Evidence Project Volume6

THE REVISED RULES
ON
EVIDENCE:
Codal Provisions, Special Laws & Jurisprudence
Class of 3-C 2003-2004 Atty. Francis Edralin Lim Ateneo De Manila School of Law
Volume 6
Evidence Project Volumes

Volume 1: I. Admissibility of Evidence II. What Need Not Be Proved III. Real Demonstrative Evidence IV. Best Evidence Rule V. Parole Evidence Rule VI. Interpretation of Documents VII. Qualifications of Witnesses VIII. Privileged Communications IX. Admissions & Confessions X. Conduct & Character XI. Hearsay Rule XII. Opinion Rule XIII. Burden of Proof & Presumptions XIV. Presentation of Evidence (Part. A., B. , C. 1. to 7.) XIV. Presentation of Evidence (Part C. 8. to 10., D., E.) XV. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence
Volume 2:
Volume 3: Volume 4: Volume 5:
Volume 6:
3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project Vol. 6 - 1 -
Volume 6: Table of Contents XIV. Presentation of Evidence Cases: 8. Refreshing Recollection a. State vs. Peoples 9. Recalling Witnesses a. People vs. Del Castillo b. People vs. Rivera 10.Exclusion of Witnesses a. People vs. Sandal b. State vs. Bishop D. Authentication and Proof of Documents 1. Rules 132, Secs. 19-33 E-Commerce Act, Secs. 5, 6-15 Rules on Electronic Evidence, Rules 5, 6, 9 & 11 Cases: 2. Bunag vs. CA 3. Heirs of Lacsa vs. CA 4. Bartolome vs. IAC 5. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping vs. NLRC 6. Zalamea vs. CA 7. People vs. Monleon 8. People vs. Salison 9. People vs. Lazaro 10.People vs. Burgos 11.IBM Phil. vs. NLRC 12.US vs. Russo 13.US vs. Croft 14.US vs. Weatherspoon 15.Perma Research vs. Singer Co. E. Offer and Objection
1. Rule 132, Secs. 34-40 Cases: 2. People vs. Carino 3. Interpacific Transit vs. Aviles 4. De Los Reyes vs. IAC 5. People vs. Yatco 6. Philamgen vs. Sweet Lines 7. Catuira vs. CA 8. Sheraton Palace vs. Quijano 9. Vda. De Onate vs. CA XV. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence A. Rule 133, Secs. 1-7 B. Rules of Electronic Evidence C. Cases: 1. US vs. Lasada 2. People vs. Abendan 3. People vs. Solayao 4. People vs. Lorenzo
XIV. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE

Cases: 8. Refreshing Recollection State v. Peoples 319 SE2d 177 (1984) Refreshing Recollection Facts: In the early morning hours of May 26, 1980, Bruce Crockett Miller participated in the armed robbery of the Borden Chemical Plant in Fayetteville, North Carolina, taking with them several buckets of almost pure silver, used by the plant in its production of formaldehyde, which was worth over $90,000. Elmer Leroy Peoples, the defendant in this case, was arrested on April 29, 1981. An eyewitness to the robbery, a shift supervisor at the company whom the perpetrators forced to open the building, identified him as one of the robbers. Pursuant to a plea agreement in an unrelated case, Miller testified against a Robert Peele, the third man in the robbery of the chemical plant. Miller outlined, in considerable detail, the planning and robbery of the plant. He related that Peoples was the one who recruited him into the heist and that after their first meeting they met several other times to plan the robbery. After consummating the robbery in the chemical plant, they sold the silver and the proceeds divided among them. Miller was arrested on March 27, 1981 for an unrelated armed robbery. On April 15, 1981, he gave police a statement concerning the robbery of the Borden Chemical Plant, in which he implicated Peele. That statement was never introduced in Peoples trial nor included in the record on appeal. On October 8, 1981, Detective S.C. Sessoms, Jr. of the Fayetteville Police Department, having undergone a two-week training course at the North Carolina Justice Academy, conducted a hypnotic session with Miller so that he may remember details of the robbery which he would not other wise remember in an ordinary state. During the two-week training course, Sessoms hypnotized between eight and ten people. Before hypnotizing Miller, Sessoms read none of Millers statements concerning the case. Miller was successfully hypnotized, which lasted for about an hour, and in that state, related facts corresponding to his subsequent testimony. Miller also testified that he did not believe he had been hypnotized. Peoples was convicted.
Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a witness who undergoes hypnosis before testifying in order to refresh his recollection is admissible? Held: The Court ruled that a witness hypnotically refreshed testimony and videotape recording of the hypnotic session was inadmissible, expressly overruling the doctrine laid down in State vs. McQueen. State vs. McQueen held that the effect of prior hypnosis goes only to the weight and credibility, not the admissibility of a witness testimony. However, this ruling needs to be appraised in the present understanding of the inherent problems of hypnosis as a tool to refresh or restore memory. Hypnosis involves more than the mere retrieval of stored or suppressed information. What often seems to be recalled is in reality a process through which information received after an event is transformed by the subjects mind into a memory of that event. Essentially the apparent recollection of a hypnotized subject may actually be a view, which he has created subconsciously. Such a situation raises a question as to the reliability or potential accuracy of recall stimulated by hypnosis. The possibility that a persons testimony might be the result of suggestion from another person presents a firm indictment of the reliability of such testimony. The process of hypnosis also tends to enhance the subjects confidence in his memory, whether genuine or invented. When the subject leaves the hypnotic session, he remembers not only the content of his new memory but forget its sourcethat he acquired it during the hypnotic session. In short, hypnosis not only irrevocably masks, whether a subjects recall induced by it is true, it also creates a barrier to the ascertainment of its truthfulness through cross-examinationthe method normally relied upon in the courtroom to determine truthfulness. Thus, McQueen should be overruled in so far as it permits the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony. Given the problems inherent in hypnotically refreshed testimony, it is simply too unreliable to be used as evidence in a judicial setting. By: Clarence Rommel C. Nanquil 9. Recalling Witnesses People vs. Del Castillo 25 SCRA 716 (1968) Recalling Witnesses Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1956, Elvira Principe, a member of the rich and wellknown Principe family was kidnapped by a band of hukbalahaps headed by Alcantara. There were three cases filed against the accused and this appeal involves only the third case where one of the accused is Estrada. The case of the prosecution was established through the testimonies of twelve witnesses and one of them is Ceribo. He stated that Alcantara called for Estrada who was the Councilor at that time. He arrived there three days after and Alcantara asked him who was the richest in town whom they could kidnap and ask ransom from because they needed money. Estrada then suggested Elvira because she could easily be ransomed. One week after this conference, the huks executed the kidnapping of Elvira. The defense, on the other hand tried to establish that the charge against him was just a concoction by Col. Castillo who allegedly admitted that his career was at stake and that he was interested in money considerations involved. He also said that he could not have been there and conferred with Alcantara because he never left his town during that month. Furthermore, before the defense rested its case, they made an attempt to put back the prosecution witness Ceribo to the witness stand in order that he could explain why he allegedly had testified falsely against accused Estrada when he testified for the prosecution. He was then ready to testify for the defense. However, the trial court did not allow the defense to put him back on the witness stand. It then found the accused guilty and was sentenced to Death Penalty. Estrada appealed and claimed that this was a denial of due process. Issue: Whether or not the trial court had abused its discretion and denied Estrada due process when it refused the defense the right to call back witness Ceribo. Held: Section 14 Rule 132 now Section 9 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the court may grant or withhold leave to recall a witness, in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require. It was the better part of discretion and caution on the part of the trial court to have denied as it did, the request of the defense to recall Ceribo. The record is loaded with circumstances tending to show insidious attempts, too obvious to be overlooked, to tamper with the witnesses for the prosecution. Under such circumstances, to allow such a procedure would only encourage the perversion of truth and make a mockery of court proceedings. By: Romeo D. Lumagui, Jr. People vs. Rivera 200 SCRA 786 (1991) Recalling Witnesses Facts:
Wilfredo Sembrano was charged with arson for allegedly willfully causing the fire that totally burned and destroyed the second and third floor of the I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath owned by Tan. Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Benjamin Lee who testified that Sembrano had run out of the VIP room where the fire had started and refused to heed Lees call to stop. He took the witness stand again during which he was cross-examined by the defense counsel Formoso. He also gave additional evidence on redirect examination and was again questioned on recross-examination by the same defense counsel and was allowed to step down. The prosecution completed presentation of its evidence-in-chief in due course but before it could rest its case and two months after Lee had completed his testimony, Formoso withdrew his appearance and substituted by another lawyer Rodriguez. The latter then filed a motion to recall Lee for further examination. The ground was that after reviewing the record of Lees testimony, he came to the conclusion that there seems to e many points and questions that should have been asked but were not profounded by Atty. Formoso. The trial court granted the motion. However, it appears that Lee had terminated his employment and moved elsewhere without indicating his new address such that his attendance could not be procured. The prosecution filed a motion that the further examination be dispensed with but the trial court denied and further ordered that the testimony of Lee be stricken off the record for lack of complete cross-examination. Hence this petition for Certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in authorizing the recall of witness Lee and in later striking out his testimony for want of further crossexamination. Held: There is no doubt that a trial court has discretion to grant leave for the recall of a witness as stated in Section 9 Rule 132 of the Rules of court. However, that discretion may not be exercised in a vacuum. The discretion is not properly exercisable by an applicants mere general statement that there is a need to recall a witness in the interest of justice or that there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground for recall of witnesses would make it no longer discretionary but ministerial. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial ground for the recall. The trial courts order is therefore nullified. By: Romeo D. Lumagui, Jr. 10. Exclusion of Witnesses People vs. Sandal
54 Phil 883 (1930) Exclusion of Witnesses Facts: Appellants Sandal, Arimao, Lonsing, Mama, and Pampang were charged with the crime of murder. The prosecution established that on February 18, 1929, a Moro woman heard appellant Sandal call Lamorena and then engaged in conversation. While the two were talking, appellant Pampang went up to them and with a hammer, struck Lamorena. Sandal and the rest of the appellants then closed in on him beating him to death. The alleged motive of the killing was that a certain Permites went to Manila and left Lamoreno in charge of his interests there. While Permites was in Manila, the appellants caused some injuries to his carabaos, as a result of which Lamorena had a dispute with them. When Permites went back, he filed a complaint against the appellant and Lamorena was to be the principal witness. The defense denied the charge and attempted to prove an alibi. However, the trial court refused to admit a certain witness presented by the defense for the reason that this witness had been present during the hearing notwithstanding the courts order that all witnesses leave the courtroom. The trial court rendered a decision convicting them of the crime charged. The appellants, in this appeal now assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to admit the testimony of the witness. Issue: Whether or not it is proper for the trial court to refuse to admit a certain witness presented by the defense for failure to leave the courtroom after being ordered to do so. Held: It is within the power of the trial court to order the exclusion of witnesses in the courtroom. Upon ordering the exclusion, it lies within the courts discretion to admit or reject the testimony of the witness who, notwithstanding the order stays inside. Also, although the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the court below should have admitted the testimony of this witness, especially when he stated that he did not hear what the other witnesses testified, yet there is nothing to show that this error has affected the appellants defense. Therefore, judgment appealed from was affirmed. By: Romeo D. Lumagui, Jr. State vs. Bishop 492 P2d 509 (1972) Exclusion of Witnesses Facts:
Bishop was charged and convicted of sale and possession of dangerous drugs. When the case was called for trial, defense counsel requested all witnesses be excluded. The prosecutor stated that most of his witnesses were police officers. The defense counsel argued that his client would be prejudiced by allowing the officers to remain. He further stated that the only advantage for them being in the courtroom is to hear the cross-examination by the defense counsel, to determine what theory of the defense is in this case and to determine these things instead of coming in on the questions cold. The trial judge denied the motion and explained that it is highly desirable from the public standpoint that officers have an opportunity to learn what it is about their police practices that is being questioned and to give careful thought to their own practices. Furthermore, some of the police officers were involved in motions to suppress in this group of cases and should be allowed to see the trails that involve the efforts that they have made. Issue: Whether or not the witnesses should not be excluded on the grounds of educational experience and for them to be able to see the fruits of their labor. Held: The witnesses should be excluded. As held in State v. Wilson and State v. Ede suggest that a motion to exclude normally should be granted. It was further held in the Wilson case that the practice of excluding witnesses in the courtroom except while each is testifying is to be strongly recommended, particularly where the testimony of the witnesses is in any measure cumulative or corroborative. The exclusion is a time-honored practice designed to prevent the shaping of testimony by hearing what other witnesses say. These authorities mean that when one party moves to exclude witnesses and the other party voices no objection, the motion should always be granted. However, when the motion is opposed, the trial courts discretion comes into play. Judicial discretion is to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not defeat the ends of justice. The trial court must weigh the good cause shown. In this case, the trial court wanted the police officers who would be witnesses to be able to view the trial as an educational experience and wanted them to be able to see the fruits of their labors. These reasons, while undoubtedly salutary as an educational device, were not relevant to the purpose of the trial, namely the determination of whether the defendant was guilty. Balance against the danger that the witnesses memories might be confused by other testimony, the reasons advanced by the court were insufficient. Lastly, the State has the burden to prove the lack of prejudice from the denial of the defendants motion to exclude. By: Romeo D. Lumagui, Jr. D. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS 1. Rule 132, Sections 19-33.
Sec. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered therein. All other writings are private. (20a) Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (21a) Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not necessary. Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is produced from the custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be given. (22a) Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a) Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All
other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (24a) Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a) Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a) Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a pending case. (27a) Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. An authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a) Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. (29) Sec. 29. How judicial record impeached. Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court
or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. (30a) Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. (31a) Sec. 31. Alteration in document, how to explain. The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence. (32a) Sec. 32. Seal. There shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33a) Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial. (34a) E-Commerce Act, Sections 5, 6-15. Republic Act No. 8792 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE RECOGNITION AND USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCIAL AND NON-COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND DOCUMENTS, PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL USE THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. - For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined, as follows: a. Addressee refers to a person who is intended by the originator to receive the electronic data message or electronic document. The term does not include a person acting as an intermediary with respect to that electronic data message or electronic document.
b. Computer refers to any device or apparatus which, by electronic,electro-mechanical or magnetic impulse, or by other means, is capable of receiving, recording, transmitting, storing, processing, retrieving, or producing information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written _expression according to mathematical and logical rules or of performing any one or more of those functions. c. Electronic Data Message refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means. d. Information and Communication System refers to a system intended for and capable of generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise processing electronic data messages or electronic documents and includes the computer system or other similar device by or in which data is recorded or stored and any procedures related to the recording or storage of electronic data message or electronic document. e. Electronic Signature refers to any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic form, representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedures employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. f. Electronic Document refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written _expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. g. Electronic Key refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive information that crosses over public channels into a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key. h. Intermediary refers to a person who in behalf of another person and with respect to a particular electronic document sends, receives and/or stores or provides other services in respect of that electronic document. i. Originator refers to a person by whom, or on whose behalf, the electronic document purports to have been created, generated and/or sent . The term does not include a person acting as an intermediary with respect to that electronic document.
j. Service Provider refers to a provider of (i) On-line services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefore, including entities offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for online communications, digital or otherwise, between or among points specified by a user, of electronic documents of the users choosing; or (ii) The necessary technical means by which electronic documents of an originator may be stored and made accessible to a designated or undesignated third party; Such service providers shall have no authority to modify or alter the content of the electronic data message or electronic document received or to make any entry therein on behalf of the originator, addressee or any third party unless specifically authorized to do so, and who shall retain the electronic document in accordance with the specific request or as necessary for the purpose of performing the services it was engaged to perform. CHAPTER II LEGAL RECOGNITION OF ELECTRONIC WRITING OR DOCUMENT AND DATA MESSAGES Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages. - Information shall not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the data message purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in that electronic data message. Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents. Electronic documents shall have the legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal writing, and (a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met by an electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and reliability and can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that (i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display; and
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for which it was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances. (b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not being presented or retained in its original form. (c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic document if (i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document from the time when it was first generated in its final form; and (ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary any and all requirements of existing laws on formalities required in the execution of documents for their validity. For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional equivalent of a written document under existing laws. This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of electronic data messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating to authentication and best evidence. Sec. 8. Legal Recognition of Electronic Signatures. - An electronic signature on the electronic document shall be equivalent to the signature of a person on a written document if that signature is proved by showing that a prescribed procedure, not alterable by the parties interested in the electronic document, existed under which (a) A method is used to identify the party sought to be bound and to indicate said partys access to the electronic document necessary for his consent or approval through the electronic signature; (b) Said method is reliable and appropriate for the purpose for which the electronic document was generated or communicated, in the light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement;
(c) It is necessary for the party sought to be bound, in order to proceed further with the transaction, to have executed or provided the electronic signature; and (d) The other party is authorized and enabled to verify the electronic signature and to make the decision to proceed with the transaction authenticated by the same. Sec. 9. Presumption Relating to Electronic Signatures. - In any proceedings involving an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that (a) The electronic signature is the signature of the person to whom it correlates; and (b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of signing or approving the electronic document unless the person relying on the electronically signed electronic document knows or has notice of defects in or unreliability of the signature or reliance on the electronic signature is not reasonable under the circumstances. SEC. 10. Original Documents. - (1) Where the law requires information to be presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data message or electronic document if: (a) the integrity of the information from the time when it was first generated in its final form, as an electronic data message or electronic document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and (b) where it is required that information be presented, that the information is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be presented. (2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not being presented or retained in its original form. (3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1): (a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the purpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all relevant circumstances. SEC. 11. Authentication of Electronic Data Messages and Electronic Documents. - Until the Supreme Court by appropriate rules shall have so provided, electronic documents, electronic data messages and electronic signatures, shall be authenticated by demonstrating, substantiating and validating a claimed identity of a user, device, or another entity in an information or communication system, among other ways, as follows: (a) The electronic signature shall be authenticated by proof that a letter, character, number or other symbol in electronic form representing the persons named in and attached to or logically associated with an electronic data message, electronic document, or that the appropriate methodology or security procedures, when applicable, were employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person, with the intention of authenticating or approving an electronic data message or electronic document; (b) The electronic data message and electronic document shall be authenticated by proof that an appropriate security procedure, when applicable was adopted and employed for the purpose of verifying the originator of an electronic data message and/or electronic document, or detecting error or alteration in the communication, content or storage of an electronic document or electronic data message from a specific point, which, using algorithm or codes, identifying words or numbers, encryptions, answers back or acknowledgment procedures, or similar security devices. The Supreme Court may adopt such other authentication procedures, including the use of electronic notarization systems as necessary and advisable, as well as the certificate of authentication on printed or hard copies of the electronic document or electronic data messages by electronic notaries, service providers and other duly recognized or appointed certification authorities. The person seeking to introduce an electronic data message and electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity by evidence capable of supporting a finding that the electronic data message and electronic document is what the person claims it to be.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the integrity of the information and communication system in which an electronic data message or electronic document is recorded or stored may be established in any legal proceeding (a) By evidence that at all material times the information and communication system or other similar device was operating in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic data message and/or electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system; (b) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party using it; or (c) By showing that the electronic data message and/or electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using the record. SEC. 12. Admissibility and Evidential Weight of Electronic Data Message and Electronic Documents. - In any legal proceedings, nothing in the application of the rules on evidence shall deny the admissibility of an electronic data message or electronic document in evidence a. On the sole ground that it is in electronic form; or b. On the ground that it is not in the standard written form and electronic data message or electronic document meeting, and complying with the requirements under Sections 6 or 7 hereof shall be the best evidence of the agreement and transaction contained therein. In assessing the evidential weight of an electronic data message or electronic document, the reliability of the manner in which it was generated, stored or communicated, the reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified, and other relevant factors shall be given due regard. SEC. 13. Retention of Electronic Data Message and Electronic Document. - Notwithstanding any provision of law, rule or regulation to the contrary -
(a) The requirement in any provision of law that certain documents be retained in their original form is satisfied by retaining them in the form of an electronic data message or electronic document which i. Remains accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference; ii. Is retained in the format in which it was generated, sent or received, or in a format which can be demonstrated to accurately represent the electronic data message or electronic document generated, sent or received; iii. Enables the identification of its originator and addressee, as well as the determination of the date and the time it was sent or received. (b) The requirement referred to in paragraph (a) is satisfied by using the services of a third party, provided that the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) of paragraph (a) are met. SEC. 14. Proof By Affidavit. - The matters referred to in Section 12, on admissibility and Section 9, on the presumption of integrity, may be presumed to have been established by an affidavit given to the best of the deponent's knowledge subject to the rights of parties in interest as defined in the following section. SEC. 15. Cross-Examination. - (1) A deponent of an affidavit referred to in Section 14 that has been introduced in evidence may be crossexamined as of right by a party to the proceedings who is adverse in interest to the party who has introduced the affidavit or has caused the affidavit to be introduced. (2) Any party to the proceedings has the right to cross-examine a person referred to in Section 11, paragraph 4, sub-paragraph c. RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, Rules 5, 6, 9 & 11. RULE 5 AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means: (a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same; (b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or (c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge. Section 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. A document electronically notarized in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial document under the Rules of Court. RULE 6 ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES Section 1. Electronic signature. An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticated in the manner prescribed hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a written document. Section 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. An electronic signature may be authenticated in any of the following manner: (a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verify the same; (b) By any other means provided by law; or
(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic signature. Section 3. Disputable presumptions relating to electronic signatures. Upon the authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that: (a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such persons consent to the transaction embodied therein; and (c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic signature operated without error or fault. Section 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. Upon the authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that: (a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;
The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate; (b) No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;
(c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed; and, (d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein. RULE 9 METHOD OF PROOF Section 1. Affidavit evidence. All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein. Section 2. Cross-examination of deponent. The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents of the affidavit in open court and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse party. RULE 11 AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC, VIDEO, AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE Section 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible
provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof . Section 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted. A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding section. If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, then the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply. Cases: Bunag vs. CA 158 SCRA 299 (1988) Authentication and Proof of Documents Facts: Plaintiff Bunag filed a case against Bautista for recovery of possession of parcel of land in Pampanga. He contends that the property was originally owned by his father Apolonio and that he has been living there with his father until 1920 when they transferred to Tarlac. Jose Bautista, a nephew in law was allowed to build a house and live therein on condition that he would pay the land taxes as compensation for the use of the land. After becoming a widow, he transferred his residence and accompanied his sister Estrudes to stay in that house. Thereafter, he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista to vacate the land. The defendant answered that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale signed by Apolonio with his thumbmark. Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said property from Apolonio and that she was present when Bunag affixed his thumbmark on the document The trial court decided in favor of Bunag and ordered the defendants to vacate the property and deliver its possession thereof to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, finding the deed of sale to have been validly executed, set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the deed of sale has been properly proved to be authentic and validly executed. Held:
It must be emphasized that the deed of sale was not acknowledged before a notary public and neither are there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of the attesting witnesses. The document is typewritten in English and over the typewritten name of Apolonio is a thumbprint. The deed is not notarized and therefore a private writing whose due execution and authenticity must be proved before it can be received in evidence as required in Sec. 21 Rule 132 (now Sec. 20 Rule 132) of the Rules of Court. The Court upheld the decision of the trial court that private respondents have failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale. It should be noted that the document was written in English and was merely thumbmarked which could be reasonably inferred that he was illiterate. The minimum proof should in the least include evidence that the document was duly read, explained and translated to him. Furthermore, there are no instrumental witnesses to the deed. The mischief that lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumbmarked without any witnesses to it and not acknowledged before a notary public could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules of evidence. Petition is therefore granted reinstating the decision of the trial court. By: Romeo D. Lumagui, Jr. Heirs of Lacsa vs. CA 197 SCRA 234 (1991) Authentication and Proof of Documents Facts: Two cases were filed by herein petitioners heirs of Lacsa in the Regional Trial Court against private respondents. One is for recovery of possession with damages and preliminary injunction and the other is for cancellation of title, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction alleging that they are the heirs of deceased Demetria Lacsa who was the owner of a certain parcel of land evidenced by OCT No. RO-1038. However, through stealth, fraud, and other forms of machination, succeeded in occupying or possessing the land. Furthermore, by presenting to the Register of Deeds certain forged and absolutely simulated documents and by means of false pretenses and misrepresentation, Inocencio Songco, the private respondents predecessor-in-interest, succeeded in transferring the title to said property in his name. Private respondents alleged that the petitioners OCT had long been cancelled and superseded by TCT No. 794 in the name of Guevarra and Limpin by virtue of a document entitled TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL entered into by the heirs of Lacsa and that it was further superseded by TCT No. 929 in the name of Inocencio, private respondents predecessor by virtue of a document ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA executed by Guevarra and Limpin in favor of Inocencio. The trial court ruled that the land belongs to the private respondents having been inherited by them from their deceased father Inocencio. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and applied the ancient document rule. Petitioners are now assigning as error its application claiming that under this rule, as enunciated in Section 22 (now Section 21) Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, for a document to be classified as an ancient document, it must be unblemished by alterations and is
otherwise free from suspicion. Therefore, the two documents cannot qualify since the first pages of said documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto. Issue: Whether or not the documents presented qualify as an ancient document under the Rules of Court which makes evidence by authenticity not necessary. Held: For a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it be more than 30 years old, it is also necessary that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine and that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion. In this case, the documents are more than 30 years old and is recorded in the Register of Deeds such that it satisfies the two requisites. As to the third, it refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages, absent any alterations or circumstance of suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents, which were certified as copies of the originals on file with the Register of Deeds, are genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion. The documents in question are ancient document as envisioned in the Rules of Court such that further proof of due execution and authenticity is no longer required. Petition denied and the appealed decision is affirmed. By: Romeo D. Lumagui, Jr. Bartolome vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 183 SCRA 102 (1990) Authentication and Proof of Document Facts: Epitacio Batara owned a parcel of land. In 1912, before he left Laoag to settle in Culalabo, Gamo (Burgos), Isabela, Epitacio entrusted the lot to his cousin, Doroteo Bartolome, who owned the lot bounding Epitacio's property on the south. In 1916, Epitacio Batara died in Isabela. In 1926, Doroteo Bartolome, to whom Epitacio had entrusted his land, migrated to Davao City. Doroteo died there two years later. Thereafter, the Director of Lands instituted cadastral proceedings over the said land involved herein (Cadastral Case No. 53). On October 23, 1933, Ursula Cid, the widow of the son of Doroteo Bartolome, Bernabe, who died in 1928, filed an answer in Cadastral Case No. 53, claiming ownership over Lot No. 11165 with an area of 1660 square meters. The land was allegedly acquired by Ursula Cid through inheritance from Doroteo Bartolome, the father of Ursula's deceased husband, Bernabe. More than three months later or on January 30, 1934, Resurreccion Bartolome, the grandchild of Epitacio Batara, also filed an answer in the same cadastral case claiming ownership over a portion of Lot No. 11165 with an area of 864 square meters alleging that he acquired it by inheritance from his grandfather and grandmother . . . Epitacio Batara and Maria Gonzales. From then on, no further proceedings were held in the cadastral case. In June 1968 (after 34 years), the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte sent out notices for the "continuation of the
hearing" on June 13, 1968 in Cadastral Case No. 53. It should be remembered, however, that from the time Ursula Cid and Resurreccion Bartolome filed their answers to the petition in the cadastral case, there had been no progress in the proceedings. A year later or in 1969, Maria J. Bartolome filed in Cadastral Case No. 53 a motion to admit answer in intervention, alleging that she is one of the children of Doroteo Bartolome and that she and her co-heirs had been excluded in Ursula Cid's answer to the petition. She therefore prayed that the answer of Ursula Cid be amended so as to include the rightful heirs of Doroteo Bartolome alleging that they were co-owners of the said Lot No. 11165 which they inherited from Doroteso Bartolome.. Three months later, Ursula Cid filed a motion to amend her answer to reflect the complete ground or basis of acquisition of Lot No. 11165. In her amended answer, Ursula Cid stated that she was the absolute owner of Lot No. 11165; that she had been the possessor of Lot No. 11165 for over fifty years; she claimed that her husband, Bernabe Bartolome, who together with her, purchased the said lot which used to be three adjoining lots from their respective owners; and that Lot No. 11165 had been declared for tax purposes in the name of her late husband Bernabe Bartolome. No hearing was conducted in the case until 1974. To buttress her claim that she and her husband purchased Lot No. 11165, Ursula Cid presented at the trial three deeds of sale: [a] one dated March 1, 1917 showing that Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid bought a 374square meter lot for fifteen pesos from the spouses Domingo Agustin and Josefa Manrique (Exhibit 2); [b] another document dated February 18, 1913 executed by Ignacia Manrique in favor of Bernabe Bartolome evidencing the sale of another lot also for fifteen pesos (Exhibit 3); and [c] still another deed executed by Maria Gonzales (wife of Epitacio Bitara) on February 9, 1917 in favor of Bernabe Bartolome and Ursula Cid ceding to the latter 772 square meters of land for P103.75 (Exhibit 4). The last-mentioned piece of land is the one being claimed by Resurreccion Bartolome. On May 10, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte rendered a decision which held that the deed of sale executed by Maria Gonzales (Exhibit 4) has no probative value as the same is incomplete and unsigned. The court also held that Ursula Cid's possession of the land after the claimants had filed their respective answer(s) or after the declaration of a general default, did not confer ownership on her because said possession was interrupted and merely tolerated by all the parties during the pendency of the case. Ursula Cid appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its decision reversing the lower court, the appellate court held that the deeds of sale presented by Ursula Cid are ancient documents under Section 22 (now Section 21), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It also ruled that Ursula Cid's continuous possession of the lot from its acquisition and her exercise of rights of ownership over it vested her with the legal presumption that she possessed it under a just title. Issue: Whether or not deed of sale executed by Maria Gonzales (Exhibit 4) is an ancient document under Section 22 (now Section 21) of Rule 132 which would be admissible in evidence even without proof of its execution?
Held: No, the deed of sale (Exhibit 4) is not an ancient document. The SC agreed with the IAC that the first two requirements ordained by Section 22 (now Section 21) are met by Exhibit 4. It appearing that it was executed in 1917, Exhibit 4 was more than thirty years old when it was offered in evidence in 1983. It was presented in court by the proper custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it. However, the third requirement, that no alterations or circumstances of suspicion are present was not conformed with. According to Dominador Bartolome (son of Ursula Cid), he first saw Exhibit 4 in the possession of his mother when he was just eleven years old. He noticed that the document had a fourth page containing the signature of Maria Gonzales and that all four pages were sewn together. However, when the document was entrusted to him by his mother in 1947 as he was then representing the family in litigation concerning the land, the document's fourth page was already missing. He stated that his mother told him that the fourth page was lost during the Japanese occupation while they were evacuating from Davao City. On its face, the deed of sale (Exhibit 4) appears unmarred by alteration. However, the missing page has nonetheless affected its authenticity. It is important because it allegedly bears the signature of the vendor of the portion of Lot No. 11165 in question and therefore, it contains vital proof of the voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the sale. Without that signature, the document is incomplete. Verily, an incomplete document is akin to if not worse than a document with altered contents. Necessarily, since Exhibit 4 is not an ancient document, proofs of its due execution and authenticity are vital. Under Section 21 (now Section 20) of Rule 132, the due execution and authenticity of a private writing must be proved either by anyone who saw the writing executed, by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker, or by a subscribing witness. The testimony of Ursula Cid's and her son Dominador on the authenticity of Exhibit 4 do not fall within the purview of Section 21 (now Section 20). The signature of Maria Gonzales on the missing fourth page of Exhibit 4 would have helped authenticate the document if it is proven to be genuine. But as there can be no such proof arising from the signature of Maria Gonzales in the deed of sale since the said fourth page was missing, the same must be excluded. By: Glenn Quintos Albano Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation vs. NLRC 161 SCRA 122 (1988) Authentication and Proof of Documents Facts: Teodoro Rances was engaged by Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation (Pascor) as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. Four (4) months later, and after having been transferred from one vessel to another four times for misbehavior and inability to get along with officers and
crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign principal terminated the services of Rances citing the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others to insubordination. Pascor filed a complaint against Rances with the POEA for acts unbecoming a marine officer and for character assassination. Rances denied the charges set out in the complaint and by way of counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a court in Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his favor against petitioner's foreign principal. The POEA found Rances liable for inciting another officer or seaman to insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and imposed six (6) months suspension for each offense or a total of twelve (12) months suspension. The POEA decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim of Rances. Later, Rances filed a complaint against Pascor where he sought to carry out and enforce the same award obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in the first POEA Case. Rances claimed that be had filed an action in the Dubai court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by the parties for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to (private respondent's) country," with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$ 1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant Rances doesn't agree with the amount sent to [her] and that since his wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her, he was entitled to recover the additional US$ 1,500.00." As evidence of this foreign award, Rances submitted what purports to be an "original copy of the decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script and language, With a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." In its answer filed on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four principal arguments: (1.) that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by Rances could not be considered as evidence, not having been properly authenticated; (2.) that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai court proceedings; (3.) that the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the enforcement of foreign judgments; and (4.) that the claim had already been resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having been there dismissed as a counterclaim. In its decision, the POEA held Pascor liable to pay Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment." The POEA denied Pascor's appeal for having been filed out of time. On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a Writ of Execution and elevated the case to the NLRC. On 14 August 1986, NLRC denied petitioner's appeal as filed out of time. Issue: Whether or not the Dubai decision was properly authenticated to be admissible in evidence? Held: No, the Dubai decision was not properly authenticated. Hence, not admissible in evidence. 1.) The Dubai decision was not properly proved before the POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country, and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) (now Section 19) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sections 25 and 26 (now Sections 24 and 25, respectively) of Rule 132 prescribe the manner of proving a public of official record of a foreign country in the following terms: Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied. if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate maybe be made by a secretary of embassy or litigation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a writing is attend for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (Emphasis supplied) In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September 1984, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section 26 (now Section 25) nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25. 2.) There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document which purports to be an English translation of that decision, but that translation is legally defective. Section 34 (now Section 33) of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that documents written in a nonofficial language like Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or Filipino. In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government. Neither the Identity of the translator nor his competence in both the Arabic and English languages has been shown. The English translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has that translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful one. By: Glenn Quintos Albano
Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals 288 SCRA 23 (1993) Authentication and Proof of Document Facts: Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations. While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who checked in before tem had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the fullfare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines. Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from American Airlines together with moral damages and attorneys fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA ? Held: The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CAs finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact. Other Issues: 2.) Even if the claimed US Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which requires that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the airline. 3.) Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in. for the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages. This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty --- a duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to selfinterest or enrichment. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Moreover, TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Evidently, TWA placed self-interest over the rights of the spouses Zalamea and their daughter under their contract of carriage. Such conscious disregard make respondent TWA liable for moral damages, and to deter breach of contracts by TWA in similar fashion in the future, the SC adjudged TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well. By: Glenn Quintos Albano People of the Philippines vs. Monleon 74 SCRA 263 (1976) Authentication and Proof of Document Facts: In the evening of June 1, 1970, Monleon arrived at his house drunk. He inquired from Concordia, his wife, whether their carabao had been fed by their ten-year old son, Marciano.
She assured him that the carabao had been fed. He repaired to the place where the carabao was tethered to check the veracity of her statement. He discovered that the carabao had not been adequately fed. He became furious. When he was about to whip Marciano, Concordia intervened. A violent quarrel ensued between them. He placed himself astride his wife's chest, squezzed her neck, pressed her head against a post, and kicked her in the abdomen. He shouted: "What do I care if there would be someone who would be buried tomorrow. You let your brothers and sisters stand up and I will also include them." Felicisimo, one of the couple's six children, pulled away his father and stopped his assault on Concordia. The following morning Concordia vomited blood. She died at eleven o'clock on that morning of June 2. Death was due to "acute abdomen", a pathologic condition within the belly, requiring surgical intervention Sixteen days after Concordia death, Monleon thumbmarked a confession, written in the Cebuano dialect and sworn to before the town mayor. He admitted in that confession that he assaulted his wife and that he had repented for the wrong which he had done to her. He orally admitted to Perfecto Bongo, a lieutenant in the Cebu City police department and a relative of Concordia, that he (Monleon) assaulted his wife because he was drunk and she was a nagger. On July 31, 1970 or about two months after Concordia's death, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) exhumed her body. He found bluish-black discolorations on the sphenoid temporal bones of her skull, on the atlas or cervical vertebra below the skull or at the base of the neck, and on the first ribs. The discolorations were due to internal hemorrhage "caused by trauma or external violence." The doctor ventured the opinion that the "acute abdomen" could have been caused "by external violence" Monleon denied that he used violence against his wife. He testified that he and his wife had merely a verbal quarrel and that Clemencia, the sister of Concordia and the wife of his elder brother, testified against him because Clemencia and Monleon had a boundary dispute regarding the lands inherited by Clemencia and Concordia from their father, Victor Bongo. Monleon said that Lieutenant Bongo asked him to sign a "recibo" that he would take care of his children. He also said that some persons threatened to kill him if he did not affix his thumbmark to his confession. The trial court convicted Monleon of parricide. In this appeal, his counsel de oficio alleged that the trial court erred in giving credence to the affidavit of his son, Marciano, which was written in Cebuano dialect, Monleon's confession, and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the NBI medico-legal officer, Doctor Ceferino Cunanan; and in treating the alleged declarations of Concordia Bongo to Clemencia's husband as part of the res gestae. Issue: Whether or not the TC erred in admitting Marcianos (son of Monleon) affidavit which was written in Cebuano dialect?
Held: The TC erred in admitting Marcianos affidavit. However, the TCs error in admitting Marcianos affidavit was not sufficient to exculpate Monleon or engender any reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The TCs judgment affirmed. 1.) Appellant's counsel argues that the trial court erred in admitting Marciano Monleon's (son of the herein accused) affidavit which was written in the Cebuano dialect and which was not accompanied with the corresponding translation. That confession is well-taken. The trial court erred in admitting that affidavit over the objection of appellant's counsel because Section 34 (now Section 33), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English, Spanish or the national language "To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial" Other Issues: 2.) The trial court, also, erred in ruling that the alleged declarations of Concordia Bongo to the husband of Clemencia Bongo Monleon, as to the violent acts inflicted upon her (Concordia) by appellant Monleon, are part of the res gestae. The accuseds counsel observed that it was incredible that Concordia, after being severely maltreated by Monleon (according to the prosecution's version), would still have the strength to go to Clemencia's house which was located on a hill. In all probability what happened was that Clemencia, on arriving at her house at around eight o'clock in the evening of June 1, apprised her husband that she witnessed the assault made by Monleon on her sister, Concordia. 3.) However, the TCs error in regarding as part of the res gestae the statement supposedly made by Concordia to Clemencias husband immediately after the incident and its error in admitting Marcianos affidavit are not sufficient to exculpate Monleon or engender any reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The corpus delicti or the fact of the commission of the crime of which Concordia Bongo was the victim was established by the prosecution witnesses, Clemencia Bongo-Monleon and Epifania Bongo. Hence, Monleon's extrajudicial confession was corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133 and sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). Further, the discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do not destroy the probative value of the confession nor negate Monleon's admission therein that he assaulted his wife. A court may reject portions of the confession by reason of the improbability of the facts or statements therein or because of their falsity or untrustworthiness. The mayor and Lieutenant Bongo testified that Monleon was not forced to affix his thumbmark to the confession. There is no evidence that he was tortured or maltreated. Monleon could have complained to the fiscal during the preliminary investigation that he was forced to execute his confession. He did not do so. By: Glenn Quintos Albano
People vs. Salison 253 SCRA 758 (1996) Authentication and Proof of Document Facts: At around 8:00 oclock in the evening of November 30, 1990, while Valmoria was watching TV in a store in Cory Village, Agadao, Davao City, the accused Salison approached Valmoria and placed his arm around the latters shoulder and brought him behind a neighbors house where there was a mango tree. There, the accused Salison boxed Valmoria in the abdomen and they got into a fistfight. During the fistfight between Salison and Valmoria, the three other accused namely Andiente, Dignaran and Fediles suddenly arrived and ganged up on Valmoria. Prosecution witness Emilia Fernandez then approached them, upon which the three others left and she was able to separate Valmoria and Salison. However, the three others returned and started to maul Valmoria again, but Valmoria fought back. The group of Salison then used pieces of wood to hit Valmoria at the back of his nape and on the rear part of the head. Valmoria was able to run home. Inside his house, Valmoria started to complain of dizziness and pain in his head which was bleeding at that time. He was later accompanied by his parents to the house of prosecution witness Patricia Alcoseba , the purok leader, where he asked Alcoseba to write down his declaration regarding the incident should he die and no one be willing to testify. Valmoria did die in the hospital after three days. At the trial, witness Alcoseba presented the written and signed declaration of Valmoria which was written in Cebuano regional language and she affirmed what was written therein. The TC convicted the accused Salison for murder. On appeal, Salison maintains that said written statement is inadmissible as evidence since it was in Cebuano language and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino. Issue: Whether or not the written statement made by the victim Valmoria to the purok leader Alcoseba, which was written in Cebuano language, is admissible in evidence? Held: The written statement is admissible. The TCs judgment affirmed. 1.) As to the declaration of Valmoria, the defense raised the issue that the written statement was inadmissible because it was in Cebuano and was not accompanied with a translation in English or Pilipino. The SC however debunked this stating that the records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of the declaration. Thus, the defense waived whatever infirmity the document had at the time of its submission as evidence. The declaration can be translated into English or Pilipino as it is already admitted in evidence and forms part of the record. The SC further held that more than once, this Court has taken into consideration documents written in a Philippine dialect, unaccompanied by the required translation but which had been admitted in evidence without objection by the accused. In those instances, this Court merely ordered official translations to be made. It is true that Section 33, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court now prohibits the admission of such document in an unofficial language but We believe that in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be taken literally here, especially since no objection thereto was interposed by the accused Salison, aside from the fact that the latter, the concerned parties and judicial authorities or personnel concerned
appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written. The accused Salisons argument regarding the inadmissibility of the declarations on mere technicality would mean the loss of a vital piece of evidence that could yield the true facts of the case. There was, therefore, no prejudice caused to the accused Salison and no reversible error was committed by that lapse of the trial court. Other Issue: 2.) Appellant likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok leader cannot be considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the deceased under the consciousness of an impending death. As earlier narrated, at the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstance thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events, assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive. By: Glenn Quintos Albano People v. Lazaro 317 SCRA 435 (1999) Authentication and Proof of Documents This case is an appeal from the decision of the RTC of Naga City finding the accused Apolinar Lazaro guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition qualified by homicide. A separate case for homicide was filed and tried against the accused Lazaro before the same judge. Facts: On May 5, 1990, at around 3:30 pm, Police Sgt. Bonnet was on board a Mobile Patrol when by-standers called his attention that a bloodied man was on board a Toyota type jeep that was traveling south prompting him to go after the said vehicle. When the said vehicle stopped along General Luna Street, Sgt. Bonnet was able to see a bloodied man beside the driver, accused Lazaro. He instructed Lazaro to follow him to the Bicol Regional Hospital where he met his station commander, Major Tuazon, who was already informed of a prior shooting incident involving the accused Lazaro. The injured person was brought inside for treatment. As he was previously informed that the driver of the jeep was armed with a handgun, Major Tuazon ordered the accused Lazaro, to step out of his jeep. He then saw the accused with a handgun tucked in his waist, pull out the handgun together with the holster and drop it at the back of the drivers seat. Upon seeing the
gun, Major Tuazon pulled the driver out of the vehicle and got hold of the gun. When confronted whether he had a license to possess said firearm, the accused did not respond. An Information was filed against the accused Lazaro for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. During the trial, the public prosecutor presented to the court a Certification issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) stating that the accused Lazaro was not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any kind of caliber. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision finding Lazaro guilty for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition qualified by homicide. On appeal, the accused Lazaro contends that the prosecution failed to prove the absence of a license to carry firearm as the prosecution merely marked in evidence a certification from the Firearms and Explosive Office without presenting the person who issued the certification himself. Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the certificate issued by the Firearms and Explosives Office considering that the person who made the document was not presented in court to testify, thus rendering it to be inadmissible for being hearsay? Held: The certification from the Firearms and Explosive Office is admissible. The SC ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearms. (The first element being the existence of the subject firearm, and the second element is the ownership or possession of a firearm without the corresponding license or permit). The rule on hearsay evidence admits of several exceptions. One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court, which states as follows: Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Relative to this provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules allows the admission of the said document. Thus: Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the Commanding Officer of the PNP Firearm and Explosive Office, which is the repository of all records regarding firearms in the Philippines is competent and admissible evidence to prove that the
accused Lazaro was not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber. Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched for a document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find it should be sufficient evidence of its non-existence in his office as though he made such testimony on the stand. Nevertheless, the SC acquitted him due to the passage of RA 8294 (The Revilla Law) which considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in a murder case in which the accused Lazaro was also being prosecuted in a separate case. By: Glenn Quintos Albano People vs. Burgos 200 SCRA 67 (1991) Authentication and Proof of Documents Facts: An information for violation of RA 1700 was filed against Deduro et.al by the City Prosecutor of Cebu. No bail was recommended on the ground that the offense charged was non-bailable and the respondents were allegedly leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Private respondents filed their petitions for temporary release on bail pending trial. Such petitions were opposed except for that of Catalina Paras as she was then pregnant. While the prosecution was still presenting evidence, Judge Burgos issued the assailed order fixing bail for five of the eight respondents. Likewise, the said judge disallowed the Peoples request for its witness, Eulogio Llego, a computer programmer, to print out in open court the materials encoded in certain diskettes seized from private respondents by virtue of a search warrant. People filed petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the prosecution witness from holding an actual demonstration in court of the contents of the said diskettes. Held: The Court held that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing Llego from printing the contents of the said diskettes. In his Comment, the respondent Judge reasoned out that the contents of the said diskettes could have been manipulated which would
be prejudicial to the rights of the accused. The insinuation was based on the fact that the prosecution has possession prior to the hearing of the diskettes. The Court stated that said statement has no basis in the evidence presented before the Judge. There was neither testimonial evidence nor physical evidence to support the conclusion that they might have been tampered with or their contents altered in order to secure conviction of the accused. The mere fact that the diskettes had been in possession of the prosecution does not necessarily imply that it had altered or tampered with the evidence to suit its prosecutorial objective. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails in the absence of evidence to contrary. The judges apprehension that the evidence might have been tampered with could be relieved by designating a competent person agreeable to both parties who can perform the task of printing out the contents of the said diskettes. The lack of confidence in the prosecution witness should not in any way affect the integrity of the diskettes or the right of the prosecution to show the contents of the diskettes. By: Anne Perpetual S. Rivera IBM Phils. Inc. vs. NLRC 305 SCRA 592 (1999) Authentication and Proof of Documents Facts: Private respondent Angel Israel was employed by Petitioner IBM as Office Products Customer Engineer for 16 years prior to his assignment to the team of Victor Reyes, a ranking officer at IBM. After 16 months in Reyes team, the latter handed a letter to Israel informing him that his employment in the company was to be terminated on the ground of habitual tardiness and absenteeism. Alleging that his dismissal was without just cause, Israel filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter. In his position paper, he claimed that he was summarily dismissed from employment based on charges not duly proven. The Labor Arbiter upheld the dismissal based on the computer printouts presented by the petitioner calling attention to Israels tardiness and absenteeism. However, it appears that prior to the release of the Labor Arbiters decision, Israel had already filed a manifestation to admit new evidence. The evidence consisted of Israels daily time records and pay slips showing that Israel did not incur any unexcused absences, that he was not late on any day within the period and that no deduction was made from his salary on account of such tardiness or absences. On appeal to the NLRC, the public respondent reversed the arbiters decision. The NLRC ruled that the computer printouts which petitioner presented in evidence to prove Israels office attendance were insufficient to show that the latter was guilty of habitual absences and tardiness.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the computer printouts are insufficient to prove just cause in dismissing Israel. Held: Petition without merit. IBM would like to argue that the computer printouts submitted by them need not be identified or authenticated according the rules of procedure in regular courts in order for the same to be admissible in evidence. Although it is true that administrative agencies are not required to observe the technical rules of procedure, the liberality of procedure is tempered by the requirements of due process. The computer printouts that IBM offers constitute the only evidence of petitioners. The said documents are not authenticated because they are unsigned. The decisions of the Court while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings in administrative level have nonetheless consistently required some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents. Not one of the 18 printouts was ever signed, either by the sender or the receiver. There was thus no guarantee that the message was sent or received. The messages were transmitted to and received not by Israel but by his computer as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General. No company official certified or authenticated that these documents came from the IBM computer system or that the data stored in the system were not and/or could not have been tampered with before they were printed. It is noteworthy that the said documents were stored in the exclusive possession and control of IBM since after Israel was served with his termination letter. By: Anne Perpetual S. Rivera US vs. Russo 480 F.2d 1228 (1973) Authentication and Proof of Documents Facts: Joseph Russo hereinafter referred to as defendant is an osteophatic physician licensed to practice in Michigan. He along with an associate were indicted for devising a scheme to defraud Blue Shield of Michigan by filing claims for services not performed on patients on dates specified and for obtaining money from such organization by false and fraudulent representations.
It was testified that Blue Shield of Michigan furnishes to doctors who practice in the state printed forms known as Doctor Service Reports (DSR). In order to be paid by Blue Shield, it is necessary for a doctor to complete a DSR for each treatment and submit it for payment. Each doctor is assigned a providers code number and this and his name are both imprinted on the DSRs furnished to him. Not all medical services are covered by Blue Shield and the coverage can vary between contracts of various subscribers which are usually the employers of the patients. The prosecution alleged that in many cases, the treatments received by patients were not covered by Blue Shield and thus not compensable. It was the contention of the prosecution that defendant caused a DSR to be prepared showing that some procedure had been followed with the patient which would have been compensable. The prosecution presented the testimony of Mr. Charles Smith, Director of Service Review of Blue Shield. He testified that the main objective of his department is to ensure the integrity of the forms submitted to Blue Shield by doctors. He stated that there were certain audits and investigative procedures initiated by his department. After the form is examined and considered complete and correct, the information on it is recorded onto a magnetic tape for further processing. The checks given to doctors are written by the computer based on the magnetic tape. Likewise, before information is finally put to the computer, the work of two key punch operators from each DSR is compared with each other. The DSRs are destroyed after the recording onto the magnetic tape. Francis Mrachina, Vice-President of Blue Shield in-charge of computer functions described the computer equipment and its particular functions in the claims processing procedure. He described an annual statistical survey which the company has produced by computer each year since 1967 which shows the number of claims paid by Blue Shield. Defendant objects to the admissibility of the computer printout evidencing the annual statistical survey of Blue Shield. It is contended that only the original DSRs can be presented to prove the act of payment for the medical procedures. Issue: Whether or not such computer printouts are admissible in evidence against the defendant. Held: Although the Federal Business Records Act does not mention computer printouts, the Court relied on the extent to which most business depended on computers for a myriad of functions. It took cognizance of the greatest utility of a computer in the business world which is its ability to store large quantities of information which may be quickly retrieved on a selective basis. Once the reliability and trustworthiness of the information put into the computer has been established, the computer printouts should be received as evidence as transactions covered by the input. The procedures for testing the accuracy and reliability of the information fed into the computer were detailed at great length by the witnesses.
The District Court correctly held that the trustworthiness of the information contained in the computer printout had been established. As to the contention of the defendant that the printouts were not prepared at the time the acts to which it purports to describe were performed or within a reasonable time thereafter as required. However, the evidence clearly shows that a record of payment was made at the time each DSR was paid and that this record was referred to as the paid claims file. This file consisted of reels of magnetic tape which reflected every payment to a doctor in the year 1967. Since the computer printout is just a presentation in structured and comprehensible form of a mass of individual items, it is immaterial that the printout itself was not prepared until 11 months after the close of year 1967. By: Anne Perpetual S. Rivera US vs. Croft 750 F.2d 1354 (1984) Authentication and Proof of Documents Facts: William Croft (defendant) was employed as an assistant professor in the Department of Veterinary Sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He developed an interest in the cancer-causing effects of asbestos and applied for a grant outlining a research project to examine mesotheliama in dairy calves as a potential monitor for asbestos. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved the research and forwarded funds. Five months later, defendant became involved in a separate research project involving asbestos for Weston. Once the EPA officials came to know of the independent project, they commenced an investigation into whether or not EPA funds were disbursed in payment for research on that project. Apparently, Croft enlisted the services of certain research assistants to help him with the Weston project. The Federal Grand Jury indicted Croft for converting to his own use the EPA funds by utilizing such funds as payment for the research assistants. The defendant assigned error on the trial court for admitting computer printouts containing the University of Wisconsins payroll records into evidence and denying Croft access to the computer program. The prosecution witness Laufenberg testified that the records were kept in the regular course of business of the payroll office. He also added that the computer printouts were made contemporaneously with or near the time that the payments were made and the payroll data became available. The staff reviewed and audited the payroll data contained in the computer printouts for accuracy on a regular basis throughout the year. Issue: Whether or not no proper foundation was laid by the prosecution for the admittance of the said computer printouts as held in US vs. Weatherspoon.
Held: The printouts are admissible. It is well-settled that computer data may constitute business records and may be admitted at trial if a proper foundation is established. In the present case, the evidence establishes that printouts were maintained and kept by Laufenberg. It was testified that it was the universitys regular practice to make such printouts. With regard to the reliability and trustworthiness of the data information entered into the computer and compiled in the printouts. Laufenberg stressed the precautions taken by his staff to ensure the accuracy of these printouts which were relied upon by the university. The records also reveal that defense counsel thoroughly examined Laufenberg concerning the accuracy of the computer and input procedures. According to the uncontroverted evidence, the computer printouts were reviewed and audited on a regular basis throughout the year combined with the fact the audits performed by Laufenbergs staff should have picked up any error in the input of payroll information. It sufficiently establishes the reliability and trustworthiness of the computer printouts. In view of the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting said printouts. By: Anne Perpetual S. Rivera US vs. Weatherspoon 581 F.2d 595 (1978) Authentication and Proof of Documents Facts: Arnette Weatherspoon hereinafter referred to as the defendant, owned and operated Arnettas Beauty College in Chicago. Defendant received approval from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) of the State of Illinois to enroll no more than 42 veteran students out of the total student body of 50. Said students then will be eligible to receive veterans educational benefits from the VA for attending defendants vocational school. To be able to enroll, qualified veterans will be issued eligibility certificates by the VA which they will present to the school who shall in turn issue enrollment certificates to be completed by an authorized official of the school. Upon receipt of the enrollment certificate, the VA will issue a check covering educational expenses. Defendant was indicted for enrolling students in excess of her authorized limit and by falsely certifying attendance of her students. The trial court admitted computer printouts which established that defendant enrolled over six times as many veterans as students than she had been authorized to do.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting said computer printouts to establish the guilt of defendant. Held: The trial court did not err in admitting the printouts. The Government did not fail to lay a foundation for the admission of said printouts. Pursuant to the testimony of a VA official who was familiar with the preparation and use of said printouts, the Government was able to establish the input procedures, that said procedures and printouts were accurate within two percent, that the computer was tested for internal programming errors on a monthly basis and that the printouts were made, maintained and relied on by the VA in the ordinary course of business. Likewise, said printouts were available for the defense counsel to inspect. The defendant cannot argue that she did not have the opportunity to inquire as to the accuracy of the procedures and programming used. By: Anne Perpetual S. Rivera
Perma Research and Development vs. Singer Company 542 F.2d 111 (1976) Authentication and Proof of Documents Facts: Perma Research (plaintiff) and Singer Company (defendant) entered into a contract wherein the latter assured the former that it will undertake all efforts to perfect an anti-skid device. The District Court sitting without a jury found defendant guilty of contractual breach. Perma assigned its patent of the anti-skid device to Singer for the purpose of improving the design and engineering of the said product. Defendant contends that it was induced by plaintiff to enter such contract upon misrepresentation that the device was fail-safe. Defendant objects to the use of the results of the computer simulation as basis for expert testimony of Daniel Goor and Andre DeVilliers. Issue: Whether or not the trial judge erred in admitting the expert testimony based on the computer simulation. Held: The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the experts to testify as to this particular basis for their ultimate conclusion that the Perma device was perfectible. While it may have been better practice for the opposing counsel to arrange for the delivery of all details of the underlying data and theorems employed in these simulations in advance of trial
to avoid unnecessarily belabored discussion of technical issues, the Court still upheld the testimony. DISSENTING OPINION (Circuit Judge Van Graafeiland) The testimony of Goor was based on the experimental data supplied by DeVilliers and the latter secured all his data from some simulated formulas he fed into the computer. The information upon which these formulas were based was hearsay having been secured from a third person. The witnesses conceded that their conclusions were based upon the computers output. Neither of the plaintiffs expert witnesses had ever seen the device in operation or had tested it. Proof that the device could be transformed in some way to perform under all conditions required more than the running of some figures through a computer which involved calculation of a theoretical series of steps, following the assumed installation of a hypothetical or simulated anti-skid device on a 1968 Thunderbird. By: Anne Perpetual Rivera E. OFFER AND OBJECTION 1. Rule 132, Sections 34-40. Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. (35) Sec. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify. Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing. (n) Sec. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefore shall become reasonably apparent. An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days after notice of the unless a different period is allowed by the court. In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified. (36a)
Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. When it becomes reasonably apparent in the course of the examination of a witness that the question being propounded are of the same class as those to which objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing objection to such class of questions. (37a) Sec. 38. Ruling. The ruling of the court must be given immediately after the objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling. The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated. However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied upon. (38a) Sec. 39. Striking out answer. Should a witness answer the question before the adverse party had the opportunity to voice fully its objection to the same, and such objection is found to be meritorious, the court shall sustain the objection and order the answer given to be stricken off the record. On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n) Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. (n)
Cases: People v. Carino and Diaz 165 SCRA 664 Offer and Objection Facts:
Accused-appellants Lauro Carino, Virgilio Diaz and a certain Balingit (who remains at large) were charged and later on convicted by the Trial Court of Makati of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and frustrated homicide. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense. The Prosecutions statement of facts aver that on September 29, 1980, at about 4:30 pm, Lolito Talisic, while tending their store, was stoned and attacked by herein accused. It was stated that they were armed with knives. Rosalia Talisic, upon seeing the incident, called for her husband, herein victim, Melencio Talisic to help out Lolito. Melencio rushed to the scene to pacify the protagonists but was attacked by Diaz and Balingit. The latter allegedly stabbed Melencio on the side thereby wounding him. Thereafter, Diaz hacked the showcase of Melencios watches and took some 50 watches plus P 5,000.00 of cash. Due to this incident, Lolito died while Melencio was treated and confined for about a week thereby rendering him unable to earn during said period. Dr. Bienvenido Munoz of the NBI autopsied the cadaver while Dr. Tito Sambilayan issued the Medico-Legal certificate for Melencio Talisic evidencing the fact that indeed Melencio was confined in the said hospital. As the accused were convicted of the offense as charged, both Diaz and Carino appealed. In the appeal of the latter, he assailed the trial courts decision whereby he contended that there was failure to prove that there was conspiracy between all the accused. Carino mentions that the trial court failed to consider that there were contradictions in the sworn statements of Jenny Arceo, Ricardo Sibay, and victim Melencio Talisic. During the trial, however, the defense never introduced these statements as evidence. Issue: Whether or not the trial court was in error when it did not consider that there was no conspiracy between the accused as gleaned from the contradictions of the sworn statements of the witnesses. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the appellants are meritless. In this case, the Court ruled that since the defense did not formally offer in evidence such sworn statements, the lower court was correct in not considering them. The courts can consider only evidence formally offered. Also, from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court established that the three accused acted in concert and with common design and purpose as shown by their simultaneous arrival in the scene and their mutually helping out each other in the killing of Lolito and the stabbing of Melencio, and finally in robbing the store plus their simultaneous flight therein. Appellant Lauro Carino further contended that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the statement of the co-accused Diaz that he was not at the scene of the crime. This is in error. Witness was silent on this point. In this case such silence does not negate Carinos presence at the scene, especially when he was positively identified as one of the malefactors by the eyewitness accounts. JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED with modification only as to civil liability. By: Emerson U. Palad
Interpacific v. Aviles 185 SCRA 385 Offer and Objection Facts: Rufo and Josephine Aviles, were alleged by petitioner Interpacific Transit, Inc to be its sub-agents and while enjoying such trust and confidence, collected from various clients payments for its airway bills in the amount of P204,030.66. instead of remitting the same to its principal, Interpacific alleged that Aviles appropriated the same to its personal benefit, bringing rise to a charge of estafa. At the trial, the prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly received by the respondents but have not yet been properly accounted for. This was done during the course of direct examination of one of the witnesses. The defense objected to the evidence citing the best evidence rule. The prosecution remarked that the originals will be presented in the future but was never done so. As such, the evidence was allowed to be marked as exhibits. Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the said bills were offered in evidence, the defense interposed no objection. The trial court acquitted private respondents on the ground that the evidence were not admissible as they are mere secondary evidence, proof of the loss was not presented; nor were such originals recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by law. Also, the court contended that there is no agency relationship such that only a creditor-debtor relationship was present. Therefore, estafa could not have arisen and thus, they were acquitted. Since the Court of Appeals cannot rule on the guilt of the respondents based on double jeopardy, petitioner Interpacific appealed the civil aspect only. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court. Issues: 1. Whether or not the Appellate Court and the trial court was in error when it rejected the introduction of the photocopy of the airway bills based on the best evidence rule where when it was offered, no objection was interposed by the defense. 2. Whether or not the objection made during the direct examination of one of the witnesses was in the form of a continuing objection making up to the lack of objection made during the offer of evidence. 3. Whether or not Aviles should be held liable for the amount in the photocopied airway bills. Held: 1. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts were in error when they rejected the use of the photocopies based on the Best Evidence Rule. The lower courts disregarded an equally important rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is deemed premature. There is a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. The first
is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case, and not before. What really matters is the objection to a document upon its formal offer and not prior. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the photocopies should be admissible to hold Aviles liable for the amount therein proved. 2. The earlier objection should not be considered a continuing objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132 for the provision speaks of a single objection to a class of evidence which when first offered is considered to encompass the rest of the evidence. In this case, no proper objection was made at the right time. 3. Aviles should be held liable. The Supreme Court said that the photocopies can be used to determine respondents liabilities. The Court rejected the claim of Aviles that the amounts have already been paid. The one who alleges payment must prove the same. By: Emerson U. Palad Delos Reyes v. IAC 176 SCRA 394 Offer and Objection Facts: Petitioner obtained a loan in the amount of P3,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Bauan and secured the payment with a real estate mortgage on a piece of land belonging to her. Petitioner Delos Reyes failed to pay and thereafter the mortgage was foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction to herein respondents for P4,925.00 on April 29, 1976. The certificate of sale, however, was registered on May 4, 1977. Thereafter, private respondents asked the petitioner to vacate the property and remove the improvements made. Petitioner countered that the sale was irregular and void and asked that the complaint be dismissed. While the case was pending, the petitioner wrote a letter to the Sheriff tendering the amount of P4,925.00 plus interest as the redemption price. The Sheriff replied saying that he refuses to accept the tender on the ground that the period for doing the same has expired. The trial court, on May 9, 1978 ordered that the amount be deposited in court. Thereafter, on Feb. 8, 1982, rendered a decision in a summary judgment in favor of the respondents. Petitioner appealed but the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of Judge Silva. Hence the appeal to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the documentary evidence can be admitted in the summary proceedings had in the lower court when the same were not formally offered. Held: The Supreme Court held that the same may be admitted. Although there was no formal offer made by the petitioners as required by the rules, the letters were formally submitted during the hearing of petitioners motion to dismiss on May 9, 1978. The lower
court took cognizance of the same and thus they were part of the records of the case. The courts found as an established fact, the tender made by the petitioner and the subsequent rejection of the sheriff. Also, when the two letters were presented during the hearing, the respondents did not object to their admission. It was only made so during appeal. While the rule on offer of evidence must be strictly complied with in ordinary trials, such a policy is hardly applicable in summary proceedings where really no full blown trial is held in the interest of a speedy administration of justice. The rule on summary judgments is that a judge must base his decision on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and documents on file with the court. Therefore, since the rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the property, the Supreme Court SET ASIDE the lower courts decision and directed that the owner be allowed to REDEEM his property. By: Emerson U. Palad People v. Yatco 97 Phil 940 Offer and Objection Facts: Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another accused were charged with having conspired together in the murder of a certain Jose Ramos. During the trial, NBI witness, Arturo Xavier stated that Consunji made an extra judicial confession to him, Panganibans counsel objected to this testimony stating that as to his client, it is mere hearsay and should not be admitted by the court. The court, however, excluded the same on the ground that to prove conspiracy, there should be prior proof of the conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances. Prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was denied prompting the prosecution to file the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the lower courts order to exclude such evidence. Issue: Whether or not the lower court was correct in excluding the evidence on the ground of lack of definite acts to prove conspiracy when the same was not yet offered as evidence. Held: The lower courts committed a grave error in excluding the same. Under the rule on multiple admissibility of evidence, although the confession was not admissible as to Panganiban, it can be admitted as a confession on the part of Consunji, the person making the same. It was the declarants admission as to his own guilt and therefore not hearsay as to him. More importantly, the prosecution has not yet offered the confessions to prove the conspiracy of the accused, nor as evidence against them. In fact, the alleged confessions have not yet been identified, the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the same. For all we know, the prosecution might be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between the accused and therefore is deemed prematurely excluded. By excluding the evidence motu propio, the court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive, and if the ground for objection is known and
not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard evidence. Therefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is ANNULLED, and the lower court is directed to PROCEED with trial. By: Emerson U. Palad Philamgen v. Sweet Lines, Inc. 212 SCRA 194 Offer and Objection Facts: The vessel SS VISHVA YASH, owned and operated by the foreign common carrier, took on board two consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for transshipment to Davao City consisting of 600 bags of Low Density Polyethylene-631 and 6,400 bags of Low Density Polyethylene-647 both consigned to Far East Bank and Trust Company of Manila. Said cargoes were covered by Bill of Lading No. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier. Tagum Plastics insured the cargo with plaintiff, Philippine American General Insurance Co, Inc. (Philamgen). Upon arrival in Manila, foreign common carrier made use of the services of MV Sweet Lines owned by herein defendant interisland carrier. A survey of the cargo upon its discharge revealed that the same contained shortages, damages, and losses as to both cargoes. Thereafter, a maritime suit was instituted by herein petitioners to recover the cost of the lost and damaged shipment plus exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs allegedly due to defendants negligence. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners ordering the respondents to indemnify the petitioners for the lost shipment. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court absolving defendants on the ground of prescription of action. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Philamgen contended that it was error for the respondent court to reverse the appealed decision on the ground of prescription when Sweet Lines failed to adduce any evidence in support thereof and the Bills of Lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing claims and instituting court actions were never offered in evidence. Issue: Whether or not the non-presentation of the Bills of Lading evidencing the stipulation of a shorter period for filing claims, during the offer of evidence is a procedural lapse which bars defendant Sweet Lines from alleging prescription of action. Will the petitioners failure to controvert the same waive the offer of evidence? Held: The Supreme Court held that it is not such fatal defect. In the case at bar, it is already too late a day to overturn the litigation on the ground of non-inclusion of the controverted bills of lading in the formal offer of evidence, for to do so would mean an over-indulgence in technicalities. Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription since the defense was so considered and controverted by the parties.
As petitioners are suing upon Sweet Lines contractual obligation under the contract of carriage, as contained in the Bills of Lading, such bills can be categorized as actionable documents which under the rules, must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses and the genuineness and due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse party. This, petitioners failed to do. Petitioners failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution of the instruments, as pleaded, amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, whether verbal or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or the proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same. Hence, the non-inclusion of the controverted bill of lading in the formal offer of evidence cannot, under the facts of the case, be considered a fatal procedural lapse that would bar respondent from raising the defense of prescription. Petitioners feigned ignorance of the provisions of the bills of lading, particularly on the time limitations for filing a claim and commencing a suit in court, as their excuse for non-compliance therewith does not deserve serious attention. Lastly, it is a safe assessment that petitioners acknowledged the existence of the said bills of lading when they made a notation in an application for Delivery of Cargoes without Original Bill of Lading that the same corresponds to the controverted bills of lading. Also, by having the cargo shipped on respondent carriers vessel and later making a claim for loss on the basis of the bills of lading, petitioners, for all intents and purposes accepted said bills. By: Emerson U. Palad Catuira v. Court of Appeals 236 SCRA 398 Offer and Objection Facts: Two Informations for estafa was filed against petitioner for having issued two checks in payment of her obligation to complainant Maxima Ocampo when petitioner had no sufficient funds to cover the same, which checks were dishonored upon its presentment for payment. After prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss by way of Demurrer to Evidence. She contended that the testimony of complainant Ocampo should be stricken off the record as it was done without formal offer of her testimony when called to testify. She added that even if Ocampos testimony was admitted, the prosecution still failed to prove that the checks were issued as payment of an obligation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss as well as the motion to consider the denial of motion to dismiss. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court rejected her petition and sustained the lower courts denial of the motion to dismiss. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner states that the respondent court erred in accepting the testimony of Ocampo for it violated the Rules of Court regarding the offer of a testimony before taking the stand. The rules also provide that a court cannot consider evidence not formally offered to it. She also faults the appellate court when the latter held that she effectively waived her right to object at the proper time when respondent Ocampo made her
testimony. She states that she could not have waived anything at all for there was no testimony that was offered. Issue: Whether or not the testimony of a witness is inadmissible in evidence if not formally offered at the time the witness is called to testify. Held: The testimony is admissible. The reason for requiring evidence be formally introduced is to enable the court to rule intelligently on the objections to the questions which have been asked. Where the proponent offers evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible, he must object. But such right is a mere privilege which may be waived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest opportunity lest silence, when there is opportunity to speak, may operate as a waiver of objections. Thus while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when private respondent was called to the stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the appropriate time, that it, when the grounds therefore have become reasonably apparent. The rationale behind the offer of testimony before taking the stand is that it is the best time to offer the same so that the courts time will not be wasted. If petitioner was genuinely concerned with the ends of justice, her actuations should be contrary to what she exhibited. She instead tried to capitalize on technicality to dismiss the case against her. Consequently, even if the offer was belatedly made, there is no reason to expunge the same from the records. On the contrary, the unoffered oral evidence must be admitted of only to satisfy the courts sense of justice and fairness and to stress that substantial justice may not be denied on the ground of technicality. By: Emerson U. Palad
Sheraton-Palace Hotel v. Quijano (C.A.) 64 O.G. 9116 Offer and Objection Admission as part of testimony of witness Facts: Plaintiff Sheraton instituted suit seeking to recover the amount of $1,257.34 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency from defendant Cristina Quijano for the latters alleged unpaid hotel charges when the defendant stayed and lodged in plaintiffs hotel in San Francisco, California. Plaintiff relies upon Exh. E-1, which is a letter of Mueller and McLeod, plaintiffs lawyer in the US, to plaintiffs counsel in the Philippines, in an attempt to show that it was the defendant who asked that her hotel accounts be charged against Fred Devine and Company, but the latter refused to pay the bills claiming that it had not authorized the defendant to charge any of her hotel bills to it. Such evidence was presented together with the testimony of Atty. Syquia, the plaintiffs counsel. The trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint alleging that defendants stay at the hotel was as a guest of a certain Fred Devine who had assumed to pay all the costs for his account. Issue: Whether or not Exh. E-1 constitutes proof of facts related therein independent of the testimony of Atty. Syquia Held: A document or writing which is admitted not as an independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a witness or merely insofar as such witness has made reference thereto in the course of his testimony, does not constitute proof of facts related therein. It was correct for the trial court not to admit the said documentary evidence as an independent piece of evidence but merely as part of the testimony of Atty. Syquia or merely insofar as Atty. Syquia has made reference thereto in the course of his testimony so that it cannot constitute proof the facts related in the said exhibit. By: Giovanni Bautista Vda. De Onate v. CA 250 SCRA 283 (1995) Offer and Objection Formal offer of evidence; and its exception Facts: The controversy involves an action for specific performance for the delivery of title of a parcel of land brought by the administratrix of the estate of the deceased Leonor Taguba against Elvira Vda. De Onate. The land was bought by Taguba from petitioner as evidenced by several receipts of the partial payments of the purchase price. After the death of Taguba, the administratrix demanded petitioner to execute a public instrument for the delivery of the title of the said land. The trial court ruled against the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the responded Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of several of plaintiffs pieces of evidence which had been marked by never formally submitted in evidence as required by the Rules. Public respondent affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not a trial court may consider pieces of evidence not formally offered Held: It is clear from Sec. 34 of Rule 132 that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. As ruled in the case of Interpacific Transit v. Aviles, a distinction should be made between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will
advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same. However, in People v. Mate, the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present: 1) the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and 2) the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. In the case at bar, we find, as the CA did, that these requisites have been satisfied. The evidence in question refers to receipts all showing the varying amounts paid by Leonor Taguba to Elvira Mato vda. De Onate. These were marked at the pre-trial for the purpose of identifying them. In fact, one of the payments was admitted by petitioner in the same pretrial. The administratrix identified the said exhibits in her testimony which was duly recorded. By: Giovanni Bautista
XV. WEIGHT & SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

A. Rule 133, Sections 1-7. RULE 133 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (1a) Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2a) Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. (3)
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
sufficient.
(a) There is more than one circumstances; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5) Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n) Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. The court may stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive. But this power should be exercised with caution. (6) Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions. (7) B. RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, Rule 7. RULE 7 EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS Section 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. In assessing the evidentiary weight of an electronic document, the following factors may be considered: (a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored or communicated, including but not limited to input and output procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy and reliability of the electronic data message or document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any relevant agreement; (b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;
(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored, including but not limited to the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as programming errors; (d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and information system; (e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information system upon which the electronic data message or electronic document was based; or (f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the electronic document or electronic data message. Section 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. In any dispute involving the integrity of the information and communication system in which an electronic document or electronic data message is recorded or stored, the court may consider, among others, the following factors: (a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in a manner that did not affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the information and communication system; (b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with interest adverse to that of the party using it; or (c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using it. Cases: US v. Lasada 18 Phil 90 (1910) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence Reasonable doubt defined
Facts: A complaint was filed against Agapito Lasada charging him for the crime of murder. A Chinaman named Pedro Sopriengco was found dead under a bridge. After pleading not guilty, he was subsequently found by the trial court guilty of homicide. Counsel for the appellant insists that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of his client of the crime charged. Issue: Whether or not appellant should be convicted or acquitted Held: The law presumes that a defendant is not guilty of any crime, and this presumption stands until it is overturned by competent and credible proof. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and if there remains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt or innocence this doubt must be resolved in his favor and he must be acquitted. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute an offense. The trial judge had an opportunity to see the witnesses, hear them testify, and observe their demeanors on the witness stand. This in one of the best ways of determining credibility of a witness. After hearing all these witnesses testify he was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the witnesses for the prosecution testified the truth. In view of these facts, we must give great weight to the findings of the trial court. The Court only has the record and the testimony for the prosecution is reasonable. It is direct and positive. By: Giovanni Bautista People v. Abendan 82 Phil 711 (1948) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence Facts: Defendant Eugenio Abendan was convicted of murder of Enrique Doria. The prosecutions version of the facts stated that Abendan and Pedro de Guzman ordered for Doria to be taken out of the municipal jail. They brought the victim to the cemetery and buried him alive. On the other hand, Abendan would like the court to believe that Doria was taken to the Japanese garrison on that day upon his receipt of a written order from the Japanese. He was only informed later on of the death of said victim by de Guzman who admitted responsibility for such killing. Issue: Whether or not defendant committed said crime
Held: The Supreme Court upheld the version of the defendant. It must be stressed that the appellant was designated by the Japanese as chief of local police during those times. There is uncontradicted evidence that the appellant was instrumental for the release of many detainees for despite his appointment he remained in contact with the guerillas. Moreover the prosecution failed to present as witness the driver of the carretela on which the appellant and de Guzman allegedly rode on the way to the cemetery while Abendan was able to put on the stand the carretela driver used by him in taking Doria to the Japanese garrison. Guzman could have been the one who was solely responsible for the death of Doria as alleged by Abendan due to his disappearance. And where there are two likelihoods, that which is consistent with the presumption of innocence will be adopted. Defendant acquitted. By: Giovanni Bautista
People v. Solayao 262 SCRA 255 (1996) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence Burden of proof in negative allegations Facts: Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitition. While CAFGU members were patrolling a certain town in Biliran, they met the group of Solayao who was drunk and was carrying a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as latong. When asked who issued him a license to carry a firearm or whether he was connected to a military group, Solayao answered that he had no permission to possess the same. The trial court convicted Solayao and thus this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the prosecution validly proved the offense charged Held: As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the element of absence of the corresponding license or permit to carry the firearm, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General which pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove that the Solayao lacked the necessary permit or license to possess the subject firearm. The prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that accused-appellant admitted before Police Officer Nino at the time that he was accosted that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm. In other words, the prosecution relied on accused-appellants admission to prove said element of the offense which is insufficient to authorize conviction. Such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to establish the lack of the license or
permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing proof, like a certification from the government agency concerned. Putting it differently, when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiffs case depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative. In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that Solayao was not authorized would have sufficed for the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm. By: Giovanni Bautista People v. Lorenzo 240 SCRA 624 (1995) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence Corpus delicti; circumstantial evidence Fact: For having allegedly killing her husband, accused-appellant Dolores Lorenzo, a policewoman, was charged with the crime of parricide. SPO1 Jose Eclipse received a report that there was a stabbing incident. He immediately proceeded to the crime scene and met Lorenzo who, wielding a blood-stained bolo and fan knife, admitted that she killed her husband. The trial court found Lorenzo guilty of the crime charged. Issues: 1) Whether or not confession alone can justify conviction 2) Whether or not circumstantial evidence present in the case can justify conviction of the accused Held: 1) According to Sec. 3, Rule 133, extrajudicial confession alone is not a sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is made up of two elements: a.) that a certain result has been proved, for example a man has died or a building has been burned and b.) that some person is criminally responsible for the act. The section does not mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence sufficient to justify conviction independently of such confession. However, the Court ruled that what Lorenzo gave was not a confession but merely an admission.
2.) Even granting that the appellant only surrendered a blood-stained bolo and fan knife but did not admit that she killed her husband, the Court finds that in this case several circumstances whose concordant combination and cumulative effect point to the appellant, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty party. These are: - a tricycle driver reported a stabbing incident and police operatives immediately proceed to the crime scene - The police met appellant who had a blood-stained bolo and fan knife - The appellant surrendered the bolo and the knife - Appellants husband lay dead nearby - Eclipse reported to the police that appellant surrendered herself and admitted she killed her husband - Appellant did not protest upon hearing the report of Eclipse These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the appellant, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty party. The requirements then of Sec. 4, Rule 133 on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict the appellant are present. By: Giovanni Bautista

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THE REVISED RULES

Codal Provisions, Special Laws & Jurisprudence

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XV. WEIGHT & SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

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