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Strategy of the
United Kingdom
Security in an interdependent world
The National Security Strategy
of the United Kingdom
Security in an interdependent world
March 2008
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Contents
1
Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Providing security for the nation and directly and also have the potential to
for its citizens remains the most important undermine wider international stability. They
responsibility of government. include international terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction, conflicts and failed
1.2 Since the end of the Cold War,
states, pandemics, and trans-national crime.
the international landscape has been
These and other threats and risks are driven
transformed. The opposition between
by a diverse and interconnected set of
two power blocs has been replaced by a
underlying factors, including climate change,
more complex and unpredictable set of
competition for energy, poverty and poor
relationships. Economic trends, including
governance, demographic changes and
more open global markets, and technological
globalisation.
trends, particularly in communications, have
strengthened the connections between 1.4 The aim of this first National Security
individuals, businesses, societies and Strategy is to set out how we will
economies. Travel is faster and cheaper than address and manage this diverse though
ever, the flow of ideas and capital around interconnected set of security challenges and
the world can be almost instantaneous, and underlying drivers, both immediately and in
distances between people and events are the longer term, to safeguard the nation, its
becoming less relevant. All those are positive citizens, our prosperity and our way of life.
changes, empowering individuals and
1.5 The scope and approach of this strategy
creating new opportunities for businesses,
reflects the way our understanding of
organisations and whole nations. But they
national security has changed.1 In the past,
also create new challenges.
the state was the traditional focus of foreign,
1.3 Ifthe international landscape as a whole defence and security policies, and national
is increasingly complex and unpredictable, security was understood as dealing with the
so too is the security landscape. No state protection of the state and its vital interests
threatens the United Kingdom directly. The from attacks by other states. Over recent
Cold War threat has been replaced by a decades, our view of national security has
diverse but interconnected set of threats broadened to include threats to individual
and risks, which affect the United Kingdom citizens and to our way of life, as well as
3
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
4
Chapter One: Introduction
Legislation
• New powers to tackle terrorism and
secure successful prosecutions, including
control orders, extended stop and
search powers, new offences of acts
preparatory, encouraging and glorifying
terrorism, and training for terrorism;
extended pre-charge detention; and
extended proscription of terrorist
organisations
• New powers for both central and local
government to coordinate responses to
domestic emergencies.
5
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
2.1 Our approach to national security is 2.2 We will be hard-headed about the
clearly grounded in a set of core values. risks, our aims, and our capabilities. We
They include human rights, the rule of law, will adopt a rigorous approach to assessing
legitimate and accountable government, the threats and risks to our security, and
justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity the options for tackling them. That means
for all. Those values define who we are being clear and realistic about our aims, and
and what we do. They form the basis of about the capabilities we and others have
our security, as well as our well-being and to achieve them. At home, our aim should
our prosperity. We will protect and respect be that people are able to go about their
them at home, and we will promote them business without fear and with a reasonable
consistently in our foreign policy. At home, assurance of safety. Some risk is inevitable,
our belief in liberty means that new laws to and the Government’s role is to minimise
deal with the changing terrorist threat will be and mitigate it. We must also continually
balanced with the protection of civil liberties review where government can best focus
and strong parliamentary and judicial its efforts, and where other sectors or
oversight. Overseas, our belief in the rule countries or international institutions
of law means we will support a rules-based should be encouraged to play their part.
approach to international affairs, under In an increasingly interdependent world,
which issues are resolved wherever possible we cannot opt out of overseas engagement.
through discussion and due process, with But overseas especially we need to be
the use of force as a last resort. We believe realistic, and set realistic expectations,
that this set of core values is a potential about what we can achieve.
basis for broad agreement, not just in the
United Kingdom but everywhere – and that
the best way to spread not just well-being
and prosperity but also security, is to build
a progressive coalition of governments and
people in support of those values.
6
Chapter Two: Guiding principles
2.3 Wherever possible, we will tackle with the United Kingdom2, but collective
security challenges early. We are action – notably through the United Nations
committed to improving our ability to scan (UN), European Union (EU) and the North
the horizon for future security risks, and to Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) –
developing our capabilities for preventive remains the most effective way of managing
action. The most effective way to tackle all and reducing the threats we face, and the
the major security challenges involves early only prospect of eliminating any of them
engagement. The most effective way to completely. The threats and drivers are
reduce the long-term threat from terrorism increasingly trans-national, and demand a
is to tackle the causes of violent extremism, trans-national response. The preparations
both at home and overseas. Similarly, the for the September 11 terrorist attacks in
most effective way to reduce the threat 2001 spanned several continents, and so
posed by failed states is to support fragile did the effects: the World Bank estimated
states in strengthening their governance, the reduction of global GDP at almost 1%.
their development and their security We believe that a multilateral approach – in
capabilities, and to improve the capacity particular a rules-based approach led by
of the international community to act to international institutions – brings not only
stop states degenerating, like Afghanistan greater effectiveness but also, crucially,
and Somalia in the 1990s, or Zimbabwe greater legitimacy. And just as globalisation
today. The most effective way to reduce the exacerbates the challenges, it also creates
potential security consequences of issues new opportunities for a multilateral
such as climate change and rising energy response, using trading, political, social and
demand is to take the tough decisions now cultural links to build wider cooperation.
to tackle them, both as global issues in their We believe that the current international
own right and their implications for global institutions, from the UN Security Council
security. to the World Bank, need to become more
ambitious, effective and representative. We
2.4 Overseas, we will favour a
will use our established position within those
multilateral approach. The ultimate
institutions to work for further reform.
responsibility for our national security lies
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The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
We also recognise that sometimes the best involved in counter-terrorism. We will work
approach will be more flexible alliances, with owners or operators to protect critical
coalitions or bilateral relationships tailored sites and essential services; with business
to particular issues. The partnership with the to improve resilience; with local authorities
United States is our most important bilateral and communities to plan for emergencies
relationship and central to our national and to counter violent extremism; and
security, including through its engagement with individuals, where changing people’s
in NATO. The EU has a vital role in securing behaviour is the best way to mitigate risk.
a safer world both within and beyond
2.6 Inside government, we will develop a
the borders of Europe. We recognise that
more integrated approach. The distinction
encouraging a more positive attitude to the
between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ policy is
United Kingdom across the world will bring
unhelpful in a world where globalisation can
lasting benefits not just to our prosperity
exacerbate domestic security challenges, but
but to our security, and that the best way
also bring new opportunities to tackle them.
to promote that is engagement at every
Similarly, the traditional contrast between
level – government, business, civil society,
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power obscures recent
education, and individuals.
experience of post-conflict stabilisation,
2.5 At home, we will favour a which shows how success in building
partnership approach. Traditionally, security depends on political and economic
the Government has been expected to development. More generally, the major
deal with the threats and risks to national security challenges require an integrated
security through the Armed Forces, the response that cuts across departmental
police, border staff, and the intelligence lines and traditional policy boundaries. This
and security agencies. Increasingly, the National Security Strategy outlines some of
changing nature of the threats and risks, the ways in which our approach has become
and our improved understanding of the best more integrated, but also identifies where
way to respond to them, demand broader we need to go further – indeed its existence
partnerships. We will build on the coalition is a reflection of the Government’s ambition
of public, private and third sectors already to work more closely together at home and
overseas to achieve our security objectives.
8
Chapter Two: Guiding principles
9
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
3.1 However insecure we might sometimes ambition than terrorist threats we have faced
feel in today’s fast-changing and complex in the past.
world, in many ways we are more secure
3.3 Since August 2006 we have published
than most countries and more secure
the terrorist threat level, based on a new and
than at most times in our history. There
more transparent assessment system. The
is a very low risk of military attack on the
threat has remained at the second-highest
United Kingdom in the foreseeable future.
level, ‘severe’, except for two short periods
Our ability to forecast emergencies and
during August 2006 and June and July 2007,
catastrophic events, and reduce their impact,
when it was raised to the highest level,
is improving. But the security landscape is
‘critical’.3
increasingly complex and unpredictable,
and we face a diverse and interconnected 3.4 Atany one time the police and the
set of challenges. This chapter sets out our security and intelligence agencies are
assessment of the major threats and risks, contending with around 30 plots, 200
both immediate and longer term, and the groups or networks, and 2,000 individuals
trends and factors which drive them. Our who are judged to pose a terrorist threat.
responses are set out in Chapter Four. 3.5 Many of those networks and individuals
share an ambition to cause mass casualties
Threats and risks without warning. Some are willing to use
Terrorism suicide attacks, and have aspirations to
use chemical, biological and radiological
3.2 The United Kingdom faces a serious and
weapons. Those tactics are quite unlike
sustained threat from violent extremists,
terrorist threats we have faced in the past.
claiming to act in the name of Islam.
Although they have very little support among 3.6 Terrorists
also aspire to attack our critical
communities in this country, and their claims national infrastructure; and to use new
to religious justification are widely regarded methods, including electronic attack.
as false, the threat is greater in scale and
10
Chapter Three: Security challenges
3.7 Recent attacks and attempted attacks and others, also continue to require attention.
in the United Kingdom and on our citizens
3.9 While terrorism represents a threat to
and interests overseas reflect a wider trans-
all our communities, and an attack on our
national trend. Since the 1990s there have
values and our way of life, it does not at
been high-profile attacks in the Middle East,
present amount to a strategic threat. But
north and east Africa, south Asia, east Asia,
it is qualitatively and quantitatively more
mainland Europe, and the United States.
serious than the terrorist threats we have
There is no single chain of command or
faced in the past, and it is likely to persist for
entity behind this pattern of activity. The
many years.
Al Qaeda leadership, who had pretensions
to fill this role, have been under pressure Nuclear weapons and other weapons
from international military, intelligence of mass destruction
and police action since 2001, including the 3.10 Sixtyyears after their invention and
disruption of their safe havens, notably in almost 40 years after the Nuclear Non-
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. It is also in Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear weapons
the nature of the new terrorist threat that remain potentially the most destructive
it is not a single organisation but a wider threat to global security. While the global
network of affiliated groups, often sharing a stockpile has reduced since the Cold War,
common ideology and outlook. The degree large arsenals remain. The number of
of structure and level of professionalism nuclear-armed states has also increased,
exhibited by those groups vary, but they even if the NPT has helped ensure that fewer
very often work together, exploiting modern states have acquired nuclear weapons than
travel and communications (especially the many predicted, and some (for example
internet) to share information, personnel and South Africa and Libya) have abandoned
training, and to spread a common ideology their programmes. North Korea has
– working together in ways that were not conducted a test of a nuclear device and
possible for terrorist groups in the past. tests of ballistic missiles, and Iran continues
3.8 Othergroups, including dissident Irish to pursue nuclear activities in defiance
republican activists, animal rights extremists of United Nations (UN) Security Council
11
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
obligations. Both North Korea and Iran are of pose a direct threat to the United Kingdom,
particular concern because of their attitude but we will continue to monitor their ability
to international institutions and treaties, to produce weapons, the development
and because of the impact of their activities and proliferation of potential delivery
on stability in regions crucial to global mechanisms, and the possibility of material
security. But we oppose all proliferation, as falling into the hands of terrorists.
undermining our objectives of de-escalation
and multilateral disarmament, and increasing Trans-national organised crime
the risk of instability in the international 3.14 Organised crime involving fraud, the
system and ultimately the risk of nuclear trade in illegal drugs and illegal weapons,
confrontation. illegal immigration and human trafficking
(especially of women and children),
3.11 We judge that no state currently has
is increasing across the world. Where
both the intent and the capability to pose a
those activities thrive, they threaten lives
direct nuclear threat to the United Kingdom
and legitimate livelihoods; undermine
or its vital interests. But we cannot rule out
and corrupt economies, societies and
the risk that such a threat will re-emerge
governments; help cause or exacerbate state
over future decades.
failure, in some cases leading to civil war and
3.12 We also monitor: the possibility of violent conflict; and can directly or indirectly
nuclear weapons or material or technology support terrorism.
(including commercial) falling into the hands
3.15 Those phenomena are not new, but
of terrorists, who we know have ambitions
they are taking new forms and exploiting
to acquire it; and the proliferation of the
new opportunities, including revolutionary
technology behind ballistic missiles, which
changes in technology and communications,
increases the chance of either new states or
and increased global movements of goods,
non-state actors being able to threaten the
people and ideas. While the effects reach
United Kingdom directly in the future.
down into our neighbourhoods, for example
3.13 Anumber of states retain the ability to through the trade in illegal weapons and
produce chemical and biological weapons. drugs, the groups and networks involved are
Again, we do not judge that they currently increasingly trans-national. Governments and
12
Chapter Three: Security challenges
13
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
3.19 Some regions in the wider Middle East or fragile states. A failed state is one whose
and Africa suffer from the distinct problem government is not effective or legitimate
of violent conflicts that are individually enough to maintain the rule of law, protect
unpredictable but collectively frequent, itself, its citizens and its borders, or provide
persistent and self-reinforcing, fuelling the the most basic services. A fragile state is one
proliferation of conventional weapons and in which those problems are likely to arise.
preventing the progress in governance and Failed and fragile states increase the risk
economic development that would build of instability and conflict, and at the same
long-term stability. time have a reduced capacity to deal with
it, as we see in parts of Africa. They have
3.20 Allviolent conflicts are humanitarian
the potential to destabilise the surrounding
catastrophes, and the United Kingdom has
region. Many fragile states lack the capacity
a moral responsibility to work with other
and, in some cases, the will adequately to
countries and the international community
address terrorism and organised crime, in
to prevent, mediate and mitigate conflict,
some instances knowingly tolerating or
as well as contribute to post-conflict
directly sponsoring such activity. That was the
stabilisation and peacebuilding. But violent
situation in Afghanistan, where the Taleban
conflict overseas has implications that are not
regime sheltered terrorist training camps
confined to the area or region in question
before the terrorist attacks in September
and can directly affect national security.
2001, and with narcotics networks in several
That is especially true of regions which are
parts of the world, for example Southern
pivotal to global security, such as the wider
Afghanistan and West Africa.
Middle East, or which directly affect British
interests, such as the Pashtun Belt straddling Civil emergencies
the border between the sovereign states of
3.22 We monitor closely the risks of
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
infectious disease, extreme weather,
3.21 Inthe past, most violent conflicts and and man-made emergencies. We assess
significant threats to global security came that the highest risk is an influenza-type
from strong states. Currently, most of the pandemic, like the outbreak in 1918
major threats and risks emanate from failed which killed 228,000 people in the United
14
Chapter Three: Security challenges
Kingdom and an estimated 20–40 million 3.24 Because of the scale and speed of
worldwide. Experts agree that there is a high the risk they pose, those phenomena have
probability of a pandemic occurring – and similar potential to other security challenges
that, as the SARS (severe acute respiratory to threaten our normal way of life across
syndrome) outbreak showed, the speed significant areas of the country with little
at which it could spread has increased warning. Moreover, our approach to them
with globalisation. We estimate that a – to assess and monitor the risks, to learn
pandemic could cause fatalities in the United from experiences at home and overseas, to
Kingdom in the range 50,000 to 750,000, develop capabilities to minimise the risks
although both the timing and the impact are and the potential harm, and to absorb
impossible to predict exactly. The second- whatever harm does occur and then return
highest risk is coastal flooding on a scale that to normality as soon as possible – is similar
last took place along a thousand miles of the to our approach to other national security
east coast in 1953, killing 300 people. Even challenges, including terrorism.
with today’s improved defences, a repeat
of coastal or tidal flooding on that scale State-led threats to the United
Kingdom
could result in the flooding of hundreds of
thousands of properties, and the need to 3.25 Ourassessment remains the same as in
evacuate and shelter hundreds of thousands the 1998 Strategic Defence Review: for the
of people. foreseeable future, no state or alliance will
have both the intent and the capability to
3.23 Additional risks include: other forms
threaten the United Kingdom militarily, either
of infectious disease (epidemic rather than
with nuclear weapons or other weapons
pandemic); river flooding similar to during
of mass destruction, or with conventional
the summer of 2007, which seriously
forces.
damaged or disrupted over 50,000 homes
and businesses; and other forms of extreme 3.26 TheUnited Kingdom does, however,
weather, which we expect to become more remain subject to high levels of covert
frequent and more severe, as a result of non-military activity by foreign intelligence
climate change. organisations. A number of countries
continue to devote considerable time
15
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
and energy to trying to obtain political insecurity, instability, or conflict. They are
and economic intelligence, and trying to major global issues with implications beyond
steal sensitive technology on civilian and national security, and security may not even
military projects. They increasingly combine be the primary reason for tackling them. In
traditional intelligence methods with many cases the risks to global well-being and
new and sophisticated technical attacks, prosperity would be sufficient in themselves
attempting to penetrate computer networks to demand action. This strategy, however,
through the internet. focuses on the security implications.
16
Chapter Three: Security challenges
3.31 Overall,there is a good case for saying 3.32 Despite those positive signs, the
that international institutions are stronger international security architecture has yet to
than ever. The UN has adapted to many adapt satisfactorily to the new landscape.
changes in the international landscape The UN Security Council has failed to adapt
since it was set up 60 years ago. Since to the rise of new powers. Across all the
the end of the Cold War in particular, its key institutions, the level of ambition in
membership has acted with greater vigour the face of new challenges remains too
in discharging its responsibilities for security. low, and the response to crises too slow.
Observers have attributed a significant part As well as notable successes, there have
of the reduction in global conflicts over this been high-profile failures, including Rwanda
period to greater UN engagement: there and frustration over Darfur. The pressure
was a six-fold increase in UN-led preventive on international institutions is likely to
diplomacy missions between 1990 and grow, most acutely with new challenges in
2002, and there has been a seven-fold the areas of climate change and resource
increase in the number of UN peacekeepers competition. Pressure will also grow
in the field over the last 10 years, with over because in a multi-polar world, international
100,000 peacekeepers now deployed in an institutions will be expected to bear more
expanded range of situations. There are also of the weight in responding to security
positive signs at the regional level, with the challenges, at the same time as demands for
emergence of security communities where reform will increase.
strong, rules-based regional institutions,
3.33 How the international system responds
often built on shared economic interests,
to those pressures, and in particular how
are increasingly playing a role in regional
well it succeeds in entrenching the rules-
security and reducing the risk of violent
based approach to resolving disputes and
conflict. The most obvious examples are
dealing with states that violate international
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and
laws and norms, will be one of the most
the European Union, both of which have
significant factors in both global security and
expanded their membership and their role in
the United Kingdom’s national security over
recent years, but there is potential in other
the coming decades.
areas, including the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and, over the longer term, the
African Union.
17
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
18
Chapter Three: Security challenges
developed world, with large cities relying on there are still over two billion people living
energy supply from far away. The premium on less than a dollar a day, with the biggest
attached to energy security, and the rising challenges for poverty reduction being in
risk of energy shortages, will increase the sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Poverty
potential for disputes and conflict. Countries in turn increases vulnerability to infectious
including China and Russia are already disease: the incidence and death rates of
making control of energy supply a foreign HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria are all
policy priority. highest in sub-Saharan Africa. The picture
on inequality within states is mixed, and
3.39 Likeclimate change, competition for
inequality between states is increasing.
energy is a global challenge in its own right,
Together, poverty, disease, and inequality
but also one with potentially serious security
can undermine political and economic
implications. Along with climate change and
development, fuel instability, increase the
water stress, it is one of the biggest potential
risk of violent conflict, and create grievances
drivers of the breakdown of the rules-based
which can be exploited by violent extremists.
international system and the re-emergence
of major inter-state conflict, as well as 3.42 The single biggest positive driver of
increasing regional tensions and instability. security within and between states is the
presence of legitimate, accountable and
Poverty, inequality, and poor capable government operating by the rule
governance
of law. Its absence – because of dictatorship,
3.40 Poverty,inequality, lack of economic state-sponsored violence, weak, ineffective
development and opportunity, and poor or corrupt government, or civil war – both
governance are all highly correlated with exacerbates the immediate threats outlined
insecurity and instability, both in individual above, and undermines the capacity to
countries and across regions. respond to them.
3.41 Worldwide levels of absolute poverty 3.43 Recent decades have witnessed
are falling, helped by economic growth, the further spread of democracy, with
increased trade and overseas aid. These authoritarian regimes being replaced by
welcome trends are set to continue. But democratically elected governments across
19
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
southern and eastern Europe, east Asia, parts continued development, and a more equal
of Africa, and Latin America. Over the long distribution of its benefits, is – alongside
term, we can expect that, with the support strengthening the rules-based international
of the United Kingdom and other countries, system – the best route to future peace and
and institutions such as the European Union security. As a trading nation committed to
and the UN, democracy will continue to remaining at the forefront of technological
spread, and governance to improve, with advances, the United Kingdom is well placed
resulting benefits for global security as well to benefit from globalisation, but has a clear
as for well-being and prosperity. But it will interest in monitoring and addressing the
be a long and uneven path, and dictatorship, related challenges and vulnerabilities.
corruption, weak or absent government,
3.46 The first set of challenges and
and civil war will remain a feature of the
vulnerabilities is economic. Last year, total
landscape over the coming decades.
United Kingdom imports and exports were
3.44 Ina number of countries in the wider over £750 billion (or about 55% of GDP),
Middle East and Africa, the prevailing and 95% of our visible international trade is
political system remains autocratic, with reliant on shipping. Business and consumers
strong internal security agencies but increasingly benefit from global supply
poor governance and limited popular chains, and from our status as a global
participation. In some, the political system hub for business and travel. Our success in
is facing the new challenge of the entry exploiting those opportunities contributes
into politics of militia movements associated to high levels of employment and standards
with violence and violent extremist ideology, of living, and to international influence. But
including Hezbollah and Hamas. These it relies on a relatively benign international
movements have combined violence with environment, and requires us to consider our
being the de facto providers of welfare to vulnerability to risks to open markets and
large parts of impoverished populations. global financial stability, and potentially to
physical threats to global supply chains.
Global trends
3.47 Thesecond set of challenges and
3.45 Globalisation brings huge benefits,
vulnerabilities is technological. As
to security as well as prosperity. Ensuring its
20
Chapter Three: Security challenges
economies and societies grow increasingly 6.2 billion today to 9.5 billion in less than
dependent on national and global electronic 50 years. The trend towards urbanisation
information and communication systems, it is set to continue, with the proportion of
becomes even more important to manage the global population living in cities rising
the risk of disruption to their integrity and from under 50% in 2000 to over 60% in
availability through cyber-attack, whether 2030, accelerated by the pressures of climate
terrorist, criminal, or state-led. Diversity change and the pull of employment in cities
of systems can provide resilience, but can linked to the globalising world economy.
also lead to increased complexity and
3.50 A growing and increasingly urbanised
interdependence, making the whole more
global population will increase demand
vulnerable to attacks or accidental shocks.
for food and water, at the same time
3.48 The internet in particular offers as climate change and other trends put
individuals, business, third sector groups, greater pressure on their supply. Already
and governments a wide range of new well over a billion people suffer from water
opportunities ranging from fast and reliable shortages, and 30 countries get more than
financial transactions to new ways of a third of their water from outside their
keeping in touch with friends. The internet borders. With climate change, those figures
is itself a trans-national, fast-changing and are likely to grow, increasing the possibility
loosely-governed entity, but is also part of of disputes. Climate change will also add
our critical national infrastructure. It is both a to the pressure on food supplies, through
target and an opportunity for hostile states, decreased rainfall in many areas, and climate-
terrorists and criminals. Some are intent on related crop failures. Increasing wealth will
destroying the infrastructure itself; others on further increase demand for food: the United
exploiting the internet’s trans-national, fast- Kingdom is leading international efforts to
changing and loosely-governed nature to reduce the numbers of people living on less
conduct illegal activity. than a dollar a day, but we must recognise
that this will increase the global demand
3.49 Thethird set of challenges and
for meat and dairy products, and further
vulnerabilities is demographic. The world’s
increase overall demand for grain. We should
population is expected to grow from
21
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
therefore plan for continued pressure on 1960 and 2005. The number continues to
grain prices and on food reserves. Global increase, particularly in developed countries.
grain supplies, measured by the number of Migration brings major economic benefits.
days’ supply per head of population, are In destination countries, it supports economic
currently at their lowest historical level (40 growth and labour market flexibility. In
days), and are increasingly dependent on source countries, it generates remittances
international shipping. from migrant workers, which the World
Bank estimates are now twice the total
3.51 A rising and increasingly urbanised
of global aid. The openness of economies
population can also have more immediate
and societies is one of the major drivers of
effects on stability. The largest-ever
long-term stability and security. A negative
generation of teenagers is reaching working
global reaction to migration and a move
age in poor countries where unemployment
towards closed economies and societies
is already high. When this development
would increase overall risks. But the global
is combined with factors such as rapid
movement of people also brings challenges
urbanisation, political exclusion, and a lack
for security: including identifying, among
of basic services and economic opportunity,
these increasing flows, those individuals who
they present risks of increased political
are security threats; and managing the effects
instability, disorder, violent conflict and
on infrastructure and social cohesion of large
extremism. Over the next decade these
and relatively rapid inflows of people.
conditions will come together in countries
in the most fragile regions of the world: The interdependence of threats,
the wider Middle East, south Asia, and risks and drivers
sub-Saharan Africa.
3.53 There are a number of common strands
3.52 Global migration is driven both by wider running through the threats, risks and drivers
demographic pressures, and by the economic outlined in previous sections. The first is
aspects of globalisation. According to UN their trans-national nature; the second, the
statistics, the number of people living outside prominence of non-state actors. In part those
their country of birth more than doubled result from the absence of an immediate
from 75 million to 191 million between state-led threat to the United Kingdom,
22
Chapter Three: Security challenges
which leads us rightly to focus elsewhere; through into state failure or increased
and in part they reflect wider trends, migration, and reinforcing continuing
including globalisation. The third theme is poverty. Poverty increases instability and the
their interdependence. Understanding those risks of conflict, increases both the likelihood
interdependencies is critical to adapting our and the effect of acute resource competition,
responses, for example: the potential links and can be a driver of migration. Finally,
between terrorism and organised crime (for climate change and related effects on water,
example in Afghanistan); the ability of both energy and food security will multiply other
to subvert governments or economies and threats and interact with other drivers of
cause state failure; the links between state insecurity, including demographic pressures
failure and regional conflict, or between and the spread of disease.
nuclear proliferation and regional conflict;
3.55 The complex and unpredictable
and the link between the strength of the
interaction of those multiple stresses will
rules-based international system and the
increase the pressure on social, economic
potential re-emergence of a major state-led
and political structures, particularly in those
threat to the United Kingdom.
countries least able to cope, and therefore
3.54 That interdependence also applies most likely to tip into instability, conflict
to the underlying drivers of insecurity; or state failure. That is likely to apply most
and it is highly complex and dynamic. acutely in parts of Africa and the wider
Economic shocks can tip fragile societies Middle East, where so many of the stresses
and economies into state failure. Regional identified above are present together.
conflicts can exacerbate tensions over energy
3.56 Theconstructive implication to be
supply. The combination of demographic
drawn from the close relationship between
pressures, such as urbanisation and the
the threats, risks and drivers of insecurity, is
growing proportion of young people, with
that there are important synergies between
political exclusion and a lack of economic
our policy responses. Our investment in
opportunity, can create a vicious circle of
responses to new threats, such as cyber-
economic crisis, food insecurity, political
attack, will potentially help us in responding
crisis, and violent extremism – feeding
to a wide range of different hostile actors
23
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
24
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
25
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
4.6 Protect includes: work with partners 4.8 Prevent includes: work to challenge the
in the private sector and local government, ideology behind violent extremism and to
and others to improve the protection of our support the voices of the peaceful majority;
critical infrastructure, hazardous sites and action to disrupt those who promote violent
materials, and crowded places (including extremism, and to support communities and
cinemas, theatres, pubs, nightclubs, institutions (for example, mosques, colleges,
restaurants, hotels and commercial centres, universities, and prisons) in developing
hospitals, schools and places of worship); strategies to resist it; giving advice and
work with architects and planners to ‘design- support to young people and their families to
in’ safe areas, and blast-resistant materials resist recruitment to violent extremism; and
and enhanced physical protection against addressing grievances exploited by those who
vehicle bomb attacks; and work at our promote terrorism, for example highlighting
borders and with international partners to our positive work overseas, including support
improve our ability to track and intercept for the Middle East peace process, to
foreign terrorist suspects, and British challenge the violent extremist narrative.
suspects travelling to terrorist training camps
4.9 The work of Prevent will only succeed
overseas.
with the active participation of the widest
4.7 Prepare includes: work to improve cross-section of society, including central
resilience at national, regional and local government, voluntary and community
level – with the Government, the police and groups, regional and local government,
emergency services operating in partnership policing, the education and youth sector,
with the private sector, local government, faith groups, and the arts and media. It
and others to ensure that our communities means ensuring that we empower local
are prepared for a terrorist attack and able authorities, institutions and communities to
to mitigate its consequences and return to deliver local solutions to local issues.
normal life as quickly as possible; as well
4.10 Likeall parts of CONTEST, Prevent
as capabilities to handle attacks on British
applies at home and overseas, including
citizens and interests abroad.
co-operation with individual countries to
challenge and resist violent extremism, to
26
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
reduce its impact on communities in the 4.12 Our work to strengthen our borders
United Kingdom, and to address grievances. and related work on the National Identity
In taking the strategy forward we will focus Scheme will also help in disrupting terrorist
on those countries and regions which have travel and restricting the use of false and
the most influence on the ideology behind multiple identities by terrorists. The Armed
violent extremism and which have the most Forces will maintain their contribution to
connections to communities in the United counter-terrorism at home and overseas.
Kingdom. We will also encourage the United We will continue to build closer links
Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and between our counter-terrorist effort and
Commonwealth to do more in this area. related programmes, including military and
civilian activities in Iraq and Afghanistan; our
4.11 Across all four strands of CONTEST,
approach to proliferation; protection against
we will continue to learn, adapt, and
electronic attack; and work to address poor
invest. As set out in Chapter One, the
governance, poverty and inequality, which
resources dedicated to counter-terrorism
can combine with other factors to become
and intelligence have more than doubled,
drivers of extremism, and which terrorist
from £1 billion in 2001 to £2.5 billion today,
groups exploit in their propaganda.
generating a major increase in our capability,
including new regional police counter- 4.13 Our approach to tackling terrorism is
terrorist units. Resources will continue to hard-headed about our aims and capabilities.
grow, with planned increases up to £3.5 Given the nature of the terrorist threat,
billion by 2011, including a further £240 success requires more than effective security
million for counter-terrorist policing, and and intelligence work, vital though that is.
additional growth in the Security Service In particular the work of Prevent, to stop
taking its strength to double 2001 levels; people becoming terrorists or supporting
improvements to our ability to monitor and violent extremism, requires challenge to
analyse violent extremism; and additional deep-seated ideas and grievances as well as
investment in the long-term challenge of immediate threats, something that cannot
tackling violent extremism and promoting be done by the Government alone, though
greater understanding – with we will continue to coordinate, drive, and
£70 million at home and £400 million fund it.
overseas over the next three years.
27
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
4.14 Our overall response to terrorism seeks – we are also determined to maintain the
to preserve both our security and the core balance of security and liberty, and above all
values on which our society depends – to maintain normal life, whether at airports,
values that are shared by the overwhelming on the train or underground networks, or in
majority living in the United Kingdom. The our communities.
current terrorist threat can itself be seen as
an attack not just on us but on those values, Countering terrorism – future
including human rights, the rule of law, priorities include:
justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity • delivering the Government’s Public
for all. We need to respond robustly, bringing Service Agreement – to ‘reduce the risk
those involved to justice while defending our to the United Kingdom and its interests
shared values, and resisting the provocation overseas from international terrorism’;
to over-react. At home, we will continue • continuing to build our capability to
to prosecute terrorists through the criminal detect and disrupt terrorists, in the
justice system wherever possible, updating United Kingdom and overseas, through
our legislation where necessary to take investment in the police and the
account of the evolving nature of the threat. security and intelligence agencies;
Overseas, where we detain terrorist suspects, • enhancing the protection against
our treatment of them will be subjected to terrorism provided by new border
the most demanding level of scrutiny by the technology and the new UK Border
International Committe of the Red Cross. We Agency;
have made clear that we are committed to
• increasing our capacity to deal with the
working with the United States to close its
consequences of a terrorist attack;
detention facility at Guantánamo Bay.
• delivering the improved range of
4.15 The threat from terrorism is real and, as projects and programmes to tackle
noted in paragraph 3.9, more serious than violent extremism, including working
those we have faced in the past, and likely to with partners overseas; and
persist for many years. But we must also keep
• addressing grievances and challenging
it firmly in perspective. While we will continue
the violent extremism narrative, for
to make the necessary changes to respond to
example highlighting our active support
the evolving terrorist threat – in strategy and for the Middle East Peace Process.
policy, structures, resources, and legal powers
28
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
29
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
relations if those obligations are met. announced alongside our 2006 decision to
Specifically, we will continue to support the maintain our deterrent – are now complete.
‘E3+3’ process (France, Germany and the
4.20 Detect includes: identifying, collecting
United Kingdom plus China, Russia and the
and assessing information on attempts
United States) in relation to Iran, and the
by proliferator states and terrorists to
Six-Party Talks in relation to North Korea. We
develop, acquire or use CBRN weapons;
will press for early entry into force of the
supporting the International Atomic Energy
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, including
Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the
completion of its verification system; seek
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
agreement to start negotiations without
other relevant international agencies, and
pre-conditions on a Fissile Material Cut-off
their inspection regimes; and using our
Treaty; and continue to support the Nuclear
security, intelligence and law enforcement
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the
capabilities to target proliferation networks
cornerstone of the international community’s
and financing. An important element of our
approach. In the run up to the 2010 NPT
ability to deter state-sponsored terrorism is
review conference, we will lead the
our capability to determine the source of
international effort to accelerate
material employed in any nuclear device.
disarmament among possessor states, in
We will retain and strengthen our world-
pursuit of our objective of a negotiated
leading forensic capability in this area and
elimination of all nuclear weapons. We have
we will also continue to work to strengthen
offered to host a technical conference for the
international expertise in this field.
five NPT Nuclear Weapons States on the
verification of nuclear disarmament. We will 4.21 Deny includes: working to strengthen
also continue to encourage the United States control regimes on proliferation-sensitive
and Russia to see their current bilateral materials, principally through the tightening
discussions as an opportunity for further of international export controls, but
reductions. Our own plans to make a further also strengthening the effectiveness of
20% reduction in our operationally available IAEA safeguards, and ensuring universal
warheads to fewer than 160, less than half implementation of relevant conventions
the planned level in 1997 – which we such as the International Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials;
strengthening the capacities of the IAEA
30
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
Nuclear Security Fund; and pushing hard for and failing states or terrorists, through
early agreement on a new IAEA-led system strengthening codes of conduct and
including a uranium enrichment bond to export control regimes, and improving the
help states secure fuel for new civil nuclear international monitoring architecture.
power programmes, while minimising
the risk of proliferation. We will continue Countering the threat of nuclear
to provide assistance through the Global weapons and other weapons of
mass destruction – future priorities
Threat Reduction Programme to the most
include:
vulnerable countries where nuclear material
is held, notably in the former Soviet Union. • continuing to address international
concerns about Iran’s nuclear
4.22 Defend includes: maintaining our
programme, notably through support for
independent nuclear deterrent, based on the E3+3 process; and supporting the
our 2006 assessment that we cannot rule Six-Party Talks in relation to North Korea;
out a nuclear threat to the United Kingdom
• achieving a positive outcome from the
re-emerging over the next 50 years. We
2010 NPT Review Conference;
will continue to equip our Armed Forces to
operate in a CBRN environment, and maintain • pushing hard for early agreement on
our capability to deter states from directly a new IAEA-led system to help states
sponsoring terrorists. secure fuel for new civil nuclear power
programmes, including through a
4.23 We adopt a similar integrated, uranium enrichment bond, in return for
multilateral approach to tackling chemical firm commitments to non-proliferation;
and biological weapons. We will work
• starting negotiations on a Fissile
to strengthen international conventions
Material Cut-Off Treaty and securing the
and to press possessor states to meet the
entry into force of the Comprehensive
agreed 2012 deadline for the destruction Test Ban Treaty;
of chemical weapons; strengthen the
international verification regime; work with • working with domestic and international
partners to reduce the risk from nuclear
experts to minimise the risk of misuse of
terrorism; and
commercial material; and seek to reduce the
risk of CBRN material, including commercial • maintaining the effectiveness of the
material, falling into the hands of failed Chemical Weapons Convention.
31
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
32
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
33
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
34
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
long-term peace and stability as part of 4.34 The longer-term challenge of security
a wider political strategy to stabilise and sector reform – building up the capacity of
rebuild the country or region in question, other countries to deliver their own security in
with neighbouring countries playing a a more effective, accountable and sustainable
constructive role, and with the support of way – is often a prerequisite for political and
the international community (this is discussed economic progress out of conflict or state
further below). failure, and an insurance against regression.
It includes a specific focus on trans-national
4.32 Second, economic support. As leading
and organised crime, which is a particular
supporters of the World Bank, and other
challenge in many countries emerging from
development-focused international financial
conflict, but it also requires a broad focus on
institutions, as well as through our own
building national and local security capacity,
development programmes, the United
including armed forces, police, and border
Kingdom helps to support the processes
forces, providing security for citizens as well
of economic and social development that
as for the state, and helping to build effective
are critical to the long-term prevention of
and accountable justice systems, from courts
violent conflict. We also recognise the crucial
to prisons.
role played by economic development in
an integrated approach to post-conflict 4.35 The United Kingdom is a leader
stabilisation. in promoting and supporting security
sector reform, and we are making a
4.33 Third, security support. Wherever
substantial investment in this area as part
possible, international peacekeeping and
of our capacity-building in a wide range of
peace enforcement should be carried out in
countries and regions. In Sierra Leone, we
partnership with local forces, both because
have supported the development of the
this is the likeliest route to success, and
Office of National Security, which played a
because local consent for international
vital role in ensuring a free, fair and peaceful
forces taking a security lead is likely to be
political transition in the recent Presidential
time‑limited. In Afghanistan, for example,
elections. We support the African Union
we are currently playing a leading role in
(AU), and advocate joint training exercises
international efforts to increase the capacity
with the EU or NATO. We run military
of the Afghan security forces.
35
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
exchange programmes and support military 4.37 As well as continuing to drive activity
training colleges, and we will build up a and capacity-building across all three areas of
similar approach in policing by identifying political, economic, and security support, we
and deploying more officers to act as recognise the common themes. In particular,
mentors, advisers and leaders in international the best chance of success in tackling and
police assistance missions, and supporting managing the linked challenges of instability,
exchange programmes and mentoring of conflict, and failed and fragile states comes
police colleges. from acting early, wherever possible in
a multilateral way, and as part of a fully
4.36 The final element of security support is
integrated approach.
countering the proliferation of conventional
weapons, which is a major driver of conflict 4.38 Early engagement limits the spread of
and instability. We are committed to effective instability and conflict, addresses threats
implementation of export controls at national to our national security at source, and
level, and recently announced an extension ultimately saves both lives and money. Early
of controls to cover brokering of small arms engagement will not always be enough. Not
by British citizens overseas. We will also assist all security problems are predictable. Even
other states to develop and implement the where they are, action will not always be
governance mechanisms needed to ensure possible, either because of conditions on
tough controls on arms transfers, and we will the ground or because of a lack of available
continue to play a leading role in pressing resources. Where action is possible, it will not
internationally for a legally binding Arms always be successful. So we need the ability
Trade Treaty, including by supporting the UN- to respond swiftly and decisively across the
convened Group of Governmental Experts. full range of intervention scenarios, not just
We have taken a leading role in working to prevent or mediate violent conflict, but
towards a ban on cluster munitions that also to stabilise situations in or emerging
cause unacceptable harm to civilians, last from violent conflicts, and to support
year withdrawing our two types of dumb recovery and reconstruction. In all those
cluster munition with immediate effect. scenarios, we need to recognise that there
are no quick fixes; that strategic patience
36
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
is essential; and that we must be clear and economic, and security resources at the
realistic about what success looks like – we disposal of different countries, and to
must not be too ambitious, and we must be provide the legitimacy on which effective
sensitive to local needs and local solutions. action demands. Multilateral working brings
its own challenges, including issues with
4.39 Across all those scenarios, we also need
burden-sharing (for example in Afghanistan)
to recognise the extent to which success
and speedy decision-making (for example in
depends on early and continuing analysis
Darfur). We advocate a clearer set of criteria
and understanding. Intervention without
for a range of international interventions,
sufficient preparation can be unsuccessful or
and a clearer and faster system for agreeing
even counterproductive. We will continue to
UN-assessed contributions. We will work
strengthen our national analytical capacity
with the EU to make continued good use of
for early warning and strategy development,
the EU’s Africa Peace Facility and to create a
enabling us to focus on building regional
predictable and sustainable EU mechanism
and country expertise where and when it is
for funding UN-authorised AU missions,
most needed. We will work with allies and
including their ability to deploy quickly.
international security institutions to do the
same. We will also strengthen our capacity 4.41 Finally,as our experience in Iraq
to monitor the effects of our actions, and and Afghanistan has shown, building
more systematically learn the lessons of our stability out of conflict or state failure is
experience in recent years in the Balkans, a complex undertaking which requires
Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Africa concerted, sustained, and integrated effort
and elsewhere, to improve our capacity to across security, politics and governance,
make a constructive contribution to future and economic development. Economic
challenges. development cannot happen in the absence
of basic security or effective governance,
4.40 Multilateral engagement, ideally
but nor can improvements in security and
through international institutions, is crucial
governance be sustained without broad-
both to allow the international community
based economic development.
to draw on the full range of political,
37
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
4.42 That was set out clearly in the United 4.44 The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Kingdom’s new strategy for Afghanistan have demanded extraordinary courage from
announced in December 2007. To ensure individuals and great commitment from a
that longer-term political and economic wide range of units across the three Services.
objectives are the guiding force behind the Their ability and readiness to carry out this
security campaign, we have brought British difficult work, the professionalism they have
civilian and military personnel together into shown and the international regard in which
a co-located headquarters – and we will they are held, are rightly a source of national
continue to strengthen their integration, pride. Our experience in Afghanistan in
working together and with the Afghan particular has reinforced our view that
government on security, the rule of law, security threats, including terrorism, are best
tribal reconciliation, and basic services tackled early, at source. It has also reinforced
such as roads, wells, schools and hospitals. the premium on forces that are deployable
We have set out clearer and more realistic and flexible, able to move rapidly between
objectives, and we are building closer different environments and different types
partnerships between NATO and Afghan of operations; and our belief that the most
security forces. demanding expeditionary operations are
likely to be conducted alongside US forces,
4.43 InIraq, unlike Afghanistan, our forces
either in coalition or in a NATO context,
are no longer in a leading security role,
and that if we wish to be able to continue
but they continue to contribute to security
to make a significant contribution to such
by training and mentoring Iraqi security
operations, our Armed Forces will need to be
forces, and maintaining ‘overwatch’.
capable of operating closely with US forces.
That is explicitly designed to support the
political and economic efforts on national 4.45 Some aspects of our operational
reconciliation and development, and experience since 2003 were not fully
our priority of working in partnership predicted, including the enduring nature of
with the Iraqi government, Iraqi business the operations and the particular premium on
and international business to unlock the certain kinds of capability, including protected
economic potential of Basra. patrol vehicles, battlefield support helicopters,
38
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
and surveillance. In the last two years, we to make them available for multilateral
have strengthened those capabilities. deployment. To support greater integration
on the ground, we have established a new
4.46 Elsewhere in the world, the United
£269 million Stabilisation Aid Fund and the
Kingdom’s military forces and civilian
Stabilisation Unit, jointly owned by DFID, the
stabilisation staff have a less visible and
FCO and the MOD. The British Embassy in
front-line role, but we are part of an
Afghanistan, our largest, embodies the new
international effort pursuing the same
joint way of working, with an integrated and
objectives and encouraging the same
inter-agency approach – with diplomatic,
integrated approach. For example, as part
political, governance, economic and
of our commitment to supporting security
financial, developmental, cultural, security,
and economic stability in the Occupied
military and British Council staff co-located
Palestinian Territories, we have committed
and working together on agreed objectives.
up to £243 million over three years, linked
We are looking at increasing the number
to tangible progress in peace negotiations,
of civilian staff in Afghanistan, and at
including progress on reform and the easing
strengthening the capacity within the armed
of movement and access restrictions.
forces to work alongside civilians for certain
4.47 To improve integration at the specific, short-term reconstruction and
multilateral level, we will work to ensure development tasks in hostile environments,
that the UN delivers its commitment to and to provide a stabilisation presence in the
genuinely integrated missions, and support immediate aftermath of a military operation
the UN Peacebuilding Commission, which while sufficient security is put in place to
works to ensure integrated effort by all enable civilians to deploy. Our review of
donors on strategy and delivery, and Reserve Forces will include an examination
to provide immediate support for post- of how reservists might contribute most
conflict reconstruction. We advocate the effectively in those situations.
development of a stronger international
4.48 We are increasing spending on
capacity, including through the EU and
addressing global conflict through pooled
UN, to deploy civilian stabilisation experts,
funding arrangements managed jointly
including judges, lawyers and police, at
by the FCO, DFID and the MOD, recently
short notice and in larger numbers and
39
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
establishing a single Conflict Prevention Pool communities and countries overseas), where
with £327 million funding over the next the opportunities to make a difference are
three years. most apparent, where the humanitarian
needs are greatest, or where our national
4.49 In summary, we will continue to fulfil our
interest is most clearly at stake.
responsibilities to contribute to the full range
of international efforts to prevent, mediate, 4.51 Based on those criteria, our current
and manage violent conflict, and to recover national security priorities overseas are:
and rebuild after conflict. We will develop our
– Pakistan and Afghanistan: key priorities
national capabilities to do so; we will ensure
for regional conflict prevention as well as
that all these capabilities – military and
domestic counter-terrorism;
civilian, security and development – are fully
integrated to deliver effect in risky or hostile – those parts of Africa suffering from
environments; we will work to encourage conflict, including Darfur, or extremism,
partners and allies to invest in the same including North Africa;
capabilities; and we will work for greater – the Middle East, including Iraq, because of
effectiveness in the UN, EU and NATO to its key role in global security and stability,
enable more timely and integrated responses and its totemic status among violent
to the linked challenges of conflict, instability extremists; and
and failed and failing states.
– Eastern Europe, where we support
4.50 We recognise that we have finite enlarged European structures.
resources and capabilities to achieve our
aims. We are, therefore, committed to
a clearer focus and more hard-headed
prioritisation, bringing together our defence,
diplomacy and development resources in a
unified approach, and focusing on countries
or regions where the United Kingdom has a
particular ability to help (for example through
historic links, or close links between diaspora
40
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
41
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
4.54 We will continue to strengthen those 4.57 We will also work closely with
capabilities across the country, as well as international bodies to reduce the risk
devoting additional effort to a number of of a pandemic and build the capacity to
specific priorities identified in paragraph 3.22. respond if it materialises. That will include
engaging WHO and other global health
4.55 On flooding, we are investing in better
bodies, the UN, the EU, the World Bank, and
weather forecasting, including forecasting
individual countries, on the coordination of
of precise local impact, and increasing
international surveillance requirements and
expenditure on flood management from
on early warning systems; on analysing and
£600 million in 2007/08 to £800 million
preparing viruses for vaccine and research
in 2010/11. The scale of the risk posed by
purposes, on increasing vaccine supply; on
coastal or tidal flooding has the potential to
planned responses; including coordinated
exceed even that posed by the fluvial and
travel restrictions; and on support to
surface water flooding of last summer. So we
vulnerable countries to help them develop
will consider carefully the recommendations
their capabilities, where the United Kingdom
of the Pitt Review, as part of a programme
has already pledged £37 million.
to reduce the risk and impact of all sources
of flooding, working with the private sector 4.58 The Government alone cannot protect
to reduce the vulnerability of critical sites people from all the consequences of natural
and services. disasters. Human and social resilience, often
at the community level, will continue to be
4.56 On pandemics, the World Health
crucial to ensuring British citizens’ future
Organization (WHO) has recognised the
security and well-being.
United Kingdom as being in the vanguard
in preparing for a pandemic and we will 4.59 The British people have repeatedly
continue to improve our capacity to minimise shown their resilience in the face of severe
the potential effects of a pandemic including disruptions whether from war, terrorism,
ensuring that effective planning is in place at or natural disasters. Communities and
regional and local levels across the country. individuals harness local resources and
expertise to help themselves, in a way that
complements the response of the emergency
42
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
services. That kind of community resilience is the legislative or regulatory framework can
already well organised in some parts of the be improved.
United Kingdom, and we will consider what
contribution we can make to support and Planning for civil emergencies
extend it, building on the foundations of the and building resilience – future
priorities include:
Civil Contingencies Act and on the lessons of
emergencies over the past few years. • continuing to increase expenditure on
flood management in England, from
4.60 Wider knowledge of the risks described
£600 million in 2007/08 to £800 million
in Chapter Three will enable communities
in 2010 /11, and taking forward the
to prepare better. We will therefore publish recommendations of the Pitt Review;
in summer 2008, and on a regular basis
thereafter, a national-level risk register • continuing to build domestic capacity to
respond to an influenza pandemic;
setting out our assessment of the likelihood
and potential impact of a range of different • continuing to build the extensive
risks that may directly affect the United network of organisations engaged
Kingdom, and the safety and well-being of in preparing for and responding to
its citizens. That will help local authorities, domestic emergencies;
communities, businesses, and others • publishing a national-level risk register
in preparing for emergencies. It will be covering the full range of risks; and
updated annually and informed by longer-
• reviewing the Civil Contingencies Act
term national assessment of related climate to ensure an effective legislative and
change effects and risks. regulatory framework.
4.61 TheCivil Contingencies Act 2004 will
continue to provide the framework for all of Defending the United Kingdom
this work, and the Government will review against state-led threats
whether the Act needs strengthening, 4.62 While for the foreseeable future no
drawing on lessons identified in its first state or alliance will have both the intent
three years of operation and, looking ahead, and the capability to pose a major and direct
examining whether there are areas where threat to the United Kingdom, we cannot
43
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
rule out a possible re-emergence of such a aimed at political, economic and security
threat in future decades. targets, including cyber-attack. The agencies
are committed to working with the FCO
4.63 We will need to safeguard the United
and MOD, and other relevant parts of
Kingdom against the re-emergence of such
government, to monitor the nature of
a threat, to defend the territory of the United
this threat.
Kingdom, its sea and air approaches, its
information and communications systems, 4.67 On defence, in 2006 we decided
and its other vital interests, including our to maintain our independent nuclear
Overseas Territories. deterrent because, while we are strongly
committed to multilateral nuclear
4.64 The foundation of our strategy for
disarmament and to the global elimination
preventing the re-emergence of such a
of nuclear weapons, we cannot rule out
threat, or deterring it should it re-emerge,
a threat to the United Kingdom involving
is our continued commitment to strong
nuclear weapons re-emerging over the next
bilateral defence and security relationships,
50 years.
our leading role in NATO and the EU and
other key alliances, a strong counter- 4.68 To help mitigate the threat of weapons
proliferation regime, and reformed global of mass destruction, we welcome US plans
institutions, including the UN. to place further missile defence assets in
Europe to provide cover for allies. We already
4.65 Ultimately,we must also continue
contribute to ballistic missile early warning
to guard against the re-emergence of a
and regularly discuss continuing support
state-led threat through maintaining strong
with the United States. We are also working
national capabilities.
closely with allies on the development of
4.66 On intelligence, in addition to the NATO missile defence options. We strongly
major effort required to tackle the current support efforts to include Russia through a
level of terrorist threat, the security and joint regional missile defence architecture,
intelligence agencies will continue to not least to provide reassurance on the
protect the United Kingdom against covert defensive nature and intent of that capability.
activity by foreign intelligence organisations
44
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
45
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
A crucial element of this will be improving budget in Iraq and Afghanistan, of which
the support we give to members of the nearly £1 billion was for equipment. But
Armed Forces and their families. We have acute cost pressures remain in certain
made significant improvements over recent areas. There are a number of factors
years, including improved pay, a new behind that including real pay increases
tax-free operational bonus paid from the and rising fuel costs. But the primary factor
Reserve, greater access to home ownership is the rising cost of defence equipment.The
schemes, and an extension of priority Royal Air Force is currently taking delivery
treatment to all veterans in the NHS. But of new generation Typhoon fast jets, which
we are determined to do more, and the cost over £50 million each – at least twice
Command Paper announced in November the cost in real terms envisaged when
2007 will set out proposals for a new the programme began in the late 1980s.
cross-government effort to improve the Similarly, the new Type 45 destroyers, the
support we offer in education, healthcare, most capable ships ever fielded by the
accommodation, and the treatment of Royal Navy, cost over £1 billion each –
injured personnel. We will also set out new again twice the cost in real terms envisaged
retention measures to help bring military when the programme began in the late
numbers back into balance. 1990s. The combination of the rising costs
of defence equipment, our commitment
Those longer-term objectives must be
to capability over quantity, and the recent
combined with the immediate imperatives
high operational tempo undeniably
of safety and success on current
presents a significant challenge, which is
operations; and – as with every area
shared with all developed countries with
of national security – these competing
major military commitments. As made
priorities have to be reconciled within
clear above, we are determined to shift the
finite resources. The Defence budget
overall balance of defence procurement
has had the longest period of sustained
towards support of current operations,
growth since the 1980s, and will see
while at the same time continuing to invest
further real growth to 2010-11. We have
in a broad range of capabilities for the
the second-highest defence budget in the
long term. To deliver that in a challenging
world in cash terms, and the fifth-highest
environment, we are reforming the
in purchasing power terms (after the
approach to defence procurement and
United States, China, India, and Russia).
our relationship with the defence industry,
In the last year, we will have spent up to
with more hard-headed prioritisation and a
£2.9 billion in addition to the defence
greater emphasis on value for money.
46
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
47
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
level we are engaged in a dialogue with all those scenarios. In particular, we need
China on a range of issues; in many of those a stronger UN system for protecting
areas we have seen tangible recent evidence vulnerable populations, preventing state
of China exercising its influence in support breakdown and the descent into violence,
of objectives we share. We still have some building peace, and laying the foundations
fundamental differences, including over for longer-term development. In some
human rights, and we make these clear in circumstances the international community
our dealings with China. But the new global has a responsibility to help countries protect
realities mean that engagement with China their populations. In most cases, that involves
is not an option but a necessity. support for the countries’ own security
forces and agencies; but in some cases,
4.74 We will continue to press for a more
where a government is unwilling or unable
representative and credible G8, and for the
to protect its citizens from genocide, war
expansion of the permanent membership
crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against
of the UN Security Council to include
humanity, or is perpetrating these acts
India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan, as well
itself, the international ‘Responsibility to
as permanent African representation – to
Protect’ ultimately requires the international
enable both those bodies to provide stronger
community to act.
and more credible leadership in world affairs.
If the deadlock over permanent reform 4.76 We will support reforms that build
continues, we will consider an intermediate international capacity in this area, including
solution. delivering the UN’s commitment to genuinely
integrated missions; ensuring that the
4.75 We will continue to press for further
Peacebuilding Commission takes on an
strengthening and reform of international
effective leadership role in shaping longer-
institutions to deliver the specific objectives
term peacebuilding; and developing a
on conflict prevention, mediation,
stronger international capacity, in the UN and
peacekeeping and peace enforcement,
EU, to deploy civilian stabilisation experts at
stabilisation, and peacebuilding. We are
shorter notice and in larger numbers. We will
committed to building a better rules-
work for greater formal international support
based framework for intervention across
48
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
for developing the capacity of regional getting people with the right skills, expert
organisations, including the AU. capabilities and management abilities into
positions that will help the institutions
4.77 We will continue to work for a stronger
deliver effectively and efficiently against their
NATO, capable of taking on a wide range of
objectives.
challenging security and stabilisation tasks in
complex and demanding situations, building 4.81 We will continue to promote and
on its experience in Afghanistan. That will support the spread of democracy, and
include improved mechanisms for burden- improvements to make governance more
sharing, to avoid NATO depending so heavily effective, legitimate, and accountable, by
on the military capabilities and political will working through international institutions
of a small number of its members. (including election monitoring), through
British and international aid and economic
4.78 We will work for a stronger and
policy (discussed below), and through broad
more accountable European foreign and
support for civil society and free media.
security policy, and for more integrated EU
capabilities across politics, development, 4.82 Thisprogramme of reform is not
and security – with a particular focus on its something that can be achieved by the
potential to make a positive contribution United Kingdom or any other country acting
to security sector reform, building on its alone. It will require a broad coalition – a
experience in Bosnia. broad range of actors in global society
working together, from international
4.79 A strong EU and NATO inherently
organisations and states through to
promote both European and regional
businesses, non-governmental organisations
security, complementing the contribution of
(NGOs), and global foundations. The United
global institutions, and we will support the
Kingdom, with its open economy, innovative
expansion of both and closer cooperation
business sector, and vibrant civil society is
between them.
well placed to play a key role in this new
4.80 We will advocate and support the kind of international coalition.
appointment on merit for key leadership
positions in international institution
49
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
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Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
51
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
technologies to compete with other forms countries, and using our position in the EU
of energy production. At home, we are also and G8 to argue for a pro-development
encouraging investment in nuclear facilities outcome to the Doha round of world trade
(although this has security implications of negotiations. Along with international
its own). partners, we are committed to delivering the
Millennium Development Goals by 2015.
Tackling poverty, inequality,
4.93 Those actions are based not just on
and poor governance
our commitment to global justice, but on a
4.90 We are committed to leading recognition that they also make an essential
international efforts to tackle poverty, raise contribution to building long-term security,
living standards, and promote development given the links between, on the one hand,
across the world. This reflects our core values poverty, inequality, and lack of development
and has important benefits for national and, on the other, instability, insecurity,
security. conflict, and failed and failing states. With
4.91 We have increased our overseas the United Kingdom’s aid contribution
development budget from 0.26% of gross growing in size and effectiveness, we are also
national income in 1997 to just over 0.5% in looking at the ways in which our overseas
2006, and are committed to meeting the UN aid policy contributes to the security of the
target of 0.7% (or over £10 billion a year) by citizens’ countries and regions concerned,
2013. We have brought greater transparency and also to our own national security. As
and effectiveness to the way that money is the development budget increases, and
spent. British aid is now lifting three million our understanding of the long-term links
people out of poverty a year worldwide, and between development and security deepens,
we are significantly increasing expenditure we are increasingly using our development
on education (£1 billion a year by 2010), and resources to tackle poverty and raise living
on global health. standards in key regions, countries and
provinces at risk of instability, conflict or state
4.92 Aswell as financial aid, we are
failure, including Pakistan and Afghanistan
supporting reforms to international trade
(including assistance in delivering basic
that open up markets to the poorest
services in the North West Frontier Province
52
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Initiative, and in partnership with business
parts of Africa, and the wider Middle East. and NGOs, we are working to build new
multilateral regimes to help ensure that
4.94 Our approach includes long-term
mineral revenues contribute to economic
support for more effective and accountable
development, political stability and security,
governance and security and justice systems,
rather than undermining them.
complementing more immediate support. A
significant part of our bilateral development
Responding to global trends
assistance is channelled through national
4.96 We are committed to ensuring that
and sub-national governments, and we
devote substantial resources to improving the world as a whole, not just the United
the quality of governance in developing Kingdom, can benefit from the opportunities
states. In Afghanistan, we are working of globalisation and contribute to dealing
with the Independent Directorate of with the related security challenges.
Local Governance and the Civil Service 4.97 Our approach will be similar to
Commission to help improve the planning that outlined throughout this strategy:
and financial management of provincial and a commitment to acting early, scanning
district governors. We also recognise the the horizon for possible future threats;
importance of ensuring that political reform to working with partners in business and
does not lead to domination by any ethno- elsewhere; and to putting our effort and
national or sectarian group, supporting assets – whether research, enforcement,
reform efforts that ensure that minority or diplomatic – behind a multilateral,
groups and regions have an adequate rules-based approach.
political voice.
4.98 In response to economic challenges,
4.95 We will continue to play a leading we recognise the links between financial
role in wider international efforts to fight stability and security, and support broad
corruption, having committed £120 million reform of international financial institutions.
over five years through the Governance and Alongside other EU nations, we will continue
Transparency Fund. Through initiatives such to push for operational improvements,
as the Extractive Industries Transparency including better surveillance activities by the
53
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
IMF to provide early warning of economic those opportunities and freedoms, and
turbulence, and better arrangements for ensuring that the internet itself is resilient
enabling economic recovery and growth enough to withstand attacks and accidents.
after conflict or in regions susceptible to Finally, we support international efforts to
conflict. We are committed to multilateral monitor and protect the safety and security
efforts to protect legal economic activity of new technology including the internet
against disruption or attack, whether and communications networks, and the
electronic attack, money-laundering, or space assets that are increasingly important
piracy. The Royal Navy maintains a presence for communications. We will continue to
in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, to explore how new confidence‑building and
contribute to international work to protect arms control measures might contribute to
vital sea lanes and choke points against a international security in this area.
range of threats, from terrorism to piracy and
4.100 In response to the demographic
potential state-sponsored disruption.
challenges and related pressures on food and
4.99 Inresponse to the technological water, we will support international efforts to
challenges, we are committed to working manage global migration, to manage water
with international, public, and private sector demand, and to liberalise agricultural trade
partners to ensure that our government and increase water-efficient food production.
systems and critical national infrastructure In our work with developing countries, for
are adequately protected against cyber- example in support of good governance and
attack. We are also investing, through the adapting to climate change, we will focus on
interception modernisation programme, to states and regions most likely to be affected
update our intelligence and law-enforcement by the combination of rapid urbanisation,
capability to meet the challenges of rapidly high unemployment, demographic shifts,
advancing communications technology. instability, and a possible further growth in
We are committed to maximising the violent extremism.
opportunities and benefits of the internet,
by protecting the freedom to develop and
host new services, while also reducing the
scope for terrorists and criminals to exploit
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Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
55
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
4.106 The Centre for the Protection of more to individual countries and to new
National Infrastructure (CPNI) was established media.
in 2007 to act as an interdepartmental
4.108 Our commitment to strong, balanced,
organisation providing advice on
flexible, and deployable Armed Forces
information, physical and personnel security
safeguards the future security of the
to businesses and organisations across
United Kingdom, and enables us to make
the national infrastructure. CPNI works
a significant contribution to international
closely with the private sector, delivering
efforts on peacekeeping and peace
advice to reduce the vulnerability of critical
enforcement. That capability, and our
infrastructure to terrorism and other national
demonstrable political will to deploy it,
security threats.
also makes a wider contribution to global
4.107 The flexible, global network of security, reinforcing international pressure to
diplomatic posts will continue to play deter aggression and encourage participation
a crucial role in delivering the United in mediation and dialogue.
Kingdom’s foreign policy. It provides and
4.109 Strong borders are essential to
supports essential cross-government
protect against terrorism, crime, and illegal
services, including security to the British
immigration. Over the last five years, the
public and businesses. It also supports the
airline liaison officer network has stopped
cross-government efforts described in this
nearly 180,000 suspect travellers boarding
strategy, including bilateral and multilateral
planes to the United Kingdom. British
cooperation on counter-terrorism and
immigration controls in France and Belgium
counter-proliferation, tackling trans-national
prevent thousands of people entering the
crime and dealing with conflict; reform
United Kingdom every year, and we are
of international institutions; and work to
increasing support for the operational activity
address the underlying drivers of insecurity.
of the EU’s border agency, Frontex. The UK
Engagement with the public in other
Border Agency will bring together, in one
countries is also crucial. Britain has a long
organisation, the work of UKvisas, the Border
tradition of public diplomacy, and we will
and Immigration Agency, and the border
build on that with new approaches, tailored
work of HMRC, improving the protection
56
Chapter Four: The United Kingdom’s response
that border and migration controls provide policy development across government, our
against terrorism, trans-national organised efforts in all those areas are designed to
crime, and illegal immigration. Alongside the deliver against a wide range of complex and
new border force, electronic border controls interdependent security challenges, now and
– which will begin to be rolled out later this in the longer term.
year – will create a modern, intelligence-
4.112 In all those areas, we are committed
led border control and security framework.
to partnership working – across different
100% of visas to enter the United Kingdom
parts of government, with the private sector
are already based on fingerprints. By 2011,
and civil society, with increasing roles for
95% of those entering or leaving the
communities and individual citizens, and
country, whether British or foreign, will be
through coordinated action with our allies
electronically checked against watch lists for
and through multilateral institutions.
terrorism, crime, and illegal immigration,
as well as being counted in and out of the 4.113 Together, that adds up to a balanced
country; 100% coverage will be completed and coherent overall policy and capability
by 2014. framework for addressing both the
immediate and longer-term threats and
4.110 Within the UK, the National Identity
risks, and for influencing the underlying
Scheme will improve protection against
drivers of the security landscape in a
organised crime and terrorism. From late
direction conducive to both national security
2008, compulsory fingerprint biometric
and global stability. It represents a truly
identity cards will be introduced for foreign
integrated approach to national security
nationals; and in the second half of 2009,
which is grounded in our values, is realistic
identity cards will be issued to people
and hard-headed about what our capabilities
employed in sensitive roles or locations,
can achieve and where they should be
starting with airport workers.
targeted to make the most difference, and
4.111 From strong borders, to capable and is dedicated to the overarching national
flexible Armed Forces, a global diplomatic security objective set out at the beginning
network, focused security and intelligence of this strategy.
agencies, and a coherent approach to
57
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
5.1 The 2007 Comprehensive Spending 5.3 We will continue to seek ways to
Review set out the Government’s spending work more effectively across government.
plans for national security: continued The Cabinet Secretariats are currently
rising real-terms investment in the Armed being reviewed to examine whether
Forces; increased resources for diplomatic improvements can be made to the way
engagement in key areas; more spending they are organised and work together, to
on conflict prevention and stabilisation; deliver greater coherence and effectiveness
and more spending on security, intelligence across government, including support for
and counter-terrorism, where the budget the Cabinet Committee on National Security,
has doubled since 2001 and will grow to International Relations and Development.
£3.5 billion by 2011. This strategy sets out
5.4 We will consider: how to strengthen
the framework for targeting those resources.
the Government’s capacity for horizon-
5.2 The recent improvements in national scanning, forward-planning and early
security structures summarised in warning to identify, measure, and monitor
Chapter One have brought greater focus, risks and threats; and our capacity for
responsiveness and integration to our strategic thinking and prioritisation, spanning
approach. Given those reforms, this strategy traditional boundaries between domestic
does not propose further radical structural and foreign policy, defence and security,
change. But our structures and processes will and intelligence and diplomacy.
be kept under review, and we will continue
5.5 Building on recent experience at home
to respond and adapt to new challenges.
(for example on counter-terrorism) and
We will, therefore, as Chapter Four states,
overseas (for example in Afghanistan, where
publish a national-level risk register in
security, policy and development officials
summer 2008 which will be regularly
now work together in joint teams), we will
updated.
58
Chapter Five: Working together
59
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom
60
Endnotes
Endnotes
61
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