The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chvez and Alberto Fujimori Author(s): Steve Ellner Source: Journal

of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 139-162 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875581 Accessed: 18/03/2009 12:31
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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 35, 139-162 DOI: I0.IoI7/Soozzz26Xo2oo6685

zoo00

Cambridge University Press Printed in the United Kingdom

139

COMMENTARY

The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chaivez and Alberto Fujimori*
STEVE ELLNER During the i990s Peru's Alberto Fujimori and Argentina's Carlos Menem were the two main political successes of Latin American populism. Both completed two successive presidential terms, a unique accomplishment in the continent, and overcame the political instability that previously beset their nations. Scholars who analysed these and other contemporary regimes concluded that Latin American populism was flexible and resilient enough to adapt to a radicallydifferent environment from that of the 193os and 194os, when it had emerged as a major force. Some political scientists labelled as 'neopopulism' the newer variant of populism in the context of globalisation and widespread acceptance of neoliberal policies. These scholars stressed two salient features of neopopulism that contrasted with 'classical populism' of the 1930s and 1940s: its social base consisting of members of the informal economy, as opposed to the organised working class; and its implementation of neoliberal policies, as against the model of import substitution and state interventionism.' From the perspective of the earlyyears of the twenty-first century,however, neopopulism appears less politically viable and less useful as an analytical category than ten years before. Unlike classical populism of half a century earlier,neopopulism has failed to produce leaders and movements that serve as a point of political reference in their respective nations over a considerable in period of time. Thus the administrationsof Carlos Andres P&rez Venezuela SteveEllner Professor History theUniversidad Oriente, is of at de Venezuela.
* The authorwould like to thankSusan Berglund, MiguelTinkerSalas,PaulDrake,Richard

1 Kurt and in America: Affinities,' Weyland, 'Neopopulism NeoliberalismLatin Unexpected

Studies Comparative in International vol. Development, 3 5, no. I (Spring 1993); Kenneth Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case,' World Politics,vol. 48, no. I (Oct. 1995).

Hillman and Ralph Van Roy for their critical comments.

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and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil ended in their impeachment, while Carlos Salinas de Gotari was forced into exile shortly after leaving office in Mexico. Subsequently, Fujimori and Menem fell into disgrace as a result of accusations of unethical conduct. Fujimori was ousted and his movement's presidential candidate received a paltry 1.3 per cent of the vote in the April zooi elections. Menem's popularity was also reduced to single digit percentages. Following the initial publication of literatureon neopopulism, Venezuela's populist leader Hugo Chivezwas elected president, infusing the phenomenon of Latin American populism with new relevance. Chivez - unlike Fujimori, Menem and other neopopulists - succeeded in creating a movement that identified with him and with the slogans, symbols and goals he embraced. Chivez was frequently compared to Fujimori by political analysts and actors, ranging from ex-President Clinton to Venezuelan and US journalists.2Most of these non-academic comparisons were narrow in scope, if not superficial, in that they focused on demagoguery and authoritarian tendencies. They passed over the essential characteristicsthat Chi~vezand Fujimori (even more than Menem) had in common and that defined them as populists: special appeal to the marginalised sectors of the population (those belonging to the informal economy), anti-elite discourse, status as 'outsiders' and charisma. The following article attempts to determine whether this common denominator also included policies, discourse, and contextual factors. Specifically,the article provides a systematic comparison of the two leaders and their governments in order to identify similarities and antithetical positions that may shed light on the applicabilityof the neopopulist concept to the Venezuelan case. In a more general sense, the article addresses itself to the proposition formulated by political scientists beginning in the mid-i99os that novel developments in the continent have given rise to a democratic system and society of a new type. For this purpose, scholars have developed the models of 'neopopulism', 'delegative democracy',3 and 'neopluralism'.4 All three models coincide in stressing the emergence of strong national executives in a democratic framework (referred to as 'hyperpresidentialism') and the

ElNational, March 19, zooz. For scholarly works, see Steven Levitsky, 'Fujimori and Postvol. 10, no. 3 (July 1999), pp. 89-90; Kenneth Party Politics in Peru,'Journal of Democracy, in to Roberts, 'Populism in Latin America,' Carter Center, Challenges Democracy theAmericas

(Oct.2000).
3 Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy,' JournalofDemocray, no. 5 (Jan. 1994). 4 Philip D. Oxhorn, 'Is the Century of Corporatism Over? Neoliberalism and the Rise of ? What Neopluralism,' in Oxhorn and Graciela Ducatenzeiler (eds.), WhatKind ofDemocracy

in Age Latin Park, (University PA, 1998). ofMarket? America the ofNeoliberalism Kind

The VariantsPopulism141 Contrasting of the concomitantweakeningof institutionsincludingthe legislature, judicial and organisations civil society. of labour, system,politicalparties,organised Each model, as well as theircomponents,can be placedon a continuum. At one extremeis an optimisticassessmentof the efficacyof recent Latin thattheirmovementswill remain American headsof stateand the possibility an importantpoint of referencein a democraticsetting for yearsto come. of in These scholars the highlight 'creativity' the presidents meetingthe chalthe lenges of globalisation, popularsupportfor their policies, and the doctrines they embracethat serve as an antidoteto personalism.5 Policies and class alliancesthat are conducive to instabilityand jeopardisedemocratic normsarelocatedat the oppositeextreme. evaluAccordingto the pessimistic ation, the new breed of presidentsare veritablecaudilloswho lack a solid base of supportin the country.Furthermore, their authoritarian tendencies threaten clashwith the international to whichis more committed community to the defenceof democracy thanin the past. The followingarticlewill locate the positions,strategies class backing and of the Chivez and Fujimori movementson this continuum.The overriding whetherthe two regimesare predominately objectiveis to ascertain personalistic and authoritarian to the contrary,have pursued strategiesand or, policies that are consistentwith their socialbase and representnew models withlong-term the of possibilities. Certainly, credibility the claimsof Fujimori and Chaivez representthe marginalised to sectors of the populationhas a of of bearingon whetherboth movements(regardless the duration theirstay in power)will retainthe backing thatclassover a significant of periodof time. In addition, noveltyof the modelsforcefully the and defendedby both leaders, theirabilityto convince followersthat they representa clearbreakwith the past, determineswhether the movements will remain cohesive, and their activistscommitted,over time. TheOptimistic-Pessimistic Continuum in concurred a new typeof democracy that Political scientists writing the I990os in as One of the wasemerging LatinAmerica, withFujimori a leadingexample. of commondenominators thesegovernments the adoptionof neoliberal was economic policies.Scholarsdiffered widely,however,as to just how democratic and stable the democracieswere. GuillermoO'Donnell and others institutional backwardness simplicity the nationalexecutive's and and stressed to accumulation inordinate of this power.They ascribed imbalance structural and culturalfactors and warned that the political stagnation could last
and and 'Conclusion,'in Mettenheim 5 Kurtvon Mettenheim JamesMalloy,'Introduction,' in and Malloy(eds.),Deepening (Pittsburgh, 1998). DemocracyLatinAmerica

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Most important,regimelegitimacy was undermined the abindefinitely. by sence of a popularmandateto implementneoliberalformulae, whichlacked championsamong organisedsectorswithinthe nation.6 The optimisticview of regime changewas persuasively forwardby put Kurtvon Mettenheim JamesMalloy. and of the Theypraised 'creativity' Latin Americanleaderswho boldlyrespondedto the imperatives globalisation of the by accepting politicalcost of neoliberal policies,in the processpreserving nationalsovereignty democracy.' and Writingin the samevein, KarenRemmer viewed neoliberalreforms as a viable political strategyand not one nor imposedby the IMF or cabinettechnocrats, contingenton the national executive'susurpation authority. of Remmerclaimedthat the electoralsuccesses of Menem, Fujimoriand other neoliberalssubstantiated thesis.8 her David Leamanarguedthat leaderssuch as CarlosMenemwent beFinally, doctrinethatjustified yondmerepersonalism developinga comprehensive by neoliberalism built on the populist traditionof radicaltransformation. but He went on to criticiseO'Donnell for overemphasising non-democratic the of LatinAmerica'sfledglingdemocracies.9 aspects The model of neopopulismdeveloped by Kurt Weyland,among other politicalscientists,may be situatedbetween the two extremes.On the one hand, these scholarsrecognisedthe institutionalweaknessof neopopulist and On regimesandthe tensionbetweenneoliberal populistimperatives. the other hand,Weylandcommendedneopopulistsfor theiradroitness forgin He ing alliances. arguedthatby winningover a largesegmentof the popular classes,neopopulistsgainedlegitimacyfor their governmentsand the neoliberalpolicies they implemented.He also claimedthat neopopulismwent and base.The marginalised beyondrhetorical arguments restedon a material sectorsof the population, lost out as a resultof long-standing having import substitutionpolicies, were responsive to neopopulist discourse.Weyland concludedby praisingneopopulismfor having faced up to entrenchedinterestsandimplementing difficult necessary but neoliberal policies,andin the The restof this article evaluate thesis will this processfortifying democracy.10 in light of recentdevelopmentsin Peruand Venezuela.
Over?' O'Donnell, 'DelegativeDemocracy';Oxhorn,'Is the Centuryof Corporatism 7 Mettenheimand Malloy'Introduction,'and 'Conclusion'. 8 Karen L. Remmer, 'The Politics of NeoliberalEconomic Reform in South America,
International 33, 1980-1994', Studiesin Comparative Development no. z (Summer 1998); Remmer, 'The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America, 198o-9 ', AmericanPolitical Sdence Review,vol. 87, no. z (July 1993), PP. 393-407. 9 David E. Leaman, 'Populist Liberalism as Dominant Ideology: Competing Ideas and in Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Argentina, 1989-1995 ', Studies Comparative Interational vol. 34, no. 3 (Fall Development, oz. 1999), PP. 99-I02 10 Kurt Weyland, 'Populism in the Age of Neoliberalism', in Michael L. Conniff (ed.), Populism in Latin America (Tuscaloosa, 1999), P. 190.
6

The Contrasting of VariantsPopulism143 in and perspective Fujimori Chdvez comparative overview General The abortivecoup stagedby Hugo Chavezon February 1992 catapulted 4, his him onto the centrestageof Venezuelan politics.Subsequently, Bolivarian a policy of electoralabMovement-zoo(MBR-200) pursued Revolutionary stention until April 1997, when it changedits name to the Fifth Republic candidate theDecember for Movement(MVR)andranChivez aspresidential elections. For nearlya year, Chbvezlagged behind in an open field 1998 became the front runner. but of candidates, by earlyI998 he unexpectedly DemocraticAction (AD) and In response,Venezuela'stwo majorparties, Copei, dropped support for their own candidatesand backed Chivez's principalrival. Political polarisationalso manifested itself in the special electionsheld in July 2000 when Chivez increasedhis support presidential from 56 to 60o cent while his main rivalreceived38 per cent. The polarper isationwas also evidentin the unsuccessfulcoup of April 2002, which was initiallysupportedby all the partiesof the opposition,and over subsequent theireffortson forcingChivez out of office monthswhen they concentrated means. by legal in was Fujimori a darkhorsecandidate the 1990electionsand,likeChivez's littlechanceof winning.Fujimori was firstcandidacy, initially appealed given to the popularclassesby opposing the neoliberaleconomic platformof his lashedout at the mainrival,MarioVargasLlosa.At the sametime, Fujimori In nation'sestablished parties. orderto avoidopenlycomingto terms political turneddown thatendorsedVargasLlosa,Fujimori with the traditional parties the renownednovelist'sofferto concededefeatby mutualaccord.In 1992 top which in out with Fujimori carrying an autogolpe, officerscollaborated military In response guarantees. suspendedcongress,the courts and constitutional of to international repudiation the coup, Fujimoriconvoked elections for a constituentassemblythatreplacedthe constitutionof 1979. As was the case in with Chaivez 1999 and 2ooo, Fujimorifaced a weak opposition and trifor the umphedin a seriesof electionsduringthe I990s, including referendum election of 1995. Both Vargas the constitutionin 1993 and the presidential in candidate Llosain 1990andpresidential JavierPerezde Cuellar 1995were white and closely associatedwith the nation's elite; both went into exile leader.Polthe followingdefeat,thus depriving oppositionof a supra-party electionsof April 2ooo, the iticalpolarisation also characterised presidential when Fujimoriand AlejandroToledo virtuallymonopolised the electoral the results.In subsequentmonths, Toledo represented entireoppositionin
claiming that electoral fraudhad been committed, in opposing the presidential inauguration of Fujimori, and in calling for the removal of Montesinos. In November zooo2000 Fujimori resigned during a trip to Japan.

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Risetopower Various developments in Venezuela beginning in the 1970s explain the officersheadedby Chiivezwho were emergenceof a group of middle-level committedto politicalactivismandradical change.In the firstplace,with the subsidenceof guerrilla activityin the 196os, the governmentimplemented the 'AndresBello Plan', which enrolledyoung officersin Venezuelanunito institutionsincludingthe School of the versitiesas an alternative military with university studentsand selecAmericas.The experienceof interacting ting courses in the social sciences politiciseda largenumberof officersin factorwas the strategy theirformative years.A second, albeitless important, a groupof guerrilla leadersin the I96os led by DouglasBravo,of pursuedby in young engaging politicalworkwithinthe armedforcesin orderto capture officersfor the revolutionary radicalisation cause.nA thirdfactorexplaining was the experienceof Chaivez's group in the militaryof organisinga clandestinemovementbetween 1982, with the formationof the MBR-2oo,and effortamongmiddlethe coup attemptin 1992. This protracted organising the level officershadno precedentin LatinAmericaandservedto strengthen of long-termcommitmentand determination Chivez's earlyfollowers.12 In the 1990 elections Fujimorialso appealedto the popularclasses by to stressinghis statusas an 'outsider'and other qualitiesantithetical those of the politicalclass, which was predominately white, wealthy,ageingand Lima-based. Indeed,he was more of an 'outsider'thanotherLatinAmerican of did political neopopulists.Fujimori not runas the candidate a mass-based labour(asdid Menem),enjoythe with dominantinfluencein organised party backingof a majormediagroup (as was the case with Collor de Mello),or at count on well-established organisations the regionallevel or of powerful businessinterests. had credentials an 'outsider'thanFujimori, as Chaivez greater Nevertheless, who was an outsiderfrom an ethnic and politicalviewpoint,but not from a social and economic perspective.Fujimoriand his parentsbefore him had been successfulin their respectiveprofessions,in contrastto Chivez who had reachedthe middleranksin the armyshortlybeforethe 1992coup, only and careerended. Chiivez's to see his military physicaltraits,his personality the popularclassesthanwas his social standingwere more akinto those of
n According to Bravo, the CommunistParty first designed this strategyin the struggle
against dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez in the 195os. Alberto Garrido, Guerrillayconspiraddn militaren Venezuela(Caracas, 1999), pp. 8-i8. Chavez himself has stated that as a young army officer, a leftist friend advised him not to abandon the armed forces since 'you, workers.' Venezolana de as a lieutenant, are worth more than a trade unionist with 20,00ooo Televisi6n TV, 11:30 a.m., 27 Sept. 2002. (Caracas, 1998), Hugo Chivez [interviewed by Agustin Blanco Mufioz], Habla elcomandante pp. I23-7; Luis Miquilena, personal interview, 29 March 2000, Caracas.

12

The VariantsPopulism145 Contrasting of the casewith populistleadersfrom Per6n and Hayade la Torreto Fujimori, who came from middleand upper-class backgrounds. and The presidential candidacies Fujimori Chivez set off politicalpolarof the isation,but the processwas moreintensein Venezuela.Chivez frightened rebel and the radicalthrustof his due establishment to his past as a military of by Manymembers the Peruvian politicalclassfeltless threatened candidacy. APRApartydecidedto endorsehis candidacy Indeed,leadersof the Fujimori. in the second round of the i990 elections under the assumptionthat they would be able to influencehis governmentdue to his lack of politicalexperience. at These differenttrajectories the time that Fujimoriand Chivez reached office aresignificant. They supportthe thesis that the generalthrustof Fujithanthatof Chivez at the mori'selectoralmovementwas morepersonalistic time of their respectiverise to power. The sharedexperiencesof Chaivez's commitment far-reaching to followersover a twenty-year period,theirgreater in change,and the greaterpolarisation Venezuelabeginningin 1998 were conduciveto the emergenceof a politicalmovement with superiorstaying In resembled power and sense of self-identification. these aspects, chavismo classicalpopulism of the I930s and 1940s more than it did the short-lived neopopulistphenomenonof the 1990s. Discourse style and of Certain common characteristics the discourseof Chivez and Fujimori fall LatinAmerican underthe rubricof modern-day populism.Both emphasised the theirstatusas 'outsiders'andlashedout at the 'elite', specifically political to marginalised sectorsof the population, class.Furthermore, they appealed Both advocated had whichtraditional 'participatory politicians failedto target. democracy'as a correctiveto the excessivepower of politicalpartybureaucraciesthat failedto representpopularinterests.Fujimoriembodiedcertain Indian that the popularclassesin Peru,which are of overwhelming qualities could readilyidentifywith. This was the case with his Japanese extraction, reticence.In addition,Fujimori playedon his familyoriginand his apparent that of his parents)as a self-mademan in orderto appealto the image (and membersof the informaleconomy,who saw themselvesas 'independents' lackingthe backingof stateinstitutionsand economic elites.Chavez,for his at his part,emphasised Indianand blackfeaturesand ancestry the sametime of thathe used the term 'sovereigns'to referto the vast majority the populationin a way that conjuredup imagesof 'the masses'. In spite of common themes, aspects of the discoursethat Fujimoriand
Ch~ivezembraced differedin fundamentalways. Most important, Fujimori defended a technocratic vision and emphasised hard work, individual initiative,

Ellner 146 Steve honesty and competence, values that were associatedwith his Japanese Consistentwith Fujimori's notions background. preferencefor technocratic was his extremeanti-political rhetoric,whichwas reflectedin his lack of interestin buildinga politicalparty,or promotingsocial movementsas a substitutefor the moribund discourse partysystem.Anotheraspectof Fujimori's that had no equivalentin the chavista movement was his determination to and extirpateterrorism his avid supportfor capitalpunishment(whichwas into the 1993constitution). is common amongdictators As in incorporated LatinAmerica,Fujimori extolledambitiousnationalprojects(as did Chivez) and stressedthe role of technologyand privateinvestments.13 Chaivez's discourse,more thanthat of Fujimori, conveyedthe notion that the Venezuelangovernment was concernedwith the well-beingof the lower classesabove thatof anyothersector.Not only did he statethatpoor people needed his help and attentionmore than other sectors, but he sometimes viewedclassrelationsas a zero-sumgame.In addition,technocratic symbols and slogans,which appealedmostly to the middle classes, were absent in discourse.In contrastto Fujimori's faithin the constructive of role Chbvez's assailed the acceptance neoliberalism, privateinvestments,Chivez frequently of which in Venezuelaand elsewherecorrelated with income and privileged the status.14 WhileFujimori Chivez gained emphasised waragainstterrorism, he would never order troops to 'fire on the popularsupportby claiming a people'. Indeed,he claimedthatthe 1992coup represented reactionto the traumatic of the mass disturbances the week of 27 February of experience 1989, when soldiersgunned down hundredsof people. Finally,more than Chiivezviewed himselfas one of the people, a relationship dehe Fujimori, scribedin metaphorical terms as 'a fish in water'.15In short, Chavez'sdiscoursewas directedmore at underprivileged sectorsof the population, which came to representhis exclusivesocial base of support. Authoritarian tendencies unethical and behaviour In the mid-I99os,at the timeof the initialscholarly literature neopopulism, on the Fujimoriregime appearedto meet the minimum requirements be to considereddemocratic. The accusationsof humanrightsviolationgenerally centredon 'low-intensity'repression. These 'dirtytricks'includedthe infiltrationof ralliesof oppositioncandidates, threatto collectbacktaxesto the
Dictators: Authoritarian Politicsin PerufromLeguia to xaRogerAtwood,'Democratic
'4

SAIS vol. Fujimori,' Review, 21, no. 2 (Summer-Fall pp. i6i-2. 2001), Kenneth 'SocialPolarization Popular and in in Roberts, Resurgence Venezuela,' Steve
'Alo Presidente', Venezolana de Televisi6n TV, I I:oo00a.m., 23 June 2002.

15 Chivez

EllnerandDanielHellinger(eds.), Venezuelan Politics theChdveZ in Era: Class, and Polarization Conflict (Boulder,CO, 2003),p. 64.

The VariantsPopulism147 Contrasting of tabloidstied to the governpressurethe media,and the use of sensationalist In ment to discreditadversaries.1" addition,analysts consideredFujimori less thanhis neopopulistcounterparts elsewheresincehis greatercontrol corrupt of the state obviatedthe need to raisemoney to financeparallelstructures lackingin officialstatus.7 exit from power and its aftermathdemonEvents leadingto Fujimori's strated the abusescommittedthroughout i99os weremoregravethan that the was previouslythought.Most important,the sinisterVladimiroMontesinos consolidatedcontrol followingthe removalof his rivalNicolas Hermozaas of commander-in-chief the armyin 1997,andhe mayin the end havewielded more power than the presidenthimself. Peru's record in combating the drug trade,which had previouslyrepresenteda big advantagefor the adbrotherclaimedthat was ministration, calledinto questionas PabloEscobar's had financed Fujimori's199o campaign.Also hundreds of narco-money of capturedvideos, which had been Montesinos'modus operandi extortion, demonstrated an intricatenetworkof corruption that pervadedthe nation's Dozens of books expose the detailsof this underworld.'8 majorinstitutions. One publicationcontainedthe resultsof a congressionalcommitteeprobe into Fujimori'spreviouslymuch lauded privatisationprogramme.19 Such in statedpolicy Fujimori's corruption the saleof statecompaniesundermined of assigninghalf of the privatisation proceeds to programmesfor undersectors,which scholarsconsideredbasic to the neopopulistsocial privileged and electoralstrategy. In addition,reportsby the Carter Centerand other probesduringthe last of electoral rule yearof Fujimori's pointedto the lackof autonomy the national of commission and the unreliability the electoralprocess. These accounts contests,but placedin doubtnot onlythevotingtalliesof the 2000 presidential the electoralresults during Fujimori'sentire rule, particularly the in I993 constitutional referendum. the humanrightsviolationsdemFinally, TruthCommissioninvestigating onstratedthat the vast majorityof the victims of the counterinsurgency campaign againstthe SenderoLuminoso(SL)werenot involvedin terrorism. ThroughoutFujimori'spresidencythe governmentjustifiedsecretive and repressiveactions by alludingto the SL's statementthat 'the Partyhas a
16

GuillermoRocharbrin,'Decipheringthe Enigmasof AlbertoFujimori,' NACLA: Report onthe vol. Americas, 30, no. i (July-Aug.1996),pp. 17-18. 17 Weyland, in vol. 'The Politicsof Corruption LatinAmerica,'Journal Democrag, 9, no. 2 of (April1998),p. Iz, ft. 15. 18 One bestseller wasManuel Dammert, Elestado mafioso Fujimori-Montesinos: elpoderimagocrditico
en las sociedadesglobali.Zadas (Lima, 2ooi). 19 National Congress, Comisidn sobre econdmicos entre cometidos z99o Investigadora losdelitos yfinancieros y 2001 (Lima, June 200ooz).Carlos Esteves (congressional commission advisor), personal interview, 11 July 2002, Lima.

Ellner 148 Steve thousand eyes and ears'. The assassination of secretary-generalPedro Huillca of the Peruvian Workers General Confederation (CGTP), previously attributed to the head of SL's Lima organisation, was now blamed on Montesinos' infamous death squad 'Grupo Colina'.20In retrospect, regardless of the degree of threat from SL, the government's anti-terrorist programme had a secret agenda, namely the suppression of critical and autonomous centres in civil and political society and even in the military.The repression was most successful against social movements and organised labour, which had become increasinglycombative over the previous two decades (beginning with the rule of General Juan Velasco Alvarado). Thus civil society in Peru was subject to old-fashion state repression, which was at least as significant as the societal fragmentation and other features associated with neopopulism and other models of Latin American democracy in the age of globalisation.21 Fujimori, who at first lacked sympathy among military officers, followed a strategy of winning them over as allies and at the same time gaining control of the institution. The militarypartnershipwas sealed by Fujimori'sneoliberal policies, his refusal to investigate human rights violations, and his willingness to grant the militarycomplete authority in highland departments where guerrillaactivitywas most pronounced. Militarysupport during the earlymonths of Fujimori's rule compensated for the president's isolated position in the political world, particularlyin the national congress. A law passed in 1991 gave in the president carteblanche the appointment of the commander-in-chief and the removal of top officers. The law signalled the beginning of the effort by Fujimori and Montesinos to penetrate the institution and eliminate dissension. facilitated the interrogation of officers in order Shortly thereafter, the autogolpe to identify members of several military lodges that championed institutional concerns. These groups did not oppose Fujimori, but they criticised Montesinos and his National Intelligence Service (SIN), opposed the 'Grupo Colina' and the atrocities committed in the war against the SL, and resented the preference given to the president's unconditional supporters in the In military.22 short, in the earlyyears of the regime, the armed forces were split between 'institutionalists' and Fujimori loyalists. Subsequently, Fujimori and Montesinos relied on the SIN to gain complete control of the institution.

20

21

See, for instance,FrancesHagopian,'Democracyand PoliticalRepresentation Latin in or Americain the I99os: Pause,Reorganization, Decline?,' in FelipeAgueroandJeffrey
in Latin America (Coral Gables, 1998), Stark (eds.), Fault Lines of Democragy Post-Transition

Victor Gorriti (secretary of organisation of the Confederaci6n General de Trabajadores del Peri), personal interview, 9 July 2002, Lima.

pp.99-141.
22 Enrique Obando,' Fujimori and the Military:A Marriageof Convenience,' NACLA: R~port vol. 30, no. I (July-Aug. 1996), pp. 3 s-6; Confidential interview with retired ontheAmericas, July 2002, Lima. military officer, ex-member of 'Le6n Dormido' military lodge, zo20

The VariantsPopulism149 Contrasting of Chaivez's adversaries characterised government's his effortsto revampthe as steps in the directionof authoritarian rule. Indeed, the politicalsystem of the criticisms Chivez for assuming excessivepowerresembled accusations againstFujimori.The new constitutionssponsored by both governments (in 1993 in Peru and 1999 in Venezuela)embraced'direct democracy'as a correctiveto party-dominated But in the processof weakening rule. political and theirstronghold whichwas the legislative branchof government, parties the constitutionsbuttressedthe nationalexecutive,contributingto hyperBoth presidentsalso reversedthe tendencytowarddecenpresidentialism. tralisation previousyears,thus undermining of anothercheck on executive to publicopinionsurveys, Furthermore, authority. manyof the folaccording lowers of both presidentshad uncertaindemocraticvalues.23 Finally,the VenezuelanConstitution the armedforces with a dangerous 1999 provided with respectto the previousI961 Constitution. Withthe degreeof autonomy of a largenumberof military officersto top governmentand appointment ran the partypositions,Chiavez the riskof transforming armedforcesinto the nation'sdominantinstitution,as occurredin Peru afterthe 1992autogolpe. Chiivez'scritics stressedthe government'sarbitrary actions of the 'low as well as widespread the intensity'type corruption. Determining veracityof these accusations beyond the scope of this article.Nevertheless,governis ment repressionin no way approximated of Peru in the 199os, as has that been documented sinceFujimori's As resignation. of the writingof this article in September2002, Chivez has refrainedfrom jailingrepresentatives of the press,even thoughthe mediafrequently for the carrydeclarations calling the president'sremovalfrom office. Similarly, governmenthas avoidedthe violent repressionof streetmobilisations thathave also demandedChivez's removal. the opposition'sclaimsthatthe government annulled the had Finally, of checksandbalances muchrelevance lost when the Chavista faction system led by Luis Miquilenasplit off from the MVR in early2002. Subsequently, followersin the SupremeTribunaland the National Electoral Miquilena's Councilsupporteddecisionsthat favouredthe opposition. At the outset of the Chaivez the movementdefinitively presidency, chavista model that was inspiredby the examplesof rejectedthe military-caudillo Gamal Abdul Nasser, MuammarQaddafyand SaddamHussein and was promoted by the ArgentinetheoreticianNoberto Ceresole.At that time, VicenteRangel(wholaterbecameDefence Minister and ForeignMinisterJos6 then Vice-President) afterwhich declaredCeresole non virtually persona grata, the latterreturned Argentina beganto criticise Chivez government to the and
23

DamarysCanache,Venezuela: Public in and Opinion Protest a Fragile Democragy (CoralGables,

Florida, zooz), pp. 146-51; Flavia Freidenberg, 'Actitudes hacia la democracia de las 1lites parlamentarias argentina y peruana,' Amirica Latina Hoy, no. I6 (Aug. 1997), p. 80.

15 o

Steve Ellner

The confrontation datedbackto the sharply.24 originof the Rangel-Ceresole of the MBR-zoowhen the organisation defineditself as a 'civilianearlyyears thana military movement',rather military lodge.In doingso, Chivez'sgroup committeditself to a non-militarist to approach. Referring the decisionyears statedthat the civilian-military alliancewas 'the best demonlater,Chaivez strationthatwe were not bent on establishing military a dictatorship'.25 The VenezuelanarmedforcesunderChivez weremore internally divided than its Peruviancounterparts underFujimori. This greatercomplexity was made evident duringthe April zoo2 coup attemptwhen a three-waysplit manifested itselfin the military. Chaivez's foes his military werepittedagainst followerswhile a third,'institutionalist' currentsupportedhis overthrowon faction two Aprili i andhis return dayslater.In contrast,the 'institutionalist' withinthe Peruvian was suppressed the autogolpe. Unlikethe military following in apoliticalFujimori,Chaivezpromoted militaryparticipation politics by the MBR-2oo's formulated the timeof the 1992coup,in at demand, fulfilling favourof the military's governrightto vote.26In short,while the Fujimori ment resembledthe caudillo-massesmodel in some respects,the political and dimensionof the Chivez phenomenonis more complexas authoritarian tendenciescoexist with a democratic personalistic impulse. Class support A fundamental was componentof neopopulistmovementsin the 1990os the class,whichhadfailedto benefitfromstate specialappealto the marginalised interventionist policies and felt largelyignoredby traditional parties.While both Fujimori Chaivez and countedon the backing thesesectors,thelatter's of more solid and exclusiveties with them. Fujimori's governmentestablished to classsupportshiftedduring tenyearsin office,thoughhe managed retain his considerable lower class sympathy throughouthis stayin power. Neitherleaderenjoyeddominant influenceamongorganised sectorsof the class.The chavista workermovementfailedto attractanyimportant working veteranlabourleaderor to successfully the challenge controlof the traditional of leadershipof the Confederation VenezuelanWorkers(CTV).Chiivez's to industrial labourwas undermined his initial sectorsof organised by appeal of maintaining currency the which benefitedthe marginovervalued, policy for alisedclass,amongothers,at the expenseof factory workers. Fujimori, his labourmovement. part,lackedany followingat all in the Peruvian

24 Jose Vicente Rangel, personal interview, I2 Sept. 1999, Caracas.

26

Chivez, Habla el comandante, 126-7. pp.

26 Angela Zago, La rebelidn los angeles: de reportaje (Caracas, 1998), pp. 37-47.

TheContrasting Variants Populism I of 5I in the 1990 elections as the candidate of the popular Fujimori triumphed classes. The marginalised class, unlike influential economic groups, was represented in Fujimori's Cambio-9o electoral slate. Furthermore, Fujimori proposed the legalisation of the status of street vendors and the creation of a special bank for them. Nevertheless, with his government's application of neoliberal policies which brought inflation under control, and successes in the war against the Sendero Luminoso, Fujimori made inroads in the middle and upper class at the same time that he lost some lower class backing. This shift was manifested in the 1993 referendum on the nation's new constitution, which Fujimori won with a mere 52 per cent of the vote.27The poor showing convinced Fujimori of the need to make a concerted effort to rein in lower class voters. With this in mind, Fujimori implemented a massive social programme administered by the ministry of the presidency with the proceeds from privatisation, which had exceeded expectations. These allocations were designed for electoral purposes to win the vote of poor people in those departments where the opposition parties did well in the 1993 municipal elections. As a result, independents (but not the governing party) displaced opposition parties throughout the country at the same time that Fujimori was re-elected president in the 1995 national elections.28Thus social expenditures created personal loyalty to Fujimori, but not his party.The support continued throughout the 2000 elections when, according to surveys, the president retained a high degree of popularity among the poor.29 Nevertheless, during his presidency, Fujimori lacked the solid support of the marginalised sectors that he had enjoyed at the time of his election in 1990. Public opinion surveys showed that the poor voted for him because of his personal qualities and his discourse, but disapproved of his neoliberal policies and stopped short of calling themselves 'fujimoristas'.30 The sympathy of the lower classes for Fujimori was largely contingent on the failure of the opposition to speak the language of the people or to take up popular causes. Fujimori's popularity among the poor also depended on state revenue
27

in Kenneth Roberts Moises and Class Behavior and Arce,'Neoliberalism Lower Voting La Ivin vol. Politics, 3i, no.2 (April Peru,' 1998), 220. Carlos Degregori, dicada p. Comparative dela antzpolitica:y huida Alberto Vladimiro Montesinos zooo), 71. de (Lima, Fujmioriy auge p. 28 Carol or Government Sustaining Graham Cheikh and Reform? Kane,'Opportunistic in Electoral Trends PublicExpenditure and Patterns Peru,1990-1995,' Latin American Research vol. 33,no. I (1998), 67-104. Review, pp. of of and 29 USNews World 31 Report, Jan.2000, p. 34.DorisSinchez(secretary organisation 10 PeruPosible interview, July2002, Lima. party), personal C. Stokes,'Democratic and Economic 30 Susan Accountability PolicyChange: Policyin A. Peru,' Politics, Fujimori's Comparative vol.29,no.2 (Jan.1997), 222; Maxwell Cameron, p. inPeru: and andAuthoritarianism Political Change Coalitions Sodcial (NewYork,1994), Democracy of D. the p. 50o; p. 'Deciphering Enigmas Alberto Fujimori', 24; Gregory Rocharbrain, in and for Schmidt, Democracy Peru? 'Delegative Fujimori's Landslide theProspects 1995 in vol. Studies 2000,' Journal p. 107. ofInteramerican andWorldAffairs, 42,no. I (Spring zooo2000),

2 Ellner 15 Steve

That activity,however,was by natureshort-term. for socialprogrammes. It once the money driedup with the phasingout of privatisation was curtailed to andthe nation'seconomiccontraction set in after1997. According the that La Repiblica, socialprogrammes the weredesignedas a 'quickfix', newspaper a termparticularly to electoralstrategy.31 applicable Fujimori's Unlike the case of Fujimori'sPeru, social polarisationcharacterised Venezuelanpolitics from the outset of Chaivez's to power and steadily rise in The pro- and anti-Chaivez mobilisations deepenedduringhis presidency. zooz placedin evidencethe degreeto whichthe middleclasswaspittedagainst the lower classes.The marchesand ralliescallingfor Chi~vez's ouster,which i i Aprilcoup attempt, were becameweeklyoccurrences beforeandafterthe In heldin the affluent eastern and few partof Caracas attracted slum-dwellers. from the poorer, marchesoriginated contrast,most of the pro-government to westernhalfof the city.The reactionof largenumbersof slumdwellers the showed that Chaivez activesupport, countedon considerable Aprilcoup S11 not just electoralor passive backing.On 13 April large numbersof poor people,some of whom hadwalkedten to twentymilesdue to the absenceof the bases surrounded presidential palaceand military public transportation, in Caracas and other cities to demandChaivez's releasefrom confinement. and the personaldangerthat the The pacificnatureof these mobilisations, faced because of the complete media blackout,reflect a high protesters amongChivez'sfollowersanda certain degreeof commitment organisational on the partof the Chivez movement. capacity Chaivez's success in maintaining lower class supportrestedon the plausiThe president'sleftist and labour critics bility of his anti-neoliberalism. his characterised anti-neoliberal discourse as empty rhetoric and demaand pointed to his failureto design an anti-neoliberal goguery, programme. If popularly would undoubtedly have unperceivedas true, this accusation derminedthe support of nonprivilegedsectors, which accordingto polls of formulas.32 AlthoughPresident disapproved neoliberal Chivez undeniably lackeda coherenteconomicprogramme, haltednearlyten yearsof widehe who some(in spreadprivatisation sharpcontrastto the recordof Fujimori, timesclaimedto be an 'anti-neoliberal'). Thus,the 1999 constitution prohibits statecontrol the saleof stockin the stateoil companyPDVSAandguarantees of the social securitysystem. Furthermore, Chivez favoured'strategicas' in the caseof thealuminium sociations overprivatisation, industry specifically and the shipyard companyDIANCA.

ax Bruce H. Kay '"Fujipopulism" and the Liberal State in Peru, I990-I995,'Journal Studiesand WorldAffairs, vol. 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997). american 82 Roberts, 'Social Polarization and Popular Resurgence'.

oflnter-

The VariantsPopulism153 Contrasting of In one importantaspect,the class backingof the Chavezmovementmay end up resemblingclassicalpopulism of the I930s and I940s more than neopopulismof the 1990s.Scholarshave pointed to the heydayof classical policiesin LatinAmerica populismand the initiationof import substitution as representinga critical juncture.33 Populist parties promoted the parof excluded sectors of the population,specificallypeasantsand ticipation in and The assured workers, tradeunion,party, statestructures. incorporation that populistpartieswould retainthe loyaltyof largenumbersof these folThe Chaivez lowersfor an entirelifetime,andoften for thatof theirchildren. movement has succeeded in attractinglargely unincorporatedmembers of the marginalised class. Many of these chavista militantshave overcome in their long-standingsense of exclusion by activelyparticipating the defence of the regime and linkingup with incipientstructures albeitmuch more fragilethan the burgeoninglabourmovement in the era of classical If populism.34 the experienceof classicalpopulism is any indication,the Chaivez movementmayretainthe loyaltyof these sectorsfor yearsto come. Political system party Venezuela's neartwo-party system(basedon AD and Copei)beganto falter in the I990s when smaller at partiesmadeinroads,particularly the locallevel. After Chivez's election in 1998, AD, Copei and other pro-establishment the partiesrecededfromthe politicalscene.Businessorganisations, CTVand the media, ratherthan partiesof the opposition, played the majorrole in and discontentwhen Chavez's popularity plummeted articulating channelling in 2001. The governing failedto fillthevacuumcreated theweakening by party of traditional parties.From its inception,the MVR was conceived of as an electoral frontandnot a disciplined with organisation ongoingsocietallinks.35 the Furthermore, MVR went nearly unrepresentedduring Chaivez'sfirst level. Conpresidency(1999-2000) in the cabinetand at the gubernatorial vinced that the MVR had succumbedto clientelisticpracticesand lacked of fervour at the time of the radicalisation the government revolutionary in 2001, Chivez announcedhis intentionsto createparallelstructures and the formationof thus reactivated MBR-200.In 2002 Chaivez the promoted
33 Ruth the Berins and the Collier DavidCollier, CriticalJ Shaping PoliticalArena: unctures,Labor in Labor in America Movement, (Princeton, 1); Charles andRegime 199 Bergquist, Dynamics Latin LatinAmerica: and Comparative onChile, (Stanford, Essays Argentina, 1986). Venezuela, Colombia The FirstYear-and-a-Half Potentialof Chavismoin Venezuela: 34 SteveEllner,'The Radical of a Margarita L6pez Maya,'The Movementand Presidency Hugo Chivez Frias,'in Steve Politics theChdiveEra: in and Class, EllnerandDanielHellinger(eds.), Venezuelan Polarization Conflict (Boulder,20zo03),p. 82.

in Power,' Latin American vol. Perspectives,28,no. 5 (Sept. zooi).

I 54

Steve Ellner

'CirculosBolivarianos', althoughit was unclearwhetherthey were designed to serve as MVR cells or autonomouscommunityorganisations. The fragility the Peruvian of politicalpartysystemwas put in evidenceby in the sharpfluctuation the electoral intakeof majorparties the sevenelecin tions held between 1980 and I990. After I990, oppositionpartieslost further becausethey concentrated theireffortson disputingthe legality of credibility in 1995and 2000, whileneglectingsocio-economicconFujimori's candidacy cerns. During this period,the nation'straditional, mass-basedpartieswere makeshift ones designedto further presidential the of candidacies by displaced Toledo (PertiPosible),Luis Castafieda and (Solidaridad Nacional) Alejandro AlbertoAndrade(Somos Peri), in additionto Fujimori. The weakeningof partyloyaltieswas reflectedin Congresswhereby 1999the anti-government As groupUnion for Peruhadlost ten of its seventeenmembers.36 wasthe case in Venezuela,the Peruvian failedto fill the vacuumcreated governingparty by the weakeningof the partiesof the opposition.Not only did Fujimori's partylack a presence at the local level, but it was not consideredfor top Indeed, Montesinospreferredto keep the party presidential appointments. at bay in order to avoid the emergenceof a rivalcentre of power.37When was raceof Fujimori's proteg' JaimeYoshiyama defeatedin Lima'smayoral 1996, the pro-government camp had no prominentleaderas candidatefor the zooo presidential electionsother than the presidenthimself.38 Thus a weakpoliticalpartysystemcharacterised both Peruand Venezuela and explainsthe relativeease with which Fujimoriand Chivez carriedout thoroughgoing political changesat the outsetof theirrule.In both nations,the traditional partieshad lost vitalityover the previousdecade.In subsequent becauseit failedto formulate yearsthe oppositioncontinuedto lose credibility alternativesocio-economic policies, nor did it engage in self-criticism reits past failures. garding the tenNevertheless, declineof the political partysystemduring Fujimori's rulewas more pronouncedthan in VenezuelaunderChivez. Only the year APRA party somewhat surprisingly reemergedin Peru after Fujimorileft office. In contrast,Venezuela'spoliticalpartiesgradually began to recover defeatsof 2000.As a resultof the errors committed by followingtheirelectoral
36

David Scott Palmer,'Democracyand its Discontentsin Fujimori's Peru', Current History, vol. 99, no. 634 (Feb. 2000), p. 65; RolandoAmes, EnriqueBernales, SinesioL6pez and
and Romeo Grompone, Elfujimorismo:ascenso caidade un regimen autoritario y (Lima, 2000), P-. 37Martin Tanaka, 'Perd, I980-2000: Cr6nica de una muerte anunciada? Determinismo, voluntarismo, actores y poderes estructurales,' Conference 'Advances and Setbacks in the Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America'. Notre Dame University, 23-24 April
2001, p. 17.

Rafael Roncagliolo, Situacddn la democracia el Peru de en (2ooo-2oo0) (Lima, zooI), p. 131. 37 Julio Coder, 'La gobernabilidad en el Peru: entre el autoritarismo y la democracia,' in Coder

38

VariantsPopulism155 The Contrasting of who led the abortiveApril 2002 coup, the parties the politicalindependents Three insistedon playinga more centralrole in the struggleto oust Chi~vez. partiessuch as playeda centralrole: traditional typesof politicalorganisation such as Union andJustice AD and MAS; new partieswith new leaderships First; and parties formed by ex-AD and Copei leaders such as Antonio ManuelRosales (governorof Zulia), Ledezma(formermayor of Caracas), and CarlosNavarro(formerCTV secretary general), AgustinBerrios(former leader).Unlike the Peruvianlabourmovement that was nearlydeciCopei the matedunderFujimori, CTV led by two AD labourleadersplayeda key role in the struggleagainstChivez. than Venezuela'sMVR party was more complex and institutionalised MVR had internalcurrentswith While Chaivez's its Peruviancounterparts. distinctprogrammatic orientations,39 partieswere completelyperFujimori's the leaders.Finally, in debateandprominent and sonalistic lacking ideological consistedof ralliesfor electoral in mobilisations Peruusually pro-government of purposesand inaugurations publicworks projectsthat featuredthe president as speaker.This was not alwaysthe case in Venezuela,as was demonthe surrounded presidential when on strated 13Aprilzooz2002 chavistas palaceand were basesto demandChivez'sreturnto power.Othermobilisations military tenuouslylinked to the MVR.Thus, for example,studenttakeoversof the CentralUniversityin early 2001, violent protests againstthe August 2002 supremecourt decision absolvingmilitarycoup leaders,and diverse land whileothers or werealljustified encouraged some chavista invasions leaders, by In Chivez himself) expressedcautionand outrightopposition.40 (including short, the institutionalbarrennessof Peru under Fujimoriresembledthat In the caudillos. contrast, moreinstitutionally of traditional complexscenario in Venezuela included diverse organisedcurrentswithin the MVR and a greatermobilisationcapacityon the part of both pro and anti-government blocs. States Relations theUnited with towardChivez from a and The USA displayed critical at timeshostileattitude for the I998 electionsand his the momenthe launched presidential candidacy had the StateDepartmentdeniedhis requestfor a visa. Indeed,Washington
39

Moderates a and at and SteveEllner FredRosen'Chavismo the Crossroads: Hardliners,

40 The takeoverof the Central University,for instance,was harshlycriticisedby Chavez's

on vol. RegimeunderAttack,'in NACLA: Report theAmericas, 35, no. 6 (May-June zooz).

and for Luis Fuenmayor lackinglegitimacy communitysupportand university spokesman a Chivez attemptedto representing heavy politicalcost for the government.Similarly, from the benefitsgrantedby the agrarian landtakeovers excludingsquatters by discourage reform.

Ellner 156 Steve good reason to oppose the Chivez government, and view with favour the coup attempt of ii April 20oo. In the first place, Chivez played an activist role in OPEC with the aim of strengthening oil prices, for which purpose he visited Iraq, Iran and Libya on several occasions. His government also opposed US-sponsored resolutions in international bodies and so, for example, voted against censorship of China, Cuba and Iran for human rights violation. Furthermore, Chivez's rhetoric in favour of a 'multi-polar world' implied rejection of US hegemony including Washington's proposals for a hemispheric union. Finally, his staunch defence of national sovereignty led him to turn down US requests to fly drug interdiction missions in Venezuelan space as well as Washington's offer to send the Army Corps of Engineers following the devastating floods in the state of Vargas in December I999. Chivez's discourse in favour of a multi-polar world and in opposition to the neoliberal-based Washington Consensus coincided with the groundswell of anti-globalisation sentiment at the internationallevel. Indeed, his stands on these issues represented a possible future point of reference in Latin America. Chivez's foreign policy would have undoubtedly had less appeal ten years earlierat a time when world-wide acceptance of neoliberalism had reached an apex, as did US supremacy with the unexpected collapse of the Soviet bloc. Although Chivez's nationalist positions were a throwback to the third-world movement of the I96os and I97os, they were unique in the Latin American setting of the I990s. This novelty contributed to the notion that Chivez was striking out in new directions, thus enhancing the possibility that chavismo would retain its appeal regardless of the outcome of the Chivez presidency. Unlike the relative consistency of its attitude toward the Chaivezgovernment, Washington reversed itself twice in its relations with Fujimori; these turnabouts reflected the contradictory thrust of Fujimori's neopopulist regime. As a result of his neoliberal policies, Fujimori secured the approval of international lending agencies following the autogolpe 1992, which was in condemned by nations throughout the world including the USA. thoroughly Fujimori defended the coup by arguing that the USA failed to comprehend Peru's predicament of Sendero Luminoso-sponsored terrorism, which made necessary the interruption of constitutional guarantees.41 Subsequently, Fujimori authorised US-piloted surveillance missions in the Amazonian region to combat drug trafficking(in contrast to Chaivez'srejection of DEAsponsored flights) and as a result coca export was largely checked. Neoliberal policies, the all-out war on terrorism, and collaboration with the DEA all explain the harmonious relations with the USA during the remainder of Fujimori's first term and most of the second.

41 Cotler,'La gobernabilidad el Peri', pp. 32-3. en

TheContrasting Variants Populism 157 of Nevertheless, following Fujimori's re-election in 1995, Montesinos consolidated his hold over the Peruvian state and cases of corruption, complicity with drug traffickers, and human rights violations reached the public. These incidents culminated in 2000 with the scandal over the sale of arms originating from Jordan to Colombian guerrillas. An additional source of irritation for the USA was Fujimori's backtracking from his commitment to market reforms, and his explicit criticism of neoliberalism for electoral purposes during the 2000 presidential campaign. Some scholars attribute Fujimori's exit from power to USA pressure rather than to the resistance of political parties of the opposition or to popular mobilisations, which were in any case poorly organised.42 The US reconsideration of its relations with Fujimori put in evidence the contradictory components of neopopulist governments: neoliberalism, populism, the electoral road to power, initial widespread popular support, and hyperpresidentialism.The populist features of the Fujimori government became increasingly salient toward the end of his rule and prompted the USA to reverse its position. This tendency included state interventionism in the economy and clientelism, which was conducive to corruption and duplicity in the war against drug trafficking.Another dimension that the USA could not ignore was the Fujimorigovernment's increasinglyvisible authoritarianorientation. In short, neopopulism (even more than classical populism) was subject to acute internal contradictions, thus explaining Washington's reformulation of its policy toward Fujimori and the brief duration of the movement of those who supported his government. Conclusion The first scholarly writing in the mid-i99os on the resurgence of Latin American populism set off a conceptual debate among political scientists. Theoretical discussion centred on whether the definition of populism should take in a wide diversity of features ranging from class following and economic policy to leadership qualities. Writers who defended the affirmative position argued against applying the concept of populism to contemporary governments in Latin America, which fell short of meeting these varied requirements.43Although regimes such as that of Fujimori and Menem resembled classicalpopulism of the 1930s and 1940s in some respects, they lacked several essential characteristicsincluding a popularly accepted economic programme 42 Cotler, norteamericana 1999). en Drogas (Lima, ypolitica elPer: la conexidn in de Anibal Burano Lara (ed.), yMenemismo,' Felipe Quijano, 'Populismo, representaci6n Paul for Conclusion: Requiem (Caracas, Seealso, W.Drake,' Elfantasma delpopulismo I998). in L. American in Perspective (ed.),Latin PopulismComparative Populism?,' Michael Conniff (Albuquerque, I982).

43

8 Steve Ellner

and a mobilisation strategy.A second school, which labelled the Fujimoriand Menem governments populist, rejected this position as 'conceptual conservatism' and as purist. Kurt Weyland, one of the school's leading members, proposed a 'minimal procedural' definition of populism that had proved fruitful for political scientists in describing the emergence of democratic regimes during the previous decade. Weyland and others considered populism a predominately 'political strategy', and thus discarded socio-economic factors as extrinsic to the phenomenon's definition.44 This article avoids such a definitional debate and has instead employed a comparative approach in order to determine the importance of neopopulism as a model followed by Latin American leaders. It has examined developments since the publication of the original works on neopopulism in the midI990s in order to evaluate the viability not only of neopopulist governments but also of neopopulist movements and strategies. The contrast between Fujimori, who lacked a movement of hard-core followers, and Ch~vez, who counted on such backing, is designed to shed light on the long-term prospects of neopopulism and the continued relevance of certain aspects of classical populism. In the mid-199os political scientists pointed out that neopopulist governments were not likely to be stable, but it was noted that at least the cases of Menem and Fujimori demonstrated long-term potential.45This article concludes that the position of neopopulist leaders was even more fragile than scholars recognised at the time. For instance, the Argentine economic crisis of 200oo-2has been attributed to the Menem regime's fiscal irresponsibility, including the social programmes that represented a basic prop of the neopopulist strategy. Furthermore, revelations about the Fujimori government during his later years in office and since then have called its democratic credentials sharply into question. These shortcomings and failures place in doubt the political future of both leaders as well as the long-term impact of neopopulism. The real issue is not the duration of neopopulist governments but the survival of neopopulist movements. That Fujimori, the neopopulist leader who lasted the longest in office, failed to maintain a political presence once he was forced out of power, suggests that the neopopulist model is less important than previously appeared to be the case. The contrast with classical populism could not be greater. Classicalpopulist leaders could boast of having initiated an economic model of major consequence, having incorporated large numbers of workers into the nation's political life through the labour movement,
a 44 KurtWeyland, 'Clarifying ContestedConcept:Populismin the Studyof LatinAmerican Politics,' Comparative Politics,vol. 34, no. I (Oct. zooI), pp. 8, 9, i8. 4 Weyland, 'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America,' p. 398; Roberts, 'Populism and Democracyin LatinAmerica'.

The Contrasting VariantsPopulismI59 of andhavingcreatedpartiesthat also lastedfor decades.Most of these parties abandoned theirfar-reaching as eventually goals,acceptedclientelism a modus and thus institutionalised, ceasingto be populist, operandi, becamecompletely as Weyland However,sucha processwasgradual, pointsout.46 encompassing severaldecades.If neopopulismcannot claim a similarset of accomplishments, then it can hardlybe assigned the same degree of importanceas classical populism. Fujimori's political decision-makingand strategies invariablyobeyed short-termconsiderations. This proved successfulin a period of economic when economic and policy-making achievements,but backfired expansion contraction in.47 set Some of the defectsof this approach were evidentin the mid-1990s andwereacknowledged scholars on while by writing neopopulism, other shortcomingsbecame increasingly with Fujimori'ssubconspicuous sequentpoliticaldecline. The short-termthrust of Fujimori'sstrategiesexpresseditself on many fronts.In the first place, the government'ssocial programme was financed fromthe proceedsof privatisation, which dwindledduringFujimori's second like These allocationsbased on electoralconsiderations, presidential period. the 'targetedprogrammes'againstdire povertypromoted by neoliberals,48 In wereby natureshort-term. the secondplace,Fujimori, whose actionswere informedby public opinion surveys,49 used gimmicksto bolster invariably his popularity key moments.This consideration at may have influencedthe of the conflictwith Ecuadorin 1995and the captureof top Sendero timing While successfulat firstin boosting Fujimori's ratings,a large guerrillas. poll In numberof Peruvians soon beganto perceivetheseactionsas manipulative. the thirdplace, Fujimori madeno effortto builda politicalpartythatwould have providedneopopulisma long-termpresencein Peru.As a result,the which was basic to the government'ssocial politicalbenefits of clientelism, that wereminimised. The extremepersonalism substituted polprogrammes, iticalpartyrulewas proneto generatecorruption, thus eventually discrediting Fujimoriand his discoursestressingpersonalhonesty. A cohesive political partymay have organisedand incorporatedmembers of the marginalised sectorsin order to converttenuous sympathyfor Fujimori into ferventand long-lastingsupport. with traditional LatinAmericandemagoguesand Despite his similarities adroitness originality; approach and his caudillos, Fujimori displayed political
46

Weyland, 'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America,' p. 14. 47 Classical populists such as Juan Domingo Per6n and R6mulo Betancourt, who reached power in the 1940s at a time when their nation counted on abundant resources, faced a similar dynamic. 48 Weyland, 'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America,' p. 398. 49 John Crabtree and Jim Thomas (eds.), El Pen~de Fujimori(Lima, 1999), p. 63.

Ellner I6o Steve clearly distinguished him from dictators such as Pinochet, who was an unqualified authoritarian, pro-neoliberal and primarily backed by the middle class. Most important, Fujimori maintained considerable lower class support in spite of the government's neoliberal policies. This backing explains the massive turnout at Fujimori's electoral gatherings during the 2000 presidential campaign and his front-runner status according to reliable polls.50 Furthermore, Fujimori's divergence from neoliberalism was more than nominal. His social programmes, which reached the remote highland areas,createdtensions with multilaterallending agencies that preferred to use privatisation money to pay off the foreign debt.51Fujimori's appeal to anti-neoliberal sentiment also strained relations with technocrats such as Minister of Finance Carlos Bolofia (who compared himself with his Argentine counterpart Domingo Cavallo - whose differences within the Menem administrationled him to form his own political party).52 In short, the strategy pursued by Fujimori diverged from traditionalauthoritarian regimes that imposed austere economic measures on the population. Those political scientists who write off the neopopulist phenomenon as demagoguery fail to recognise the novel aspects of Fujimori's approach. Although the long-term importance of the neopopulist phenomenon should not be overdrawn, the uniqueness of Fujimori's political strategies cannot be denied, nor the appropriateness of the term neopopulism. The political movement led by Hugo Chiivez, like those of the classical populists in the 1930s and I940s, is likely to leave an indelible mark on the political life of the nation. Most important, large numbers of the marginalised class consider the chavista movement to be theirs, and identify with its stated and visions. If the experience of organised workers in the heyday of goals classical populism is any indication, the incorporation of these excluded sectors in activist structures, albeit rudimentary, will guarantee long-time political loyalty. In addition, Chivez has created a political partyand a coalition that are likely to form part of the nation's political landscape for some time to come. Nevertheless, the high degree of polarisation in Venezuela is a double edged-sword. It generates fervent loyalty to Chivez, with long-term implications, at the same time as it intensifies rejection for the president among influential sectors, limiting his options and the possibility of achieving stability.

como proyectoinconcluso,'in Cotlerand Grom50 Romero Grompone,'El Fujimorismo pone, El Fujimorismo, I2 5. p. 51 Nelson Manrique, 'The Two Faces of Fujimori's Rural Policy,' NACLA: Reporton the
62

vol. Americas, 30,no. I (July-Aug. pp. 1996), 42-3.

Carlos Bolofia Behr, De Paniagua Toledo: la confusidn caos(Lima, oo2002), 58; Cotler, a de al p. 'La gobernabilidad en el Peri,' p. 45.

TheContrasting Variants Populism I16 of Political scientists and actors have pointed to the Chivez movement's authoritarian and demagogic tendencies, its failure to promote institutionalisation, and its actions depriving civil society of autonomy and an independent mobilisation capacity. These characteristics would place in doubt to the ability of the chavistas participate efficaciously in a democratic setting to the rules of the game over an extended period. Nevertheless, according when Chivez's brand of populism is placed alongside neopopulism, and the Fujimori regime in particular,these characteristicsappear to be less severe. In spite of a dangerous degree of militaryautonomy and cases of 'low intensity' repression, the government generally refrained from using force against an drafted the extremely aggressive opposition. At the same time, the chavistas constitution of 1999 with the aim of deepening the nation's democracy. Finally, movement was not at all monolithic. The mobilisations conducted the chavista in its name were not always externally controlled; and internal factions such as the Chavista labour branch sometimes embraced positions that the rest of the movement did not officially endorse.53These features indicate a degree of complexity that is more compatible with the democratic system than is the extreme personalism characteristicof neopopulism. In a similarvein, classical populist movements in the 1930s and 1940s maintained close ties with factions within the military and were often accused of being demagogic, undemocratic, and anti-institutionalist,but they also made lasting contributions to their nation's democracy. The principal overlap of the Fujimori and Chivez phenomena is their special appeal to the marginalised class. Unlike in the case of Fujimori, Chivez's exclusive social base was the marginalised sectors, which provided him with active support that was crucial for his political survival. The mobilisation capacity of the marginalised class, and specifically its response to the coup of i i April 2002, had no equivalent under Fujimori's rule. Political analysts need to explore in detail the relations between the marginalised sectors, on the one hand, and Chaivez and Fujimori, on the other. Specific features worthy of exploration include paternalist ties, attitudes toward the positions upheld by both leaders, and levels of participation and incorporation (such as the highly polemical, but little known, Circulos Bolivarianos). The 'bottom up' methodological approach of labour historians who have explored the reaction of unionised workers to classical populist movements of the 1930s and 1940S needs to be applied now to the marginalised sectors in Latin America.54 Such research focusing on the era of
53

54

Steve Ellner, 'Organized Labor and the Challenge of Chavismo,' in Ellner and Daniel and Politicsin the ChdiveEra: Class,Polarization Conflict (Boulder, Hellinger (eds.), Venezuelan 2003), pp. I169-7I. and See, for example, Daniel James, Doha Maria'sStoty:Life, History,Memory PoliticalIdentity (Durham, NC, zooo).

162 Steve Ellner globalisation would test the accuracyof long-held stereotypes that portraythe marginalised class as susceptible to paternalistic relationships and authoritarianism,55 politically volatile, and revolutionary.56Given the marginalised class's political independence vis-a-vis workers of the formal economy in recent years, and the importance it has assumed under Chaivez,Fujimori and other populist governments in Latin America, such a study is of paramount importance.

Fascism, and National Populism(New Brunswick, 1978), 55 Gino Germani, Authoritarianism,

56

pp. I53-208. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched theEarth (New York, 1963). of