"General Rules" in Hume's Treatise

Hearn, Thomas K.
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1970, pp. 405-422 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

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"General Rules" in Hume's Treatise

THOMAS K. HEARN, JR.

IT COULD BE CONFIDENTLY ASSERTED in 1925 that H u m e was "no longer a living figure." x Stuart Hampshire records that when he began his philosophy studies in 1933, H u m e ' s conclusions were regarded at Oxford as "extravagances of scepticism which no one could seriously accept." 2 T h a t virtually no Anglo-American philosopher would now share such opinions about H u m e testifies not only to the general change in the philosophical climate but, in addition, it reflects a transformation which has occurred in the interpretation of H u m e ' s philosophy. In eitecting this transformation .much credit is due to the work of N o r m a n K e m p Smith. K e m p Smith argued that preoccupation with H u m e ' s empiricist heritage and his scepticism had blinded scholars to the fundamentally constructive intent of his philosophy, and, indeed, that only from the perspective of his positive achievement was it possible to grasp the nature and significance of H u m e a n scepticism. This paper, in keeping with the basic orientation of K e m p Smith, sets out a central feature in the attempt to describe and assess H u m e ' s constructive, nonsceptical point of v i e w : H u m e attributes to general rules " a mighty influence on our actions and unders t a n d i n g . . . " (374). 4 This paper examines the Treatise to show that this was not just a casual comment. T o discuss the "influence" of general rules requires an examination of their character and the various aspects of "action and understanding" in which such rules function. The thesis to be developed can be stated briefly. In Book I H u m e introduces two sorts of general rules which must be distinguished carefully. One type of rule describes a propensity of the imagination to extend the scope

This research was supported by a grant from the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. x Charles W. Hendcl, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume (New York, 1963), p. 20. (First published in 1925.) For Professor Hendel's later comments on this statement, see pp. xxi ft. "Hume's Place in Philosophy" in David Hume, ed. D. F. Pears (London, 1963), p. 3. a Proper stress is due here to the phrase "basic orientation." There is much about Kemp Smith's understanding of Hume which is mistaken in my view. 9 The page references in parentheses refer to the Svlby-Bigge edition of A Treatise o/
Human Nature (Oxford, 1888).

[4o5]

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of judgments formed in one set of circumstances to other resembling but non-identical circumstances. The other type of general rule, the discussion of which largely occupies this paper, functions to correct certain natural propensities which result in erroneous belief or action if permitted to operate unchecked. The same pattern, a natural tendency requiring correction by general rules, is exhibited in all three books of the Treatise, and can be said to represent one of the basic ingredients in Hume's account of human nature and experience. It is somewhat surprising that in a book which patiently discusses almost evcxy theme in the Treatise, Kemp Smith's study contains no discussion at all of rules. This is the more puzzling as Kemp Smith clearly recognized that by reflection the understanding supplies principles which are normative for the interpretation of experience. 5 Our aim in this study is to discuss what for Hume these principles are, and, as far as possible, how they fit into the Humean account of human nature. A fuller understanding of the nature and function of such reflective principles is required to spare Kemp Smith's interpretation from a seeming inconsistency. This apparent inconsistency arises because Kemp Smith takes the slavery of reason to the passions as the "key" to his understanding of Hume, but then develops the view that for Hume reason/s a passion, in Hume's words, "a wonderful and unintelligible instinct." (179)6 The inconsistency disappears when it is recognized that Kemp Smith's account of Hume requires a more subtle and complex understanding of the role of reason than that suggested by the emphasis on the "slavery of reason" especially in the early parts of the book. This study represents a way of supplying the broader and more const,ructive understanding of reason which Kemp Smith's view of Hume requires. Another important element in Kemp Smith's study is the insistence on the basic affinities between Hume's moral theory and epistemology. Believing that it was through the "gateway of morals" that Hume established the basic doctrines of the Treatise, Kemp Smith undermined the positivistic interpretation of Hume by insisting that feeling is no less central to Hume's account of empirical judgment than it is in his account of morals. The principle of vivacity is the foundation of empixical belief for Hume, and this same principle functions in Hume's account of morals because sympathy is regarded as a mechanism whereby ideas of passions become enlivened. We shaU see that the principle of vivacity does not per se commit Hume to either epistemological scepticism or ethical subjectiv,ism. General rules provide corrective, normative principles for the evaluation of those feelings which form the basis of both empirical and moral beliefs. Concem4ng matters of fact Hume states that the degree of vivacity and assent are not proportional: " A like xeflection on general rules keeps us from augmenting our belief upon every increase of the force and
The Philosophy of DavM Hume (London, 1960), pp. 128, 382-388. First published ' in 1941. 6 Kemp Smith regards "passion" in Hume as the name of a class which includes "instinct" among other things. See p. 11.

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vivacity of our ideas." (632) He recognizes that in moral matters our sympathies are " m o r e li'vely" depending on the special relationships in which we stand to the objects of moral evaluation. However, as in the case of empirical belief, the force of feeling must be checked by general rules if one is to be a "judicious spectator." Furthermore, in both factual and moral matters the influences of natural feelings or propensities and corrective rules result in a kind of "inner conflict." In Book I of the Treatise the imagination and the judgment conflict, while in Book III there can be opposition between the judgment and the sympathetic affections. Such conflict means that at some times the one and at other times the other will prevail, but Hume's claim is that one who adheres most resolutely to the reflective rules is most likely to render an appropriate verdict.

It is in the context of "reflections" added to the discussion of probability that the subject of rules is first raised in the Treatise. Hume's remarks at this point concern the influence of general rules on the passions, and he comments, "These general rules we shall explain presently." (142) The explanation follows in the next section which is concerned with the subject of unphilosophieal probability. There is a species of unphilosophieal probability, says Hume, which is derived from general rules which we "rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call Prejudice." (146) An illustration follows: An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity; for which' reason, the' the conversation of the former in any instance be visibly very agreeable, and of the latter very judicious, we have entertain'd such a prejudice against them, that they must be dunces or fops, in spite of sense and reason. (146) We are then given the promised explanation of general rules: Shou'd it be demanded why men form general rules, and allow them to influence their judgment, even contrary to present observation and experience, I shou'd reply, that in my opinion it proceeds from those very principles, on which at[ judgments concerning causes and effects depend. Our judgments concerning cause and effect are deriv'd from custom and experience; and when we have been accustom'd to see one object united to another, our imagination passes from the first to the second by a natural transition, which precedes reflection, and which cannot be prevented by it. Now it is the nature of custom not only to operate with its full force, when objects are presented, that are exactly the same with those to which we have been accustom'd; but also to operate in an inferior degree, when we discover such as are similar; and tho' the habit loses somewhat of its force by every difference, yet 'tis seldom destroy'd where any considerable circumstances remain the same. (147)

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Thus, the origin of general rules is to be sought in the same principles "on which all our judgments concerning e a u s ~ and effects depend," i.e., the effect of constant conjunction in generating habit or custom. The imaginataon has a propensity to extend opinions derived from one set of circumstances to resembling sets of circumstances. This propensity is a source of general rules. In effect, general rules result from the combined effects on the imagination of custom and resemblance. Hume immediately confronts an objection to his thesis that all judgments are formed on the basis of custom. If custom without qualification were the only force at work in our reasoning, it would not be possible to account for conflicting elements in xeasoning. H u m e acknowledges such cortfliet and attributes it to the differing influence of custom on the imagination and the judgment. The' custom be the foundation of all our judgments, yet sometimes it has an effect on the imagination in opposition to the judgment, and produces a contrariety in our sentiments concerning the same object. (147-148) A more complete statement of the difficulty is also given: According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom . . . . It may, therefore, be concluded, that our judgment and imagination can never be contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a manner, as to render it opposite to the former. This di~culty we can remove after no other manner, than by supposing the influence of general rules. (149) Hawing reduced all reasoning concerning matters of fact to custom, how is H u m e to explain the fact that custom's influence permits an opposition of judgment and imagination? The problem can only be answered, Hume comments, by "supposing the influence of general rules." This now brings us to an interesting and important aspect of our discussion. One of the effects of custom on the imagination is the formation of rules of a certain sort. "General rule" is hardly the best way to designate the notion H u m e is employing here. What is involved is a generalizing propensity of the imagination which extends the scope of judgments or opinions under certain conditions. When a given judgment has been formed on the basis of a particular set of circumstances C, the imagination has a propensity to generalize and make the same judgment in oircumstances C' or C". Having formed the opinion that Irishmen are witless on the basis of the observation of a certain number of dull Irishmen, the imagination has a propensity to extend this verdict to a new set of conditions in which one is confronted by an Irishman who is apparently very witty. The imagination's propensity to generalize is governed largely by the degree of resemblance of the conditions, but this propensity is "seldom destroy'd where any material circumstances remain the same." (147)

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The same custom goes beyond those instances, from which it is deriv'd, and to which it perfectly corresponds; and influences [one's] ideas of such objects as are in some respects resembling but fall not precisely under the same rule. (148) 7 The influence of custom on the imagination provides us with "rules" of a certain sort which are a n operative factor in o ~ judgments, but before we can understand the conflict between the imagination and the judgment and how such conflict is explicable in terms of the influence of general rules, we must notice a different sort of rule to which H u m e now refers: We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of the .understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects. By them we learn to distinguish accidental circumstances from efficacious causes . . . . (149) Though the "rules by which to judge causes and effects" a~e specified later, they are introduced here as rules which are not the result of a propensity of the imagination, but which are "form'd on the nature of the understanding." Before we try to distinguish these two sorts of general rules m o r e carefully, let u~ indicate how H u m e answers the problem he set for himself concerning the opposition of the imagination and the judgment. On any given occasion when we are making a causal judgment, both of these sorts of rules are apt to be present and operative. Let us continue with the preceding quote: By them [i.e. the rules formed on the understanding] we learn to distinguish accidental cireurnstances from efficacious causes; and when we find that an effect can be produc'd without the concurrence of any particular circumstance, we conclude that the circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious cause, however frequently conjoin'd with it. But as this frequent conjunction necessarily makes it have some effect on the imagination, in spite of the opposite conclusion from general rules, the opposition of these two principles produces a contrariety in our thoughts, and causes us to ascribe the one inference to our judgment, and the other to our imagination. (149) In other words, in the production of admost any effect there is a complication of m a n y circumstances, some of which are essential to the given effect, and some which though frequently conjoined with the essential circumstances are superfluous. These superfluous factors, however, still have an effect on the imagination: Now we may observe, that when these superfluous circumstances are numerous, and remarkable, and frequently conjoin'd with the essential, they have such an influence For other statements by Hurne of this same generalizing tendency, see pp. 374, 551.

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on the imagination, that even in the absence of the latter they carry us on to the conception of the usual effect. . . . (148) For example, let us suppose that C is known to be sufficient and necessary for the production of E. However, when C produces E, it i,s conjoined with D which is entirely incidental to the production of E. The effect of the conjunction of D with C, however, is that the imagination extends the principle "'C causes E " to the resembling circumstance "C and D cause E." The imaginauon even can be led to expect the production of E when D is present and C absent. This effect on the imagination is what H u m e here calls the "first influence of general rules." (150) If we ~re to reason correctly about causal relationships, however, it is necessary that we correct this propensity of the imagination: But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish'd principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our rejecting it. This is a second influence of general rules and implies the condemnation of the former. (150) The conflict of imagination and judgment is to be explained by the conflict of two sorts of general rules: Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails, according to the disposition and character of the persons. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second. (150) The first sort of "rule," we have seen, is the result of the effect of custom and resemblance on the imagination; rules of the second type are said to be formed "on our undorstanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects." (149) The first are prone to lead to error as, for example, in the prejudice we hold against t h e w i t of an Irishman or when we err in including accidental circumstances in describing causal ,relations. " H u m a n nature," Hume notes, "is very subject to errors of this kind . . . . " (147) The sense in which the second sort of .rule is a product of custom will be discussed in the next section. At this point, we note that these rules are precisely concerned to avoid or correct potential errors resulting from the generalizing propensity of the imagination. The second sort of rules also have a reflective character; by that I mean that they are consciously formulated and adopted, s They are not the result of mere propensities. The justification of this claim largely depends upon the whole discussion which follows, but in setting out the rules for the direction of 8 The remainder of this paper is largely concerned with rules of this type. to them as "reflective rules." I shall refer

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causal judgments H u m e speaks of "fixing" (173) these rules, and we have seen that those who follow these rules are designated "wise." In addition, these rules are directive in oharacter; we "ought" to follow them and failure to do so is a potential source of error. Hence, if I have read this admittedly dlffiedt section correctly, H u m e has called "general rules" two things which are very different. There is a propensity of the imagination to generalize, and H u m e regards this propensity as a source of "rules." There are also "rules of the understanding" which, as contrasted with the previous type are corrective, reflective and directive. The distinction between these senses of "rule" is essential if we are to understand the entire treatment of this subject in the Treatise. For example, Passmore, who gives more attention to general rules than any recent commentator, regards all general rules as propensities, and, thus is unable to account for the corrective function H u m e attributes to these rules. 9 Hampshire comments that H u m e lacks any "absolute distinction" between "rules to which any thinking m u s t conform" and "mere habits and uniformities in our thought and behavior." lo Though Hampshire's use of "absolute" and "must" are troublesome, it ~s my contention that the Treatise does contain exactly this distinction. H Let us now turn our attention to the question of the ecigin and stares of these reflective rules within the Humean framework. 11 There is no difficulty in accounting for the generatlzlng propensity of the imagination which is explicable in terms of the familiar Humean principles of custom and resemblance. The problem is to determine whether H u m e has also allowed for the formation and use of reflective rules. This .l'equi~es a brief examination of Hume's discussion of belief. It is sometimes suggested that Hume's theory of belief is fully analysable in terms of the vivacity of perceptions. However, as Church points out, " T h a t s,uch ~s the case no one who has taken seriously Sections 8 to 14 of Book III [Part III, Book I] will be likely to agree." 12 The function of vivacity is more accurately described in this comment Hume makes ~ega.rding the bc~ef which attends the impressions of memory and sense:
9 Hume's Intentions (Cambridge, 1953), p. 64. The only place I have found the distinction between the two sorts of rules presented is in the work of the French scholar A. Leroy. David Hume. (Paris, 1953), p. 71.

ix Interpreters sometimes accuse Hume of introducing rules as a purely ad hoc device for overcoming difficulties to which his commitments lead him. See, for example, Passmore, pp. 19, 53. Ed. Selby-Bigge, Hume's Enquiries (1899), p. xxix. Without dealing with specific arguments, this section attempts to show that these rules are not simply a bit of philosophical ad hocery. x2 Hume's Theory of the Understanding (Ithaca, N.Y., 1935), p. 192.

x0 Pears (ed.), p. 7.

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'Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, which constitutes the first act of judgment, and lays the foundation of the reasoning which we build upon it, when we trace the relation of cause and effect. (86) Vivacity, hence, is the foundation not the whole edifice, and H u m e ' s considered position is that while vivacity is a necessary, it is not a sufficient condition of warranted assent. The phrase "first act of judgment" in the preceding quotation is an important one for our purposes, and in order to understand it one must turn to Section I of Part IV. A t this point H u m e refers to the "first judgment" and the "first deoision," and asserts here also that this "first act" is based upon vivacity or "force and liveliness." I suppose, there is some question propos'd to me, and that after revolving over the impressions of my memory and senses, and carrying my thoughts from them to such objects, as are commonly conjoin'd with them, I feel a stronger and more forcible conception on the one side, than on the other. This strong conception forms my first decision. (184) This first act, however, is not sufficient to determine our belief. In every judgment, which we can form concerning probability, as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgment, deriv'd from the nature of the object, by another deriv'd from the nature of the understanding . . . . Here then arises a new species of probability to correct and regulate the first, and fix its just standard and proportion. As demonstration is subject to the control of probability, so is probability liable to a new correction by a reflex act of the mind, wherein the nature of our understanding, and our reasoning from the first probability become our objects. (181-182) With this in mind, we must look again at the section in which general ru,les are introduced. This is H u m e ' s procedure for correcting the imagination's propensity to generalize: But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most established principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our rejecting it. (150) There are, thus, a variety of texts suggesting that H u m e was abundantly aware of the fact that by reflecting on the nature of ou~ mental acti~ties and operations, we are able to correct certain tendencies which ~ e "destructive of all the most established principles of reasoning . . . . " It .is in this reflex activity of mind wherein our cognitive activities themselves are scrutinized that the origin of reflective rules is to

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be located. For the outcome of this reflection is the formation of rules by the use of which the correction occurs. In the only example thus far discussed, the rules by which to judge of causes and effects which serve to correct the generalizing propensity of the imagination am founded on our reflective awareness of our understanding and "our experience el its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects." (149, italics added) We deferred until this section discussing the sense in which these rules are products of custom. Clearly, for Hume, there is no sense in which these rules could be other than empirical and, hence, products of probable reason or custom. He thus speaks of a new species of probability, but, as has just been emphasized, the experience relevant to their formation concerns "the nature of the understanding, and our reasoning from the first probability . . . . " This new species of probability functions io regulate and control the first. As we reflect upon the understanding as employed in causal judgment, we form certain rules the following of which makes possible the coherent and ordered interpretation of our experience. One wishes that Hume had been more explicit and careful about these matters. Particularly, it would be desirable to understand precisely how this rule forming capacity is to be related to Hume's general account of mental activity and how such rules might be justified in terms of Hume's general outlook. In weighing the force of these texts we have just been considering, however, there are some obvious but important matters to keep in mind. The first is that much of Hume's entire philosophical achievement presupposes our ability to attend to those principles operative in human nature in cognitive and affective experience. His celebrated discussion of causality certainly rests upon this presupposition. One could note, in addition, the important functions of the self as the observer of its own activities which are discussed by Kemp Smith. 13 This is only to underline the fact that the "'second act of judgment" refers to a dimension central to Hume's interests in the science of man. Further, as Professor Wolff has argued in a most convincing manner, Hume's actual account of mental activity is far more subtle and complicated than the presuppositions of the early pages of the Treatise could possibly explain or justify. 14 Now while considerations of this order by no means account for the origin or justify Hume's use of reflective rules, they do indicate that these texts do represent tendencies in Hume's thought generally which must be seriously weighed. Expositing what Hume says regarding the origin and justification of reflective r d e s is best accomplished by developing the suggestions of Goodman in his wellknown discussion of Hume. Goodman suggests, quite apart from reference to Hume, that there is a "virtuous circularity" in the relationship between rules and x~ Kemp Smith, pp. 73, 92, 98, 224, etc. ~" "Hume's Theory of Mental Activity," Philosophical Review, LXIX (1960). Reprinted in Chappell (ed.), Hume (Garden City, N. Y., 1966). The suggestion developed here that the understanding reflecting on its own activity supplies rules which are in some sense normative for the interpretation of experience extends the analysis offered by Wolff.

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the inferences which such rules govern. That is, the rtrles which determine valid inference, deductive or inductive, do in fact reflect our practice in making and approving such inferences. "The point is that rules and particular inferences alike are justified by being brought into agreement with each other." is Thus, the rules are in one sense empirical, and yet their use is at the same time determinative of valid inference. Hume's version would require statement in different terms. When we follow certain rules in the evaluation of causal judgments, we reach conclusions which make possible the coherent and reliable interpretation of experience. These rules, deriving from reflection on the activity o f the understanding in causal judgment, in the final analysis become determinative for the justification of such It would require a n o t h ~ paper to explicate the textual support which underlies this pragmatic, coherence theme in Hume. General rules are "justified" in that they enable us to deal reliably with experience and to determine which beliefs can and cannot cohere with those "system(s) of realities" (109) which are formed by the senses, memory and judgment. Fortunately, this aspect of Hume has been elab. orated by Kemp Smith in defense of his claim that it is not sheer custom but "experience as extended in and through our reflective activities" which is normative for Hume. . . . reflective thinking and the criteria to which it appeals are . . . indispensably necessai'y for the conduct of human life. . . . Only through reflective scrutiny can the uniformities which are truly causal be distinguished from those which, as resting on contingently determined c o m b i n a t i o n s of causes, may at any moment vary . . . . Clearly on his final view . . . custom is far from king. It is because it so usuany u s u r p s sovereign power that reflective thinking, and the logic which ought to govern it, a r e imperatively demanded. 1~ It is clear now that Kemp Smith's account of Hume requires an analysis of general rules since these are the rules of the "logic" which governs "reflective thinking."

judgments.

III Thus far we have examined reflective rules concerned with belief, but one of the aim~ of thi~ paper is to show that the same notion of rules is used by Hume in various aspects of his analysis of experience. Both to demonstrate this and to provide additional support for the interpretation just given of the origin and status
x~ Fact, Fiction, and Forecast
:6

Kemp Smith,

p. 386. Cf. 382-388.

(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1955), p. 67.

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of reflective rules, we move to Book II of the Treatise to examine certain "enlargements" or "limitations" which Hume adds to his account of pride and humility.
I may add . . . that general rules have a great influence upon pride and humility, as

well as on all the other passions. Hence we form a notion of different ranks of men, suitable to the power or riches they are possest of; and this notion we change not upon account of any peculiarities of the health or temper of the persons, which may deprive them of all enjoyment of their possessions. This may be accounted for from the same principles, that explain'd the influence of general rules on the understanding. Custom readily carries us beyond the just "bounds" in our passions, as well as in our reasonings.
It may not be amiss to observe on this occasion, that the influence of general rules and maxims of the passions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all the principles, which we shall explain in the progress of this treatise. For 'tis evident, that if a person fullgrown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our world, he wou'd be very much embarrass'd with every object, and would not readily find what degree of love or hatred, pride or humility, or any other passion he ought to attribute to it. The passions are often vary'd by very inconsiderable principles; and these do not always play with a perfect regularity, especially on the first trial. But as custom and practice have brought to light all these principles, and have settled the just value of everything; this must certainly contribute to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by means of general establish'd maxims, in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one subject to another. (293-294) ~7

This is in some respects a difficult passage, but I shall argue that its chief difficulty can be resolved on the basis of the previous discussion. First a terminological matter must be clarified. Hume speaks here of explaining these rules from the same principles which accounted for their influence on the understanding, and the principle provided is that of custom. H u m e was notoriously lax about terminology, but it is clear that "understanding" is used here in the broad sense in which it occurs in the title of Book I and not in the restricted sense in which "understanding" or "judgment" is contrasted with "imagination." The pllzzling part of this text, however, is that it appears to say two conflicting things about the influence of custom. Custom "carries us beyond our just bounds," but it also guides us "in the proportions we ought to observe . . . . " The difficulty is resolved by noticing that custom is operating here at two distinct levels. The imagination, we have seen, has a propensity to generalize illegitimately on the basis of the influence of custom and resemblance. The passions also have certain "natural deficiencies." In Hume's inimitable way of putting it, the passions are "vary'd by very inconsiderable principles." Plume often points out that the passions are influenced by special ~' The first sentence of the second paragraph of this quotation again emphasizes the importance of general rules for Hume.

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relations in which we stand to the exciting objects, and as a result they fail to be apportioned to the "intrinsic worth" of the objects. Customarily, therefore, the passions are apt to can-y us "beyond our just bounds." Now the second reference to oustom and practice refers not to our immediate experience of the passions themselves, but to our awareness of those principles according to which the passions are influenced. This second level "custom," corresponding to what was called in Book I the second act of judgment, enables us to form "general establ,ish'd maxims" which then can be used to "guide u s . . . in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another." The pa~aalel between this discussion of the principles operative on the passions and the treatment of the basic themes of Book I is underlined by Hume's use of the "Adam argument" both here and in his analysis of causality. Before an Adarnie figure could make causal judgments or know how to proportion his attitudes, it would be necessary that he have experience in both senses just designated. The experience of the conjunction of objects and the arousal of passion must finally be scrutinized by .reflective insight into those principles operative when we make causal claims or exporience passions when these activities are appropriately done. Thus, .reflective rules as they apply to passion and belief arise from insight into the principles operative in human awareness. If followed, these rules direct us in the way most likely to provide us with correct means of dealing with experience, t8

IV Having noted the employment of general rules in belief and passions, it is now our intention to show that Hume extends the application of such rules into the area of human action. In Book III of the Treatise Hume divides the virtues into two categories. The natural virtues are those deriving from instinctive human responses. The artificial virtues, however, come about "by means of an artifice or contrivance which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind." (477) The artificial virtues comprise the "rules of justice" (or the "laws of nature" as he also terms them), the "laws of nations" which concern the origin of government and the nature of our obligations of obedience to sovereignty, and '~another set of duties, viz. the chastity and modesty which belong to the fair sex . . . . " (570) It is vital to recognize, however, that these artificial virtues constitute, for H~me, another .instance of reflective general rules. Most of Hume's discussion is given to the rules of justice. These rules are three in number and concern the stability Of possessions, the tramis "All the rules of this nature are very easy in their invention, but extremely difficult in their application . . . . " (175)

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ferenc, of possession by consent of the owner, and the performance of promises. Of these Hume regards the stability of possessions as the most important, and since my concea-n here is to demonstrate the employment of the concept of rules and not to discuss the a~tificial virtues as such, I shall use the rule concerning property as exemplary of a pattern which can be discerned in nil the artificial virtues. In short, I intend to show that the rule concerning the stability of possessions is a reflective general rule. There are, in the first place, several texts in which this rule concerning possession is called a "general rule." x9 In addition, this class of rules has all the essential characteristics distinguishing reflective rules. To see how these rules of justice come about, we must imagine the life of man in the so-called "state of nature," a concept which Flume regarded as a convenient "philosophic fiction." The establishment of society, says Hume, depends upon the institution of these general rules of justice. T h e e are two distinct matters to be dealt with: the first and for purposes here more important, is how these rules are "establish'd by the artifice of men," given that there is no natt~al or instinctive motive which causes men to act in accordance with such rules; the second is why there comes to be a moral sentiment attached to these rules, i.e,, why the artificial virtues are virtues. No virtue, Hume asserts, "is more esteem'd than justice; nor are there any qualities, which go farther to the fixing the character, either as amiable or odious." (577) Briefly, Hume's solution to this second problem is that once these laws or rules of justice are established, we recognize their utility, and the moral sentiment of humanity and the moral effects of sympathy cause us to morally approve whatever serves the social good. The first problem concerning the origin of these rules Hume attacks by observing that only in man, among all nature's animals, is there such a great disparity between the quantity of wants and necessities for sustaining life and the scarcity of physical endowments for the satisfaction of these many needs. (485) The solution to the problems created by the disjunction of ability and need is to be found in the formarion of society. The beginning of the social order comes as a result of the sex appetite which unites a man and woman and "preserves their uniTon, fi1,1 a new tye takes place in their concern for their common offspring." (485) The children which spring .from this natural necessity become, by custom and habit, sensible of the advantages to be derived from the societal relationship. There are, however, disintegrating forces which threaten the social order. Chief among these is the selfishness which character~.es man's "natural temper." (485) Though what Hume terms the "kind affections" or the "benevolent principles of our frame" taken together outweigh selfishness, man's first concern is for himself and then for his family and friends. This partiali:ty of our affections coupled with
a9 pp. 497, 502, 504n., 532. In some cases, what Hume in these texts is that this rule must apply to all and to each the "generality" of these rules, and the point could be made apply to the whole class of judgments or activities which stresses by the term "general" with equality. This emphasizes about all reflective rules. They they regulate.

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the scarcity of essential goods means that each person's possessions are "expos'd to the violence of others." (487) This problem threatens the fabric of society and because it is created by the state of man's natural temper, this partiality is not open to a "na~ral remedy," i.e., one based solely on instinctive human tendencies. This remedy, then, is not deriv'd from nature, but from artifice; or more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and the understanding for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections. (489) Notice, especially, that the remedy is provided by the "judgment and understanding." The remedy is, . . . a convention enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry. (489) This convention is formulated as the rule of justice, the general rule establishing the stability of possession, and this rule "is of all circumstances the most necessary to the establishment of society." (49I) Though the rule here being discussed by Hume concerns the direction of action rather than belief or feeling, it shares the same characteristics which marked the reflective rrules d,iscussed already. As just noted, the rule is reflective. Hume's entire discussion is based upon the fact that man becomes aware of the problem created by the partiality Of his instincts, and judges what means he must take to solve this problem. The alteration of ot~r love of gain, he commen~s, "must take place necessarily upon the .least reflection. . . . " (492) Human nature, he points out, is composed of two principal paxts, the affections and the understanding: "'Tis certain, that the blind motior~,s of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate men for society. . . . "(493) Thus the establishment of the rule has the deliberate chaxacter of an "invention." (543) The reflective insight required for the establishing of this rule differs from that required by the rules previously discussed. Those rules required insight into the nature of the human understanding and affections ~since these were the dimensions of experience in which they functioned. Here, what is required is the ability to grasp the consequences of our actions, in brief, "causal foresight." 20 The corrective aspect of these rules is equally apparent, being devised precisely to correct a problem which arises from man's natural temper. The correction here does not take the form of destroying man's avidity, any more than by following the rules of causal judgment one destroys the propensities of the imagination.. What happens, however, is that the acquisitive Lmpulse is redirected to a more suitable
~0 This expression is A. B. Glathe's. Hume's Theory of the Passions and of Morals (Berkeley, 1950), p. 113. Glathe gives no attention to Hume's account of rules even though his work comprises a most careful study of Books H and III o f the Treatise.

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means of satisfaction. It is the function of this rule to bring about what Hume calls a "remedy" or a "restraint." The third characteristic, directiveness, is also stressed, for without the observance of this rule man will not be able to enjoy the benefits of society which are essential to his well being. Hece the notion of coherence is extended to the requirements of the social order. Originally, there is no moral sanction involved in the following of this rule, and the "ought" .involved here is a purely prudential one based upon the fact that without compliance to this rule the social fabric will be destroyed. Once established and their utility reco~iTed, a moral sentiment comes to be attached to ~hese rules and their obed~ience becomes a moral as well as a prudential requirement. With the formation of government, legal sanctions are brought into being and a host of social forces converge to aid in the inculcation and promotion of these rules. The artifices of politicians, the concern of each man for his reputation, parenta1 concern, private education and public praise, all "assist interest and reflection." (500) Thus, when Hume speaks of the "rules of justice," it is clear that he intends us to understand this discussion from the perspective of his treatment of rules in Books I and II. There is additional internal evidence to justify this claim. In discussing general rules in Book I, Hume makes reference to "rules of good breeding" which "condemn whatever is openly disobliging, and gives a sensible pain and confusion to those with whom we converse." (152) In Book III the "rules of good breeding" are compared to the "laws of nature" or artificial virtues. In like manner, therefore, as we establish the laws of nature, in order to secure property in society, and prevent the opposition of self-interest; we establish rules of good breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive. (597) This seems to be decisive support for the claim that axtifieial virtues are regarded by Hume as reflective general rules.

V There is one other important use of general rules made by Hume which occurs in the concluding section of the Treatise. In the presentation of this part of Hume's moral theory, two issues must be separated. One is the experience of the moral sentiments; the other is the judgments made which have these sentiments as their basis. The form of Hume's argument will be familiar for his claim is that the moral sentiments require correction by reflective principles if one is to be a "judicious spectator." (581)

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Hume begins by stressing the pervasive influence of the mechanism of sympathy in accounting for moral approval. This discussion is familiar and does not require comment. However, of special interest here are Hume's comments regarding two circumstances "which may seem objections to the present system." (580) The first stems from the fact that the intensity of the sentiments we receive sympathetically is variable according to the relationships in which we stand to those with whom we sympathize: But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualifies in China as in England. They appear equaUy virtuous, and recommend themsdves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator. The sympathy varies without a variation in our esteem. Our esteem therefore, proceeds not from sympathy. (581) Hume points out that our own personal situation is "in continual fluctuation," and if our moral pronouncements reflected only our personal perspectives, " . . . 'tis impossible w e cou'd ever converse together on any reasonable terms . . . . " (581) The soletion to this fluctuation is the provision of a rule which specifies the point of view which a legitimate moral judgment must reflect. H e proceeds to state this point of view: " ' T i s therefore from the influence of characters and qualities, upon those who have an intercourse with any person that we praise or blame him." (582) Given this point of view, it follows that moral judgments are strictly impartial: "We consider not whether the pecsons, affected by the qualifies, by our acquaintance or strangers, countrymen or foreigners." (582) Thus, the same pattern of a natural propensity ~equiring correction by a reflective principle or rule is found again. Here the xeflective awareness concerns the principles by which the mechanisms of sympathy are influenced, and unless certain natural propensities of sympathy were corrected it would be impossible for men to "converse together on reasonable terms" regardin, g moral matters. Before coming to the second objection Hume poses against his position, there are three matters Hume mentions in this discussion which should be underscored. It is emphasized that corrections are "common to all the senses . . . . " There is a corrective, reflective factor operative in perceptual reports as well as in moral and aesthetic determinations. "Momentary appearances," in each case, .require correction by reflection. Such corrections take place by the use of general rules. The second point is that our felt moral sentiments often are not affected by these corrections: But however the general principle of our blame or praise may be corrected by those other principles, 'tis certain, they are not altogether efficacious, nor do our passions often correspond entirely to the present theory. "I'is seldom men heartily love what lies at a distance from them, and what no way redounds to their particular benefit. . . . " (583)

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Just as the rules of justice do not obliterate the natural selfish propensity of man nor the causal rules the tendencies of the imagination, so these "other principles" do not always alter our- felt moral sentiments. However, and this is the third point, the reflective principles are "alone admitted as the standard of virtue and morality." (591) Furthermore, this reflective point of view alone determines when it is appropriate to use moral terms, for even when we cannot correct our sentiments, we can correct our language. (582) And the' the heart does not always take part with those general notions, or regulate its love and hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools. (603) These corrective principles hence determine when one can appropriately use moral terms, and, thus, when one can be said to be making moral judgments as opposed to judgments reflecting one's own interests alone. We come now to the second consideration whioh H u m e concedes as counting prima facie against his thesis that sympathetic feelings are the predominant source of moral approval. The dit~culty arises from Hume's recognition that there might be a person the natural tendencies of whose actions would normally be beneficial to those around him, yet "particular accidents" prevent this person's activities from realizing their intended consequences. It would seem that sympathy with the good of mankind is possible only if the good has .in fact been achieved. This view, however, would contradict Hume's already stated claim that motives alone are the appropriate objects of moral evaluation. " ' T i s evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motive that produced them . . . . T h e external performance has no merit." (477) To Hume's specification of the point of view of a moral judgment, we see that such judgments also have a specified object. The manner in which he resolves the seeming discrepancy between the object of a moral judgment and the effects of sympathy is interesting because we also find here the operation of the generalizing propensity of the imaginalion. The first question as to why we are able to sympathize with "consequences" which are not realized is dealt w.ith as follows: . . . where any object, in all its parts, is fitted to attain any agreeable end, it naturally gives pleasure, and is esteem'd beautiful, even the' some external circumstances be wanting to render it altogether effectual, q'is sufficient if everything be compleat in the object itself. . . . Where a character is, in every respect, fitted to be beneficial to society, the imagination passes easily from the cause to the effect, without considering that there are still some circumstances wanting to render the cause a compleat one. General rules create a species o f probability, which sometimes influences the judgment, and always the imagination. (584-585) Hume is claiming here that our approval ,in these c.a~ses rests upon the propensity of the imagination to generalize from one set of circumstances in which certain

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qualifies have produced good consequences to resembling ones in which the qualifies are seemingly present but the consequences prevented. This generMizing tendeney has a~ready been explained though in this case Hume does not regard this propensity as a source of error. Yet there is still necessity here for the operation of those general rules which "sometimes influences the judgment." This function .is necessary because our sympathies are "more lively" when the effect of a virtuous motive is existent, and "yet we do not say that it ,is more virtuous, or that we esteem it more." (585) Hume regards this as a parallel instance of the correction .involved when "we correct the different sentiments of virtue, which proceed from ,its different distances from ourselves. . . . " (585) Here again, reflecting on the nature of sympathy, rules a~re formulated which enable us to correct certain natural propensities, and thus to provide order in the interpretation of moral experience. VI The object of this paper has been to discuss a neglected aspect of Hume's account of experience in the Treatise. 2x Human nature is subject to the influence of certain feelings and propensities which if uncorrected tend to result in erroneous belief and action. General rules serve this corrective function, and Hume asserts that those who employ these rules are the "wi,se" and "judicious." The importance to Hume of these .rules is underscored by the fact that they appear in each book of the Treatise. T h e recognition of this function permits us to understand how Hume sought to avoid the apparently sceptical, subjective consequences of his emphasis on the role of feeling in both cognitive and moral experience. The task remains of working out in detail the 4inplications of a proper appreciation of general rules for various issues in Hume's philosophy. In some cases, the direction such work might take seems rather clear and quite suggestive. For example, there has been a scholarly eontxoversy concerning whether Hume's moral theory is more adequately characterized as some form of naturalism or non-cognitivism. The results of this study suggest that a genuine moral judgment for I-Iume is the outcome of certain moral feelings corrected or evaluated by general rules. If so, Hume's view of moral judgment would appear to approximate the "qualified attitude" theory whose best known recent advocate is Richard Brandt. 22 This interpretation, if sustained, would represent a considerable cla~cation of the issues basic to the understanding of Hume's moral philosophy.
College of William and M a r y

~1 Other than the Treatise, the work in which .most use is made of general rules is the Enquiry Concerning the Principles o/ Morals. See especially Sections V, IX, Appendix I. There are scattered references to these rules in Hume's other works. as Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs,NJ., 1959), Ch. 10.