310

Chapler 7
Three Roots of Rationality
10 order to providc a provisional wi ll discuss the comple-
mentary rclati onship bctwecn discursive SlrUClUrc and reneclion (or
self-rcferCl1ce as a conditiOI1 for thc rationality f procced
ing then 10 deal with thc rational core str ucturcs of knowledge,
pllrposivc aClivity, and cOlllmunicalion
Discursivc Rationali ry and Reflcctio n
The a person is proponionatc to his himself
Tlionally and 10 his abili ty 10 give account for his expressions in a
stance. A pcrson expresscs himself rationally insofar as he
is oriemed perfonnati,"cly toward that hc 1101
only behavcs rati onally bUl is rational if he (an give aCCounl
for his ori entation claims. We also call lhis kind of
rationaliry accountability (ZurecJmungsfhigkeit)
Accoun13bili ty presupposes a on the part of
the pcrson to what shc and does; this capacity is
entwined with the rational corc structurcs of knowledge, purposive
activi ry, and communication by W"dy of the
tions. The epistemic sclf-relalion implies a reflcxive auilude on thc
part of the knowing lO her own beliefs and conviclons;
the tcchnical-practical sclf-relation implics a rcfl exive auitude on the
pan of the acting subjccl 10 his own acuvity, be it tO his
own inslrumental intervcnuons in the obiecli ve world or to his
SllccCs.H:l riCnlcd subjecLS cncountered as oppo-
nents in the objectivc world. (1 undcrstand world" as the
lotali ry of enuties concerning which true profX>sitions arc possible.)
The moral-practical self-rclation of thc communicati vcly acng aClor
demands a rcfl exive aU tllde to her own norm-regulalcd actions; thc
existential self-relalon requires from the aClor a reflexive auitllde 10
her own in thc context of an individuallifc-hislor y which
course, with pregi\'cn coll ective forms of !ife. Morc-
m a person's ability lO distance himself in lhis way in thesc VriOUS
from himsclf and his cxprcssions is a neccssar y condi
tio n of his freedm
?

311
Some Furthcr Clarifca rions of the Conccpl of CommuniC31ivc
Freedom is differcntiated according tO the di fTerent sclf-relations
of thc knowing and aCling subject. Refl exive freedom in lhe sense
of opcnness (U1/lNfangrnhei t) requires !ibcration from thc
egoccll tric pcrspecti\.e of a participant deeply involvcd in action
contexlS; this is the frecdom wc traditionally associate wth the theo-
rctical Stance. Frccdom of consislS in the
for rational1y choosing to act in one or 01' for
making a ncw s13rt chain of we refer
capacily for binding own will on the basis of !I1 oral insic:ht as
freedomd autonomy FInally, etlIleali free
dom makes possible a deliberate life-projcct and the stabili7.ation of
an lhesc forms of freedom are dispositions
that can to a but thc accompanying self-relatons
arc duc in each case to thc adoption and internali zation of the
perspcctivc on me of othcr argumentauon:
epistcmic sclf-rclation and in the various practical self-relations 1, as
a first adopt the pcrspective in which
IOCulors-that is, other participanLS in (empirical
pragmalic, moral, or discourses--focus 011 my expressions
Thus, in thc ref1 cclion of the rati onal who dis13nces hmself
from himself, the rationality inheren t in the struclure and in the
procedure of argumen13tion s mirrortd in a Howevcr, it
at lhe samc time the integrati ve level of
refl ecti on and discourse, the Ihrce ratonality componcnts-know.
ing, acti ng, and speaking--combi ne, that form
Epistcmic Rati onal ity
Our knowledge is buiI< up from propositions or
elemcntary uniLS thal can be true or false: o n account of
sitional SLr uclurc, knowledgc is intrinsicall y of a linguisti c nature
This structure can bc wilh the help of
tences. will not deal here with the semantcs of proposi
tional scntences the pragmatic meaning of acts of reference
and predication
In ordcr 10 know in an explicit sense, l is nOl, of
CQurse. sufficielll mercly to be familiar wi th facts that could bc
outlineN
NNvQ
N*\h

accounta
bility--
>self-
relation--
>T|\
h
312

represemcd in trllC

know facts and havc a knowledge
of thcm at our disposal onl)' when we simultancollsl y know why the
corresponding j udgmcnlS are true. we spcak of in1ulivt:
or implicit knowledgc--of a -practical
H
knowledgc of how one does
something. Onc can know how 10 do somclhing WithOlll
knowing what it is that goes to mak.e Up these compctendcs
contrast, the bound Up implicitly wil h a
WhyH and insofar poill1S<oward potcl11ial
Whoever believes lhal hc al his disposal lhc
possi bility of a of corresponding truth cJaims
Put is part of the grammar of the expression -knowing
H
that cverything we know can be criticized andjuslified
This docs nOl mean, of course, lhal rational beiicfs or convictions
always consist of lrue sharcs views that turn o Ul
tO bc untruc is irra1ional. Someonc is irr.uional if she pll lS
hcr belicfs to lhem ahhough she sces
that she cannot thelll. In order to belief as ralional.
it is sufficient that it can be held 10 be trlle on lhe of good
reasons in lhe rclevant comext of jllstification-that is, that it can bc
accepled posuraditional 01' under
of al1 knowledge-from the of a
third person- is deemed fallible (this, too, is part of the grammar
of thc nowadays) , even though in the performative
stance, from the pcrspective of a participant, we cannot avoid
11luonditiOlwll)' regarding the knowledge as truc. Despite this
natllre of knowlcdgc, thc rationality of a judgment does
not but mcrely its acccptability in a givcn
context
Of course, the ref1cxive ch<l. rac1cr of true judgmcnt.s would no t bc
possible if wc could not o ur knowledgc, lhal is, if wc cOllld
no t express it in and if wc cOllld not COfrCct it and cxpand
it; means: ifwc werc not able also to (l rn from ollr practical
dealings resisLS us. To this eXlcnl, epistcmic ration
ality is e1l 1wi"td with aclion and thc use of language.
6
I speak of an
epistemic core structure bccausc lhe propositional structure is de-
pendent in speech and aClion: it is nOl a ulf

li
313
Some Funhcr of thc Conccpt of R.'uionality
struClurc. It is 1he linguistic rcpresentation of what is
known. and the confrontation of knowledge Wlh a reali ty agai nst
which a justifi cd expectati on can firsl make it possible
to dea! wilh knowl cdgc in a rational wa)'.
On the o nc hand, we can deal Wth our knowlcdge operalively-
render it more precise, elaborate it, rcconstruct it, systcma-
lize it, lest it for consistcncy and if it takcs on a
can be grasped (On lhe rcf1exive level of
science, whcre i1 is a matter of constructing theori es, the necessity
for o rgani zing knowledgc the be, using a
formal language-is striking.) On the other hand, as
pragmalism correctly we make use of our knowl-
edgc in practices, implemcl1l ing it in goal-direc1cd actions con-
trolled in ter ms of success, in order to be able to Icarn from
expcricnces. frol1l by proccssing surprises
by mcans of and by rcvisi ng thc knowledge that
has been rendered problematic. (On the rcflexive level of scencc,
this 5On , which are to be processed
arc generatcd rclation 10 action of the
evidence-1hat is, of the disappoinUT1 ents-is revcalcd, in particular,
in expcrimental action.) 7
Teleological Rationality
AJl action is intentional; an acti o n may be understood as carrying
OUl the intcmion of a frcel y choosing and dcciding actor. Anion has
a teleological struc1ure, for every action-intention aims at lhe rcali.
of a SCl goal. Once again , the rationali ty of an action IS
proponionatc not to whcther the state aClually occurring in lhe
result of thc action coinddcs with stale and
satisfies thc corrcsponding conditions of mther lO
whethcr thc actor has achieved lhi s result on the basis deliber-
ate\ y selected and implcmentcd mcans (or, in accurate\y perceived
circumstances, could normalJy have donc 50). A successfu\ actor has
acted ratio nall y only if he (i) knm"'s why he (or why
he could have realized thc set goal in normal circumstanccs) and if
rationali
ty^v^
f/~g
N[f/
true
f/_:
ct
v
zW(
ry[s
XNS
Njustify
justify
-->
epistemic
core
structure
314
Chaplcr 7
(ii ) this k.nowledge mouv.nes thc aClor (at least in in such a
way that he carries out his aClon fOf reasons that can at
time explai n its possible success
In the simplesl case, the considerations thal can simultaneollsly
mOlvale a rational acriOI1 take the form of a pnlct cal
infcrence. Given certain A intenru in situation S
bring abOUl thc slate ; circumstanccs A lhe implc-
men l3ton ofthc means Mas the satisfaction ofa
suff cie n l-cond i 10 bdng about wi th a ccrtain prob-
ability; for thiS A carries oul the action that
selected means.
8
\\'e have knowledge in the strict sense
requires a reOexive of refcrs lO possible
justificalions: action requircs a
- suitable for possible deci
sive aCl ion-intention, that is, a caJculalion of the success of thc
aClion. Once again, there is a relat.i onship of mUlual rcference be-
tween the rdtionaJity of the action and the forum of a di scourse in
which an actor 's decisivc reasons for making his decision-dcter
mined I!X ante-could bc tested. Thc theory of rational choice deals
the dccision-making problems of acting sub-
who are guided in an cgocentric way by lheir respccli\'e per-
sonal preferences and expectations of succcss, that can bc uscd to
construct models
Thc rationality of activity. too, is emwincd
Olhcr structures of knowledge and speech. For the prac ti cal
considcrations by means of which a rational plan of action is carried
out are dependent on lhe nput of reliable informaLon (about
expccled evenLS in lhe wodd, 01' aboul the bchavior and the inten-
tions of other actors) -c\'en if, in general, the aClors acting in a
purposive-rational way have lO bc satisficd with highly incomplclC
On the Olher hand, such information can be processcd
intelligentl)'-that is, referred to decision-making maxims and goals
lhat for thcir part have bccn selcctcd in light of personal prefer-
encc-o nl y in the medium of linguistic rcprcscntation. This is 01>-
case of the theorcLcal trealment of complex
dccision-making e\ ementary action-illlentions and
simpl c too, are linguisticall y structured. Just as
'
315
Somc Funher Claril cations of Ihe Conccpl of Ra tionalilY
propositional knowledgc is dept: ndent on thc use of propositional
sentences. 50 too is inlentional aClion essentially depcndent on the
use of
Communical\'e Rationality
There is a peculiar not in language as such bUl
in the communicative use of Ii nguislic expressions, thal can bc re-
duced neither to the epistcmic rationality of knowlcdgc (as c1assical
truth-conditional semantics sllpposes) Il or to thc purposive-ntLonal
ity of action (as intcntionalist scmantics This communicative
rationalily is expressed in the unitying force oriented
ward reaching lI ndcrslanding, which sccures for thc participaling
speakers an intcl"Subjectvel y sharcd thereby securing at
the same time the hori ZOIl w'ilhin which cver yone can refer to o ne
and the same world
The communicati\'e use of linguistic cxpressions ser\'cs not onl y
imentions ofa also to represent
states of arfairs (or to presuppose their tO establish
intcrpersonal relati ons wi th a second person. Here, the three aspects
of an aClor rcaching understanding (b) with someone (c) about
something are reOectcd. What the spcaker wants
expression is conneCled bOth with what is in it and
action as which it should be lI nderslood. ThllS, a threefold
relation CXiSlS belWeen the mcaning o f a linguistic and
(a) what is intemkd (gemeint) by (b) what in it, and (c) thc
way in which il is USffl in the speech act. With his speech the
speaker pursucs his aim of reaching understanding with a hcarer
about something. This illoclltionary aim, as wc will refer to it, is
the speech aCI is firSl of all supposed to be understood
by thc hearer and as The rational
ity or lhe use of orientcd loward reaching understanding
thcn depends on whethcr the spcech sufficieny comprc-
hensiblc and acccptablc for thc speaker to achieve illocutionary
success with lhem (or for him lO be able to do 50 in normal
stanccs) . Oncc again, we do not call onl y valid rational
but rdlhcr all comprehensible spccch acts for which the speakcr can
316
Chapter 7
take on a credible in the givcn circulll stances lO the effCcl
that the validity c1aims raised could, if be vindicated dis-
Thus here. (00, lhcrc is an intcrnal conneclon
the ratonalil)' of a speech aCl and its possible justifi cation. 0111)' in
argumentations can the va li dily c1aims impli citly raised wilh a spccch
aCl be thcmati7.ed as slIch and testcd with rcasons
III oculionary ai ms be as can he
brought aboUl through intcTventions in thc Fo r this
we should l10t cOl1 ccive of thc illocutionary aims of reaching
understanding (which speak, imrnanent (0
thc speakcr produces in lhe hcarer with
her spccch act hy way of a causal exerton ofinf1 ucnce. Hcre, 1 \'lollld
like to make three obscrvations. First, the amlS cannot
be defined indepcndcntly of the Ii nguistic means ofreaching
standing; as WittgellStcin made the lelos of reaching under.
slanding is inherenl in the linguistic mcdium itsclf. Second, the
cannot intend her aim as something to bc cfTected causall y,
because thc of the hearer is a rationally mo ti\'alcd
posi ti on; I.he frecdom of being
ablc to say Mno." Finally, speakers and hearcrs confronl onc anothcr
in a as first and second pcrsons,
nents or as objecLS thc world of emiti es aoout which they are
speaking. In wanting 1.0 reach lI ndcrstanding ....'i th one another
abolll somclhing, thcir aims li e t.he oqjective
worl d in which thc)' can inlcrvcne as observi ng actors
As evenLS lhat are localizable in time and space, howevcr, speech acLS
are simuhaneollsly part of the world in which, likc all
lc1eological actions, lhcy can a/.so bring things abom. that is, they
also prodllce perlocutionary cffCCLS
The speaker wOll ld likc the addressee to acccpl what as
this is dedded b)' the addrcssee's "yes" 01' to the \'ali dit)'
c1aim for whal is the spcaker raiscs with his spccch act
What makes the spccch-act offer acccptablc arc, rea-
sons that thc speakcr could in thc gi\'cn comext Cor lhc
V' dlidity of what is said, The rationali ty inherent in communicat ion
thus rests on the internal conncClion betwecll (a) the conditions
that make a spccch act valid, (b) the daim raised by thc speaker lhal

-

317
Somc FUrlhcl' Clarilcalions of Or Communicali\'c RationalilY
thcsc conditions arc satisf ed, and (c) the credibility of the warramy
issucd b)' the spcakcr to the CffCCl that he could, iC necessar )', discur-
validit}' claim
In ordcr to cover Ihc emire specU' um of possible validit}' claims,
il. makcs scnse to Slart b)' posing the heuristi c qllestion: in what sense
can spccch acLS be answcring this queslion wc
hil upon three sorlS daims: truth cJaims in
10 with reference in the
live world: cJ aims lO the trllthfulness of lI 11erances
thal. make subjeclive experiences (Erlelmsse) 10 which the
spcaker has privilcged and finall y. claims 10 the rightness of
norms and ill .111
shared soci"l world?
Language Use
The illocutionar)' stlccess of a speech act is propoJ' tionatc 10 lhe
inlcrsuqjective recognition accorded to c1aim with
il. Here, a communicative situation is prcsupposed in which the
panicipants can lake 011 the respccli\'e roles of speaker and hearcr
(and, if need be, the role or a third pany pl is, can takc
on thc ro les of Ihc sccond, and thi rd This distribulion
of roles, which is built into the logic of the of pcrsonal
pronouns, is cssential fOl<hc communicative rationalilY embodied
m of reaching undcrstanding. Wc can sce this cJearl y if wc
compare thc use of language orientcd toward reaching undcr-
slanding wil. h a use oC linguistic expressions lhat is nOl gearcd toward
communication. Following on from thi s distinction the
communicative and use of language. I will un-
dertake d iCrerentiations in the concepl of understanding"
itsclf
Use of Langllage versus the Noncommunicalive
Usc
The epistemic and telcological lISCS of langllagc al'C OOl dcpcndenl
on an iOlerpcrsonal rel:uionship belwecn hearcr in 3
318
Chaptcr
cooununicative situalion. IllQCll. lionar)' lhe daims
connecled with them, which havc a buill-ll orie1! tllt01! tmilllrd intersub-
nOl rolc eithcr in the
epistcmic use of language. which sen 'cs primarily 10
knowledge, or in the calcula1ion of action the
language users are not pursuing ilIocmionary ams. Although in
case language has to be acqui rcd communicatively. lhc linguis-
tic expressions al1! be used monologicaUy in such instanccs--that is.
refercnce 10 a second person. That lhe pragmatic
are nOl relevant in the case of lhe or leleological
use of languagc is c\ car from the structure of the propositional
scnlenccs and imentional sentences essemiall y uscd in cach. Unli ke
for examplc. questi ons or imperati vcs, propositional and i11lentional
scntenccs are not fundamemally li ed tO addressees; thei r mcani ng
c011lent is independenl of the illocutionary acLS in which they can
be embcdded-which is why lhcy can bc analyd exhaustivel)'
the tools of formal semantics.
IO
Onc understands epistemical ly used propositional senlcnces if
o ne knows thcir truth that is, if o ne knows when they are
1rue; this is the special case to which the 1hcsis of lrlllh-conditional
scmantics applies. makes sense here to spcak of assign-
ing (as is customar y in because lhc assertoric
force of aClS of asscJ' tion is nOl intrinsicall y such
monologically cmploycd scmences. For of purc repre-
scnlalion we abstracl from how lhe propositional senltnce s embed-
dcd n a speech llcl; in othcr words, we disregard the
in which a speaker would as.sert thc propo-
sitioll aim of finding agrecment wilh an addrcssec.
11
An
cpistemically used propositional scmence servcs lO rcprese nt a state
of affairs or a fact. For the of this son of reresenlation, it is
sufficicnt if thc audlor givcs (whomcver) to 1l1l derstand lhal he is
considcring holds il to be true. By cont.raSI, wi th thc a.sserti01!
of a fact, a communicating spcaker would n01 mcrcly wish to
an addrcssee know thal hc himself holds "M to ra1her, hc
pursue thc illocmionary aim of having the olhcr acknowledge
thal is true
w
319
Somc Furthcr Clarrcalions or thc Conccpt Rationality
It is a wit h intentional used for planning
aclion undcrstands imemional sentences dlal
structure purposive aclivities if one knows thc of success,
that is, if onc knows under which lhey are made true
Conditions of success are truth condi ti ons that are in an
actor-rclativc in thc case of epislemically uscd propositional
sentences, the relation ofthe sentences to somelhing objective
world-that is, knowledge of the state of afTairs and direction of
fit-is suffidel1l for understanding such pragmatically used inten-
tional sentences. An force is nOl already connected
with lhese per sc; this force only when the actor an
noU1!Ces hCI" imenons in a communicativc situation, lhal is. when
the aClor utters hcr intentions with the ill oculionar y aim of having
others takc them se1"ou.sly and count on thei r bei ng carried out
thc noncommunicative use of language for purposes of
pure representation or for a plan of aClion playcd u ough mentally
is due to a feat of merely slIspcnds the reference-
which is llltlJllys rtSD!1 virtually----of proposi lions to truth. or of inlen
tions LO the seriousness of what is This is evident as soon
as representations 01' plans of action arc called into question. When
this happens, lhe aUlhor is expected 10 justify to others discursively
what she lhe public forum
of argumenlation. Cerlainly, such argumentations, too, can he con-
ducted in jqro similar manner in which we can direct
imperatives 10 argumenLS and arc by
their very naturc pragmatic and for this unlike propositional
and intcntional can be intcrnalized only
rclations that are inherent tO their meaning. Proposi
tions and imcmions can be dives1ed of the i1Iocmionary meaning or
acts of asserting and announcing without losing their meaning.
whercas evt! n in joro 1! tenw an imperative without an illocllti onary
componenl would 110 longer be an impera1ive (for even here. 1, in
the role or the first direct an imperativc to myself as a fictivc
second person). Communicative rationali ty embodied only in
a process of reaching opemles by way
daims and hearcr. in a pcrformative attitude di
320
Chapter 7
rCCled lO second persons. (0) rcach underSlanding wit h OIl C
anot her aboUl something in thc wor1d. The difference lhis
and lhe no ncommunicauve use of language resuhs from the addi.
lion of c1ai m wilh lhe sfflJur a hearer. Here.
his aim does not consist in lcuing thc addressee know
his double intention, namely, that hc (i nlcntion t) holds (0 be
true (01" would like (0 bring about .. lhat hc wishes her 10
know this mther, he wishcs tO communicate the faCl (01
lhe (0 Lhe addressee in such a way lhal she herself is
convinced Hthat p" (or takes seriously the speakcr's intcntion "(0
bring The iIlocutionary meaning of an ullerancc is nOI.
lhal lhe hearcr should lake nOle of Ss belief (or intention) but
rather lhal shc should comc to hold the sameview as S (or that she
should take seri ously Ss announcement). For S [0 achieve hi s illoclI'
tionary aim, it is nOl sufficicnt for H to know the truth conditions
(or thc SllCCCSS conditions) of "p;" H is also supposed to understand
iIlocutonary meaning of assertions (or declaraoons of imen.
oon) as possi ble,
claims
In the case of al1 asserton, the a for
what is said. The hearer will take an affirmative posiLion on this (00
mauer how implicitly) on1y if he ho1ds what to be justi fied or,
al leasl, reg'Mds the speakcr 's warranty as credible lO lhe effecl lhat
shc c01l1d, if necessary, convince lhe hearer fact on
basis of good In the case of the va1idi ty daim raised wilh
a dcclaration of intcntion, the hearer wilJ take seriously thc an.
nounccd inlention if he is convnced lhat the speaker means what
and has good reasons for wanting to makc hcr an-
nouncemcnt Lr lle: he presumes thal thc utlerance is serious if he
holds Ss intentio l1 to be justified (from her poil1l of v ew)
The Use of Langllage Oriented toward Agreement verslIs lhe Use
of Langllage Oriented toward Reaching Understanding
Now, of coursc, it makes a difference whether agreement (Einver.
stndnis) a facl exists between pan.icipants or whether
they bolh mertly reach an undcrstanding (sich one
F
321
Some Funher Clari ficalions of the CQncept of Rationality
another concerning Agru-
menl in thc is achieved onl y if the participants are able
to accept c1aim for lhe reasons, whi1e mutual under.
sta7l ding can also come aoout when one participant
the other, in Iight of her preferences, reasons in
the for hcr dcclared IS, reasons
that are good frrr her-without havi ng to make these reasons his own
in light of his preferences, reasons permit a
stronger mode of reaching undel'standing lhan actor.relative rea-
sons. In the following, 1 will declaratiOI1S of intention
and simple impcratives with (ii) and com
mands in order to makc a differentialion within the communicative
use of betwecn a "weak and mode of reaching
understanding
i. As wc have seen, the validity claim raised with an aCl of assertion
for a proposilion .. achicvcs intersubjeclive recognilion only if al1
participants are convinced "that for the same reasons, 50 long as
the speaker and addressee accept the proposition trlle fOJ
different respectivel}', and bolh know with regard tO the
lhese conslitute good only for the onc or
the other of them. the truth c1aim raised for .. which is dependent
011 is nOl accepled as $Uch. 5ince a
siwcompetition for lhe better argulllent has, for conceptual reasons,
agrcement and not its goal , thc
of lhe valid iry left open lIntil reasons make
lhe contested truth c1ai m rationally acceptablc in for all
participants. It is a d ifferent matlcr wi th the one-sided an
nouncement ofan aClion based on arbitlry free choice ("1
lomorrow") or with simplc down ").
uttcranccs are, without doubl , il1ocll lionary acts, it would be coun
terinluitive tO suppose t hat a to bring about any kind
of them, The spcaker cannot reckon with agrcc.
ment for one.sided cxpressions of wil l. Nonetheless in sllch cascs,
too, it is permissible to speak in a wcakcr sense of under.
between here. too, validily claims are
that onc participant raises ;md the other can accept or
reJccl
322
Chaplcr 7
10 the case of annoullccments or declar.nions of intention. thc
actor can gain asscnl by showing the inlended action to bc one that
is rationlll in lighl of his prert: rcnces given circumstanccs and
given means). For this son of mutual understanding, tele-
010gica1 rationaliry takes On a mediating folc. In such the
hcarer has good rcasons for
evcn if she does nOl own the rcasons for the dcclared
intentioJl. In general , one propostional con lenl of
an announcement if OIlC k.nows the conditions of SlIccess for
however, Qlle meaning only if
knows why OIl C should take the declared intcntion seriously as an
announcement, thal i5, why Ol1e should COUO{ 011 its bcing carried
out. Certainl y, a hearcr, in a given case, may accept the an
as an to be taken seriously for the same
reasons as thc actor; howcver, it is these are actor.relat;vf!
reasons that show the announccd action tO be rational for the actor
from 0/ therefore, from <hc poilll of of thc
addressee, Iikely to be carried out. There can be no question of
"agreement" here because the reasons supporting thc sinccrity of
lhc actor's illlention can quality a.s good rcasons only according 10
that are valid for the actor but not for his
might call sllch distinguish them from generally accep<e
able rcasons-"publicly intclligiblc" reasons. Wha1 are good reasons
for the actor to in lend 10 carry out an action arc good for
the not to doubt his intcntion
It is a diffcrCIll matler again-lhough in effcct, si milar-wilh im
peratives. There is no noncommunicative use of imperativc sen
for are intrinsically of a pragmatic nature. Thcir
il\ocutionary meaning consists in the facl that the speaker wants 10
motiva1e an addressee-thal is, bring aboUl "p."
One lI ndcrstands the propositional conten1 of an imperalive if one
knows the conditions of success for lhe corresponding action ; in
order to underSland its iI1ocutionary meaning, however, one has to
know (as in thc case of dcclarations of intention) why thc speakcr
sincercl y means what she says and this, why she
may expect the addresscc 10 comply with her impemtive
An impcrative is rational o nly if (apart from its viability) Ihc actor
323
Somc Funhcr Clarificalioll s of the Concept
has good reasons for supposing addressce ha.s not
LO oppose her impcrati\'c. Thcsc additional reasons, too, are aCIOI
in this that the (possibly wrongly) attrib-
utes to t.he reasons ror spcaker assumes
thc either of sanClons, should the desired acuon fal lO
be carried out, or or if it is carri ed out. As with declarations
of intcntion, in thc casc of imper.nve the rationally expecl
ablc acton conscquences coun l as part
that speak for the ratonali ty of sllch uucrances (although now thcy
are assesscd positive\ y 01' negativcly from the point of the
hearcr)
AnnouncemcnlS and imperatives do not aim at agreemenl
strCt scnse). Nonetheless, lhey movc \\fi thn the horizon ofa mUlual
undcrstanding based c1 aims and <hus the
communCaLivc rationality. It s truc that thc acceptability
valdi ty claims is mcdiated via the purposivc ralonality that
the resolvc or lhe decision has for thc actor whose attitude is succcss
oricnted; however, thcir illoculonary success is in lurn measured in
lerms of claims to truth and ll' uthfulness even is only wth
refercnce to thc prerercnces of the speakcr (or in connection with
prcferences auributcd by thc to the hearer). Thc hearcr
assumcs tha1lhe speaker means what and holds 1 tO be truc
For this reason, dedarations of intention and imperau\'es charac-
tcrisucally can be challenged under lhe two aspccts or truthrulness
(comparc l ' and 2') and thc truth of existenlal presup-
positions (compare 1'" and
( 1) I wil\ sign the contract tomorl'ow in
are pul1ing my leg
( 1 H) You COllldn '( possibly be in Tokyo by lomorrow (due to the
tme diffcrence)
(2) Cive money [ need now,
(2') You arcn ' t basically looking for all but for some-
thing quite differcnt (namely afTcction)
(2"') I couldn.t get that al110unl or money togcthcr so
324
Chapter 7
ii . Of course, thc mode of language usc would have to change as
soon as the lruth of the assertions presupposed
nouncements or imperatives is itself themalzed. $uch a change in
lopic would necessitalc transition to an orientation loward an
lhal goes bcyond merc '"reaching understanding. " Such
a swlch from the usc of languagc oriented loward reaching undcr.
standing 10 one orientcd may also bc ilIustratcd
in a difTercnl way with lhe help of the examples given, for in each
therc is a funhcr possibJe in which il can be ncgated
( lack the good wi ll neccssary (0 take 011 such a sLrenu.
ous commltment
(1 "") You don ' t have the legal fOf that
I don ' ( owe you anylhing
Herc. however, the speech presumcd (0 havc a di fTerent
iHocutionary meaning. For, now, the negation of (1) and (2) refers
to daims th;:u comc into play only when intcntional
and "embedded" in normalive contcxts
and arc by a normativc background. The an.
nouncemcnt signing contract could bc a commissivc
spccch aCI-for instance, a promise with which the actor commit.s
herself to 5Omethil1g-or else a dcdar.nive speech act, with which
speaker d ischarges an institutional task (for examplc, the duty
of a of Ihe Board lO inform lhe pub1i c). Thc impe ra-
ti\'C to hand the moncy could imply a friend's requesl, a supc
rior 's a creditor's demand.
Through backing of this kind, dedartiollS of intentiol1 and im
are transformed into nonnaliwly aulhoriud of
will such as promises, dedarations, and commands. Wilh this, the
i\Iocuti onary meaning and validily basis of Ihc uttcranccs change
Normati vc rcasons do 1101 dcterminc lhe prudclllial asscssment.s 01
arbilranLy choosing Ihcy rathcr
the decisions of subjcClS who bind their are thus able to enter
into obligati ons. In COntraSl to thc Mnakcd M declarati OIlS of
intentions and

imperativcs, normati\'c rcasons are not
actor-rclati ve reasons for onc's own (or anothcr's) pUl'posivc-rati onal

.,
325
Sorne Furthcr ClarifcaLions of thc Conccpt of Communc-dti\'c Ralonalty
behavior bm-as n the casc rca
however, unlike the reasons for assertions. they are nOl rca50ns
for the existcnce of statcs of afTairs bm rather for of
normatvely binding expectalions. Connected with rcgulativc spcech
acts declar.uions, and conunands is a validiry daim
that has a buill-in OIientati on toward vindication in practical dis-
courses. In o rdcl' to undersland lhe illocutionar y meaning 01' this
50rt of spccch one know the normative context that
cxplai ns why an actol' feels amhorlzed or obliged to perform a
ccrtain action o r as the addresscc is concerned, she may
his compliance with thc imperalive. Insofar as the par-
ticipanLS Iccogni.lc a nonnativc backgrolllld (fol
cxample, within the framcwork of a sharcd , thcy can
accept regulative acts as val id for the .same rca50ns
In contrast to an epistcmicall y consensus, however, lhis
normative background should be less as a resuh than as
a poinl of deparlure. In thc case of rcgulati\"e spcech acts, the
prcsupposed normativc background agreemcn l scrvcs as a reservoir
for shared rcasons, thc spccch acts, the
reasons the msclvcs servc as a vehidc for achicving a rationall y
motivatcd agreemclll. At any rle, ths is how il is V' dluc
consensus thc hOrlzon of tradj[ions handed down in
a quasi-nalllral certain analogy with an
cpistemic agrccmelll is establishcd postlraditional levcl of
jllsti fi catioll where a consenslls of the kind call no longer bc
takcn 101' grantcd, with lhc result that lhe juslitying norlllS thcm
sclvcs requirc jllstif cation. (At this point, 1 wOllld Iike simply to
II1 cntion that what we nonnall y deal wth unrler the heading "prdc-
lical not an clemcntary phenomenon but rather goes
back to an cntwinemen -effccled within lhe
intcractions--of epistemic and tcleological rationality
nicative rationalily.)
Conununicative Action
I have compared "simpl e" announccmcnt.s and impcra.
wth normativcly cmbcddcd oncs in ordel' to lIndertake a
326
Chapter 7
within the dimension of reaching understandi ng and to
cast light on two kinds of communicati vc language use. We no\\'
affects the functon of aClion coordina-
ti oo. Up tO now we ha\'c cOllsidered only speech acts, that is. linguis
lic expressions. thcy Ihnnselves
represcnt actions. However, the communicalve rationali ty embod-
ied in illoculionary acts extends beyond verbal uttcranccs
actions 01' imeractions as well. (A c1ass of thcse-normavely
rcglllatcd social actions--has already been lookcd at
nection with lhc illoculionary forces of regulative spccch acts.) With
wc can dcfnc social actions generally as actons whcreby
actors, in pursuing thci l' pcrsonal plans of action, 3re 31so guidcd by
lhc expected aclion of olhers. We wl\ spcak of communicative (lCliOll
whcrc actol'S coordinate their plans of acon wit h onc anothcr by
way of linguistic proccsscs of rcaching understanding, that is, in such
a way that thcy draw on l e ilIocutio nary binding and bonding
powcrs of speech acts coordination. In Slrd-
tegic aClion, this potemial for commllnicativc rationality remains
unexploited, c\'cn where the intcractions arc linguislicall y medialed
Because lhe participants in slralegic action coordinate lheir plans of
action with onc another by way of a exerlion of inOuencc,
language is used nOl communicaLive1y, in the sense elucidated, bm
Wilh an orientati011 analysis of the lauer use of
perloclltions a suitable
Two Sorts of Communicati vc Action
I will spcak of communicaLve aClion whenevcr rcach
ing understanding applics to facLS and tO actor-relalivc reasons fOI
one-sided expl'essions of will ; I wi l1 speak of communicativc aClon
m a slrong lImlt as underSlanding extends tO 1C
normauve fo l' lhe se\cction of the goals lhemsclves. In the
lattcr case, the participanLS refer to intersubj ectively shared value
orientati ons be)'ond their pCl'sonal prcfcrcnccs-billd
lhcir will s. In commllnicati ve action the ilctors are oriented
sole1y towal'd claims lO trllth and truthfulness; in slrong
cati vc action thcy Ire oriented toward recognized
327
Somt': Furler Clarificalons of the Concept of Communicati\'c Ralionali ry
rightness claims as well ; in lhe case of strong conuuunicative action,
not just arbitrary freedom of choicc but autonomy
the capacit}' to bind one's wi ll on the basis of normati\'e insights is
prcsupposed
In lhe case of both of the examples considered of cxprcssions of
will that are not embcddcd normatively, iOlenLi onal and imperative
scntcnccs are a1ready bcing uscd
aim of bringing l e hearer to a rationaHy moLivated
agreement. In such cases, howcvcr, the actors, who are oriented
can coordinate their plans o nl y if onc of them ac-
seriou.rness of the imentions 01' imperatives uttered by the
olher (as well as the ( rtt(!L of thc l;c1icfs lllpli t: I;y tht: m).
validity are involved: the sinceriry of the resolve 01' the dcci
sion, and thc lruth of what is level, reaching
undcrslanding does not yet cxtend lO d aims
Characterislc for action coordination in thc weak sense of an orien
tatio n toward reachi ng undcrstanding is the Iimited natul'c of lhe
agreement, which cannot be I'egard to lhe moti vating
intentions and prefel'ences but mercly wilh regard
lheir reaching understanding
here means lhc hearer understands the conlent
declaration of inlention or imperative and does not doubt
ousness (and The basis foJ' the mulual understanding ef-
fective in action coordination is solely l e acceptance claim
to trll thfu1ness raiscd for a declaration ofintenlon 01' for an impera.
to which the disccrnible rationality of the resol\'e 01' of the
decision attests
This common basis rcstricts the free choice of the aClors acting
communicatively in an auitude o ri ented loward succcss on1y insofar
as each olher tO I'enounce al1 inteotions 10 deceive
(which are action). In
aclion the actors do not as ye t cxpecl each othcr lo be guided by
common norms 01' valucs and to rccogniz.c reciprocal obli gations. I
""m speak of only when an iIlocutionar y
act can be criticized with regard to c1ai ms, regardless
of whethcr the normalive validity claim is nt. ised explicitly, as in
regu1ative speech acts (commands, promises) , or remains
328
Chapter 7
tized. Even assertions and confessions, with which cxplicit claims 10
truthfulness are can bc wi lh respect to
the nonnative context of the uuerance as of place,"
and so on-in shon , as normativcly inappropriate
In such cast:s, they violate the legitimatcly regulaled intcrpersonal
relationships of a social world to which the
nication belong
From normalivc contexlS such as these, regulative spccch acts
condiloos under which the speaker may regard himself
as authorized for dircctives, commands, imperatives, advicc, re-
negouauons,
forth. To this eXlem righUl ess i!locuonary acts
of this 50rt are connecled, rcly on something in world in a
manner analogous tO thc way in which the truth claims connected
with aclS rely on 50mething objcctive world
(evcn if norms are in a different way than facts and
are by no means independent of t.he acting subjeclS samc way
which we refer when we state facts aOOm them). At
any rate, under conditioos of postmetaphysica1 thi nking. daims 10
the normative rightness of utterances.-like trulh claims-may be
discursively vindicated, which means on the basis of reasons that are
the samereasons for al1 members of the social world in question. Thc
ain1 in such cases is a normative agreement; unlike a mutual under-
standing concerning the seri ousness (and viability) of resolutions
and decisioos, such a normative agrcemenl extends not only to the
aclor-relative premises of the pursuit of action goals selected on the
basis of arbitrary free choice, but also to the actor-independent
mode legitima1c goals. In strong communicative action,
the participants presume not only that they are guided by faclS and
say what they hold to be U" ue and what they mean , but
pursue their action plans only wthin the boundaries of norms and
values deemed to be valid
Underlying communcative action in the weak sense is thc presup-
position of an that is the same for all ; in strong
communlcauve parUClpants aOOve this count on
is shared by them intersubjectively.
agreement is reckoned with in the case of statcmcnts JUSl

329
Some Further ClarificatiOIlS of the Concept of Communic-Ati\'c Rationality
as t is in thc casc of normative statements; statements of
fact have to be capable of being made intel.
li gible for all panicipants for the same rea.sons. a cogllltlve
agreement ahoul facLS rcquires tJle panicipanLS in communication
only to takc Lhcse agreed-upon facLS into consideration in me sub-
sequent llleraction. In contrast to a normative agree-
ment, a cognilive agreement does not Wd.y in
actors select and pursue their action does nOl affect
are guided exc1usively by lheir preferences OT whether
they afC also guided by binding norms valucs heJd in esteem
by all membcrs) . Whereas in weak communicative action onl y con
stativc speech aclS and normatively nonauthorized expressions of
wi ll come inlO communicative aclion demands a use of
language that also refers to 50mething in a social world. Incidcntally,
this also holds for those cxpressive specch aclS that-unlike declara
tions of intcntion and not refer to (fmure) actions.
for example. expres.sions of feeli ng
Language Orientcd tow. rd Consequences.
and Strategic AcLi ol1
Communicati ve rationality is embodied in languagc games in which
the participants takc a poston on critcizable validity claims. In the
for ms of the communicative language and communi
cative action. communicati\'e rationality is cntw1ncd pur-
posive rationali ty 01" actors in an aui tude oriented toward
success--although stil1 in such a way illocutionary aims
d()7nina the "perlocutionary" that in certai n circurnstal1ces
may be striven for as well. "Perl ocutionary"' is, of course, the name
we give to the effcclS of speech aclS that, if need be, can also bc
brought about by nonlinguistic actions. In the following, I
am in speech acts and (H) those interactions in
which lhe relationship of dependency normall y existing between
illocutionary and perl ocutionary aims and effeclS is reverscd. In
such communicative rationality relrealS.
stitute a kind of contrast or foi l peculiar binding and OOnding
power of iIlocutionary acts
330
Chapler 7
i. 1 would li ke lO bcgin by distinguishing three c1asses of
tionar y effccLS. Perlocutionary effcctsl result grammatically from lhc
contenl of a ilIocutionary act-as whcn a valid command
is cxecutcd, a promise is kCPl, a declarcd lllention is reali7.cd, or
when assertions and confessions consistendy the subscquent
course of the interaction. Here, the iIlocmionary aims rule the pcr
locuLi onary oncs. By contrast, cffecLS2 are grammati
cally contingenl, of a speech aCl
ooly as a result of ao ilIocutionary succcss--as
whcn a piece of news, depending 00 the context, start1es
the when an imper.ttive encounters resistance. a confes-
sion awakens doubt, and 50 forth. Finally, per1ocutionary can
be achieved only in a is inconsicuou5 as far as lhe
addressee is concerned; the success kind of
ki nd that remains latent for the other also dependent on
manifest success of an ilIocutionary act
The constitute a special case that is intcrest
ing for analytic too, requirc sllccessflll llocll tonary
acLS as thcir vchic1e; however, in the case of perlocll tions, even the
aarml dominancc of the illoculionary aim-sti ll necessary for lhe
c1ass of per1ocutionary I

The illocutionar y act of
(3) YOtl are bchav ng Iike a swne
takes on a differelll meaning in lighl of purslled perl ocu
tionary aim of offending the hcarer, for then the assertion
slander, insuil. In a similar way, any
iIlocutionary aCl whatsoevcr can, according to the context, count as
an expression of mockcry 01' derision bccause the Ii terally expressed
II ocutionary meaning is blotted out and reimerpreled by lhe sel
pcrlocutionar y aim of showng up the addressee (or by the already
effecl of this)
ThreaLS represem a of perloclllion. The iIloclltionary
aCl of announcing a conditional negative sanction scnse
of a lhreal through the explicit refercnce to thc intcnded perlocu
tionary effect2 of deterring the addressee. Its perloclltionary mean-

331
Somc Fllrthcr Clarifl C3lons of the Conccpl Ralionality
ing as a deterrent ovcrshaclows its ill ocutionary an
nouncernent. For lhis reason, a lhreal such as
(4)
that
If you don't give Pcter lhe moncy 1'11 inform your superior
may he chall enged nOI onl y as a Ii LCrall y Illcant "naked" an-
l1 0uncemcnl from the two poin t.s of vi ew of thc \ack of lruthfu\ness
of the dcclaration of intenrion and lhe lack of lrulh of the exislenlial
it can also be challenged to the conlCx-
tual conditions 01' the illlended perlocutionary effect2. (4)
negated 11 01 only wilh the help of the validity claims expressly
with this illocutionary 3Ct. as in
(4')
don' t mean what you arc sayi ng
(4')
YOll don '( ha\'c can use agamsl me
In thc Con tcx( prcsupposcd by lhc spcaker, which
becomes a lhreal for a addressee, can also be COI1.
lesled
You can 't lhrealen me with lhal-he has aJ rcad\' known it
for a long lime
10 such a the speech aCl is not strictly speaking cOlltesled; rathcr
it is simply explained why the intended effeCI will not occur and
thc pcrlocmion rcmains Iloclltionary can
bc valid Or in.valid may bc contested
(Howe\'er, pcrlocutions of lhis k nd can be re-cmbcddcd in a
normallvc context in a secondary way because, of COllrse, the con
demnation 01' n a Illoral or a lcgal scnse appeals to
a normati vc background consensus and to ths extenl, despite
pcjorative connotation, is di rected tOward agl'ecmenL For this rea-
son, such lI ormatively embedded reproaches-unlike aClions that do
not really aim anything but, alm
be rcjected 011 the basis of reasons. Somclhine simi
lar tO what holds for moral reproaches, condemnalions, and so on
also holds, for example, for legal Ihreats of punishmcnt; due to t he
332
Chaptt:r 7
legitimating backgrollnd consensus about the norms of punishment
thcmselvcs, thc lhrealcned punishment is rcga.rdcd as a conse
qucncc of a leg-dl system fOf which agreemenl is presupposed)
ii . In stratcgic action contexts, language funclions in gcnerdl ac-
cording to lhe p31lern of per1ocutions. Here, linguislic communica
tion is subordWled lO the prercquisilcS of purposive-rational aclion
Strategic intcraclioos are detcrmined hy lhe of actors in
an auilude oriented loward Sliccess who observe Q I1C an
other. They conrront one anolher under conditions of double COI1-
tingcncy as opponenLS who, in the intcrest of thcir plans of
acti O!l, txerl injlufflon one another (normall y on the propositional
auitudes of thc other). They suspend thc performalive auitudcs of
participants in communication insofar as they lake on thc participal-
ing speakcr and hearcr roles from the pcrspeclivc of third pcrsons
From the laucr vanlagc point, iJIocutionary aims arc now rcJevan t
onl y as conditions for pedocmionar y cffects. unlike in thc
commullLcatlve language. stratcgically aCling who
communicate wilh onc another do not pursue thcir
aims
With lhis, cvcn the narrow basis of reciprocall y assumed lrmhful
ness now all spcech acts are robbcd iIIoculionary
binding and bonding powcr. Not only-as in weak communicativc
action- are thc shared normative contexts and the corresponding
c1ai ms tO no rmali\'c rightness lacking here; even the c1aims 10 truth
and tfUthfulness raised with aclS arc no lo ngcr
ai mcd d irectl y at the rational motivation of thc hcarer bm at getting
the addrcssee 10 drdw his from what the spcakcr indirectl y
to undcrstand. Naturally. this is possible only if I.hc partici
panLS undcrstand one is, if lhey fced parasiticall y 011 a
common linguislic knowledge (that thcy have learned in comexts of
communicative action). Bccallse thc presuppositions of communica
ti vc aClion are suspcnded, howcvcr, thcy now makc use of this com-
pClencc onl y indireclly to give cach other lO understand what lhey
believc or wanl. strategically acting subjects prcsumc of
each othcr that, make decisions rationall y. they base
dccisions on thcy themselw.$ hold tO be tfUt!.
333
Some Funhcr Clarificalions of thc Concept of Comrnunicati e RalionalilY
truth valllcs that guide each of thcm fro m the point
respecl1\'e prcferenccs and goals are not
formed inlO truth which havc a buh-i n orientaton toward
and which they therefore raisc publicly,
with a c1aim to (We are familiar with this fonn
of indirCCl communication from diplomati c intercourse between
mutually parties or from miliLary contcxLS: in the Cuban
missile cnsis, for cxample. the provcrbial shot bows [of
the Russian ships) had 10 replace thc missing iIIocutionary force of
the verbal announcement wilh a signal from which the opponent
could infer of A.meri can intentions.)
Communicative Raonality and Unguistic World-Disclosure
A glance al the Ollr rcncctioos so far shows that the
relationship bctwecn communicative rationality and languagc
shollld nm be construed every lIse of language is
thc frst entry in thc following schema) and nOI
cvery lingllstic communication serves 10 rcach understanding on
the rccognized c1aims t11C last
lne of thc
Exemplary types
Propositional and intentional
sentences
("pure" rcprescntation and
actio n planning)
Normatively l1 0ncmbeddcd ex-
pressions of wil1
Complctel y illocutionary acLS
(expressivc, nor mativc. consta-
tive)
Perlocutions
Modes of language use
Noncommunicat..i ve
Oriented toward rcaching
understanding
Orientcd toward agreemcm
(Einverslndnis)
Oriented toward consequences
(indirecl mutual
UI1 derstanding-
33.
Chaptcr 7
The modalities of language in connection
actor's four differenl types of linguislically structured ac-
lion of only lwo embody communicative ralo naliLy
thc second and third cnu"ies in the schema)
of action/ actor's
Modcs of language
auilude
U'"'
Objectivating Performauve
Intenti onal
aC1100 Noncommunicalive acuon
Oricn led toward \Veak
reaching commUI11catlvc
undcrstanding acuon
(
Social
il1leractions I Slfong
agreemcil l communlcatlvc
(EinverstndTl u) acuon
Oriented lOward Stralegic
consequences Illlcracuons
Clearl y, lhe Jinguistic medium extends further tJ, an communica-
ti vc nllionali ry. With the cpistemic rationaliry of knowledge, the
lcleological rationali1)' of aClion, and the communicativc rationality
of reaching understanding wc have become acquainted
autonomous rationality that are interwoven by way of the
common medium oflanguagc. Furthcrmore, these core struclures arc
intcrnall y relaled 10 discursive practices (and, as Schndclbach cor.
reclly 10 a corresponding renexivi ty of thc consdousl y
conducted life of persons). Their relation lO the level 01' argumcn-
tation and refleclon is as corrobordtivc authonties. Bul whal does
languagc as such have to do with the rationali ty of beli efs, actions,
and persons?
indicauon is dcrived thcse expressions
arc cmbeddcd in the context of a lifewor1d Ihal is in tllrn linguisu

335
Some F' urthcr of lhe Concept of Communcative Rationality
call y const tllled. We speak H not o nl y (Iike Frelld)
in the sensc of a retrospective justification of wishes and actions bUl
(likc Weber) with respeCl to the lifc-<o nduct of and the
forms of Iife of coll ectives. Such forms of Iife consist of praclices and
a web inslitlltions, customs. and
be called "r.uiona' " tO the they to the
of extent. ahhough forms of Iife
qualify for the term in the
indircct they consllutc the more or 1ess "congenial" back-
ground for establishing discursive for developing
renexive capadties. ]0 this cao promote for
prublt:lllsulviug lhal fUI lhcir pan cna1Jh: rational beliefs. actions,
and commllnication
With its categorial organization and grammatical prestructuring
of the background consensus of the lifcworld, language makes a
contribution e1I llblingofrdtional bchavior. In reaching llnder.
standing with one another about something in lhe objectivc world,
communicative actors always already operate horizotl of
their Iifeworld. No malter how high t.hey the honzon retrcats
before them, with the rCSllh that they can never bring lhe lifeworld
as a WhQM befort is possible with the objectivc world-and
survey it as a whole. 11 s no that this Being-in-the-World,
as analyzed by Heidegger, can be iIIustrated by lhe strange semitran
sccndence of a langllage that, we can use it as a means of
communication, is nonetheless never at our disposal: wc always op-
eralc through thc medium of language and can never perfor-
speak bjectify it as a wholc. In
lifeworld, which is it.self articulated medium of language,
opcns up an interpreti ve hori1.on for
they experience in the world, about which they reach under-
standing, and from which lhey can learn
have presumed up to langllage has a structure-form
mg regard 10 beliefs, actions, and communicative UUer-
ances. However, sllch a globaJ rcference to conceals the
genuine contriblluon thal language makes with
ing Cenainly, thc epistemic core structure of the
proposition is pan logical semantics of naturallanguagcs. The