STRATEGIC ASIA 2011-12

ASIA RESPONDS TO
ITS RISING POWERS
China and India
Edited by
Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough
With contributions from
M. Taylor Fravel, Michael J. Green, Chung Min Lee, Rory Medcalf,
Harsh V. Pant, Kenneth B. Pyle, Teresita C. Schaffer, Ashley J. Tellis,
Carlyle A. Thayer, Dmitri Trenin, and S. Enders Wimbush
THE NATIONAL BUREAU of ASIAN RESEARCH
Seattle and Washington, D.C.
THE NATIONAL BUREAU of ASIAN RESEARCH
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Copyright 2011 by The National Bureau of Asian Research
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Asia responds to its rising powers: China and India / edited by Ashley j. Tellis, Travis Tanner,
and Jessica Keough; with contributions from M. Taylor Fravel ... let al.].
p.: ill., maps; cm. -- (Strategic Asia 1933-6462; 2011-12)
Based upon work supported in part by the Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security
Administration).
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN: 978-0-9818904-2-5
1. Asia--Foreign relations--China. 2. Asia--Foreign relations--India. 3. China--Foreign
relations--Asia. 4. India--Foreign relations--Asia. 5. China--Foreign economic relations. 6.
India--Foreign economic relations. 7. Asia--Strategic aspects. I. Tellis, Ashley j. II. Tanner,
Travis. III. Keough, jessica. IV. Fravel, M. Taylor. V. National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)
VI. Series: Strategic Asia; 2011-12.
DS33.3 .A85 2011
320.95
Printed in Canada
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Z39.48-1992.
Preface .
Richard f. Ellings
Overview
The United States and Asia's Rising Gi
Ashley f. Tellis
An overview of the themes and
examining the causes behind t h ~
implications for the U.S., and the
Special Study
International Order and the Rise of AI
History and Theory .
Kenneth B. Pyle
An examination ofhow Asia's rise ~
the integration of rising powers in
Country Studies
China Views India's Rise:
Deepening Cooperation, Managing I)
M. Taylor Fravel
An examination of how China vi
implications ofIndia's rise for ChiJ
objectives.
~ N R E S E ~ R C H
" WA, and Washington, D.C.
sian Research
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
ectronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or
lisher.
part by the Department of Energy (National Nuclear
sponsored by an agency of the United States
ment nor any agency thereof, nor any of their
lied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility
any information, apparatus, product, or process
nfringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to
"rvice by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
mement, recommendation, or favoring by the United
views and opinions of authors expressed herein do
ed States Government or any agency thereof.
egarding the accuracy of any map in this volume.
nJy and do not represent the views ofNBR or NBR's
I Bureau of Asian Research
mage Bank I Getty Images
ata
a and India I edited by Ashley j. Tellis, Travis Tanner,
rom M. Taylor Fravel ... let al.].
933-6462; 2011-12)
the Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security
index.
sia--Foreign relations--India. 3. China--Foreign
ns--Asia. 5. China--Foreign economic relations. 6.
sia--Strategic aspects. I. Tellis, Ashley j. II. Tanner,
. Taylor. V. National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)
inimum requirement of the American National
ce of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI
Contents
Preface
Richard f. Ellings
ix
Overview
The United States and Asia's Rising Giants ,
Ashley f. Tellis
An overview of the themes and conclusions of the volume,
examining the causes behind the rise of China and India, the
implications for the U.S., and the responses of other Asian states.
3
Special Study
International Order and the Rise of Asia:
History and Theory ,
Kenneth B. Pyle
An examination of how Asia's rise relates to classic questions about
the integration of rising powers into the international system.
35
Country Studies
China Views India's Rise:
Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences
M. Taylor Fravel
An examination of how China views the rise of India and the
implications ofIndia's rise for China's core interests and strategic
objectives.
65
India Comes to Terms with a Rising China .' 101
Harsh V Pant
A discussion of the changing trajectory of Indian policy toward
China and an exploration of how India is responding to China's
rise across a range of issue areas central to its strategic calculus.
Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle with China
Michael]. Green
An examination of Japan's relations with and strategies toward
Chin'a and India.
131
Coping with Giants:
South Korea's Responses to China's and India's Rise 161
Chung Min Lee
An assessment of Korean efforts to maximize a range of security
and economic interests with the major powers of the Asian
strategic landscape-especially China and India-without
weakening South Korea's central alliance with the United States
or loosening its growing linkages with the international system.
Grand Stakes: Australia's Future between China and India 195
Rory Medcalf
An examination of Australia's response to the rise of China and
India, including tensions among economics, security, and values,
as well as implications for U.S. strategy in Asia.
Challenges and Opportunities:
Russia and the Rise of China and India 227
Dmitri Trenin
An analysis of Russian perceptions and policies regarding the
rise of two Asian giants: one near neighbor, China, and one
long-time ally, India.
Regional Studies
Great Games in Central Asia 259
S. Enders Wimbush
An exploration of the competition for influence in Central Asia
between China, India, and other powers, as well as Central
Asian responses.
India Next Door, China Over the Horb
The View from South Asia .
Teresita C. Schaffer
An assessment of the responses of,
rise of India and China.
The Rise of China and India:
Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast
Carlyle A. Thayer
A comparative analysis ofthe impao
Southeast Asian regional a u t o n o m ~
for the United States.
Indicators
Strategic Asia by the Numbers .
About the Contributors .
About Strategic Asia .
Index .
ing China 101
I trajectory of Indian policy toward
how India is responding to China's
eas central to its strategic calculus.
.angle with China 131
elations with and strategies toward
's and India's Rise 161
~ r t s to maximize a range of security
; the major powers of the Asian
ally China and India-without
ltral alliance with the United States
ages with the international system.
between China and India 195
's response to the rise of China and
ng economics, security, and values,
, . strategy in Asia.
I India 227
eptions and policies regarding the
e near neighbor, China, and one
.................................. 259
tition for influence in Central Asia
other powers, as well as Central
India Next Door, China Over the Horizon:
The View from South Asia
Teresita C. Schaffer
An assessment of the responses of countries in South Asia to the
rise of India and China.
285
The Rise of China and India:
Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast Asia's Autonomy?
Carlyle A. Thayer
A comparative analysis of the impact of China's and India's rise on
Southeast Asian regional autonomy that considers implications
for the United States.
313
Indicators
Strategic Asia by the Numbers 349
About the Contributors 363
About Strategic Asia 369
Index 373
About the Contributors
Richard J. Ellings (PhD, University of Washington) is President and Co
founder of The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Prior to serving
with NBR, from 1986 to 1989 he was Assistant Director and on the faculty of
the Jackson School ofInternational Studies of the University of Washington,
where he received the Distinguished Teaching Award. He served as Legislative
Assistant in the U.S. Senate, office of Senator Slade Gorton, in 1984 and
1985. Dr. Ellings is the author of Embargoes and World Power: Lessons from
American Foreign Policy (1985); co-author of Private Property and National
Security (1991); co-editor (with Aaron Friedberg) of Strategic Asia 2003-04:
Fragility and Crisis (2003), Strategic Asia 2002-03: Asian Aftershocks (2002),
and Strategic Asia 2001-02: Power and Purpose (2001); co-editor of Korea's
Future and the Great Powers (with Nicholas Eberstadt, 2001) and Southeast
Asian Security in the New Millennium (with Sheldon Simon, 1996); founding
editor of the NBR Analysis publication series; and co-chairman of the Asia
Policy editorial board. He also established the Strategic Asia Program and
AccessAsia, the national clearinghouse that tracks specialists and their
research on Asia.
Michael J. Green (PhD, Johns Hopkins University) is Associate Professor at
the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and
Japan Chair and Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International
Studi s (CSIS). He previously served as Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs and as Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the
National Security Council (NSC) from January 2004 to December 2005
after joining the NSC in April 2001. Dr. Green spent over five years in Japan
working as a staff member of the National Diet, as a journalist for Japanese
and U.S. newspapers, and as a consultant for U.S. business. He also has been
on the faculty of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
(SAIS), a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a staff member at the
Institute for Defense Analyses, and a Senior Adviser to the Office of Asia
Pacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Green is a member
of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, and the Aspen Strategy Group, as well as Vice Chair of the Japan -U.S.
Friendship Commission. He serves on the advisory boards of the Center for
I
also founding editor of the Journal
rofessor Pyle has been a member
. Jackson Foundation since 1983,
e Maureen and Mike Mansfield
to 1988. In 1999, the government
e Order of the Rising Sun for his
exchange. The Japan Foundation
o Professor Pyle.
. economic, political, security, and
he is a Nonresident Senior Fellow
es as a Senior Adviser to McLarty
onal strategic advisory firm. Prior
ars as a U.S. diplomat, serving in
mbassador to Sri Lanka. She also
State for the Near East and South
,st position in the State Department
eign Service, Ambassador Schaffer
nter for Strategic and International
lve years. She is the author of India
g Partnership (2009) and co-author
Negotiates with the United States:
ebsite, South Asia Hand, includes
r at The National Bureau of Asian
Kenneth B. and Anne H.H. Pyle
these roles, Mr. Tanner creates and
etermines significant and emerging
and is responsible for the success of
ewas Deputy Director and Assistant
at the Nixon Center in Washington,
istant at the Peterson Institute for
's interests and expertise include
a's economy and foreign affairs, and
lude Strategic Asia 2010-11: Asia's
rpose (co-edited with Ashley J. Tellis
a 2009-10: Economic Meltdown and
sWey J. Tellis and Andrew Marble,
t, Training, and Education in China's
lisen and Andrew Scobell, 2008), and
About the Contributors 367
Taiwan's Elections, Direct Flights, and China's Line in the Sand (co-authored
with David M. Lampton, 2005). Mr. Tanner holds an MA in International
Relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
(SAIS) at the Johns Hopkins University.
Ashley J. Tellis (PhD, University of Chicago) is Senior Associate at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international
security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. He is also Research Director of
the Strategic Asia Program at The National Bureau of Asian Research and is
co-editor of the seven most recent annual volumes in the series, including
Strategic Asia 2010-11: Asia's Rising Power and America's Continued Purpose
(with Andrew Marble and Travis Tanner, 2010). While on assignment to the
U.S. Department of State as Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs (2005-8), Dr. Tellis was intimately involved in negotiating
the civil nuclear agreement with India. Previously he was commissioned into
the Foreign Service and served as Senior Advisor to the Ambassador at the
U.S. embassy in New Delhi. He also served on the National Security Council
staff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic
Planning and Southwest Asia. Prior to his government service, Dr. Tellis
was Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation and Professor of Policy
Analysis at the RAND Graduate School. He is the author of India's Emerging
Nuclear Posture (2001) and co-author of Interpreting China's Grand Strategy:
Past, Present, and Future (with Michael D. Swaine, 2000). His academic
publications have also appeared in many edited volumes and journals.
Carlyle A. Thayer (PhD, Australian National University) is Emeritus Professor
at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force
Academy, Canberra, from where he recently retired after 31 years of service.
He spent his entire academic career teaching in a military environment, first
at the RE\)'al Military College-Duntroon between 1979 and 1985, and then
at the Australian Defence Force Academy from 1985 to 2010. His later career
involved attachments to the Asia- Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii
(1999-2002), the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (2002-4), and the
Australian Command and Staff College (2006-7 and 2010). Professor Thayer
has been honored by appointments as the inaugural Frances M. and Stephen
H. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ohio University in 2008 and
the c.v. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor at the School of Advanced
International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University in 2005. He is the
author of over four hundred publications, including Southeast Asia: Patterns
ofSecurity Cooperation (2010).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
'I his chapter presents a c0111parative analysis of the in1pact of China's
and India's rise on Southeast Asian regional autonon1y and considers
i111plicat ions for the C.S.
.\lA1:\ >\lr.\:T:
Southeast Asian states seek to advance their national interests through the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to pr01110te
regional autononly and ASEAN's centrality in the region's security
architecture. 'vVhile \\'elcol11ing the rise of the region's two large neighbors,
especially for the ccononlic opportunities they offer, ASEAN states are also
concerned \\'ith preser\'ing regional autonon1Y. They seek an equilibriu111 in
external relations based on engage111ent \vith China and India, the
ofhoth rising p()\\,ers in ASEAN-centric n1ultilateral institutions,
and the continuance of C.S. presence in the region. Although Southeast Asian
C.S. regional in\'olven1ent they do not \vant to be forced to choose
bet \\'een external po\\'ers.
POI ICY L\lPLICAT10\:S:
Regional are concerned that a po\ver shift in China's favor is
under\\'ay. '111e C.S. should continually denlonstrate that it retains
sutt1cient n1ilitary p()\\'er to deter Chinese assertiveness.
As East Asia gro\\'s in econon1ic strength, the U.S. nlust redouble its efforts
to renlain an attracti\'e nlarket and source of technological innovation.
Southeast Asian states ha\'e beconle n10re proactive in pron10ting
ASl-',A:-J's centrality in the region's security architecture. The U.S.
\\'ould benefit fronl putting n10re diplon1atic effort into consulting and
coordinating \\'ith regional states in advance of ASEAN-related sun1nlits
and nlinisterial
India i.ll11hitions to becon1e a global power. The U.S. should support a
greater, independent Indian role in Southeast Asian security attlirs.
The Rise of China an,
or Reinforcing Southe,
This chapter presents an analysis of
illlplications for Southeast Asia, as well
Southeast Asian states welcome Chin
opportunities it offers, while they look
and a Inarket for goods and investment
preserving regional autonomy in their n
seek an equilibrium based on continuing
of China in multilateral institutions, an(
region's security architecture. In particul
the United States' long-standing primacy
China relations thus have a considerablE
in the 11laritilne d0l11ain. Although each
its own set of bilateral relations with thl
prefer not to choose bet\veen China and
a united approach through the Associ
(ASEAN). Men1ber states therefore prOffi(
security architecture to enhance region
power interference.
The rise of China and India as m,
heightened salience of the maritime de
C0l11munication (SLOC) that traverse thl
China Sea. Since the 1990s, India has pu
to prOlllote econon1ic linkages. As a res
Carlyle A. 'Ihayer ,1t the Cniwrsil
ForL'C AL',ldcI11Y, C,ll1bnrll. Hc L'lll1 ht' retlL'hed at <c.tha)
J
I
Southeast Asia
analysis of the inlpact of China's
regional autononly and considers
their national interests through the
)ns (ASEAN) in order to pronl0te
entrality in the region's security
of the region's two large neighbors,
ies they offer, ASEAN states are also
ononlY. They seek an equilibrium in
ment \vith China and India, the
EAN-centric nlultilateral institutions,
the region. Although Southeast Asian
er do not \vant to be forced to choose
a po\,ver shift in China's favor is
ually denl0nstrate that it retains
nese assertiveness.
the U.S. nlust redouble its efforts
urce of technological innovation.
ne nlore proactive in prOITIoting
s security architecture. The U.S.
JlOnlatic effort into consulting and
.dyance of ASEAN-related sunlnlits
al po\ver. The U.S. should support a
Asian security affairs.
The Rise of China and India: Challenging
or Reinforcing Southeast Asia's Autonomy?
Carlyle A. Thayer
This chapter presents an analysis of the rise of China and India and its
implications for Southeast Asia, as well as for U.S. interests in the region.
Southeast Asian states welcome China's rise because of the econonlic
opportunities it offers, while they look to India as a source of technology
and a nlarket for goods and investnlent. But they are also concerned \vith
preserving regional autonolny in their relations \vith the nlajor po\vers and
seek an equilibrium based on continuing U.S. engagenlent, the ennleshnlent
of China in I11ultilateral institutions, and an enhanced role for India in the
region's security architecture. In particular, China's rise poses a challenge to
the United States' long-standing prinlacy in Southeast Asia. Tensions in C.S.
China relations thus have a considerable inlpact on the region, particularly
in the nlaritinle donlain. Although each Southeast Asian state has developed
its own set of bilateral relations with these nlajor pc)\vers, individual states
prefer not to choose between China and the United States, instead favoring
a united approach through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). Melnber states therefore pronlote ASEAN's centrality in the region's
security architecture to enhance regional autononly and nlininlize' nlajor
power interference.
The rise of China and India as nlajor econonlies has resulted in the
heightened salience of the nlaritiI11e donlain, particularly the sea lines of
COnlITIUnication (SLOC) that traverse the northern Indian Ocean and South
China Sea. Since the 1990s, India has pursued a "look east" policy designed
to promote econonlic linkages. As a result, the boundaries bet\\'een South
Carlyle A. Thayer i" Emeritu" <It thc L'l1i\'L'r"ity of :\l'\\ \",lk" ,It thl' .\u"tr,d\,lI1 [kklhl'
Forcc AC<ldcl11:', C,lI1bcrra. t-k L'JI1 bc rc,lchcd ,It < C.th<lycr\<1 adLl.cdu"lll
314 Strategic 2011-12
and Southeast Asia are becon1ing blurred. India can no longer be viewed
as n1erely a subcont inental po\ver; instead, it is an enlerging power with
strategic interests in the security of Southeast Asia.
chapter is divided into six sections. The first section assesses the
in1pact of the rise of China and India on Southeast Asia's strategic interests.
These interests are defined as national resilience (prolnoted through
policies of cOIl1prehensive security) and regional resilience (prolTIoted
through the assertion of regional autonomy and ASEAN norn1s). China's
rise poses challenges to the contelnporary regional security order as well as
to Southeast Asia's econon1ic development. In response to these challenges,
ASEAN has encouraged the United States to ren1ain engaged in the region
\vhile vie\\'ing India as adding ballast-that is, geostrategic weight-to
relations \vith China. ASEAN seeks to Inoderate great-power rivalry by
enll1eshing the n1ajor po\\rers in ASEAN-centric multilateral institutions
such as the ASEAN Regional Forun1 (ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministers'
Nleeting- Plus (ADJ\!INI- Plus), and East Asia Sun1Init (EAS).
Section two canvasses the key forms of China's and India's interactions
\vith Southeast Asia across six dimensions: historical, geostrategic,
econon1ic, cultural, Inilitary, and nonproliferation. The third section
considers Southeast Asia's changing perceptions of China's and India's
rise. During the Cold \lVar, China was viewed as a threat and India was
viewed as a Soviet surrogate. As a result of don1estic economic reforms,
however, first in China and then in India, both are now viewed as nlajor
econon1ic partners and contributors to regional security. Section four
then discusses the n1ain strategies pursued by ASEAN in its relations with
both countries: econ0111ic interdependence, socialization into ASEAN
norn1s, and soft -baIanci ng.
Section five assesses the in1pact of relations among China, India, and
Southeast Asia on the United States and its interests. Whereas China's
ll1ilitary n10dernization challenges U.S. naval supren1acy in the Western
Pacific, India and the United States have developed a nascent strategic
partnership that rell1ains a \vork in progress. Southeast Asian states have
sought reassurance that the United States will ren1ain engaged in the
region, \vhile also encouraging India to playa greater role in the region's
n1ultilateral institut ions.
Last, section six analyzes four key Southeast Asian states' bilateral
relations \vith China and India. These states are grouped into three categories:
continental (Nlyan 111ar and Thailand), littoral (Vietnarn), and n1aritin1e
(Indonesia). The continental states have atten1pted to engage both China
and India as econon1ic and security partners. Vietnan1, as a littoral state, has
de\Tloped a con1plex strategy of "cooperating and st ruggling" with China to
protect its national interests. Indonesia ha
of engaging both China and India on eco
cooperates n10re with India on n1aritime
The Impact of the Rise of Chir
Southeast Asia's Strategic Inte:
With a total population of nearly 60
of $1.5 trillion in 2008, Southeast Asic
Asian trading partner after China and
overall). It is also the largest destination
Of all the regions in Asia, Southea
sense of regional identity and the
ASEAN. Strategic analysts often divide
the n1ainland or continental states an
inlportant shipping routes that extend
Straits of Malacca and Singapore to thE
of China and India has altered this gee
the inlportance of the n1aritime domai
Southeast Asian states thus n1ay be gro
(Myannlar, Thailand, Laos, and Caml
Malaysia, and Vietnan1), and maritime
During the past six and a half dec
dependent on U.S. leadership for main1
In 1967, five key Southeast Asian
ASEAN. All were anti-Comn1unist
allied \vith or inclined to\vard the l
relations with the major po\vers by pr
of Southeast Asia and the centrality 0
architecture. In 1971, for example, A
Asia was a Zone of Peace, Freedom ar
they adopted the Treaty of Amity ar
n1enlber states fron1 using force or t1
Likewise, in 1995 ASEAN states adopt
nuclear weapon-free zone. ASEAN fl
expanding its n1en1bership to include
1995, Laos and Myann1ar in 1997, and
I See "ASEAN for America," East-\Vest eel
interactiye m.1;'- be accessed at http://asc
"n1t' fin' th.1t founded :\SEA:\ Jre Indonesia,
A

...
India can no longer be viewed
it is an en1erging power with
least Asia.
ions. The first section assesses the
Southeast Asia's strategic interests.
al resilience (promoted through
1d regional resilience (pron10ted
omy and ASEAN norn1s). China's
yregional security order as well as
nt. In response to these challenges,
to remain engaged in the region
-that is, geostrategic weight-to
moderate great-power rivalry by
N-centric Inultilateral institutions
ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministers'
lsia Summit (EAS).
; of China's and India's interactions
historical, geostrategic,
1proliferation. The third section
erceptions of China's and India's
vie\ved as a threat and India was
It of domestic economic reforms,
lia, both are now viewed as major
o regional security. Section four
led by ASEAN in its relations with
Jence, socialization into ASEAN
relations an10ng China, India, and
lnd its interests. Whereas China's
naval supremacy in the Western
ave developed a nascent strategic
)gress. Southeast Asian states have
tates \vill remain engaged in the
) playa greater role in the region's
y Southeast Asian states' bilateral
tes are grouped into three categories:
littoral (Vietnaln), and maritime
'e attenlpted to engage both China
ners. Vietnan1, as a littoral state, has
'ating and struggling" with China to
CTI1ayer - Southeast 31S
protect its national interests. Indonesia has also developed a dual-track policy
of engaging both China and India on econon1ics and security n1atters, hut it
cooperates more with India on maritime security issues.
The Impact of the Rise of China and India on
Southeast Asia's Strategic Interests
With a total population of nearly 600 Inillion and a con1bined econon1Y
of $1.5 trillion in 2008, Southeast Asia is the United States' third-largest
Asian trading partner after China and Japan (and the fifth-largest partner
overall). It is also the largest destination for U.S. investlnent in Asia.
l
Of all the regions in Asia, Southeast Asia has developed the strongest
sense of regional identity and the I110St enduring n1ultilateral institution,
ASEAN. Strategic analysts often divide Southeast Asia into t\VO suhregions
the n1ainland or continental states and the n1aritill1e states-bisected hy
in1portant shipping routes that extend fron1 the Persian C;ulf through the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore to the Western Pacific. The econoll1ic rise
of China and India has altered this geostrategic fran1e\Vork hy heightening
the in1portance of the maritime domain, particularly the South China Sea.
Southeast Asian states thus n1ay be grouped into three categories: n1ainland
(Myann1ar, Thailand, Laos, and Can1bodia), littoral (Philippines, Brunei,
Malaysia, and Vietnam), and l11aritime (Singapore and Indonesia).
During the past six and a half decades, Southeast Asia has been vitalh'
dependent on U.S. leadership for n1aintaining regional stahility and securit;'.
In 1967, five key Southeast Asian states joined together and founded
ASEAN. All were anti-Con1munist in orientation and either forn1ally
allied with or inclined toward the United States.': ASEAN has n1anaged
relations with the major powers by pron10ting both the regional autonon1y
of Southeast Asia and the centrality of ASEAN in Southeast Asia's security
architecture. In 1971, for exalnple, ASEAN states declared that Southeast
Asia was a Zone of Peace, Freedon1 and Neutrality (Z()PFAT\), and ill' 1()76
they adopted the Treaty of AI11ity and Cooperation (TAe) that enjoined
member states frol11 using force or the threat of force against each other.
Likewise, in 1995 ASEAN states adopted a treaty declaring Southeast Asia a
nuclear weapon-free zone. ASEAN further asserted regional autonon1y hy
expanding its nlembership to include Brunei in 1984, socialist Victnaln in
1995, Laos and Myanl11ar in 1997, and Canlbodia in 19()(). In 2003,
I See "ASFA N for America," Center amI In.... t1t uk (lj l1l'cht .\ .... lclJ) \1 Udll ..... I hI ....
interactive may be clt .... t()LlmlTkcl.(lrg
'Ihe tl\'e that founded ASEAN clrt' 1\IelLl)".]cl, tIlt' )rl', Jild I hdil,llllL
316 Strategic 2011-12
set the goal of creating an ASEAN con1nlunity by 2015, and in 2007 the
organization took on a fornlallegal personality by the adoption of a charter.
Although up until the end of the Cold War ASEAN avoided direct
in\"olvenlent in regional security, it has since then sought to promote its
ilnportance in Southeast Asia's security architecture. In 1994, it founded the
ARF as a vehicle to pr0I110te regional autonomy with ASEAN "in the driver's
seat." The ARF counted as founding meInbers all of ASEAN's dialogue
partners, including China and the United States. In 1997, ASEAN initiated
the ASEAN +3 process \vith China, Japan, and South Korea. Finally, since
2003 sixteen countries outside Southeast Asia have acceded to the TAC,
\\"hich \\"as opened for accession by external powers in 1987.
U.S. strategic interests in Southeast Asia have rernained relatively
constant over the past 65 years. First, the United States has maintained a
security order based on alliances, designed to prevent any power, regional
or external, froIn exerting hegenl0ny over the region. For example, the 2010
Quadren1lial Dej('1lse RcvieH' Report states: "The foundation of our presence
in Asia reInains our historical treaty alliances. These alliances have helped
Inaintain peace and stability for nlore than sixty years, particularly through
the continued presence of capable U.S. forces in the region, and we remain
cOlnnlitted to the security comn1itn1ents embodied in these
agreelnents." Second, vVashington has promoted a liberal international
econolnic order based on free trade and investment. Third, it has encouraged
econOlllic developnlent through assistance prograIns to Southeast Asia's
developing econoI11ies. Fourth, the United States has promoted delnocracy,
hunlan rights, and religious freedonl in the region. Finally, after the terrorist
attacks of SepteI11ber 11, \Vashington has pursued a global war on terrorism
that has focused specifically on terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.
Ho\v does the rise of China and India affect Southeast Asia's strategic
interests and relations \\"ith the United States? Regarding China, individual
states have ditferent perceptions of the challenges and opportunities posed
by its rise. Several states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, initially viewed
C=hina's econolnic rise as a challenge because of fears that it would lead to
a diversion of trade and investnlent fronl Southeast Asia. SOIne states were
further concerned about being pulled into China's orbit in a dependent
relationship based on supplying raw lnaterials. Gradually, ASEAN states
began to collectively vie\\' China's econonlic rise as an opportunity and
nl0\"Cd to enhance their unity and cohesion by fornling a viable ASEAN
free Trade Area to collective bargaining with China. I\t the sanle
tinle, China's econonlic rise has raised concerns an10ng sonle ASEAN
1kp<lrtl11l.'l1t of 1)1.'lL'n"l.', ()/lddrl'lll/ldllhft'llc'e Report I ),C., l'ebrudr)
2() I () J,
states that the United States Inight diseng
protectionist policies-anxieties that \ver
signing of the North Anlerican Free Trade
China's econon1ic power has pro'
l110dern ization and transforn1ation of its
Beijing is developing robust anti-access/;
affect the ability of the U.S. Navy to ope
increased n1ilitary pro\vess also has impli
where four Southeast Asian states have co
disputes with China. China's gro\ving as
exercises has raised regional security COl
primacy and the United States' disengager
India's rise has provided ASEAN
geostrategic weight to the region's relati<
ASEAN's centrality in Southeast Asia. AS
in the ARF and, Inore significantly, in t
ASEAN have conle to vie\v each other as at
investn1ent in India's infrastructure, \vhile
sector. In addition, several A.SEAN states
potential partners in providing 111aritime s(
and northern approaches to the Strait of M
The greatest threat to Southeast A5
potential for great -power rivalry to under
friction between China and the United:
spill over into Southeast Asia. U.S. alli(
the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, an(
side with the United States, and all mer
whether ASEAN Illultilateralism \vas a 1
security than alignn1ent \vith a 111ajor f
United States could be undernlined if re
had entrapped thenl in a dispute not of tl
111ilitary friction bet\veen the United Sta
ASEAN's unity and cohesion.
Key Forms of Southeast Asian.
with China and India
This section revie\vs the key forms of
China and India across six dirnensions: b
cultural, Inilitary, and nonproliferation.
A
ommunity by 2015, and in 2007 the
'rsonality by the adoption of a charter.
le Cold War ASEAN avoided direct
las since then sought to pronlote its
y architecture. In 1994, it founded the
lUtonomywith ASEAN "in the driver's
members all of ASEAN's dialogue
tited States. In 1997, ASEAN initiated
apan, and South Korea. Finally, since
least Asia have acceded to the TAC,
ternal po\vers in 1987.
heast Asia have remained relatively
t, the United States has Inaintained a
;igned to prevent any power, regional
)ver the region. For exaIllple, the 2010
:ates: "The foundation of our presence
alliances. These alliances have helped
than sixty years, particularly through
forces in the region, and \ve renlain
ty commitments embodied in these
las promoted a liberal international
ld investment. Third, it has encouraged
istance programs to Southeast Asia's
nited States has promoted delnocracy,
n the region. Finally, after the terrorist
has pursued a global war on terrorisnl
st groups in Southeast Asia.
India affect Southeast Asia's strategic
d States? Regarding China, individual
le challenges and opportunities posed
ionesia and Malaysia, initially viewed
because of fears that it would lead to
"rom Southeast Asia. Sonle states vvere
ed into China's orbit in a dependent
v materials. Gradually, ASEAN states
rise as an opportunity and
:ohesion by fornling a viable ASEAN
Te bargaining \vith China. At the saIne
lised concerns anlong sonle ASEAN
"lhayer - 317
states that the United States ll1ight disengage fronl the region and pursue
protectionist policies-anxieties that \vere heightened in 1994 \\'ith the
signing of the North Anlerican Free Trade Agreenlent (NAfTA).
China's econonlic power has provided the foundation for the
nl0dernization and transfornlation of its anned forces. It is evident that
Beijing is developing robust anti-access/area-denial capabilities that \\'ill
affect the ability of the LJ.S. Navy to operate in the VVestern Pacific. "This
increased nlilitary prowess also has inlplications for the South China Sea,
where four Southeast Asian states have conflicting territorial and nlaritinle
disputes with China. China's growing assertiveness in the fornl of na\'al
exercises has raised regional security concerns about the decline in U.S.
prinlacy and the United States' disengagenlent fronl Southeast Asia.
India's rise has provided ASEAN \vith the opportunity to add
geostrategic weight to the region's relations \vith China, thus reinforcing
ASEAN's centrality in Southeast Asia. ASEAN secured India's nlenlbership
in the ARF and, nlore significantly, in the EAS process. Both India and
ASEAN have conle to view each other as attractive Ne\\' I)elhi values
investnlent in India's infrastructure, while ASEAN seeks access to India's IT
sector. In addition, several ASEAN states and India no\\' see each other as
potential partners in providing nlaritiIne security in the eastern Indian ()cean
and northern approaches to the Strait of Malacca.
The greatest threat to Southeast Asia's strategic interests lies in the
potential for great-power rivalry to undernline regional autononly. IVlilitary
friction between China and the United States in East Asia \\'oLdd quickly
spill over into Southeast Asia. U.S. allies and strategic partners such as
the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia \vould be pressured to
side with the United States, and all ll1enlber states \vould need to decide
whether ASEAN nlultilateralis111 was a better guarantee of their national
security than alignnlent \vith a nlajor pO\\Ter. Security relations \vith the
United States could be undennined if regional states felt that 'v\Tashington
had entrapped thenl in a dispute not of their o\\'n nlaking. At the least,
nlilitary friction bet\veen the United States and China \vould se\'erely test
ASEAN's unity and cohesion.
Key Forms of Southeast Asian Interaction
with China and India
This section reviews the key for111s of Southeast A.sian interaction \\'ith
China and India across six dinlensions: historical, geostrategic, econonlic,
cultural, Inilitary, and nonproliferation.
Strategic Asia 2011-12
Historical
Conten1porary Southeast Asia has been profoundly influenced by the
interaction of states in the region with the precolonial empires of India
and China. Precolonial Indian influence was pervasive due to the spread of
Buddhisl11 and Hinduisl11. Hovvever, the most significant fornl of strategic
interaction took place through China's tributary system. This system served
three purposes: it ackno\vledged il11perial China's primacy, it enhanced
C=hina's security by creating a buffer of friendly states on the country's
southern periphery, and it regulated trade, often to the advantage of the
supplicant. In contrast, India had no con1parable strategic n1echanism to
structure its relations \vith Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia's autononl0US interactions with India and China were
largely curtailed during the colonial era by European powers incorporating
Southeast Asian states into their en1pires. Although Burma was ruled
as part of British India, else\vhere in the region relations with India and
China \vere truncated. The one exception to this was the 111igration of large
nun1bers of Chinese and Indians to work as laborers on plantations and
other infrastructural projects.
rlhe postcolonial era gave birth to new nation-states and new forms
of interaction bet\\'een Southeast Asian states and India and China. India
en1erged as a strong proponent of decolonization and played a leading role
in pron10ting nonalignn1ent. In particular, New Delhi's advocacy of the
five principles of peaceful coexistence resonated in Burma, Indonesia, and
Call1bodia. Elsewhere in the region, anti-Conlmunism assumed greater
salience following the Chinese Comillunist Party's ascension to power and
the onset of the Cold War in Asia. China established close relations with
Con1n1unist Vietnan1 in 1950 but found itself ostracized elsewhere. The end
of the Cold War later created the conditions for both China and India to re
engage \vith Southeast Asia.
C;eostrategic
I)ecolonization after \Vorld War II was a decade-long process nlarked
by the independence of the Philippines in 1946 and Malaya (subsequently
renan1ed Malaysia) in 1957. l The new states of Southeast Asia pursued three
different patterns of alignn1ent: pro- Western (Philippines, Thailand, Malaya/
Malaysia, and South Vietnan1), neutral or nonaligned (Burma, Indonesia,
C=an1bodia, and Laos), and pro-Communist (North Vietna111). The United
States exerted influence bilaterally vvith its treaty allies the Philippines and
j 'I hcllLllld W,1'-, ncver co!oni/ed, Brunei, and Timor became independent in 1963,
]YH4, ,111J 2002, rC"r'L'dl\'ely
i
Thailand and ll1ultilaterally through the S,
(SEA Indi a and China both erne
principles of peaceful coexistence and"
Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia,
major role as chair of the International C,
Laos, and Vietnam, \vhich oversaw the G
and China also supported the policies of
Carnbodia. At the same time, India deve
ties vvith Indonesia until the mid-1960s, v
Union, became a strong supporter of Nor1
The foundations of modern Sou
developed in World War II \vhen Brit
Command as an anti- Japanese theater l
Malaya, and Indonesia. Regionalism took
SEATO in 1954, the Association ofSoutht
in 1963.
6
By the 1960s, the idea of South
taken hold all10ng indigenous elites, who
a C0111ffiOn regional identity, and in 1967 it
region with the fornlation of ASEAN.
Economic
Southeast Asia sits at the
Indian and Pacific oceans that developed
centuries. During this period, Southeast
for trade froln Europe, the eastern Medite
Japan. The age of cOlnnlerce" came to an
and the role of India and China receded d
In the postcolonial era India turned j
trade links with the Soviet Union, ar
Southeast Asia. Similarly, the People's Rl
inward in the 1950s and 1960s and, with
Vietna111, remained cut off fronl Southeas
India only re-emerged as nlajor econom
the 1990s after separately carrying out d
seeking integration with the global eeo]
China, India, and Southeast Asia mutl
Thailand and the Philippines were the only regiOJ
New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and tt
guarantees for the non-Communist states of Laos, Car
() The Association of included Malav
Maphilindo a association of :Y1alaysia, thl
j
J
been profoundly influenced by the
th the precolonial empires of India_
:e \vas pervasive due to the spread
he most significant form of strategIC
tributary systenl. This system served
perial China's prinlacy, it
of friendly states on the country s
trade, often to the advantage of the
comparable strategiC mechanism to
\sia.
eractions \vith India and China were
ra bv European powers incorporating
mpi;es. Although Burma was. ruled
1 the region relations with IndIa and
tion to this was the nligration of large
work as laborers on plantations and
to ne\v nation-states and new forms
ian states and India and China. India
colonization and played a leading role
ticular, New Delhi's advocacy of the
:e resonated in Burnla, Indonesia, and
1, anti-CoInmunism assumed greater
munist Party's ascension to power and
China established close relations with
lnd itself ostracized elsewhere. The end
lditions for both China and India to re-
r II \vas a decade-long process nlarked
ines in 1946 and Malaya (subsequently
wstates of Southeast Asia pursued three
Western (Philippines, Thailand, Malaya/
Itral or nonaligned (Burma, Indonesia,
mmunist (North VietnaIll). The United
with its treaty allies the Philippines and
runei, and East Timor became independent in 1963,
Thayer - Southeast Asia 31'-)
Thailand and nlultilaterally through the Southeast Asia Treaty ()rganization
(SEATO).:1 India and China both enlerged as proponents of the five
principles of peaceful coexistence and were pronlinent at the Afro- Asian
Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. Sinlilarly, India played a
nlajor role as chair of the International Control Conlnlission in Canlbodia,
Laos, and Vietnanl, which oversaw the Geneva Agreenlents of 1954. India
and China also supported the policies of neutrality adopted by BUrIlla and
Cambodia. At the saIne tinle, India developed close political and nlilitary
ties with Indonesia until the I11id-1960s, while China, along \vith the Soviet
Union, became a strong supporter of North Vietnanl.
The foundations of nl0dern Southeast Asian regionalisnl \vere
developed in World War II when Britain set up the South East Asia
Command as an anti- Japanese theater of operations covering lhailand,
Malaya, and Indonesia. Regionalisnl took steps for\vard \vith the creation of
SEATO in 1954, the Association of Southeast Asia in 1961, and 1\;1aphilindo
in 1963.
11
By the 1960s, the idea of Southeast Asia as a distinct region had
taken hold anlong indigenous elites, who consciously pronloted the idea of
a common regional identity, and in 1967 it enlerged as a distinct geopolitical
region with the fornlation of ASEAN.
Economic
Southeast Asia sits at the crossroads of historic SLOCs bet\veen the
Indian and Pacific oceans that developed fronl the fifteenth to seventeenth
centuries. During this period, Southeast Asia becanle the vital entrepot
for trade from Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, and India to China and
Japan. The "age of cOInmerce" canle to an end in the seventeenth century,
and the role of India and China receded during the colonial era.
In the postcolonial era India turned inward econonlically, developed
trade links with the Soviet Union, and renlained disengaged fronl
Southeast Asia. Sinlilarly, the People's Republic of China (PRe) turned
inward in the 1950s and 1960s and, with the exception of relations \vith
Vietnanl, remained cut off from Southeast Asia econolnically. China and
India only re-emerged as I11ajor economic players in Southeast Asia in
the 1990s after separately carrying out donlestic econonlic refornls and
seeking integration with the global econonlY. High gro\vth rates nlade
China, India, and Southeast Asia 111utually attractive nlarkets. A key
') "Ihailand and the were the only region<ll memlwr" <llong"ide .\u"tr<lli<l, h"<lIKe,
New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the L'nited Sl"A 10 pro\'IJed "t'curity
guarantees for the non-Communist of Laos, Cambodid, <ll1d \'il'tn<1ll1.
(1 'Ihe of Southeast included tIlL' Phillppinc", <ll1J "} h<liLll1d, \\hde
Maphilindo a stillborn of Philippil1c", <ll1d Indol1e"l<l.
320 StrategiL 2011-12
turning point in China's relations with the region can1e in 2002 with the
of a fran1evvork agreen1ent for the China-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreeinent India follo\ved suit seven years later by signing an
agreen1ent \vith ASEA N covering the free trade of goods.

As discussed above, India's cultural influence in Southeast Asia was
pervasi\'e in the precolonial era and led to what historians call Indianization.
Indianization refers to the process by which local rulers underpinned
their legitilnacy by grafting the values of Hinduisn1 and Buddhisn1 onto
indigenous belief systen1s. \Vith the exception of Vietnam, 1heravada
Buddhisn1 becaine the state religion of all Illainland states. Hinduism
and Buddhisn1 forn1ed the basis of state legitinlacy in the Indonesian
archipelago until the arri\'al of Islan1 in the thirteenth century. Such deep
cultural connections bet\\'een India and Southeast Asia have not proved
durable enough, ho\vc\'er, to translate into Inore pern1anent bonds in the
conteillporary period. Indian influence in Southeast Asia is now Illainly
transillitted by the large diaspora con1n1unities in Malaysia (2 n1illion),
.\lyann1ar (1 InHlion), Singapore (371,000), and Thailand (150,000), as well
as by overseas Indian residents \vho work in Southeast Asia.
X
In Singapore
the Indian diaspora has played a nlajor role in developing ties \vith India,
\vhereas political and econonlic discriIllination against the diasporas in
.\Iyann1ar and 1Vlalaysia, respectively, has inlpeded the developn1ent of
bilateral ties bet\veen India and those countries.
By \\'ay of contrast, in the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras,
n1ade a sustai ned cultural in1pact on only one state in Southeast Asia:
\Tietnan1. Ho\vever, the PRC and Vietnanl becanle adversaries during the
conflict (197R-91), and all forn1s of cultural and educational
interaction \vere tenninated. In the late 1970s, up to 250,000 ethnic Chinese
f1ed Vietnanl to China. lhis hiatus in relations canle to an end in 1991
\vhen China and \Tietnan1 restored nornlal relations, and Vietnanlese now
represent the third-largest group of foreign students in China.
Today, the overseas Chinese con1n1unity constitutes a Illajority of the
population in Singapore (7 and over a quarter of the population in
A-/lalaysia There are also sizeable overseas Chinese cOlnmunities in
Brunei (1 lhailand (1 and Canlbodia (7%).Y Overseas Chinese
I hI" I" "OI11t'tII11l'" ,1bhrl'\'i,lkd ,\( 'I, L\ for ,\SFA.N -Chill,l Frct? Trade Agrt.'CI11t?Ilt.
, ('/.\, IIII.' \\'o,.ld }-udlJollA. (\\',l"hingtun, D.C .. CIA, 20{)L), ,l\'ailable ,1t
gO\'/ publil..,lt j( 111,,1 t 11L'-\\ orld- LILtbook/index.htI11I.
, IbId.
influence is arguably strongest in Thaila
business class took root historically, bu
Indonesia, and the Philippines. Althougl
assin1ilated into local COnlI11Unities, oth
cultural identity through Chinese
At tinles, overseas Chinese C0I11muni
racial discrinlination, particularly in II
governlllent only recently relnoved discr
indigenous ethnic Chinese conln1unity.
China has responded to the \videspr
in Southeast Asia by developing Confuc:
language and culture. By contrast, it is
India has begun to systenlatically pn
exchanges to enhance its relations il
mainland Southeast Asia.
Military
1here have been three instances of (
a Southeast Asian state in the contempo
Vietnanl. TIle PRe seized the southern P;
in 1974 and clashed \vith \Tietnanlese na
Johnston Reef in the Spratly Islands.
pun itive attack on northern Vietnan1 in
to Vietnaill's invasion of Call1bodia.
China only began to pr0I110te def
Asia in the 1990s under the rubric of it:
will be discussed belo,v. Betvveen 1999 (
cooperation fran1evvork agreen1ents \vit]
of these agreeinents (\\Tith Thailand, Mal
the Philippines, and Laos) include clause
a range of activities such as high-level ex
dialogues, sInall-scale exercises, Inilitar)
equipn1ent sales, and cooperation
In addition, China has pursued defel
brokering agreen1ents '\'ith ASEAN ane
prin1arily focused on nontraditional seCl
India's defense relations ,vith SOL
Defense ties \\'ith Singapore are particulc:
conducted increasingly con1plex annua
India also conducts joint exercises ,vit

Ihaycr
'ith the region canle in 2002 with the
t for the China-ASEAN Free Trade
suit seven years later by signing an
e free trade of goods.
tural influence in Southeast Asia was
ed to "vhat historians call Indianization.
I by \vhich local rulers underpinned
ues of Hinduisnl and Buddhisnl onto
he exception of Vietnam, Theravada
In of all 111ainland states. Hinduis111
)f state legiti111acy in the Indonesian
n in the thirteenth century. Such deep
l and Southeast Asia have not proved
ite into more permanent bonds in the
in Southeast Asia is now nlainly
comnlunities in Malaysia (2 million),
71,000), and Thailand (150,000), as well
) \vork in Southeast Asia.
K
In Singapore
,ajor role in developing ties with India,
iscrimination against the diasporas in
ely, has il1lpeded the development of
;e countries.
olonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras,
pact on only one state in Southeast Asia:
Tletnam becanle adversaries during the
d all forms of cultural and educational
late 1970s, up to 250,000 ethnic Chinese
.s in relations came to an end in 1991
normal relations, and Vietnamese now
.foreign students in China.
on1n1unity constitutes a nlajority of the
ld over a quarter of the population in
eable overseas Chinese con1ITIunities in
1d Cambodia (7o/0).L) Overseas Chinese
,SEA.:\-China Free Trade Agreement.
ton, D.C.. CIA, 200L)), Ll\"ailable at /www.cia.

influence is arguably strongest in "Thailand, \\'here a po\\'erful Sino-'Ihai
business class took root historically, but it is also strong in .\lalaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. Although n1an: in the Chinese diaspora
assin1ilated into local conln1unities, others retained a separate sense of
cultural identity through Chinese language schoob and religious practices,
At till1es, overseas Chinese con1n1un itics ha\'e sut1tTed fron1 harsh
racial discrin1ination, particularly in Indonesia, \\'here the del110cTatic
governn1ent only recently ren10ved discrin1inatory against the
indigenous ethnic Chinese con1n1unity.
China has responded to the \videspread intcrL'st its rise has proyokcd
in Southeast Asia by developing Confucius Instit utes to pron10te Chinese
language and culture. By contrast, it is only in the last half decade that
India has begun to systen1atically pron10te educational and cultural
exchanges to enhance its relations in the region, particularly \\'ith
n1ainland Southeast Asia.
Military
TIlere have been three instances of China usin
u
n1 ilitar\' force auainst
a Southeast Asian state in the contemporary periOll and all' havc
Vietnan1. TIle PRC seized the southern Paracellslands fron1 South \rietnanl
in 1974 and clashed \:vith Vietnan1ese na\'al forces in .\larch lYHR at
Johnston Reef in the Spratly Islands. In addition, na conduL-ted a
punitive attack on northern Vietnan1 in February-\larch lY7'lJ in response
to Vietnall1's invasion of Can1bodia.
China only began to pron10te defense cooperation \\'ith
Asia in the 1990s under the rubric of its "ne\\r concept of security," \\'hid1
will be discussed belo\v. Bet\veen 19lJ9 and 2000, signed long-tern1
cooperat ion fran1e\vork agreenlents \vith all ten n1en1bers.
of these agreell1ents (\:vith 11lailand, Nlala\'sia, \riet nan1, Brunei Si ntraporl'
the Philippines, and Laos) include clauses '011 dcfcll,e (ooperati(;11
a range of activities such as high-level exchanges, na\'al port \"isits, "strategic
dialogues, sll1all-scale exercises, n1ilitary education and training, arI11S and
equipn1ent sales, and cooperation bet\\reen national defense
In addition, China has pursued defense cooperation Inultilateralh" b\
brokering agreell1cnts \vith ASEAN and alh'ancing initiatiYes in the
prin1arily focused on nontraditional security
India's defense relations \vith Southeast A arl' n1ainl) bilateral.
l)efense ties with Singapore are particularh' dose, \\'ith the t\\'O sides ha\'i ng
conducted increasingly cOlllplex annual j'oint na\'al SinCl) 1L)Y;.
India also conducts joint exercises \\rith 1.111d Ihailand, \\"ith a
322 ratcgil 2011 -12
focus on the Andanlan Sea and approaches to the Strait of and
hosts a nlajor nayal l\Iilan, in the Andanlan Sea. In February 2011,
\\'arships fronl Indonesia, Myannlar, Singapore, and Thailand
participated in the exercise, \vhile Brunei, the Philippines, and Vietnanl sent
nayal obseryers. In tenns of anns sales, India sells \veapons, equipnlent, and
spare parts to and \Tietnanl.
"v0 IIprol 1"(1 ti011
:'\0 Asian state possesses nuclear \veapons.
111
As nlentioned
earlier, in 199:; ASEA:-\ nlelHbers adopted the Southeast Asia Nuclear
\\Teapon-free Zone (SEAN\\,FZ) Treaty, \vhich enjoins signatories not to
deyc!op, or control nuclear \veapons and prohibits thelll fronl
stationing, transporting, using, or testing nuclear \"'eapons in Southeast
Asia. ASt-.Al\' states haye since encouraged the nuclear powers to accede to
this treaty. But \vhen China offered to do so first, ASEAN denlurred, hoping
to bring the other nuclear states on board at the saIne tilHe.
11
Although
ASLA:'\ the international nonproliferation reginle, its Inenlbers
do not ah\'ays present a united front. In May 1998, for exanlple, \vhen
India conducted a series of nuclear tests, only Malaysia, the Philippines,
and '1 hailand condenlned India, \vhereas Vietnanl Illerely called for
nuclear disarnlanlent \\Tithout singling India out.
l
-2 Senior ASEAN officials
declined to nlake a statelnen1. \;\'hen the issue was raised at the annual
ARt- Ineeting, the deleted all references to India in the final
statenlent. Silllilarly, only four ASEAN nlenlbers have supported the U.S.
led Proliferation Security Initiative (Singapore, Brunei, Canlbodia, and the
Philippines), \\,hile the relnaining six nleInbers either actively opposed it
(Indonesian and or declined to support its principles (Laos,
\lyannlar, rIhailand, and \TietnaIn).
th,lt :\orth I" PW\ Ilill1g 11lllk<1r technology to '\ly ,111 111M h,l\ l' not been \ erihcd.
111l' ,h.,llklllh.. Ilkr,ltllrl.' l'!TOlh'Oll"I:' rq
1
0rh th,lt Chin,l W<l" thl' cOlllltry to "ign the protocol
tl) till' \1,\:\\\'11 It'l',ll:. \n ottl(i,d -,ull1ll1,ny or i\SLA:\\ rcLltion" \\ith Chin,l on
\0\ l'll1hlT .2
l
), .2() ll), "utl''', "( _hillel il,l" ,d"(l ih illtt'ntion to <1(Ct.'dc to the Protocol to the
'\1.\:\\\'1/1," \t'l' "\",1 RcLltion<' \JoH'lllbcr 2Y, 20}O, ilttp:l/\\-W\\".,bC<llbl'L'.
org Lilt Ill.
(1.\".< '\,lldLl,' 1hl' .\LlllIl,l \",1 .\kt'lll1g" clnd Indicl," In"titutc of lkfclKe ,llld Strategic
\11<1]:"1" (11)"'.\1, :\()\l'lllhl'r <1nd "Indi<1
:\lll k,w [Jo!ttll<1L I )q'!Olll,ltl( ,llld LconollliL Illlplication<' Illdi,l Indi<1 Foeu", T\L1Y
I1tql: \\ \\ I1Ll: 111.
Southeast Asian Perceptions of tl
China
Southeast Asian perceptions of the P
were heavily int1uenced by Cold War alignl
Korean conflict, and PRC support for Corr
insurgencies in Southeast Asia. The
as a threat and withheld diplolnatic recogr
contrast, the nonaligned states extended d
Perceptions of China began to alter
wound do\vn and the United States COl
from nlainland Southeast Asia. Malaysia
\vith China in May 1974, as did the PhilJ
Nonetheless, China's past support for rE
resid ue of suspicion that lingered for OV(
until 1990 that Indonesia restored diplom
the door for Singapore and Brunei to folIc
rrnere is no one Southeast Asian perce
vary fronl country to country and are shapE
particular issues of concern to each state. ]
of the pro-denl0cracy nlovenlent in Tianar
the "China threat" in the region's democ
states. By the early 1990s, those states"
Sea had beconle alarnled by the manner
nlaritinle c1ainls. TIley \videly vie\ved the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in
China's oil exploration activities brought it
both countries to scralnble to occupy isla
issuing a declaration of concern urging un
peacefully. TIle anxieties of Southeast Asia
assertiveness were aroused again in 1995 "
which had been clainled by the Philippir
declaration calling for restraint and the p
By 1995, virtually all nlembers of AS
threat to the region. So prevalent \vas thi
policynlakers began to re-evaluate how
concerns. TIle end result \vas China's "I
first presented to a nleeting of the ARF j
signaled Beijing's intention to pursue a pc
\vith ASEAN and its nlenlbers, including (
.......
l
Jaches to the Strait of Malacca, and
the Andanlan Sea. In February 2011,
tv1yanlnar, Singapore, and Thailand
.ei, the Philippines, and Vietnanl sent
India sells \veapons, equipnlent, and
es nuclear \\Teapons.]() As nlentioned
iopted the Southeast Asia Nuclear
tty, \\Thich enjoins signatories not to
oar \veapons and prohibits thenl frol11
nuclear \veapons in Southeast
aged the nuclear po\vers to accede to
fo so first, ASEAN deI11urred, hoping
board at the sanle tinle.
11
Although
Jnproliferation reginle, its lllelTI bel'S
1. In lvlay 1998, for exanlple, \vhen
ests, only lv1alaysia, the Philippines,
hereas Vietnanl nlerely called for
T India Senior ASEAN officials
,
the issue \"as raised at the annual
:ed all references to India in the final
" menlbers have supported the U.S.
lngapore, Brunei, Call1bodia, and the
members either actively opposed it
led to support its principles (Laos,
:chnology to \ lY'-ll1111 ,lr h,l\'e not been \Tritled.
,t Chind the country to sign the protocol
r of relations with Chin<l prepared on
:esseJ. ib intention to ,lccedt' to the Protocol to the
:\oYel11her 2l), 2010, http://W\\w. .
S dnd lndi,l," of Defence ,1l1d Strategic
and "Indi,l
lndi,l Strategy, India Focus, :\lay 199H,
Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Rise of China and India
China
Southeast Asian perceptions of the PRe:, Asia's first (:on1n1unisl slate,
\vere heavily influenced by Cold War alignnlents, inter\'ention in the
Korean conflict, and PRC support for Conlnlunist \'ietnan1 and
insurgencies in Southeast Asia. 'TIle region's pro- \'ie\\'ed China
as a threat and withheld diplonlatic recognition for a quarter ora century. In
contrast, the nonaligned states extended diplonlatic recognition to e:hina.
Perceptions of China began to alter in the 1Y70s as the \Tietnan1 \\'ar
wound down and the United States con1pleted n1ilitary disengagl'n11'nt
fronl nlainland Southeast Asia. IVlalaysia establ d iplon1atic relat ions
\vith China in May 1974, as did the Philippines and lhailand a year later.
Nonetheless, China's past support for regional Con1nlunist parties lett a
residue of suspicion that lingered for O\Ter a decade and a half. It \\"as not
until 1990 that Indonesia restored diplonlatic ties \\'ith China, thus opening
the door for Singapore and Brunei to follo\\' suit.
There is no one Southeast Asian perception rather, perceptions
vary frol11 country to country and are shaped by differing Llctors, including the
particular issues of concern to each state. In 19H9, C=hina's brutal
of the pro-denlocracy nlovenlent in Tianannlen Square raised about
the ((China threat" in the region's denl0cratic and deIllocratically inclined
states. By the early 1990s, those states \vith a littoral on the South C:hina
Sea had beconle alarnled by the l11anne1' in \vhich \\'as
nlaritinle clair11s. lhey \videly viewed the PRC's adoption of the La\\' on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in 1992 as a clain1 to the entire sea.
China's oil exploration activities brought it into conflict \\"ith \rietnanl and led
both countries to scranlble to occupy island features. ASEA:'\ b:'
issuing a declaration of concern urging unnan1ed part to resoh'e the n1atter
peacefully. 111e anxieties of Southeast Asia's littoral states concerning
assertiveness were aroused again in 1995 \vhen China occupied Reef,
which had been clainled by the Philippines. issued another public
declaration calling for restraint and the peaceful settlen1ent of disputes.
By 1995, virtually all nlenlbers of ASEAN perceived China as a
threat to the region. So prevalent \vas this \rie\\' that ehinest' st rategists and
policynlakers began to re-evaluate ho\'v best to Southeast Asian
concerns. The end result \vas China's ((ne\v security concept," \\'h ich
first presented to a nleeting of the ARF in 1997. 1hl' nl'\\' cOllcept
signaled Beijing's intention to pursue a policy ofcooperatiYe
with ASEAN and its 111enlbers, including a nlajor enlphasis 011 nontraditional
324 StrdtcgiL 2011-12
threats.
l
In after several years of negotiations, the PRC
and ASf"A\f agreed to a [)('c1aration on Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea reducing concerns about territorial an1bitions.
a further den10nstration of reassurance, China becan1e the first external
pO\\Tr to accede to the protocol endorsing the TAC in 2002.
In the decade and a half after concerns shifted fron1 the China
threat to the il11plications of the econon1ic rise for the region.
l
+
Southeast Asian states initially feared that Chinese grc)\vth vvould be at
their expense and take the forn1 of trade and investn1ent diversion. These
fears intensified as China began negotiations for entry into the \A/orId
I'rade \\'hich it eyentually joined in 2001. A lnajor turning
point occurred during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, ho\vever, \vhen
Beijing's policies contrasted \vith those of the International
,\ !onetary fund (backed by the United States), which in1posed conditions
on its loans. C]1ina not only refrained froIl1 devaluing its currency but
also contributed to regional bailout packages. As a Southeast Asian
...,tates caine to vie\\" the ecol10111ic rise n10re as an opportunity than
a challenge. In C:hina caine to be perceived as an indispensable
l'conolnic partner and the 111ain engine of regional grc)\vth.
I phc11ol11enal eco11on1ic however, provided the foundation
for Chi na to n1oder11 ize al1d transforn1 its 111iIitary forces. Although
Beijing's ne\\" cooplTatiye approach to Southeast Asian security had been
\\"e1l received in thc SOI11e states began to suspect that one of
for ad\"ancing its ne\\' security concept was to underIl1ine the
alliance that had been the n1ainstay of regional security for
o\"cr four approach failed to gain traction and proved
counterproducti\"e, it Southeast Asian states, particularly
to fron1 \Vashington that the United States
\\"ould rel11ain engaged in regional aftlirs.
In littoral on the South China Sea becan1e increaSingly
concerncd about the gro\\,th of C:hinese naval especially after satellite
in1agery contlrI11cd that (:hina had constructed a n1ajor base on Hainan
i4.t1er renc\\'ed assertiveness in the South Sea
furthcr heightened regiol1al concerns about Beij intentions. In 1
not only against SUbl11issions by Nlalaysia and Vietnanl to
( ,1I h k \ j ]),1\ IT (h111c\" "l'\\ "ldll"l t \ ( (1Illl'pt' ,1l1d . III . \."11 II/h'i/il' '\l'(l/fit\': JlO/iL ,\'
( Iltllll'II,\l \. l"J I )c\\ III \ \', I ll\ l'll i "Ing,lf'll/l'. 11ht ItlltL' oj "'llUt hl',l"t ,\ .... I,l!l .... , 2()(U), K')' 1
I \"h 11 (I(lh \(lutl1L,.),t \"Lll1 \\hpl'ltl\l'" \)11 tl1L' ('hll1c\ ( h,llkl1gl<' /o/ll'l/til \)1 Str"t(\!,f( Stlldies
11(h, I clnd -:; I \ugu"t ()It(ll'l' 2()()-1.
(,llhk \. 111-1\,'r H.l'll'11t lh'\,']ol'111L'I1h ill the (:hll1,1 Sl',l: (;roulld.... j()J- C:,lLltiOLh
( )rllll1l "111? " lZlll,lr,\t lL\1l1 \l])( l,l! (It 111 krl1,lt iOI1,ll St Ll,lil .... \), \:,ll1y,mg klh llO!OgIl,d
l 111\l'I"It\ IZ\I\ \\()lkll1g 1\'I"r. 11(1. 22(), [)l'll'l11lwr 1 L 2(J!U.
the LTN C0I11n1ission on the Limits of t
tabled a 111ap of the South China Sea ill
map in1plied that China \vas clain1ing
incidents follo\ved in Nlarch and May
acted aggressively to\vard Philippine an
respectively, in contested \vaters.
In sun1, Southeast Asian states ha
as the n1ain threat to regional securit)
support for COIl11nunist insur
1990s as the ll1ain driver of regional
to a 111iddle position of vie\ving Chin,
111ilitary rise with apprehension. China
China Sea has detracted froln the p(
econon1ic rise and caused
perceptions about the benign nature oj
actions are seen not only as directly thr
but as likely undern1ining r
United States. they challenge
centrality in regional security affairs.
India
As described India's precol
were largely based on trade and com
Buddhist religious and gen
India largely squandered this legacy \v
relations \vith the region to slow do\vn
World vVar II .[(1 Prior to the Inl
in South Asia with a backwa
Southeast Asian affairs. There \vere
gro\vth of Indian naval particl
in Maldives in 1988.
1

Southeast Asian perceptions begar

donlestic reforn1s led to rapid econo
to engage with selected Southeast Asi,
India increasingly C.1111e to be \'ie\ved
III K, \" "'I ht' R\ llt' of Institutioll
.\olltl/L'ilSt ,-1S/I1: RL'.'f\l/1dIllX to Ceo-Polit
,md D,lliit 1Il"titute
I "Indi,l'" Look East Policy-A
3M2, h'bru,u" IC, cOIO.
j
eral years of negotiations, the PRe
on Conduct of Parties in the South
s about China's territorial ambitions.
ance, China becanle the first external
sing the TAe in 2002.
'95, concerns shifted froll1 the China
tC's econonlic rise for the region.
l
+
d that Chinese gro\vth \vould be at
'ade and investn1ent diversion. These
gotiations for entry into the World
illy joined in 2001. A n1ajor turning
cial crisis of 1997-98, ho\vever, when
ted \vith those of the International
'd States), \vhich in1posed conditions
ed frol11 devaluing its currency but
ackages. As a result, Southeast Asian
nic rise n10re as an opportunity than
D be perceived as an indispensable
e of regional gro\vth.
th, hO\\Te\Ter, provided the foundation
form its n1ilitary forces. Although
D Southeast Asian security had been
s began to suspect that one of China's
:urity concept \vas to undennine the
he mainstay of regional security for
failed to gain traction and proved
Southeast Asian states, particularly
vVashington that the United States
lirs.
South China Sea becal11e increasingly
e na\Tal pO\\Ter, especially after satellite
:onstructed a lllajor base 011 Hainan
assertiveness in the South China Sea
about Beijing's intentions.
l
" In 2009,
nissions by J\lalaysia and Vietnan1 to
[' and Southca"t '\"i,\," 1I1 .isicl-}Ju(jfiL" Sl't'liritr: Po!itT
tt' of .\"i,\l1 10';"" / ,
the Chin,l Ch,lllcngl"" ]llllrJZlII StrllfL'git- Studics

the South Chin,l (;round" for
ational Studlt'" :\lll1ylll1g TL'lhnologicd
1bef 1-4, 2010.
the UN Con1n1ission on the Lin1its of the Continental Shelf hut ottlcialh'
tabled a n1ap of the South China Sea lllarked \vith nine dashed lines. his
n1ap in1plied that China \1\'as clain1ing of the Inaritin1e area. (Jther
incidents followed in March and May 20 11, \\'hen patrol
acted aggressively toward Philippine and exploration
respectively, in contested \vaters.
In SUll1, Southeast Asian states have oscillated fron1 \'ie\\'ing (:h ina
as the lllain threat to regional security in the 1960s and 1970s-due to
Beijing's support for C0111111unist insurgencies-to \'ie\\'ing rise in the
1990s as the n1ain driver of regional econonlic gro\\,th, and then hack
to a middle position of viewing China's econOlllic rise but its
n1ilitary rise with apprehension. China's recent in the South
Chilla Sea has detracted fron1 the positive-sunl \'ie\\' of the country\
economic rise and caused Southeast Asian to their
perceptions about the benign nature of the gro\\'ing PO\\Tr. (J1ina\
actions are seen not only as directly threatening littoral particularly
Vietnan1, but as likely undern1ining regional security by pro\'oking the
United States. '-TIlus, they challenge ASEAN's assertion of autonon1y and
centrality in regional security affairs.
India
As described ahove, India's precolonial relations \\'ith
were largely based on trade and C0111n1erCe, the diffusion of Hindu and
Buddhist religious practices, and generally peaceful
India largely squandered this legacy \vhen it allo\\'ed the n1on1cntun1 of its
relations with the region to slo\v dO\1\'n and stagnate in the years follo\\'i ng
World War II.'h Prior to the 1990s, India \\'as vie\\'ed as a country locked
in South Asia with a closed, backward econon1)' that lnarginal to
Southeast Asian There \1\'ere regional concerns, hc)\\'e\'er, about the
gro\vth of Indian naval po\ver, particularly follo\\'ing India\ inter\'ention
in Maldives in 1988.
1

Southeast Asian perceptions hegan to change in the \\'hcn India\

d0111estic reforn1s led to rapid econon1ic gro\\Tth and :-\e\\' I)elhi began
to engage with selected Southeast Asian states under its look east polic).
India increasingly can1e to be viewed as an attractive n1arket and ccononlic
1(, K.\' KC"ll\',ll1, "'lilt' Role of Rq!,iol1,d 111 Indl<l" 1(Hlk I,ht Pldll\" In \olltll l/lll!
SOllt!lCilSt Asiil: Ucspolldillg to ()uzllgillg Gco-}Jo!iticlil ullll \l'lllrit \' ( Ildlllll,\!.t'.\, k\ I'l'''<l\ .Ill
llnd D,lljit Singh of r\ "I<ln 2() 1() l, 1(lh.
I C.S. "lndi<l\ Look Poli(y - A Rc\ ic\\':' \"'Id "I" (JrllLlp, Pdpn IlO.
3662, h'brLl,lry 12, 2010.
326 Stratcgil 2011-]2
partner.
I
" ASEA0J responded to India's rise by granting the country sectoral
partner status in lLJ92 and full dialogue status in 1995. Two year later, it
India's nlen1bership in the ARF, and in 2002 the two partners
began to lneet annually at the sunln1it level. Concerns about India's naval
pc)\\'er dissipated the follo\\'ing year after New Delhi acceded to the TAC.
Relations \\'ere further strengthened \vhen ASEAN successfully pronl0ted
India's inclusion in the process in 2005.
'I hus, \\'hile Southeast Asian concerns about Chinese assertiveness
gre\\\ India increasingly becanle perceived as a n1ajor independent po\ver
that could pn)\'ide ballast in relations with external states, particularly as a
nlenlber of the EAS process. The track record of recent interaction between
India and states has served to reinforce perceptions of the country's
rise in positi\'e-sunl tenllS. India is no\v viewed as a dependable econolnic
partnec a counter\\'eight to China's rise, and a state that will be supportive
of ASEA0J's assertion of regional autonon1y.
Factors Shaping Southeast Asia's Relations
with China and India
In the 1970s, ASEA:\ fornlalized its linkages with external powers
by lneeting \\'ith its dialogue partners in a post-Ininisterial conference
inlnlediate}y follo\\'ing the annual nleeting of the group's foreign lninisters.
'I process took the fOrIn of an ASEAN nleeting \vith all its dialogue
partners as a group (ASEA.N +10) and then separate meetings between
and each dialogue partner (ASEAN + 1). Although individual
Southeast Asian states do pursue their own bilateral relations with China
and IIH.iia, all take into account the lnultilateral fralnework provided by
ASr,A0:. C:hina and India \\Tre accorded consultative partner status in 1991
and 19LJ2, respecti\'ely. India \vas subsequently elevated to the status of full
dialogue partner in I)ecenlber 1995, \vith China following in July 1996.
pursues three strategies to manage its relations with both
countries: the prolnotion of econolnic interdependence, socialization into
regional nOrIns or the <cASEAN \\'ay,"jLJ and soft-balancing. Each of these
is discussed belc)\\',
, 1{,111\ \lk.n, "Jl1dl,l'" J ook. L1 .... t PO!JL'Y' 1\ CritiL'dl of PC,lCt? and Conflict
(J J, J RlTort, CktohtT 2()()<.).
I hl' ... l' norm... II1L-llldl' 111 l',lch othcr\ internal athir,,>, for national
... 0\ L'rL'lgnty, rl'I111I1Cl,ltlon of the thrcat or ll"'l' of force in rclation">, pcaL'eful
uf dhplltc... , ,1I1d <1 dCl-l ... lonm,lklng pWCl' ....... h,l ... ed on di<l!oguc, equality, and
,1I1d ,1t ",1 p,ltl' lomforL1hk to <111."
Economic Interdependence
After China becan1e a full dialogu
quickly forn1alized relations by setting up
coordinate all cooperative mechanisms at
enn1eshing China advanced in late 2002 ,
agreelnent on conlprehensive economic (
the foundation for \vhat becan1e CAFTA.
goods was reached, follo\ved in 2007 by a
and in 2009 by an investnlent agreemer
January 2010 for ASEAN's six developed I
the four least-developed nlenlbers in 201:
Efforts to ennlesh India in a silnilar ,
have proceeded n10re slo\vly. After }
dialogue partner status, the two sides
trade, investlnent, science and
cooperation relnained restricted due to Il
n1easures. In 2003, India and ASEAN fin,
on comprehensive econon1ic cooperatio:
It took another six years, ho\vever, befoI
finally concluded. Subsequently, India
in 2003 and less fonnal comprehensive I
with Indonesia, Malaysia, Iv1yanmar, Sin;
are currently under\vay to conclude agr
l
and investments. Although India ranks (
partners, the t\vo-\vay volulne of trade
that bilateral trade reached only $43.9 b
the Appendix).
Socialization: Shaping Attitudes throL
The end of the Cold War changed
ASEAN becan1e n10re proactive in pror
security in external relations and c
institution, the ASEAN Regional Forun
held in Bangkok in 1994 and attended
addition to ASEAN's six foreign mini:
n1inisters fron1 forn1al dialogue partnel
Union, Japan, Ne\v Zealand, the Repub
ASEAN's consultative partners (China
(Laos, Papua Ne\v Guinea, and Vietnan
......
's rise by granting the country sectoral
gue status in 1995. T\vo year later, it
ARF, and in 2002 the t\VO partners
lit level. Concerns about India's naval
after Ne\v Delhi acceded to the TAC.
\vhen ASEAN successfully pron10ted
12005.
)ncerns about Chinese assertiveness
:eived as a nlajor independent power
; \vith external states, particularly as a
K record of recent interaction between
reinforce perceptions of the
O\V vie\ved as a dependable econolnic
and a state that \vill be supportive
nomy.
Relations
its linkages \vith external powers
ers in a post -ll1inisterial conference
of the foreign Ininisters.
lSEAN ll1eeting \vith all its dialogue
and then separate nleetings between
(ASEAN +1). Although individual
o\vn bilateral relations with China
Inultilateral franlework provided by
fed consultative partner status in 1991
sequently elevated to the status of full
Nith China follo\ving in July 1996.
s to manage its relations with both
ic interdependence, socialization into
;'19 and soft-balancing. Each of these
ical Assessment," of Peace and Conflict

lch other\ intern<l! affairs, for national
of force in interstate peaceful settlement
on dialogue, equality, and
'Ihayer -
Econofnic Interdependence
After China becanle a full dialogue partncc ASr.Al\' and Beijing
quickly fornlalized relations by setting up a joint cooperation con11nittee to
coordinate all cooperative nlechanisn1s at the \\Torki ng lC\Tl. '} he proccss of
enn1eshing China advanced in late 2002 \vith the adoption of a fran1C\\'ork
agreen1ent on conlprehensive econolnic cooperation. 'This agreelnent laid
the foundation for vvhat becan1e CAFTA. In 200S an agreen1ent on trade in
goods \vas followed in 2007 by an agreen1cnt on trade in StT\'ices
and in 2009 by an investnlent agreelnent. CAfTA entered into forcc in
January 2010 for six developed econonlies and \\'ill take effect for
the four least -developed nlenlbers in 2015.
Efforts to ennlesh India in a sinlilar \veb of econon1ic interdependence
have proceeded n10re slowly. After ASEAN accorded India sectoral
dialogue partner the t\VO sides began to explore cooperation in
trade, science and and tourisn1. But the scopc of
cooperation relnained restricted due to foot-dragging on
nleasures. In 2003, India and ASEAN finally signed a fran1c\\'ork agrcelnent
on cOlnprehensive econonlic cooperation as the tirst step to\\'ard an fTA.
It took another six years, ho\vever, before a trade in goods agreen1ent \\'as
finally concluded. Subsequently, India signed a bilateral FTA \\'ith '{ hail and
in 2003 and less fonnal cOlnprehensive econolnic cooperation agreclnents
with Indonesia, Malaysia, Myannlar, Singapore, and \Tietnanl. Negotiations
are currently underway to conclude agreenlents covering trade in services
and investn1ents. Although India ranks an10ng the top-ten ASEA:-\ trading
partners, the two-way volun1e of trade is 10\\'. 111e n10st recent figures sho\\'
that bilateral trade reached only $43.9 billion in 200'J-I 0 (see Table A 1 in
the Appendix).
Socialization: Shaping Attitudes through Intcnlctiol1
The end of the Cold War changed Southeast strategic context.
ASEAN becanle n10re proactive in pron10ting its nonns of conlprehensi\'l'
security in external relations and created an entirely ne\\' security
institution, the ASEAN Regional Forun1. 111e first nleeting of the ARf \vas
held in Bangkok in 1994 and attended by eighteen founding n1enlbers. In
addition to ASEAN's six foreign participants included foreign
ministers from formal dialogue partners the European
Union, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of and the United
ASEAN's consultative partners (China and RussiaL and invited obser\'crs
(Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnaln). India forlnally joined in 1Y9h.
Strategic 2011- 12
(:hina's interaction \\'ith ASEAN has likely contributed to its
socialization into at the very least, Beijing has revised
diplon1atic rhetoric in order to "talk the talk" with Southeast Asian
In 2003, and China issued a joint declaration on a strategic
partnership, the first fonnal agreen1ent of this type for both sides. 'The
declaration included a provision for the initiation of a new security
dialogue \\'hile abo prolnoting general cooperation in political n1atters.
1he follo\\'ing year, ASEAI'\ and China agreed to a five-year plan of action
(runn ing fron1 2005 to 20 10) to raise relations to the level of an "enhanced
()\'erall, there are at least 48 joint con1n1ittees that
pro\'ide the n1cchanisn1s for engagen1ent between ASEAN and China, in
to only eighteen ASEAN-India joint con1lnittees.
has arguably also been socialized into ASEAN nonns through
111elnbcrship in the Although initially disn1issive of n1ultilateral
Beijing soon can1C to appreciate that it could benefit froITI
acti\'c engagen1cnt and a pron1inent role in the ARF's intersessional
\\'ork prograln related to confidence-building lneasures. In 2003, it launched
a Jl1ajor initiati\'c by succcssfully proposing the creation of a security policy
l'onfcrcncc cOlnpriscd of scnior lnilitary and civilian officials dra\vn fron1
all ;\Rl- n1cn1bers. C:hina also has been a strong proponent of cooperative
to nontraditional security challenges.
India shares cOlnpatible values \vith ASEAN and is n1uch less in
need than of socialization into the group's nonns. Indeed, the five
of peaceful advocated by India during the Cold War
forn1 thc core of thc ASEr\;..J \\'ay. Both sides strongly support the norn1S
of national and noninterference in internal ASEAN
and India abo entered into a Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared
Prosperity in Yt't the current fi\'e-year plan of action (2011-15), \vhich
HO points for cooperation, appears rudin1entary when con1pared to
thl' plan of action (20 II-IS) with over 200 detailed
of cooperation for the saIne tin1e period.
s -Hell el Jl (i Jlg
l\' to enll1esh all the n1ajor powers through
l'ngagen1ent in the r\Rl-'. It ho\\'ever, on ren1aining in the driver's seat
chair and that the en1bodied in the ASEAN \vay guide the ARF's
proccss and \vork progralns. ASEAN seeks to use these
to lnoderate the in1pact of the lnajor po\vers on Southeast
"I..'\.' (Jrhk \. 111.l\\.'1" \ 11..'lllJl11 " lktl..'Ih.'\.' Policy cl11d Ib Impdd on hlrcign RcLltiO!1<","
\ t rli',l Il1"t I tLit. l 111\ \.'1 "It,lt I LII1l hLlrg, I L1r() \'IL't 6, 'L1!1t' 2()()K.
Asia by drawing then1 into ASEAN-centr
addition, the organization seeks to uphold
equilibrium alTIOng the n1ajor po\vers and
n1ust choose bet\veen theIn.
ASEAN has therefore adopted a pol
against the potentially disruptive effects
encourages the United States-as well as
to ren1ain engaged in regional security aft
The group expanded its strategic linkag(
ASEAN +3 fran1ework to include the Ul
Australia, Ne\v Zealand, India, and Rus
ASEAN also included India, Australia, ar
EAS and later enlarged the EAS to includE
The Impact of Southeast Asia's
with China and India on the VI
This section considers the inlpact of
with China and India on C.S. interests il
in the chapter, U.S. policies to\\Tard South
global fran1e\Vork that seeks to n1aintain a
order" pren1ised on a rules-based system
international organizations in order to pr
hun1an rights, religious freedoln, and dt
set within the context of a broader appro
exanlple, the United States pursues its gIl
supporting n1ldtilateral institutions sue
Cooperation (APEC), the Trans-Pacific P
Southeast Asia, the Oball1a adn1inistratic
a stronger relationship \vith ASEAN,
becon1ing a charter 111ell1ber of the ADM
The U.S. alliance systell1 underpins l
Pacific and Southeast Asia. As the 201
ll1akes clear, "alliances \vith Japan, South
and Thailand are the bedrock of seCUl
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region:'2:
stressed the in1portance of \vorking
partners (Singapore), potential strategic
":\,ltional Sccurity StLlkgy," Office of the President
Ibid.,

l
AN has likely contributed to its
t the very least, Beijing has revised
'talk the talk" \vith Southeast Asian
iued a joint declaration on a strategic
ent of this type for both sides. The
>r the initiation of a ne\v security
'ral cooperation in political n1atters.
La agreed to a five-year plan of action
relations to the level of an "enhanced
are at least 48 joint con11nittees that
nent between ASEAN and China, in
ia joint con1n1ittees.
cialized into ASEAN norn1S through
initially dis111issive of n1ldtilateral
appreciate that it could benefit froln
ninent role in the ARF's intersessional
uilding n1easures. In 2003, it launched
osing the creation of a security policy
ary and civilian officials dra\vn fron1
en a strong proponent of cooperative
'curity challenges.
"vith ASEAN and is n1uch less in
o the group's nonns. Indeed, the five
Tocated by India during the Cold War
)th sides strongly support the norn1S
in internal affairs. ASEA N
rship for Peace, Progress and Shared
plan of action (2011-15), which
'pears rudin1entary \vhen compared to
.on (2011-15) \vith over 200 detailed
ne period.
sh all the n1ajor po\vers through
vever, on ren1aining in the driver's seat
d in the ASEAN \vay guide the ARF's
)rogralns. ASEAN seeks to use these
:t of the Inajor po\vers on Southeast
liey cll1d Ih Impact on Forcign ;'bien
6, lune 200R.
Asia by drawing then1 into ASEAN-centric n1ldtilateral arrangenlents. In
addition, the organization seeks to uphold regional autonollly hy pronl0ting
equilibriun1 anl0ng the n1ajor powers and avoiding circunlstances \vhere it
n1ust choose between then1.
ASEAN has therefore adopted a policy of soft-balancing as a hedge
against the potentially disruptive effects of China's risc and continually
encourages the United States-as \vell as Japan, South Korea, and India
to relnain engaged in regional security atLlirs as a counter\veight to (]lina.
The group expanded its strategic linkages beyond the (]lina-donlinated
ASEAN +3 fran1ework to include the United States, Japan, South Korea,
Australia, New Zealand, India, and Russia in the AI)NII'vl-Plus
ASEAN also included India, Australia, and Ne\\' Zealand in the inaugural
EAS and later enlarged the EAS to include the United States and Russia.
The Impact of Southeast Asia's Relations
with China and India on the United States
This section considers the inlpact of gro\\'ing
with China and India on U.S. interests in the region. As descrihed earlier
in the chapter, U.S. policies toward Southeast are deri\'ative of a larger
global fralne\vork that seeks to n1aintain a "just and sustainahle international
order" pren1ised on a rules-based systen1 of representati\'c and
international organizations in order to pron10te free trade and the of
hlunan rights, religious freedon1, and den10cracy.- I Such policies arc also
set within the context of a broader approach to the Asia-Pacific region.
exan1ple, the United States pursues its glohal objecth'es regionally through
supporting Inultilateral institutions such as the Econonl1c
Cooperation (APEC), the Trans- Pacifi.c Partnership (TPP), and the LAS. In
Southeast Asia, the Obalna adn1inistration has given priority to developing
a stronger relationship with ASEAN, re-engaging \vith the ARE and
beC0111ing a charter n1enlber of the ADMIvl- Plus
The U.S. alliance systen1 underpins regional in both the
Pacific and Southeast Asia. As the 2010 L'.S. I'\ational Security Strategy
n1akes clear, "alliances \vith Japan, South Korea, Australia, the
and Thailand are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation of
prosperity in the Asia-Pacifi.c The ()balna adnlinistration
stressed the in1portance of \vorking \vith elnerging po\\'crs,
partners (Singapore), potential strategic partners (Indonesia, and
I ";\Jcltiol1cll Sccurity 01tlL'c of tlw Pre"idellt of tlw l'l1Ikd "'LitL''', \ Icl: .20] (), \.2,
Ibid., -12.
330 2011-12
\TietnaI11), and the region's I11ultilateral architecture to 111aintain a security
en\'irOnIllent conduci\'e to econoInic development. In addition, the U.S.
Security Strategy underscores the inlportance of bilateral relations
\\'ith China, India, and Russia as Hcritical to building broader cooperation
on of n1utual such as pronl0ting trade and investnlent and
countering \'iolent extrel11isln and nuclear proliferation.
Ecollonzic [nzpelcf
China has displaced the United States as ASEAN's largest trading
partner. In 2009, t\\'o-\vay trade bet\veen ASEAN and China was valued at
S17R billion, or 11.6
Q
oof total trade (see Table A2 in the The
LTnited States ranked fourth, after the EU-27 and Japan, at $150 billion, or
of total t\\'o-\\'ay trade, \\'hile India ranked eighth at $39 billion, or
1.6();() of t\vo-\vay trade. According to the ASEAN Statistics [)atabase
for 200L}-1 0, China enjoyed a surplus of $22 billion with ASEAN, over three
tin1es India's of 57 billion.
I'rade tlgures for individual countries reveal that only four of ASEAN's
ten Illelnbers are Illajor players (see Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix). In
ten11S of total t\vo-\\'ay trade, Singapore tops the list, followed by Indonesia,
and 'nlailand. In terrns of bilateral trade with China and India,
Singapore is like\vise the leading iIllporter and exporter. Malaysia and
'Ihailand are the next-largest ASEAN trade partners with China, while
.vlalaysia and Indonesia are the second- and third-largest trade partners
\\'ith India. \Tietnan1 has displaced Indonesia to becoIne the fourth-largest
AStAN destination for Chinese goods, and 11lailand ranks fourth in trade
\vith India in tenllS of both inlports and exports.
not only buys prin1ary conlnl0dities and natural resources,
particularly oil and gas, fron1 the ASEAN states but also buys electronic
parts and conlponents. 'The cOLlntry's econonlic rise has also altered the
region's political econonl)', given that Southeast Asian states manufacture
parts and con1ponents that are shipped and assen1bled in China prior to
export abroad. In other words, ASEAN states are both dependent on and
subordinated in a production net\vork that feeds China's export-orientated
n1anufacturing industries.
'I he United States has pronl0ted free trade primarily through APEC,
but progress stalled as countries failed to nleet COInnlitInents agreed to at
"'\,ltlor"l,d Ottll'l' of the of the United 1\la)' 2010, ,D.
I :\ondhl'k"", 1ll\'e"tl11l'nt 111 ,\"itl continue" to CUl11uLltive
l'.\. direct ill\'l'''tnh.'nt 111 for 2(}()(}-20()H totaled billion, cOl11pared to a total of
"'::1.1 bJllion In ChIJlC"l' direct in\'l,,,tn1l'nt for tl1l' period. ASEAN Stllti,\tiL"a! rcarllook 1008
(1,1",lrL1: '\ \l'crd,lrl,lt, 2()()l}), 1,+,!, pdf.
the 1994 Bogor sun1mlt held in Indonesia.
launched the Enterprise for ASEAN Init
agreements bet\veen the United States ar
Singapore quickly canle on board, but F'
have foundered. The Obanla administr;
a regional approach through the TPP, a r
According to U.S. Trade Representative
element for "unlocking the Asia- Pacific
United States has entered into negotiatiol
New Zealand, Brunei, and Chile to crea
providing greater nlarket access and i5
and Vietnam to join these efforts. There
ASEAN- U.S. FTA, and the TPP is unlikel)
handful of Southeast Asian states.
U.S. interests in Southeast Asia are
United States' lopsided economic relations}
U.S. debt, and the LT.S. -induced global finar
adInit, Washington's authority to promot
growth has been severely dinlinished.
2h
In a
approach to aid has opportunistically taker
states rankle over the conditions attached tl
It is also worth noting that China's (
Mekong River to provide electricity for tr
potentially serious consequences for the
states. There are t\VO n1ajor bodies that pi
the Mekong River ConlInission and t]
development project funded by the As
central Chinese governnlent is not reI
The Obanla adnlinistration has sought t<
Southeast Asian states over this issue
Initiative to pronl0te environmental,
developnlent. Secretary of State Hillary (
foreign Ininisters of Thailand, Laos, C,
developInent projects.
2-; 1\LlCkenzie C. Babb, "LT.S. Progress on 1
lnform,ltion c.s. Department of State, j
2(' Carlyle A. Clhayer, "I\Llritime Strategic O\"ef\'iew 0
SC(ll'rc f(J/" All: Intcrlwtio1Ul! .\Ilritimc Securi
Select ing in with Republic of S
2- China a dialogue p<utner of the Rive
on the Greater .\lekong Subregion Ecor
and the GU<lI1gxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.
....
aq
eral architecture to n1aintain a security
lic de\Telopment. In addition, the u.s.
Ires the importance of bilateral relations
ritical to building broader cooperation
1S promoting trade and investn1ent and
uclear proliferation.
ed States as ASEAN's largest trading
\veen ASEAN and China \vas valued at
(see Table A2 in the The
1e ED-27 and Japan, at $150 billion, or
India ranked eighth at $39 billion, or
o the ASEAN Trade Statistics Database
s of $22 billion with ASEAN, over three
ntries reveal that only four of ASEAN's
Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix). In
ore tops the list, followed by Indonesia,
f bilateral trade \vith China and India,
importer and exporter. Malaysia and
'\N trade partners with China, while
:ond- and third-largest trade partners
ndonesia to beconle the fourth -largest
Ids, and 111ailand ranks fourth in trade
and exports.
comn10dities and natural resources,
states but also buys electronic
y's economic rise has also altered the
at Southeast Asian states manufacture
'ped and asseinbled in China prior to
AN states are both dependent on and
rk that feeds China's export -orientated
d free trade primarily through APEC,
ed to meet conlInitlnents agreed to at
ident of the l'nited f\Iay 20 I0, -13.
to investment. Cumulative
)0-2008 totaled S3-t8 billion, compclred to a total of
e same period. See ASEA,\J Stlltisti({11 Ycarhook 200S
/\\\\'\\-.asean.orgl publ a5,eanstats08. pdf
the 1994 Bogor SUInn1it held in Indonesia. In 2002 the adnlinistration
launched the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative to bilateral trade
agreeinents between the United States and individual nlenlber
Singapore quickly canle on board, but F"fAs \vith '] hailand and Iv1alaysia
have foundered. The Oban1a adn1inistration subsequently adopted
a regional approach through the TPP, a nlultilateral FTA fOrIned in 2006.
According to U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, the TPP is a critical
elen1ent for "unlocking the Asia- Pacific region to LT.S. '1 he
United States has entered into negotiations \\Tith TPP nlenlbers Singapore,
New Zealand, Brunei, and Chile to create an expanded trade agreenlent
providing greater n1arket access and is strongly encouraging Ivlalaysia
and Vietnan1 to join these efforts. There are no prospects, ho\\'C\'er, for an
ASEAN-U.S. FTA, and the TPP is unlikely to expand to include nlore than a
handful of Southeast Asian states.
U.S. interests in Southeast Asia are Inore seriously challenged by the
United States' lopsided econonlic relationship \vith especially regarding
U.S. debt, and the U.S.-induced global financial crisis. As senior officials readily
admit, Washington's authority to pronlote good governance and econon1ic
growth has been severely din1inished..2h In addition, no-strings-attached
approach to aid has opportunistically taken advantage of situations \\,here local
states rankle over the conditions attached to U.S. assistance progranls.
It is also worth noting that China's construction of dains on the upper
Mekong River to provide electricity for the country's southern provinces
potentially serious consequences for the econonlic \Tiability of do\\'nstreanl
states. There are two Inajor bodies that pron10te responsible de\'elopnlent
the Mekong River Comn1ission and the Greater l\lekong Subregion (a
development project funded by the Asian Developn1ent Bank)-but the
central Chinese governinent is not represented in either organization. ,
The Oban1a adlninistration has sought to address the concerns of n1ainland
Southeast Asian states over this issue by launching the Lc)\ver Mekong
Initiative to pron10te environinentaL educational, and infrastructural
development. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Inet four tinles \vith the
foreign ministers of TIlailand, Laos, Can1bodia, and Vietnan1 to advance
development projects.
2:'- I'vlackenzie C. Babb, "U.S. on Pcll-ihL' 1rcllk," Burcau of I\1tl'rnatlo\1,ll
Informatio\1 U.S. Department of State, April 6, 2() IO.
2() Carlyle A. 'Ihayer, "I'vlaritime Strategic O\-en'iew oftl1l' ,.\"ia-P,llitic 1\1 Re(//I..;;ilJp, dll(1
Secure Seas !()f' All: lJItcnllltiOlllll ;\]lritilllc Securit)' cd. [O .... I1LI,l [10
Select in with Republic of Singapore a\1d 2()()9), 26.
2- China a dialogue partner of the f\lekong River COll1mi".... io\1 hut not ,l jorm,l! \11l'mhcr It \....
on the (;reater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperatlo\1 Progrclm by YUl111clll Prm'I\1\:l'
and the C;llangxi Zhuang Region.
?l32 Strategil 2011-12
India's gr()\ving econOI11ic engagen1ent with Southeast Asia, although
still chvarfed by China's, is conlplinlentary rather than conlpetitive with
U.S. interests and has created a ne\v nlarket for Southeast Asian goods and
investnlcnt. rurthern10re, \vith projections indicating that India will have
the \vorld's third-largest ('conon11' by 2025, the country's econon1ic presence
in Southeast Asia can be expected to increase vis-a-vis China..2S
Political-Security Inlpact
'has atteI11pted to otfset U.S. political and security int1uence in
Asia by pron10ting exclusive arrangenlents with East Asia, such
as the ASEAi\ +3 sun1n1it process. China has been proactive in pushing the
+3 to institutionalize defense cooperation and n1ilitary exchanges
aI110ng its n1en1bers, \\'ith a particular focus on nontraditional security
l1
issues..2 'I hese etforts to pronlote East Asian exclusivisn1 resulted in
disagreeI11ent al110ng Southeast Asian states. Malaysia favored retaining the
+3 as the 111ain \Tehicle for regional econon1ic integration, \vhereas
Singapore and Indonesia developing n10re inclusive ll1ultilateral
arrangcl11ents such as the tAS. The latter countries successfully pronl0ted
India as a founding l11en1ber in 2005 and added the United States and Russia
as n1el11 bel'S h\Te years later.
China also en1ploys both Illultilateral and bilateral n1echanisITIS to
enl11esh states in a \veb of security cooperation. By depreciating
arrangel11ents that focus on conventional or traditional security issues
in of nontraditional security issues, China plays into ASEAN's
predilection to give priority to transnational security threats. In 2002, for
exan1ple, and issued a Joint I)eclaration on Cooperation
in the Field of :\on-Traditional Security Issues, and in 2009 ASEAN
upgraded its '\Iinisterial i\Ieeting on Transnational Crin1e to include China
as a full participant. Like\\'ise, China has used its n1elnbership in the ARF
to prol11ote dialogue, conhdence-building n1easures, and n1ultipolarity,
particularly to address nontraditional security issues such as hUl11anitarian
assistance and clisaster relief, in contrast to unnan1ed powers that Beijing
alleges practice hegel11onisI11, bullying, and gunboat diplon1acy. ,() In
2002, ASEAN responded to pressure fronl the Bush adn1inistration to
prioritize the global \\Tar on tt'rrorisn1 and pressure fron1 Beijing to address
, IZolwrt 0, I roO 11.''>11111011> hl'l nrc till' I lOll "c r\ tLir" COI11I11 i t tee, ))lll"lllttee Oil the
\llddk Lht lind ,",uuth \"I,l. \\',hhll1gtO!1, [),( ., .\pril.:=i, 2011
I ),l\ Id \Ll"l', '\O!1- ll,ldlt\(lllcll "L'lllnty III Chi!1cl r\SFr\;...' COOPl'r,lti()!1: 'Ihe
(l! ,ll1d till' 1\()!ution of Ll"t Rcgio!1,1Ii"m:' ,\SiUII SlIITL'Y ':=;0,
110. l ( luI>! .\ugu"t .2() I () I:
h ('!lII1l'''l' Il,ll1g ICllllIl III Itll1gKOK, ,h reported by \.inllLltl, St'pkmbcr 3, ll)l)ly'
nontraditional security issues by bracketi
the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on COUI
Crinle. But China's proposal of a region,
the ARF was left on the table by ASEAN
atten1pt to undennine U.S. engagement in
In contrast, India's political and seCl
Asian states, particularly Indonesia, Viet]
conlplilTIented rather than conflicted w
India supports the HEyes in the Sky" prog
Malacca Strait, and an increasing numbel
participate in the Milan exercise hosted b'
also offers valuable capacity-building by 1
professional nlilitary education and traini
In sun1, Southeast Asian states seek tc
in ASEAN -centric n1ultilateral institutio]
and EAS in order to nl0derate their ri'
regional security. To do this, ASEAN stat
strategies-soft -balancing, the pr0I110
econonlic interdependence \vith China a
successful in integrating China into tl
India's integration is still at the fonnati'
assertiveness in the South China Sea has
soft-balancing Ineasures to l110derate Bl
the organization have also encouraged b
playa greater role in the region to offset l
Southeast Asian States betweel
This section revie\vs the interaction
\vith China and India, considering the c
littoral and Inaritin1e states.
Myannlar
Tvlyann1ar shares land borders '''ith
a cockpit of geostrategic rivalry betwe
intervened \vhen Tvlyanlllar ,vas slappe(
repressing the pro-den10cracy lnoverr
pro\'ided the State La\\' and Order R<
'1 C,lrlyk A.I h,1H'r. Souf/lcc/sf :1.'i(/: Pattt'nl.5 of
(( Strategic Policy Institute, 20]

l
ement \vith Southeast Asia, although
lentary rather than conlpetitive \vith
narket for Southeast Asian goods and
ctions indicating that India will have
the country's econonlic presence
ncrease vis-a-vis China.
r.s. political and security influence in
ve arrangelnents \vith East Asia, such
lina has been proactive in pushing the
e cooperation and n1ilitary exchanges
lIar focus on nontraditional security
East Asian exclusivisln resulted in
l states. Malaysia favored retaining the
'gional econonlic integration, \vhereas
nlore inclusive lTIultilateral
atter countries successfully pronl0ted
,nd added the United States and Russia
ilateral anJ bilateral n1echanislTIs to
security cooperation. By depreciating
1tional or traditional security issues
, issues, China plays into ASEAN's
national security threats. In 2002, for
a Joint Declaration on Cooperation
Issues, and in 2009 ASEAN
Transnational Crinle to include China
has used its nlenlbership in the ARF
uilding measures, and multipolarity,
.1 security issues such as hun1anitarian
trast to unnamed powers that Beijing
ying, and gunboat diplonlacy. 'll In
.re from the Bush adnlinistration to
1 and pressure fronl Beijing to address
,e )ubcol11l11ittee on the
.,April\2Ull
1ina-ASL-\:\ Cooperation: 'Ihe
lution of Sur\'cy 50,
angkoL ,b by Xinhu<l, 3, 1l)l)l).
Iha\'cr - l3.J,
nontraditional security issues by bracketing both concerns and setting up
the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorisnl and Transnational
Crin1e. But China's proposal of a regional security treaty for adoption by
the ARF was left on the table by ASEAN 111el11bers \vho perceived it as an
attenlpt to undernline U.S. engagenlent in Southeast Asia. '
In contrast, India's political and security engagel11ent \\'ith Southeast
Asian states, particularly Indonesia, Vietnanl, 'nlailand, and Nlalaysia,
conlplinlented rather than conflicted \vith U.S. interests and priorities.
India supports the "Eyes in the Sky" progran1 of the littoral states along the
Malacca Strait, and an increasing nUlnber of regional na\'ies haye begun to
participate in the Milan exercise hosted by India in the Andanlan Sea. India
also offers valuable capacity-building by hosting Southeast Asian oft1cers in
professional nlilitary education and training progran1s.
In sunl, Southeast Asian states seek to enn1esh all nlajor external PO\\'lTS
in ASEAN-centric nlultilateral institutions such as the
and EAS in order to nl0derate their rivalry and reduce their il11pact on
regional security. To do this, ASEAN states have pursued three interrelated
strategies-soft-balancing, the pronl0tion of ASEA:\ nornlS, and
econoll1ic interdependence with China and India. has been largely
successful in integrating China into the regional architecture, \\'hereas
India's integration is still at the fornlative stage. Ho\\'eyer, recent nese
assertiveness in the South China Sea has led to pron10te additional
soft-balancing n1easures to nl0derate Beijing's behayior. Key 111enlbers of
the organization have also encouraged both India and the United to
playa greater role in the region to Chinese assertiYeness.
Southeast Asian States between China and India
This section reviews the interaction of f()llr key Southeast Asian
\vith China and India, considering the continental first and then the
littoral and nlaritinle states.
Myanrn(lf
Ivlyann1ar shares land borders \vith China and India and has becon1c
a cockpit of geostrategic rivalry bet\veen thel11. China opportunistically
intervened when Myann1ar \vas slapped \\"ith sanctions by the \\Test after
repressing the pro-del11ocracy lTIOVenlents in and lLJLJO. Ha\"ing
provided the State La\v and Order Restoration (:ouncil (SLC) \\"ith
"I Carh'lc A 'J hd\TL Asil: ul ,\t't lint I' ( t)tl/lt'} dl}tlll \ "PI \trlltq!: Rq1()rt
Au"t;-ali<ll1 Pnlicy In"tituk, 201 ()), 22,
2011-12
nearly 52 billion in nlilitary assistance, Beijing gained access to signals
intelligence fronl posts n10nitoring naval n10ven1ents in the Indian
()ccan. CJ1ina is presently the n10st ilnportant source of trade, investnlent,
and de\'elopn1ent assistance to Nlyanlnar. In particular, the PRC has focused
on building energy and transportation infrastructure-roads, rail, and gas
link southern China \vith ports on the Indian Ocean. TIle
:\ational Petroleunl Corporation (CNPC) is exploring for oil in
\\'aters otf Rakhine State \\'ell as constructing a pipeline to link the port
in Kyaukpyu to the to\\'n of '\luse on the border. In addition, in April 2011,
and Nlyann1ar signed a n1en10randunl of understanding (MOU) to
jointly construct a raih\'ay parallel to the pipeline.
India initially sided \vith the international con1n1unity in condelnning
.\lyann1ar hut soon reyersed policy in response to growing Chinese influence
in the country. '.' India's look east policy \vas initially ailned at cultivating
\l)'anlnar as a land bridge to the lnarkets of Southeast Asia. Later, however,
India to OyerCOlne endelnic insurgency in its northeast states fron1
hased in by eliciting the cooperation of the SLORC and
its the State Peace and l)evelopnlent Council (SPDC). India's
counterinsurgency strategy also included road-building projects to link its
northeast to 1\ 1yannlar and 'nlailand. ;,
India is one of .\lyanl11ar's largest trade partners, with the balance of
trade five to one in .\lyann1ar's favor (see Table A 1 in the Appendix), and in
June 2010 the t\\'o countries reached a trade agreenlent that slashed inlport
duties on a large nun1ber of goods. Trade is concentrated in three n1ain
sectors: hydrocarbons, phan11aceuticals, and beans and pulses. India, \vhich
is not self-sufficient in energy, has prioritized investing in Myann1ar's oil
and gas sectors. ()T'\(;C \Tidesh Lin1ited, for exan1ple, is exploring blocks off
Sitt\\T in Arakan State.
interaction \vith 7\lyanl11ar has led to the n1igration of Chinese
husinesslnen into northern 1\lyann1ar, where they donlinate cross-border
trade. Beijing an in n1aintaining a peaceful border and supported
the quo \\'hen the negotiated ceasefire agreen1ents \vith ethnic
lninority groups and their arn1ed forces. However, China found itself in a
dilcnlnla in 200Y \\'hen thl' SPl)C n10ved to incorporate ethnic n1inority
forces into the national anny prior to the 2010 elections. When fighting
hroke out after the gOyernlnent n10ved against the Kokang ethnic Ininority,
30,000 people fled into (:11il1a's Yunnan Province, tenlporarily straining
lZl'luud I grdl',lLl, "lllliIJ'" \mhlt It Ill" III A.\lllll SIIlTt',I' -is, no. 6 (:-.Jon?l11Iwr -I )e(emher
.2()()SJ: L)3h
1)oml11k J. \:,lrdl, "( :ro",,Bordl.T (:h,lO": .\ (:ritiqul' of IndLl'-. Attel11pb to Ih Tribal
\ r\.\h through COOr'l.TJt lOll \\ ith \ h',1I1l11,lr" ,,, -\ II) Rl'l'it'lt' 2S, no. 1 (\\'interSpring 2()()S): 161 71
relations bet\veen the t\VO countries.-'-t
nlilitary forces and closing the border.
of the Chinese People's Political Consu
inlnlediately after the 2010 elections and
Sein to Beijing in !Viay 2011 signaled that
Thailand
Thailand is a treaty ally of the Un
multilateral nli1itary exercise in the \vorl
the first Southeast Asian state to sign a 1
agreenlent \vith China in 1999. This agr
that has led to the gradual development I
naval port visits, nlilitary officer exchan!
exercises by special forces, lin1ited ant
dialogue. TIle election of Thaksin Shind
resulted in the developnlent of close ec(
Bangkok and Beijing. Thaksin \vas parti
l
Thailand's agricultural sector and repea'
Chinese n1arket.
TIlailand has son1etin1es acted equivo
Thaksin governlnent did not in1mediately
Although later, after a change in Thai p(
Thailand a n1ajor non-NATO ally. Washin
in 2006 \vhen the Thai n1ilitary seized PO\\
in with its own nlilitary assistance pack
with Ivlyannlar, Laos, and Canlbodia) ref
lnen1bers and the United States in raisin
seventeenth ARF nleeting.
Thailand shares a nlaritinle border wi
about nlaritinle security. Both navies con
patrols in the approaches to the Strait of
Myanlnar are signatories to the Tripartit<
2003, India and Thailand signed their firs
alongside several M0 Us covering coop<
agriculture, and intelligence-sharing on
offered to assist Thailand in the developl
encouraging TIlai investlnent in India's n
the construction of a high\\Tay linking
q \h'anl11eU Strateg\': Elections, Ethnic Politil
Brietll'lg, no. 112, Sei1'tl'l11her .2 L 2010,2-.3.
.....
:e, Beijing gained access to signals
Dring naVailTIOVen1ents in the Indian
lportant source of trade, investn1ent,
1r. In particular, the PRC has focused
l infrastructure- roads, rail, and gas
rith ports on the Indian Ocean. The
on (CNPC) is exploring for oil in
lstructing a pipeline to link the port
1e border. In addition, in April 2011,
'andun1 of understanding (MOU) to
1e pipeline.
'national COn1lTIUnity in conden1ning
esponse to gro\ving Chinese influence
lCy \\'as initially ailned at cultivating
.ets of Southeast Asia. Later, however,
surgency in its northeast states fron1
the cooperation of the SLORC and
Council (SPDC). India's
ded road-building projects to link its
,t trade partners, \vith the balance of
see Table A1 in the Appendix), and in
1 trade agreen1ent that slashed in1port
Trade is concentrated in three main
.Is, and beans and pulses. India, \,yhieh
rioritized investing in Myan111ar's oil
for exan1ple, is exploring blocks off
lr has led to the n1igration of Chinese
Lr, \\There they don1inate cross-border
lining a peaceful border and supported
iated ceasefire agreen1ents with ethnic
ces. Ho\vever, China found itself in a
l1o\Ted to incorporate ethnic n1inority
to the 2010 elections. When fighting
against the Kokang ethnic n1inority,
nnan Province, ten1porarily straining
que Attt'l11ph to Secure Ib Tribal
IS RenCH' no. 1 200H): 161 -71
'1 haycr - 33)
relations between the two countries. q China responded by Illobilizing
lnilitary forces and closing the border. Visits by ]ia (Jinglin, chainnan
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, to ;V1vanlnar
il11Inediately after the 2010 elections and by ne\\'l) elected presiden't '1 hein
Sein to Beijing in May 2011 signaled that relations had returned to norn1al.
Thailand
ll1ailand is a treaty ally of the United States and the
n1ultilateral n1ilitary exercise in the \vorld, Cobra (;old. 'I hailand
the first Southeast Asian state to sign a long-tern1 coopcrat ion fran1e\\'ork
agreen1ent \vith China in 1999. This agreen1ent included a clause
that has led to the gradual developn1ent of n1ilitar\
,t
cooneration, includin
b
o
navaI port vi sit S, 111 iii tary 0 tfi cer excha11 ges, j 0 int pat rob, Inall- scaIe j0 int
exercises by special forces, lin1ited anns sales, and an annual
dialogue. ll1e election of Thaksi11 Shi11c1\\'atra as prin1c Ininister in 2()0 I
resulted in the developlnent of close econOlllic and political ties bet\\'een
and Thaksin was particularly concerned \\'ith protecting
ThaIland s agncultural sector and repeatedly sought special to the
Chinese 111arket.
Thailand has son1etin1es acted equivocally as a L'.S. ally. for exalnple, the
Thaksin governn1ent did not in1n1ediately support the global \\'ar on
Although later, after a change in Thai policy, the States designated
Thailand a n1ajor non-NATO ally. Washington suspended n1ilitarv assistance
in 2006 the '1 hai military seized power. China opport un stepped
In. WIth Its own n1ilitary assistance package, and in 2010 '1 hailand (along
WIth 1\I1yann1ar, Laos, and Calnbodia) refrained fron1 joining other ASl-'JAr\
Inen1bers and the United States in raising the South C=hina Sea issue at the
seventeenth ARF n1eeting.
ll1ailand shares a n1aritin1e border \,yith India as \\'ell as con\'ergent \'ie\\'s
about n1aritin1e security. Both navies conduct joint and coordinate
patrols in the approaches to the Strait of and India, 'I hailalid, and
Myann1ar are signatories to the Tripartite 1\Ilariti n1e Agreen1ent. In ()ctober
2003, India and Thailand signed their first fran1C\\'ork agreen1ent for an fTA.
aloI.1gside several MOUs covering cooperation in tourisn1, biotechnology,
agnculture, and intelligence-sharing on :-.Je\\' I)elhi
offered to assist Thailand in the developlnent of nuclear energy, along \\'ith
encouraging ll1ai investlnent in India's north\\'est pro\'inces and prolnoting
the construction of a high\,yay linking the t\VO countries \'ia
; I 1\,lyallm,u Strategy: nhnic Politic" ,1l1d Il0I11 1111 ]l""" I I1krn,lt]OI1,l] (.n..,].., (;rl lUI"',
BncllI1g, no. I 12, September 21, 20 I 0, 2 -3.
330 St ratcgiL' 2011-12
In 2010, Indian in\'estlnents in 1hailand stood at $1.5 billion, while Thai
investnlents in India totaled 5800 nlillion. During Prinle Minister Abhisit
\lejjaji\'a's state \'isit to India in April 2011, the tvvo sides agreed to step up
negotiations to conclude an agreelnent on goods, services, and investlnents,
as \\'ell as to initiate a nlinisterial-level defense dialogue and consider
cooperating on antipiracy and defense technology.
\rietll(Ull
LTntil the end of the (:old \Var, India's close political relations with
\'ietnanl \\'ere ah\'ays overshado\\'ed by Soviet -Vietnanlese relations. But
the collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced the conlnlonality of strategic
interests bet\\'cen Hanoi and Ne\v [)elhi, particularly vis-a-vis China, and
pro\'ided India \vith the opportunity to develop relations with Vietnanl as
part of its look east policy. [)efense cooperation has played a central role
in the bilateral reLltionship due to India's considerable experience with
producing and Inai ntaini ng Soviet - equipnlent. ,-, 1he first
protocol on cooperation \vas signed in Septenlber 1994, and this
later upgraded into a Inore fornlal defense cooperation agreenlent
(I)(:A) in (vlarch 2000 during the first visit by an Indian defense nlinister to
\'ietnan1. Under the ternlS of the I)C=A, India agreed to assist Vietnanl \vith
upgrading its fl eet 0 f Ii -21 aircraft and nava1\varships (frigat esand t
attack craft), help train the \rietnanlese nlilitary, and enhance cooperation
bet\\'Ccn the t\\'O states) national defense industries. In 2005, Vietnanl and
India initiated an annual dialogue at the senior level.
'Ihe year 2007 111arked a nlajor turning point in relations bet\veen
the t\\'O countries. In Vietnanl and India raised their bilateral
relationship to a strategic partnership, and in I)ecenlber they stepped up
cooperation as a result of [)efense Nlinister A.K. Antony)s trip to
\'ietnanl. India subsequently pro\'ided Vietnanl \vith a nlassive anlount of
parts to keep its -era fleet operationaL including nlodernizing
the nl ilitary)s anti ne \\'arLlre capabilities. India has also expanded
professional nlilitary edUl'ation and training progranls for Vietnalnese
and Indian Na\'y ships regularly call at Vietnanlese
I)efense r\.ntony returned to Vietnanl in ()ctober 2010 to
fu rtheI' con 0 lidate dl' fe n L' ties.
is clear fronl the le\'el of defense cooperat ion, India and Vietnanl
ha\'e (on\'ergent interests, not the least of \vhich is to lnaxinlize
their 1'00111 for 111aneU\'CT i 11 dl'al il1g \vith China and other Inajor po\vers.
P,lllkell k IheL Il1dlel-\'ldll,1111 "'l'l,L1 !ll/" Ll1hcll1(t'd cO()pl'rcltiol1," ,\triltcglL l!li/fr,,,;/,,,; 32,
11\) hi \()\,'l11h,'r ]llK') L)C)
India's relations with Vietnanl, as \vith otn
a basis for a larger Indian role in East As
enhance Hanoi's drive to avoid dependt
Both share nlutual benefits in the defenst
equipment, and spare parts enhances V
armed forces while avoiding conlplete de]
By contrast, Vietnalll)s franle\Vork for
with China is one of "cooperation and st
this context, cooperation refers to the e
for nlutual benefiC whereas struggle refe
Chinese po\ver and influence ilnpinges
Vietnaln and China nornlalized relati
decade of estrangenlent it \vas not until
Conlnlunist parties and states codifiec
cooperative franlework agreements. The
high-level visits by party and governme
heads of governnlent, and defense minis
developed a dense net\vork of bilateral
joint steering conlnlittee headed by dep
nlenl bers of their respective ruling pol:
in negotiating a treaty on their land bo
Tonkin, where they have set up a joint fi
regularly conduct joint patrols and searc
People's Liberation ArnlY Navy (PLA1\
Vietnanlese ports, \vhile Vietnanl has m<
The major point of friction betwee
conlpeting clainls in the South China Sea
ilnposed an annual fishing ban during
fishing season. Vietnalnese vessels a
(with loss of their catch, valuable nav
equiplnent), and even sunk. In 2010,
and South Sea Fleets conducted joint e
Philippines, in one instance entering tn
aid of a fisheries adnlinistration vessel bl
Having failed to nl0derate such ben
and diplonlacy, Vietnanl has initiate
1110dernization, including the acquisit
Su-30 nlultirole jets, both equipped ToN
announced it \,yill procure six conven
'i) Cclrlyle A..[hayer, "\ 'ietn,ll11 cll1d Rising China: The
2010, ed. Daliit Singh (Singapo

d stood at $1.5 billion, \vhile Thai
Dn. During Prillle Abhisit
Ill, the t\VO sides agreed to step up
)n goods, services, and investn1ents,
'el defense dialogue and consider

1dia's close political relations with
y Soviet-Vietnan1ese relations. But
)rced the con1nl0nality of strategic
li, particularly vis-a-vis China, and
develop relations with Vietnanl as
operation has played a central role
dia's considerable experience \vith
lnufactured equipnlent.;' The hrst
igned in Septenlber 1994, and this
tal defense cooperation agreelTIent
isit by an Indian defense minister to
India aareed to assist Vietnan1 \vith
v _
nd naval \\Tarships (frigates and fast
) military, and enhance cooperation
;e industries. In 2005, Vietnanl and
gue at the senior level.
point in relations bet\veen
lam and India raised their bilateral
dnd in Decenlber they stepped up
ense l\:linister A.K. Antony's trip to
Vietnanl \vith a Inassive alTIOunt of
operational, including nl0dernizing
:apabilities. India has also expanded
training progran1s for Vietnanlese
ships regularly call at Vietnan1ese
ned to Vietnanl in October 2010 to
1se cooperation, India and Vietnan1
It the least of \\'hich is to nlaxin1ize
\Tith China and other nlajor powers.
India's relations with Vietnanl, as \vith other Southeast Asian states, provide
a basis for a larger Indian role in East Asia. Vietnaill's relations \\'ith India
enhance Hanoi's drive to avoid dependency on anyone external po\\'er.
Both share nlutual benefits in the defense relationship. India's sale of anns,
equipnlent, and spare parts enhances Vietnanl's ahility to nl0dernizt' its
arn1ed forces while avoiding conlplete dependency on Russia.
By contrast, VietnalTI's fralllework for its hugely asynl111etric relationship
with China is one of "cooperation and struggle" (doi tac 1'a doi [[{01lg). 'I' In
this context, cooperation refers to the enhancelllent of bilateral relations
for nlutual benefit, whereas struggle refers to resistance \\,hen
Chinese po\ver and influence ilnpinges on national interests. Although
Vietnanl and China nornlalized relations in 1<)<) 1 after nl0re than a
decade of estrangenlent, it \vas not until 1999 and 20UO that the t\\'O ruling
Conlnlunist parties and states codified their relationship in long-ternl
cooperative franlework agreenlents. These agreenlcnts proYidc for regular
high-level visits by party and governnlent officials, including party
heads of governnlent, and defense Ininisters, Vietnanl and China haye
developed a dense network of bilateral relations that is coordinated by a
joint steering conl1nittee headed by deputy priIne nlinisters (\\'ho are abo
111enlbers of their respective ruling politburos). rIlle t\\'O sides succcedcd
in negotiating a treaty on their land border and denlarcating the (iulf of
Tonkin, \vhere they have set up a joint fishery. Additionally, the t\\'O na\'ies
regularly conduct joint patrols and search and rescue exercises. Since
People's Liberation ArnlY Navy (PLAN) v\'arships ha\'e begun to call at
VietnalTIeSe ports, while Vietnanl has 111ade t\\TO port \'isits to (Jlina.
The Inajor point of friction between Vietnanl and China in their
conlpeting clainls in the South China Sea. Since 200R, China has aggressively
inlposed an annual fishing ban during the height of \'ietnaln's traditional
fishing season. Vietnalnese vessels are chased, ranlnled, inlpounded
(with loss of their catch, valuable navigation aids, and
equiplnent), and even sunk. In 2010, elenlents of China's I\orth, East,
and South Sea Fleets conducted joint exercises bet\\'ccl1 ()kina\\'a and the
Philippines, in one instance entering the South Ch ina Sea to C0111C to the
aid of a fisheries adll1i nistration vessel besieged by \'ictnalllese hshing craft.
Having failed to Inoderate such behavior through high-Ie\'el sunl111itry
and diplon1acy, Vietnanl has initiated a robust progranl of nlilitary
n10dernization, including the acquisition of Gepard-class frigates and
Su-30 lTIultirole jets, both equipped with antiship nlissiles, and has also
announced it will procure six conventional Kilo-class sublllarines froln
;1' Cdr!'dc A, 'Ihdycf, "\'idnam ,1l1d Chin,l: 'lhe Ihn,IIl11L'" ()j .\ .... \'ll1ll1dn," Jil
Sout/ICt/st Asim; AJfllirs 20 jO, ed. Daliit (Singapore: In"titutL' oj .... t .\ .... i,\!1 2() 1()), 'Wh.
J3X Strategic 2011-12
Russia. \!ietnanl has also reached out to other states to help balance tensions
in its relationship \vith China. In 2010, Vietnanl successfully leveraged
its position as Chair of ASEAN to internationalize the South China Sea
issue at the seventeenth ARF Jlleeting and at the inaugural nleeting of the
Al)MNI-Plus. The net result has been the revival of Illultilateral discussions
bet\\'('en ASEAN and China in their Joint Working Group to Implement the
I)eclaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Likewise,
Vietnalll and India reaftlrnled their strategic partnership in October 2010
\vhen President IVlanl1l0han Singh visited Hanoi. Vietnam has also signaled
that it is ready to step up the pace of defense cooperation with the United
States and has offered the of Cam Ranh Bay to all navies.
Another irritant in bilateral relations with China is the trade
illlbalance bet\veen the t\VO countries. The trade relationship is heavily
ske\ved in China's favor, \vith Vietnanl's deficit reaching $13 billion in
2010. 'Ihis contrasts \vith Vietnaill's surplus of nearly $9 billion with
the United States. Chinese investment in the country is quite low when
cOlllpared \vith that of other external powers. Hanoi has repeatedly raised
the issue of its trade i111balance in high-level discussions with China's
leaders and sought to offset this ilnbalance by encouraging increased
Chinese invest111ent in Vietnanl. However, such investnlent has become
a highly charged donlestic political issue due to tensions arising from
territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
Indonesia
Indonesia's relations \vith China and India have been late to develop
conlpared \vith those of other regional states. For example, although
Indonesia and China resunled full diplol11atic relations in August 1990
and India inaugurated its look east policy in 1991, it was not until 2005
that Indonesia agreed to establish separate strategic partnerships with
China and India.
1he developnlent of significant ties between Indonesia and China
after 1990 \vas hostage to three 11lain issues-the treatnlent of ethnic
in Indonesia, relations with Taiwan, and the South China Sea
addition to Indonesia's initial preference to deal with China
through 111ultilateral foruIlls such as ASEAN and the ARE The Asian
financial crisis of 1997-98 and the collapse of Suharto's New Order reginle,
ho\vever, proved a turning point. China responded to the financial crisis
by selling rice and nledicine to Indonesia, contributing $400 Inillion to IMF
Riled "!lldOllt">iel-( :hlllel Rt,Lltiolll.,: Ihe of Re-engagement," ,tsian SZOTCy -1-9, no.4
r luly i\UgU"t 2()()9): :;9 I
relief packages, and extending $200 mill
supported Indonesia in the UN over the
In October 1999, President Abdl
overseas visit to China and unsuccessfuL
partnership between China, India, ar
Megawati Sukarnoputri, responded t<
relations with Taiwan."s During this p
relations developed steadily as China bt
Indonesia and invest in palm oil, eneq
2004, China had becoille Indonesia's fiftt
China's decision to downplay the eth
with the ARE and provide prompt ass
contributed to changing Indonesian pen
viewed in Jakarta as a reliable political
reflected in April 2005 when the preside
Ba111bang Yudhoyono and Hu Jintao,
In July 2005, during the course of Pres
the two countries signed MOUs coveri
technology. By this tinle, two-way tra(
had extended Indonesia $800 million
had risen to $7.4 billion. In 2010, defe]
Indonesia purchased C-802 and C-705
nl0unting on frigates and fast patrol boa
New Delhi's look east policy II
111embership in the ARF in the mid-19
proved a catalyst for improved relatio
Indonesia began to view India as a pott
Wahid and Sukarnoputri paid visits t
respectively. In 2003, Indonesia and Ir
oversee bilateral relations, and in 2006
develop economic ties. By 2006-7, bilate
and Indian investment in Indonesia ha
of this in the oil and gas sectors off thl
imported coal now COIlles from Indone
grown to $11.7 billion. In October 201
an FTA in goods, they pledged to raise t,
Indonesia and India share a maritin
kilonleters frol11 Indira Point in the Ba
in n1aritinle security interests, Indonesl
,K Rahul i\lishra and Sari, "Indonesia-C
IDSA, IDSA bsue Brief, No\'ember 22, 2010, 1-8.
....
) other states to help balance tensions
)l 0, Vietnan1 successfully leveraged
lternationalize the South China Sea
and at the inaugural Ineeting of the
:he revival of multilateral discussions
int Working Group to Implement the
s in the South China Sea. Likewise,
rategic partnership in October 2010
ted Hanoi. Vietnam has also signaled
defense cooperation with the United
:am Ranh Bay to all navies.
elations \vith China is the trade
The trade relationship is heavily
am's deficit reaching $13 billion in
surplus of nearly $9 billion with
1t in the country is quite low when
powers. Hanoi has repeatedly raised
high-level discussions with China's
1balance by encouraging increased
wever, such investment has become
issue due to tensions arising froln
a Sea.
and India have been late to develop
)nal states. For example, although
liplomatic relations in August 1990
)olicy in 1991, it was not until 2005
,eparate strategic partnerships with
ties between Indonesia and China
lin issues-the treatment of ethnic
Tai\van, and the South China Sea
itial preference to deal with China
ASEAN and the ARE The Asian
lapse of Suharto's New Order regime,
lina responded to the financial crisis
sia, contributing $400 million to IMF
)olitics of Re-engagement," Asian Survey -19, no. 4
relief packages, and extending $200 million in export credits. Beijing also
supported Indonesia in the UN over the East Tin10r issue.
In October 1999, President Abdurrahn1an \Vahid Jl1ade his first
overseas visit to China and unsuccessfully pronloted the idea of a trilateral
partnership between China, India, and Indonesia. \lVahi(fs successor,
Megawati Sukarnoputri, responded to Chinese concerns by n1uting
relations with Tai\van. During this period, Sino- Indonesian econon1ic
relations developed steadily as China began to purchase oil and gas fron1
Indonesia and invest in paln1 oil, energy, and infrastructure projects. By
2004, China had beconle Indonesia's fifth -largest tradi ng partner.
China's decision to downplay the ethnic Chinese issue, engage positively
with the ARF, and provide pron1pt assistance after the 2004 tsunan1i all
contributed to changing Indonesian perceptions of China. Beijing \vas no\v
viewed in Jakarta as a reliable political and security partner, \vhich \vas
reflected in April 2005 when the presidents of Indonesia and China, Susilo
Balnbang Yudhoyono and Hu Jintao, agreed to a strategic partnership.
In July 2005, during the course of President Yudhoyono's visit to Beijing,
the two countries signed MOUs covering trade, investlnent, and defense
technology. By this tin1e, two-way trade had topped S17 billion,
had extended Indonesia $800 111illion in loans, and Chinese investlnent
had risen to $7.4 billion. In 2010, defense industry sources reported that
Indonesia purchased C-802 and C-705 antiship n1issiles fron1 China for
lnounting on frigates and fast patrol boats.
New Delhi's look east policy led Indonesia to support India's
Inen1bership in the ARF in the Inid-1990s. The Asian financial crisis also
proved a catalyst for inlproved relations, as an econolnically depressed
Indonesia began to view India as a potential econon1ic partner. Presidents
Wahid and Sukarnoputri paid visits to Ne\v I)elhi in 2001 and 2002,
respectively. In 2003, Indonesia and India set up a joint con1n1ission to
oversee bilateral relations, and in 2006 they adopted a plan of action to
develop economic ties. By 2006-7, bilateral trade had clilnbed to $6.2 billion
and Indian investment in Indonesia had reached S2.5 billion, \vith n1uch
of this in the oil and gas sectors off the coast of Aceh. Nearly half India's
imported coal now comes froln Indonesia. By 2009-10, bilateral trade had
grown to $11.7 billion. In October 2010, when India and Indonesia reached
an FTA in goods, they pledged to raise two-way trade to 525 billion by 2015.
Indonesia and India share a maritilne border. Aceh Province is only 162
kilon1eters from Indira Point in the Bay of Bengal. Due to a convergence
in lnaritilne security interests, Indonesia and India entered into a defense
Rahul!\lishra and Irfa Puspita Sari, Re],ltlOl1''': (,!1,llkngc" ,md ()pportuIlltll' .... ,"
JDSA, IUSA Brief, November 22,2010,1 H.
3-+0 Strategic A"ia 2011-1.2
cooperation agreenlent in 2001, Inainly involving Indian support for the
Indonesian navy. In 2004 both countries con1n1enced joint patrols in the
approaches to the Strait of Nlalacca. India's major role in tsunarr1i relief
in 2004-5 further raised its profile in Indonesia as a reliable security
partner and reinforced Jakarta's decision to support India's n1en1bership
in the inaugural EAS. The t\VO countries also have convergent interests in
countering international terrorisnl and disrupting the linkages between
extrelnist groups in Indonesia and Pakistan.
In Novenlber 2005, relations \vere raised to the level of a strategic
partnership follo\\'ing the exchange of visits between Singh and
Yudhoyono. ;l) Indonesia and India pledged to pron10te broad-based
dcveloplnent in political, security, econon1ic, C0I11nlercial, cultural, and
science and technology fields based on their shared values and con11nitlnent
to denl0cracy. '} he t\\'o sides also agreed to an annual senior-level strategic
dialogue and signed three :VI0Us. The first covered lnarine and fisheries
cooperation, the second involved training progran1s for diploI11ats, and the
third set up a joint study group to negotiate a Conlprehensive Econon1ic
C:ooperation Agreelnent. '1\\'0 years later, Indonesia and India set up a
joint defense cooperation con1nlittee to prolnote the procurelnerrt and co
production of \veapons and equiplnent. Bilateral relations were raised to
ne\\' heights in January 2011 \vhen Yudhoyono was the chief guest at India's
Republic 1)ay cerelnonies.
'I he considered in this section reveal the difficulty of
generalizing about Southeast Asia's relations \\lith a rising China and a
rising India. Each of the four exanlples reveals different patterns in relations
\"ith and India fronl \vhat a broader analysis of China-ASEAN or
India- relations \vould suggest.
In general, ho\\'('\'er, econonlic influence 100n1s large but its
inlpact is uneven and does not invariably translate into direct political
influence. All four countries seek to balance China's econon1ic influence
through relations \\'ith other n1ajor po\vers. Thailand, Indonesia, and
\Tietnanl look to the LTnited States and India as counter\\leights, while
has fe\v options but to look to India. China's increased n1ilitary
p()\ver is of greater concern to Vietnanl and Indonesia than it is to
and '1 hailand, due to Chinese assertiveness in the South China
Sea. India's econOlllic influence, \vhich has grown fronl a low base, lags
behind China's 111ai nly due to bureaucratic hurdles ilnposed by India itself.
\\'ith the exception of the Philippines, Southeast Asia's n1aritilne and littoral
states look to the Indian na\')' as a potential counterweight to China. All
l\ll1kcll k Jhcl, "IJldlcl IJldOl1l'-.,lcl: Lll1lTglllg COJltlul'llll' in thl' Il1di<ll1 ()cl'cln Region,"
')/,-t/kg/( \/1(//1'.''-' ).2, no. ) .2()():-\): c c
the region's states value India for the P'
multilateral forun1s on their behalf.
Conclusion
Since its founding in 1967, ASEA
regionalism. For each of its ten memben
national strategies for coping and man,
powers. As an institution, ASEA.N ha
to 111anage relations \vith external pc
socialization into ASEAN norms, and S(
Collectively, the Southeast Asian
and ASEAN's centrality in the regio
markers of regional autonomy are, inter
and the goal of creating an ASEAN corr
centrality in the regional architecture i
the ARF and leading role in the ADM.N
promotion of these objectives provides
for its n1embers-individualJy and coll
with the n1ajor powers.
For Inost of its existence, ASEAl
order shaped by u.S. engagement in So
states viewed China as the n1ain threat
viewed as nlarginal to regional affairs.
perceptions of both countries began to
has been able to leverage its historic
and the presence of a large number 0
advance its con1n1ercial interests. Indi
and cultural in1pact on Southeast Asi,
been as successful in leveraging this leg
China's rise is transfonning the n
The country's sheer economic \veigh
resilience of each individual state as t
China has not only displaced the Unite
partner, but its gro\ving political and
regional resilience by undercutting 60 )
Southeast Asian state has is own uniq
collectively these states are in general
is best preserved through continued 1
enn1eshnlent of China in ASEAN-cen
en hanced econon1ic, political, and secu
...
t1volving Indian support for the
commenced joint patrols in the
a's major role in tsunami relief
ndonesia as a reliable security
to support India's nlembership
llso have convergent interests in
jsrupting the linkages bet\veen
1.
1ised to the level of a strategic
)f visits bet\veen Singh and
iged to prolnote broad-based
mic, con1n1ercial, cultural, and
r shared values and COll1111itn1ent
) an annual senior-level strategic
st covered n1arine and fisheries
programs for diplolnats, and the
ate a Con1prehensive Econon1ic
, Indonesia and India set up a
on10te the procurenlent and co
relations \vere raised to
ono \vas the chief guest at India's
section reveal the difficulty of
ons \vith a rising China and a
different patterns in relations
er analysiS of China-ASEAN or
ic int1uence 100n1s large but its
ly translate into direct political
nee China's econon1ic influence
iVers. Thailand, Indonesia, and
India as counter\veights, while
[ndia. China's increased military
n and Indonesia than it is to
ssertiveness in the South China
1S gro\vn fro111 a low base, lags
hurdles in1posed by India itself.
heast Asia's 111aritin1e and littoral
jal counter\veight to China. All
Cont1uenct' in thc I nJi'll1 Occan Rl'giOl1,"
Thayer - Southeast 341
the region's states value India for the political influence it Inight \\'ield in
multilateral forulns on their behalf.
Conclusion
Since its founding in 1967, ASEAN has prolnoted Southeast Asian
regionalism. For each of its ten n1en1bers, the organization is central to their
national strategies for coping and Inanaging relations \\'ith Inajor external
po\vers. As an institution, ASEAN has developed three n1ain strategies
to ll1anage relations with external powers: econon1ic interdependence,
socialization into ASEAN nonns, and soft-balancing.
Collectively, the Southeast Asian states pron10te regional autonon1y
and ASEAN's centrality in the region's security architecture. The key
Inarkers of regional autonon1y are, inter alia, the TAC, the ASEAN Charter,
and the goal of creating an ASEAN comn1unity by 2015. rn1e organization\
centrality in the regional architecture is evidenced by its chairn1anship of
the ARF and leading role in the AL)MM-Plus and EAS processes. ASEAN\
promotion of these objectives provides a Ineasure of protecti\'e insulation
for its n1en1bers-individually and collectively-in their external relations
with the n1ajor powers.
For n10st of its existence, ASEAN has benefited froln the securit y
order shaped by U.S. engagelnent in Southeast Asia. Until the 1990s, n1an1'
states vie\ved China as the Inain threat to regional security, \vhile India \\'as
viewed as marginal to regional In the Inid-1990s, Southeast Asian
perceptions of both countries began to in1prove. China, to a certain extent,
has been able to leverage its historical ties under the tributary systcn1
and the presence of a large nun1ber of overseas Chinese con1n1unities to
advance its con1n1ercial interests. India, which had an in1n1ense religious
and cultural impact on Southeast Asia in the precolonial period, has not
been as successful in leveraging this legacy.
China's rise is transforn1ing the regional order in fundan1ental
The country's sheer econon1ic weight poses challenges to the national
resilience of each individual state as trade patterns alter in China's
China has not only displaced the United States as the region's n1ain trading
partner, but its growing political and n1ilitary po\ver poses to
regional resilience by undercutting 60 years of U.S. prilnacy. Although each
Southeast Asian state has is own unique relations \vith the n1ajor po\,'ers,
collectively these states are in general agreen1ent that regional autonolny
is best preserved through continued U.S. engagen1ent in Southeast Asia,
enn1eshn1ent of China in ASEAN-centric multilateral institutions, and an
enhanced econon1ic, political, and security role for India.
342 Strategic 2011-12
At the sanle tinlt\ the econoInic rise of China has increased the salience
of the 111aritinle donlain and the SLOCs from East Asia through the South
China Sea to the Indian Ocean and Middle East. The traditional boundaries
bet\\'een Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are thus being eroded as a new
East Asian region takes shape. The enlergence of ASEAN +3 is the n10st
visible developlnent of this trend. However, India's econoInic rise has added
another diI11ension to the changing boundaries of Asian regionalism. New
L)elhi's engagenlent \\'ith ASEAN and the new security architecture is
beginn ing erode the traditional boundaries that once separated South
Asia frol11 Southeast Asia. Sonle strategic analysts see the enlergence of
an Indo-Pacific 111aritinle region (encon1passing the Bay of Bengal and the
South China Sea) as capturing this new dynarnic.
China's assertiveness in the South China Sea has further eroded
traditional distinctions bet\\'een the continental and nlaritime states of
Southeast Asia. \Tietnan1, as a littoral state, has en1erged as a distinct actor with
both continental and InaritiI11e interests and pursues a policy of (4cooperation
and struggle" \vith China. Indonesia, as a n1aritinle power, pursues a dual
track policy of developing relations with China while prolll0ting enhanced
cooperation \vith India. The continental states generally pursue econonlic
and security relations \vith both China and India.
has interacted \vith Southeast Asia econon1ically by prolTIoting
C:AfTA. In the security sphere, Beijing pronl0tes its new security concept as
an alternati\'e to the U.S. alliance system. India's rise has been acconlpanied
by a look east policy of econolnic integration with its nearest neighbors
in Southeast Asia and a greater political-security role in regional affairs.
'The United States has responded to these developlnents by renewing its
conlnlitlllent to ASEAN-centric I1lultilateralislTI. ASEAN has in part tried
to balance China's rise by including India as a nlember of the inaugural EAS
and also expanding Inelnbership to Russia and the United States.
ASEAN's prornotion of Southeast Asia's autononly and the institution's
centrality in the regional security architecture is a continuing work in
process. ASEA1\'s collective unity will be severely challenged now that it
has engaged the l11ajor p()\vers in t\VO new regional bodies, the ADMM-Plus
and the EAS. Continued rivalry and friction between China and the United
States \vill be quickly transnlitted to Southeast Asia. The dilenlnla for each
ASEA:\ state \vill be ho\\' to \veigh the costs and benefits of collective action
against national interests. Territorial and sovereignty cont1icts in the South
C:hina Sea \vill be a litnlus test in this regard. Will all ten ASEAN states band
together in defense of the clainls and interests of the littoral and nlaritime
states? If ASEA N states fail to reach a consensus, hedge, or break ranks, the
idea of a fornlal ASEAr\ conl11lunity in 2015 could beconle a paper tiger.
The United States, which already]
will also face a major problenl in
supremacy in the Western Pacific. This i
the requisite military power but the pI
partners, and friendly states in the regio]
want the United States to remain
that appear designed to contain China.
placed in the difficult position of
through the hub-and-spoke model \vill r
on consensus-building through the alrea
that have ASEAN at their core.
....
se of China has increased the salience
=s from East Asia through the South
ddle East. The traditional boundaries
t Asia are thus being eroded as a new
mergence of ASEAN +3 is the most
rever, India's econo111ic rise has added
)undaries of Asian regionalism. New
Ld the new security architecture is
)undaries that once separated South
tegic analysts see the emergence of
)mpassing the Bay of Bengal and the
v dynamic.
lth China Sea has further eroded
continental and n1aritinle states of
te, has en1erged as a distinct actor with
s and pursues a policy of "cooperation
is a maritilne po\ver, pursues a dual
ith China \vhile pronl0ting enhanced
tal states generally pursue econon1ic
and India.
Asia econonlically by pron10ting
promotes its new security concept as
'm. India's rise has been accompanied
Ltegration with its nearest neighbors
jcal-security role in regional affairs.
these developments by renewing its
ilateralism. ASEAN has in part tried
dia as a member of the inaugural EAS
Issia and the United States.
Asia's aut0110111Y and the institution's
rchitecture is a continuing work in
11 be severely challenged now that it
1e\V regional bodies, the ADMM-Plus
"iction bet\veen China and the United
;outheast Asia. The dilelnma for each
costs and benefits of collective action
tnd sovereignty conf1icts in the South
egard. vVi11 all ten ASEAN states band
interests of the littoral and maritime
consensus, hedge, or break ranks, the
n 2015 could becon1e a paper tiger.
lhayer - 343
lhe United States, which already has econon1ic problenls at honle,
will also face a major problenl in addressing China's challenge to U.S. naval
suprelnacy in the Western Pacific. This is a Inatter of n1aintaining not only
the requisite 111ilitary power but the political support of allies, strategic
partners, and friendly states in the region. Although Southeast Asian states
want the United States to renlain engaged, they \\'ill not support policies
that appear designed to contain China. Nor do regional states \vant to be
placed in the difficult position of taking sides. Traditional lIS. leadership
through the hub-and-spoke l110del will need to give \va)' to greater reliance
on consensus-building through the already existing nlultilateral institutions
that have ASEAN at their core.
344 Strategic 2011-12
TAB LEA 3 ASEAN member states' trade
Appendix
TAB LEA 1 India's trade with Southeast Asia, 2009-10 ($rn)
Country Exports Imports Total
Brunei 24.44 428.65 453.09
Cambodia 45.54 5.05 50.59
Indonesia 3,063.36 8,656.66 11,720.02
Laos 16.93 20.05 36.98
Malaysia 2,835.41 5,176.78 8,011.78
Myanmar 207.97 1,289.80 1,497.77
Philippines 748.77 313.07 1,061.84
Singapore 7,592.17 6,454.57 14,046.74
Thailand 1,740.16 2,931.52 4,671.68
Vietnam 1,838.95 521.81 2,360.76
Total 18,113.71 25,797.96 43,911.67
47,352 52,258
Country 2004 2005
Brunei 243 234
15 Cambodia 12
Indonesia
Laos
4,605
1
6,662
4
Malaysia
Myanmar
8,634
75 I
9,465
119
Philippines
Singapore
2,653
15,321
4,077
19,770
9,083
2,828
Thailand 7,098
Vietnam 2,711
'-, () LJ f" (l l.\.port -Import I)<It<l ltlll k Government of India, I)epartmel1t ofConlmerce,
\1<1\' ii, 20 ii, http://col1ll1ll'rcL'.nic.in/eidh/deLndt.asp.
TAB LEA 2 Inter-ASEAN trade and ASEAN's trade with China, India, and the
United States, 2009
Brunei 87 94
Cambodia 337 430
Indonesia
Laos
4,101
89
I
5,843
185
Malaysia
Myanmar
11,353
351
14,361
286
2,973
20,527
11,116
5,322
Philippines 2,659
Singapore
Thailand
16,137
8,183
Vietnam 4,416
1 Value Share of total ASEAN trade
Trade
I
{$m}
{%}
partner
Exports Imports Total trade Exports Imports
Total
trade
ASEAN
countries
199,587.3 176,620.1 376,207.3 24.6 24.3 24.5
China 81,591.0 96,594.3 178,185.4 10.1 13.3 11.6
India 26,520.3 12,595.5 39,115.8 3.3 1.7 2.5
United
States
82,201.8 67,370.3 149,572.1 10.1 9.3 9.7
Total
trade with
partners
389,900.4 353,180.2 742,080.6 48.1 48.6 48.3
Total trade
with all
countries
810,489.2
726,354'L
6
,843,3
100.0 100.0 100.0

sou R C E: ASEA N Trade Statistics database, Jul;
\ (j L! R (t ["r<llk J<lL1h<1'>1', July 20iO.

----- - ---- ---
I
TAB LEA 3 ASEAN member states' trade with China, 2004-8 ($ m)
Asia, 2009-10 ($m)
Imports Total
428.65 453.09
5.05 50.59
8,656.66 11,720.02
20.05 36.98
5,176.78 8,011.78
1,289.80 1,497.77
313.07 1,061.84
6,454.57 14,046.74
2,931.52 4,671.68
521.81 2,360.76
25,797.96 43,911.67
wernment ofIndia, Departl11el1t OfCo111111erce,
ult.asp.
trade with China, India, and the
Share of total ASEAN trade
trade
376,207.3
178,185.4
39,115.8
149,572.1
Exports
24.6
10.1
3.3
10.1
(%)
Imports
24.3
13.3
1.7
9.3
Total
trade
24.5
11.6
2.5
9.7
742,080.6 48.1 48.6 48.3
536,843.3 100.0 100.0 100.0
2010.
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Brunei 243 234 174 201

Cambodia 12 15 13 11 13
Indonesia 4,605 6,662 8,344 8,897 11,637
Laos 4 35 15
Malaysia 8,634 9,465 11,391 15,443 18,422
Myanmar 75 119 133 475 499
Philippines 2,653 4,077 4,628 5,750 5,467
Singapore 15,321 19,770 26,472 28,925 29,082
Thailand 7,098 9,083 10,840 14,873 15,931
Vietnam 2,711 2,828 3,015 3,336 4,491

ASEAN exports 52,258 __
171 120 157 Brunei 87 94
Cambodia 653 933 337 430 516
8,616 15,247 Indonesia 4,101 5,843 6,637
43 131 23 Laos 89 185
18,646 18,897 Malaysia 11,353 14,361 15,543
671 564 Myanmar 286 397 351
4,250 4,001 Philippines 2,659 2,973 3,647
31,583 27,185 31,908 Singapore 16,137 20,527
16,184 19,936 Thailand 13,578 8,183 11,116
12,148 7,306 Vietnam 4,416 5,322
----'-,---------
ASEANimports=r47,774
74,957 707,774 93,773
L-___ _ _
5 0 U R C E: ASEAN Trade database, July 2()()9.
34
6
.
St rategic Asia 2011-12
TABLE A4 ASEAN member states' trade with India, 2004-9 ($m)
_._- - - - ! , !
70,400] 72,607.43] 76,473.52 79,740.63
Country 2004-5 2005-6 2006-7 2007-8 2008-9
Brunei 5.06 42.94 8.31 10.43 17.64
Cambodia 18.13 24.19 52.07 53.50 46.90
Indonesia 1,332.60 1,380.20 2,032.96 2,164.17 2,559.82
Laos 2.65 5.47 2.39 3.86 9.00
Malaysia 1,984.06 1,181.86 1,305.22 2,575.26 3,419.97
Myanmar 113.19 110.70 140.44 185.82 221.64
Philippines 412.23 494.66 580.98 620.32 734.77
Singapore 4,000.61 5,425.29 6,053.84 7,379.20 8,444.93
Thailand 901.39 1,075.31 1,445.54 1,810.87 1,938.31
Vietnam 555.96 690.68 985.69 1,610.09 1,738.65
STRATEGIC.
INDICATC
I 9, 7 78, 708.49 26,202.96
-- - ------
Brunei 0.54 0.88 285.38 227.24 397.52
Cambodia 0.24 0.78 1.60 2.90 2.72
Indonesia 2,617.74 3,008.11 4,181.96 4,821.25 6,666.34
Laos 0.05 0.10 0.35 0.11 0.53
Malaysia 2,299.01 2,415.61 5,290.31 6,012.90 7,184.78
Myanmar 405.91 525.96 782.65 808.63 928.97
Philippines 187.39 235.49 166.79 204.54 254.77
Singapore 2,651.40 3,353.77 5,484.32 8,122.63 7,654.86
Thailand 865.88 1,211.58 1,747.75 2,300.93 2,703.82
Vietnam 86.50 131.39 167.38 173.68 408.66

" 0 U Ref r',\.purt -Impurt l)lllll 1-Link Goyernmenl of India, Department of Commerce,
.\Ll\ 21, 2() II, http://(()!11!11crL'c.niL.inkidb/dc(ault.asp.