entry to remove the sheared line / nozzle and make the
vessel client isolation valves able to close.
In any situation the decision to shear will be made in consultation with the OIM if
there is no immediate risk or hazard. In an emergency situation the decision to ‘shear’
should be taken in line with the ‘pre operation meeting agreed actions’ agreed between
the OIM and RBG supervisor if there is an immediate risk and evident hazard. The
integrity of the separator is compromised while the sheared section of line remains in
place.
Until the manual isolation valve is closed there remains a flowpath between the client
separator and the jetting unit protected only by a non return valve (NRV).
While this line and the NRV is designed for 250 barg and it is expected that the NRV will
hold, it is not good practice to rely on a NRV for isolation.
Ideally the separator mounted manual valve should also be closed.
Alternatively, an automatic valve functioning on the platform 24/110 v permissive to the

Jetting unit could be installed in the 1” line.
Isolations of Skid Mounted Equipment

Assessments have been carried out on 2 scenarios of carrying out work on the AOD skid
while the skid remains on line. While the works could be carried out after careful
checking of the integrity of the butterfly valve isolations it must be concluded that the
skid is not designed for work to be carried out while the skid remains on line. The skid
should be S/D and adequately isolated if works are to be performed.
The only routine skid intervention while on line is for the changing of fine filter elements.
Only single valve isolation is required and the skid is fitted with two valves. However,
the valves are butterfly type which is not recommended for isolations other than non
hazardous fluids.
This is a border line case and can be considered if the integrity of the valves can be
proven.
Alternatively one of the two valves on each filter inlet and outlet could be changed for a
different valve type (ball?) which is acceptable for an isolation service.
Isolation Risk Assessment Work Sheet:
Scenario Description (1):

Isolation from client vessel during rig up / rig down, i.e. no flow situation.
Situation is a separator module = B (client separator module)
Substance is produced water = 6, could be hot, (could ultimately turn to hydrocarbons =
5).
Line size is 3”
Pressure is up to 40 barg
Hook up, say, 2 visits / year x 3 separators, rig up and rig down = 12 = monthly
Situation B Substance Best 6 Effects score 2

(Worst (3)
5)
Line Size 4” System Pressure >20 Release score 3
Frequency M Duration <shift Time score 3
Hazard
Effect x Release x Time = Factor
2(3) x 3 x 3 = 18(27)
Required Isolation Method:

</= 30 Single Valve x (x)
31 – 150 Double Valve
151 – 450 Double Block & Bleed
451 – 600 Single Valve, Spade & Bleed
>600 Double Block, Bleed & Spade
Does design / as built meet the isolation standard? Y

Single valve is the client valve. RBG would normally expect double valve isolation from
the client vessel anyway.
Assessment by: C Sherwood Date: 7/10/05
Scenario Description (2)( to be considered in conjunction with scenario 3 + 4):

Isolation in event of a platform initiated S/D, i.e. flow path is isolated at AOD inlet.
Situation is a separator module = C (location of AOD and most operators)
Substance is produced water = 6, could be hot. (Could ultimately turn to hydrocarbons =
5).
Line size is 3”
Pressure is up to 40 barg.
Frequency of platform initiating an AOD S/D during de-sanding operations is considered
low, say, annual.
Situation C Substance 6(5) Effects score 1(2)
Frequency A Duration <shift Time score 2
Hazard
1(2) x 3 x 2 = 6 (12)

</= 30 Single Valve x

Isolation standard is adequate but line between client separator and AOD skid remains
‘live’ until the manual separator valves are closed; this could be a significant length
crossing module boundaries.

Scenario Description (3) (to be considered in conjunction with scenario 2 + 4):
Isolation in event of a platform initiated S/D, i.e. isolation between jetting unit and
client separator.
Situation is a separator module = B (isolation point rather than location of jetting unit)
Substance is produced water = 6, could be hot. (Could turn to hydrocarbons = 5).
Line size is 3”
low, say, annual.
Situation B Substance 6(5) Effects score 2(3)
Hazard
2 (3) x 3 x 2 = 12 (18)


This is not an automatic isolation function in an emergency situation.
Hydraulic Ram retracts allowing manual isolation valve to be closed.
Worst case, ¾” jetting hose is jammed, shear valve is operated, and hydraulic ram retracts
allowing manual isolation valve to be closed.
Scenario Description (4) (to be considered in conjunction with scenarios 2 + 3):

Jetting unit manual isolation can’t be accessed due to emergency situation.
Situation is a separator module = B (isolation point rather than likely location of jetting
unit)
Substance is produced water = 6, could be hot.
Line size is 3/4”
low, say, annual.
Situation B Substance 6 (5) Effects score 2 (3)
Line Size </=1” System Pressure >20 Release score 2
Hazard
2 (3) x 2 x 2 = 8 (12)

Does design / as built meet the isolation standard? N

Isolation between client separator and jetting unit is an NRV. This should not normally be
considered an adequate isolation.
Scenario Description 5:
Changing liners / blanks in H2 while H1 and H3 remain on line.
Situation = C, AOD skid location.
Substance = produced water (AOD will detect hydrocarbons and S/D)
Line size =3”
Pressure is up to 7 barg (AOD trips at 7.0 barg inlet)
Frequency is low, say, annual.
Situation C Substance 6 Effects score 1
Line Size 4” System Pressure </=10 Release score 2
Hazard
1 x 2 x 2 = 4


H2 inlet has a two valve isolation, outlet has a single valve isolation, however all valves
are butterfly valves, not recommended for isolation purposes except for non hazardous
substances.
While the assessment does not prohibit the use of such isolation, consideration should be
given to the need to perform such an operation while the AOD skid remains on line.
Work on a Centrifugal Pump while the AOD Skid remains on line
Line size =3”
Frequency is low, say, annual.
Hazard
1 x 2 x 2 = 4


Pump inlet isolation is a single valve; discharge isolation will be double valve. However
all valves are butterfly, not recommended for isolation purposes other than non hazardous
fluids.
While the assessment does not prohibit the use of such isolation, consideration should be
given to the need to perform such an operation while the AOD skid remains on line.

Changing a fine filter element
Line size =3”
Frequency is, say, daily, taking less than 1 shift
Frequency D Duration <shift Time score 10
Hazard
1 x 2 x 10 = 20


While the requirement is for a single valve, both the inlet and outlet have double valve
isolations but all valves are butterfly valves, not recommended for isolations other than
with non hazardous substances. The fluid, having passed through the AOD skid could
now be considered to be non hazardous (fluid temperature?)
While the use of such an isolation is not prohibited, if it is to be used, the integrity of the
isolations must be carefully confirmed by use of the filter vent and drain valves and
monitoring of the filter pressure gauges.
Scenario Description:
BLANK
Situation Substance Effects score
Line Size System Pressure Release score
Frequency Duration Time score
Hazard
x x =

</= 30 Single Valve
Does design / as built meet the isolation standard?
Assessment by: Date:
The Assessment Model:
Situation Substance Pressure Line Size Frequency Duration
Effects Matrix Release Matrix Time Matrix
EFFECTS RELEASE TIME FACTOR

FACTOR FACTOR
CALCULATE
Hazard factor = Effects x Release x Time
SELECTION
ISOLATION
METHOD
Situation, Substance, Pressure, Line Size, Frequency and Duration are defined and
derived for each situation in the following tables:
Situation:
Type Description Typical Examples
Onshore Offshore
A Congested or confined equipment or >20 Crude distiller unit, Compression module
people at risk. catalytic cracker plant. heavily populated with
Offshore there is the potential for Village or town within pipework and objects of
escalation resulting in the need for range of toxic effects. box type construction.
platform evacuation.
B Open process storage or product transfer Treater Unit, LPG Module containing large
plant or 11-20 people at risk. Offshore spheres, road car cylindrical vessels, such
open or less congested modules where loading gantry. as separators, widely
explosion hazard is minimal or escalation separated.
beyond the immediate area is unlikely.
Large fire with the potential for local
damage and multiple fatalities.
C Storage area or 6-10 people at risk. Tank Farm, pumping Wellhead modules or
Offshore an area where gas is unlikely to manifold, unprotected other non enclosed
accumulate to hazardous levels with minor control room or outside spaces open on two or
fires contributing the highest risk. workers within range of more sides.
toxic effects.
D Few items of equipment in an open area or Isolated pumphouse. Modules containing
3 to 5 people at risk. Offshore utility temperature or high
systems with the potential to cause pressure utility systems
fatalities or structural damage. or corrosive substances.
E Remote single items or 1 or 2 people at Remote pump or vessel.
risk. Offshore minor fires which are easily
contained.
Substance:
Type Description
1 Toxic gasses e.g. HF, Cl 2, SO 2 , H2 S, HCN, HCl, CO.
Note: Toxic liquids such as Cl2 and SO2 require special treatment since leaks may cause toxic effects over a wide area. In
such cases the highest standard of isolation should be employed.
2 LPG, NGL or flammables above a temperature where more than 50% weight would flash on
release. Material above auto ignition temperature.
3 Flammable liquids above their flashpoint.
4 Flammable gasses.
5 Flammable liquids below their flashpoint
6 Other hazardous fluids, e.g. steam, high temperature or low temperature (cryogenic) fluids,
corrosives, acids, asphyxiants, etc.
7 Non hazardous substances. (Note that substances such as water and nitrogen may be hazardous in
some situations)
Effects Matrix:
Situation
Substance A B C D E
Type
1 10 10 9 8 7
2 9 8 5 4 3
3 8 6 4 3 2
4 5 4 3 2 1
5 4 3 2 1 1
6 3 2 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1 1
Release Matrix:
System Pressure
Line size > 100 barg > 50 barg > 20 barg > 10 barg </= 10 barg
>/= 8” 10 8 6 5 4
6” 8 6 5 4 3
4” 6 4 3 3 2
2” 4 3 2 2 1
</= 1” 3 2 2 1 1
Time Matrix:
Duration
Frequency < 1 Shift > 1 Shift > 7 days
Daily 10 10 -
Weekly 7 10 -
Monthly 3 7 10
Annually 2 3 7
Occasionally 1 2 3
‘Hazard’ Factor = ‘Effects’ x ‘Release’ x ‘Time’

The result is a score between 1 (trivial consequence) and 1000 (disastrous consequence).
Selection of Isolation Method:

Hazard Factor Isolation Method Reference No.
</= 30 Single valve Method 1
31 - 150 Double valve Method 2
151 - 450 Double block and bleed Method 3
451 - 600 Single valve, spade and Method 4
bleed
> 600 Double block, bleed and Method 5
spade
Methods 1 – 5 refer to diagrams in the original document showing the required
arrangements for valves, spades, bleeds and pressure monitoring points.
… “only use gate, plug, globe or ball type valves which provide a reliable, positive tight
shut off seal for isolations of hazardous substances. Flow Control Valves and butterfly
type valves are generally suitable only for non-hazardous substances, as they may not
always provide a tight shut off. In general, non-return valves are not suitable for use in
isolations unless the valve is designed to close against the pressure which is to be
protected and can be positively locked closed in that position. If a suitable non-return
valve is to be used in an isolation it should always be pressure tested to at least the
maximum anticipated differential pressure.”

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Advanced Online De-Sander

RBG Ltd Document No: AQD/AOD 006

Title: Advanced Online De-Sander Isolation Risk Assessment

Revision Revision Section(s) Changed Prepared Checked Approved

The Assessment Model

There is a need to provide assurance to the client that in an emergency there is an

Summary Comment on Isolation Risk Assessments Considered:

Connection to Client Separators

Isolation in Event of an Automatic / Emergency Shutdown

Alternatively, an automatic valve functioning on the platform 24/110 v permissive to the

Isolations of Skid Mounted Equipment

Isolation Risk Assessment Work Sheet:

Scenario Description (1):

Situation B Substance Best 6 Effects score 2

Line Size 4” System Pressure >20 Release score 3

Frequency M Duration <shift Time score 3

Required Isolation Method:

Does design / as built meet the isolation standard? Y

Isolation Risk Assessment Work Sheet:

Scenario Description (2)( to be considered in conjunction with scenario 3 + 4):

Situation C Substance 6(5) Effects score 1(2)

Line Size 4” System Pressure >20 Release score 3

Frequency A Duration <shift Time score 2

Required Isolation Method:

Does design / as built meet the isolation standard? Y

Assessment by: C Sherwood Date: 7/10/05

Isolation Risk Assessment Work Sheet:

Situation B Substance 6(5) Effects score 2(3)

Line Size 4” System Pressure >20 Release score 3

Frequency A Duration <shift Time score 2

Required Isolation Method:

Does design / as built meet the isolation standard? Y

Assessment by: C Sherwood Date: 10/10/05

Isolation Risk Assessment Work Sheet:

Scenario Description (4) (to be considered in conjunction with scenarios 2 + 3):

Situation B Substance 6 (5) Effects score 2 (3)

Line Size </=1” System Pressure >20 Release score 2

Frequency A Duration <shift Time score 2

Required Isolation Method:

Does design / as built meet the isolation standard? N

Assessment by: C Sherwood Date: 10/10/05

Isolation Risk Assessment Work Sheet:

Situation C Substance 6 Effects score 1

Line Size 4” System Pressure </=10 Release score 2

Frequency A Duration <shift Time score 2

Required Isolation Method:

Does design / as built meet the isolation standard? N

Isolation Risk Assessment Work Sheet:

Situation C Substance 6 Effects score 1

Line Size 4” System Pressure </=10 Release score 2

Frequency A Duration <shift Time score 2

Required Isolation Method:

Does design / as built meet the isolation standard? N

Assessment by: C Sherwood Date: 10/10/05

Isolation Risk Assessment Work Sheet:

Situation C Substance 6 Effects score 1

Line Size 4” System Pressure </=10 Release score 2

Frequency D Duration <shift Time score 10

Required Isolation Method:

Does design / as built meet the isolation standard? N

Assessment by: C Sherwood Date: 10/10/05

Isolation Risk Assessment Work Sheet:

Situation Substance Effects score