Federalist 50-58 50. Federalist 50 is a relatively brief continuation of the topic James Madison explored in Federalist 49.

In the previous essay he had critiqued Thomas Jeffersons proposal to resolve constitutional issues through frequent appeals to the populace. In this essay, Madison addresses the idea of resolving these issues through periodical appeals to the population. In other words, there would be fixed intervals at which the nation at large would get to address issues related to enforcing the Constitution (Madison acknowledges that this does not concern amending or altering the Constitution). Madison rejects this idea, too, noting that there would be problems with either too short or too long periods. Either the period would be too short, and therefore the issues too current to be settled reasonably, or the intervals would be too long to constrain bad actors. Madison turns his attention to Pennsylvania, a state that actually developed a mechanism similar to the one under consideration here. The Council of Censors was impaired by a number of circumstances that prevented it from doing its job fairly. First of all, many of the individuals on the council had also been active and leading characters in the parties which pre-existed in the State. More importantly, many of the individuals on the council had been members of the executive and legislative branches during the period under review, and therefore had a vested interest in the councils deliberations. On top of all this, the proceedings showed the fundamental shortcomings of this particular approach. The Council of Censors was thus dominated by the same partisan divisions that marked the proceedings of the legislature. Instead of the council being a dispassionate reviewer of constitutional clashes, it was as beset by partisan wrangling as any other actor involved in the process. Madison outlines two other problems with the council. The council misconstrue[d] the limits prescribed for the legislative and executive departments, instead of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places. Finally, Madison doubted that the councils decisions had any effect in varying the practice founded on legislative constructions. In one instance the legislature essentially ignored the councils decision. So not only was this council beset by partisan intrigues, it was ineffective in reigning in the political branches. Madison has an argument ready for anyone wishing to assert that Pennsylvania is a special case in its partisan division. Furthermore, it would be no solution to restrict council membership to people who had not been involved with the governments decision during the period under consideration. Having thus rejected popular appeals as methods of dealing with encroachments of the constitution, Madison provides a solution in Federalist 51.

51. The conclusion from the last few papers is that the only means of maintaining in practice the separation of powers among the branches is through means built-in to the structure of government. This paper provides a few general observations intended to inform as to the reasons the government is formed as it is in the Constitution. It is desired that each department should have a will of its own and should not have its members appointed by another department but should be chosen from the fountain of authority by the people. But this cannot apply to the judiciary because judges must be chosen for their qualifications and they will be chosen for a permanent tenure, thus they should be chosen by the mode that selects the best candidates. The permanence of their tenure insures that there will be no long term dependence on the authority selecting them. It is also evident that compensations for the executive and judiciary departments should not depend on the legislative or independence would be merely nominal. The next thought in the paper deals with human nature and how the ambitions of men in the departments of government coupled with constitutional means will be the greatest security against the loss of respective powers. These men must defend their constitutional powers and ambition must be made to counteract ambition. But the interest of men must also be for constitutional rights for government is administered by men. If men were angels, no government would be necessary and no internal controls required. Thus the great difficulty for a government of men, you must first enable the government to control the governed and in the next place oblige it to control itself. But it is not possible to give each department an equal power of self defense. As mentioned the legislative authority will dominate in a republic thus it is divided into different branches with different means of election, and different responsibilities at least as far as possible given their common dependence on the people. Further the executive is strengthened by the veto which is not absolute however, given it can be overridden by those passing the laws. He concludes these thoughts by observing that if the federal government does not adhere to the principles of separation of powers then the State governments will certainly fail to do so. The rest of the paper is off this subject but returns to the subject introduced in Federalist No 10 of how a republic protects the rights of the people and minority factions. Even though the people surrender their power to the governments, a double security to their rights results from having a federal republican government divided into separate departments and State governments similarly divided and by having each controlled by the other and at the same time controlled by themselves. It is a great importance in a republic to protect a minor part of society from a majority united by a common interest. In a republic of a considerable extent society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens that the rights of individuals or of the minority will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. It is the same for civil rights as religious rights. The number of sects or interests if large will prevent a majority interest from dominating. This view argues against small confederacies in favor of the union since majority factions may trample on the rights of minorities in confederacies of limited size. In the United States the exception to the possibility of a majority uniting in a common cause would be for the causes of justice and the common good and thus less danger to a minor faction. Therefore there is no pretext for introducing into government a means to protect the security of the minority

not dependent on the will of the majority or in other words a will independent of the society itself. 52. This paper concerning the House of Representatives begins a more detailed examination of the branches of government. Two issues are considered, the qualifications for representatives and their term of office. It is interesting to note that much has been said to this point in the Federalist papers about a republican form of government where the people elect their representatives. But in our Constitution that only applies to the House of Representatives since Senators are chosen by the State legislatures and Presidents by electors appointed by the same legislatures. Perhaps as we progress through the remaining papers we will discover why Madison and Hamilton thought it best that the people did not directly elect Senators and the President. Madison begins this many paper discussion of the House by stating it was important to establish in the Constitution the right of the people to chose the members since it is regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. This right was too important to allow Congress or State legislatures to modify for this branch of government ought to be dependent on the people alone. But who can vote is left up to the State legislatures as long as the qualifications to vote are the same as that for electing the members of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. The convention that wrote the draft Constitution believed that for uniformity it needed to include qualifications for the members, thus twenty five years old, seven years a citizen of the US, live in the State he represents, and hold no other US office are required qualifications. The rest of the paper discusses the appropriate term of office by addressing the question are biennial elections safe and necessary or useful? . This branch of government is to be immediately dependent on the people and in sympathy with the people and that requires frequent elections. But there is no formula by which the frequency can be selected so he turns to the experience of history. He fist considers the British House of Commons where through its entire history the shortest election frequency was three years thus suggesting that our two year cycle would be even more satisfactory. Two years is also better than Ireland's best frequency of eight years. When considering what frequency is necessary to protect the liberties of the people our own revolution must also be considered. Clearly the peoples liberty was not endangered by a non-responsive State government even in Virginia which was the first colony to resist the usurpations of Great Britain and their frequency of elections was seven years. This discussion therefore proves that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from biennial elections. 53. This paper answers the second question asked in the last paper, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful? The first question, answered in the last paper, was are biennial elections safe in preserving the liberty of the people. Before addressing the question, he needs to discredit a proverb that states that where annual elections end, tyranny begins. This is done first using ridicule by observing no man will pretend there is a connection between the sun or the seasons and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. Then logic, in South Carolina elections are biennial while in Connecticut and Rhode-Island they are half yearly but even with this four to one difference is one better governed than the other? And finally suggesting the

proverb was formed concerning a government practice in Great Britain not applicable to the current US government. In Great Britain the the authority of the parliament is uncontrollable with regard to their constitution as well as laws. They have on several occasions changed the frequency of elections for themselves and in one case extended their tenure from three to seven years or four years longer than the term for which they were elected by the people. In our case of course the government cannot change the Constitution, he says. The paper the asks the question of interest, whether biennial elections be necessary or useful? The bulk of the response is based on the amount of knowledge required to be an effective legislature. The majority of States have elections for their representatives annually but the argument goes that the knowledge needed at the State level is considerably less than at the national level since one needs to know about foreign affairs and have some knowledge concerning the other States. This added knowledge will take time to acquire and thus requires a longer term in office. Other considerations in favor of a longer term are the distance traveled, the need for guidance of new members and for interactions with the Senate from those having gained extended knowledge by being elected numerous times, and leaving sufficient time to investigate claims of spurious elections. 54. This paper presumably about the number of representatives granted each State is much more than that. It is the discussion of the rationale for counting only three fifths of the total number of slaves in a State when determining the number of representatives in the House of Representatives from that State. In Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution three fifths of the total number of slaves is a compromise number of course and the clue to the compromise comes from the first part of the clause, namely Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States..... If southern States counted all slaves their representation in congress would increase but so would their share of the government's tax load. Northern States would argue if slaves are property they should be counted in estimates of taxation which are founded on property but excluded from representation based on census. We know how this was resolved in the Constitution so that the southern States would ratify it, but of interest is how did Madison, who we have seen, thought slavery an abomination, defend the document. He gives the arguments presented on the issue and then selects the argument he uses for the defense. First he claims there is no argument that the number of representatives and share of taxes should be proportional to the number of people in a State. But what about slaves? Southerners believed slaves were both property and persons because their laws considered them in some respects persons and in others property. The property part is obvious but there were laws supposedly that protected his life and his limbs against violence of all others even the master and being punishable himself for his violence he was regarded by law as a member of society. Therefore Southerners proclaim that the Constitution is correct when it views slaves with a mix of characteristics of person and property because that is based on the laws under which they live. He continues the discussion by offering a second way southerners might look at the issue. Would the convention that wrote the draft have been impartial or consistent when not counting slaves when considering the number of representatives but including them

when the tax burden was considered. Essentially, would the southern States ratify the draft if this was the outcome? Could northerners who berate the southerners for this barbarous policy agree that the federal Government consisting of the States should also consider the slaves property? But how are they to be counted in the federal estimation of people for rejecting them entirely would support the principle of property. It gets more complicated for the Constitution at that time gave the States the power to decide which inhabitants of the State to include or exclude from the census. States also decided qualifications for suffrage within their States. As a result every State excluded certain portions of their inhabitants from being counted in the census used to decide representatives. Southerners thereby ask that equal consideration be given to their side and that a compromise be accepted where slaves are included as inhabitants but debased by servitude below that of free inhabitants. Madison states with regard to the a southerner's argument to follow that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the Convention have established. He questions whether this clause in the Constitution can be defended by considering property as well as persons when representation is being apportioned. Is not government instituted to protect property as well as people and should not those charged with the government represent both? In fact in New York one branch of government is intended more especially to be the guardian of property and is elected only by those with property interests. The federal Constitution does not consider property or wealth when electing the representatives but since their responsibilities includes protecting the rights of property should not attention be paid to property when choosing those representatives? For another reason the votes allowed in the Federal Legislature to the people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. Within a State people of wealth and property influence the votes of others so through this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State possesses no such influence over another State. The representatives from richer States will possess no advantage over those from other States but they should be entitled to an advantage by a superior share of representation. In the Articles of Confederation the cooperation of wealthy States was important to the success of resolutions passed by the Congress as was true for some confederacies in Europe. Thus wealth should also influence the share of representation. The summary of the argument that persuaded Madison to be reconciled to the three fifth number goes like this: property needs to be protected by government but there is no provision for doing so and property or wealth should have an advantage in representative government but it doesn't so allowing southerners to include property at the three fifths scale for the purposes of representation helps correct these problems and if the property is considered equally for taxation then it is justified. It is worthy to note that he is only reconciled to the scale of the number three fifths and he takes no responsibility for the argument by saying a southerner might employ it. In fact he takes no responsibility for any of the arguments in the entire paper which is a first. His task was to defend the indefensible which he did by being reconciled to the fraction employed but not to the concept requiring such a number nor to the policy of slavery itself. 55. This paper deals with how many members there should be in the House of Representatives, a subject that apparently drew considerable attention and argument. The

arguments were four fold; first such a small number will be an unsafe depository of the public's interests, second they will not possess adequate knowledge of the local interests of the numerous constituents, third they will be taken only from the upper class of citizens, and fourth as small as the number is relative to the population this will only get worse as the country grows. The rest of the paper deals only with the first argument. He argues there is no numeric formula for fixing the ratio of representatives to population by pointing out that the ratio among the States is wildly different. The ratio should be large enough to allow free consultation and discussion and to guard against an easy combination for improper purposes. But not too large in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. He rephrases the first argument as that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power. Initially there will be sixty five representatives which will grow to one hundred in ten years and two hundred in twenty five years and four hundred in fifty years based on projected population growth rates and the number of one representative per thirty thousand inhabitants. Even at the current number of sixty five or a hundred he cannot conceive that the American people would elect and and reelect every two years men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny and treachery. And once more concerning States power he says state legislatures that posses so many means of counteracting the federal legislature would detect and defeat a conspiracy against their liberties and constituents. Where might we ask have these powers gone? But maybe the danger comes from bribery of foreign gold. The argument against this is that it would already have happened but it did not so this is not a threat. During the war when there was more opportunity for foreign gold to influence the government and there were fewer members needed to bribe, there was no treachery. Maybe the danger is from other branches of government. If there was a danger it would have to come from the President being able to influence by making appointments to public office. But the Constitution prohibits representatives from holding any civil office that may be created or whose emoluments have increased during their term. He concludes that it is human nature to have suspicion and distrust but he believes there is sufficient virtue among men for self-government and that is a basic presupposition for republican government. 56. This paper discusses the second charge against the number of representatives in the House of Representatives, that it will be too small to posses adequate knowledge of the interests of the constituents. The first question in this regard is what are the interests of the constituents that the representative needs to be acquainted with? The objects of federal legislation that are most important concern commerce, taxation, and the militia so what local knowledge is required for federal legislation in these area? Local laws and situations relating to commerce discussed previously can be handled with regard to federal legislation by a very few representatives. Taxation consists in a great measure of duties involved in the regulation of commerce so as above only a few knowledgeable representatives are required. Taxation within the States will be more diffusive but a few intelligent men from different parts of a State can bring sufficient knowledge to the federal legislative process for there will not be a great difference in the laws on taxation across a State. Further many of the representatives will be or have been members of the State legislatures where all of the local knowledge and interests of the State are assembled. These same observations apply in greater force to

the militia. Although there may be differences in discipline between States those differences within a State will be small and can be known by a few people. Having previously argued that representatives need considerable knowledge and therefore a two year term was necessary to acquire it, he now argues that the knowledge previously discussed was interstate knowledge whereas here it is intrastate. Knowledge about all the other States requires being in the legislative body for considerable time but local knowledge is obtained prior to election. As to the exact number of representatives for a given population he gives as examples the two kingdoms of England and Scotland. Through some numerical and logistical manipulations he shows that the people's interests are supported by representatives at a ratio to population of one per twenty eight thousand six hundred and seventy, thus the number in the Constitution of one per thirty thousand is justified. 57. This paper addresses the third charge against the House of Representatives, that it will be taken from the class of citizens which will have the least in common with the mass of the people and be the most likely to sacrifice the many for the aggrandizement of the few. Good grief, crooks and corruption in our government, say it isn't so. A republican form of government with a limitation on the term of appointments will maintain a proper responsibility to the people. But he asks is there something in the Constitution of the House of Representatives that violates the principle of republican government and favors the elevation of the few on the ruins of the many? Who are the electors? Not the rich more than the poor or the learned more than the ignorant. They are the same body of people of the United States who elect in every State the corresponding branch of the legislature. And what are the situations of the people elected? In the first place since they have been elected by the people they will have those qualifications that warrant being distinguished. In the second, having been elected by the people they will have gratitude and affection toward their constituents. In the third, his pride and vanity will favor his creation of a government in which he can share its honors and distinctions. Fourth is the restrain of frequent elections which will keep him dependent of the people. And he adds a fifth circumstance, which is news to us, that restrains the members and that is they can pass no law that does not also have its full operation on themselves. Further, this is one of the strongest bonds connecting rulers and the people together. Without this connection of interests and sentiments every government degenerates into tyranny. If this spirit (of America which nourishes freedom) shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the Legislature as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate anything but liberty. Has our spirit been so far debased that we now are prepared to tolerate anything but liberty? He argues that critics that are opposed to a Federal republican government are in favor of State republican government and this makes no sense. The only difference between the two is that federal representatives are elected by five to six thousand citizens while those in the individual States are elected by many hundreds. Reason tells us that in either case a fit representative would be found. If we say that five or six hundred is the most that can be used to elect officials then what happens in cases where the ratio of needed representatives to population is less than that. And as in many papers after making the arguments he gives examples. In this case as in others he uses the governments of many

of the States to show that officials are often elected by large numbers of citizens without dire consequences. 58. The paper addresses the remaining charge against the House of Representatives which is that the number of members will not be increased as the populations increase. The rationale for this charge comes from the fact that at that time in the Senate small states had an advantage over larger states because all had the same representation but there were more smaller states than larger states. In the House four of the thirteen states would have a majority of the members so that set the ratio of large to small at four to nine. The fear was that the Senate would block any bill that increased the allotment of members to the larger states as their populations grew presumably faster than the smaller states. Admitting that this objection if true would have great weight, he argues 1. the federal and state constitutions both provide for the gradual increase in representatives as populations increase, 2. experience with the states has shown no such problem in increasing the number or in any objection to the increase, and 3. the federal constitution divides the congress into two houses, one the House of Representatives where members are directly elected by the people and the Senate where members are appointed by the state governments. Any attempt by the smaller states in the House of Representatives to prevent an increase in the allotment of members relative to population would be overcome by the four larger states whose members totaled more than a majority. He then discusses the primary objection where the Senate might block the increase in allotments. The large states, with the larger number of members speaking for the majority of the people and supported by right and reason will have the advantage in this argument. Also there is a gradation between large and small states so even in the Senate it is not certain it would be unfriendly to proper allocation. And where would new states align themselves? Also the House controls the purse so it could disrupt government should the Senate be unreasonable. In such a battle the members of the Senate being fewer in number will feel the wrath of the people more than the more numerous House members. Two interesting but seemingly out of place discussions follow. He argues against too large a body of legislature for the greater will be the proportion of members of limited information and of weak capacities. Now it is precisely on characters of this description that the eloquence and address of the few are known to act with all their force. Increasing the size of government beyond a particular size will decrease the peoples safety for the few will manipulate the many. We could use such wisdom these days. And finally the question of whether a majority is required for a quorum as in the Constitution or should some larger fraction be required. A larger fraction would give too much power to minority interests who could prevent action by being absent.