RESUMES ABSTRACTS

SESSIONS PARALELLES PARRALEL SESSIONS

DOGS In The Name of the Dog, or Natural Rights, Levinas describes three dogs--and then adds another. There is a contemptible dog, servile and crouching, that has lost its wild nature; and there is its opposite, the wild dog or wolf who thirsts after blood. In between is the dog who interests Levinas. Hes just a dog--not a base dog who begs nor a heroic one, but a happy, direct dog who transforms the torn flesh of war into good flesh. He simply sees it as food and does not use its savage origin to instigate further war of one group with another. Because of this dogs direct or pure nature, this dog has rights. Levinas identifies this dog with the Egyptian dogs that did not growl on the night Israel waited to be released from the house of bondage and become free. These dogs, too, are direct-lacking in ethics or logos--but dignified, since they do not reveal Israel. They are universalists without universal concepts. They do not categorize the Israelites. They do not see them as different from Egyptians. Levinas identifies the Egyptian dogs with Bobby, the dog that greeted the prisoners of war in his forestry commando unit. Bobby greeted them every morning and waited for them every night, jumping up and down with delight to see them return. The people around the camp--men who worked with the prisoners, and women and children who passed them by--were not so welcoming. Instead, they let them remain shut away because of their category (Jew? prisoner?). Bobby was the last Kantian in Nazi Germany lacking the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives (153). Neither heroic nor servile but direct, Bobby represents the non categorizing straightforwardness (droiture) that Levinas associates with righteousness. Finally, Levinas contrasts Bobby and his Egyptian forebears with a fourth dog, Odysseus dog who recognizes Odysseus when he comes home after his long odyssey. Odysseus loyal dog is not, for Levinas, Bobbys forebear. Odysseus dog recognizes only his own, come home to this place, Ithaca, the fatherland. It is instructive to bring in a fifth dog, the noble dog of Platos Republic. For Socrates, the noble dog is friendly to his own and hostile to others--friendly to those who are of this place and hostile to those who are not. Like Bobby and his Egyptian forebears, the Platonic noble dog lacks intellect. He is loyal, but can only say mine and not mine, native and alien. The noble dog is needed in every city, for he represents loyalty, but must be superseded, since love must be directed not simply to ones own but to what is good--such love is the source of true virtue--and recognition of the good requires highly developed intellect. For Plato, then, a noble dog must be superseded, just as guardians must be superseded by philosophers, since loyalty is necessary but must be guided by knowledge of what is good. For Levinas, to the contrary, a friendly dog is not superseded but represents human beings at their best, since what is best about them is a direct being for another that does not make intellectual, categorial distinctions. It is this friendly, doggish way of being for another without regard to the others origin or qualities that undergirds natural rights for Levinas, for this non intellectual way of being for another constitutes freedom. A main point of this paper will be to compare Bobby and Platos noble dog, showing why one represents ethics, and so undergirds natural rights, and the other represents something prior to ethics that must be superseded. Deborah Achtenberg University of Nevada, Reno, USA

LA SENSIBILIT EXPOSEE: LAPPEL IRRECUSABLE DUNE REPONSE La notion de subjectivit qui est dfendue par Emmanuel Lvinas a des implications qui invitent repenser les relations qui sinstaurent au sein de la socit, des relations o la rciprocit nest pas le fondement. Lide que nous voulons explorer tourne autour des consquences quon peut faire en partant dune subjectivit passive qui porte dans sa peau,

dans sa sensibilit la plus fragile, dans sa vulnrabilit, lexposition toute violence et, au mme moment, lexpression des yeux sans dfense qui perce limage plastique du visage et rappelle la trace du divin. Il sagit dune rectitude qui est ascendante, vers la hauteur, ce qui finalement donne le sens la relation thique, laquelle privilgie lautre et permet au je de pouvoir sortir de soi, dviter le retour soi, non pas par lalination dune identit qui se trahit, sinon, au contraire, par un non-retour soi d un manque de disponibilit dun temps qui nexiste plus pour soi. Il sagit dune extrme gnrosit envers lautre et pour lautre. Enfin, cest une thique qui parle de linfinition de lhumain: le geste humain ne se produit pas dans le concept, sinon justement travers une nouvelle conception de la subjectivit. Eleonora Ahrensburg Caracas, Venezuela GAGARINE ET LA FORET-NOIRE. UTOPIES DU DERACINEMENT CHEZ LEVINAS ET BLANCHOT Le recueil Difficile libert reprend notamment le bref essai Heidegger, Gagarine et nous paru en 1961 dans Information juive. Ce qui se prsente comme un texte de circonstance Lvinas ragit la mise en orbite, en avril 61, de la capsule Vostok avec Youri Gagarine son bord constitue en ralit un ambitieux programme philosophique qui vise, rien de moins, draciner une pense de la proprit et du propre dont lontologie heideggerienne constituerait le dernier avatar. Derrire le numro de Luna Park qui impressionne les foules il y a, selon Lvinas, la libration de toute logique du lieu propre et de son corrlat, lhorizon (p. 350). Dans le fragment indit La conqute de lespace datant de la mme poque, Maurice Blanchot rpond lessai lvinassien et approfondit encore la mise en perspective u-topique comme libration des attaches au lieu et ses logiques territoriales. Ce fragment qui devait constituer un des quatre textes pour la Revue internationale laquelle Blanchot travaillait avec Dionys Mascolo est rest indit en franais. En 2007, nous en avons dit une premire version, une seconde fut depuis reprise dans la rdition des Ecrits politiques chez Gallimard 2008. Dans la comparaison que nous nous proposons de faire de ces deux textes, il sagira de montrer comment la conqute de lespace est associe une pense de lexil. Si lon trouve donc dune part une rinterprtation puissante de la tradition juive dont on connat la suite, ces deux textes constituent pourtant aussi une svre dfense de la technique contre son rejet sans appel par Heidegger. Certes, la technique comme instrument darraisonnement recle certes des dangers (Blanchot le rptera dans son fragment), mais son rejet se double dangereusement, chez Heidegger, dun retour prn la terre primordiale, la Erde perdue. Les remarques de Lvinas sont originales dans la mesure o elles montrent que la pense heideggerienne rvle ici, sans doute, moins sa proximit avec la thologie chrtienne (proximit trop souvent souligne) quavec le paganisme : comment comprendre autrement le programme heideggerien ( Construire, habiter, penser) autrement qu'un retour aux sources, ces sources qui dans toutes les croyances paennes sont le lieu habit par les esprits ? Levinas aura eu en tout cas le mrite dexpliquer comment il est possible de passer des esprits du lieu, des genii loci, au lieu de lesprit. Dans le texte de Lvinas et ensuite dans celui de Blanchot, on peut donc entrevoir lexorde dune certaine interprtation de la philosophie de Heidegger dont on sait quel point elle marque sa rception ce jour. Mais dautre part, on y lit galement une rflexion sur les modalits plus concrtes dune utopie du non-lieu qui slabore, non pas contre, mais avec la technique et dont nous sommes peut-tre en mesure dentendre, aujourdhui encore plus clairement, la porte. Emmanuel Alloa

Universits Paris I

TOWARDS THE FULLNESS OF EROS : Emmanuel Levinas on Ethical Paternity and Maternity This paper explains the epiphany of the Good through Emmanuel Levinas metaphors of Eros through the virility of the male and the tenderness of the female, and Fecundity through liberating paternity as mentioned in Totality and Infinity, ethical maternity as mentioned in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Herein, we echo that fecundity as the fullness of erotic love is where total transcendence proceeds. This is particularly through the act of creation the transmittance of life to a child, and other. Through fecundity, separation is beautifully revealed as a liberating rearing: with the male (Father) giving the gift of freedom to the very gift, and the female (mother) for having kept the child during pregnancy and for keeping the child despite being separated through care and keeping the home. In this situation, we see fecundity as the highest expression of erotic love a relation between male and female which goes beyond the symbolic and ontological, as it is ethical. Fleurdeliz R. Altez University of Santo Tomas, Manila, Philippines A DIFFICULT FREEDOM: INFINITE ECHOES OF RESPONSE This essay examines an unconventional understanding of interpersonal communication driven by Levinas explication of Difficult Freedom. Interpersonal communication literature generally presupposes that freedom protects the communicative self from external obligations, expectations, constraints, and restraints. Levinas, in a contrary move, conceptualizes interpersonal communication with a self held hostage by the Other. Levinas ethics as first philosophy presupposes responsiveness to an a priori call. The biblical Here I am! that reveals the alterity of the Other commands a response. Responding to the call of the Other, is the start of Levinas philosophy of communication. This essay seeks to explicate the significance of Levinas understanding of communication for interpersonal communication literature. Unlike other philosophers of language, Levinas does not engage in language games, but sees speech, communication, and language as a part of the primacy of the ethical. Speech belongs to the order of morality before belonging to that of theory. (DF, 9) The defining of speech in the action of responding to the call of the Other moves us outside of the excesses of subjectivity and towards the Other. The selflessness of this act of answering the call is antithetical to violence. For Levinas, the the banal fact of conversation ... is the marvel of marvels. (DF, 7) Communication is external to violence. To truly respond to the face of the Other, I do not respond to the Other as I would have them be, for that would be a form of violence to the Other. Instead the Other becomes my constant concern; an infinite echo. Communicative corporeality: Body, self, and alterity in Levinas and Watsuji Joel W. Krueger, Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen. Among other things, Levinas Difficult Freedom concerns varieties of communication. In Signature, the short essay at the very end of Difficult Freedom, Levinas offers a characteristically pregnant, and characteristically elusive, remark, essentially a condensation of the main themes animating his entire corpus. He writes: The fundamental experience which objective experience itself presupposes is the experience of the Other. It is experience par excellence. As the idea of the Infinite goes beyond Cartesian thought, so is the Other out of proportion with the power and freedom of the I. The disproportion between the Other and the self is precisely moral consciousness...[which is]not a modality of psychological consciousness, but its condition. The primitive encounter with the radical alterity of the Other, Levinas insists, thus communicates the very possibility of experiencing my world at all. Taken in light of other formulations (e.g., crucial passages in Otherwise than Being), Levinas insists that this encounter is something that unfolds at the pre-predicative level of our embodied, affectively-laden

interpersonal encounters. Thus, moral consciousness, in this Levinasian sense, is the very ground of all other forms of experience. The body communicates this fact. This paper critically evaluates Levinas model of body, self, and alterity. I argue first that, despite his laudable phenomenological sensitivity to many facets of embodiment, Levinas nevertheless failed to develop an adequate (or even consistent) formulation of the relation between body and alterity. I argue further that his failure stems from Levinas overarching commitment to an atomistic conception of self. This commitment motivates Levinas default portrayal of the self-other relation as one of radical asymmetry, that is, a relation of absolute Otherness-to-Otherness. I show how this theoretical commitment to an atomistic bodily self precludes Levinas from making the sort of claim present in the passage quoted above. I also summon empirical research from developmental psychology to demonstrate the explanatory inadequacy of Levinas account here. But my intentions are not purely critical. As a point of contrast with Levinas, I discuss the phenomenological ethics of Tetsuro Watsuji, a twentieth century Japanese thinker. Like Levinas, Watsuji was concerned with ethics as first philosophyand more precisely, with developing a phenomenology of embodied ethics. Despite some crucial differences, there is thus a natural affinity between them. I focus in particular on Watsujis Zen Buddhist-inspired formulation of the human self as in-betweeness ( aidagara). Drawing upon Buddhist notions of emptiness (sunyata) and no-self (anatman), Watsuji argues that the self is constituted within a perpetual movement of double-negation: a betweenness in which individuality negates sociality and sociality, in turn, negates individuality. The human self is thus empty of fixed identity, as this double-negation is perpetual and persistent. At first glance, this model of self appears to be diametrically opposed to Levinas. However, I spell out some ways that their views are actually compatible. Moreover, I show how Watsujis model can preserve some of Levinas most important insights while nevertheless correcting some of the difficulties mentioned above. I conclude by again returning to empirical work in developmental psychology to support my claims. Ronald C. Arnett Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA BRUNSCHVICG ET LHISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE OCCIDENTALE Grand no-kantien, historien de la philosophie et de la mathmatique, diteur des uvres de Pascal, et, selon Paul Nizan, reprsentatif des chiens de la garde de la Sorbonne , Lon Brunschvicg semble avoir attir peu dattention de commentateurs de Levinas. Pourtant, celui-ci a consacr deux articles ( Lagenda de Lon Brunschvicg (1949), Etre occidental (1951) repris dans Difficile libert) ce philosophe juif et dreyfusard qui cependant ignore le judasme (p. 68). Pour Levinas qui en tmoigne les deux souvenirs, il tait un personnage qui a parfaitement incarn lesprit occidental , sans aucune trahison envers le judasme pour autant, ni la dissimulation de son origine. La position philosophique de ce juif exemplairement assimil ne semble pas avoir non plus daffinit avec lesprit de la phnomnologie. Il ne serait pas inintressant de poser une question; en quoi Levinas a apprci ce grand philosophe occidental ? Ayant termin sa thse doctorale Strasbourg, Levinas est venu sinstaller Paris. Il frquentait la Sorbonne o donnait ses cours ce no-kantien franais. Dans Lagenda de Lon Brunschvicg , Levinas se souvient de la querelle de lathisme en 1937, o le philosophe disait que la mort de Lon Brunschvicg proccupe moins Lon Brunschvicg que la mort de Gabriel Marcel ne proccupe Gabriel Marcel (p. 67). Lesprit occidental dispose dun accs lEternel lintrieur de sa conscience au moyen de lactivit rationnelle, et ne sintresse plus au salut qui reste, une trace de lgocentrisme naturelle (p. 71, lexpression de Brunschvicg cite par Levinas). Cet esprit se trouvait trs proche de la position de Levinas par rapport au conatus essendi. Mais, bien videmment, la proximit nentrane pas lidentit. On se demanderait quelle est la contribution de Brunschvicg et de sa pense au

dveloppement de la philosophie du jeune Levinas. Dune part, comme dautres auditeurs de cours de Brunschvicg, Levinas tait conscient de lcart qui le spare de ce grand idaliste. Dautre part, il est vrai que celui-ci lui a appris une certaine vision extrmement cohrente sur lhistoire de la philosophie occidentale. En effet, la prsence de Brunschvicg se confirme galement dans un passage vers la fin de Lontologie dans le temporel (1949) o la pense brunschvicgienne se prsente comme totalement oppos lontologie heideggrienne. La pense brunschvicgienne ne se fait pas lobjet de la critique lvinassienne au mme titre que Heidegger, nanmoins, elle motive dune certaine manire la formation du projet philosophique de Totalit et infini; la critique de lhistoire de la philosophie comme violence du Mme subie par lAutrui. Afin dclairer de premiers moments de la gense de cette critique, nous allons examiner linfluence de Brunschvicg sur elle. Dans un premier temps, nous allons prsenter comment Levinas a interprt lhomme et la pense du philosophe surtout partir des deux articles de Difficile libert. Dans un deuxime temps, en tenant compte de la constellation des autres philosophes (Heidegger, Hegel, Rosenzweig) chez Levinas, nous allons nous interroger comment lidalisme de Brunschvicg a contribu la gense de la vision critique de lhistoire de la philosophie occidentale. Enfin, nous allons mditer ce que signifie l Occident pour Levinas. Tomokazu Baba Universit de Hitotsubashi, Toyko, Japan MYTHIC VIOLENCE AND ADULT RELIGION: LEVINASS RESPONSE TO ADORNO In Dialectic of Enlightenment (DE), Theodor Adorno (and Max Horkheimer) famously utilizes the characterizations of ancient myths to criticize the nature of Enlightenmenta broad term categorizing the development of thought and culture from Francis Bacon to the present day, culminating in Fascism. Myths are totalizing explanations of the worldclosed systems of fate, retribution, and dominationwhich deceptively offer the illusion of guaranteed roads of redemption (DE 24; cf. 9, 16). And Enlightenment, as much as it tries to modernize and demythologize the world, becomes the very thing it seeks to deny, creating its own myths and abiding by myths laws (8, 3132). Nevertheless, Adorno laments the necessity of Enlightenment thinking for philosophy with its unavoidable domination of the other and alienation from Nature. However, in contrast to Adorno, I want to argue that all myths are not the same. Not all myths, as Adorno characterizes, are defined by the qualities of fate, domination, and power. I suggest that a certain religious myth, one that he unnecessarily conflates with Greek mythology, actually supports his project of self-reflection and reconcilement. To support this claim, I turn to Emmanuel Levinas, whose project surprisingly mirrors Adornos. Particularly I focus on essays from Difficult FreedomA Religion for Adults, Loving the Torah more than God, and For a Jewish Humanismin search of an alternative, Levinasian, understanding of religious myth. The religious myth Adorno unnecessarily conflates with Greek mythology is the Genesis 1 creation account, specifically the command to man to rule and have dominion over the earth (Gen. 1:28). By recourse to Levinass religion for adults, I examine his view of myth, God, and Judaism, taking into account some key Levinasian terms including creation, atheism, kenosis, and his use of the Kabbalistic notion, tsimtsum, to provide a Levinasian account of Genesis 1. This account reveals that the Genesis 1 myth is actually anti-myth, calling for a dominion without dominon, and that the command to rule the earth can actually be understood as an ethics of alterity. Brock Bahler Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA

ON THE TRAIL OF A PROPHETIC THEORY OF METAPHOR 1. In the philosophy of Lvinas, language is not primarily thought of as intermediation, or the manner in which communication between two subjects is made possible. Instead of lessening the irreducibility that goes from me to the other, language can, itself, and by excellence, be the place of an experience of vulnerability and hospitality among people, meaning, an experience of otherness. It is certain that it can also be the place of that reduction, as if it was concerned with assuaging the irreducibility of the other, or still, as if it was about containing the infinite of the other through its logos. Language, just like any other dimension of human existence, does not escape the ambivalence between Infinity and Totality. The question lies in carving the different levels of this ambivalence, thus clarifying the essence of language. 2. The subjects alterity is experienced through language, instance to which Lvinas reports essentially the significance of the Saying (la significance du Dire), and only accidentally, the crystallization of significations of the Said (la signification du Dit). The verbal sayings and notsayings, that is, the word and its silencing, do not exhaust the human linguistic dimension, which, more originarily, is nurtured by the very expressivity of the face, promptly concentrated in the look of the other, but also irradiating through the body, from the face to the hands, the hands to the torso, etc., thus signalling the significance in the vulnerability of the human body. 3. This does not mean, however, that the word is less originary linguistically speaking and that, consequently, has a lesser value, reach, or authenticity than, for example, the expressivity of a look, or of a grimace in the face of the other. That would only be the case if we could not recognize, in the verb and the word, any other power beyond the ability to reconduct to Totality and Sameness. Just as an image can be worth a thousand words, it is worth recognizing that so can a word reflect a thousand images. In a time of sacralization of images, a ressacralization of the word as critic of meaning is called for, starting with that of images. 4. Language is experienced as infinite when it is itself an experience of alterity. In this, verbal language is no exception for example, in poetry, but also (and not to a lesser degree), in the prophetic word, the verb, the word, spoken and heard, is overflowing with the signification of the said to break through in the experience of exposure to the significance of saying. 5. It is here that a theory of metaphor can be inscribed, the one which Lvinas made a [rough draft] of in some notes published in the book Emmanuel Lvinas et les territoires de la pense. Notes sur la mtaphore. (Cohen-Levinas, Danielle & Clment, Bruno, Eds.)Paris, 2007: pimthe/PUF. A theory of metaphor that, firstly, gives back to the word in its written or spoken concrete experience, and therefore in its possibility to make vulnerable whoever reads or hears it the value of the Saying alterity. And, also, a theory of metaphor which, secondly, establishes the bases for a theorization of the prophetic word. In those same notes, Lvinas poses a challenge to the understanding of the phenomenon of verbal language God is the metaphor of metaphors. The proposal for this paper is to analyze these notes by Lvinas. Andr Barata, Universit de Lisbonne, Portugal DESACRALISER LINFINI LECTURE DE LARTICLE UNE RELIGION DADULTES (1957) Lthique lvinassienne repose sur le retournement du sujet gocentr en agent pourlautre. Cette conversion est dautant plus radicale quelle nintervient qu travers la rencontre de lautre. Et, selon la signification que Levinas donne aux termes de moi et dautre, le lecteur se confronte rapidement cette question : comment rencontrer lautre ? Comment runir ce qui est absolument dsuni : lautre et le mme ? Depuis 1957 et son article Une religion dadultes , Emmanuel Levinas a pos un passage dans sa rflexion quil ne cessa de creuser et qui trouve une

forme aboutie dans Autrement qutre ou au-del de lessence. La rencontre de lautre, cet vnement qui dpasse le sujet, nest pensable que si lon trouve une sphre intermdiaire o elle puisse advenir. Dans quel lieu intermdiaire pourraient se faire face lintriorit subjective et labsolue extriorit de lautre ? Comment faire cohabiter dans un unique endroit laltrit dmesure et le moi repli sur lui-mme, en qute didentit ? En filigrane de cette question pose par Levinas, limplication du sujet dans lthique consiste dans une mise en danger, une perte de contrle sur soi. En trouvant un lieu de rencontre, cest en effet la diffrence qui se confirme entre lautre et le mme. Il sagit donc de voir apparatre le fondement de lindividu dans son dvouement lautre. Cest dj ce que larticle de 1957 affirme : lindividu ne trouve de fondement que dans lpreuve de lautre, cest-dire dans la fin de son autosuffisance, la dcouverte de son usurpation . La rencontre de lautre marque la limitation du sujet et du mme coup son ouverture linfini qui enseigne, qui commande. Louverture est la relation mme du prochain et du moi. Toute la difficult consiste penser ce lieu de louverture en dehors de lessence, et comme une relation non allergique . Penser que lautre vient sans violence selon des rgles qui ne sont pas celles de lessence et sans nier la libert du moi, revient penser lthique elle-mme. Le problme est de penser la venue de la dmesure de lautre dans la mesure de la conscience humaine, dans un lien qui la fois les met en relation et ne rduise pas lautre au mme. Chez Levinas, lide de dsacralisation vient prcisment de cette possibilit de lautre de venir en lexistant. Cette venue de Dieu sur terre sans quitter le ciel, consiste penser la saintet dautrui, cest--dire cette ouverture sur lau-del qui traverse le visage pour toucher lintriorit malgr elle. Dans Une religion dadultes , le lecteur rencontre les prmisses de lautre dans le mme et ce texte permet donc de penser cette ide de Levinas dans la perspective de son dploiement crucial. Flora Bastiani Universit Toulouse Le Mirail WHAT CONTEMPORARY JEWISH EDUCATION CAN LEARN FROM LEVINAS The raison detre of much of contemporary, mainstream North American Jewish education is expressed through the twin concepts of Jewish identity and Jewish continuity. Whether due to the haunting shadow of the Holocaust, the threat of assimilation, or the emergence of identity politics, Jewish education has internalized the demand of Fackenheims 614th commandment to place the survival and continuity of the Jewish people as first priority. This hyper-focus on the issues of identity and continuity shapes the Jewish educational project around nationalism and cultural preservation, while relegating to the background consideration of the actual epistemological forms, theological concepts, and intellectual heritage that constitute Judaism as a unique civilization. At the same time, modern Jewish Day Schools regard themselves, in part, as preparatory institutions for success in the secular economy. The result is the bifurcation of day School education into Jewish Studies and General Studies. This bifurcation reinforces a message that one can maintain a separate Jewish identity while still participating in the economic, social, and political forms of secular society. Thus Jewish education fulfils Y.L. Gordons call to be a Jew in your tent and a man in the street. Absent from such an educational project is any notion that Judaism may be a source of important insights into modern life and thought, insights which may engage dialogically with dominant cultural concepts. Emmanuel Levinas, in his essays in Difficult Freedom, shows how concepts which have evolved in the millennia year old Jewish civilization offer essential critiques of post-emancipation humanism and insights into the limits of universalistic ethics. Levinas observations can serve as a useful road-map for Jewish educators, who have been inured in the mandate of Jewish continuity and identity, to revisit unique forms of Jewish epistemology and ethics and to contemplate how such forms might inform the goals and methods of Jewish education.

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Particularly significant is Levinas observation that "Jewish education is the conviction that a limit must be imposed on the interiorization of principles of conduct (Difficult Freedom, 288). The notion that some limitation should be placed on the interiorization of ethical concepts is an idea that stands stark contrast to many contemporary theories of moral education (for example, Kohlberg). Educators are often concerned when students have not properly internalized moral concepts, since without such internalization students may be acting out of fear of external censure, and not out of an internal sense of what is right. Levinas insistence on the study of Talmud and its rigorous science of ethics underwrites an alternate form of moral education one which combines an energetic of pursuit of truth and justice with a critical scepticism that protects the psyche from the deep incursions of ideology. This paper examines the cognitive and affective proclivities that might be nurtured through such an approach to Jewish education, as well as the potential value of these proclivities as the pre-conditions for civic education, democracy and pluralism. The paper concludes with some suggestions for practical curricular projects and pedagogies that reflect a Levinasian approach to Jewish education. Greg Beiles University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada THE SEARCH FOR THE UNIVERSAL DIMENSION OF JUDAISM In his short article The Diary of Lon Brunschvicq, Lvinas describes in very personal terms the moving experience of reading the journals of his teacher, Lon Brunschvicg, and peering back into Brunschvicgs youth. The uniqueness of that article is that while written not as a philosophical treatise but in a personal vein, relating to the particular experience of Prof. Brunschvicg, it nonetheless bears wider human and Jewish significance. This can be described, paraphrasing Lvinas, by saying that this is a general, universal article in the way that only a personal expression can be so very universal. Among other topics, Lvinas deals in that article with the cultural richness of European Jewry, then struggling toward a rebirth. Lvinas describes Brunschicgs atheistic position as closer in spirit to Jewish monotheism than is the mystical religious experiences toward which contemporary Jews were turning. Lvinas unconcealed criticism of the mystical spiritual positions is part of the search for the ethical aspect of Jewish wisdom. Lvinas unique approach to Brunschvicg is fascinating, since he attempts to understand Brunschvicg not just as a philosopher and an important European man of letters, but also in the Jewish context that Brunschvicg himself chose to ignore (although not deny). That exegetical undertaking itself leads one to wonder about Lvinas own path and about the degree to which his insight into Brunschvicg is in fact correct. Brunschvicg is described by Lvinas as someone who clings to a universal ideal and in doing so realizes and deep Jewish ideal: Assimilation for Braunschvicg proceeded not from betrayal, but from adherence to a universal ideal to which he could lay claim outside of any particularism (Difficult Freedom, 43). This attitude toward Brunschvicg can be contrasted with the critical stance taken by Lvinas, both personally and philosophically, toward Spinoza. Regarding the latter, his language is different: Spinoza was guilty of betrayal ( Difficult Freedom, 108). Hanoch Ben Pazi Bar Ilan University, Israel TO LIVE LIKE EVERY OTHER PEOPLE ON EARTH: TEACHING BY EXAMPLE Levinas begins his polemical essay on the foundations of the Jewish State of Israel, The State of Israel and the Religion of Israel, with a peculiar list of examples. Having the State of Israel means being able to emulate the modern nations of the world: To live like every other people on earth, with police and cinemas and cafs and newspaperswhat a glorious destiny!

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This list is Levinass complaint of how derisory have been Israels aims for itself as a nation among nations. These are certainly examples of the leisure, security, and democracy of modern nations. In fact, it is a list of some of the mediations between aspects of modern society that make themand Israelmodern. But is this all? Do these examples reveal Israels glorious destiny after all, asks Levinas. Or is there more? What these examples reveal, he claims, is the contrast at the center of the current (1951) situation. They reveal both the obsessions of the traditional Jewish ideal and everything that is phoney about its by now literary perfection. It is the aim of this paper to address how this list of mediations calls for another mediation between these poles, how these elements of Modernity call for teaching. Levinass essay is divided into three parts, each addressing a simple point. First, the nature of the modern State and the modern humanist thinker within that State. Such a person is religions true antagonist within the State of Israel. Second, the social promise of Israel: the contrast between those who seek to have a State to have justice and those who seek justice to ensure the survival of the State. Third, that there is no necessary conflict between religion and the State but, Justice as the raison dtre of the State: that is religion. Or put another way, the Torah proclaims the essential values of democracy and socialism and can inspire an avant-garde State...[through] the example of a given situation that is rendered human by the Law. What must be established is the formidable science between the Jewish State and the doctrine that should inspire it, the Jewish religion. The relationship between the two is that of study [ ltude], what was strongest in rabbinical exegesis, what makes the text speak, allows it once more to resonate with the great and living voice of teaching [ lenseignement]. Teaching, the youth, and the future of Judaism are the focus of Difficult Freedom. And, this peculiar list of mediationspolice, cinemas, cafs, newspapersconnects to the whole of Difficult Freedom and Levinass thought in general by its call for mediation. These examples expose the relationship between teaching and the modernity of Israel, between tradition and everything phoney, between the heart of the State of Israel and modern life outside Judaism, between Socratic maieutics and Levinasian lenseignement. These examples call to the other examples in the essay and to discussions of teaching and examples of examples throughout the book, showing how Levinas teaches by example the need for teaching by example. Brian Bergen-Aurand Nanyang Technological University, Singapore LE PROBLEME DE LA GENEALOGIE DE LA THEORIE DANS Difficile Libert,Totalit et Infini et Autrement qu'tre ou au-del de L'essence Dans l'article Ethique et esprit sur lequel s'ouvre Difficile Libert, Levinas dfinit la relation interlocutive la fois comme relation thique et comme principe de la signifiance du discours, inaugurant ainsi l'ide d'une signifiance thique qui traversera, tel un fil rouge, l'ensemble de son oeuvre. Or, une telle approche de la signifiance, en vertu de laquelle "La parole est de l'ordre de la morale avant d'appartenir l'ordre de la thorie 1, va de paire avec la ncessit de penser une gnalogie de la thorie, puisque la possibilit mme d'un discours thorique mesur l'aune de la singularit de l'auto-signifiance du visage ne va nullement de soi. En d'autres termes, oprer une rduction thique de la thorie sans pour autant quitter le terrain du discours thorique n'est possible qu'au prix d'une nouvelle approche de la gnalogie de la thorie en tant que telle. Notre propos sera de rinscrire la thorie de la signifiance thique et son pendant qu'est la conception de la gnalogie de la thorie, telle qu'elle est bauche dans Ethique et esprit, dans le cadre de l'volution de la pense de Levinas. Nous essaierons de montrer que Levinas apporte en ralit deux solutions ce problme, savoir celle inaugure dans Ethique et esprit et dveloppe dans Totalit et Infini en vertu de laquelle l'expression du visage ,,Tu ne tueras point constituerait une condition ncessaire et suffisante la signifiance du discours et une deuxime dans Autrement qu'tre ou au-del de l'essence, o le discours thorique nat de l'entre du tiers. Ce qui nous retiendra in fine, ce sera de comparer les deux conceptions de la gnalogie de la thorie voques cidessus afin de montrer s'il s'agit l de deux moments d'une seule thorie de la signifiance ou alors si l'introduction du concept de l'entre du tiers dans Autrement qu'tre ou au-del de l'essence est l'origine

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d'une thorie de la signifiance foncirement distincte de celle labore dans Totalit et Infini. Pour ce faire, nous aurons recours l'instrumentaire conceptuel de la dialogique transcendantale du philosophe du langage Francis Jacques, qui, en dpit des divergences entre les deux auteurs, notamment sur la question de l'(a)symtrie de la relation interlocutive, nous semble constituer un organon indispensable afin d'expliciter les implications de l'affirmation lvinassienne de l'essence thique du langage, dont la difficile gnalogie de la thorie. Jan Bierhanzl Universit Charles de Prague REMARQUES SUR LA PENSE JUIVE Au dbut de son article de 1961 : La pense juive aujourdhui , Emmanuel Lvinas rappelle que celle-ci consiste ramener le sens de toute exprience la relation thique entre les hommes faire appel la responsabilit personnelle de lhomme, dans laquelle il se sent lu et irremplaable, pour raliser une socit humaine o les hommes se traitent en hommes . Cest quil est si vident que la Bible dpend tout entire du Dcalogue, de son esprit et de sa lettre, que lon a bien souvent tendance loublier. On se propose ici de justifier cette conception, qui prsente le judasme comme une panthique et une mtathique, et den montrer lactualit aujourdhui . Le cur du rcit biblique sarticule en trois moments complmentaires qui organisent la cohrence de son message fondamental (ibidem) :La rsistance spirituelle loppression, qui en refuse la fatalit (Exode 1-15), mais nen sous-estime pas la gravit (Ecclsiaste 4).La rception et ladoption collective, dramatique et mouvemente, de la Loi juste (Exode 19-40).Leffort sans cesse renouvel pou difier une socit juste (Livre des Juges), avec son tat et son Temple (Livres de Samuel et des Rois). Cette articulation de la narration identitaire en trois tapes rapportes trois lieux du rcit : gypte, Sina, Jude, indique une mme problmatique dont les trois aspects lis se garantissent mutuellement leur signification et la fortifient: 1) Loppression nest dsigne que comme refus de la loi ( Je ne connais pas YHWH , dit le Pharaon dExode 5,2).2) Le sens de lattachement la loi est rapport la mmoire de loppression ( souviens-toi que tu as t esclave )3) Le sens de laction sociale et politique se ressource par le souvenir de la Loi qui libre de loppression et fonde les projets de libert. Cette triade tend donc prvenir trois perversions : 1) Si la pense juive nignore certes pas la mystique, elle refuse donc le primat du salut surnaturel sur la justice terrestre (ibidem), qui mne au fatalisme irresponsable, au fameux silence du Vatican. La Bible nest pas un livre qui nous mne vers le mystre de Dieu, mais vers les tches humaines des hommes (DL 3e ed. page 352). Cette orientation articule et unifie les trois champs de lexprience humaine : mystique, thique, politique. Lthique est une optique du divin (ibidem). La Bible ignore lhistoire des dieux. On ny parle pas des dieux, mais Dieu y parle aux hommes des hommes et de leur libert, cest--dire de leur responsabilit dans ltablissement de la justice terrestre. Dieu y est dieu de lhistoire, thique et politique, qui fait sortir de la terre dgypte, dune maison desclaves (Exode 20,2). 2) Ensuite, cette thique nest pas un moralisme abstrait qui ferait le lit des engouements populistes dont il susciterait la raction et dont le rcit dit du Veau dor anticipe les risques, mais senracine dans la spiritualit dune exprience historique dramatique, transfigure par une puissante identit narrative. Cest une qute de la signification thique du devenir historique, une traverse du dsert , des exils, et des aberrations de lhistoire, constituante. 3) Enfin elle saccomplit dans une pense de leffectivit politique, lude par des traditions plus spiritualistes, plus nostalgiques de la pense mythique- moins modernes. On aura compris la triple actualit du propos : Emmanuel Lvinas crit en 1961 dans un contexte et un horizon qui restent les ntres : tre rescap de la Shoah, qui rvle la faillite du spiritualisme chrtien, et du Goulag, abme du moralisme abstrait ; tre tmoin enfin de la renaissance prometteuse de lEtat juif. Trois expriences juives et universelles qui avivent la conscience de la dignit humaine, des fondements historiques de lthique librale et sociale

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moderne, et du droit des peuples disposer deux-mmes. Claude Birman DIFFICULT HISTORY: TIME, JUDGMENT AND ROSH HASHANA In the essay Between Two Worlds, Levinas defends one of the key elements of Rosenzweigs thought, arguing that the separateness and particularity of the Jewish people is not one that celebrates an unbending nationalism but rather the ability to step outside of history in order to judge it. For Levinas, Rosenzweigs achievement is the defense of Jewish particularity, which preserves internal relations outside of the historical realm in order to judge external history. And yet what is not forthcoming in Levinass analysis is the measure of that judgment and how it is to be enacted. Indeed in order to bring actions and events, which may appear irrelevant, to judgment, Levinass thought often hangs the menace of murder over his texts in the shape of the Shoah. Murder inquiries bring a great weightiness to actions; actions that were once deemed irrelevant are brought to significance by an enquiry which plots the course of events backwards in time to trace the motivation behind the killings. This heavy burden is one aspect of judgment ( Din); however, it risks the peril of enforcing harsh judgment to events and persons that are equally subject to the forces of history. A harsh judgment would rule all guilty. Is there a judgment without the threat of murder? This paper explores the paradoxical relationship between judgment and the need for world, time and history. If God exercises Din, he loses the world; how much more so when the Jewish people exercise Din against history? Through engagement with the concept of judgment enacted in the Jewish holiday of Rosh HaShana, I will development a deeper appreciation of Din, of which judgment is only one aspect. Din also includes a creative power and a fundamental connection to time via yearly cycles, where Jewish particularity would not be permitted to step outside of history but rather history and Jewish participation in that history is part of creation in time. In Rabbinic literature, Din is related to the beginning of history because it is the beginning of time. God created the world through Din. Time is Din because it is limiting and enables distinct existence for individuals; it is Torahs version of spontaneity. The creative aspect of Din allows for becoming: the existence of things in time. To leave time in order to judge history then appears paradoxical and Levinass reading will be read against a rabbinic tradition that see judgment and time as connected. By exploring the literature relating to Rosh HaShana and the day of judgment, a richer account of Din will be developed in tandem with Levinass difficult history and difficult judgment. Louis P. Blond University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BEING A JEW IN THE MODERN WORLD: LEVINAS, WILL HERBERG AND EMIL FACKENHEIM Levinas, as well as the aforementioned Jewish philosophers Will Herberg and Emil Fackenheim are confronted with the reality of Jewishness in an ever changing world. An unavoidable need of understanding both 20 th century history and the significance of a millennial tradition in a convulsed and complex Western World lead us to a comparative study of Jewish identity in these three fundamental thinkers. The three authors represent clear and distinct viewpoints in the Jewish Weltanschauung: Levinas, the Lithuanian-born thinker represents the French and hence, European and continental perspective, Will Herberg embodies the American moment and its cultural Erbschaft (inheritance) and finally, Emil Fackenheim, whose autobiography An Epitaph of German Judaism. From Halle to Jerusalem represents the exodus from the Great Persecution and Holocaust of the Second World War to a greater understanding and reparation in the freedom of Canada, as well as being the ultimate representation of PostHolocaust Thought.

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In my reading of Difficile Libert, I shall be viewing Levinass main points of view on four topics in relation to Emil Fackenheims What is Judaism and to Will Herbergs Judaism and Modern Man.The parts of Difficult Freedom I will be analyzing will be those that refer to the main dilemmas for Judaism in this new century and that stem from the complex historical background of the past century. The topics are: The State of Israel The State of Israel is essentially the utopia and reality of Modern Judaism. Its significance both for the Jewish psyche and history cannot be underestimated. Its importance in all 3 authors will be considered. The relationship between philosophy and contemporary Judaism This part of the presentation deals with the eternal questions for Judaism (a supernatural sense of history, the Law, messianic hopes, etc. ) and the philosophical boundaries and diversity of the philosophical boundaries of 20 th century thought are extremely diverse: existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism, postmodernism, etc. Jewish identity What does it mean today to be a Jew? Is this a historical concept that is subject to change or are there certain idiosyncrasies that may never be altered? How does the cultural heritage of four millennia adapt itself to present times? Is there a specific role for a Jew? Evil, Suffering and the Holocaust The inevitable historical fact that has shaped Jewish thought in the last 60 years is to be considered in the text Loving the Torah more than God. Miguel Gimnez Blunden IES Lluis Domenech Muntaner - Canet de Mar, Barcelona, Spain LEVINAS, HEIDEGGER : VISAGE ET MONDE OU LA TECHNIQUE ET LE SPECTRE DU PHARMAKON. Dans son court article Heidegger, Gagarine et nous Levinas dnonce lattitude obscurantiste et ractionnaire de Heidegger vis--vis de la technique et plus gnralement vis-vis de la science. La parole heideggerienne serait, dans sa version la moins nocive, une tentative de repli sur soi, et dans sa modalit la plus dangereuse une puissance dostracisme. Ce que Levinas rprouve cest la sublimation du Lieu et ce que, par conomie, il nomme, lenracinement. Or, le lieu, lenracinement sont des dterminations et des possibilits du monde tel que la pense heideggerienne le dfinit et lapprhende dans le cadre de lanalytique existentiale. Aussi, toute la critique levinassienne se concentre autour du phnomne du monde et stigmatise lautochtonie foncire que celui-ci implique tacitement selon elle. Au monde heideggerien Levinas oppose le Visage. Si la technique nous coupe du monde , linterprtation de cette rupture diffre du tout au tout ds lors quelle est lue partir de la pense heideggerienne ou de celle de Levinas: Engoncement du Dasein dans une existence inauthentique et msinterprtation ontologique dun ct, piphanie du Visage et chance thique de lautre. La question de la technique marque la limite du monde et du visage. Cependant, il nest pas anodin quau moment de signifier sa propre position eu gard la technique et son arrachement au monde heideggerien Levinas voque en faveur de sa thse la figure de Socrate et plus prcisment Socrate tel quil est mis en scne dans le Phdre, dialogue au cours duquel le hros platonicien avoue son autochtonie et dclare ne se livrer lerrance hors les murs dAthnes que sous lemprise du pharmakon que constitue le texte de Lysias. Est-ce dire que la technique, linstar de lcriture, apparat comme un nouvel avatar du pharmakon ? Partant, les thmes de lcriture et de lerrance, mais aussi de la technique et du judasme sont lis et sont tisss par Levinas pour laborer une trame argumentative visant conjurer le monde heideggerien . Il convient donc de sinterroger sur le bien fond de ce recoupement conceptuel dans la mesure o il est opr furtivement par Levinas. Ny a-t-il pas lieu, en effet, de se questionner sur la lgitimit du discours levinassien lendroit de sa critique du monde heideggerien tant donn le rle trangement pharmakologique que lauteur de Difficile libert donne la technique? Et si le judasme est compar la technique on entrevoit alors quelles sont les

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implications thologiques de ce geste. Cest pourquoi nous parlerons de Visage et monde et non pas de visage ou monde , car il sagira pour nous de montrer, par-del les diffrences conceptuelles, que le monde heideggerien , loin dtre antinomique au Visage levinassien le rend possible. Herv Bonnet CNED, France LEVINAS ET ARENDT LA LIBERT ENTRE MATRIALIT ET NATALIT Levinas et Arendt . Si les diffrences de style semblent d'abord videntes entre Levinas et Arendt , la question qui les habitent merge de la mme exigence rpondre de l'histoire subjective et collective comme mise ensemble de la structure qui rend possible justice et je pense et aborde la question du temps de la fcondit de la maternalit, de la natalit , contre le temps de la mmoire d-porte et pour la responsabilit -venir envers une libert qui est chez Levinas comme Arendt une libert, non du libre-arbitre mais du commencement qui prcde toute dcision. Il s'agit de repenser avec et contre Heidegger une rversibilit du temps de l'alination par la natalit. Tout se passe pour les deux auteurs, comme si il fallait refuser l'ide selon laquelle philosopher c'est apprendre mourir et renouveler la question du temps enseign par Heidegger par la sensibilit qui est libration du sujet par la corporit. Nous nous demanderons quel est le lien possible entre vasion et arrachement l'tre ou entre natalit et pluralit ? Comment ces notions se croisent-elles dans la pense de Levinas et Arendt pour rpondre librement de l'histoire et chapper l'idologie du destin ? Quelle est leur rsonance dans notre rflexion aujourd'hui sur l'incapacit de l'accueil d'autrui, sur la rification de l'intersubjectivit et le mpris de toute forme de vulnrabilit ? Autrement dit, comment rapprendre aimer le monde tel qu'il est ? Quelles rflexions nous lguent Levinas et Arendt pour affronter les dfis prsents de l'arrachement au mensonge par une hermneutique du courage qui fait du dire de la philosophie une rsistance la fatalit de l'tre ou de l'il y a ? Lorsque nous voquons les termes la maternit chez Levinas , la natalit et la pluralit d'Arendt, il semble que ces notions soient travers une uvre comme celle de Levinas, un pre dbat avec la pense heideggrienne selon laquelle l'homme ne serait qu'historiquement engendr comme l'affirmait Heidegger dans L'essence de la vrit . Comment ds lors s'arracher l'humanisme de l'ontologie occidentale et faire natre l'autre de l'homme ? semble bien tre la question partage par nos deux auteurs. La question plus spcifique d'Arendt tant comment largir les fonctions du monde commun et faire de la pluralit une pense qui abolisse l'idologie de l'tranget, alination qui occulte la ralit premire du monde commun comme pluralit. Cette ide est exprime par Levinas en termes d'irrductible singularit du moi, qui est pour lui la condition d'une thique interhumaine. Comment s'vader d'une vision fige de l'tre pour distinguer activit cratrice et reproduction si ce n'est par la temporalisation qui est le contraire de l'intentionnalit ? L'htronomie dvoile la possibilit de l'autonomie condition que le sujet ait le courage d'un arrachement au donn, qui seul permet de se librer de ce qui nous dtermine sans tomber dans l'autosuffisance. ces questions qui sont ancres dans un vcu commun, Levinas et Arendt rpondront de manire sensiblement diffrente. Nanmoins ils sont tous deux conditionns par la question de la juste guerre la guerre car le dire n'est plus un choix mais une difficile libert qui exige de repenser la naissance et la natalit. Mylne Botbol Baum UCL Bruxelles LEVINAS ET LAFFAIRE SPINOZA En 1955 David Ben Gourion suggra que soit leve de lever la condamnation qui fut

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jadis porte contre le philosophe dAmsterdam. Lanne suivante, dans Le Cas Spinoza , Lvinas protesta contre cette suggestion, parce que, dans lhistoire des ides , Spinoza aurait exerc une influence anti-juive (p. 144) Saute aux yeux le rle nfaste jou par Spinoza dans la dcomposition de lintelligentsia juive (p. 144-145) En quoi cette influence fut-elle anti-juive ? Lvinas ne tient pas rigueur Spinoza davoir inaugur la critique biblique, laquelle lui semble sans danger pour la foi. Mais il lui reproche davoir fait du judasme une prfiguration du Christ. Notre sympathie pour le christianisme [...] reste [...] de fraternit. Elle ne peut pas devenir paternelle (p. 146) Au terme de cet article, Lvinas oppose trs brivement - sa conception de lhistoire celle de lauteur du Tractatus. Pour ce dernier, comme on sait, le christianisme dpasse le judasme avant dtre lui-mme dpass par le rationalisme: Le christianisme nest quune vrit pnultime , ladoration de Dieu en esprit et en vrit doit encore surmonter le christianisme (p. 145). Lvinas esquisse une toute autre histoire: Les philosophes grecs ont rvl [la Raison] au monde. Mais dune faon plus autonome et plus glorieuse encore le mosasme prolong et interprt par le rabbinisme y mena Isral (p. 146) (Cest lun des thmes les plus originaux de plusieurs autres essais de Difficile Libert.) En revanche, Lvinas en est persuad , le christianisme a une autre inspiration . On aurait donc plus de chance de trouver un rationalisme sans mlange chez Platon et chez Aristote que chez Spinoza (p. 146) Dix ans plus tard, dans un article intitul Avez-vous lu Baruch? Lvinas fait un long compte rendu du livre de Sylvain Zac, Spinoza et lInterprtation de lEcriture, Cet ouvrage le conduit dcouvrir un ct de Spinoza le moins spinoziste peut-tre (p. 156) Certes, il ne rvise pas le jugement quil a port dans Le cas Spinoza . Au contraire, Lvinas au terme de sa recension, reproche Spinoza davoir ignor le Talmud. Le Talmud et la littrature rabbinique ne sont ni folklore ni invention purement humaine, comme le pense encore Spinoza (p. 155) Mais Zac rvle Lvinas un Spinoza imprvu qui aurait le mrite de rserver un statut propre hors de [lalternative entre] lopinion et les ides adquates (p. 156). Au terme de son article, Lvinas crdite Spinoza davoir su apercevoir lirrductibilit de la signification exacte de lcriture (p. 158-159) Nous voudrions exposer en dtail ces deux interprtations de Spinoza, ou plutt les interprtations de deux aspects de sa pense, et examiner leur bien-fond. Franois Brmondy Institut dEtudes Judiciaires de la Facult de Droit Universit de Tours, France LEVINAS AND THE CHILDHOOD CRISIS OF OUR AGE: BEYOND THE RELIGION-ATHEISM DIVIDE Since 9/11, a pernicious polarization has emerged that pits religion against its supposed opposite, atheism. The conflict between belief and unbelief, of course, is not unique to our time. Modernity as a whole has been marked by this tension. But in the last few years, the quarrel between the two has taken on dramatic form. The terrorist acts that opened the new millennium have made patently clear the serious dangers and risks associated with religious fundamentalism, not only within Islam, but also its equivalents within other faith groups, including Christianity and Judaism. The response to 9-11 has at the same time made us aware of an increasingly more militant atheism which is far removed from the more nuanced atheisms that just a generation or two ago were inspired by the likes of Nietzsche or Freud. While certainly unfriendly to religion these earlier atheisms could nevertheless appreciate, even accept the social value of religion. By contrast, the New Atheists, as they have come to be called, claim that religion as such represents a terrible poison contaminating the wellspring of human affairs. This toxic social force, they argue, should be brought under greater public scrutiny, if not outright government regulation. Some of the more strident voices of this movement even call for its eventual eradication, likening religion in this instance to disease. Though the essays that comprise Difficult Freedom were written during a different epoch, one

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dominated by the tensions of the Cold War, they nevertheless continue to speak to issues that still affect us today, including the problem of the deadlock outlined above. As Levinas correctly points out in those essays the fundamental problem facing us in the contemporary world is not so much whether we are to be religious or not as religious and secular fundamentalists make the problem out to be but rather what sort of stance one ought to take with respect to the predicament of being. In other words, beyond both religion and atheism lies the deeper issue of an attitudinal problem, that is, an imperative to adopt a moral position vis--vis existence in general. Levinas refers to the malaise that affects us most deeply today as the childhood crisis that threaten[s] our existence ( DF 198). The ground-zero of that crisis he tells us has virtually nothing to do with either institutional religion or with explicit denials of the existence of God. The crisis in question runs much deeper for Levinas. Neither religious conformism nor dull atheism (DF 222) can do justice to the crisis. Paraphrasing the thought of Rosenzweig, Levinas notes that the separation of men into the religious and the non-religious does not get us very far (DF 186). For Levinas, the true sign of having adopted an ethical stance vis--vis being is the un-Nietzschean ability to affirm ones bad conscience, or what amounts to the same thing, to refuse to make moral compromises with the moral indifference of existence: [t]o be a fully conscious Jew, a fully conscious Christian, a fully conscious communist, is always to find yourself in an awkward position within being [ se trouver en porte faux dans ltre] (DL 367, DF 264). Using Levinas, I will argue that both religious fundamentalists and the New Atheists represent expressions of a refusal to be fully conscious of the precariousness and ethical implications of our existential plight as human beings. John Caruana Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada THE POLITICS OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION In my essay I shall endeavor to show how Difficult Freedom provides a clue to understanding the relationship between philosophy and religion in Levinas oeuvre. Levinas often said, and many scholars have repeated his claim, that the two areas of his work are separate. But as I shall undertake to show, a careful consideration of the status of the political in his philosophical work and in Difficult Freedom reveals that the political plays a pivotal function in both domains, allowing us to see how the two are connected. In Levinas more frequently read philosophical work, the political plays a more significant role than is sometimes attributed to it. Numerous scholars have devoted their attention to Levinas conception of the ethical to articulate how the latter is used to criticize universalizing conceptions of politics. In part, this representation is accurate in so far as Levinas is critical of certain forms of universalization. But it is wrong to dismiss universalization in totality as a dimension of Levinas philosophical thinking. Given that, as Levinas makes clear especially in his work from Otherwise Than Being onward, we are responsible for all others, we need politics to help us determine how best to meet and to universalize our responsibilities. When we bear this point in mind, we can see that, on a Levinasian reading, politics is necessary in order for us to carry out our responsibilities and, as such, is the only way we can be responsible. To put this point another way, it is simply irresponsible not to be political. The essays in Difficult Freedom, largely about the relationship of Judaism to late modernity, are as much about politics as they are about religion. Throughout all the essays, Levinas maintains the consistent position that Judaism is in a sense withdrawn from the totalizing and universalizing tendencies of modernityin history, the nation-state, the economy, and secular humanism. Judaism is withdrawn, according to Levinas, in not belonging to the Christian atmosphere that he attributes to secularism, in its commitment to liturgical practices in many ways at odds with the values and tempo of modern life, in its beliefs in a hidden God and non-enchanted world, in its assertion that God is manifest in human ethics, and in its concern for the Messianic justice rather than the future world. Levinas sees this withdrawal as necessary for the sustenance of Judaism and even makes the case for promoting it

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in his essays on Jewish education. This withdrawal, I suggest, is analogous to the role in his philosophical writings that interiority plays. They both allow for separation to be maintained, the separation that, in the philosophical writings, gives to politics its meaning and significance. In the case of Judaisms relationship to modernity, its withdrawal is not a turning away from politics but is the very investment of politics, to borrow a word he uses in his philosophical discussion of freedom. In being committed to particularityto Jewish particularity certainly, but to the particularity of allJudaism is committed to universality and therefore is political, even if it is not these on the model of catholicity (DF 175). The State of Israel, for instance, should not be understand as the fulfillment of Gods promise for land, since the withdrawing essence of Judaism means that it exceeds land and national boundaries, but as the opportunity to carry out the social law of Judaism (DF 218). The political state allows for withdrawal to be lived. Thus, the texts in Difficult Freedom seem to set themselves the same task as does his philosophical work, although geared toward a different audience. Where the philosophical work is aimed at reminding philosophers that social and political meaning comes from ethical responsibility, the writings in Difficult Freedom are aimed at encouraging Jews to understand Jewish politics and especially the state of Israel (as a state based on Jewish values) as one venue for Judaism to carry out its various commitments to particularity, including to the particularity of others. Mark Cauchi York University, Toronto, Canada LEVINAS RESAYING THE HUMAN The claim that I start out from in this paper, reusing the title from my dissertation to be published in 2010, is that we must understand Levinas as resaying the human. Here, not only the notion of the human, but also that of resaying, is ambiguous. We seem to stand before an alternative: Are we to understand resaying the human as a radical transformation of the notion of the human or as a conservative insistence on the notion of the human? These ambiguities are reflected in the secondary literature, we find both thinkers that want to use him in a radical transformation of political thinking, and those that accuse him for providing an apology for apolitical or conservative thought. On the first side, we find interpreters such as Miguel Abensour, and Simon Critchley who insist on the savage and anarchic nature of Levinass notion of the human, opening for a radical political philosophy. On the other side we find critics like Zizek, who thinks that the ethics of the other leads away from a certain necessary violence in the name of universalism, but also someone like Rudi Visker who in contrast to Zizek finds that Levinass notion of the human is too universalist, and is not open to the multi-culturalist challenges of modern society. But to pose this alternative is to make a shortcut from the philosophical question of the notion of the human to a politicised language that looks for answers in a shorter perspective. When Levinas in the preface Humanism of the other commented on the untimely ( inactuelle) character of his consideration, he wrote that they are no longer or not yet frightened by the word humanism. What is thus the historical modus of this philosophical discourse? This leads us back to the question of the historicity of the human. The ambiguity of the resaying can be related to the ambiguity of the very notion of the human. Is it to be seen as an eternal concept from the tablets of stone, revived and rearticulated by Levinas, or is it a historic concept, the meaning of which is to be firmed by his philosophy? Both tendencies seem to exist in his work. On the one hand, the appeal to the human is an appeal to the sacred and the holy that can be upheld by religious practice. These are practices carried out to please God only to the extent that they allow one to safeguard the human in man(Anti-humanism and education, (Difficile Libert, 429; Difficult Freedom, 288 ). On the other hand, he finds that the notion of the human can harbour the anti-humanist critique and the Nietzschean word that is to cut through the humanist jargon (Humanism of the Other). The aim of my paper will be to examine to what extent these seeming contradictions or

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ambiguities can be brought together in a coherent manner. Carl Cederberg Sdertrn University, Stockholm, Sweden QUAND LA COMMUNICATION PERD LA PAROLE... LECTURE DEMMANUEL LEVINAS La reconnaissance de laltrit laquelle la pense de Lvinas nous convie nimplique aucun retour soi, ni aucune concidence. Lthique qui slabore autour dune telle exigence instaure en mme temps une conception indite de la socialit qui vient provoquer le drangement de tout ordre prtabli, quil soit politique, administratif ou communicationnel. En nous rfrant principalement un article de 1957 intitul La libert de parole , nous tcherons de montrer au cours de notre intervention dans quelle mesure lthique lvinassienne sinscrit dans lhorizon dun questionnement socio-politique en mettant principalement en vidence le fait que si des logiques qui consistent neutraliser la force de la parole caractrise une grande part des politiques totalitaires qui appauvrissent ainsi les conditions de toute opposition, une telle logique nest pas non plus trangre aux socits dmocratiques et librales o les moyens dinformations, sous toutes leurs formes crites, verbales et audiovisuelles et pntrant dans tous les foyers, tiennent les hommes lcoute dun discours quasi permanent qui tient plus de la rhtorique que de lchange proprement dit. Le rgne de linformation et de la communication marquerait en ce sens un appauvrissement du langage : les mots dans les socits contemporaines, devenant les signes muets des infrastructures anonymes , se donnant comme les ustensiles de civilisations mortes , o la parole a perdu la parole . Pierre-Antoine Chardel ) Universit de Paris Descartes (Sorbonne)

THE FEW AND THE MANY: LEVINAS ON POLITICS Since the death of Socrates Western politics has been troubled by the opposition between the disciplined few and the unruly many, the best persons and the common rabble. For Spinoza the few are scientific intellectuals while the many are emotional ignoramuses. For his disciple Nietzsche, the few are the strong and healthy while the many are the weak and sick. For both, politics whether prosaic or grand is the art whereby if the few cannot rule they are at least able to flourish protected from the many. In contrast, Levinas conceives of a politics based not on knowledge or power but morality. Indeed, the justification of and the quest for a just state arises as a rectification of a crisis injustice - created by the very twoperson proximity of the moral relation (face-to-face). That is, if the responsible self attends to the infinitely obligating vulnerabilities of the other person who faces, as moral proximity demands, then third parties are left out. But third parties suffer from their own personal vulnerabilities and are furthermore subject to social violence. For Levinas there is no higher vocation than the establishment of justice serving morality its actualization is holy. The Justice rendered to the other, my neighbor, Levinas has written in Difficult Freedom, gives me an unsurpassable proximity to God. It is as intimate as the prayer and the liturgy which, without justice, are nothing. God can receive nothing from hands which have committed violence. The pious man is the just man. (DF, 18) Clearly, Levinas is opposing the prophetic tradition of Judaism what he calls a complete and austere humanism linked to a difficult adoration (DF, 145) - against the modern advocates of power politics. The demand for justice, however, the demand for fair distribution of goods and services which is made possible by equality before the law, requires for its satisfaction the order, institutions and sanction of the state. Such a state is justified not by why it can do for the intellectual or athletic elite, but rather by the extent to which it creates a society of plenty, i.e., the conditions social,

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economic and political - which serve righteousness, the one-for-the-other of morality. The just state is just not because it protects and enhances an elite few, whatever their character (smart, strong, smug, etc.), but because it upholds and enhances the possibility of kindness, of moral compassion between all of its citizens. Richard A. Cohen State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, USA LINVOCATION NON TRAGIQUE DE YOSSEL, FILS DE YOSSEL RAKOVER DE TARNOPOL (Yossel, Fils de Yossel Rakover et Antigone) Emmanuel Levinas voque, sous ce titre: Aimer la Thora plus que Dieu , un texte qui se donne pour un document , et o sont crites les dernires paroles dun combattant du Ghetto de Varsovie qui a vu prir tous les siens, et qui au seuil de la mort sadresse Dieu. Il ny a plus dinstitutions sur terre pour protger les hommes et garantir le droit. Dieu sest voil la face, selon une expression biblique que reprend Emmanuel Levinas, en cho galement avec cette clipse de Dieu dont parlait Martin Buber. Mais ce Dieu qui se voile la face et abandonne le juste sa justice sans triomphe - ce Dieu lointain vient du dedans. .Comment le Dieu lointain devient-il mon Dieu ainsi que linvoque Yossel, fils de Yossel Rakover? Alors un autre cho nous parvient de la Grce antique, o, au moment de sa mort brutale, abandonne des dieux et des hommes, Antigone meurt tragiquement en invoquant mon Zeus !. Linvocation de Yossel, fils de Yossel, est-elle tragique comme chez Sophocle? Hlderlin, dans lElgie Pain et Vin, explore ce sens du tragique. Le Pre, dit-il, a dtourn des hommes son visage. Sans doute il continue vivre et oeuvrer sans fin, mais pardessus nos ttes, l-haut, dans un monde tout autre. La tche de lhomme est ds lors dapprendre endurer ce dfaut de Dieu... Telle serait lentre dans la dimension du tragique ( Trauer-spiel). Cest en effet partir de ce dtournement catgorique du divin que le deuil ( das Trauern) commena de rgner sur la terre... La tragdie serait donc lexploration dun monde dsert par le divin. Ici rsonne le sens du mot tragdie en allemand: Trauer-spiel : le jeu du deuil. Quel lien y a-t-il entre laventure tragique, lintriorit, la mort et la perte de la Rfrence absolue? Le paysage tragique se dploie dans cette infidlit rciproque du dieu et de lhomme qui nous semble dj trangre la pense hbraque de la emouna, la foi ou plus exactement la fidlit. Jean Beaufret explique, dans son tude sur Hderlin et Sophocle, que lorsque lhomme cherche se lier au divin, surgit la dimension tragique, comme dans le cas de lathisme ddipe ... moins que, comme dans Antigone, le dieu ne devienne immdiatement prsent dans la figure de la mort . Le dieu que Antigone nomme mon Zeus est celui qui prcipite dans la mort. Lpoque moderne inaugure dans le grand cosmopolitisme de lEmpire Perse, lorsque Athnes atteint son apoge, est marque par le retrait ou le dtournement du divin et le dveloppement de lhumanisme comme si lhomme tait seul au monde. Abandonn il se tourne vers lui-mme, en qute de la mort lente ou rapide. La mort serait-elle lexprience du divin pour lhomme moderne? Yossel, fils de Yossel Rakover de Tarnopol, est-il le hro dune tragdie juive moderne? Comment le Dieu de la tradition juive, le Dieu des pres, le Dieu des multitudes, invoqu dans la liturgie comme notre Dieu , peut-il devenir mon Dieu? Lexistence juive moderne qui apparat en mme temps que naissent la philosophie et la tragdie en Grce, ignore la dimension du tragique. Pourrait-on dire que les Juifs ne sont pas tragiques parce quils ont deux lois : la loi crite et la loi orale? Yossel, fils de Yossel Rakover, vit lpoque initie par le Livre dEsther, quand Dieu sest voil la face, poque terrible de lantismitisme, poque o ce combattant du Ghetto renouvelle le choix de la vie que transmet le texte biblique. Choix que lon entend dj dans la filiation que dit le redoublement de son nom, et qui se dit laune dune invocation alors non tragique : mon Dieu! . Difficile libert par o nous quittons, selon lenseignement de Levinas, le ciel enfantin comme le ciel de la tragdie, pour Aimer la Thora plus que Dieu . Monique Lise Cohen Toulouse

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WILD VEGETATION: THE NATURAL UNDERSIDE OF LEVINAS HUMAN ETHICS My aim here is to first offer a criticism of Levinas thinking about nature and to then locate an alternative environmental philosophy that Levinas himself does not acknowledge but which is implicit in his often-neglected account of the elemental, the nonpossessable non-human environment that contains and nourishes the human subject (TI 131). The unsettling dichotomy Levinas sees between nature and ethical life is perhaps nowhere more starkly expressed than in Ethics and Spirit, the early essay that opens Difficult Freedom: Consciousness is the impossibility of invading reality like a wild vegetation that absorbs or breaks or pushes back everything around it. [It] is the equivalent ... of the fact of not existing violently and naturally, of speaking to the other. Morality accomplishes human society (DF 9). In this 1952 essay, Levinas is here expressing the developing core of his ethical theory: To begin to become ethical to come into consciousness of a social self is to undergo a face-to-face encounter with the sheer otherness of another human that interrupts ones initially insular and self-satisfied life, demanding a response that breaks from ones complacent and haphazard enjoyment of the material richness of the elemental. It is, in short, to no longer be able to behave in the oblivious manner of wild vegetation encroaching upon a landscaped property. Generally, in Levinas ethics as expressed in Difficult Freedom, Totality and Infinity and beyond not only is nature devalued as a dark precursor to civility as that merely Darwinian realm from which the ethical and social constitute a decisive break but it is also conceived as the material resource that conditions ethical giving. The responsibility that arises in the faceto-face encounter with the utter destitution of the other demands that I give up something of my sustaining elemental world: my glass of water, my plate of food (i.e., plants and animals), a piece of my land. While Levinas emphasizes crucially that this encounter teaches me at a deep level that what I had believed I alone possessed is in fact something destined for a community, he neglects to ask whether or to what extent the natural world is something we have the right to take or give or possess at all. Levinas ethics account for how we avoid behaving like wild vegetation toward others, but how are we to behave toward wild vegetation? Does it have the power in its very wildness to contest our claims to possession, of, say, the veranda upon which it encroaches? Without explanation, Levinas asserts in Totality and Infinity that it is only man who can contest human action (TI 73). If we endorse Levinas basic principle is that the absolutely foreign alone can instruct us ethically, then would it not make sense at least to ask whether the natural world might also harbor its own set of imperatives and teachings the natural world which, insofar as it is altogether other than human, is perhaps still more foreign than the other human (TI 73)? I would like to suggest that a response to my criticism of Levinas is already implicit within his own work, namely, in the account he gives in Totality and Infinity of the genesis of the human subject as a separation from and appropriation of a primordial elemental medium. Here is my thesis: even as the human subject is constituted in and by the elemental which I interpret as Levinas phenomenological concept of the natural environment the elemental retains a radical alterity of its own that is of a kind other than, but no less radical than, human alterity. This distinction is important because it paves the way for a Levinasian environmental ethics, a topic other writers have pursued only by means of an application of the notion of the face, which, I argue, must be reserved as the mark of a specifically human alterity. Christopher Cohoon SUNY Stony Brook University, New York, USA

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 SUR TERRE :LA THORIE DU TERRESTRE ET DU MATRIEL DANS DIFFICILE LIBERT Le rapport dE. Lvinas la terre, comme tude du rapport du Juif la terre, est pris dans une double exigence qui conduit un paradoxe. Dune part, comme le souligne lavant-propos notamment, il se mfie dune revendication du spirituel qui servirait craser les revendications des misrables, et notamment lgitimer la faim o quelle soit soufferte. Dautre part, il rejette la dfinition de la nature de lhomme comme enracinement, la terre faisant alors figure de lieu dexil. Ny a-t-il pas l contradiction quant au statut de la terre, la fois exige et rejete? Alors, quel est le sens de la terre? Que promet la terre dite promise ? Dans un pome du grand thologien et pote Yehuda Halevi, on peut lire: Je suis sur le dos de la terre comme un tranger en sjour, pourtant les entrailles de la terre sont mon hritage. (le Kusari, n 80 des Editions de lEclat). Est-ce la mort seule qui fait de lhomme un sdentaire? Sinspirant du dernier des Proverbes, dans la Bible, attribu la mre dun roi, E. Lvinas nous dit ce quest vraiment ce lieu quon appelle ma maison . Loin du souci btisseur dun Heidegger, il nous dit que lhomme juif dcouvre lhomme avant de dcouvrir les paysages et les villes. Il est chez soi dans une socit avant de ltre dans une maison. Et la socit par excellence qui va faire que dedans et dehors ne seront plus interchangeables, cest une femme ( Difficile libert, p. 43-44) : par cette trange dfaillance quest lintervention de la femme va natre de lintriorit, dans lextriorit gnrale des espaces de la gomtrie classique. Le travail surgit quand lexistence fminine habite et cre dans le concret le discret, car, dit le Proverbe cit, la femme vaillante ne mange pars le pain de loisivet . Elle rend le bl, pain, et le lin, vtement , crit Lvinas (p. 60-61). La terre se met tre travaille. Finalement, aprs avoir refus les valeurs de lenracinement ( lhomme, aprs tout, nest pas un arbre , p.44), il faut faire cette concession: Lenracinement invitable de la pense qui domine le monde saccommode dun repos dun retour chez soi (p.61) Ce retour annonce une dlivrance, insparable du retour du peuple juif la Terre promise. Le charnel et le terrestre sont le lieu de notre dlivrance (p.50). Cest sur la terre, parmi les hommes, que se droule ainsi laventure de lesprit; le traumatisme que fut mon esclavage en pays dgypte constitue mon humanit mme . Cette dfinition de la libert et de la vritable dlivrance en fait pour le moins une difficile libert . En effet, ce rappel pour tout juif quil a t tranger en pays dgypte et quil a t esclave puis dlivr de loppression le renvoie lexigence de libration pour tous les opprims. Nous ne saurions tre quittes envers les opprims et acquitter Dieu de laccomplissement de la dlivrance tant que le corps de tant dhommes est dans les fers de lesclavage et de loppression, quelque part sur la terre, et tant que rciproquement il y a sur terre une terre desclavage. Cest cette faon dtre matrialiste que revendique Lvinas. Quand toute humanit a sembl abandonner les non-Juifs qui ont organis les camps de concentration nazis, on a vu apparatre un sens du sens mme chez les cratures terrestres, tel ce chien que les prisonniers appelaient Bobby, qui nous attendait au retour, sautillant et aboyant gaiement. Pour lui ctait incontestable nous fmes des hommes (p.234). Sylvie Coirault-Neuburger Ecole Normale dInstituteurs (philosophie), France LIBERT ET AMOUR Mon expos partira du texte Hegel et les juifs. Levinas rcuse dans ce texte la rationalisation du judasme dans le systme hgelien. Je voudrais dabord suivre la critique lvinasienne et articuler son bien fond tout en montrant que Levinas se trompe toutefois lorsquil suggre que le sens de la modernit serait pour Hegel essentiellement grec. Selon la logique que Hegel est en train dlaborer dans ses textes de

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jeunesse, le sens mme du judasme se retrouve dans le principe mme de ngativit (sans laquelle il ny a pas le devenir de lEsprit). La critique lvinasienne peut toutefois nous aider rcuser aussi la rationalisation du christianisme dans le systme hgelien. Le sens du christianisme, qui est li la notion de lamour dans les crits de jeunesse de Hegel, se retrouve dans la dialectique hgelienne comme principe de reconnaissance (sans laquelle il ny a pas de suppression (Aufhebung)). Dans une deuxime partie, je voudrais argumenter que le sens mme de lamour se perd justement lorsquil se rduit une problmatique de la reconnaissance et jexaminerai le sens de lamour partir de lapproche de Levinas. Mon intention est dentamer partir de ce double mouvement une rflexion sur la question du rapport entre amour et libert, question laquelle Difficile Libert ne rpond que partiellement et que je devrai resituer dans lensemble de la philosophie lvinassienne. Arthur Cools Universit dAnvers, Belgique L'DUCATION COMME LA PLUS HAUTE FIN DE LA PHILOSOPHIE? LEVINAS ET STRAUSS A PROPOS DU LIBRALISME Emmanuel Levinas comme Lo Strauss sont souvent interprts comme des ennemis du libralisme. L'un parce qu'il dnoncerait l'individu libre comme source de violence et voudrait le remplacer par une subjectivit en dette infinie envers autrui. L'autre parce qu'il dnoncerait l'galit des droits humains et voudrait la remplacer par la rfrence une loi naturelle. L'un comme l'autre de ces philosophes s'engagent de manire importante en faveur d'un renouveau de l'ducation - dans le sens d'une renaissance de l'ducation juive pour l'un, comme un appel une ducation philosophique classique pour l'autre. Ces engagements seront eux aussi interprts comme des manires de dvaloriser l'ducation librale, rduisant celle-ci une illusion pour l'un, un mensonge pour l'autre. Nous montrerons qu'en interprtant de cette manire l'enseignement de ces deux auteurs, en particulier pour ce qui concerne leur conception de l'ducation, on se prive de ressources critiques qui permettraient sans doute l'ducation librale de retrouver la conscience de ses objectifs et, ainsi, de ses propres exigences. Il ne s'agira pas de construire une quelconque convergence entre deux auteurs tellement diffrents. Nous examinerons en quoi le dialogue mme entre deux perspectives si diffrentes, dans le regard critique auquel chacune invite l'gard de l'ducation librale moderne, permet un enrichissement de la philosophie de l'ducation. Nous commencerons par interroger cet cart auquel invite chacun de ces auteurs. D'abord l'ducation juive telle que la conoit Levinas, en particulier dans Difficile Libert, les voies propres qui sont les siennes mais surtout ses finalits et son articulation l'ducation nonjuive et, partant, ce qu'il enseigne ainsi quant aux voies et aux finalits de l'ducation non-juive. Nous verrons que celle-ci n'est pas qu'illusion, et qu'au contraire elle joue un rle essentiel dans l'conomie du juste (Lecture d'AE). Ensuite l'ducation philosophique mise en oeuvre par Strauss, sa reprise de l'enseignement de philosophie politique platonicienne et sa lecture de l'ducation des Lumires. Nous verrons que celle-ci n'est pas que mensonge, mais qu'au contraire elle trouve sa justification propre dans la loi de la raison. Dans un second temps, nous nous attacherons dgager la libert qui est au c ur de ces enseignements sur l'ducation. Elle n'est pas en effet l'apanage de l'ducation librale : tant pour Levinas que pour Strauss c'est bien de libert qu'il s'agit, mme s'ils invitent rinterroger son articulation la loi. Ensuite, nous verrons comment ces regards renouvels sur la libert peuvent enrichir, sur trois points cruciaux, la philosophie contemporaine de l'ducation. L'autonomie du sujet, la science et les institutions sont autant de points d'interrogations qui reoivent des clairages nouveaux grce aux perspectives ainsi rouvertes. Enfin, nous montrerons comment les rflexions sur l'ducation, loin d'tre un dveloppement accessoire dans les uvres de ces deux auteurs, peuvent tre considres comme la cl pour comprendre adquatement leur enseignement et pour renouveler notre

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comprhension du monde que nous habitons. Franois Coppens Haute-Ecole Lonard de Vinci, Bruxelles, Belgium EMMANUEL LEVINAS ET SIMONE WEIL : LA QUESTION DE LUNIVERSEL Dans un texte clbre de Difficile Libert Simone Weil contre la Bible Emmanuel Levinas sefforce de dmonter le refus de lAncien Testament par cette philosophe dont lintelligence, la grandeur dme, et la vocation thique au service de ses prochains, ne lui ont par ailleurs pas chapp. La violence de lantijudasme profess par S. Weil lui apparat ainsi dune part lie son ignorance du texte sacr, et plus particulirement du Talmud, faute davoir rencontr, contrairement lui, un matre , et dautre part un parti pris mthodologique indigne de la probit intellectuelle. Par-del sa relecture htive de la Bible, dans la traduction en franais du Grand Rabbin Zadoc Kahn, lors de son exode Marseille en 1940, S. Weil, contrairement Levinas, duque dans une famille juive agnostique et assimile, na pas bnfici dun environnement culturel juif et ne semble avoir fait aucun effort pour sapproprier cette tradition et y prendre racine, cette relecture len ayant bien au contraire irrmdiablement loigne. Prfrant aller en prison quau ghetto , en refusant de se faire recenser lors de la promulgation du Statut des Juifs par Vichy, le caractre irrmissible de sa condition juive ne lui apparat pas. Prtendant tre pour ainsi dire ne dans linspiration chrtienne au motif dun certain nombre de traits de caractre observables ds lenfance dsir de vrit, esprit de pauvret, amour du prochain, devoir dacceptation lgard de la volont de Dieu, notion de puret S. Weil ne se rsolut toutefois pas franchir le seuil de lglise. Au nombre des obstacles quelle numre viennent tout dabord les souillures de lglise lInquisition, les Croisades, celles qui cartrent galement dans un premier mouvement le jeune Levinas du christianisme. La filiation du Nouveau Testament par rapport lAncien, dont elle voudrait paradoxalement len purger, constitue ses yeux un second obstacle, alors que Levinas peroit la proximit de lvangile de Matthieu 25 et dIsae 58, quand bien mme avoue-t-il le monde ne se trouvait pas chang par le sacrifice chrtien . Un troisime grief sur lequel S. Weil revient constamment, concerne la notion de peuple lu dans laquelle, dcidant dignorer la rvlation faite Isral, elle feint de ne voir autre chose que l idoltrie sociale, la pire idoltrie . Pour Levinas en revanche, loin de caractriser linjustice dune prfrence, un orgueil ou un particularisme, le sens de llection suppose la relation de pre enfants o chacun est tout pour le pre sans exclure les autres de ce privilge . S. Weil oppose ici aux Hbreux non seulement la Grce Nous avons la grande tche dnoncer en grec les principes que la Grce ignorait , crivait de son ct Levinas mais galement les textes taostes de la Chine, les critures sacres des Hindous, bref, ce quon pourrait appeler la voie de lOrient : Est-on anathme si lon regarde comme au moins trs douteuse, et probablement fausse, lopinion que la vritable connaissance de Dieu est plus rpandue dans la chrtient quelle ne la t dans lantiquit, et quelle ne lest actuellement dans des pays non chrtiens tels que lInde ? , demandait-elle ainsi Dom Clment Jacob. Enfin, quatrime obstacle dnonc par S. Weil, le dogmatisme de lglise sexprimant dans la formule anathema sit, prouverait que celle-ci, contrairement ce que laisse entendre son nom katholou, nest pas universelle. On sait que la formule fut abroge lors du Concile de Vatican II qui sacheva par la promulgation de lencyclique Nostra Aetate, laquelle fut positivement accueillie par Levinas, qui avait dj trouv chez Franz Rosenzweig une possibilit de dialogue et de symbiose entre le judasme et le christianisme . Si les deux philosophes semblent saccorder sur le fait que la pense ne va pas sa fin par une voie unique , la position de S. Weil se caractrise toutefois comme ni juive, ni catholique, celle de Levinas se laissant bien plutt apprhender en termes de judasme et christianisme. Sylvie Courtine-Denamy Centre dHistoire Moderne et Contemporaine des Juifs Paris, France

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LEVINAS, PAGANISM AND US In Difficult Freedom, the essays on Judaism first collected in 1963, Levinas writes of one prestigious current in modern thought, which emerged from Germany to flood the pagan recesses of our Western souls, and he names Heidegger and the Heideggerians. In this paper I will examine how the terms pagan and paganism function in the texts of Difficult Freedom, and in turn how Levinas opposes them to a Judaism that he describes in an essay from the 1930s as anti-paganism par excellence. I will begin by examining Levinass understanding of paganism, both ancient and modern, in relation to what he perceives as the violence of the Sacred and implementation in a landscape or enrootedness. To explicate the Jewish alternative to paganism so conceived, and how this bears on Levinass ethical philosophy, I will focus on one controversial text from Difficult Freedom, Heidegger, Gagarin and Us. Here I will also raise some critical considerations prompted by readings of this essay by Jacques Derrida and Rudi Visker. Derridas description of the essay as violent will invite the question of whether it is necessary to oppose the violence of the Sacred with a no less violent desacralisation, the vandalism (Levinas) of destroying the Sacred groves. I will then examine Viskers claim that the opportunity afforded by technology according to Levinas to perceive men outside the situations in which they are placed, and let the human face shine in all its nudity involves in effect a naturalistic reduction of the Other to the rudiments of biological life and amounts to a disdain for what is peasant in humanity. In responding to the latter critique in particular, I will consider to what extent it is possible or desirable to speak of the face of the Other as signification without context or without cultural adornment. Finally, I will consider the meaning of a Judaism that, as Levinas puts it, has always been free with regard to place, especially in light of the Zionist sympathies that figure in other texts of Difficult Freedom. This analysis, I will argue, in tandem with the above, will lead to a more nuanced though still Levinasian appreciation of what is peasant or pagan in humanity and what transcends such categories. Hugh Cummins University College, Dublin, Ireland

VIOLENCE DE L'THIQUE ET/OU L'THIQUE DE VIOLENCE. Libert et violence, rgle et contrainte en tant que dfis de l'thique contemporaine Au dbut du 21e sicle, la pense morale occidentale est prdomine par l'attitude liberale. En tant que telle, elle cherche liminer toutes les manifestations de violence de la vie publique et de la vie prive. Comme le montrat Richard Rorty, le pch cardinal devient la cruaut, dont les traces sont mticuleusement depistes, puis dnonces. Or, socialement bienfaisant comme il est, un tel approche ne me semble ni indisputable, ni touttranchant. Peur de violence nous fait dlguer notre responsabilit ailleurs, c'est dire : aux appareils tatiques et mtatatiques. Pire encore, le mme peur de violence nous fait nous interdire d'agir et nous fier aux experts prtendus. En rupture de cet approche, dans mes recherches je vise formuler l'thique des adultes : une thique radicale qui prend en compte l'agence propre aux humains. Pour un tel projet, des fils de Difficile libert (l'ouvrage du caractre morale qui en mme temps n'est pas de toutes pices thique) ne font pas conclusion mais plutt une inspiration. On pourrait prendre le modle spiral levinasien de la pense juive pour un archtype de chaque effort intellectuel de rpondre une question pertinente : Que faire ?, qui se pose, pour ainsi dire, en opposant son homologue liberal : Qu'est-ce qu'il ne faut pas faire ? Je voudrais en mme temps rconsiderer une proposition faite il y a un dmi-sicle par Leszek Koakowski, un des philosophes polonais les plus connus. Ce dernir proposa une thique sans code, thique de consideration propre situation particulire. Des dvoirs moraux de rligion

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des adultes sont-ils susceptibles de consister un code thique, comme le comprit Koakowski ? Ou bien, dans situation donne, font-ils antipodes des interdictions propres au code liberal ? Agata Czarnacka, Universit de Varsovie, Pologne HEGEL'S SWINGING DOOR: RECOGNITION Speech is at flight with itself, defining terms with other terms yet to be defined and in turn beg for a greater self referencing system of thought. Where are we to find the foundation for speech? How are we to express problems of mind and identity? How does Levinas speak without building a system of knowledge and where does this leave him? In his paper, Hegel and the Jews, Levinas identifies the Greek tradition as a ground upon which Hegel rests his system of knowledge Phnomenologie des Geistes. This paper is an examination of the relation between Levinas and Hegel in terms of their respective accounts of self-consciousness. The focus of the paper is an analysis of the opening into Hegels system that Levinas identifies in his essay Hegel and the Jews in Difficile Libert. Further, this paper draws on Levinas chapter Ethics and the Face in Totalit et Infini to make explicit links between Levinas and Hegel. Levinas claims that this is the door of unthought into Hegels system and can be equally used to exit the system. An examination of Levinas responsibility, Hegels recognition, and their relation as key concepts in the construction of their respective philosophy, constructs an account of self-consciousness in the form of a discourse. In this discourse I propose Hegels narratorial voice assumes the speech of the Greek: present in absence. Further, that Levinas assumes the Judaic voice of the slave consciousness, whilst the master consciousness is only held within the system by the representation within the slaves mind. Beyond establishing a Wittgensteinian point that identity is linguistic, I claim that ethics can be founded in identity. Hayden Daley University of New South Wales, Australia DIFFICULT FREEDOM IN THE SELVA LACANDONA: Similarities between Levinas Ethical System the Zapatista Movement As we know Levinas Difficult Freedom is mainly concerned with defining the role of Judaism in the modern world, where, he argues, Judaism has been corrupted by Christianity and western worship of scientism in the forms of objective reason and causal relationships. Levinas claims that Judaism must turn back to its roots in the Torah, and other sacred texts, for they are the expression of the core of Judaisms credo: the Is ethical duty to the Other. It is the purpose of this paper to show that regardless of the criticism that has been made about this position that it impossible to create a society where this maxim can be actually followed and it is in fact achievable. I will illustrate this point via the analysis of the similarities between Levinas ideas elaborated on Difficult Freedom and my understanding of the ethical lifestyle of the Zapatistas communities. I will elaborate on two of the core concepts of Levinas philosophy. The first one is composed by the Is ethical duty to the Other and the idea of me being the chosen one. The second one is the idea of achieving justice through language and dialogue with the Other. I hope to achieve this goal through a Levinasian interpretation of a historical analysis of the genesis and evolution of the Zapatista communities. I will explain that even when there is not a direct historical or intellectual relationship between Judaism and Zapatista communities they can be seen as living under the same principle: my ethical duty to the Other to the extreme where there is not an I, but only an us. They live under the idea that, as Levinas argues, I can only offer my life to the Other, but not expect desire or even accept the sacrifice of the Other to save mine. We can see this is the way the members of the Zapatista Army offered their life during the 13 days that the armed rebellion lasted, and to this moment they are still willing to do. However, as I will try to show,

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this is not to say that the Zapatista army is a violent army, for they believe words are more powerful than weapons. This situations takes us to my second point where they believe in a form of Levinasian justice as discourse. In other words, justice can only be achieved through an ethical conversation with the Other, where reason and language are external to violence. An indication of this is the way they have subordinated the army to civil society, both inside and outside of the Zapatista communities. They believe in a spiritual order where if morality must truly exclude violence, a profound link must join reason, language, and morality.(pg 7).To summarize, the point I will try to make through this paper is that Judaisms concept of my ethical duty to the other, is not only right but also feasible. Luis R. Diaz Community College, El Paso, USA FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LEVINAS UNE RELIGION DADULTES In Une religion dadultes Levinas argues that the Judaic conception of freedom is universal. He does this by understanding freedom within the spiritual relation according to Judaism. This relationship is not thought of as an exclusive relation between Jewish people and God, but as one of ethical responsibility for the other, which is universal in the sense that it is a relationship of every single human being with the specific other. Levinas understands ethical responsibility as a condition of freedom: as questioning my freedom, without taking it away. To be precise, he claims that freedom is made possible because the spontaneous character of my egoistic activity of taking possession is put into question, is discovered as being unjust, by the (needs of) the other. But what does Levinas mean in arguing that the questioning of my actions my ethical responsibility is the condition of possibility of freedom? How must we understand the spiritual relationship in Une religion dadultes, if it is not an exclusive numinous possession of religious man by God, an interfering in human actions and thus a limitation of this mans freedom? To put it in another way, how is Levinas able to understand the Judaic conception of freedom in Une religion dadultes as universal? To answer this question, it must be examined if and in what sense Levinas claims in this text that our spontaneous action of taking possession can only be realized and/or make sense as being free, if it is revealed by the needy other as unjust. That is to say, it must be investigated if Levinas is claiming that without me being responsible my actions cannot be called free, because I do not experience them as free and/or that my free actions can only have significance when they are in service of the other. After all, it seems that freedom can have no meaning when it is taken for granted. Geoffrey Dierckxsens Doctorant, Universit dAnvers DIFFICULT LIBERATION: READING LEVINAS IN AFRICA Writing to mark ten years of South African democracy, the postcolonial African theorist Achille Mbembe drew upon two of the most powerful traditions that have taken to its deepest philosophical consequences our understanding of bondage, captivity, exile and death and therefore of freedom in the modern world: the Jewish and the black tradition. (Mbembe 2004: 4) His essay brought Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin and Emmanuel Levinas into conversation with Aim Csaire and Frantz Fanon, to examine the relationship between freedom and ethics a freedom that is aware of itself as an ethical practice. (ibid.) Emamnuel Levinass Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism was written over the years following the Liberation of France (Levinas, 1990: xiii). Its central concern is how Jews will live as Jews together with Christians in Europe after the Holocaust. Christianity and Enlightenment reason are both called to task, accompanied by an acknowledgement of profound fraternity and solidarity, a recommitment to Judaisms roots and a rejection of facile answers.

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To read Levinas in Africa now following the liberation of this continent is perplexing, and sometimes painful. When he writes of the European moral conscience that flourished in that happy period in which centuries of Christian and philosophical civilization had not yet revealed, in the Hitlerian adventure, the fragility of their works (ibid: 5), how can we not flinch, remembering the Atlantic slave trade by which Europe thrived and Africa was decimated? Or remembering the genocide of Herero and Nama people in German South-West Africa, a colonial adventure that led directly to Auschwitz? Still, we are reading Levinas in Africa. We read him for the problem of freedom, of how Africans could live decently as Africans in a postcolonial world. We read him for the problem of African-European relations, often posed by Europeans as a contradiction between (backward) tradition and (progressive) modernity, and by Africans as the need to reclaim and reconcile subjugated ways of knowing and being. We read him because he seems to open a passage toward this even as he sometimes seems to close it. Levinass radical ethics transcend the limits imposed by a certain conception of subjectivity developed through centuries of Western thought, a conception that simply does not prevail elsewhere. In southern Africa, for instance, being-human is not Da-Sein but ubuntu, an awareness that I am because we are. Anyone who knows Levinas will recognise that, just as anyone who knows ubuntu recognizes Levinas. But one cannot simply draw a line between the two. This essay approaches Levinass Difficult Freedom to understand more clearly this mutual (and ambivalent) recognition, and to see how Levinass views and strategies might be put in service of our difficult liberation. Helen Douglas Philosophy in Practice, Cape Town, South Africa

JSUS, CHRISTIANISME ET CHRTIENS DANS"DIFFICILE LIBERT"

Recueil de textes crits, entre 1949 et 1975 en ce qui concerne la seconde dition, Difficile Libert traite d'une grande varit de sujets mais prsente aussi l'homognit d'une pense mure. Sur un fond constant de judasme, Levinas fait une rfrence presque obsessionnelle au christianisme; quelque soit le sujet trait Levinas s'y rapporte que se soit pour polmiquer sur la notion de Messie, de l'anthropomorphisme, sur les amitis judo chrtiennes. Il l'attaque propos de Simone Weil, de Paul Claudel ou d'Edmond Fleg. Il parvient en discuter mme lorsquil traite de Spinoza et de manire moins surprenante propos de Hegel et de Rosenzweig. Il s'attarde la description du messie souffrant tel qu'il apparat dans le talmud. Dans les textes o il fait rfrence la Shoah il ne manque pas de rappeler d'une part que celleci fut perptre sur une terre chrtienne depuis deux mille ans et d'autre part n'oublie pas le rle jou par des prtres dans le sauvetage de nombreux juifs. Nous voyons donc que dans la pense de Levinas, le christianisme dans son ensemble est incontournable non seulement pour parvenir une bonne comprhension du judasme mais surtout pour permettre ce mme judasme de s'affirmer dsormais sans complexe comme source de vie et rappeler sans cesse surtout aprs ces annes de supplice qu'il est aussi source du christianisme Mais ce n'est point un inventaire la Prvert que nous avons l'intention de proposer l. Il s'agit plutt de prsenter les divers aspects d'une rfrence constante ou nous dcouvrirons la fois l'humour et l'ambigut, nous y percevrons la fois la colre et le respect que le christianisme ait pu lui inspirer. L'influence de Rosenzweig y est claire mais ncessite quelques mises au point notamment l'abandon d'une approche purement thologique des rapports judochrtiens. Nous montrerons que Levinas va plus loin que l'auteur de "L'Etoile" dans son rejet de la "religion" et de son acceptation comme "ralit". Si Rosenzweig s'abstenait d'utiliser le terme "religion", Levinas lui n'a cesse de critiquer les notions purement thologiques pour les ramener chaque fois a des rapports plus terre terre, ceux de l'existence humaine, que se soit travers les relations avec l'autre ou les relations avec Dieu. Mais la thologie ne persiste-t-elle pas

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lorsque l'on continue parler de mtaphysique ou bien change-t-elle seulement de sujet et Dieu c'est maintenant l'Autre? Nous nous arrterons aussi une formule cl: "la Passion d'Isral" qui revient souvent chez Levinas, donc pas par inadvertance, lorsqu'il traite de la Shoah. Cette notion tire tout droit de la thologie chrtienne mrite d'tre releve et nous tenterons d'lucider son emploi sous la plume de Levinas. En fin de compte nous verrons que Levinas ne traite pas du christianisme d'un seul bloc et sous un seul aspect, mais parvient en dgager les varits de ses diffrentes facettes, des plus sombres aux plus clairantes, sachant mettre en valeur malgr le flagrant chec d'une Europe chrtienne les belles mes des justes des nations. Paul Elbhar Israel THE PASSION OF ISRAEL It was in Difficult Freedom that Levinas first referred to the Passion lived out by Judaism between 1940 and 1945 and thereby unmistakably associated the epochal suffering of the Jews with the essence of Christianity. Despite the shocking quality of this trope, Levinas continued to invoke the Passion of Israel on several subsequent occasions. Moreover, the notion of passion became central to his later thought, where it emerges as the fundamental passivity of the persecuted ethical self. In addition to the philosophical significance Levinas gives to the ethicality of passion, this paper argues that the particular trope of the passion of Israel bears the weight of several arguments. These include his view concerning the meaning of the Holocaust for the Christian West, his account of the historical vocation of the Jews and related views regarding Jewish nationalism and diasporism, and his understanding of JudeoChristian civilization. Levinas provocative formulations will be explored not only in the context of his own writings but also with a view to similar positions in premodern Jewish and Christian literature and in post-Holocaust theology. Dr Michael Fagenblat Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, Australia

I FIGURED YOU OUT! MONOTHEISTIC SARCASM IN LEVINASS POETRY AND THE IMPOSSIBLE With all of the essays and books written on the subject of Levinass notion of the Saying and the Said, one of the least explored aspects of Levinass work is, strangely enough, his rhetoric. To be sure, Levinass writing makes explicit his effort to bring us near to the other in a language that is, in Edith Wyshcogrods words, touched by transcendence. When language is touched by transcendence, it touches us with the transcendence of the other, and calls on us to answer to alterity. For this reason, Levinass rhetoric, which articulates transcendence, is always very careful to bring Saying and The Said into tension; for in this tension, the Said, language, becomes other. This movement marks language - touches language - and transforms it into a trace of and a response to the other. In his best works of writing, specifically in Otherwise than Being, Levinass language takes on this tension through a prophetic tone. As prophetic, this tone is not free to say whatever it wants; it is accused, gnawed at by other. We are traumatized and inspired by the other: in trauma and in inspiration, the one-for-the-other is, according to Levinas, the psyche In footnote three of chapter three in Otherwise than Being, Levinas spells this out: The soul is the other in me. The psyche, the-one-for the-other, can be a possession and a psychosis; the soul is already a seed of folly. The last words of these lines are telling. They suggest that the psyche can be possessed and psychotic. But it is too late, the soul is already a seed of folly. On the one hand, these lines indicate that the very one-for-the-other, the psyche, can be

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a (form of) possession and a psychosis; regardless of this possibility, however, the psyche does in fact already plant the seed of possible madness. Indeed, it is a seed of folly. By its very existence for the other, the psyche is the possibility of possession and psychosis. I would like to suggest that the above-mentioned rhetorical tension between the possibility of being psychotic and possessed by the other and the fact of the soul being a seed of folly is not a concept. It is Saying, the one-for-the-other, which plants the seeds of folly and is itself a seed of folly for others. This seed of folly is what Derrida calls writing or, as might be argued via Levinas, poetry; the trace, this seed, marks the folly of substitution. In my talk, I would like to show how, in Levinass essay Poetry and the Impossible (from Difficult Freedom), Levinass rhetoric, since it is for the other, plants the seeds of folly and is already a seed of folly. In that essay, the psyche traverses the possibility of possession and psychosis through a tone that is monotheistic, prophetic, and, it must be noted, sarcastic. In the essay, directed at Claudels reinterpretation of the Torah in his poetry and the new possibilities between Christians and Jews, Levinass criticism enacts what Blanchot might call a voice from elsewhere. The voice is sarcastic and presents a different type of madness. This unthinkable folly, which I would like to argue is Monotheistic, sarcastically negates language though its being for the other. By paying close attention to this rhetoric we can hear the question obliquely posed by Levinas in the title of his essay, Poetry and The Impossible. Can the seed of folly be poetic or is that, quite simply, impossible because the prophetic is not the poetic? Is sarcasm more transcendent than poetry? What does writing touched by transcendence have to do with Monotheism? This talk will address all of these questions through a close reading of Poetry and the Impossible so as to bear witness to the sarcastic transcendence which mocks and, ultimately, destroys figuration. Menachem (Matthew) Feuer Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada LINDIVIDU OU LLECTION ? KIERKEGAARD, LEVINAS ET LA DIFFICILE LIBERT Peut-on encore tre juif sans Kierkegaard ? Question paradoxale que Levinas pose dans le premier chapitre Difficile libert, et laquelle il noffre, ironiquement, aucune rponse. Aucune rponse mises part quelques critiques adresses lloge de la singularit ou de lindividualit, un rejet du salto mortale paradoxal dans le got de Kierkegaard qui serait le fondement de toute construction mtaphysique, la crainte et au tremblement devenus la parole matresse de la modernit, linjonction quil faudrait ncessairement dpasser le stade thique pour rentrer dans la foi. Ces quelques remarques font de Kierkegaard une trange figure dabsent cependant convoque par Levinas dans les articles runis sous le titre Difficile libert, et nous obligent interroger le rapport entre la pense kierkegaardienne et luvre levinassienne, dautant plus quelles tmoignent dune caricaturisation peu valorisante de la pense de Kierkegaard. Car si Kierkegaard rige en effet le particulier au-dessus du gnral, on doit cependant se demander si le particulier recherch par Kierkegaard est effectivement incompatible avec le concept duniversel tel quil est revendiqu par Levinas, et si lindividu kierkegaardien est vritablement radicalement distinct de llection levinassienne. Kierkegaard prsente, il est vrai, une reprsentation de lthique comme un stade quil faudrait dpasser (notamment dans les Stades sur le chemin de la vie) mais cette reprsentation nest en fait quune des nombreuses reprsentations diffrentes de lthique que lon retrouve dans luvre dans son ensemble, et ne saurait vritablement exprimer la pense kierkegaardienne, qui congdie la dialectique hglienne avec ses synthses et Aufhebungen en faveur dune dialectique non-synthtique, dans laquelle lthique occupe une place essentielle, et dailleurs tout autant indissociable de ce quil appelle lesthtique comme du religieux. On doit voir galement que le saut de foi nest pas chez Kierkegaard un dpassement de lthique, mais au contraire sa suspension tlologique, qui naurait de valeur que si cette suspension ntait pas une manire de sabstraire de la vie, mais au contraire une manire

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de revenir pleinement sinvestir dans la vie. Aussi doit-on se demander si la critique adresse Kierkegaard nest pas plutt la critique dune reprise heideggrienne (notamment) de la pense de Kierkegaard, dans loptique dun humanisme si peu humain, comme Levinas le souligne. Et si, au-del dune certaine diffrence conceptuelle qui les spare, Levinas et Kierkegaard ne disent pas fondamentalement la mme chose : que ce nest pas la lettre qui tue, mais au contraire la lettre qui sauve, dans un monde marqu par la fin de la philosophie qui est obligation pour chacun de philosopher, de dire, dcrire, et responsabilisation absolue de chacun (comme seule lection). La question (non-pose) chez Levinas ne serait-elle pas alors : Peut-on encore tre juif avec Kierkegaard ? A moins quelle ne soit tout simplement : Peut-on encore tre ? Mlissa Fox-Muraton Universit Blaise PascalClermont II IDENTITE JUIVE ET OBLIGATION ENVERS LETRE HUMAIN : LE DIVERGENT ACCORD ENTRE EMMANUEL LEVINAS ET SIMONE WEIL Le rapport entre Lvinas et la pense de Simone Weil a t un objet de rflexion surtout de la part des spcialistes de cette dernire. Et cela pour deux raisons : la premire est quen effet, lunique intervention directe et explicite de Lvinas sur Weil remonte 1952 et na pas fait lobjet, par la suite, de rvisions ou de rflexions ultrieures. Par consquent les spcialistes de Lvinas doivent lavoir jug non seulement marginale, mais aussi occasionnelle ; la seconde, en revanche, concerne les spcialistes de Simone Weil qui nont pas pu se dispenser de se confronter avec la seule intervention du grand penseur mettant en question un des n uds les plus pineux et irrsolus de la pense weilienne, cest--dire son rapport avec le judasme. En effet, lintrieur dune pense unanimement considre comme un exemple de probit intellectuelle et dattention au malheur, les propos weiliens sur les juifs et sur la Bible sont dissonants, embarrassants, inassimilables et ceux qui tudient cette pense se sentent presque investis de cette faute de Weil. Les questions que nous nous poserons appartiennent cet horizon, dans lequel une double faute plane sur les mots, les rendant difficiles et pnibles : dune part, la faute que Simone Weil attribue au peuple juif, cest--dire celle dadorer un Dieu des armes et de lavoir utilis pour la constitution dun peuple violent et nationaliste, convaincu que son lection est un signe de supriorit par rapport toutes les autres nations de la Terre ; dautre part, la faute que presque tous les juifs imputent Simone Weil, celle de la trahison, du reniement de ses origines, de lincomprhension prjudicielle de toute leur tradition, prcisment au moment o avait lieu lextermination dans les camps de concentration. Sans omettre cette double faute sur laquelle, dautre part, existent dj des tudes importantes nous chercherons dapporter une rponse deux questions : 1) Lintervention de Lvinas sur Weil se confronte rellement avec la question cruciale souleve par les rflexions weiliennes ? 2) tout en tenant compte de lincontestable occasionalit de lintervention directe sur Weil, il existe, peut-tre, une dette encore impense de Lvinas lgard de la pense weilienne? En ce qui concerne la premire question, en suivant larticle publi en 1952, nous nous arrterons sur la totale et blouissante absence du rapport institu par Weil entre le peuple hbreu et les Romains trs significatifs pour comprendre les raisons, mme si elles ne sont pas partageables, de Weil , rapport compltement omis par Lvinas en faveur dune scrupuleuse rflexion sur lignorance dont fait preuve Simone Weil lgard de la Bible et du Talmud, nestimant, videmment, pas devoir se confronter avec la question du nationalisme juif souleve par Weil. Pour ce qui est de la seconde, nous nous arrterons sur la notion d obligation envers ltre humain et sur la notion de responsabilit sur lesquelles ont rflchi Simone Weil et Lvinas, en cherchant de dmontrer comment largumentation weilienne nest en rien trangre la pense de Lvinas, mais nous pouvons, au contraire, trouver entre elles de profondes affinits. Plus que de dmontrer une possible influence de Weil sur Lvinas thse, notre avis, dune certaine faon, possible nous voudrions, surtout, mettre en lumire un horizon commun aux deux penseurs, dans lequel la

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responsabilit pour lhumanit de lhomme se rvle tre le concept charnire pour repenser le droit et la politique. Rita Fulco Universit degli Studi di Palermo THE NEW LEVINAS In contrast to what I shall call the pious reading which has treated Levinas' major works as a moral theory anchored in a supposed prescription of deference and respect for 'the alterity of the other', I seek to advance what I shall call the heretic reading taking "Ethics and Spirit" and "Loving the Torah more than God" in Difficult Freedom as interpretative keys. This reading is first and foremost intended to define the Levinasian project as a metaphysical account of constitutive normativity capable of addressing salient issues in current debates in metaethics. In so doing, I will argue that from Levinas' articulation of the ethical, no substantive prescriptive assertions can be extracted and thus all treatments of this account of ethics espousing the prescriptive force of the other or of its face are essentially misreadings of the work, which issue from a profound misunderstanding of the central issues in metaethics. The paper will consist of three parts. The first part will be a general assessment of the problem that guides the metaethical debate. The purpose of this section is to show what are the main philosophical problems that define the boundaries of any discussion on the substantive content of prescriptions and their justifications. In the subsequent part, I shall present what I understand to be the pious reading and explain why, from the perspective of the metaethical framework articulated in part one, its understanding of Levinas' ethics amounts to a resounding metaethical failure. If taken seriously, Levinas ethics, as interpreted by the pious reading, is incapable of addressing the challenges that the metaethical debate has maintained in place at least since Hume. If the pious reading is correct, Levinas could provide nothing other than a set of doctrinal claims that can be accepted on faith and which would demand a pious acceptance of the idea of the goodness of "ethics". At best, it would demand a form of justificatory quietism which would be normatively ineffectual. However, as I will argue, the pious reading is one that is not supported by Levinas' texts. Rather, as I will show in the last part of the paper, Levinas' ethics, when understood correctly, is not only continuous with the metaethical tradition outlined in part one, but bears significantly on current debate concerning the nature of normativity. Martin Gak Pratt Institute and Hofstra University, New York, USA LEVINAS AND THE ETHICS OF THE COMMUNICATIVE SPHERE: SPEAKING REBELLIOUS FREEDOM WITH AN OBEDIENT VOICE Difficult Freedom has always been one of my favorite Levinasian texts. At first glance the essays of Difficult Freedom seem to be a hodgepodge of disparate topics and ideas. However, I argue that the essays actually produce a quite coherent philosophy of communication grounded in our infinite responsibility to respond to the Other. These essays are social, political, and religious exemplars of the complicated freedom of a hortatory rather than a propositional response to the infinity of the face of the Other. Levinas gives us correctives of the modern aphasia that silences the difficulty of my relation to the Other. In tracing out a philosophy of communication via the various essays in Difficult Freedom Levinas speaks in a compelling voice about how one can speak ethically in the wake of cacophonous events. The guidelines for communicative action apply as equally well today as they did the nearly fifty years ago when the texts were first written. The voice of Levinas philosophy of communication trembles under the awesome responsibility of hearing an apodictic freedom that has the capacity for murderous desire. The expressing of the face is language. The Other is the first intelligible. But the infinite in the

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face does not appear as a representation. It brings into question my freedom, which is discovered to be murderous and usurpatory ... In front of the face, I always demand more of myself; the more I respond to it, the more the demands grow. (DF, 294). Therefore, we see a first difficulty in speaking to the face of this Other. Speech itself is inadequate before the infinity of the Other. Grasping the infinity of the Other exponentially expands my responsibility to respond to the Other. The Other demands a response, but my response will at best be inadequate, and at worst idolatrous, or murderous. I pause to point out the humbleness of the tenor of the philosophy of communication here. Levinas exemplar can be found in the Stoic exemplar of the dog Bobby, who alone recognized the infinite humanity of Levinas and his fellow Jewish prisoners of war in that camp in Nazi Germany. This dog was the last Kantian in Nazi Germany, without the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives. He was a descendant of the dogs of Egypt. And his friendly growling, his animal faith, was born from the silence of his forefathers on the banks of the Nile (DF, 153). Despite the infinite gap between myself and the Other via communication my response is never an empty servitude. The Other commands a stance of obedience, but not servitude (DF, 114). There is a protreptic rhetoric that Levinas invokes. Levinas stresses obedience over the purely theoretical because obedience entails the deed. Yet we return to the difficult freedom of the obedient response because the Other does not command our freedom. The communicative sphere is pregnant with a praxis of freedom. The lived embodiment required of the communicative response to the Other takes place in a social world where a third person appears representing the political. In speaking with this rebellious voice Levinas work has inspired social-political movements from Charter 77 to today. Erik Garrett Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, USA

THE ETHICS OF PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS IN THE CONTEXT OF "DIFFICULT FREEDOM" Emmanuel Levinas' Ethics as First Philosophy has lead to an ethical turn in Western Philosophy in 20th Century. He talks about the ethical relationship between "the Same" who is mortal and "the Other" who is absolute. This ethical relationship, whereby there is no hegemony of the Same, changes the definition of "Subject" radically. Levinas calls this a change from "Power to Participation". The essays on Jewish Thought compiled in "Difficult Freedom" make the reader familiar with Levinas' definition of Judaism. They repeatedly talk about one's relationship with the Other being a precondition for one's relationship with God. In order to fulfill this precondition, he suggests unreadings and rereadings of Torah, which would open up new possibilities of interpretation. In this context "Readings of Difficult Freedom" can talk about "Reading" that is "Difficult Freedom". This paper is an attempt to work with the essays of Difficult Freedom in the light of Philosophical Hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer. Keeping the diological character of Judaism in center, I would like to create a passage between Levinas' essays on Judaism and Philosophical Hermeneutics. A hermeneutic reading of Levinas texts then leads to the question, whether the relationship between the Text and the Reader is ethical in nature too; whether Not-Understand (Nicht-Verstehen) is way of Understanding and whether poetry is nothing else but a possible entry to or a meeting point with the Face of the Other (Gedicht als Gesicht). The moment one realizes the primacy of the Existent (and her ethical realationship with the Other) over Existence, one has the desire to understand, which one doesnt wish to see fulfilled. An engagement with this hypothesis could help one find out the influence of Levinasian Ethics on Philosophical Hermeneutics. Maithilee Gatne, Pune, Inde

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LA VRIT DU DVOILEMENT COMME GLOIRE DE L'INFINI: QU'EST-CE QUE L'OUVRAGE POUR LA VRIT DANS LA COMMUNAUT Arbetn oif zich---Kotzker Rebbe Abrbeit macht frei----Auschwitz Nous sommes tous les juifs allemands---pour D. Cohn-Bendit, 22 mai, 1968 L'ouvrage (die Arbeit) de la rvolution de mai 1968 a bris l'identit sociale qui a autoris la politique se passer en France. Dans la rvolution qui a choqu la rgime Gaulliste vers sa fondation, la France a exprim un moment transformatifla dialectique de la thorie et de la practique s'est unifie. Il y avait une nouvelle expression de la libert vive laquelle on a pu rflchir ce moment. Il y avait un mouvement vers la vrit de tmoignage qui tait capable de surpasser la vrit du dvoilement. Quelle typologie de communaut a merg quand la Sorbonne est dvenue une commune et la posie a regne les rues de au mois de mai 1968? Une communaut traditionelle ou une communaut elective? Une communaut ngative ou une communaut d'amants? Une communaut inavouable ou une communaut de tmoignage? Tandis que la rticence culturelle considrer l'agence de la politique collective agrandit, ces questions deviennent cruciales. Pendant que ces types de communaut sont suggrs par des philosophes comme Maurice Blanchot (celui qui a senti son moment de l'interrogation existentielle en mai 1968), explicitement dans son petit livre, La Communaut Inavouable (1983), il est plus difficile identifier aucun effet notable sur la pense de Lvinas aprs mai 1968. La pense Lvinasianne, est-elle fait partie du discours qui compris Blanchot et al, ceux qui ont identif la site d'interrogation vers la aprs-vie de mai 1968, ou est-ce que le mouvement de Lvinas vers l'ethique comme la prmiere philosophie fait partie d'un nouveau discours de la moralit thique qui entoure des droits humains produits par des ex-Gauchistes et la venue des Nouveau Philosophes qui gardent ses distance de mai 1968? Est-ce que la pense Lvinasianne fait partie du discours de la tournure post-moderne de1968 ou est-elle un signe de discours interrompu de Temps et LAutre (1946/7)? En considrant comment Difficle Libert est proccup sur la question de la communaut, l'absence aprs 1968 d'une seul article sur les implications urgentes pour la communaut juive demande plus recherches. A part du commentaire terse de Lvinas pendant sa Lecture Talmudique: Judasme et Rvolution (bBaba Metsia 83a-83b) dans Les Colloque des Intellectuels Juifs 1969,et quelques allusionspr-1968 disperss dans Difficile Libert qui sont l'appuies de la tendance du Judaisme neutralis l'impulse mssianique et a soupconner l'utopie, il n'y aucune articulation claire aprs 1968 de la communaut et son ouvrage vers la vrit. En juxtaposant <<Education et Prire>> (ca. 1963) avec<<Vrit du Dvoilement et Vrit duTmoignage>> (1972), je propose un dfit la pense juive de Lvinas et sa forme de commuanut et son ouvrage vers la vrit. En changeant la priorit au loin des Juifs des Psaumes (la priere/l'extase) vers des Juifs de Talmud (l'ducation/l'thique), les critures exotriques de Lvinas prioritisent une thique rationelle, tandis que les critures philosophiques et esotriques priortisent une thique plus mystique. Ce mouvement de la prire comme "la provocation qui vient de Dieu de son invocation" vers la prophtie qui est "resonnant dans le Nom de Dieu de tous langages dvoile un parcours vers la vrit d'illeit comme tertialit qui est fondemental pour construire une communaut. En traduisant le hebru en grec (ou le judaisme en philosophie), Lvinas a fait allusion une modalit de la communaut inavouable, ou laquelle la vrit du tmoignage par ncessit dvoile la gloire de l'Infini. Aubrey L. Glazer, Jewish Community Center of Harrison, New York, USA

DIFFICILE LIBERT ET PAROLE

Dans ses premiers crits, Lvinas cherche lvasion, la sortie de l` il-y-a. Cette perce se conoit principalement par le temps. la fin de De l'existence l'existant, figurent quelques mots sur le langage, comme allusion. Dans Le temps et l'autre on trouve la recherche d`une proximit autrui tout

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en gardant la sparation en forme de caresse. Buber, qui pourrait tre une source d`influence, est mentionn mais non pour la parole. Le langage apparat vraiment pour la premire fois dans La transcendance des mots propos des biffures (Temps modernes, Juin 1949. Repris dans Hors Sujet, Fata Morgana, Paris, 1987, p. 195 204). C`est une conception du langage en tant que transcendance, rapport social et enseignement, et en dehors de sa traditionnelle subordination la pense (203).Dans Totalit et Infini, le langage joue un rle central dans la rupture de la totalit, dans la rencontre avec autrui, son visage, dans la signification et pour la vrit. La notion de dire, centrale dans Autrement qu`tre apparat pour la premire fois dans Langage et proximit (En dcouvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger, Vrin, Paris, 1967, p. 218 - 236. )Difficile libert, publi entre Totalit et Infini et cet article datant de l`anne 1967 montre la maturit de la conception du langage de Lvinas avant lapparition du dit et du dire, notions qui napparaissent point dans Difficile libert. Le langage est l`opposition la violence: Le fait banal de la conversation quitte, par un ct, l`ordre de la violence. (DL 19). Les grands thmes de Totalit et Infini ce sujet sont ainsi prsents de faon claire ds le dbut de Difficile libert. L`apparition du visage d`autrui, qui n`est pas seulement vu, mais surtout entendu puisque autrui me parle c`est l`ordre humain qui transcende l`il-y-a, le monde violent et ferm du Mme. Lvinas crit trs peu sur la guerre et la Shoah, sur son exprience personnelle de captivit. Mais on peut trouver deux petites anecdotes sur ce sujet douloureux (p. 26, 216). Est-ce par hasard que l' absence de langage y prend une place prpondrante? Il rpond explicitement cette question dans Signature (408 409). Mais ce n'est pas n`importe quel genre de langage. La parole est de l`ordre de la morale avant d`appartenir l`ordre de la thorie. (21). Cela condition de commencer absolument dans celui qui la tient et qui va vers un autre absolument spar". (290). Parole qui est aussi enseignement, puisque je ne sais jamais ce qui me sera dit par autrui. Et parole vocative. Par contre, la parole de Dieu n`est jamais entendue directement; elle ne peut tre entendue que par l'tude et "exige des matres".La psychanalyse et la sociologie qui interprtent les mots comme symptmes ou superstructures discrditent le langage. Il est intressant de remarquer que des aspects juifs du langage apparaissant dans Totalit et Infini la parole cratrice et la parole prophtique n`apparaissent pas dans Difficile libert. Je ne sais pas pourquoi. Le nom de Martin Buber, qui a eu une influence explicite sur Lvinas ce sujet n'y est pas non plus mentionn. Elizabeth Goldwyn Haifa University and Oranim College in Israel L'ALTRITE ET LA RALIT PERSONNELLE: LA LIBERT DANS LE VOLONTARISME DE LEVINAS La philosophie de Levinas est une affirmation progressive et radicale de l'altrit de l'intersubjectivit, qui exige le remplacement de la mtaphysique pour l'thique comme philosophie premire. En rponse au subjectivisme moderne, en particulier l'autoaffirmation nietzschenne de la volont, la primaut de l'altrit de Levinas est un rappel trs puissant. Mais sans l'appui du personnel, la volont, mme si elle s'en est justement dirige vers l'autre, est irrvocable et fausse la vie humaine. Au lieu de l'artiste, qui en prend soi esthtiquement, nous avons le tmoignage de la gloire divine, en donnant gnreusement la garde thique de l'autre. Les deux approches de rduire la personne l'action; de ce lien doit tre un absolutisme moral, ou la sujtion de l'homme une sorte d'impratif de la ligne de Kant: ce n'est pas grave si c'est le devoir, la vie ou le bien d'autrui. Mais cette attribution des tres humains leur dynamique, absolutise lthique, et il ny a pas de libert relle, mais mandat principal: proriginaire, anarchique, selon les termes de Lvinas. Mais alors tre souleves: Ne dirigez pas la libert de la personne au-del de leur caractre oprationnel? Autant que le subjectivisme mine l'existence libre de l'homme ce naturalisme de choix (une force spontane mue par quelque impratif) dans lequel Levinas nengage pas moins

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que Kant ou Nietzsche. Pour atteindre vraiment la ralit de la libert, la personne doit tre distingue des vicissitudes de ses motivations; contribuerait -il une explication anthropologique de lthique qui atteignent la dimension transcendante de la personne humaine. Dans l'ordre de l'tre, la personne doit rpondre quelque autre personne, et donc l'amour du bien fait place l'amour interpersonnel, donner et d'accepter, la plus haute forme de reconnaissance, comme le note Ricoeur. La coexistence interpersonnelle n'est pas la symtrie jetu de Buber, si vilipend par Levinas, mais l'empathie mutuelle, qui nest radicalement sans l'autre, cest--dire la crature sans le crateur. En tant que personne humaine est cre, plutt que de la justice, ou l'amour du bien, elle appel l'amour interpersonnel: jusqu' l'extrme, l'amiti filiale avec leur Crateur. Juan A. Garca Gonzlez Universidad de Mlaga, Spain LEVINAS, ANIMALITY, AND CATASTROPHE: CATCHING SIGHT OF A POST-HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS Levinas essay in Difficult Freedom, The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights, centers on his autobiographical story of internment in a Nazi camp and Bobby, a wandering dog that visits him there, who he (in)famously calls the last Kantian in Nazi Germany. (Levinas 153) In recent years, this remark has aroused a great deal of attention among scholars interested in the possibility of a Levinasian environmental ethics. (For instance, Calarco 2008; I-Ioule 2007; Atterton 2007) I-Iowever, Bobby is not the only animal appearing in this text. There are also his ancestors, the dogs of Exodus. These animals are as seldom-noted in recent animality scholarship as they are, Levinas tells us, in Talmudic commentaries on the laws and ordinances of the Old Testament. I remedy this lapse by revisiting two verses of Exodus Levinas brings to our attention in The Name of a Dog. The first is 11:7, which foreshadows the death of the first-born of Egypt. This catastrophe not only claims the eldest child of the Egyptians, but also the first-born of beasts. It is an event cutting across humanity and animality alike, binding their fates together. The second verse is Exodus 22:31, which forbids eating flesh torn by wild animals and commands that it be cast to the dogs, passed from the strong species to the weak. (Levinas 151) Of note here is that the relation between human and animal is not one of disinterest: Elohims command requires comparison, decision, responsiveness to the weaker of beasts in other words, it calls for a political calculation and intervention between two animal groups. It is not trivial that this intervention is mirrored in reverse when Bobby comes between two human groups: the Jewish prisoners and their Nazi captors. Thus in The Name of a Dog we glimpse some ways in which human and animal histories cross and entangle at points where they are mutually vulnerable to catastrophes like the I-Iolocaust or the Ten Plagues of Egypt. Moreover, Elohims injunction to care for weak beasts, and Bobbys friendliness toward the Jewish prisoners is suggestive of the kinds of political interventions that matter during moments of crisis or disaster. While others have noted this injunction to care for the animal world is implicit in the verses Levinas draws on (Llewelyn 1991), they have yet to be interpreted politically. Only recently have scholars of Levinas begun to suggest a political site for animals at all (Perpich 2008). I enter this conversation in agreement with this suggestion, and I frame it in terms of a history and vulnerability to catastrophes that we share with animals. My paper ends by proposing that the politics arising from this thought is post-I-Iistorical in the I-Iegelian sense, a politics that testifies to the end of the dialectic between Nature and I-Iistory, thus one marking the end of the human task. (Agamben 2000) These findings may bear out some important features of a politics that balances concern for man and animal, nation and ecosphere, bringing to a standstill the dialectic which continues to overlook animals and environments as ethical and political Others. Doug Halls University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada

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AU-DELA DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DE LA PITI: LA CONSOLATION Dans les Textes messianiques de Difficile libert, Emmanuel Levinas confre un statut singulier lun des quatre noms que le trait t a l m u d i q u e S a n h d r i n d o n n e a u M e s s i e : M e n a h e m , l e consolateur . la diffrence des trois autres noms Silo, Yinon et Hanina -, qui rappellent ceux des Sages de trois coles talmudiques, lexprience laquelle renvoie la consolation nest pas de lordre de la relation entre matre et lve. La consolation se distingue des valeurs signifies par les trois autres noms du Messie la paix, la justice et la piti sur un point capital: alors que ces dernires ont trait la collectivit, lespce ou lhumanit, la consolation instaure une relation strictement individuelle avec autrui: comme lcrit Levinas, On peut avoir piti dune espce, on ne console quune personne. (DL, 2003, p. 135). Pour Levinas, cette reconnaissance de lirrductibilit de la personne humaine la dfense de la subjectivit quil sassigne, la mme poque, dans Totalit et infini -, est le vritable but du messianisme. Cest en cela que le consolateur va plus loin que lhomme de la paix, de la justice et de la piti. Nanmoins, le privilge accord au consolateur dans les Textes messianiques ne va pas de soi. Comment peut-on le confrer un type de relation tranger la relation matre-disciple qui forme la structure mme du Talmud et gnralement, du Lernen, de ltude juive cette relation d enseignement qui, dans Totalit et Infini, sert penser le rapport avec autrui comme celui qui met en moi lide de lInfini ? Comment peut-on le justifier alors que tant de sources hbraques et la critique moderne de ces sources (notamment, G ersh o m Sch o le m ) vo ien t dan s sa di m en sio n c o lle ctive - linstauration de la paix universelle et de la justice sociale lessence mme du messianisme juif ? Levinas lui-mme nadhre-t-il pas cette conception en promouvant, dans la prface de Totalit et infini, leschatologie de la paix messianique , ou en considrant, dans Difficile libert, lavnement de la justice sociale comme la raison dtre de lEtat dIsral ? Par ailleurs, il met souvent des rserves lgard de la conception onctueuse, et au sens nietzschen, consolatrice de la religion , conception qui convient mal lthique rigoureuse propre au judasme, religion sans promesses, fussent-elles messianiques. Pourtant, cette vision positive de la consolation nest pas un hapax. On la trouve dj dans De lexistence lexistant o elle consiste galement dans la relation strictement personnelle que le Messie entretient avec lindividu qui souffre. En lisant le commentaire de Levinas sur les textes messianiques du Talmud la lumire de ce texte philosophique, le but de mon expos est de clarifier le sens particulier quil confre la consolation et, par l mme, au messianisme: ni compensation des peines endures ici-bas, ni attente et promesse dun avenir meilleur, mais espoir dun salut ou dun rachat qui concerne le prsent, linstant mme de la souffrance. Jolle Hansel Isral LEVINAS ON PHILOSOPHY AS A PROPHETIC POLITICS This paper argues that the significance of Levinas for ethics and political philosophy lies in the fact that his project does not concern ethics at all but rather the source of ethics. His question is: how is it that we are concerned about being ethical in the first place? Sensitive to the trajectory of his thought, this paper emphasizes the differences between his earlier and later thought. In his later work, Levinas abandons the attempt to craft a philosophical ethics, and puts into question the whole attempt to deduce solutions to political problems from a pregiven philosophical position. The result is an insight into the nature of philosophy itself as a prophetic politics. Levinass thought has no direct application to politics, and it is here the paradox of his work is manifested, viz. that it interrupts our attempt to understand rather than satisfying it.

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There is an inability to move from what Levinas says to a particular conclusion in any case with which we are concerned; our normal mental modus operandi is disrupted. In this way Levinass pointthat the source of ethics is an anarchy rather than an originis enacted. As soon as we start thinking about ethics its ungraspable source is effaced. Our situation is one of complete freedom, not only whether or not to be ethical, but as well with the form any ethical concern would take (it not being dictated by its anarchic source). With this infinite freedom comes infinite responsibility for everything; there are no ultimate assurances or a priori ethical standards to support us. We cannot know if we are truly ethical or holy, the latter word being both a term used by Levinas more and more extensively in the last two decades of his life, and a crucial idea for understanding the project of the late Levinas. The tenuous access or trace we have of this unknowable realm occurs precisely in an interruption of consciousness, preeminently in the form of unbearable suffering, a privileged metonym, it will be argued, for the realm beyond being. There are no direct, positive conclusions to be drawn concerning political morality from the beyond being or from the suffering of the other, only an unsettling formulation of limitless responsibility. But the exercise of this responsibility continues as before: we must try to do our best with what is given, and by following reason and experience attempt to discern what is to be done in the particular situation we find ourselves. Levinas is then much closer to the communitarian critique of liberalism which distinguishes between moral and technical knowledge and insists upon the rights of the former to be considered real knowledgethan is generally thought to be the case. Crucial differences of course remain, and this paper will bring some of them out through a contrast with the moral philosophies of Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. Philip J. Harold Robert Morris University, Pittsburgh, USA

MIDRASHIC ASSIGNATIONS: A PHARISAIC TRYST IN THE SONG OF SONGS In The Pharisee is Absent, Emmanuel Levinas addresses a polemic to an audience of Jewish readers concerning the loss of the Pharisaic sense of religious learning in the education of contemporary Jewish students. Written from out of his own involvement in running a Jewish day school in the aftermath of the Shoah, Levinas worries about enthusiasm...born of shamelessness among contemporary adherents of Judaism and mourns that there is no sign of one person for whom the meaning of the divine can no longer be expressed by the image of the source that springs up in each of us. By such a person, Levinas means the Pharisee, who, as Ephraim Meir has argued, establishes contact with God without merging with God. Through his study of Torah, he listens to what comes from the outside. But the Pharisee is also, as Levinas observes, a figure whose knowledge has been slandered. In this formulation Levinas indirectly alludes to two millennia of misreading and misprision propagated by the Christian gospels and the Church Fathers concerning the alleged hypocrisy, mean-spiritedness and narrow-mindedness of the Pharisee interlocutors of Jesus. In a post-Shoah existence, how does one then revivify the Pharisee, which is to say, the Rabbinical tradition which quickly evolved out of the Pharisaic movement? This question is important beyond the context of a Jewish audience. For among the many symptoms of that devastating wound that is named the Shoah is precisely the attack both from within Judaism and without upon the figure of the Pharisee. It is to be argued that what Levinas announces in a polemic becomes in his greatest philosophical works and particularly in Othewise than Being, a strategy for the renewing of philosophy through the undoing of this slander. Most often this is accomplished subtly, not by means of a frontal attack but rather through the introduction into his own philosophical argument of terms derived from rabbinical discourse or insights. These function to decenter or skew the possible Christian readings of whatever theme is being addressed. Paradoxically, the Pharisee is restored to Jewish thought in part through a renewing of the tradition of philosophy that heretofore for the most part wells up, at least from Levinass

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perspective, from a Greek account of reasoning spoken in a heavy Christian accent. This situation has kept philosophy from thinking the exteriority of transcendence with sufficient sensitivity to monotheistic tradition in its Jewish context. As Levinas puts it succinctly, The history of Western philosophy has not been the refutation of skepticism as much as the refutation of transcendence ( OB, 169). By introducing rabbinical thought into the thought of philosophy Levinas hopes to remedy, at least in part, the estrangement of philosophy and transcendence. One moment in this rabbinical renewal of philosophy occurs in Levinass introduction of the trope of assignation in Otherwise than Being. Levinas provides footnotes linking his use of this term to the lovers tryst in the Biblical Song of Songs.4 Without reference to the Song of Songs, Levinass very complex usage of the word assignation remains opaque in his text. But paradoxically, Levinass interpretation of this trope hyperbolizes the rabbinical reading of it, at least as it occurs in Song of Songs Rabbah.5 Whereas the rabbinical discussion there focuses on the souls relationship with G-d, as well as G-ds wrath in the wake of G-ds indulgence with the human soul, Levinas provocatively rereads ethically the assignation and its failure in terms of the human others singular approach. Thus, Levinass rabbinical reference, at least in this instance, works ambivalently by bringing both traditionsphilosophic and rabbinicalto offer rereadings of one another. In this manner Levinas not only introduces a rabbinical voice into his text put radicalizes the very senses of the rabbinical in his philosophical distillation of rabbinical discussion. Dr. James Hatley Salisbury University, Maryland, USA REVISITING THE RATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS SELF CONSCIOUSNESS OF A RELIGION FOR ADULTS In his 1957 essay A Religion for Adults Levinas makes the extraordinary claim that Ethics is not the corollary of the vision of God; it is that very vision. Ethics is an optic, such that everything I know of God and everything I can hear of His word and reasonably say to Him must find an ethical expression. Here the link between his philosophical writings and his specifically Jewish dimension appears in all its clarity and establishes a non-oppositional concept of rational and religious thought while also presaging key ideas from a number of subsequent philosophical and Jewish works, including Totality and Infinity, Nine Talmudic Readings, and Otherwise than Being. In Otherwise than Being, published almost twenty years after A Religion for Adults, Levinas fully articulates his earlier insight in the final chapter, wherein ethics is shown to be the very condition for the existence of rational subjectsthe very condition, not merely for a vision of God but for rational seeing as such. Ethics, that very vision [...] of God, is not merely a corollary of rational optics, but somehow is that very visionsomehow constitutes rational vision itself. Although his primary concern in the earlier text is Judaism, Levinas unequivocally connects these two visions of the rational and the religious in A Religion for Adults. Judaism, he notes, feels very close to the West, by which I mean philosophy; and in the West, philosophy has, by and large, been epistemology. Yet on what basis is it that Levinas connects rational and religious vision, so closely as to identify one with the other? How is it that seeing God is somehow identical with seeing reason?The expositional aim of our panel is to highlight the most basic structural symmetries that explicate this astonishing identity claim. The panel will consist of two presentations, each focused on one of these visions. The first will look at Levinas work on Jewish religious identity, and introduce the symmetries which appear in the more strictly philosophical work on the rational identity of subjects. Daras discussion of Jewish religious identity will explore its origins in obedience, prior to understanding, to a transcendent Imperative, (the knowledge of God comes to us through a commandment) the apparent threat (violence) to autonomy this obedience seems to present, and the inevitable danger of atheism, intrinsic to adult religion, which resistance to this threat presents and will be paralleled with Kevins discussion of

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Western rational identity which (i.) has its origin in an accusation prior to understanding, manifest as an obsession with justifyingi.e. with defending one's self, with giving reasons; this leads us to the apparent threat to rationality this aboriginal accusation presents (there appears to be no reason to accept its validity, no rational ground of it), and, as with the atheism in the religious case, raises the inevitable danger of skepticism this lack of a rational ground for the justifying project entails. With respect to choice of text: we have chosen A Religion for Adults not merely because of the symmetries it offers structurally, but also the position it occupies chronologically. Situated after Is Ontology Fundamental? yet prior to the publication of Totality and Infinity, A Religion for Adults reveals the Jewish dimension to Levinas later and more secular philosophical work, especially that found in Otherwise than Being with its critique of rationality as vision, its alternative view of rationality (ethics as vision or as an optic), and its claims for an ethical essence of religion. With respect to what the panel aims to contribute to Levinas studies in general: the broader goal is to deploy Levinas' extraordinary means of bridging the gap between the rational and the religious, via a single transcendent and unquestionable imperative which underlies both, to overcome the presently considerable gap between different approaches to Levinas, i.e. between a religious approach to his work and the approach of Analytic philosophy. We endeavor to participate in the continued growth of NALS and SIREL by showing how the content of Levinas' claims can lay the groundwork for encouraging this interdisciplinary dialogue about them. Dara Hill Indiana University, Bloomington, USA and Kevin Houser Indiana University, Bloomington, USA LEVINAS, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE SPLITTING OF HUMANITY INTO NATIVES AND STRANGERS During interviews, Levinas always insisted on a strict separation between his philosophical writings and those on matters related to Judaism. However, upon reading Difficult Freedom (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), one is struck by how often Levinas crosses this line when he presents key elements of his philosophical texts a discovery of ones encroachment on the other (16), the height of the other (17), the face (18), election (21, 51, 159, 176), asymmetric and infinite responsibility (pp. 21-22), the softening of the law (26, 147) as elements of Judaism and being Jewish. Such bridging feeds the concern that the philosophical texts for which Levinas has become famous is in fact Jewish ethics dressed in philosophical garb. Even if this were true, Levinass philosophical texts are able to stand on their own, and, in my view, should stand on their own. One encounters a similar problem when trying to identify the contours of Levinass political philosophy. While Levinass discussions of political philosophy are hardly extensive, he has very instructive things to say about freedom, institutions, justice, the state, and so on. Moreover, his brief forays into political philosophy, coupled with his other writings, hold powerful implications for many of the central questions of political philosophy. The problem is that when Levinas moves from a high level of abstraction to pronounce on how to balance competing values in politics he usually does so with reference to the state of Israel which in Difficult Freedom is described as special (218) and not like any other (250) instead of searching for more generally applicable answers. While many of Levinass discussions of political principle are colored by his focus on the unusual case of Israel, it does seem possible to distill his views on some of the more general problems of political philosophy. One such problem concerns the appropriate balance of responsibility for fellow-members of a political community and those beyond its borders, a debate that has been aggregated into cosmopolitan and communitarian sides. Although Levinasian ethics seem cosmopolitan the self is responsible for whoever shows up such

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an initial impression needs to be considered against his views of community, culture and the state. Many of the essays collected in Difficult Freedom are concerned with the relation between Jews and different neighboring groups, who are varyingly categorized as nonJews, Christians, Muslims and fellow French citizens. But there are moments in Difficult Freedom where it becomes clear that Levinas was also concerned with the more general problem of the splitting of humanity into natives and strangers (232). Difficult Freedom is therefore an important starting point for considering Levinass views on the appropriate general relation between insider and outsider, but these views need to be extracted from their application to the exceptional case of Israel and should also be considered in light of Levinass other writings. By doing so, my paper intends to clarify Levinass views on the generally appropriate relations between insiders and those on the outside of ones community. Eduard Jordaan Singapore Management University, Singapore THE BODHISATTVA PARADOX: A BUDDHIST ARGUMENT FOR LEVINASS ANTI-UTOPIANISM I take as a starting point the potential for radical politics latent in Levinass Difficult Freedom essays, especially as articulated by Oona Eisenstadt in Anti-Utopianism Revisited. From this starting point I ask how can the conceptual resources of Mahayana Buddism contribute to this political discussion? I find striking similarities between Levinass sense of Jewish stubbornnessthe stiff neck that rejects otherworldly salvation and denies a utopian messianism and the Buddist bodhisattva who steadfastly refuses nirvana while remaining committed to alleviating suffering in the present world. Both the bodhisattva and the messiah illustrate the impulse Levinas discusses in Messianic Texts to take on responsibility for the suffering of others. And both are amenable to a kind of political anti-utopianism, which declines to attenuate such responsibility by confusing commitment to the present with dreams for the future. What the bodhisattva metaphor adds to this notion of stubborn anti-utopianism is the dimension of compassion. As a value, compassion is certainly not opposed to Levinas Judaism, but it is the object of extended theorization in Buddhist thought. With reference to this theoretical framework, which links compassion to Buddhist doctrines concerning impermanence and nonattachment, I make a case that anti-utopianism occupies not only a stance of political critique but has its own transformative political agenda. Buddhism, in general, prioritizes becoming over being and is thus resistant to ontologizing interpretations. The impermanence of lived reality speaks to the lack of any ontological substantiality underlying the flux of existence. Because rigid attachment to transitory states of affairs leads only to frustration and unhappiness, Buddhism suggests non-attachment as an appropriate response to the impermanence of life. Certain strands of Buddhist thought differentiate detachment, which implies distancing oneself emotionally from the flux of existence, from non-attachment, which does not necessarily offer such emotional escape from the pain of loss due to impermanence. Indeed, an awareness of the suffering that results from transience is a central concern within Buddhism, giving value and meaning to the notion of compassion and the Mahayana bodhisattva ideal. In short, this ideal is the ability to practice compassion and non-attachment at the same time. It is the ability to remain compassionately committed to the present, even though that present may be fleeting. With compassion, we are able to work stridently for positive change in the present, while remaining non-attached to claims we can make on the future. Thus the bodhisattva ideal gives us a unique model with which to approach the often competing demands for flexibility and commitment in political action.Moreover, compassion counteracts the tendencies toward both defeatism and purely critical skepticism that Eisenstadt identifies as misguided responses to Levinas politics. To be committed to present projects, while being open to the inevitable and ever-impending loss of that to which one is committed, is to feel, as Levinas interprets Samuels position in Talmudic debates over messianism, the permanent

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effort of renewal which would be necessary even if the messianic age were to arrive. Thus, combining compassion and stubbornness, the politics of anti-utopian messianism becomes radical, not only because it pits itself against one or another instance of societal oppression, but because it retains its stubborn urgency and its capacity for creative transformation even in contexts of societal harmony. Leah Kalmanson University of Hawai'i, Hawaii, USA EMMANUEL LEVINAS, EDUCATION AFTER THE SHOAH. Sixty years after the Shoah, despite the countless humanistic discussions and opinions nowadays, we are permanent confronted with the barbary of war, with the suffering of people, as well as the so-called new anti-Semitism. The humanistic thinking of our time is ineffectual here, which, according to the philosopher Emmanuel Lvinas makes rethinking inevitable. This progressive oblivion of values led European humanism to a crisis according to Levinas. This crisis of humanism began, with the inhuman events of the history of the 20 th century and of the recent history and found expression particularly in Shoah. Levinas describes Shoah in his writing as abandonment of the victims and to put/ putting in question their humanity. Interregnum or end of the Institution, or as if being itself had been suspended. Nothing was official anymore. Nothing was objective. Not the least manifesto on the rights of Man. These inhumanities not only found expression on the level of the historical events but on the level of science, of philosophy and liberal politics as well. The science that wants to calculate the real without always thinking it, as though it were created on its own in the human brain, without man, who is reduced purely and simply to the fields in which operations of numbers unfold, to the fields of statistics. The ambitional philosophical enterprise subordinates the humans to the anonymous gains of Being, to the ontology. The liberal politic suppress neither exploitation nor war. According to Levinas the Jewish experience of the concentrations camps, of the anti-Semitic which is in its essence hatred for a man who is other than oneself, for the other man, could assist in a movement towards a doctrine, better able than the humanism to give a meaning to being and life and to keep alive the persecuted mans human essence. Levinas interprets Judaism as humanity on the brink of morality without institution, as the Jewish men discovers a human before discovering landscapes or towns. Jews find their place in society first, and only later discover their place in the home: they understand the world on the basis of the Other rather than the whole of being functioning in relation to the earth. In his writing, Levinas often underscored his connection to Judaism to various degrees. He also noticed the need to complement and deepen the European humanism with Jewish ethical tradition. Perhaps from this point on also, Levinas speaks about the education in the context of Jewish education only in his work. I would like to present some reflections on the thinking about Education after the Shoah. My presentation will firstly focus on a basic category of the thinking of Levinas: that is on another perception of the other person, the child the metaphysical one. Finally, I attempt to present a key aspect of Levinas educational thinking - responsibility, authenticity and justice. My comments and statements are guided by basic ideas which are presented by Levinas in his essay Anti-humanism and education. Monika Kaminska University of Hamburg, Germany

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DIFFICULTY IN THE FACE OF THE OTHER: THE ETHICAL (RE) GROUNDING OF EXISTENTIAL PERFORMATIVITY In this essay, I analyze and discuss how Judith Butlers concept of performativity works as a critique of critical existential conceptions of subjectivity as well as a corrective in regards to understanding and delimiting how ethical questions of individual responsibility and agency can be understood. In line with the fundamental insights of Emmanuel Levinass approach to approaching difficult freedom through the face of the Other, Butler seeks to approach the conditions under which subjectivity unfolds, relying primarily on a critically oriented conception of discourse and the need to break ties with the narcissism of an ontologically grounded subject. Particularly I analyze the concept of existential performance, as understood through a critical appropriation of intentionality and facticity as found in traditional existential phenomenology. In so doing, I display how the post-structural concept of performativity deconstructs the ontological assumptions of critical existential performance, displaying fundamental problems imbedded in existential philosophy. By illuminating an uncritical assumption imbedded in existential thinking about the simple thereness of the subject, and by analyzing the conditions under which the subject is produced, it will be seen that the task of existential phenomenology needs to be radically re-evaluated, particularly in relation to Levinass approach to the Other. Butler sees in Levinas a conception of ethics that rests upon an apprehension of the precariousness of life, one that begins with the precarious life of the Other, and it is this precariousness that she attempts to analyze within the inner workings of discourse. Accordingly, a critical ethics requires that we can account for or at least position ourselves philosophically to understand the constitutive elements that lie below our feet. If we do not take into account the processes of discursive production, covert binaries remain covered up, allowing for a false sense of accountability in critical existential philosophy. Secondly, if we assume that the primary move of an existentially sound political theory is that of critical self-relation and action, it appears that we also overlook an imbedded narcissism at the heart of the subject. Butlers conception of performativity certainly re-orients subjectivity, but does so in order to usher in a philosophy of otherness and one of difference, which attempts in its critical gesture to provide a humility, and highlights the difficulty missing in the existential claims to critical agency and what has traditionally been termed as freedom. In the vein of Levinass shifting of the grounds of phenomenology, this essay will make clear that the concept of performativity does not eradicate the agency of the subject, but rather works to explain how, due to the nature of history and discourse, the agential subject of humanism has been normatively assumed in our day to day lives. By critiquing and contrasting critical existential performance with the constitutive power of performativity, this essay works to establish the need for a post-humanist attitude of humility, one that can guide us in thinking through the possibilities of ethical subjectivity without installing an uncritical awareness of the very tools of our inquiries. Brian C. Kanouse Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA

FROM LEVINASS ETHICS AND SPIRIT THROUGH DERRIDAS VIOLENCE AND METAPHYSICS TO INFINITY AND IMMANENCE: TWO READINGS OF ROSENZWEIG The latest book cited in Derridas essay Violence and Metaphysics, Levinass Difficult Freedom, leads with Spirit and Ethics, which bisects Greek and Jew, distinguishing a spiritualism (Geistlichkeit) that violently encloses everything and a spirit (ruach) commanding resistance of violence. Restraining domination or sovereignty to expose oneself presupposes recognition that a self which is not myself can exist. However the vocative do not kill me, from Rosenzweigs revelation, brings thought and being to ruin against otherness. Levinas cites Aristotle, one must philosophize in order not to philosophize. In opposing desire to a

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premetaphysical unity, physical freedom, Derrida argues, Levinas assumes a positive infinity (Rosenzweigs blindfolded synagogue). Language betrays ambiguity, the speaking face precedes ontology and yet the speech of war precedes God. Derrida cites Rosenzweigs appeal to a certain force that remains opposite of bellicosity. The ambiguous language of violence is history. History demands (contingent, contextual) recognition of, respect for the other as other, specifically, another one (like me). That presupposes a (nonethical) violence of essence dissimulated in the time it takes to unveil, manifest existence. Leading beyond totality, ethics cannot outrun the difference between Being and beings. To be other is another being, not a totality but an origin. (Being other is being itself). The ontic-ontological difference is (or takes) time. Challenging Levinass (1965) reading of Rosenzweig that Judaism posits itself unconditionally, gains the right to judge history, Derrida (in 1988) finds Rosenzweigs eternal people inscribed in a history under the sign of the law (expanding do not kill into love your neighbor). Rosenzweigs new thinking differs from logic because it needs the other and, what amounts to the same, takes time seriously. Levinas (wrongly, to Derrida) subordinates time to the other. The Judaic height cannot fend off a Greek return: not to philosophize is still to philosophize. Levinass 1975 God and Philosophy counters, the biblical God, acting without analogy, transcends being altogether, leaving only a trace otherwise than being (his 1973 tome). The infinite is non- and in- the finite by adding a new (extrinsic) layer of meaning without being, nonindifference or disinter-estedness. The infinite passes the finite because it orders the neighbor to me. Exposing oneself to the other, saying without words, but not without empty hands, demands following no sequence of events but, instead, a retrogression of past suffering into present healing. Edith Wyschogrod wrote: Vulnerability is not subject to closure; an ethics of remembering commands less the anatomy of war, or play, than a-chronological recovery of impossible alternatives. In 1980, Derrida wonders how one who retains the passing of God does not turn the other of the other over to the feminine [elle], wounded, wounding, impossible utterance in the depths of the same. Levinas restates in Philosophy and Transcendence (1989): behind all unveiling truths, ethics turns around the self as if the order were formulated in the voice of the very one who obeys it. In accord Derrida bids Levinas Adieu (1995): to open a closure is to dis-close, to disrobe and to denude. Violence against violence beckons and begets a life for a life. Gregory Kaplan Rice University (USA) REGARDING RESNAIS: LEVINASIAN ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN ALAIN RESNAIS NIGHT AND FOG Emmanuel Levinas, in the foreword to Difficult Freedom writes, To find oneself a Jew in the wake of the Nazi massacres therefore meant once more taking up a position with regard to Christianity, on another level again to the one sovereignly assumed by Jules Isaac (xiii). Levinas expresses the very difficulty of being a Jew after the Holocaust. To be a Jew, one will have to be placed in a binary relationship with regard to Christianity. What stands out in this quote in the very phrase, with regard to. To understand the term regard, we have to look to a quote in Jacques Derridas Memoirs of the Blind, where he reminds us, Before doubt becomes a system, skepsis [or skepticism] has to do with the eyes. The word refers to a visual perception, to the observation, vigilance, and attention of the gaze [regard] during an examination (1). If regard is the attention of the gaze, regard has a political meaning, to elicit a form of (in)sight from what is being looked at. If regard has to do with skepsis or skepticism, there is doubt, a form of hesitation, or blindness, towards eliciting something from what is looked at. This gives regard an ethical meaning. Politically, to regard means to look at, gaze upon, observe (OED 1a). Levinas describes the political relationship between Western Christianity and Judaism, explaining, Christianity had accustomed Western Judaism to thinking of these origins as having dried up or as having been submerged under more lively tides (xiii) The Self (Christianity) asserts its identity on the expense of the Other (Judaism). In Resnais Night and Fog, one can see this in the black and white historical footages of the film. As the viewer sees Nazi soldiers marching, the voiceover informs us that in

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1933. The [Nazi] machine goes into action. The viewer elicits the (in)sight of history, as historical footage displays Jewish suffering and Jews perishing in the Holocaust. As viewers watch a bulldozer pushing Jewish corpses into a pit, and Jewish men, women, and children forced to carry the corpses of their fellow internees, we become aware that the Germans assert their identity onto the Jews. The Self asserts its identity on the Other. Yet, to regard also means to look after, take care of (OED 2), alluding to ones responsibility to the other, the ethical. Even while Christianity had asserted its identity on Judaism, [t]he experience of Hitler brought many Jews into fraternal contact with Christian who opened their hearts to them [...] risked everything for their sake (xiii). Christians cared for Jewish men, women, and children during the Holocaust. In Night and Fog, one the color footage shows the concentration camp as vacant places. At the same time, the voiceover comments, No current runs through the wires. No footstep is heard but our own. Both the visuality and narration point to an absence, something hidden from sight. Resnais avoids a gruesome portrayal of the Holocaust, to avoid making it unreal and incomprehensible to his viewers. He bears responsibility to the Jews. The Self cares for the Other. The Self takes responsibility for the Other. Using Emmanuel Levinas Difficult Freedom, I explore the ethics of responsibility cinematically, especially in one of the first Holocaust documentaries, Alain Resnais Night and Fog. The key question of my paper is: Does Resnais film successfully bears responsibility for the Holocaust? Kiat Goh Nanyang Technological University Singapore, Singapore THE DIFFICULT FREEDOM OF GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITY In A Religion for Adults, Levinas tells us that, [in order for] equality to make its entry into the world, beings must be able to demand more of themselves than of the Other, feel responsibilities on which the fate of humanity hangs.... 1 This line, I argue, captures the nature of our difficult freedom. Tracing the themes of violence and justice through a number of key essays from Difficult Freedom, I seek to explain the freedom held by individuals in a world that is increasingly democratized and privatized, living lives in which they can travel across the globe in a day, independently invest their capital in foreign governments and business, and communicate globally, sharing values and viewpoints. In arguing for the supreme relevance of Levinas work in this era of unprecedented global integration, I also draw upon examples and insights of three authors on globalization who offer philosophically insightful explorations of human freedom: Thomas Friedman, Amy Chua, and Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen.2 I begin with an exploration of the violence that [seeks] out in the Other...the weakness that betrays his person. 3 This violence occurs politically, culturally, and economically, resulting in not only the savagery of war and genocide, or the tragedy of cultural homogenization, but also the possession and exploitation inherent in modern forms of economic development, which offer to people the promise of prosperity and independence, while prioritizing corporate profit over human dignity. These, I argue, are forms of violence that are grounded not in mere instinct, which is, in fact, lawful.4 Rather, this violence is grounded in our freedom, and the ultimate consequence of freedoms failure is the perpetual war of each against all. 5 This freedom is also, however, capable of justice, so I turn to several essays in Difficult Freedom which articulate a complex and enlightening notion of justice, using these explanations to illuminate relevant examples. We often misunderstand justice as the enactment of eye for an eye violence that repays, in kind, the disfigurement or wound that bleeds for all time an eternal haemorrhage. 6 We fail to realize that justice is wiser than that, and, when grounded in a primordial peace, it puts an end to this chain reaction. 7 Further, whether political, social, or economic, justice also demands the freedom...of an emancipated man remembering his servitude and feeling solidarity for all enslaved people, 8 and the spirit of patience that is essential[ly] link[ed]...to true revolution. 9 It requires the essential features of non-violent resistance: [t]olerance that paves the way to [ethical] love,

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when it does not already proceed from it, 10 as well as the will that undertakes to do something despite the paralyzing obstacles in its way and hope...in the absence of reasons forhope. 11 This justice concerns the infinite resources of the spirit which freely...enter[s] into the cause of the Other. 12 As in the Old Testament, 13 this notion of justice as sacrifice is found in Matthew, where service to the least of these brothers is service to God. 14 Freedom, when invested with responsibility, seeks justice and transcendence. Katherine E. Kirby St. Michaels College, Burlington, USA LA POLITIQUE ET LE POLITIQUE AU-DELA DE LA POLITIQUE EMMANUEL LEVINAS ET JAN PATOCHKA SUR LA CONDITION HUMAINE DU XXE SIECLE En ce qui concerne le rapport prcaire de la politique et de lthique on peut facilement constater quaujourdhui la plupart des thoriciens accepte un point de vue dit systmique . Les grands systmes sociaux, y compris lthique et la politique (au moins partir de la modernit) sont les uns les autres des terrains totalement indpendants et chaque sous-systme fonctionne selon ses propres lois internes. Jan Patoka, grand philosophe tchque du XXe sicle, se rvolte notamment contre cette conception. Luvre thorique de Patoka, ainsi que sa prise de position personnelle, sont exemplaires pour dmontrer que la conception qui considre la morale comme phiphnomenale et intenable. Le philosophe tchque a lutt durant toute sa vie contre toute version de toute sorte de rductionnisme, comme le dogmatisme thologique du positivisme, la dification de la technocratie, le scientisme, le marxisme, etc. Cest pour cela que Patoka conoit la question de la rsistance dans un modle plus gnral : il met en vidence quil faut rsister aux systmes ouvertement totalitaires; en outre, il faut galement voir que la morale ne peut pas tre base sur un fondement idologique, puisque la techo-science moderne est capable de paralyser toute rsistance. Et cela exclut lapplication de la morale des fins tactiques de la politique. Chez Patoka il sagit dun politique qui se trouve au-del politique ou, en autres termes, une transpolitique. Les catgories cl de cette transpolitique sont le sacrifice, le dissident et le soin de lme . La posture intellectuelle de Lvinas est en apparence analologe celle de Patoka. Il accepte ausssi que ltat, cest dire la forme visible de la politique, doive tre une condition ncessaire de la coexistence humaine durable, mais pas plus... Ltat fonctionne impersonnellement, Ltat ne pleure pas , dit Lvinas. Il considre en gnral ltat sous laspect de ladministration, de lordre et de la hirarchie. Ltat peut tre juste, au sens de la justice rendue la partie impartiale (au Tiers). Mais cet tat de Csar , y compris sous sa forme plus dveloppe, la dmocratie moderne, bloque sur le premier palier du ltat pr-messianique. Au contraire, tat de David est la fois au-del de ltat de Csar et en dea de son accomplissement. En autres termes : Ltat de David est toujours venir, cest une promesse qui attend de saccomplir. La source de ce messianisme se trouve dans la Jrusalem biblique. Lajos Andrs Kiss cole Suprieur de Nyregyhza, Hongrie PATERNITY, MATERNITY, SUBJECTIVATION: Natality In Totality And Infinity And Otherwise Than Being Totality and Infinity considers the rise of ethical alterity though paternity and Otherwise than Being the development of ethical subjectivity through maternity. i In Totality and Infinity Levinas considers together fecundity and paternity as a figuration of the ethical relation. Levinas opens with a reconsideration of metaphysics and transcendence and concludes by looking "beyond the face" through love, eros, and fecundity to "the infinity of time." ii Rather than separation and

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possession, the child represents to and for the parent coexistence and "incommensurability." For Levinas, the paternal relationship is uniquely structured. The child is at the same time the stranger, the Other, the neighbor who is in some sense also myself. Here, the child (the son for Levinas) is this selfsame Other who can neither be reduced to the father's work nor to the father's property, yet who is somehow essentially of , and coextensive to, the father.iii The strangely familiar Other of paternity, of fecundity, of the one who is Other but who is in some sense still of me. Paternity finds its converse in filiation in which the father-son "relationship designates a relation of rupture and a recourse at the same time." iv In Otherwise than Being, maternity rather than paternity subtends the ethical relation. "Maternity in the complete being 'for the other' which characterizes it is the ultimate sense of this vulnerability [to the other]," for "maternity [is] gestation of the other in the same." v Rather than preparing the dwelling as in Totality and Infinity, the maternal "not only provides but becomes the dwelling-place for the stranger. For Levinas, the maternal body gives despite itself, without having chosen to give; she emerges as "wounded, persecuted, vulnerable, exposed, held hostage by the other." vi Birth and natality emerge as anarchic phenomenon. In effect, across these two major texts Levinas outlines a phenomenology of parenthood in relation to natality. Parenting and natality are found to be inseparable, and the emergence of a child into the world enables maternity and paternity. Levinas's articulation of subjectivity turns from eros, voluptuousity, and fecunditythe pleasures of lived experiencein Totality and Infinity toward a vocabulary of abjection and destitution in Otherwise than Being.vii Risking a reduction of these profound and beautiful meditations, it is as if Levinas has also described the jouissance of natalityits simultaneous ecstasy and horror from the perspective of the child. In Totality and Infinity, "voluptuosity" names the caress of skin upon skin or the open face of child raised in wonder and joy toward the parent, "a transsubstantiation beyond every possible project, beyond every meaningful and intelligent power" that "engender[s] the child." viii In Totality and Infinity, Levinas's phenomenology of voluptuousity and fecundity, paternity and filiation, redefines transcendence in the face of the other (child) as a pluralist existing. ix The son appears as a promise to the father of an open future rather than a foreclosed past, and the maternal subsists in the preparation of home, dwelling, and hospitality. In Otherwise than Being, "the self is a sub-jectum; it is under the weight of the universe, responsible for everything." x The subject comes to be in pain, insomnia, obsession, passivity, trauma, hunger, wounding, hostage, persecution, debt, and most crucially, substitution: "The responsibility for another, an unlimited responsibility which the strict book-keeping of the free and non-free does not measure, requires subjectivity as an irreplaceable hostage." xi The demand of the other places the subject in the accusative, in a passivity beyond passivity, prior to any nominative. xii Imagine the world of the newborn, where the jubilance of sensation threatens at any point to become oppression and the horror of feeling overlaps into the joy of contact, where caregivers are unknowable gods upon whose every breath the child waits in worship and the child's every action is designed to entreat. The figure of the child is central to examination of paternity in Totality and Infinity and maternity in Otherwise than Being, but the different orders natality in the two texts not only articulate a phenomenology of infantile subjectivation but also extend the possibilities of mature ethical relation through a Levinasian consideration of aging: "Time passes ( se passe). This synthesis which occurs patiently, called with profundity passive synthesis, is ageing." xiii "The subject," Levinas writes, "has to be described on the basis of the passivity of time." Daniel T. Kline, University of Alaska, Anchorage, USA CREATION THE BIBLICAL ORIGINS OF DIFFERENCE AND ALTERITY In a quotation from Difficult Freedom (p. 272) Levinas writes about the difference of Jewish identity which resists subordination to the universality and totality of an equal humanity (humanit gale). The election of Jewish people, faithful to the Judgement, shows the priority of particularity over the universality of Reason. Levinas demands no less than a fundamental reversal: particular is prior to universal, difference is prior to unity and equality. But this original

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difference should be understood as a true source of freedom: the freedom to be different. However, it is a difficult freedom, since there is no possibility of unity, conciliation and quietude. The universal pretension of the difference analogous to the universal mission of the elected people challenges Logos (Reason) itself. The difference does not want to be different from Logos but rather, a different Logos; a Logos of difference: a rationality which not only includes difference but originates from it. In my paper I intend to reflect on the origins of this difference, which does not figure only as an apology for Jewish particularity, but is rooted in the very heart of biblical tradition. The difference results from the original biblical horizon which is one of personal relationship and alterity. One of its fundamental expressions is the idea of creation. Creation ex nihilo, unknown to the Greeks, can serve as a counterpoint to Greek understanding of the world and Logos. In their cosmological perspective they admire the eternal laws which govern the cosmos including the humans. Their Logos is conceived of accordingly: as an eternal and universal meaning surpassing particularity, individuality, time and history. On the contrary, the Jewish idea of creation does not originate from contemplation of the world, but from the understanding of a transcendent and personal God who enters into relationship with man, or the elected people. Creation (and also the revelation of God, which precedes the idea of creation) is a unique event, not founded in an eternal logical necessity but in a free decision of a personal God. In the beginning there is a personal call (the Word, Logos), to which only man within creation can fully respond. The personal relationship presupposes difference between its participants; it is characterized by freedom, contingency and history. This creation represents an asymmetrical relation, in which a created being is in a state of absolute passivity, unable to ground itself or to assume a universal perspective. This idea of creation represents a fundamental difference at the very onset, without any possibility of being overcome by unity. The Logos (hebr.: dabar) still plays a fundamental role, but beneath the unity of meaning (said) there is a difference and a diachrony of relationship (saying). The difference wants to be better than unity: it opens up a horizon of infinity; it reveals Logos in its transcendent vocation, in the ethical excess of its meaning. The plea for the Jewish difference in the writings of Levinas thus coincides with the claim for the universal ethical vocation of the Logos. Branko Klun University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia UNE ESQUISSE POUR UNE RFLEXION SUR LHRITAGE SPINOZISTE ET LEVINASSIEN 1. La comparaison entre Spinoza et Levinas simpose pour plusieurs raisons. Certaines sont videntes : dabord les philosophes reprsentent les deux figures de la prsence juive dans la Modernit. Les figures opposs dambl mais cette opposition, comme cest souvent le cas en philosophie, trahit les affinits intimes et parfois inattendus. Deuximement, le premier comme le deuxime nous disent beaucoup sur cette mme Modernit. Le premier en linaugurant ( sa propre manire) le deuxime en la clturant (aussi a faon inou). LOpus Magnum de Spinoza conu comme achvement de la mtaphysique sintitule lEthique, Levinas quant lui, nous a propos de penser lthique comme la philosophie premire. Lenjeu qui se dessine ici ne se dduit nullement un jeu de mots... 2. Dans Difficile Libert Levinas nous prsente deux mditations sur Spinoza. Le premire concerne le trahison de ce dernier. Ce trahison na prcisment rien voir avec la controverse du cherem. Elle consiste plutt un geste intellectuel spinozien de rduire le Judasme un rle du parrain de christianisme. Et pourtant Spinoza nest jamais devenu chrtien (cest qui pouvais lui coter la vie). Dans la deuxime, Levinas fais une sorte dapologie de texte blasphmatoire par excellence Trait theologico-politique. Spinoza, comme lindique Levinas, na pas tord de rejeter le caractre descriptif et reprsentatif de lEcriture, il dcouvre en revanche que la Tora est essentiellement un commandement exposition de la raison pratique et de la raison thique. Ici on peut tracer un souci commun pour Levinas et Spinoza - - celui de lutter contre idoltrie.

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Limagination et enthousiasme sopposent lamour du Dieu. Spinoza est souvent accus de la divinisation lEtre. Mais il faut remarquer que Spinoza nest pas Heidegger. LEtre ne nous dvoile rien en dehors de la raison. LEtre est aussi fondamentalement indiffrent envers lhomme. Lamour de Dieu est asymtrique. Lamour de Dieu ne peut donc pas tre autre chose que lamour de soi et lamour de son prochain pris simultanment. ( lexception de amor intellectualis Dei, un concept spinoziste auquel on attache souvent trop dimportance). La raison spinozoste est une raison ethique La formule spinoziste lhomme est un Dieu pour lhomme comporte plus quune simple sonorit Levinasienne. 3. La substitution et le contaus esssendi en tant que modalits constitutives de la subjectivation et de la communaut semblent se placer aux antipodes conceptuels. Il ny pas lieu de rduire lune lautre ni de dduire lune de lautre. Mais es-que cela veut dire quon doit pas chercher une mdiation possible entre ses extrmes ? Cest peut tre dans lordre politique quune telle mdiation, mme si partielle et provisoire, pourrai se produire. Cest parce que je vis dans la socit que jai le droit de rester en vie. Michal Kozlowski, Universit de Varsovie ,Pologne

LA VIOLENCE ET LA FORCE DU LANGAGE DANS LA PHILOSOPHIE DE LEVINAS Quel est le rapport du langage avec la violence? Quelle est la force du langage? ces questions essentielles non seulement pour nous mais aussi pour les philosophes anglo-saxons, Emmanuel Levinas, qui a tent de penser la relation avec Autrui comme langage , semble rpondre en mettant en opposition la non-violence du langage et la violence de la connaissance de lobjet. Cependant, la conception lvinassienne de la nonviolence, dont la problmatique a t releve par Jacques Derrida dans son essai Violence et mtaphysique , nest pas si simple. En revenant au point de dpart de la notion lvinassienne de violence, qui apparat dans le premier article de Difficile Libert, intitul thique et Esprit (1952), la prsente tude essaie de dnouer lentrelacement entre la violence et la force du langage dans la philosophie de Levinas, et de penser cet entrelacement du point de vue strictement linguistico-philosophique, afin dy chercher une radicalit par rapport la tradition philosophique, mais aussi par rapport la philosophie contemporaine du langage. En analysant thique et Esprit , nous montrerons dabord que Levinas a forg la notion large mais prcise de violence, pour la mettre en contraste avec la raison et le langage qui sont extrieurs la violence . Ensuite, pour examiner des prsuppositions constitutives de cette argumentation, nous les mettrons en relation avec la distinction quEric Weil a tablie entre la violence et le discours, distinction cruciale quil partage avec Levinas lui-mme, mais que celui-ci prend en un autre sens. Pour Levinas, lessentiel de cette distinction consiste introduire la raison dans le rapport du sujet parlant avec Autrui. Afin de redfinir la valeur philosophique de cette raison qui est distingue de la raison thorique ou objectivante, nous devrons comprendre avec prcision certains rapports conceptuels dans la philosophie de Levinas, parmi lesquels la non-violence du langage, la force dans le discours et la violence de la connaissance. Pour ce faire, nous examinerons la conception lvinassienne, dune part, par comparaison avec la tradition philosophique (surtout hglienne) et, dautre part, en la confrontant avec la thorie austinienne de lacte de langage . Cette dernire nous apportera, grce sa ressemblance et sa diffrence, plusieurs clarifications sur la notion lvinassienne de violence , de force et de raison . Ainsi, nous essayerons enfin de dvoiler une radicalit de la thorie lvinassienne du sens, qui consiste montrer la modalit non-violente du langage dans lorientation au destinataire et la modalit non-violente de la subjectivation dans la force du langage. Shojiro Kotegawa Universit Paris X Nanterre, France

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COMMUNICATIVE CORPOREALITY: BODY, SELF, AND ALTERITY IN LEVINAS AND WATSUJI Among other things, Levinas Difficult Freedom concerns varieties of communication. In Signature, the short essay at the very end of Difficult Freedom, Levinas offers a characteristically pregnant, and characteristically elusive, remark, essentially a condensation of the main themes animating his entire corpus. He writes: The fundamental experience which objective experience itself presupposes is the experience of the Other. It is experience par excellence. As the idea of the Infinite goes beyond Cartesian thought, so is the Other out of proportion with the power and freedom of the I. The disproportion between the Other and the self is precisely moral consciousness[which is]not a modality of psychological consciousness, but its condition. The primitive encounter with the radical alterity of the Other, Levinas insists, thus communicates the very possibility of experiencing my world at all. Taken in light of other formulations (e.g., crucial passages in Otherwise than Being), Levinas insists that this encounter is something that unfolds at the pre-predicative level of our embodied, affectively-laden interpersonal encounters. Thus, moral consciousness, in this Levinasian sense, is the very ground of all other forms of experience. The body communicates this fact. This paper critically evaluates Levinas model of body, self, and alterity. I argue first that, despite his laudable phenomenological sensitivity to many facets of embodiment, Levinas nevertheless failed to develop an adequate (or even consistent) formulation of the relation between body and alterity. I argue further that his failure stems from Levinas overarching commitment to an atomistic conception of self. This commitment motivates Levinas default portrayal of the self-other relation as one of radical asymmetry, that is, a relation of absolute Otherness-to-Otherness. I show how this theoretical commitment to an atomistic bodily self precludes Levinas from making the sort of claim present in the passage quoted above. I also summon empirical research from developmental psychology to demonstrate the explanatory inadequacy of Levinas account here. But my intentions are not purely critical. As a point of contrast with Levinas, I discuss the phenomenological ethics of Tetsuro Watsuji, a twentieth century Japanese thinker. Like Levinas, Watsuji was concerned with ethics as first philosophyand more precisely, with developing a phenomenology of embodied ethics. Despite some crucial differences, there is thus a natural affinity between them. I focus in particular on Watsujis Zen Buddhist-inspired formulation of the human self as in-betweeness (aidagara). Drawing upon Buddhist notions of emptiness (sunyata) and no-self (anatman), Watsuji argues that the self is constituted within a perpetual movement of double-negation: a betweenness in which individuality negates sociality and sociality, in turn, negates individuality. The human self is thus empty of fixed identity, as this double-negation is perpetual and persistent. At first glance, this model of self appears to be diametrically opposed to Levinas. However, I spell out some ways that their views are actually compatible. Moreover, I show how Watsujis model can preserve some of Levinas most important insights while nevertheless correcting some of the difficulties mentioned above. I conclude by again returning to empirical work in developmental psychology to support my claims. Joel W. Krueger University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark A DIFFICULT AESTHETICS: LEVINAS AND THE FACE OF LITERATURE Although not a text focused explicitly on aesthetic issues, Levinass Difficult Freedom reiterates and develops conceptualizations of the artwork found throughout his work. It also recapitulates the complexity, tension, and apparent contradictions underlying what might be

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described as Levinas aesthetics. In his brief attack on Paul Claudel, for example, Levinas suggests that figurationthe hallmark of Catholic and Christian hermeneuticsreplaces the persons of the Old Testament with a series of lifeless figures, thus stripping the text of its ethical immediacy. These remarks seem to echo more general observations about the immorality of the artwork, under whose rubric literary texts fall. In essays such as Reality and its Shadow, Levinas asserts that mimetic works freeze the face into an imagea repeatable totality into which the viewer is irresistibly drawn. Although possessing derision for artworks closely resembling Platos, Levinas nevertheless frequently alludes to the work of several prominent artists, describing their work in terms of the highest moral value. The issue becomes especially complicated when the textuality of scripture itself becomes the object of analysis. How does scripture evade the problems. Levinas associates with the aesthetic? Given the centrality of the biblical text for the formation of the Jewish people, the issue troubles the ethical validity of tradition itself. Put differently, if the bible is a work of art, how can it help to found or perpetuate an ethical community? Levinas seems to recognize this ambiguity in Difficult Freedom when he suggests that art seeks to give a face to things, and in this its greatness and its deceit simultaneously reside. Using several of Levinass works, this paper will explore what the attempt to give a face to things means, and wherein the greatness of this attempt might lie. The questions this analysis will attempt to answer are: What differentiates a deceitful text from an ethical one? How does the Old Testament escape the problem of mimesis? Is there something essential to ethical texts or do they become ethical through a method of interpretationmidrash as opposed to figuration? Can mimetic works become ethical as they mark or enact their own limitations? What is the essential difference between scripture and literature? In summation, the purpose of the paper will be to explore the possibility or impossibility of Levinasean modes of literary interpretationof a Levinasean hermeneutics. Alexander Erik Larsen University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame,USA DIFFICILE LIBERT DE RINVENTER LE JUDASME DAPRS-GUERRE EN FRANCE : La Rsistance par les tudes Hbraques. Nous proposons dexaminer la facette moins connue mais dcisive de lactivit intellectuelle et professionnelle dEmmanuel Lvinas, savoir sa tche dducateur et de directeur de lcole normale isralite orientale, lcole de formation dinstituteurs juifs de lAlliance isralite universelle dont il prend la direction sa rouverture aprs-guerre Paris en 1946. Lvinas a t en effet toute sa vie un vritable penseur de lducation juive engag dans une praxis. Nous faisons lhypothse qu travers ses textes, confronts sa doctrine et sa pratique pdagogique et ducative, et dans le contexte global du lancement des coles juives temps plein dans la France daprs-guerre, nous sommes mme de prendre la mesure dune rvolution historique opre au sein du judasme franais travers lducation, rvolution laquelle il a particip. Dans les crits de Difficile libert sur lducation juive et lassimilation, ne faut-il pas entendre lexhortation user de la libert retrouve pour rinventer une identit juive franaise dont les contours idologiques passs ont t briss par la trahison de Vichy? Nous faisons le pari de reconstituer la place quil occupe dans le panorama intellectuel juif de laprs-guerre partir des citations de Difficile libert sur laction des ducateurs et penseurs juifs tels Jacob Gordin, Lon Asknazi, Andr Nher, Robert Gamzon. Nous apprcierons le renversement des perspectives opr simultanment par ces matres auprs de leur jeune public et le sens recouvr par la rvaluation communment partage des textes juifs au sortir de la guerre. Lvinas lui-mme dnomma en 1962 cole juive de Paris ce vaste mouvement de retour aux textes dploy dans un lan de transmission aux jeunes juifs de laprsguerre du Talmud, de la Bible et de la Kabbale. Du point de vue de lidentit intellectuelle du judasme franais, que signifie la rorientation qui prend place lintrieur des tudes hbraques?

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Nous montrerons combien cette entreprise fut galement politique, malgr le refus de Lvinas de laction publique. En effet, son corps dfendant, en cherchant former des juifs modernes et lettrs insrs dans la socit franaise et non des professional Jews retranchs derrire leurs traits vermoulus , Lvinas remodle la frontire entre espaces publique et priv telle quhistoriquement fixe par le pacte rpublicain. Ce pacte avait fond la fiction de la communaut politique des citoyens franais supposs neutres et dtachs de leurs appartenances particulires. Or la mise au ban des juifs et leur destruction ont sign pour Lvinas lchec de lmancipation politique, ne en France du pacte rvolutionnaire de 1793. Quelle nouvelle formule dintgration ltat inventer? Sur quels lments fonder une identit juive daprs la destruction, quand les quilibres prcaires du pass, ceux de lisralitisme franais de type politique, ont t balays par la tragdie? Lvinas pose notre avis les tudes hbraques en rsistance contre le retour aux schmas du pass. Comment Lvinas thorise-t-il les exigences dune vie moderne et les impratifs dune vie juive totale pour une jeunesse juive en qute de savoir et de tradition, de pense et daction? De quelle manire son positionnement pour lavenir est-il spcifique lintrieur de lcole juive de Paris? Johanna Lehr Universit Paris 1 Panthon La Sorbonne, France HEGEL ET LEVINAS. UN DIFFICILE DIALOGUE Lvinas construit sa philosophie en prenant ses distances par rapport au logocentrisme, lequel culminerait, si lon en croit son article Hegel et les Juifs , dans un discours o la parole stouffe. Cest au nom de cet effacement de la parole dans une universalit sans visage que Lvinas prend ses distances par rapport au systme hglien. Pour le philosophe franais, il ne sagit ds lors plus de rpondre de Hegel, de le justifier ou de lexpliquer, comme le font excellemment certains commentateurs, mais bien de rpondre Hegel. Il sagit moins de sattacher son dit que de rpondre au dire qui le sous-tend par un autre dire, un autrement du dit. Les difficults auxquelles se heurte Lvinas, qui dans Totalit et Infini critique le logos, tout en sexprimant dans un langage empreint dontologie, dterminent tout son effort postrieur, et en particulier celui de son recueil Difficile Libert, dans lequel il tente partir de la tradition juive, perue comme une autre universalit, de librer les promesses non tenues du langage. Lvinas voit la trace de ces promesses dans les tables de pierres du mosasme, ainsi que dans la posie. Celle-ci, rduite un moment du systme hglien, est comprise la suite de Celan, comme un chemin vers lautre . La perce de ce langage de lautre ne sorigine pas dans un dit, mais dans un interdit celui qui mest signifi dans lpiphanie du visage dautrui. Cet interdit irrductible un dit ou une signification, est signifiance , interpellation par autrui et appel rpondre de lui. Ce caractre absolu de la parole pothique doit cependant pouvoir tenir compte du tiers qui nest pas directement prsent dans le rapport proximal avec autrui. La parole doit, ds lors, faute de se systmatiser, pouvoir sinscrire dans le systme des mdiations quimplique le tiers. Il y a ainsi une tension entre le langage an-archique de lthique et le langage des structures quappelle le politique. Lvinas indique comment sorienter dans cette tension, en nous disant, que la logique du systme ne se justifie quen rendant possible sa perce dans la parole, dans le dire. Il reste que, pour que cette exigence ne reste pas lettre morte, il faudrait montrer comment le dit des mdiations peut souvrir au dire thique. On peut alors se demander si Lvinas nest pas pig par son refus du dit occidental. La radicalit de son langage rend le dialogue avec le dit du systme et de la tradition trs difficile. Son exgse de Hegel, distance de son dit, tmoigne de lambigut dune philosophie qui veut tre autrement et sinterdit le dit commun, au risque de se perdre dans l irrelation dune radicale altrit. Guillaume Lejeune Universit Libre de Bruxelles, Belgique

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DIFFICULT FREEDOM: RESPONSIBILITY, THE OTHER, AND LANGUAGE This paper will discuss three essential elements of Lvinas ethical thoughts mainly from Difficult Freedom and also from his other works. These three elements responsibility, the Other and Language are mutually related with each other. Freedom is the uniqueness of that responsibility (GDT 181), the disproportion between the Other and the self is precisely responsibility as moral consciousness (DF 293), and the expression of the face of the other in an ethical relationship is language (DF 294). Because of their interconnection, the difficulties of the freedom will lie in the language that speaks towards the Other. In other words, language is the spiritual order of morality that entails the ethically irreducible freedom of the Other. In Difficult Freedom, Lvinas points out that Judaism has been on the point of losing freedom because the Torah has already become a closed language and speech has lost its speech. This is because we can no longer speak, because no one can begin his discourse without immediately bearing witness to something other than what is said. (DF 206) The ability to answer for becomes difficult. However, the Jews as the chosen people must be able to answer the call, which is the irreplaceable assumption of responsibility in a manner of universalist particularism. Based on the foregoing analyses, I will argue the relationships between these three essential elements give rise to three considerations: 1) As regards the relationship between responsibility and the Other: responsibility precedes and conditions the freedom of the individuality between the self and the Other; 2) As regards the relationship between the Other and language: the responsibility for the Other demands the selfs genuine response in the way of hearing and answering; 3) As regards the relationship between language and responsibility: language plays an important role in one beings receptive to an absolutely other being which conditions the very possibilities of understanding one another. These three aspects would be linked too closely as a circle of interpretation systematically, and lead to the difficulty of universal responsibility if this interpretation is inclined to be self-interpretation to the Other. However, difficult freedom opens up to new possibilities and it is the new possibilities that are derived from the selfs response to and responsibility for the Other, which would be achieved in language. The language as discourse can lift itself out of its eternal contest and return to the human lips that speak it, in order to fly from man to man and judge history, instead of remaining a symptom or an effect or a ruse. This is the word of a discourse that begins absolutely in the person in possession of it, and moves towards another who is absolutely separate. (DF 207) Through this absolute separation, the distance between the Other and the self is established, which brings responsibility as the moral consciousness from an access to external being, the Other, by means of the language that is both to be given and to give to justice and the divine. Yinya Liu National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Ireland INTERCULTURAL UNDERSTANDING Levinasian openness to the other and Gadamerian conversation Societies where diversity was and is noticeably growing demand new approaches. Cultural diversification has increased dramatically in Europe. Europe has been a magnet for migrants in search of a better life and asylum-seekers from across the world. In a world of hyper-mobility where the make up of cities is becoming more diverse every day, a new and different type of contract is needed to govern how individuals and groups behave together. The globalization process has squeezed space and time on a scale that is without a precedent in human history. These are great challenges for any society, but at the same time offer opportunities for an intercultural dialogue which can lead to intercultural understanding. To get to know the Other we need to get involved in conversation. Gadamer believes that conversation is a process of two people understanding each other. In a true conversation we

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get inside the other to such an extent that we understand not a particular individual but what the other is saying. Gadamer argues that the thing that has to be grasped in conversation is the possible different opinion and the others objective claim to truth. For such conversation we need to show good will to listen and acknowledge what the other has to say. I believe that Gadamer paves the way but the openness as defined by Levinas is more convincing in order to achieve intercultural understanding. In Time and the Other Levinas argued that: [I]f one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other. Possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms for power Levinas wants to avoid the imperialistic and totalizing connotations of Heideggers understanding of openness. Levinas explains openness as a relationship of proximity with the Other in which the subject is exposed to unlimited responsibility and vulnerability. Openness is about being called to others in obligation, without any recourse to ones own rights or needs. Complete openness according Levinas refers to ones interiority being opened, converted, and turned inside out to an exteriority of being for another. It is the call of the Other by way of the face that leads to the complete openness of the subject. Being for-the-Other demands selfless openness. Levinass theory transcends identity politics or communities bound by race, creed, or culture. Only the need of the Other matters, for alteritys call for community cuts across categories of accidental difference and signals persons in need of justice and solace. Levinas gives the right importance to communication as he writes: To communicate is indeed to open oneself, but the openness is not complete ifit is on the watch for recognition. It is complete not in opening to the spectacle of or the recognition of the other, but in becoming a responsibility for him Levinasian openness calls us to take responsibility and to engage in genuine Gadamerian conversation. I will show that through this combination way can achieve intercultural understanding. Bleni Lleshi Free University of Brussels, Belgium DEFENDING LEVINAS, DEFENDING BOBBY This paper concerns one of the more well-known essays included in the second edition of Difficile Liberte, Levinass short piece first published in 1975 titled The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights. This essay is famous largely due to the fact that this is where Levinas writes about the dog Bobby who visited Levinas and his fellow prisoners in their P.O.W. camp for Jewish soldiers in Germany during the war. Levinas here famously describes Bobbyfor whom, he says, we wretched prisoners were menas the last Kantian in Nazi Germany, without the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives ( DF, p. 153). Although this quotation from the essay is well-known and often remarked upon by Levinas readers and scholars, the essay itself from which this quotation comes has received insufficient attention from scholars. Levinass remark about Bobby is almost invariably discussed without any attention to the content of the essay in which it appears. What is even worse, most scholars who write about this remark do so within the larger issue of whether or not Levinas believes animals have a face. This specific question of whether or not Levinas believes that animals have a face dominates the larger question of whether or not Levinas work can help us think about human responsibilities to animals. Since Levinas answers this question in the negative and does not attribute a face to animalssomething many Levinas readers and critics find disappointingthey tend to assume that Levinas work is insensitive to animals and of no or little help in thinking about human ethical responsibilities to animals. This leads them to diminish and to discount what Levinas says about Bobby and leads them to overlook entirely what Levinas does say in this essay, The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights, about the dignity of animals and human responsibilities toward them. This paper, titled Defending Levinas, Defending Bobby, discuss two particularly egregious examples of this regrettable tendency of Levinas scholars who are very disappointed that Levinas does not attribute a face to animals. The first is Derridas treatment of Levinas on animals and on Bobby in particular in his The Animal That Therefore I Am (Fordham, 2008), and the second is David Clarks essay On Being the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany: Dwelling with Animals after Levinas (in Animal Acts, Routledge, 1997, pp. 165-198). In this paper I counter

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several strong claims made by Derrida about Levinas on the question of ethical responsibilities to animals in general and on Bobby in particular, claims that I contend cannot be supported if we closely read what Levinas says about animals, about human responsibilities to animals, and about Bobby in particular in his brief essay The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights. More specifically, I attempt to counter these strong claims made by Derrida in his The Animal That Therefore I Am: That Levinas puts animals outside the ethical circuit That Levinas fails to be looked at by any animal That Levinas is silent about the face of the animal and human responsibilities to animals That for Levinas (just as for Heidegger) animals dont die That Levinas calling Bobby a Kantian is no compliment That the animal remains for Levinas what it will have been for the whole Cartesian-type tradition: a machine. . . (p. 117). The essay by David Clark offers a much more nuanced and careful reading of Levinas on animals in general and on The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights in particular than Derrida provides. Nevertheless, Clark ends up with a conclusion about Bobby and about Levinas on animals that is no more grounded in Levinas texts than is Derridas strong and unsupported claim that for Levinas animals are simply machines. Clarks strong and rather odd conclusion is that Bobby is closer to a cyborg than a sentient creature (p. 190) and that Levinas replicates Kant in putting animals outside our ethical concerns. This seems a rather odd conclusion given the fact that the starting point for the Levinas essay in question is a Biblical verse which Levinas reads as testifying to human obligations to animals. Both Derrida and Clark come to such strong and, in my opinion, drastically wrong views of Levinas famous words about Bobby because they fail to read closely this short but important essay in which those words appear, The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights. Here Levinas discusses two texts from Exodus about animals, first Exodus 22:31 and then Exodus 11:7, to affirm two essential truths Levinas embraces: that animals have both rights and dignity and that humans have ethical obligations toward them. Levinas scholars should recognize, I argue, that Levinas does embrace these two essential truths, even as he does maintain that the face that founds infinite ethical responsibility is always and only a human face. Robert J. S. Manning Quincy University, Quincy, USA LE CHIEN DANS DIFFICILE LIBERT D'EMMANUEL LEVINAS Le chien est considr comme l'animal philosophique par excellence dans la tradition grecque des Cyniques Platon. Levinas renouvelle cette figure dans Nom d'un chien ou le droit naturel qui relate un cruel souvenir de son sjour dans un camp de concentration: seul un chien, Bobby, a reconnu alors l'humanit des prisonniers. A la manire du Dtail de Daniel Arrasse, nous tenterons d'clairer la philosophie de Levinas partir d'un dtail, le chien, que nous mettrons en perspective avec l'ensemble de l'uvre les autres articles de Difficile libert, ainsi qu'en En dcouvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger et Autrement qu'tre ou au-del de l'essence. Levinas fait d'emble du chien une figure plurielle, en rappelant qu'elle appartient des cultures diffrentes. En effet, Bobby, le chien dont se souvient le philosophe, est compar deux modles : la culture juive de l'Exode et la culture grecque d'Ulysse. Mais Bobby est peru selon une logique de ngativit: il n'est ni tout fait le chien de l'Exode, ni tout fait celui d'Ulysse. En un sens, le philosophe recre un triptyque qui existait dj dans le reste de l' uvre entre sa propre pense et celle de deux personnages conceptuels , pour reprendre l'expression de Deleuze, Ulysse et Abraham. Par un jeu de mtonymie, les diffrents chiens deviennent alors porteurs de systmes philosophiques : le chien d'Ulysse est associ la philosophie grecque qui trouve son aboutissement chez Hegel, le chien de l'Exode la philosophie juive. De quelle pense Bobby est-il ds lors le support ? En dernire instance, si le chien est construit travers la mdiation de rfrences culturelles, il demeure une forme de rsidu brut de la nature. Il devient paradoxalement capable de fonder en nature la dignit de l'homme, prcisment parce qu'il est un animal. C'est en ce sens que

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Levinas fait de Bobby le dernier chien kantien reconnaissant le droit naturel de toute personne humaine. Il construit une scne de reconnaissance indite : dans le camp de concentration, la vue qui fonde d'ordinaire l'humanit de l'autre, devient l'oue. C'est l'aboiement du chien qui garantit prsent l'humanit des prisonniers nie par les nazis. Levinas retrace donc une exprience fondamentale de dconstruction et de refondation. D'abord totale par la rencontre des cultures, elle aboutit une forme de ngation absolue de l'homme dans le camp de concentration, puis de remergence d'une forme d'humanit refonde en nature. La prsence du chien engage une rflexion plus gnrale partir de la problmatique phnomnologique de l'articulation de l'animal et de l'humain : pourquoi Levinas utilise-t-il paradoxalement la figure du chien pour dire quelque chose de l'humain ? Comment notamment parvient-il inscrire cette figure d'ordinaire essentiellement profane - en peinture par exemple- dans une pense marque par l'ouverture une transcendance? Son statut animal, plus prcisment d'animal domestique, l'ami de l'homme, confre au chien une signification bien singulire par rapport aux personnages conceptuels. C'est en ce sens que nous serions tents de proposer l'expression danimal conceptuel pour dsigner le chien dans l' uvre de Levinas. L'tude successive des deux perspectives prcdentes nous permettra de voir s'il existe chez Levinas, audel de la pluralit des figures, une cohrence de la pense dont le chien, comme animal conceptuel est le support. Marie Daney de Marcillac Universit de Paris VI, France ON THE POSSIBILITY OF NON-VIOLENT SELF-KNOWLEDGE: KNOWING AS TIHUI () In the essay, Ethics and Spirit in the collection Difficult Freedom, Levinas sets up a distinction between knowing and speaking. Knowing is grasping and seizing, while speaking is addressing and invoking. Knowing is violent, while speaking (language) is external to violence. While he is clear that self-knowledge is not the goal of this essay, we can still inquire as to what implications this distinction has for the possibility of self-knowledge. After all, if knowing ourselves as Others is at the very least problematic, and it is to Others we speak, then are we left with knowledge of ourselves as objects? And if so, given his explicit statement that knowledge of objects is violent, is self-knowledge inevitably violent? In this project, I suggest the use of an alternate epistemological framework, specifically that of classical China, which has certain relevant resonances with Levinass work at large, to articulate a third position between knowing of objects and speaking to Others, which opens the possibility for non-violent self-knowledge. Briefly, in classical Chinese thought, knowing begins with tihui (), embodied knowing. We know as knowers in the flesh before we know as graspers. To know in early China is to be able to put into practice, as seen in the paradigmatic example of Cook Ding from the Zhuangzi ( ). Self-knowledge, then, is not the universe within, as Levinas argues against, but rather wisdom and the continuing realization of how to live well, taking full advantage of the possibilities and conditions of a given situation. The character for knowing in general, zhi (), also has etymological suggestions of knowing as a communal achievement arising out of effective communication, and thus effective speaking and listening to others. When we apply this epistemological framework to the problem of how we know ourselves, a third possibility arises between the violence of object-knowing and the impossibility of self-as-Other knowing. This understanding of tihui and zhi also has parallels with the focus-subsidiary model of knowledge proposed by Michael Polanyi, in which the unique way we know our embodiment becomes an analogy for the process of gaining knowledge. If knowing can be understood as primarily not seeking a mental grasp on an object, but as learning to move beautifully and effectively in the world, then we can know ourselves non-violently. Sarah Mattice University of HawaiI, USA

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TRANSCENDENCE IN FILM: A LEVINASIAN CRITIQUE OF PAUL SCHRADERS CONCEPT OF TRANSCENDENTAL STYLE Paul Schraders 1972 Transcendenal Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, Dreyer offers one of the classic definitions of religion as it appears in film. Schrader claims that for the most part religious blockbusters like Cecil B. Demilles The Ten Commandments have failed because they represent transcendence through special effects that age quickly and show themselves not to transcend the year they were made much less approach the eternal. Schrader celebrates rather the art films of Yosujiro Ozu and Robert Bresson saying that each approaches the transcendental ideal of stasis beyond the temporal. Something like Mel Gibsons The Passion of the Christ seems about as far from Paul Schraders notion of transcendental style in religious film as could be imagined. Mel Gibsons ultra-violent torture scenes and arterial spray crucifixion seem to have more in common with ultra violent effects of Takashi Miikes Ichi the Killer, or Audition than anything by than Schraders description of transcendental style. But Gibson and Schrader share something: a common disdain for this world and the desire for the transcendent realm. Gibsons intense almost slasher film violence and master French Catholic Robert Bressons precise attention to everydayness seem realms apart and yet both aim to show the meaninglessness of the world and the desire for escape. In Bresson, the oppression of the village and the smallness of its people compared with the priests revelation that he has been gifted to suffer the passion of the Christ in Diary of a Country Priest reflect a desire to flee this world that is filled with violence and devoid of transcendence as much as James Cavizels Jesus regarding the devil walking through a crowd crazed with violence. This desire for escape to the peace of transcendence beyond the world is at odds with the Levinasian claim about transcendence in the face. The problem is that Schraders model for transcendence is taken from the characterizations of the numenous and the sacred put forth in classical phenomenology of religion by Rudolf Otto and Mircea Eliade. In A Religion for Adults Levinas point is that the miraculous and the magical can damage our freedom. This is an interesting refutation of Rudolf Ottos idea of the Holy as the mysterium, as the powerful mystery that crushes me. Levinas claims the truth of angels in not another species of truth from the truth of human beings. Human truth includes suffering, uncertainty, and self-criticism. He questions the self-certainty of the ecstasies before the sacred. In ecstasy we can receive truths that reduces others to annoyances or as evil obstacles to the deployment of the sacred in the world. He argues for a distinction between the Holy and the Sacred. and claims the usual ways that these terms are defined as the essence of idolatry. James McLachlan Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, USA

JUIFS/NON JUIFS DIFFICILE LIBERT DES DEUX COTES La perception commune de lautre en tant qutre implique gnralement la perception dune essence. Or il se trouve que ltre juif se caractrise par un au-del de lessence que Levinas a appele un autrement qutre . Cest la raison pour laquelle il est si difficile de comprendre ltre juif dun point de vue ontologique moins de se trouver son tour dessaisi de cet tre-saisissant . A premire vue il sagit l, dune impossibilit radicale. Un peu comme sil sagissait de se reprsenter des extraterrestres ne possdant aucun point commun avec les humains, ni jambes, ni bras, ni tte, ni organes de la vision, ni mme de regard. Or, des extraterrestres totalement dpourvus de formes humaines nauraient aucune chance dtre reconnu comme tel. Pour tre extra , ils nen doivent pas moins nous apparatre terrestre .

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Pour avoir accs la notion dextriorit vritable, il faut avoir soi-mme expriment de manire la fois absolue et concrte le mode dtre appel autrement qutre . Or, cette exprimentation ne peut se produire, croyons-nous, autrement que par le biais dune rvlation seule mme de garantir lauthenticit dune perception de laltrit. Si bien que toute position trangre lvnement du Sina - o sorigine cette sortie de ltre et lbranlement vers lautrement qutre - engendre de facto une navet du regard qui consiste percevoir lautre comme un mme. Spontanment, cette rquisition de quitter la place o lon croit possder un morceau de soleil effraie autant sans doute que les silences infinis des espaces ternels . Elle invite quitter le repos rassurant de lessentialisme pour un mouvement d-essentialisant. Cette dsertion de son lieu condamne le sujet marcher sur du vide. Ce qui nest pas, croit-on a priori, trs bon pour lquilibre. Le midrash nous raconte que les mes des isralites furent ravies au moment de la rvlation. Et lon peut bien comprendre que lon ne soit pas forcment ravi dtre ravi. Le souci de faire percevoir lautre-qui-vous-regarde-comme-un-mme quil tourne dj le dos lthique est au principe mme de la philosophie dEmmanuel Levinas. Dans En dcouvrant lexistence (p.168), il voque - pour la rejeter- [la] philosophie pour qui L'essence de la vrit [nest] pas dans le rapport htronome avec un Dieu inconnu, mais dans le djconnu qu'il s'agit de dcouvrir ou d'inventer librement en soi, et o tout inconnu se coule. Elle s'oppose foncirement un Dieu rvlateur. La philosophie est athisme ou plutt irrligion, ngation d'un Dieu se rvlant, mettant des vrits en nous. C'est la leon de Socrate, qui ne laisse au matre que l'exercice de la maeutique : tout enseignement introduit dans l'me y fut dj. L'identification du Moi, - la merveilleuse autarcie du moi - est le creuset naturel de cette transmutation de l'Autre en Mme. Toute philosophie est une gologie pour employer un nologisme husserlien (...) Cette identification exige la mdiation. D'o un deuxime trait de la philosophie du Mme : son recours aux Neutres. Pour comprendre le non-moi, il faut trouver un accs travers une entit, travers une essence abstraite qui est et n'est pas. L se dissout l'altrit de l'autre. L'tre tranger, au lieu de se maintenir dans l'inexpugnable forteresse de sa singularit, au lieu de faire face - devient thme et objet. Il se range dj sous un concept ou se dissout en relations. Il tombe dans le rseau d'ides a priori, que j'apporte pour le capter. Pour explorer la situation du regard non-juif sur lautrement qutre juif, je me propose un petit dtour par le trait Sota du Talmud de Babylone (page 11a) qui raconte comment fut prise par Pharaon la dcision de jeter dans le Nil tous les nouveau-ns hbreux mles : Rabbi Hiya bar Aba a rapport cet enseignement au nom de rabbi Sima : Trois hommes taient prsent au moment o fut dcid de jeter les enfants hbreux dans le Nil : Bilam, Job et Jethro. Bilam qui avait donn le conseil (de les noyer) fut tu ; Job qui avait gard le silence fut condamn endurer des souffrances ; Jthro stant enfui, une partie de ses descendants eurent le privilge de siger au temple dans la salle des pierres taille en tant que membres du grand Sanhdrin. Il faut revoir la scne : Pharaon entour de ses trois conseillers. Laropage se penche sur la question juive. Cest un peu Wanse sur le Nil. Le texte nous fait passer en revue une palette dattitudes qui dcrivent autant de manire de se situer vis--vis des Hbreux et fait natre une srie de questions concernant chaque personnage : Pharaon dabord. En quoi lexistence du peuple hbreu lui pose-t-il un problme ? Veut-il vraiment sen dbarrasser ? Comment envisage-t-il de le faire ? Les trois conseillers ensuite. Bilam. Pourquoi est-il intress au projet de destruction des Hbreux ? Sur quoi a-t-il fond son conseil de les noyer ? Job. Pourquoi sest-il tu ? Pourquoi a-t-il t condamn subir des preuves ? Et enfin Jethro. Comment sest constitue sa position ? Que conclure du fait quil se soit enfuit ? En examinant ces diffrentes attitudes, on tentera de dgager les principales modalits pour le monde non-juif de considrer lexistence du peuple juif. Face ces possibles, la libert des non-juifs de se dterminer reste entire. Cest aussi une difficile libert. Antoine Mercier France Culture, Paris, France

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LEUROPE AU-DELA DE LEUROPE LA DIFFICILE LIBERTE DE PAROLE Ds ses premiers crits, Levinas sest montr la fois apologtique et critique vis--vis de lEurope. Apologtique lorsquil la dsigne comme le berceau de la merveilleuse naissance de lesprit objectif du vrai , de luniversalit de la raison, dune aspiration lgalit et la libert. Critique lorsque dans cette objectivit de la raison saccusent la rduction du multiple lunit, la subordination de la paix la vrit et de la justice ltat. Finalement, Levinas nest pas loin du diagnostic que fait Nietzsche dans la Seconde considration intellectuelle lorsquil demande : est-il vrai que cette objectivit a son origine dans un esprit de justice plus intense et plus vif ? et quil dnonce mme cette aspiration lobjectivit, lhypocrisie de lhomme de raison, son manque de compromission, c'est--dire sa dissolution dans une histoire dans laquelle il na plus part quen laissant la raison parler sa place : or trop souvent lobjectivit nest quune phrase crit Nietzsche, et rduit toute la culture infrieure de ce temps un silence ternel et Levinas : Dans ce monde sans parole, se reconnat lOccident tout entier. Langage sans parole. Civilisation daphasiques (). force de cohrence, la parole a perdu la parole . Comment alors briser ce silence ? Si, comme Levinas lcrit dans Difficile Libert, la fameuse et lucide conscience occidentale nest plus certaine de se tenir en tat de veille ( Libert de parole ), comment juger une histoire avec laquelle on se commet et se compromet ( En exclusivit ) ? Mais surtout, comment se commettre et se compromettre ? Quest-ce qui engage la libert au-del des formes muettes ou plastiques de la raison ? Faut-il renoncer lhritage europen ou le dpasser ? ct de ce questionnement qulabore lensemble de luvre de Levinas, nous demanderons si les textes runis dans Difficile Libert ne rpondent pas aussi de lurgente ncessit de prendre la parole, de briser le silence des formes, et par l de donner voix la difficile libert c'est--dire, en des termes quil est arriv Levinas dappliquer Nietzsche mme, une libert qui est une faon de se commettre avec le monde et qui nest donc plus mesure par lesprit objectif du Vrai, mais par la responsabilit. Si, comme lcrit encore Levinas dans Difficile Libert, on ne peut plus parler, car personne ne peut commencer son discours sans tmoigner aussitt de tout autre chose que de ce qui se dit , quest-ce qui engage la libert de parole, et quels possibles ouvre-t-elle lEurope ? Peut-on sortir du silence ? Et le peut-on sans revenir en arrire, c'est--dire en saccrochant quelque optimisme concernant lhomme ou le sujet ou en se tenant une conception hroque de la libert ? Et enfin, si le dpassement nest ni relve ni fuite dans un arrire monde mais structure ce que Derrida avait appel lau-del dans , quest-ce qui, en Europe, ou dans ce qui fait lEurope permet larticulation de cet au-del dans ? quelle responsabilit finalement se mesure lEurope ? Acha Liviana Messina Universit Diego Portales Santiago du Chili

JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS: LEVINAS EYE FOR AN EYE AS A RESPONSE TO GANDHI In An Eye for Eye, Emmanuel Levinas engages in dialogue with an unnamed interlocutor, and that interlocutor is Gandhi. Levinass carefully chosen phrases suggest that in this essay from Difficult Freedom, he is not merely addressing vague ideas about non-violence that were politically relevant at the time, but rather that he was responding specifically to Gandhis philosophy of non-violent action as a means of halting injustice. Levinas certainly knew of Gandhi. Three times he mentions the Mahatma in Libert et commandement. In An Eye for an Eye, Levinas contemplates whether Gandhian non-violence can stop violence and produce justice. After exploring the points at which Gandhi and Levinas converge and diverge, I demonstrate that Levinas found Gandhian

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non-violence inadequate as a means of achieving or restoring justicebut that he thought violence equally inadequate. An Eye for an Eye reveals a thinker deeply conflicted and it leaves the reader in a state of irresolution, with neither violence nor non-violence capable of soothing the cry of injustice and staunch[ing] this eternal haemorrhage (148) of the unhealed wound. Gandhi wrote that Mankind is at the crossroads. It has to make its choice between the law of the jungle and the law of humanity1and it is exactly at this crossroads that Levinas stands in this essay. He closes with these words: Neither all eternity, nor all the money in the world, can heal the outrage done to man. It is a disfigurement or wound that bleeds for all time, as though it required a parallel suffering to staunch this eternal haemorrhage (148). After resisting a literal interpretation of the lex talionis as perpetuating cycles of violence, here Levinas seems to take a divergent path from Gandhis, choosing at the crossroads to pursue the law of the jungle. Must we conclude that justice can only be achieved through violent and literal retaliation? Not quite. If that were the case, Levinass final sentence would read: It is a disfigurement or wound that bleeds for all time, which requires a parallel suffering to staunch this eternal haemorrhage rather than as though. With as though, he simultaneously acknowledges the wounded hearts desire to inflict a parallel suffering and, forbidding that, the rabbis arguments for justice based on peace and kindness (147). With this, we stand again the crossroads. An unresolved ending to An Eye for an Eye leaves us with no preferred path; each is limited and inadequate. Impotent outrage remains uncalmed. Neither non-violent financial penalties nor violent vengeance provide satisfactory justice. Neither will staunch the eternal hemorrhage. An eye for an eye may or may not make the whole world blind, but it neither preserves nor restores the sight of the blinded victim. From those eyes, tears of lamentation will continue to pour down unceasingly. Whatever healing may take place will occur not due to any mode of restitutionno mode is adequatebut due to the invisible processes inside wounded human hearts. Richard Middleton-Kaplan Department of English Harper College, Palatine, USA

HEARING SOCIAL JUSTICE IN LEVINAS WORK To see a face is already to hear You shall not kill, and to hear You shall not kill is to hear Social justice (DF 9). Though Levinas here indicates that the call to social justice is inherent in the face, too little consideration has been given to Levinas conception of social justice, that is, justice within a political society. Too often, readers of Levinas focus on the privacy of the face-to-face relation with the Other and neglect Levinas point that justice cannot be conceived independent of the third party (DF 18). This essay offers a constructive sketch of Levinas conception of justice within a political society. While I rely primarily on the texts collected in Difficult Freedom, I also bring in some later texts to indicate Levinas critical development of some of the concepts he employs in his early work. I suggest that Levinas' account of the face of the other and the third party is analogous to modern social contract theorists state of nature accounts. Ethical responsibility prompted by the face indicates the purpose of social institutions while the account of the third explains their necessity. Since freedom and self-interest are subordinated to responsibility, what results, however, is not a social contract theory, but a society rooted in mutual responsibility. Though Levinas endorses democracy (DF 107, 219), his reasons for doing so are not rooted in liberalisms conception of freedom nor the possibilities of rational consensus or the general will, but in the view of democracy as the recognition of ineradicable plurality. Levinas thinks that the view that peace is found through consensus or unity makes our efforts to achieve peace violent and totalitarian, since this will require silencing or eliminating dissenters. Democracy, by contrast, is a political form that recognizes that debate never ends, and so allows

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and even encourages dissensus, while seeking to diminish violence through a faith in the possibility of interpersonal reasoning (DF 7, 219). One point that becomes clear in Difficult Freedom is that political society cannot be based on an abstract conception of freedom, nor egoistic self-interest, but must include some commitments to fundamental social goods or principles. We need a commitment to not just a political form, but also some political content. Here I turn to Levinas' endorsement of the language of rights, which though only sporadic in Difficult Freedom, becomes more extensive in his later work. Because responsibility has priority over freedom, human rights for Levinas must be understood as fallible interpretations of our responsibility to others, rather than as an extension of the Lockean natural rights tradition. This allows us to recognize the ways in which human rights are, as their detractors point out, Western, individualistic, masculine, and capitalistic and encourages an openness to new political principles, while still allowing us to affirm the current political efficacy of human rights in calling attention to suffering around the world. The universal scope of human rights is fitting for the unbounded responsibility Levinas defends. Stephen Minister Augustana College, Sioux Falls, USA LA QUESTION DES NORMES MORALES APRES LA SHOAH CHEZ E. LEVINAS ET H. ARENDT: RPONSE A LAPPEL DU BIEN OU PENSE ET JUGEMENT? En 1963 paraissent Difficile libert, dEmmanuel Lvinas, et Eichmann Jrusalem. Rapport sur la banalit du mal, de Hannah Arendt. Les deux philosophes sont ns en 1906 et ont vcu pendant la Shoah; tous deux sont de confession juive et ont suivi lenseignement de Martin Heidegger. Cependant, malgr leur commune empreinte historique et philosophique, ils conoivent de faon trs diffrente la source normative permettant de lutter contre la rapparition du Mal. Chez Lvinas, la guerre est intrinsquement lie lontologie. Ltre se rvle comme guerre la pense philosophique [...] La guerre se produit comme lexprience pure de ltre pur 1. Cest dans le concept de totalit, qui domine la philosophie occidentale , que se fixe la face de ltre qui se montre dans la guerre et anantit laltrit. Seul lInfini, dont la trace se manifeste dans le visage dautrui, peut briser la totalit. Cest la responsabilit pour le prochain, commande par la Transcendance divine, qui permet la perce de lhumain dans ltre. Dans un texte de Difficile Libert intitul Une religion dadultes 2, Lvinas explique que le rapport avec Dieu ne se conoit pas indpendamment du rapport avec les hommes. La voie qui mne Dieu mne [...] ipso facto [...] vers lhomme . La relation thique, o le moi est engag infiniment lgard de lautre, nest pas le corollaire de la vision de Dieu, elle est cette vision mme 3. Le Commandement divin institue la responsabilit fondatrice du rapport interhumain. Cest dans la rponse lappel de Dieu que se dcouvre lhumanit de lhomme. Lvinas emploie galement le terme de Bien pour dsigner la vocation lautre. Le sens du Divin rside dans la rvlation de la saintet potentiellement prsente en chaque tre humain. Dieu est Bien en un sens minent trs prcis que voici: Il ne me comble pas de biens, mais mastreint la bont, meilleur que les biens recevoir . Cette astreinte passe par le service de lindsirable par excellence, autrui . La bont du Bien incline le mouvement quelle appelle pour lcarter du Bien et lorienter vers autrui et ainsi seulement vers le Bien 4. Seule lthique permet de lutter contre lanantissement totalitaire de laltrit. Elle constitue le socle moral pour lexpression de la dignit humaine. linverse de Lvinas, Arendt situe la source normative permettant de rpondre au problme du mal dans la pense et le jugement propres chaque individu. Ne-pas-penser, par exemple ne pas se reprsenter ce que jprouverais si ce que jinflige autrui mtait inflig voil en quoi consiste le mal , crit-elle dans son Journal de pense. Demander quelquun qui ne pense pas de se comporter de faon morale est un pur non-sens 5. Lorsquelle assiste au procs dAdolf Eichmann Jrusalem en 1961, elle relve chez laccus une absence totale de jugement. Par lexpression de banalit du mal , elle entend montrer

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quEichmann nest pas un monstre mais un homme qui a commis des actes monstrueux, dont il est entirement responsable. Son incapacit penser nest pas congnitale: elle de lordre du refus et de la dmission. Cest parce quil a obi aux ordres en renonant sa capacit proprement humaine de rflchir par lui-mme quEichmann est coupable. La politique et lcole maternelle ne sont pas la mme chose: en politique obissance et soutien ne font quun 6. Prenant pour modle le deux-en-un de la pense socratique, Arendt situe lorigine de la morale dans le dialogue intrieur. ses yeux, la seule raison qui peut dissuader de commettre un meurtre est la perspective de partager sa vie psychique avec un assassin. Rponse lappel du Bien ou structure dialogique de la pense, telles sont donc les deux sources de la morale daprs Lvinas et Arendt. la lumire de cette divergence philosophique, je poserai, pour conclure, la question des implications politiques de lhtronomie lvinassienne. Tout en manifestant frquemment son attachement aux institutions dmocratiques et ltat libral, Lvinas affirme que le rle de linstitution tatique consiste exclusivement limiter la responsabilit pour autrui par souci de justice pour le tiers. La politique doit-elle alors tre mene en fonction du bien? Lenjeu est de savoir dans quelle mesure lantriorit absolue de lthique peut se concilier avec lorganisation institutionnelle du monde commun, et comment la rciprocit ncessaire au fonctionnement juridique dune socit cohabite avec lasymtrie fondamentale de la responsabilit premire. Aurore Mrjen Universit Paris IV Sorbonne, France LE TOURNANT DU MESSIANISME EN 1961 ET LA CURE DU TRAUMATISME UNE LECTURE DES TEXTES MESSIANIQUES Les lments cardinaux de la religion chez Lvinas tels que Dieu transcendant et lthique ne la caractrisent pas en ralit, puisquils sont prsents aussi dans les autres religions. La particularit consiste plutt dans labsence de certains lments. Llimination du sacr est trs connue, mais il y a des autres choses, savoir labsence de salut. En outre, la foi lvinassienne, cest lexercice du rite et elle nest en aucun cas la foi en salut ou en Dieu comme chez les chrtiens. La religion chez Lvinas se caractrise donc par les points suivants: le rite sans foi ni sacr, ltude au lieu du salut, lthique sans rcompense. Est-ce quil y a dautres religions qui renoncent la notion de salut? Le point de dpart de litinraire de Lvinas est le renoncement au salut aprs lpreuve du non-sens absolu. Comment retrouver le sens aprs la Shoah? Les refus du sacr et de la croyance relvent de cette exigence. En tant quinstance ultime qui assure la possibilit du sens, Lvinas propose une religiosit qui substitue lide courante (Le refus du salut se culmine dans la notion de la substitution implicitement labore dans les Textes messianiques).Si on ne lit que des textes dits philosophiques du Lvinas, ce qui assure le rapport de lhomme et de Dieu nest pas trs clair (puisquil ny a pas de foi ni de thologie). Dans ses textes dits religieux, cest le rite et ltude qui fonctionnent comme mdiateur entre lhomme et Dieu et qui fonde lthique. Le rite et ltude ont donc une fonction architectonique dans sa pense. Ils sont introduits comme moyen du rtablissement du sens face au non-sens. Une religion dadultes a labor, sans doute pour la premire fois, cette importance du rite et de ltude en les situant dans larchitectonique de la pense lvinassienne. En dautres mots, si lthique lvinassienne caractrise sa religiosit, cest dabord parce quelle carte une rcompense et deuximement parce quelle soppose radicalement la grce chrtienne. Souvent, une pense religieuse carte leffort pour viter le cercle vicieux entre la recherche du mrite et langoisse due son insuffisance insurmontable. Lvinas adopte une autre stratgie (mme si lthique lvinassienne carte aussi leffort). Il est donc intressant de comparer la religiosit chez Lvinas avec la justification par la foi chez le christianisme et le Nen-butsu (rcitation du nom dun dieu) chez Hnen (1133-1212, fondateur de la secte bouddhiste le plus populaire au Japon) qui cartent tous les deux leffort humain pour retrouver la possibilit du sens universellement valable. Lvinas et Hnen ont tous les deux une pense radicale qui rtablit la possibilit du sens au milieu du non-sens (Hnen a vcu lpoque de la guerre civile et de la famine), mais il existe aussi une diffrence importante dans larchitectonique de leur pense. La

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singularit de Lvinas correspond la situation de notre poque, savoir, de la perte de la conception de la vie aprs la mort et de lactualisation du non-sens absolu, qui interdisent logiquement la promesse du salut. Yasuhiko Murakami Universit dOsaka, Japon LA COMPLICITE DE LA FOI ET DU SAVOIR CHEZ LEVINAS EN LA CONFRONTANT AVEC CELLE DE KANT Ma contribution aux lectures de Difficile Libert consistera dgager la complicit de la foi et du savoir dans la pense lvinassienne en la confrontant avec celle de Kant. la diffrence de la tradition chrtienne qui pose la foi contre ou au-del du savoir, Lvinas propose dans plusieurs articles intgrs Difficile Libert, la foi qui ne soppose pas facilement au savoir: dune part, il dcrit la religion juive comme la maturit de la raison, en soulignant la sagesse de Rabbis et le caractre intellectuel de la religion juive, et dautre part, en prfrant le terme religion au terme foi pour la distinguer de la sacralisation comme lidoltrie, il dploie la conception de religion comme rapport sans rapport dpassant toute la facult de croire du sujet et qui se rvle en tant que passivit absolue au-del du savoir jusqu tre irrationnelle. Ce rapport complexe entre la foi et le savoir chez Lvinas se reflte dans le rapport entre la croyance en grce inconditionnelle et leffort rationnel, rapport que lon trouve dans les dbats des Rabbis que Lvinas interprte dans Textes messianiques. Nous nous rappellerons lantinomie kantienne dploye dans la Religion dans les limites de la simple raison et travers laquelle Kant essaie dtablir la conciliation parfaite entre la foi et le savoir au nom de la religion rationnelle . Lantinomie consistant dans lide que la croyance en grce inconditionnelle peut rendre inutile leffort humain pour lamlioration de la morale, se superpose au paradoxe du mal radical: coexistence de la contingence du mal et de la radicalit du mal, qui se refltent, soit dans lappel notre effort, soit dans la rsignation face leffort : antinomie classique de limmanent et du transcendant, de lautonome et de lhtronome. La solution kantienne consiste tirer une ligne des limites la raison humaine. Pour la raison humaine, ce qui correspond dans le champ pratique la certitude , relevant du champ thorique, est l esprance . Leffort humain se concilie avec la grce du don au nom de l esprance . Chez Lvinas, cette antinomie du don et de leffort est dploye travers la discussion entre Schmouel et Rabbi Yochanan ou Rav, et encore entre Rabbi Yehochoua et Rabbi Elizer. Linterprtation lvinassienne de ces dbats nous semble dgager lalternative la solution kantienne, alternative qui consiste surmonter cette antinomie par la conception de Messie tant moi , lIpsit. Cette concidence de celui qui arrive (Messie) et celui qui attend (Moi) ralise la conciliation de lhtronomie et de lautonomie. La conception du Messie-Moi, la responsabilit qui support lunivers qualifie par Lvinas une universalit juive diffrente de luniversalit par la confrontation des croyances multiples nous ouvrira la possibilit de la socit juste ne reposant plus sur un accord des opinions diverses, mais sur la souffrance de lipsit. Cette autre forme de conciliation de la foi et du savoir nous montrera lessence rationnel de la foi en tant que confiance en sagesse . Masumi Nagasaka Universit de Toulouse II Le Mirail et Bergische Universitt Wuppertal, France et RFA

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RELIGION, REVOLUTION, AND PEDAGOGY: TOWARD A LEVINASIAN MAIEUTICS Enrique Dussel observes that politics is necessarily entropic. Invariably, new forms of oppression, exploitation, and human misery will arise, just as old forms of suffering still haunt us today in the obstinacy of the rational systems that prop them up. The correctiveor, rather, the restorative, that which renews in us the vigilance of witnessinglies in the ethical relation, which Levinas calls in Difficult Freedom a religious relation (16). More importantly, in his essay A Religion for Adults, Levinas expresses the religious in terms of pedagogy and justice: Here educationobedience to the other willis the supreme instruction: the knowledge of this Will which is itself the basis of all reality. In the ethical relation, the Other is presented at the same time as being absolutely other, but this radical alterity in relation to me does not destroy or deny my freedom, as philosophers believe. The ethical relation is anterior to the opposition of freedoms, the war which, in Hegels view, inaugurates History. (DF 18) The education of which Levinas speaks is tied, as well, to what he calls selfeducationwhich he relates to the ritual discipline of Jewish law. He writes, The way that leads to God therefore leads ipso factoand not in additionto man (DF 18). Self-education, for Levinas, is thus tied to an aspiration [for] a just society commanded in Judaism, and this commandment is such that the personal responsibility of man with regard to man is such that God cannot annul it (DF 20). In this way, difficult freedom entails a difficult pedagogy. Given Levinas broader project to translate Judaism into Greek, I argue that Levinas understanding of self-education is enriched existentially, socially, and politically if we bring to our understanding of it a postsecular appraisal of its maieutical qualities. Of course, Levinas famously espouses a suspicion of maeiutics, but when Levinas writes that [t]eaching is not reducible to maieutics because it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain, he is thinking of a reduced understanding of the term that is derived from Socratic dialogues more so than the expanded sense that Kierkegaard gives it and that I would like to give it in this project. Maieutics, read through Kierkegaards developed sense, does not merely mean that I already contain the foundation of wisdom within me. It means, rather, that I cannot do it on my own that I need a teacher. What Levinas seems to miss in Kierkegaards understanding of maieutics is precisely what they share in commonan existentially similar understanding of the self that is irreducibly relational and shatters the monadic subjectivity that characterizes the ego of the philosophical (Cartesian) starting point. In a sense, both thinkers subvert philosophical maieutics and offer, instead, a kind of biblical maieutics. In A Religion for Adultsand in the context of his writings on self-educationLevinas expresses this sense of the self when he writes, All alone, the I finds itself rent and awry. This means that it discovers itself to be one who had already encroached on the Other, in an arbitrary and violent manner (16). The language of maieuticsread in the postsecular, existential sensenot only expresses this irreducible sociality constitutive of the self, but it also ties pedagogy to existential self-education ( teshuva) and restorative projects of justice (tikkun olam). Given both the theme of the 2009 SIREL/NALS conference, Readings of Difficult Freedom, and its European setting, this paper will direct such a notion of Levinasian maieutics to the concrete struggles and resistances against political totalitarianism and existential suffering that occurred with the Velvet Revolution. Martin Matutk testifies, in Specters of Liberation, that the Charta 77 Human Rights Agreementwhich he says was inspired by Levinas and Pato alike(45) opened a new model ka of collaboration that ws foundationally pedagogical. In this way, the lessons of the Velvet a Revolution give concrete circumstances to reevaluate in contemporary terms what Matu tk calls dissident responsibility in light of the category of the religious and the pedagogy of revolution. Sol Neely University of Alaska Southeast, Juneau, USA

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INTELLECTUALISME ET LE JUDASME : UNE LECTURE DE DIFFICILE LIBERT DEMMANUEL LEVINAS Comment saisir la libert humaine dans un dispositif conceptuel lvinassien qui ds son horizon de naissance dans les annes 30, rcuse dj comme illusoires les fausses vasions de la libert comme coute impersonnelle de lEtre, clbration du jaillissement crateur de la dure, ou encore victoire de lEtre sur le Nant travers laffirmation de lirrcusable libert du pour-soi? Comment concevoir une entente autre de la libert que celle que confre le savoir, clart du concept qui rend faisable laction rationnelle? Comment par ailleurs rendre audible en philosophie, cet amour de la Sagesse si souvent souponneux envers les lans de la croyance ou de la foi, une sagesse de lAmour qui inverse lordre de prsance de lEgo sur lAlter, et fait de lEgo, un vritable Me Voici , naissant soi seulement lorsquil se sent ontologiquement, puis thiquement responsable travers son investiture traumatique par lAlter ? La lecture de Difficile Libert que nous comptons proposer sarticulera autour de ces questions pour montrer en trois moments que: Lvinas conoit la libert en labritant jalousement de ce quil considre comme ses illusions modernes, sous les figures critiquables de la tradition romantique, llan crateur bergsonien, de lappel de ltre heideggrien et de la toute-puissance quasi nietzschenne du pour-soi sartrien. Il convient donc de voir comment Lvinas brise ces idoles. Il ne sen suit pourtant pas que Lvinas renonce lhritage de la science et la technique occidentale, et donc une certaine tradition intellectualiste, voire idaliste, mais en sabritant derrire les leons tires du Stern der Erlsung de Franz Rosenzsweig, savoir la critique radicale du projet de totalisation de la pense occidentale, que Lvinas entrevoit comme lune des sources du totalitarisme. Enfin, le terrain tant ainsi dblay, Lvinas peut ouvrir lintellect d-totalitaris du quteur de lInfini lcoute du penser thique de la tradition judaque, qui cesse alors de se rduire aux croyances dans lesquelles lathisme militant refoule les religions, pour ouvrir les horizons inous dune foi raisonnable qui fait lenjeu mme de la difficult dtre libre. La vie libre se dploie alors comme une exgse charnelle, mentale et spirituelle de lInfini. Franklin Nyamsi Lyce Delamare-Debouteville,Forges-les-eaux, France HORS LIEU Il ne faut pas tre dupe de la paix des bois , crit Lvinas dans Difficile libert. Ceci dit, il ne faut pas tre dupe du lieu. Les promesses lies au lieu, lattachement au sol et au monde, la paix des arbres, ce sont des promesses trompeuses. Elles sont trompeuses car elles sont intrieures au monde, intrieures la logique de ltre. Elles ne transcendent point ltre. Cest une chose avre que daffirmer que la pense de Lvinas ne fait pas lloge du lieu. Profondment utopique - dont le sens il faudra prciser - cette pense est pourtant loin de promouvoir quelque chose comme un arrire monde. Au lieu de substituer un monde un autre, un lieu un autre, cette pense promeut ds ses premiers jours une sortie du monde ombr par ltre, une vasion du lieu. Autrement quinclusion ou participation, le premier geste spculatif est de lordre de larrachement, de lexclusion, bref, de lexception ltre. La constitution dune vritable socit est un dracinement crit Lvinas. Conjurer le lieu cest ainsi le tout premier germe dune socit dont la porte vritable est thique. Il sagira ici donc de relire la notion du lieu , travaille dans quelques passages de Difficile libert, la lumire du texte de 1935 De lvasion. Dans cette relecture il importera de mettre au jour les ides suivantes : Dabord, que depuis le premier essaie philosophique De lvasion, la question du lieu est une question qui hante profondment la pense de Lvinas. Ce faisant, lon pourra tendre un lien spculatif fcond entre le texte de 1935 et le texte de Difficile libert. Ensuite, que de par son origine, la question du lieu fait pied dans la question de ltre. La premire rplique la question de ltre se situe ici, le besoin dvasion est la forme privilgie de cette rplique. En effet, tout en mettant en question la logique du lieu tenu comme

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lhorizon o lexistence du sujet se dcouvrirait jete, Lvinas mettra en avant la catgorie de sortie et dvasion. Plutt que demeurer, il sagit de sortir de ltre . Enfin, et parce quil sagit de Sortir de ltre par une nouvelle voie , on avancera lide que cette nouvelle voie ouverte par lvasion, ce dlaissement du lieu, se produit par la promotion de la sensibilit du sujet. Cette promotion a ceci de particulier quelle est demble exception ltre. La sensibilit, laffectivit selon le vocabulaire de De lvasion est processus, de sortie de ltre , processus premier de la conjuration du lieu, forme premire donc du dracinement . Claudia Gutierrez Olivares Universit du Chili Santiago , Chili

INTERRUPTING VIOLENCE: THE PHOTOGRAPHY OF ADI NESS In Levinas Thinking on Religion as Beyond the Pathetic: Reflections on the First Part of Difficult Freedom, Ephraim Meir suggests that, like conscience, religion should be conceived as the impossibility of invading freedom (146). And, violence, says Levinas in Ethics and Spirit, is to be found in any action in which one acts as if one were alone to act: as if the rest of the universe were there only to receive the action; violence is consequently any action which we endure without at every point collaborating in it (6). In this sense, there are very few things that do not constitute violence on some level. It is, according to Levinas, only reason and language that are external to violence: They are the spiritual order (7). The so-called order of violence, in other wordsthe order that, especially in the current world climate, seems to dominate all other sensibilitiescan be ruptured only by dialogue. The spiritual order is the place where we communicate with one another.The act of speaking to another human being and recognizing his or her humanitythat is, the admonition against killing that it is inscribed on the living faceforces a break in the continuity of violence that characterizes too many of our experiences in a contemporary world. When we are confronted by the instance of being looked at by another human being, we are compelled to break away from our mundane and typical manner of daily living. In a 1937 essay called The Meaning of Religious Practice, Levinas suggests similarly that ritualthe physical act of Jewish observancedoes exactly this. The enactment of ritual belongs to the spiritual order because it interrupts our natural inclinations, marking the moment between reality and us (287). The ritual act is in the realm of mystery and the mystical as it wedges itself between us and the manifestations of the mundane. It ruptures our habitual activities in much the same way that Levinas suggests that dialogue and language rupture the acts of violence in which we participate on a daily basis. The link between ritual acts, language/dialogue, and violence is one that I find particularly interesting. As a way of further exploring what these ideas mean for Levinas, in this presentation I will draw on the work of Adi Ness, an Israeli photographer whose most recent series, Biblical Stories, explores biblical narratives that confront issues of violence and responsibility. In a midrashic move, however, Ness spins these narratives in such a way that forces the viewer to question what it means to live in a contemporary world that is ordered by violence, and then questions the roles that we play (or might play) in either perpetuating or rupturing such moments of violence. For example, his Jacob and Esau stages the biblical story of the two dueling brothers in a modern-day Israeli soup kitchen (see below). But whereas in the biblical narrative Esau, the red and ruddy one, was robbed of his birthright and blessing by the younger conniving Jacob, Ness photograph retains Esau as the rightful inheritor, by placing him to the right hand of Isaac, their father. The photograph calls to mind all of the biblical accounts of violence that seem to characterize the relationship between these two brothers; but it also raises the question of who are the modern-day Jacobs and Esaus and how we should understand their fraught relationships. What violences, Ness seems to ask, do we endure? How might we use language and discourse and reason to rupture such violence? And, finally, how might artistic endeavors such as the ones staged by Ness contributed to the dialogue that Levinas sees as possessing the potential to interrupt violence? These are some of

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the questions that this presentation will explore. Monica Osborne University of California, Los Angeles, USA ENCHANTEMENT ET ILLUSION : LE FMININ DANS LES INTERPRTATIONS TALMUDIQUES DE LEVINAS Dans mon rapport, je voudrais soulever quelques questions en esprance de trouver des rponses. Je vais faire la lecture des textes de Lvinas dans lesquels il analyse le problme de la fminit dans la perspective talmudique: Et Dieu cra la femme... ( Cinq nouvelles lectures talmudiques), Dsacralisation et dsenchantement ( Du sacr au sent: quatre lectures talmudiques) et Le Judasme et le Fminin ( Difficile libert). Je voudrais formuler mes questions/ doutes en quelques mots. Pour Lvinas la femme comme femme, parat-il, est une particularit secondaire et la spcificit, la dfinition primaire de laquelle - la sexualit, se manifestant comme illusion, enchantement, par des multiples facettes au-del de la certitude de sauvage droiture du visage, enchantement, qui, comme le sacre idoltrique, n'a rien voir avec lEsprit, la vie spirituelle. Le rapport avec la femme comme femme nest pas le rapport de la responsabilit, le dernier nest que secondaire, comme un accessoire, un accidentel. Mme si Levinas ne dit pas comme Weininger qu il n'y a pas de secret de la fminit , qu au-del du masque du Secret il ny a simplement rien , mais quest ce quil est au-del d'illusion, denchantement, d'apparence fminin comme les principaux aspects de la femme comme femme ? La fminit dgrade, aline conduit la soustraction de la Loi. Si la Loi est lAutre constituant le sujet, la femme jusqu' ce qu'elle nest quune femme, elle nest pas l'autre, avec qui, selon Lvinas, s'tablissent de relations de la responsabilit, fonde sur une directe relation de face face. Comme dit iek en faisant le commentaire sur Weininger, quand elle dit la vrit, cela n'est pas parce quelle le fait vraiment pour accomplir la justice, mais pour faire l'impression lhomme, pour le sduire de la manire le plus sophistique: la femme, elle toujours mente, mme si objectivement elle dit la vrit - ... La plus grande ide que les femmes peuvent sen obtenir, cest un vague pressentiment de son asservissement essentiel, que la conduit chercher le salut dans l'autodestruction . Selon iek, "Weininger manque le but lorsquen interprtent la coquetterie fminine ontologiquement comme un infini dsir de Rien de raliser Quelque chose , la femme il aperue comme un objet. Dans cet effort de Rien pour devenir Quelque chose il ne voit pas daspiration du sujet de trouver le soutien substantielle . Bien que, mme si Lvinas ne tente pas interprter femme ni comme sujet, ni comme objet, si la condition de ltre humaine comme crature doit tre comprit comme celle de sujet, dfinit par son assujettissement l'Autre, sujet, situe pour lAutre, responsable pour lAutre, constitu par le regard de lAutre, en vise de la droiture de son visage, la femme en tant que femme, nest-elle pas quune sorte de vide, d'illusion d'apparence, la forme sans contenu, sans sujet ? Aura Parait iauliai University Vilnius, Lithuania LVINAS DUCATEUR Examiner la pertinence dune dmarche ducative, cest lanalyser dans son contexte, puis la mettre en perspective dans le temps et vrifier son impact. Cest galement observer comment son auteur la met lui-mme en uvre dans son enseignement. Cest ce travail que nous voudrions nous attacher partir de la contribution dEmmanuel Lvinas, la rflexion sur lducation telle quelle se prsente dans Difficile Libert. En examinant les textes de la partie Hic et Nunc avec le recul qui est le ntre aujourdhui en 2009, alors que ces textes ont t publis entre 1951 et 1973. Cela nous permettra de dgager lactualit de la pense de Lvinas sur ces questions. Puis en recherchant dans les autres textes du recueil, la mise en uvre de ses principes

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ducatifs, nous serons mme, dvaluer limpact de sa pense sur la pense pdagogique actuelle. Patrick Petit-Ohayon Fonds Social Juif Unifi, Paris, France NGATION ET INFINI CHEZ LEVINAS DEUX COTES D'UNE MEME MDAILLE ? Le fait banal de la conversation quitte, par un ct, lordre de la violence. Ce fait banal est la merveille des merveilles. Dans Ethique et esprit publi pour la premire fois dans la revue Edivences en 1952 -, Levinas sinterroge comme le titre lindique sur la notion de lesprit. Il conclut que la dmarche spirituelle sengage partir de lthique, et cest pourquoi une religion ,,ne saurait se placer sur une autre voie. Pour Levinas, il ny a pas dopposition entre la raison et la morale, si bien que, pour lui, une religion irrationnelle et numineuse est impensable. Bien au contraire: la morale et en lien avec celle-ci la religion sont constamment en contact avec la raison. Linstance conciliatrice en est le langage. Levinas fait allusion cette instance quand il parle de la ,,conversation [qui] quitte lordre de la violence. Parler institue le rapport moral, ,,laction sans violence. Par la suite, Levinas aborde la thmatique bien connue du ,,face--face, qui seul permet de parler dune manire non-violente. On connat les dveloppements sur ce point: Levinas oppose la connaissance des choses qui comporte toujours une dimension violente la prsence du visage qui, quant lui, est inviolable. Ses ,,yeux absolument sans protection [...] offrent une rsistance absolue la possession, rsistance absolue o sinscrit la tentation du meurtre [...]. Cette tentation du meurtre et cette impossibilit du meurtre constituent la vision mme du visage. Cest l que samorce mon interrogation: Que signifie le fait que Levinas mette la tentation du meurtre et limpossibilit du meurtre sur le mme plan? La phrase voque une pense de Levinas quil nonce de faon rpte mais quil ne dveloppe jamais prcisment dans ses textes mmes. lexception de quelques contributions disparates, ce problme na pas encore fait lobjet de recherches jusqu ce jour. La question porte au-del de ce qui parat vident premire vue: Si lon considre que Levinas caractrise le meurtre comme ,,ngation absolue et que lil y a signifie le retour de la prsence dans la ngation, 7 le problme saggrave: Dans ce cas, la question se pose de savoir si l il y a et linfini sont comparables, si les deux parfois mme se touchent ou sils reprsentent deux ctes de la mme mdaille. Dans le texte tudi, cette problmatique sexprime dans plusieurs passages, par exemple dans la citation mentionne au dbut, o Levinas dit que le fait de la conversation quitte, par un ct, lordre de la violence. Et quen est-il de lautre ct? Le fait que le meurtre, la ngation ou lil y a, dune part, et le visage, linfini ou le divin, dautre part, sont imbriqus, sexprime dans une phrase la fin du texte: ,,Le regard moral mesure, dans le visage, linfini infranchissable o saventure et sombre lintention meurtrire. Dans larticle Dieu et la philosophie n au znith de son travail philosophique , le thme est mme aborde plus prcisment. Levinas dit: ,,[...] Dieu [...] est [...] autre quautrui, autre autrement, [...] lastreinte thique au prochain, et diffrent de tout prochain, transcendant jusqu labsence, jusqu sa confusion possible avec le remue-mnage de lil y a [...]. La structure et le contenu de larticle Ethique et esprit manifestent de faon paradigmatique un rapport entre meurtre et visage, respectivement entre ngation et infini (signalons que les chapitres ,,Esprit et visage et ,,Tu ne tueras point suivent immdiatement le chapitre ,,Esprit et violence). Dans ma contribution, jaimerais dgager ce rapport spcifique, et demander ce que cela signifie pour la philosophie dEmmanuel Levinas spcialement du point de vue de la relation entre l il y a et le divin. Natalie Pieper Universit de Zurich, Suisse

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DROIT ET LIBERT : ENTRE LOUVERTURE A LA TRANSCENDANCE ET LE RAPPEL DE LA SERVITUDE Entre laffirmation des possibles existentiels quelle met en jeu et le rejet de la servitude qui lanantit, la difficult de la libert se mesure lorientation de son exprimentation, lorsque celle-ci est mise au dfi dembrasser la voie dune investiture humaine. Du lien au pacte et du pacte la socialit se prpare ainsi lapprentissage de la libert de lhomme entendue comme celle dun affranchi se souvenant de sa servitude et solidaire de tous les asservis , veill par la transcendance comme par une dette toujours ouverte qui est redcouvrir. En nous engageant sur le cheminement esquiss par Emmanuel Lvinas dans certains textes de Difficile libert , nous nous proposons dexplorer le statut du droit, qui permet la libert de se saisir comme libert de lhomme parmi les hommes. Sa position mdiane, entre le domaine de lexaltation de la sensation de soi qui dfinit la subjectivit sensible et laltrit des autres hommes qui linvite se dpasser vers un partage thique, permet au droit de confronter deux conceptions de la libert et leur rapport problmatique la servitude. Le droit apparat en effet comme la condition pratique du maintien de la libert dans son rapport la transcendance, qui lui interdit dchouer dans la sphre goque et qui la soustrait ainsi lpreuve de larbitraire et de la violence qui signent son impossibilit. Mais qui ce droit sattribue-t-il pour que le miracle de la sortie du soi , savoir la socialit, puisse avoir lieu? Le maintien de la libert humaine comme enjeu dune exprience dcouvrir remet en question le statut mme de la subjectivit dans son rapport laltrit. Dlia Popa Universit Catholique de Louvain, Belgique

EMMANUEL LEVINAS- UN MESSAGE TOUS POUR LA VRITABLE LIBERT HUMAINE -RFLEXIONS ET THMES D'UNE PERSPECTIVE ALBANAISE Ltude est prsente comme un essai en six parties. La premire partie prsente mes rflexions sur lhritage de la pense d'Emmanuel Levinas et sa position dans le cadre de la pense occidentale du XX sicle . On met en vidence l'importance d'accentuer le facteur moral comme racine dune philosophie de rvlation , et aussi le rapport spcial existant entre la philosophie et particulirement la mtaphysique avec le monothisme. Quelques citations de " Difficile libert " et de " Totalit et infini " illustrent les ides prsentes. Une brve comparaison des positions de Heidegger, Husserl, et Kierkegaard, avec celles de Levinas est galement faite, visant accentuer la nouveaut et l'mancipation morale que ses ides ont apportes aux coles occidentales de la pense. La deuxime partie examine l'importance de prsenter la pense de Levinas, et tout particulirement de " Difficile Libert ", (mais aussi " De L'vasion ", et " Autrement qu'tre ") au public intellectuel albanais d'aujourd'hui. Un sommaire court mais succinct sur les racines culturelles albanaises et particulirement sur la tradition folklorique et morale de la socit est donn, l'influence des diffrentes religions monothistes dans une culture nationale, leur coexistence pacifique sont galement discutes. Diffrentes ides surgissant dans le contexte de la perception et de la ncessit des Europens orientaux et des Albanais pour la philosophie et particulirement lthique occidentales sont aussi examines dun point de vue critique. Le besoin pressant dtre clair sur les ides de Lvinas sur les racines morales leves des normes de la societ, et de celles de ses disciples et collgues, comme Paul Ricoeur etc., est intensment prsent dans l lite culturelle et politique albanaise d'aujourd'hui parce que la socit souffre d'un hritage presque totalement rural aux caractristiques sociales primitives, o souvent la civilisation n'est rien dautre qu'une imitation malheureuse et inexacte. Leffort pour lamlioration de la perception albanaise(et galement dautre pays dorigine orientale) sur la ncessit dun noyau moral de la socit pour sopposer la culture d'impunit cultive par lhritage communiste corrompu est discute dans le cadre des ides rvlatrices de Levinas dans

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" Difficile Libert ". La troisime et la quatrime partie inclut des ides dans une confrontation du dveloppement scientifique et technologique avec la rflexion philosophique et religieuse suivante : des ides, illustrant des relations de nature philosophique et religieuse avec le dveloppement technologique notamment dans de petits pays, sont proposes. L'importance des petits peuples dans le dveloppement de l'humanit est prsente dans une nouvelle lumire, confronte la menace de la mort culturelle engendre par la Globalisation. Dans la cinquime partie les diffrences entre des petites socits relativement sous-dveloppes comme en Albanie par rapport l'histoire rcente du peuple l sont discutes. Le concept de l'lection religieuse est discut dans le contexte des ides originelles de Levinas. Des paralllismes intressants entre l'histoire albanaise et juive sont souligns et des interprtations raisonnables sont proposs. Des discussions ultrieures sur la relation de l'Humanit avec la Globalisation sont galement prsentes, sous langle dune relation dans la dialectique des dveloppements historiques rcents. Dans la sixime partie des concepts nouveaux sont exposs pour donner une image plus claire de l'histoire humaine rcente, en tant que celle dune nanonation. Des socits de dsordre posttraumatiques sont dcrites et compares dans les exemples de la Shoah et du Kosovo ainsi que dans les exodes postcommunistes albanais. Des paralllismes inattendus dans le dveloppement des accomplissements culturels monumentaux juifs refltant et gurissant ces pathologies sociales sont trouvs et prsents. Diffrentes illustrations concrtes pour les ides phares de Levinas sont galement prsentes. Lluka Petraq Qafoku Tirana, Albania

UNE LOI VENUE DAILLEURS... LAUTONOMIE KANTIENNE COMME DIFFICILE LIBERT

La tentative de rapprocher la pense thique dEmmanuel Levinas au moralisme kantien pourrait, premire vue, faire semblant dtre dpourvue de tertium comparationis. Car, si lon prend les deux philosophes au mot, lhtronomie an-archique dont parle Levinas pour dcrire la mise en accusation du sujet moral face Autrui, parat sopposer diamtralement lautonomie souveraine qui, daprs Kant, permet la raison pure pratique de nobir qu des lois quelle se donne soi-mme. Mais, paradoxalement, la fondation kantienne dune mtaphysique des m urs qui soit pleinement purifie de tout ce qui provienne de lempirie effective, se sert comme point de repre et dappui de ce fameux fait de la raison qui annonce par limpratif catgorique une ralit du devoir moral avant que celle-ci ne puisse tre transcendantalement constitue dans les conditions de sa possibilit. Dans la mesure o le fait de la raison rvle ainsi sa nature de tache aveugle de la morale (B. Waldenfels), la loi thique en sa vigueur est remise en la question de sa gense ; et cest ici que la gnalogie de la subjectivit morale, comme Levinas la dveloppe phnomnologiquement, fait voir son importance systmatiquement primordiale pour la philosophie pratique en gnral et une ractualisation du criticisme kantien en particulier. En renvoyant au principe indispensable, mais indductible de sa propre facticit, la raison pratique se heurte une limite thique quelle ne sait ni construire ni thoriquement connatre, mais dans la transcendance de laquelle doit tre pratiquement reconnue la source normative dune libert investie par la responsabilit. Lautonomie de la raison se voit confronte une injonction revendiquant par la gnralisation des maximes avant tout les droits de lautre homme et impliquant ainsi non seulement le primat du pratique devant toute thorie spculative, mais aussi la priorit et la matrise de lAutre sur le soi-mme. En tant quautonomie relationnelle ou htronomie privilgie (E. Levinas) la libert na plus rien dune spontanit triomphante : Elle est devenue difficile, prcisment le problme dont elle, dans son idalisme hroque, se croyait volontiers la solution. Cette affinit intellectuelle entre Levinas et Kant au fond de leurs penses trouve un renforcement considrable par lanalyse dtaille des textes. Parmi les essais qui sont rassembls

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dans Difficile Libert, cest particulirement lide centrale d Une religion dadultes qui fait penser La religion dans les limites de la simple raison o Kant tablit un universalisme thique qui fonde la religion sur une morale du devoir dsintress et dont la question est beaucoup moins celle de savoir ce que lhomme peut esprer, que celle de savoir ce quil doit faire : ici et maintenant, au nom de Dieu, mais au service du prochain. En coutant dans lintimit de la conscience morale cette voix venue dailleurs (M. Blanchot), du visage parlant dAutrui, Kant et Levinas restent fidles La Loi et frres dun humanisme hbraque. Christian Peter Rner, Augsburg, Germany

ETHICS BETWEEN VISIBLE HISTORY AND INVISIBLE UNIVERSALITY: "READINGS OF DIFFICULT FREEDOM" In this paper I intend to explore the significance of a recurring theme in Levinas's Difficult Freedom: the question of the relationship between Levinas notion of ethical responsibility and his understanding of the Holocaust. For Levinas, the historical fact that the Jews have been victims of the Holocaust carries clear ethical implications that ultimately lead to his idea of radical responsibility for the Other. To be persecuted, to be guilty without having committed any crime, is not an original sin, but the obverse of a universal responsibility a responsibility for the Other. The idea of the linkage between ethical responsibility and the Holocaust should be, according to Levinas, a history for all, visible to all. Levinas, therefore, claims that the relation between the Holocaust as a historical fact and ethics should be viewed by anyone, that it should be clear to everyone. Nevertheless, at the same paragraph Levinas describes ethics as an invisible universality. What is the meaning of invisible universality? Can ethics be associated to a concrete historic era and at the same time be universal? Can ethics, as an invisible universality, also be visible for all? I intend to explore these questions by linking ethics with the medium of visuality, or more specifically, with the medium of cinema. I suggest that cinema, as a visual medium, can allow ethics to appear in a unique way. I will demonstrate this idea by relating it to the animated documentary film Waltz with Bashir (Israel 2008). The film can be a good example of Levinas theme because it demonstrates how his notion about the link between ethical responsibility for the Other and the Holocaust is still relevant today. Moreover, as a film that cannot be classified under any specific genre, that is neither documentary nor fictional, the status of its visual images transcends the dichotomy between visibility and invisibility. On one hand, as a documentary, the images of the film can be viewed as visible history, representing what has happened in the First Lebanon War. But, on the other hand, as an animation film, its pictorial aspects transcend mere representations of historical facts. In what way the unique status of the films images can illuminate the problematic relations between history and ethics as they are represented in Levinas discussion? Orna Raviv Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel TIME VERSUS BEYOND BEING: THE FIRST FREEDOM AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHERS Differing from an ontological understanding of philosophy, Levinas proposed a philosophical attitude which transcends from relation to being. Levinas and his philosophy were inspired by the ontological question regarding the relation between a being and being. He goes from egoistic thoughts which focus on the self and the being, and towards Others. Although Levinas absorbed ontological thought and its main questions, he confronted them and separated himself

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from them. He explained the difference between ontological interpretation and experiences of eschatology, making the separation more and more clear. Heideggers philosophy focuses on myself and the relationship with being. To be more precise, it extends to a space in which we come into contact with others regards - my attitude towards my being, which is only mine. Therefore, Levinas criticized Heideggers schemes involved in the exposition of the face of Others and ethical events. This seminar paper Time versus beyond being: The first freedom and attitude towards Others consists of two parts. The first part deals with discourse between being and the transcendent relation to Others as regards philosophical tradition and the explanation of time. Levinas, similarly to Heidegger, takes distance to the traditional understanding of time. Instead, they propose a conception of time which doesnt concentrate on causality , but rather as arche and an-arche. The second part addresses the question of freedom as sovereignty, independence and liberty. Heidegger and Levinas relate to freedom which is not the essence of philosophy. In Being and time, Heideggers thoughts are based on ontological truth. The issue of freedom is analyzed by him in On the essence of truth. In contrast to this, Levinas concentrated on freedom which leads to responsibility. While freedom is not the most important structure for both philosophers, it presents the essence of thoughts and directed to the essence. Although only part of the article the first freedom is inspirited by Levinas Difficile libert. Essais sur le judasme it is related and includes other books such as: De lexistence lexistant, En dcouvrant lexistence avec Husserl et Heidegger, Totalit et infini. Essai sur lextriorit, Autrement qutre ou au-del de lessence, Le temps et lautre. The first freedom is observed on the horizons of philosophy and Jewish tradition. Marcin Rebes Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland

ENTRE DEUX MONDES DANS DIFFICILE LIBERT : UNE TROP GRANDE PROXIMIT AVEC ROSENZWEIG QUI SERAIT DE LORDRE DE LINDICIBLE, DU DIRE ? Nous voudrions clairer un certain nombre de difficults que soulve cet article, et qui donnent penser. Le contenu de notre intervention consistera tenter de rpondre en partie ou en totalit aux questions que nous soulevons ici. 1. La Rvlation au sens de Rosenzweig devient la religion au sens de Lvinas. Or les deux ont le mme contenu, puisquil sagit dans les deux cas de dcrire une situation qui chappe la philosophie faite histoire chez Hegel, cest--dire la totalit idaliste : une relation vivante prcde toute pense, ft-elle idaliste, et donc en mme temps fonde toute pense, et permet de la limiter et de la critiquer. 2. Or dans la description de cette religion , Lvinas passe quasiment sous silence la dimension langagire qui traverse toute la rflexion sur la temporalit chez Rosenzweig, et qui y est centrale. 3. De plus, il ne fait mme pas mention du lien entre Rvlation et visage par laquelle lEtoile de la Rdemption se clt. 4. Or ces deux thmes langage et visage sont eux-mmes tout fait centraux dans la philosophie de Lvinas. Pourquoi prcisment taire ce qui fait la plus grande proximit de ces deux penseurs ? Que signifie ce silence de Lvinas (qui sera corrig plus tard, dans lintroduction quil rdigera pour le livre Systme et Rvlation de Stphane Moss)? Lvinas ne cache-t-il pas ainsi ce qui fait la grande nouveaut de lapproche rosenzweigienne de la Rvlation, savoir son lien intime au langage et au visage, alors que lui-mme tentera dexpliciter cette relation intime entre langage, visage et religion deux ans plus tard dans Totalit et Infini ? Pudeur ou crainte du philosophe face une dcouverte en travail et un point central de sa propre pense ? 5. Enfin, Lvinas insiste avec raison sur la tournure anti-politique et anti-hglienne qui serait celle de Rosenzweig lorsquil fait du peuple dIsral un peuple an-historique, ternel. Mais y regarder de plus prs, on se rend compte quune vision positive de Hegel et de lEtat est reprise par Rosenzweig, puisquil en fait des lments indissociables

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du dveloppement historique du christianisme, qui avec le Judasme, constitue un des tmoins ncessaire de lternit dans le temps ou de la vrit du visage. LEtat en effet, est dcrit comme une des figures du christianisme ptrinien (ER4742), et Hegel est vu comme une des expressions les plus abouties du christianisme paulinien (ER333). La forme johannique de la civilisation occidentale ouvrirait-elle alors une nouvelle forme de relation entre un christianisme mondialis et le Judasme ? Quapporte en ce sens la notion johannique desprance qui semble rapprocher dsormais le christianisme du Judasme -, par opposition lamour ptrinien et la foi paulinienne (voir ER337) ? Ne signifie-t-elle pas la possibilit dune nouvelle relation entre le Judasme et la vie du monde, par rapport laquelle la notion dEtat deviendrait ncessaire et insuffisante ? douard Robberechts, Universit Aix-Marseille CNRS , France

THE TORAH AS COMMENTARY ON THE WORLD AND THE WORLD AS COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH: On Revelation and Place in The Jewish Writings of Emmanuel Levinas In his early unpublished essay, The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate Hegel evaluates Judaism as a practical and philosophical system through an interpretation of the story of its progenitor. Abraham, according to Hegel, abandons the bonds of family and place that define ones identity. He severs his ties to his natural community and native land in order to become a rootless nomad, a stranger on earth, a stranger to the soil and men alike. Judaism, accordingly, defines itself through its opposition to the world and its negation of all natural identity. Hegels critique of Judaism as a self-alienated religion is contrasted to the organic totality that Hellenic culture and Christianity aspire to. The unity of man and nature, essence and appearance, world and spirit cannot be attained by Judaism which is governed by abstract laws. The Jewish rejection of mans organic relation to his natural surroundings is viewed by Hegel as immoral in that it prevents ones total immersion in the world. Emmanuel Levinas would agree with Hegels understanding of the Biblical account of Abraham as primarily a story of dissimilation and differentiation from a native habitat, but in contrast to Hegel, Levinas finds there within the exemplary core of Jewish ethics, which can be followed only by a break from the state of nature and a removal from ones immersion in the world. In fact, Abraham figures as a central metaphor in Levinass philosophy, as counterparadigm to the organicism inherent to Hegels thinking. Judaism, Levinas contends, does not restrict itself to the transcendent at the cost of renouncing mans place in the world, but rather engages the corporeal world in dialogue, principally through an originary act of separation. It is only after the self is removed from the autochthonous that it can recognize its divine responsibility. In my paper I attempt to read the trajectory of Levinass Jewish writings as an ontological critique of being. This critique reads Hegels notion of organic belonging and his elevation of nature as the failure of human solidarity. Levinass reading of Jewish sources is developed into an anti-foundational universal ethics that revives the sanctity of human life. His ethics do not draw upon social contracts, and do not exhort natural rights. Levinas proposes a model for universal human engagement derived from the Bible and Talmud that rejects the notion of place as the defining of identity and ethics. In my reading of Levinas, I seek to emphasize the manner in which he substitutes the idea of the sacred as structured around a spatial axis invested with ontological significance with a notion of the divine revealed through an encounter with the text. He contrasts the concept of the sacred as an immanent attachment to nature to Biblical and Talmudic sources in which the act of exegesis is the Jews participation in revelation. Judaism, claims Levinas, has always been free with regard to place. The trope of ethical revelation as exilic phenomenon is then expanded through his reading of Midrashic sources that stress the conversion of space into text. The scriptures testify to an ethical existence that
2

LEtoile de la Rdemption, traduction dA. Derczanski et J.-L. Schlegel, Seuil, 1982.

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does not reside in nature, ontological existence or the knowledge of abstract principles, but in the awareness of the others irreplaceable singularity. Abraham Rubin City University of New York, New York, USA L THIQUE ET LA RDEMPTION Le messianisme occupe dans Difficile Libert une place capitale, sous deux angles, deux questions, une problmatique: lthique et la Rdemption. Y a-t-il opposition ou complmentarit entre lune et lautre? Si pour Rosenzweig, les trois moments fondateurs sont la Cration, la Rvlation et la Rdemption, les trois concepts cardinaux du rapport de lHomme Dieu, pour Levinas, sont sans doute la responsabilit, l Infini et la Saintet. La saintet tant le stade ultime de l thique, l une et l autre tant la condition mme de la Rdemption. L thique est le concept principiel, la condition de la Rvlation. Mais cette premire acception n est-elle pas dj une modalit de l thique humaine? Ce principe lvinassien de saintet, si fondamental dans l uvre entire du philosophe, prend toute son ampleur biblique, prophtique, talmudique et actuelle, dans Difficile Libert, l'ordre thique n'est pas une prparation mais l'accession mme la Divinit. Tout le reste est chimre , crit Levinas Michal de Saint-Chron France LE TEMPS ET LAU-DELA DE LHISTOIRE ROSENZWEIG ET LEVINAS Notre objectif est de reprendre la question du temps messianique et de lhistoire travers la comparaison des textes dEmmanuel Levinas et ceux de Franz Rosenzweig. Il est vrai que la phnomnologie de Husserl et lontologie de Heidegger caractrisent le temps chez Levinas. Cependant, linfluence de Rosenzweig sur Levinas nest pas ngligeable, et aussi pour Rosenzweig comme pour Levinas, la question du temps occupe une position centrale. Evidemment, Levinas affirme que lopposition lide de totalit chez Rosenzweig se trouve partout dans Totalit et infini (1961). Dans la confrence prononce en 1959 et rdite dans Difficile libert (1963), Levinas prsente la biographie spirituelle de Rosenzweig. Cette prsentation vise rsumer LEtoile de la Rdemption, surtout montrer le sens des lments irrductibles la totalit. Pour Levinas, linterprtation de Rosenzweig nest pas une lecture simple, mais un processus pour dvelopper sa propre pense. Selon Levinas, Rosenzweig dcouvre la mise en mouvement du temps lui-mme, de la vie . Cest le temps et la vie qui sopposent la totalisation et qui brisent la totalit. Mais le temps dcouvert comme brisure de la totalit le temps appel le temps messianique ne concerne ni le temps objectif ni le temps subjectif, car le temps messianique se situe en de de lopposition du temps objectif et le temps subjectif. En fait, notre travail consiste en lanalyse de la dformalisation du temps si nous employons lexpression de Levinas. Nous nous questionnons sur le rapport entre la dformalisation du temps et la vie concrte et nous prcisons la porte du temps messianique. Pour traiter du temps quon ne peut pas rduire la totalit, le rapport entre le temps et lhistoire est une question rflchir. Dune part, Levinas critique la notion de lhistoire parce que lhistoire en tant quhistoire au service des pouvoirs est le synonyme de la totalisation. Selon Levinas, linterprtation de la temporalit du Dasein comme historicit, comme le fait Heidegger, se consacre une telle comprhension de lhistoire. Dautre part, le temps vcu ne peut pas tre spar de lhistoire. En effet, pour Levinas et Rosenzweig, qui hritent de la source hbraque, il sagit de lhistoire sainte en tant que au-del de lhistoire considre partir du temps messianique. En fait, linterprtation du temps entre Levinas et Rosenzweig est si proche.

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Cependant, alors que Rosenzweig a pour but de rechercher le sens de lhomme avec les termes religieux, Levinas, qui se base sur la phnomnologie, sapproche de lhomme travers les analyses sur la sensibilit ou lintentionnalit non-intentionnelle. Cette diffrence nous amne rflchir de nouveau sur le sens de lhistoire o nous vivons et sur le sens de la vie dans lhistoire. Notre question principale: pourquoi et comment faut-il penser lau-del de lhistoire aujourdhui? Nous essayons de rpondre cette question en examinant la notion de lhistoire. La dmarche est la suivante: Prsenter la structure du temps dans Ltoile de la Rdemption et dcouvrir son influence sur Levinas. Analyser le temps messianique chez Levinas par comparaison du temps chez Rosenzweig. Rflchir sur le sens de lhistoire non-totalisante et son rapport la vie. Kaori Sato Universit Paris X Nanterre, France

TOTALITY AND SELF-BIAS: SIMONE WEIL AND THE REVERSE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION OF THE SAME Difficult Freedom presents motifs of tension and violence that originally emerged in the exegesis of same and Other in Totality and Infinity (T&I). A number of the essays comprising Difficult Freedom show Levinas grappling with the demands and limits of his own faith and trying to reconcile horrors, the extermination of six million defenseless beings with the Christian faith of Europe at the crossroads of the 20th Century. The violence and reduction of Other to same that flowed throughout T&I (often at the level of theory) resurface in Difficult Freedom with greater practical urgency. While enhancing familiar keynotes, Levinas also reveals a practical result of his thoughts on totality and violence that inheres in T&I without finding expression: selfbias. Writing in the wake of Simone Weils untimely death, Levinas reflects on the relation of her thought to biblical Judaism. As Weil developed her chosen themes of absence, affliction, beauty and metaxu, she staunchly rejected any recourse to the Bibles Old Testament. Addressing Weil, Levinas states: With regard to the Scriptures themselves ... her attitude is ambiguous: she treats them as historical books whenever they support her thesis, and false whenever they disturb it. It is precisely such bloody-mindedness (which Levinas deftly explores in Simone Weil Against the Bible) that lies at the heart of self-bias as carefully derived from T&I. Levinas spends most of T&I seeking to establish a Copernicus-like revolution of ethical relation. It is not, he argues, Other that must bow to self, but rather self that must recognize and show due reverence for the height of Other. At the centre of this revolution, however, lies the irony that the selfs core function is not to respect alterity but to suspend it: the possibility of possessing, ... of suspending the very alterity of what is only at first other, and relative to me, is the way of the same. The reverse Copernican revolution reveals itself in Levinas comments on Weil: the way of the same will naturally assume all that must be assumed to make the same/totality correct (i.e., the basis of all subsequent understanding). As the sum of daily action condenses into a worldview (a vulgar proxy for what Levinas might call totality), a person will reorder all other information to bolster and protect the worldview. Although the reverse Copernican revolution of self-bias plays out at the level of theory in T&I, the culture and religion wars of Difficult Freedom give it desperate vibrancy. And the vibrancy fails to wane. With a meltdown in financial markets arguably attributable to traders and bankers inability to accept information that contradicted their established positions and celebrity culture that complains about dishonesty of the media only when the dishonesty fails to suit the occasion (if coverage helps then it's OK, true or not), Difficult Freedom presents itself as an aide for reflecting

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on the conditions for translating reverence for the height of the Other into a credible recognition of information that should modify the seemingly immovable weight of entrenched worldviews. Robert F. Schwartz Allen & Overy, London, England LEVINAS, MAIMONIDES AND THE LITHUANIAN KABBALAH One of the key frames of Levinas writing in a Jewish vein has been his insistence that we must embrace what he calls, a religion for adults. I take this to mean, along with the idea of difficult freedom, that religion must be ethically responsible and free of comforting or helpful but false mythologies, including the myth of divine being or presence that animates even sophisticated Jewish thinkers like Abraham Joshua Heschel or Martin Buber. In a recent article in the Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, I argued that Levinas negation of the idea of divine being can be traced directly back to his early fascination with Maimonides, whose importance for Levinas scholarship has long been underestimated. Maimonides also wrote frequently about the need for an adult religion in his Guide of the Perplexed, making this a natural focal point for comparison between the two thinkers. At the same time, I believe it can be shown that at least some of this Maimonidean influence was indirect and mediated by the Lithuanian Kabbalistic (Jewish mystical) tradition, which has sometimes drawn on Maimonides in a paradoxical way to critique aspects of mystical thought that were central to other kabbalistic schools such as Hasidism, like the quest for intimacy with the divine that seems to place ontology ahead of ethics. Levinas acknowledged his debt to Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin, but there are other figures in this trajectory who should also be considered. Lithuanian Jewish writers like Leshem and even Rav Kook used the term adult religion to critique the notion that one can perceive or attach oneself to divine being except through the intermediary of ethical ideals or middot that define human virtue. One need not assume a direct link between Levinas and these rabbinical writers in order to recognize a broad cultural and religious milieu in which Levinas and others were concerned with different articulations of a common set of problems in religious phenomenology. The convergence of todays resurgent fascination with Jewish mysticism and the fact of Jewish social, economic, and even military power in North America and Israel call for a renewed look at this philosophical-cum-mystical critique of childish or non-adult religion whose focus on divine being and immediacy may have (arguably has had) violent or unethical implications. My paper shows that Levinas critique, while original, was also grounded in a longstanding minority Jewish intellectual tradition, and that his importance as a contemporary expositor of that tradition is greater today than he probably could have imagined when he wrote these essays. Don Seeman Emory University, Druid Hills, USA LEVINAS CRITIQUE DE LA LIBERT DES MODERNES La libert ne repose-t-elle pas sur un engagement pralable avec ltre lgard duquel on se pose comme libre? [...] La libert en gnral ne suppose-t-elle pas un engagement pralable au refus mme de cet engagement? 1 Ces interrogations qui, dans Difficile libert, sont laisses sans rponse et qui font sans doute signe vers les apories intrinsques de la libert, consacres par le titre mme de louvrage, expriment nos yeux le mouvement de mise en question de la libert catgorie minente de tout idalisme et transcendantalisme philosophique sans cesse ritr par Levinas tout au long de son uvre. La difficult de la libert, Levinas le montre bien, nest pas dabord le simple revers de la finitude du sujet incapable dabsolutiser sa matrise, mais elle tient surtout au pril de

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larbitraire et de linjustice. Le problme fondamental, pos ds Totalit et infini corrlativement la rsolue mise en question de la libert 2, est, ds lors, celui du dpassement de larbitraire et de lgosme, celui de dcouvrir linvestiture qui libre la libert de larbitraire 3. Or, de manire paradoxale, la rconciliation de la libert avec elle-mme ne peut soprer que sous la forme dune certaine htronomie privilgie 4, rendue possible par la prsence dAutrui qui accuse linjustice foncire de la libert goste. Cest un paradoxe que Levinas assume dans toutes ses consquences, jusqu redfinir, dans Autrement qutre ou au-del de lessence, la subjectivit comme otage, et jusqu faire, lencontre de toutes les certitudes de la philosophie moderne de la subjectivit (y compris transcendantale), de la condition dotage une modalit essentielle de la libert, la premire 5. De cette manire, cest la charge 6 de toute libert qui passe au premier plan, charge dont le contenu est constitu par lthique mme et dont le nom le plus adquat est celui de responsabilit. Dans la responsabilit, la sujtion totale 7 du moi dpossd de sa souverainet despotique peut se retourner en lection et renforcer, de manire inattendue, lunicit du moi et son caractre irremplaable. Et seule cette conjonction entre libert et responsabilit, rinvestie par Levinas jusque dans ses derniers cours professs en Sorbonne 8, est susceptible de compenser la perte de lautarcie sans faille du sujet qui se complat dans larbitraire dune libert dpourvue de toute investiture, en faisant de lancien matre un lu qui accomplit l uvre de la justice. Il appert ainsi que la difficult la plus haute de la libert, cest de se convertir en justice, d uvrer autrement que sous la forme de lasservissement et de la domination et surtout, de se mettre en cause, de faire son propre procs. Sans un tel procs, nous serions contraints daccepter lhypothse inquitante de Libert et commandement, selon laquelle seul le tyran (celui dont laction ne connat aucune entrave), est vritablement libre. Et la difficult suprme de la libert non critique, qui se fie sa spontanit, et prcisment de ne pas faire de la tyrannie sa vrit inluctable. Claudia-Cristina Serban Universit de Paris IV Sorbonne , France REFLECTIONS ON DIFFICULT FREEDOM, THE IL Y A, SHAKESPEARE AND ROSENZWEIG As the call for papers reminds us, the historical context of the publication of Difficile Libert (first published in 1963) is the aftermath of World War II; the discovery of Hitlers horrors; Stalinism; and the founding of the State of Israel. Today, we face a different set of problems and conditions: the rise of terrorism world-wide in the wake of a particularly violent interpretation of Islam; the startling economic ascent of China and India; and a far more global understanding of religious and spiritual traditions, in which the Dalai Lama, for many even in the West, has greater moral authority than the Pope. In the light of these changed historical realities, some of the remarks that Levinas makes in Difficile Libert about both Islam and Asia sound rather dated or narrowly provincial. My paper has two objectives: 1) it will ask if what Levinas has to say about Islam (in the essay Monotheism and Language and Asia (in the essay On Jewish Thought Today), in the context of his understanding of what he calls the Holy History of the JudeoChristian tradition, has relevance for todays diverse, multicultural world; 2) and it will compare Levinass understanding of these traditions with those of Franz Rosenzweig, who is a continual presence in Difficile Libert, particularly in the essay Between Two Worlds (The Way of Franz Rosenzweig). In Monotheism and Language,, Levinas makes an argument about monotheism that seems almost unthinkable in today's academic discourse, which tends to view belief in God as a defensive posture, as a fundamentalism that unites adherents to one of the particular monotheist faiths Jews, Christians, or Muslims -- against those with different beliefs. Startling, in today's context, is Levinass claim that the word of the one and only God . . . is a word that obliges us to enter into discourse (p. 178). In Jewish Thought Today, Levinas remarks on what he considers the three great events in response to which Jewish thought today orients itself. The third is the arrival on the historical scene of those underdeveloped Afro-Asiatic masses who are strangers to the Sacred History that forms the heart of the Judaic-Christian world. I do not

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wish to minimize the cultural provincialism that this sentiment expresses. It reveals a disturbingly phobic ignorance of Asian thought, to be sure. But Howard Cayghill ( Levinas and the Political, 2002) is wrong to insinuate that Levinass use of the term Holy History is tantamount to a fundamentalist notion of providential history unique to Christians and Jews, and perhaps to Muslims. Holy History is rather, for Levinas, the eruption of the holy out of the cruelty of the sacred. Thus, participation in Holy History is not, for Levinas, limited to Jews and Christians (and Muslims), but is open to all, from any of what Levinas calls the great spiritualities (Of God Who Comes to Mind, 93), which might include ancient Chinese Confucianism or Buddhism. In the light of his statement about the equivalence between the great spiritualities, can Levinas can be viewed as more open than Rosenzweig to the truths articulated in spiritual traditions other than the Judeo-Christian? Steven Shankman University of Oregon, Eugene, USA MEETING LEVINAS THROUGH REMEMBERING WYSCHOGROD: A PHENOMENOLOGY OF LANGUAGE, ART AND THE ETHICAL To have been touched by Edith Wyschogrod is to have been caught up in her vision. Much the same can be said of Levinas, since the thrust of her contributions to shaping our intellectual and ethical lives has, from the beginning, been inspired by his. What follows is dedicated to remembering the brief time when Edith Wyschogrod passed through my life and to her dedication to embodying immemorial memories of others. The task that was set by the organizers of this years gathering of Levinas scholars was to turn to the sorts of writings by Levinas collected in Difficult Liberty, with the two-fold hope that (1) because of their accessibility (2) they may provide keys to better grasp the complex interaction of Levinas Jewish and philosophical writings. One of the joys in working with Wyschogrods writings on Levinas is that in her handling of his conceptualizations more often than not efforts at staying with her exegeses are rewarded with deeper and broader insights into just how difficult it really is to read Levinas. This is not the liberty that we expected. By the end, it should be apparent that I basically agree with Wyschogrods readings of Levinas and recognize them as co-workers in developing the ethical theory I call phenomenological ethics. I begin by briefly commenting on the historical significance for the field of Levinas studies of Wyschogrods book, Emmanuel Levinas: the Problem ofEthical Metaphysics. For the body of my presentation, I stay with a reading of that book and focus on her interpretation of Levinas use of language as the pivotal experience that differentiates his philosophical approach from the methodologies of several other seminal modern philosophers: Husserl, Buber, Heidegger, and Hegel. She sets Levinas phenomenologically ethical use of language against the backdrop of a Husserlian language of intentionality, conscious that at a fundamental level Levinas reamains within the orbit of phenomenology. However, she guides us through the structural differences that set Levinas off in another direction than that entailed by the dogmatic rigidity of Bubers language of I-It and I-Thou relations. And yet, she takes great care in drawing a clear line between Levinas metaphysics of language and the framing of ethical implication that serves as a powerful foundational attractor for Heideggers language of authenticity. Rather, Levinas develops a language of ethical touch and proximity. Wyschogrod presents what she takes to be Levinas alternative philosophy of language by reconstructing a phenomenological account of subjectivity. Unlike Levinas, however, Wyschogrod does so by putting on the hat of a philosopher of history, and she can dance with the best of themin this case, dances a few steps with the philosopher of history, Hegel in taking us from an immanentist account of language, and thus of ethicality, to Levinas transcendental, phenomenological account. Wyschogrod points out how Levinas remains phenomenological and thus must reveal a transcendent, transhistorical eschatological dimension of meaning within history itself precisely in order to allow for the lived, incarnated experience of the world of art and culture. In the final part of the essay, I take up how Wyschogrod deals with the trace and what I

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take to be an omission on her part, namely, the occlusion of the influence that Levinas reading of Rosenzweig most likely played in setting the parameters for an ethical metaphysics in the first place. Jules Simon University of Texas, El Paso, USA THE ADVENT OF THE ETHICAL IN DIFFICULT FREEDOM Consistent and profound writings on Judaism in Levinass work date back to 1934, yet Difficult Freedom reaches back only to 1949, excluding as much as it gathers. It was of course natural that Levinas should want to focus on the situation of a Judaism transformed by the holocaust, and natural that this 1963 selection of essays should echo the concerns of Totality and Infinity. In fact, the historical range of the compilation reflects a pivotal turn in Levinass philosophical trajectory: the turn from ontology toward ethics at the beginning of the 1950s, initiating the well-known theses that culminate in his magnum opus. But the genesis of this primacy of the ethical is obscured in Difficult Freedom inasmuch as it (a) excludes the perspective of his earlier writings on philosophy and Judaism, which was decidedly ontological (if antiHeideggerian); (b) obscures the chronology of the included writings with a thematic arrangement, framing the ambiguities of its earliest material within the more definite theses of Levinass post-ontological stance. Ethics and Spirit, the 1952 essay which opens Difficult Freedom, represents (with its philosophical counterpart of the previous year, Is Ontology Fundamental?) a drastic departure which anticipates many theses of Totality and Infinity: the identification of comprehension with violence; the resistance of the face to possession; the grounding of the possibility of murder on its own prohibition; the irreducibility of the vocative relation with the Other to knowledge and ontology. This relation is initially called religion. Throughout Difficult Freedom, Levinas is clear that the essence of (Jewish) religion is ethics and justice. Since the ethical erupts spontaneously into Levinass existing ontological vocabulary (which had already accommodated the thoughts of the Other and transcendence), it is worth considering the precise meaning of its initial identification with religion. From the books 1952 essay on Simone Weil to its 1961 essay on Heidegger, the severance of the meaning of religion and ethics from ontology takes the form of a discourse on Judaism as a spiritual uprooting, a freedom from place, versus the pagan attachment to world and soilenrootedness. But in the writings of the 1930s and 1940s, Judaism was said to have its own enrootedness, not to soil, but to the facticity of the Jewish identity to which one was riveted. Judaism was characterized as a modality of the ontological, a particular way of feeling ones place in the economy of being. Though these works were never republished by Levinas, their shadow remains in the ambivalence of Difficult Freedoms oldest material. Place and Utopia (1950) offers the earliest formulation (preceding even Is Ontology Fundamental?) of the distinct and primordial nature of ethics as the priority of murders prohibition. However, at this threshold ethics is not prior to ontology, but remains a modality of it: it is found in the Jewish experience of the weight of existence as a way of being without being murderous. Judaism presents an alternative enrootedness to that of Christianity or Paganism, an impossibility of uprooting oneself from a facticity which includes responsibility. Jesse Sims The New School for Social Research, New York, USA LVINAS PHILOSOPHE ET DUCATEUR Au-del du ncessaire questionnement du titre de luvre (emprunt aux derniers mots de larticle ducation et Prire), lobjectif de ce colloque est non seulement de rinscrire les textes de Difficile Libert dans leur contexte historique, philosophique, et dans le cadre de lvolution de la pense de Levinas, mais plus

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encore, de les entendre nouveau dans ltonnement et le questionnement quils suscitent encore aujourdhui. Il faudrait inverser laffirmation concernant le titre de luvre : ducation et prire ne fut publi que dans ldition de 1976. Texte dune intervention dEmmanuel Lvinas datant de 1964, un an aprs la parution de Difficile libert, cest sans doute le titre du livre qui, en cho celui-ci, a dict la phrase qui clt le discours et renvoie la lecture. Lvinas philosophe fut, pratiquement sa vie durant, non seulement philosophe et matre s philosophie et enseignant mais aussi ducateur. Mais alors que son uvre proprement philosophique sadressait tous, sa proccupation dducateur concernait spcifiquement la jeunesse juive. Cest peut-tre, plus que les sujets et la manire de les traiter, ce qui caractrise son discours proprement juif par rapport aux textes purement philosophiques. Cette proccupation transparat en bien des pages de Difficile libert. Elle forme lessentiel de Hic et nunc, surtout lorsquon considre ensemble la premire dition et celles dsormais inchanges qui suivirent. Et le fait que des textes aient disparu ds la seconde dition exprime surtout le fait que Lvinas ne voulait garder l que ce qui encore et durablement tait dactualit. Que le texte ducation et prire , dj ancien, sy soit ajout, indique sans doute que Lvinas navait pas, entre temps, chang davis. Quelle doit tre la place de la pratique religieuse, de linstruction religieuse dans lducation juive ? Dans ce texte de rfrence, la formation la pratique religieuse par excellence la prire doit semble-t-il cder le pas la redcouverte des sources qui alimentent le judasme authentique : le Talmud. Pourtant, lire un autre texte de Lvinas, De la prire sans demande , paru dans Les Etudes philosophiques , n2/1984, la prire juive aurait pu tre une ou peut-tre la pdagogie de la libert et hic et nunc un apprentissage de la responsabilit. En parcourant les divers textes de Difficile libert consacrs lducation, nous essayerons de rpondre la question de savoir si le primat de ltude talmudique sur lenseignement de la pratique religieuse sachant que Lvinas lui-mme tait pratiquant relve dun jugement circonstanciel sur la ralit sociohistorique ou sil sagissait dun jugement de principe fond sur un dire du trait Avot : Grande est ltude, qui mne laction. Dans ce cas, il fallait certainement, selon Lvinas, accorder lurgence de la priorit ltude du Talmud. Jerme Yeroham Simsovic Universit de Bar Ilan , Ramat Gan, Isral LEVINAS CREATIVE APPROPRIATION OF THE HEGELIAN CONCEPT OF RECOGNITION The 1930s and 1940s experienced a resurrection of Hegelian studies in France. Important translations of and commentaries on Hegels texts by a new generation of scholars - Wahl, Koyr, Hypollit and above all Kojve - made his thought not only accessible, but also riveting for the next generation of French thinkers. Without denying the strands of absolute idealism and logical structures in his thought, they found and emphasized the concrete human aspects of consciousness in his works. It is within this context that the concept of recognition, which has a less prominent role in Hegels later works and which only has a minor, even if important, role in his earlier works, and which heretofore was scarcely highlighted particularly in the French reception of his thought, began to emerge as a central concept for philosophical analysis and creative reinterpretation. For recognition is a concept that emerges within an interpretation of spirit as an intersubjective and social concept that takes the other seriously and concretely, and not merely dismissed as an illusion as argued in traditional metaphysical, idealistic interpretations of Hegel. It is under this generation of scholars and amidst this revival in Hegelian studies that Levinas would appropriate, rehabilitate and creatively reinterpret the concept of recognition. This paper seeks to explore and analyze Levinas account of the concept of recognition. That recognition is a central and abiding issue for Levinas is evidenced by his use of the concept

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scattered throughout the corpus of his works in general. More germane to his work Difficile Libert, recognition is a pressing issue particularly when one considers the historical background in which he writes, that is, of postwar France, the horrors of the Holocaust, and his struggles over Jewish identity. Yet despite its clear importance for his life and thought, what he means by recognition is never precisely delineated and defined. For instance, at times the concept of recognition is formulated in Hegelian terms as a struggle for recognition ( Kampf um Anerkennung), and at other times, he uses it to refer to the ethical and religious relation with the other. I will try to show that there are fundamentally two meaning of recognition, paralleling his more familiar distinctions of totality and infinity, being and otherwise than being. While the former meaning is related to consciousness, the latter is ultimately grounded in Levinas peculiar understanding of sensation. Philosophically grounded in sensation, his understanding of recognition is furthermore deeply embedded in and entwined with religious concerns over representation and idolatry. Thus, it will be shown that recognition is the lynchpin which holds together and illuminates his relationship to both German thought as well as Judaism, to both philosophy and religion. Michael Sohn University of Chicago, Chicago, USA UNE COMPRHENSION PHNOMNOLOGIQUE DE LA TRANSCENDANCE ET L'THIQUE TANG CHUN-I, LEVINAS ET LA PHILOSOPHIE TRANSCULTURELLE Notre propos est de montrer une comprhension phnomnologique de la transcendance et l'thique partir d'un philosophe chinois contemporaine, Tang Chun-I (1909-1978) et Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) et finalement proposer le plan de la philosophie transculturelle comme la rencontre thique entre les cultures diffrentes. (1) Dans La formation dun soi thique (1944), Tang constate que la transcendance est l'essence de l'esprit individuel et le point de dpart de la transformation thique de la vie est la rflexion sur les affects (qin) que nous nous sentons dans la vie quotidienne. La transformation thique de la vie nest pas fige un but concret mais plutt vise la fin infinie et ainsi rsiste absolument au conformisme moral quon a attribu la tradition de la philosophie chinoise jouant aussi dans la politique aujourdhui. (2) Nous lisons Totalit et infini (1961) de Levinas en dpassant le schma hglien de Tang pour mettre laccent la thse levinasienne que lthique ne peut tre rendu possible que par la transcendance de lautrui, qui ne peut absolument tre dduit de la structure ontologique de ltre humain. La transcendance comme linfini ne signifie pas que la vie peut devenir ltre infini ou sintgre linfini en quelque sort, mais linverse, cest linfini qui se maintient transcendant et rend possible lappel thique de lautrui vers nous-mmes. (3) tant donn que lapproche de Levinas est tout fait trangre celle de la philosophie chinoise, elle nous demanderait repenser lapproche subjectiviste de la philosophie chinoise dfendue par le no-confucianisme contemporaine dont Tang fait partie et nous amnerait larticulation nouvelle de lexprience thique. Cette rencontre entre Tang et Levinas ne peut tre compris comme la philosophie compare qui suppose lessence culturelle dans la tradition de la philosophie. Nous voudrions montrer que la philosophie transculturelle sopre sur le plan interculturel par les descriptions phnomnologiques et vise la comprhension transculturelle, comme la impliqu Levinas dans Difficile Libert, essai sur la Judasme (1963). Yuen-Hung Tai Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

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DIFFICULT FREEDOM: DIFFICULT HUMANISM Throughout the essays that constitute Difficult Freedom, Levinas offers us a variety of tensions to characterize the theme announced in the title. In one instance, at the end of the Preface, we are reminded of the difficult condition whereby the hunger of the third party limits the rights of the Other to which we are also responsible freedom is the difficulty of having to calculate justice. In another essay near the end of the text, Education and Prayer, Levinas calls attention to a difficult freedom of difference which is germinating within the walls of a homogenous humanism. Though this difficult freedom of a different Judaism might appear to be just being difficult (stubborn), these seeds hold the promise of something more true. Levinas works to fulfill this truth by articulating both a humanism which includes the difference of identity and a Judaism that is, before all, an ethical responsibility to the human. Through these articulations, the difficulties of humanism prove to be as manifold as the difficulties of freedom: there is the difficult task of living a Judaism that lives through the study of the Talmud; the renewed demand to find fraternity amongst the monotheistic traditions; the work of ensuring that monotheism is a humanism; the imperative for Christians to recognize a reconciliation with Judaism based on the impossible passion lived between 1940-1945; the tense union of being a Muslim friend and unhated enemy of the Six-Day War; the uneasy awareness that true monotheism is duty bound to answer the legitimate demands of atheism. Amidst all these tensions, and the many more unmentioned, this last quotation forces a seemingly curious conclusion on this already difficult humanism: true humanism is duty bound to answer the legitimate demands of antihumanism. I explore the implications of the relationship between humanism and antihumanism presented in Difficult Freedom. The aim of my presentation will be two-fold. On the one hand, I want to articulate and preserve Levinas critique of antihumanism. Through Antihumanism and Education I will explore the danger inherent in eliminating a notion of Law from human essence which leaves the human with only the freedom to pursue all desire distinct from law (a lesson Levinas finds in the Talmudic doctors who teach that freedom is inscribed on the Tablets of stone). On the other hand, I also want to focus our attention on Levinas insight that we must accept certain truths of atheism in order to propose a similar argument with respect to certain truths of antihumanism. Crucial for my argument will be Levinas presentation of the sixth commandment (You shall not kill) from Ethics and Spirit. Here, Levinas argues that though the face is inviolable, it offers a resistance in which the temptation to murder is inscribed... This temptation to murder and this impossibility of murder constitute the very vision of the face. Accepting that this murderous impulse is a temptation and not necessarily a specific action, it is still integral to emphasize that both the temptation to murder and the impossibility of murdering constitute the vision of the face. If I do not see my own temptations to murder, I do not truly see the face. In my presentation I will be speaking to the importance of retaining this insight within the realm of humanism. If we do not accept our own temptations to antihumanism, we are not true humanists. Without accepting our murderous inclinations, we will not truly welcome the Other. It is my hope that exploring the relation between humanism and antihumanism in Difficult Freedom will provide a unique context for considering the resonances throughout all of Levinas works. Shawn Thomson York University, Toronto, Canada JUDAEO-CHRISTIAN FRIENDSHIP: AN OBSCURING OR ILLUMINATING HYPHEN? Levinas attentiveness, throughout his life and writings, to the margins to the baraita is central to both his theoretical ethics and to its praxis. These teachings, or Rabbinic commentary, that are not easily categorized in the mishnah and are often simply disregarded. Following in the footsteps of the rabbis who chose not to deny the baraita their place in history, Levinas Talmudic readings give priority to that which is excluded, to that which is traditionally

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overlooked. It is precisely this respect for the baraita that makes one particular piece in Difficult Freedom so fascinating. Entitled Judaeo-Christian Friendship, Levinas here refers to a brief interchange between Jacques Madaule and himself that followed his fourth Talmudic reading on teshuvah delivered at the Colloques dIntellectuels juifs de la Langue franaise in 1960. In it he declares what for him was the essential moment in the dialogue between Jews and Christians. It is this moment which I wish to investigate, by returning to the improvised exchange that is its context, and secondly, to honour it, by means of a challenge. The nature of the latter is to be found in the question; Judaeo-Christian Friendship: An Obscuring or Illuminating Hyphen?. Levinas finds redemption in the idea, expressed by Madaule, that Christians no longer see Jews or Judaism as simply a historical, or theological, footnote. It is the significance of this transformation of the traditional approach to Jewish-Christian friendship that is essential for Levinas. He sees new hope for a real relationship on the basis of Judaism being significant for the future and for life. It is this significance that strikes me as much mor complex and problematic then Levinas seems to acknowledge. By firstly seeking to understand the ground of Levinas new hope , I would like to consider several other essays in Difficult Freedom which engage the topic of JewishChristian relations. Levinas ambivalence on this subject is perhaps a taboo topic unconsciously overlooked by so many of his readers hailing from a Christian background but it is certainly worthy of further inquiry and fundamental to an understanding of what Levinas takes to be the grounds for a Judaeo-Christian friendship - a friendship and term that need to be explored from within his writings and beyond. Anya Topolski Catholic University of Brussels, Brussels, Belgium RENDRE LE LANGAGE POSSIBLE Dans le numro de janvier-mars 1969 du Bulletin de la socit Paul Claudel, Emmanuel Levinas sinterroge sur lvolution de lcrivain catholique lgard du judasme et des juifs: Claudel aboutit la reconnaissance du judasme, mais part dun antismitisme trs cru . Aussi, pour Levinas, le parcours de Claudel est-il emblmatique dune volution de la conscience catholique qui, aprs ce que Claudel appelle - et non la lgre, et non par mtaphore use lholocauste , a t conduite reconsidrer la place du judasme et des juifs dans leschatologie chrtienne. Ce qui a dcid du basculement de cette conscience catholique, cest que le peuple juif gisait au plus profond de labme o, entre 1939 et 1945, fut jete lhumanit . Levinas le souligne, cela signifie aux yeux de Claudel que, dans un sens non confessionnel, non ecclsiastique , le peuple juif vcut le religieux: Le peuple juif retourne, pour la pense chrtienne, au c ur de la Divine Comdie. Pour la premire fois, ce retardataire incorrigible de lHistoire Sainte est lheure . Levinas prend acte du courage de Claudel. Mais, en philosophe, Levinas nomet pas de questionner la posture du pote Claudel: Il faut tre grand comme Claudel pour user de posie comme dun moyen de connaissance . Cest de fait en questionnant la capacit de la posie se dpasser vers une transcendance dont le point de gravit serait limpossible que Levinas relativise la perspective claudlienne. En effet, cela dont aucun temps humain ne saurait jamais vritablement rendre compte, cette immolation religieuse de tout un peuple, perce la conscience humaine dune question qui, pour Levinas, dborde les limites nationales o lHistoire Sainte est habituellement perue: quest donc un vnement dHistoire Sainte qui ne toucherait pas dans sa chair vive lhumanit, par-del les distinctions nationales ? Et quest la suppression de ces distinctions, sinon une humanit indivisible, cest--dire responsable tout entire de crimes et de malheurs de quelques-uns? Levinas choisit donc demporter la posie de Claudel au-del de son intention historique initiale : pourquoi rester prisonnier de catgories sociologiques uses? Certes, Claudel rend possible une attitude quun chrtien adopte pour la premire fois: il saperoit que le juif - en tant que juif - est pleinement son contemporain . Mais alors, il faut aussi dbarrasser la posie ellemme des fantasmes qui masquent son exigence premire, pour viser cette transcendance qui

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fait sa vraie grandeur: rendre le langage possible . Levinas donne ainsi la posie un rle critique dont la tche est immense: ne pas laisser le discours politique - polmique - envahir le champ de la parole, retrouver en elle une autre raison dagir. David Uhrig Universit amricaine, Paris

THE DELAY IN HUMAN CONSCIENCE AND SCHIZOPHRENIA: A Psychiatric Interpretation of Benjamin Libets Experiments From The Viewpoint of the Philosophy of Emmanuel Lvinas Applying a naturalistic view of human cognition, one should see our conscience as retarded to the external world, because awareness would be given only after sensory stimuli reached to brain cortex. A series of experiments performed by Benjamin Libet brought controversy on the status of the human conscience. At first, he showed that about 0.5 sec of cerebral activities is needed to produce awareness of sensory stimulation. Then he demonstrated that subjectively we seem to be aware of sensation almost immediately, with no appreciable delay. Finally, Libet postulated a subjective referral of the timing, by which the sensation appears subjectively as if there were no delay. Clinical practice tells that the retarded awareness appears in the experience of schizophrenic patients. For example, they suddenly find the abnormal meaning already decided in delusional perception. The delusional meaning precedes them without anticipation. Similarly, patients often experience the auditory hallucination as already passed and cannot recognize the agents of the voices. In these experiences, schizophrenic patients show a failure in subjective referral to antedate the delay and fail to be the subject of their own experiences. Libets postulation shows the disconnection between mind and body. Also, it might prove the rightness of Jewish morality restricted to the prohibition, compared with Christianity. We might find phenomenological equivalent of the delay in the deconstruction by Jacques Derrida. Delay and antedating in sensory experience refers to diffrance indispensable to construct our experience. Our immediate phenomenon is always and already intermingled by spurs of signs, which make each phenomenon repeatable, preventing us from schizophrenic disruption. However, it is indispensable to consider on the statue of the other as introduced by Emmanuel Lvinas, if one would like to appreciate the abyss of time experienced by schizophrenics, which is normally embedded in the midst of our ordinary life. The concept of the face and the plus haut elaborated by Lvinas would provide important clues for understanding the psychopathology of the most severe human mental illness. In this presentation, we will make a meditation on the relationship between the time experience and the other through the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Takeshi Utsumi Tokyo University of the Arts, Tokyo, Japan DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITIES In the Essay "Judaism and the Feminine", Levinas quotes the Talmud's explanation that "The house is the woman." Whereas Levinas has been criticized for this stereotypical positioning of women, I would instead like to focus on the significance of the home in Judaism, and its implications for Levinas's ethical and political thought. The home has a central role in Jewish culture. Many of the most important commandments, such as the laws of Kashrut, focus on the proper maintenance of home. The most important festival of Judaism, Passover, begins with an invitation to the hungry, and ends with an invitation to the prophet Elijah. Especially during the years when Jews were exiled from

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any state, from any stable political structure, the home took on especial importance, and civic practices such as education became centered in the home. This Judaic idea of the home stands in stark contrast with Heidegger's conception, as Levinas shows in both "Judaism and the Feminine" and "Heidegger, Gagarin, and Us." Heidegger considers Home as the Place in which the gathering of Being occurs in man, the source of his primordial, pagan enrootedness. Already simmering within Levinas's critique is the awareness that Heidegger employs this concept to spiritualize the notion of the *polis* as the locus for the historical gathering together of a people (*Volk*), the Home (*Heim*) that exposes them to Homelessness (*Unheimlichkeit*). In light of Heidegger's description of this encounter as a place where mankind heroically confronts the "terrible" (*deinon*), Levinas's analysis of the home as a place for warmth and intimacy takes on an particular significance. I believe that understanding the prominence of the home is essential for comprehending Levinas's ethical and political thought. Many commentators have endeavored to interpret how Levinass ethical reflections can be applied to the political realm: how does one go from an intimate situation of face-to-face moral responsibility to the impersonal rules of justice. I would like to suggest that, before we attempt to consider the ethical meaning of the political, we should employ Levinas thinking to reflect upon the significance of an intermediate region, the domain of the home. Levinas's reflections about the home can open up new ways of thinking about prepolitical forms of social affiliation, to consider modes of responsibility which are characterized by their focus on domesticity. Levinas emphasizes how domesticity characterizes human responsibility when he, for example, explains signifying as "nourishing, clothing, lodging" and describes the one-for-the-other as "hospitality" or even as "hostage." I would argue that this type of domestic responsibility is an important component of many contemporary social movements, including ecology and food safety movements. For example, an awareness of how our domestic choices involve us in networks of responsibility can be found in authors like Michael Pollan, who writes that our dietary choices comprise a set of social and ecological relationships, reaching back to the land and outward to other people. Mitchell Verter New School for Social Research, New York, USA PARTICULARISME, UNIVERSALISME ET RISQUES DUNE THIQUE MONDIALE Cest dans le climat intellectuel de la querelle de lhumanisme (qui opposait Sartre ou Dufrenne Lvi-Strauss ou Foucault, entre autres) que Levinas a publi son Humanisme de lautre homme. Il est bien tonnant que dans ce livre seulement trs peu soit dit explicitement sur lhumanisme que Levinas semble prner. Il faut comprendre lhumanisme de lautre homme comme une formule dsignant le tournant du sujet de la modernit vers un point de gravitation autour de lautre tournant opr par toute l uvre de Levinas et cela, plus particulirement dans le contexte de la deuxime phase du dveloppement philosophique de Levinas nonc dans ce livre. Le point de dpart de cet ouvrage est la particularit, considre comme problme thique; Levinas rpond ce problme en rhabilitant le monothisme en philosophie, ce qui implique une rfrence de jugement thique qui reste indpendante de toute particularit. Serait-il possible de complter notre comprhension de ce livre et des enjeux dun humanisme de lautre homme par une lecture de Difficile libert, cest--dire du livre dans lequel lhumanisme est discut le plus en dtail ? Rpondre cette question est une entreprise complique puisque le genre du recueil mme prend sa forme dans ladhsion une particularit que lauteur affiche. Le texte, la langue, la religion, les lieux de culte, la littrature, la civilisation et la discipline juifs sont mis en valeur en tant quopposs ou diffrents de la culture dominante ambiante. Ce particularisme soppose donc, au moins premire vue, luniversalisme rclam par lhumanisme traditionnel et, plus important, lindpendance de lthique par rapport aux particularits culturelles (comme dans Humanisme de lautre homme). Ce constat ne nie pas le changement de perspective que Levinas a fait (et qui est document dans

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Difficile libert): dune acclamation dun humanisme hbraque ou juif, dans laquelle le monothisme mme est prsent comme un humanisme, vers le particularisme dAbraham qui, tout en sopposant au climat intellectuel ambiant, prend radicalement au srieux lantihumanisme de lpoque, notamment par une explication de la mort de Dieu comme crise de lhumanisme. Dans les deux versions, Levinas semble accepter que la particularit culturelle juive nest pas seulement compatible avec lthique, mais apporte une contribution essentielle la comprhension de lthique. Dans cette prsentation, jexplorerai en dtail la manire dont Levinas se situe par rapport lhumanisme et lantihumanisme, en suivant le fil conducteur du rapport entre la particularit et luniversalit dans lthique. La confrontation d Humanisme de lautre homme et Difficile libert (surtout la dernire section) sur ce sujet, permettra de dgager les tensions et aboutissements de la position de Levinas. Tout cela sera fait dans une optique philosophique dans laquelle la situation actuelle des rapports thico-politiques de la mondialisation fonctionnera comme horizon du problme. Ernst Wolff Universit de Pretoria, Afrique du Sud LEVINAS ET LE CHRISTIANISME : UNE PROXIMITE LOINTAINE La philosophie d'Emmanuel Levinas, trop longtemps ignore de son vivant, suscite au cours des dernires dcennies un intrt grandissant auprs des philosophes, phnomnologues, spcialistes d'thique mdicale, juristes, hermneuticiens, thologiens, etc. Plusieurs parmi ces experts auront suggr de manire plus ou moins explicite, une proximit trs prononce entre les thses centrales de la pense levinassienne et celles de la pense chrtienne. Certaines notions propres la tradition thologique chrtienne, et travailles par Levinas comme par exemple la Knose, auront incit certains de ses interlocuteurs et commentateurs voir une correspondance ou mme une communion d'ides entre le philosophe juif lithuanien et une lecture de la tradition chrtienne. Plusieurs articles, richement arguments et trs subtilement noncs, conduisent une conclusion quivoque quant la position levinassienne par rapport la tradition chrtienne. On notera cependant que plusieurs de ces articles se basent sur une lecture 'slective' des sources levinassiennes. Qu'en est-il en fait? D'autres textes du matre de Kovno semblent rsolument svres par rapport aux thses fondamentales de la foi chrtienne et plus encore par rapport toute une ligne de conduite pratique en Europe, depuis l'avnement de la chrtient et jusqu'aux "exterminations hitlriennes qui ont pu se produire dans une Europe vanglise depuis plus de quinze sicles". Force est donc de poser franchement la question du rapport de la pense levinassienne envers la Chrtient qu'il considre comme une spiritualit authentique laquelle aucune aventure spirituelle ne saurait tre pargne. L'importance de cette question n'est pas de dterminer 'une fois pour toutes' une sorte de verdict quant diverses tentatives de 'rcupration' de la pense de Levinas et son affiliation tel ou tel ordre thologique, voire pour reprendre l'expression grossire de Badiou, "la philosophie annule par la thologie" (juive! s.w). Au contraire, la question d'une analyse philosophique de la relation entre Judasme et Christianisme, soit dans la trace de celle suggre par Franz Rosenzweig qui voit dans toutes deux, "deux aventures de l'esprit qui seraient toutes deux et au mme titre ncessaire la vrit du Vrai", soit dans une position plus proche de celle de Hermann Cohen, le philosophe du no-kantisme et matre de Rosenzweig qui mit l'emphase sur le foss infranchissable qui spare les deux perspectives religieuses, se pose avec acuit de par l'ambigut de l'ensemble des textes levinassiens concernant le Christianisme. Il se trouve que plusieurs des textes fondamentaux relatifs cette ambigut se trouvent dans Difficile Libert. En effet, on retrouve dans ce premier livre consacr l'aspect plus particulirement juif de sa pense, et contenant plusieurs articles publis peu de temps aprs la Shoah, plusieurs rfrences directes et indirectes la tradition chrtienne. Dans diverses parties du livre: Au-del du pathtique; Polmiques; Ouvertures et Hic et Nunc ainsi que dans les premires lectures talmudiques, Levinas pose une double question: D'une part celle de l'ouverture juive vers le monde

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chrtien, et d'autre part celle de la distance par rapport ce monde. A partir de ces textes, mais en rsonance avec d'autres textes plus tardifs d'Emmanuel Levinas, nous tenterons de montrer quelle a t l'approche trs singulire qu'il a suggre, et en quoi elle peut servir de socle un nouveau et autre type de dbat interculturel. Shmuel Wygoda Universit hbraque, Jrusalem, Isral SAMOZVANETZ : SE DIRE MESSIE, PRETENDRE ETRE MOI LE DEBAT RUSSE ENTRE LEVINAS ET JANKELEVITCH AU QUATRIEME COLLOQUE DES INTELLECTUELS JUIFS DE LANGUE FRANAISE La deuxime partie de Textes messianiques a t prononce comme un commentaire talmudique au quatrime colloque des intellectuels juifs de langue franaise. Nous voudrions regarder de plus prs la polmique entre Lvinas et Janklvitch, qui a eu lieu ce colloque, dont les traces sont prsentes dans ce texte. Vladimir Janklvitch, qui a ouvert le colloque avec son expos L'esprance et la fin des temps , a propos une vision de messianisme juif sans fin des temps ni Messie personnelle. En dveloppant les ides magistrales de la pense russe des annes 1910-1920 (N. Lossky, Berdiaef, Troubetzkoi), Janklvitch dnonce le messianisme traditionnel en tant que missionisme : partir du moment o quelqu'un sinvestit dune mission il devient un usurpateur, Samozvanetz. Tout Messie qui sest dit tel est un faux Messie , a dit E. Minkowski en rsumant la position de Janklvitch sur ce point. Lvinas, lui aussi, utilise limage de Samozvanetz dans le cadre de son analyse, mais dune faon tout fait diffrente. Quiconque se dit Moi est Messie juste parce qu' il se dsigne pour ce rle . Donc Messie, qui est Moi, est un Samozvanetz, celui qui sest promu (lui?)soi-mme pour porter toute la responsabilit du Monde . Lvinas insiste sur le fait que personne ne peut se dire porteur dune mission que dans la mesure o elle a dj commenc l'accomplir. Ainsi la diffrence principale entre Lvinas et Janklvitch se formule de la manire suivante : quel est le rle de lauto-dsignation dans le devenir dune subjectivit (messianique)? Selon Janklvitch le sujet moral ne sait pas tre le hros ou le saint du type bergsonien, parce quil ny a pas dinstance capable de le revtir d'une mission; le devoir infini dabngation de soi-mme nest limit que par la finitude du pouvoir du sujet. La thmatisation dun mystre sacrificiel de lamour en termes de mission (prsupposant un moment de privilge) dvalorise lacte moral du sujet. son tour cette insistance sur le caractre sacrificiel, voire salutaire, de devoir moral d'un sujet reste compltement trangre Lvinas. Pour lui mon obligation infinie envers autrui vient de mon unicit dlu, et donc finalement de Sina. Se dire Moi nest possible que dans la forme me voici , mais cet nonc fonctionne en tant que performatif. Le sujet lvinassien se constitue en parlant, en se disant responsable, en se dsignant comme Moi dont il rpond lappel de lAutre. Anna Yampolskaya Russian State University for the Humanities

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LE RENOUVEAU DE LA PENSEE JUIVE EN FRANCE LA CONTRIBUTION DE LEVINAS On peut dire de la philosophie de Levinas que c'est "une pense de la survie, non d'une vie ternelle, non de la vie immdiate, mais d'une vie autre dans l'immdiat, aprs un cauchemar." (Guy Petitdemange, Philosophes et Philosophies du XX sicle, Seuil, Paris, 2003, p.353) Un cho de cette vie autre dans l'immdiat se trouve dans les textes sur l'ducation juive qui clturent Difficile Libert. Comme Rosenzweig, mais dans des circonstances historiques trs diffrentes, Levinas entend dynamiser les tudes juives par un retour aux textes-fondateurs et leurs soubassements linguistiques. C'est le seul moyen de contrebalancer, dans la vie quotidienne, les influences imperceptibles mais relles des civilisations environnantes. C'est en ressuscitant une haute science juive qu'il comptait contribuer la survie des Juifs dans la diaspora. David Banon Universit Marc Bloch, Strasbourg France PASSION D'ISRAL : LEVINAS FACE AU CHRISTIANISME. Nombreux sont les motifs qui invitent s'interroger sur les rapports pour le moins ambigus de Levinas avec le christianisme: esquisse, ds l'aprs-guerre, de l'ide d'une Passion d'Isral, polmiques diverses avec arrire-plan chrtien dans les annes qui suivent, et surtout mergence massive de concepts chrtiens dans sa dernire pense. En dpositaire autoris de la tradition rabbinique, Levinas fait-il toujours prvaloir la rfrence juive ? Ou bien est-on fond le souponner de quelque "drive christianisante"? Et quel regard porte-t-il en dfinitive sur la figure christique, dont il semble plus d'une fois vouloir reprendre le paradigme son compte? Pour instruire ce dossier complexe, il importe de remonter la priode o s'amorce sa rflexion sur le dbat judo-chrtien, en relisant notamment certains fragments des annes quarante et, bien sr, Difficile Libert. David Brzis, CNRS, Paris LA SOLIDARIT SYMPATHETIQUE ET LA POLMIQUE INPUISABLE Dans la contribution que je propose pour le Colloque jentends envisager les lignes dominantes de lattitude trs complexe et tourmente que Levinas a eu envers le christianisme. Dans les essais runis dans Difficile Libert on peut remarquer deux articulations fondamentales de cette attitude, cest--dire, celle de la solidarit sympathtique et celle de la polmique inpuisable. Je me propose dtudier lentrecroisement particulier que les deux articulations dessinent dans Difficile Libert et ladmirable synthse qui les runit dans une confrence de 1968, intitule: Un Dieu Homme? Francesco Paolo Ciglia Universit de Chieti-Pescara, Italie TAKING LIBERTIES: RE-SITUATING DIFFICILE LIBERT This paper focuses on the revisions and receptions of Levinass Difficile libert, in order to question why this work is increasingly thought of as both a major and central text by Levinas and as one of his most accessible. It argues instead that the subtle, decisive and significant shifts

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effected in the book actually make it a highly complex construction that elaborates an argumentative anachronism designed to create post hoc facto a consistent and exemplified difficult freedom. The paper therefore involves initially a revisionist review of the most obvious differences that exist between the original 1963 edition and the later, definitive 1976 version. Such differences mean, for example, that the title of the work does not derive from the end of the article Education et prire, with its contemporary philosophical reference to diffrence, as is often assumed, but arguably from the Talmudic readings being offered to the Colloquium in the early sixties, of which we have a trace in Difficile libert in the retained 1957 article Une religion dadultes, with their subtle maintenance of a concern for nation-building that is comprehensible inter alia in a context of post-war reconstruction. It means also that the relationship of the later editions ethics, most intimately given in the expanded Signature but also strongly present in the article ostensibly on Paul Claudel and in De la monte du nihilisme au juif charnel, to the nazi horror, hitlerian massacres, exterminations and the period 1933-1945, remains more implicit (or, viewed retrospectively, belated) in the original work. Similarly, we can see that the encouragement repeatedly given to a young, muscular Israel, mostly via pieces concerned with contemporary Jewish education in the West, and a quite complementary hawkish view of current politics in a section given the openly cold-war title of Le Grand Jeu, are both attenuated and re-located with the removal of no fewer than nine articles (even if they are also compensated by the addition of Lespace nest pas une dimension, with its vision of a totally religious state, and Antihumanisme et ducation with its deliberately concluding evocation of the State of Israel). Finally, it becomes clear that certain additional philosophical solidarities come subtly to qualify and re-colour some of these earlier affirmations, with new pieces on Spinoza, Jacob Gordin, and a certain Hegelianism, as well as most obviously and importantly with the delayed addition to the work of the key 1959 essay on Rosenzweig, Entre deux mondes. Through this insistence on the diachronic and developmental nature of the work, the paper therefore also reviews the relationship of Difficile libert to the rest of Levinass uvre, and notably its function of absorbing Totalit et infini and anticipating Autrement qutre through the elaboration of a chronologically mobile third voice that modulates philosophical and political tensions through delicate anachronism. In postulating this reading, the paper also focuses on the significant moves of rapprochement and distantiation that one sees effected in the general presence and absence of Rosenzweig in Levinass work. Sen Hand University of Warwick, UK SINGULARIT DISRAL ET UNIVERSALIT MORALE Parmi les nombreux thmes dvelopps par Levinas dans Difficile Libert, lun des plus prsents est le rapport entretenu par le peuple juif avec le monde extrieur. Le plus souvent, cette question est aborde dans un cadre fix par les seuls concepts de particularisme et duniversalisme articuls de diverses faons. Si, en tant que peuple appartenant la famille des peuples, le peuple juif peut bien, dans un sens qui reste prciser, relever encore de ce formalisme, cela nest plus vrai ds linstant o ce peuple devient porteur de la loi de la Torah. Il convient alors dajouter un troisime terme, la notion de singularit, laquelle chappe au couple ci-dessus. Cela ressort, tantt explicitement, tantt implicitement, des analyses de Levinas et cest dans ce sens que je commenterai un passage talmudique extrait du trait Avoda Zara, passage dans lequel le Talmud prononce sur lHistoire des Nations le verdict du Jugement Dernier, le verdict du jugement thique. Georges Hansel Paris, France

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WHAT IS A DIFFICULT LIBERTY?

QUEST-CE QUUNE LIBERTE DIFFICILE?

Le titre Difficile libert est inattendu. On sattendrait ce que la libert soit facile ( libre comme loiseau ; voir Ibn Ezra sur Lvitique 25 :10). Loiseau qui chante librement en haut de larbre est cens tre dans une position facile . Celui qui est enferm dans une cage est dans une situation difficile. Et donc, quest-ce quune libert difficile? Je propose de passer en revue le livre de Lvinas, Difficile libert, en rdant autour des mots libert et difficile un peu comme un chasseur l'afft. Lpigraphe du livre est une citation de Michna Avot 6 :2 : Libert sur les tables de pierre (DL, p. 5). Il sagit donc de la libert qui provient de la Loi. Cest elle qui est difficile. Dans "Une religion d'adultes" Lvinas crit: "Le numineux ou le sacre enveloppe et transporte l'homme au-del de ses pouvoirs et de ses vouloirs. Mais une vraie libert s'offense de ces surplus incontrlables Cette puissance, en quelque faon, sacramentelle du divin, apparat au judasme comme blessant la libert humaine, et comme contraire l'ducation de l'homme, laquelle demeure action sur un tre libre. Non pas que la libert soit un but en soi. Mais elle demeure la condition de toute valeur que l'homme puisse atteindre. Le sacr qui m'enveloppe et me transporte est violence" (DL, p. 29). Et voil donc que la libert humaine de la Loi soppose au numineux , lincontrlable , au sacr qui menveloppe , la violence , et Paul, Otto et Heidegger. Le choix est entre libert difficile et violence facile. Dans le mme article, Lvinas explique: "L'homme juif dcouvre l'homme avant de dcouvrir les paysages et les villes L'homme commence dans le desert ou il habite des tentes, ou il adore Dieu dans un temple que se transporte. De cette existence libre a l'gard des paysages et des architectures, l'gard de toutes ces choses lourdes et sdentaires qu'on est tente de prfrer a l'homme, le judasme se souvient, au cours de toute son histoire, qu'elle s'enracine dans les campagnes ou dans les villes. La fte de 'cabanes' [sukkot] est la forme liturgique de cette mmoire Pour le judasme, le monde devient intelligible devant un visage humain et non pas, comme pour un grand philosophe contemporain qui rsume un aspect important de l'Occident, par les maisons, les temples et les ponts. Cette libert n'a rien de maladif, rien de crisp et rien de dchirant. Elle met au deuxime plan les valeurs d'enracinement et institue d'autres formes de fidlit et de responsabilit" (DL, p. 40). La libert difficile offerte par les tables de pierre signifie la libration lgard de lenracinement dans les paysages et les architectures, dans les temples et les demeures -- libration qui nous rend capables de voir le visage de lautre homme. Cest la libration a lgard de lenracinement heideggrien. Cest la libert de la responsabilit. W. Zeev Harvey Universit hbraque de Jrusalem TRACES DUNE LECTURE (MAURICE BLANCHOT LECTEUR DE DIFFICILE LIBERT) Si Blanchot a pris soin de commenter longuement et mticuleusement certaines uvres de Levinas, notamment Totalit et Infini et Autrement qutre, accompagnant les uvres du philosophe presque pas pas, il nexiste en revanche gure dtudes consacres Difficile libert, hormis La conqute de lespace dont la dette au livre de Levinas est explicitement reconnue. Blanchot saisissait alors loccasion de larticle de Levinas, Heidegger, Gagarine et nous pour proposer, une rflexion sur la question de la technique et celle du lieu. Mais force est de constater que les traces visibles de sa lecture de Difficile libert, se rduisent une note sur les deux Torah dans LAmiti et quelques fragments de LEcriture du dsastre. La lecture patience, attentive de Difficile Libert a pourtant eu lieu, en atteste une douzaine de pages archives, dont le titre Difficile Libert nest pas mentionn par Blanchot, une douzaine de pages de citations recopies du livre de Levinas. Douze pages o lcriture de Blanchot certes de rares moments, et dans une infinie discrtion , se mle celle de Levinas, comme en attestent plusieurs points dinterrogation, ou mme quelques rares assertions de Blanchot entre parenthses, prcisant, reformulant ainsi la pense de lami.

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Cette absence de commentaire de Blanchot incarne la survie dune lecture travers lactivit de copie. Sauvegarde dune trace, mmoire dune lecture dans le seul geste patient, solitaire et dsintress du copiste. Comme si la possibilit dun commentaire dbutait toujours par la paraphrase, instituant ainsi la rptition comme le vritable commencement de lcriture. Sans essayer de reconstituer vainement et virtuellement un texte de Blanchot qui nexiste pas, on accordera au seul acte de lecture, la puissance dune criture finalement demeure invisible, sans avenir, comme en rserve, mais non sans effet. Cet effet nous le mesurerons essentiellement dans les rares rflexions que Blanchot proposent dans les marges des Textes messianiques de Difficile Libert. Eric Hoppenot IUFM de Paris Universit Paris IV LEVINAS, EDUCATION, AND THE POLITICAL In his 1956 essay, For a Jewish Humanism, Levinas reassures his audience that the Jewish school does not betray the republican ideals of the secular school. By promoting what he calls Jewish humanism, he explains that the Jewish school supports that which gives meaning to Judaism in the modern world and that modern humanistic values have their origins in ancient Judaism. He emphasizes that the aim of the Jewish school is not simply to bring a Jewish education to Jewish children in order to maintain Judaism as a religion, but to bring children into the kind of education that will reinforce the Jewish humanism found in and promoted by Jewish sacred texts. Twenty years later, in his 1973 essay translated as Antihumanism and Education, Levinas argues that the Jews are in a crisis of humanism for which a deepened Jewish education is ultimately the solution. Referring to the principles of 1789, he explains that Judaism and Jewish education were sanitized of the very element that might have allowed it to contribute to modern culture in a meaningful way. By tracing the roots of the problem back to 1789, Levinas links the problems of Jewish assimilation, Jewish humanism, and Jewish education to the development of the French republic. These essays on Jewish education, written during his 30 years as Director of the Ecole Normale Isralite Orientale, mirror themes in Levinas philosophical project, which he was developing at the same time. The original publication venues of these essays indicate that some were intended for an audience of Jewish educators and others were directed at French Jewish intellectuals. Recognizing that the intended audience for these essays included teachers and staff at the Alliance, as well as secular Jewish intellectuals in France, is crucial to understanding the significance of these essays. They are his gentle attempt to persuade his readers to replace the secular mandate of the Alliance with one that is religious [Jewish]. As a result, his educational writings implore the Jews to become more Jewish (i.e., particular). My claim, provocative as it is, is that, for Levinas, it is not enough that the Jews reclaim their spirituality and deepen their relationship to their religion; the world must also change. In Levinas view, the humanism of modernity has its roots in ancient Judaism. In a sense, then, we are allor, rather, we all have the potential to beJewish (i.e., universal). Levinas philosophical project describes an ethical responsibility and a human subjectivity that is also essentially Jewish in its universal expression. Levinas, then, pulls out the roots of a philosophical prejudice that reserves universality for a certain type of Christianity while relegating Judaism to the realm of the purely particular. Judaism maintains the tension between particularity and universality. If it is the case, then, that we are all to become Jewish, the next logical question to ask is How is this to happen? I argue that the answer lies in considering Levinas writings on Jewish education in relationship to his philosophical project. Claire Katz Texas A&M University, College Station, USA

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SHOULD LEVINASIANS ALSO BECOME HEGELIANS? THE PROMISE OF EDITH WYSCHOGRODS SAINTLINESS It is well known that the first book on Emmanuel Levinas to be written in English is Edith Wyschogrod's book on Levinas from 1974. What is less well known is that the last paragraph of that book offers a *criticism* of Levinas's work, concluding that Levinas's thinking through the infinite does not escape the problems of Hegel's notion of the bad infinite. Wyschogrod concluded that "Hegel's infinite thus haunts all of Levinas's work as the possibility of return into undifferentiated being". In this paper I reconstruct Wyschogrod's mapping of the limits of Levinasian discourse, and argue that the theme of sainthood in her 1990s work is a way of fighting against the deleterious risks of this haunting. I suggest that the saint was, for Wyschogrod, both a Levinasian category (the saint acknowledges the force of alterity) and a Hegelian category, exemplifying the "concrete universal" in her body. The saint is the figure who prevents the Levinasian life from being as formless as the *il y a*, and thereby keeps the haunting forces at bay. In other words, what Wyschogrod taught Levinas scholarship before her death in 2009 is that it is only when Levinasian ethics embraces Hegel, against the letter of Levinasian thought, that it can fulfill the goal of Levinasian thought and open the future. Martin Kavka Department of Religion, Florida State University LES SOURCES DE LA PENSE SLAVE DANS LA CONCEPTION DE LA LIBERT CHEZ LEVINAS Emmanuel Levinas a plusieurs fois soulign limportance de la littrature dans llaboration de sa pense. Il a t persuad que tous les grands thmes de philosophie taient l ds lge classique. Une littrature digne de ce nom soffre lhomme comme texte inspir appellant penser et agir. Le philosophe, qui a bien vritablement pratiqu la lecture de diffrentes litteratures pendant toute sa vie, a nanmoins rserv une place privilgie aux romans et la posie russes, aux auteurs comme Pouchkine, Dostoevski, Tolsto, et vers la fin de sa vie, V. Grossman. Excellent russophone, il savait rciter par coeur La lettre de Tatana, et dans sa pratique dialogale de la philosophie, les auteurs russes ont t constamment voqus. Or, les uvres de grands crivains russes refltent clairement ltihque biblique appuye sur la responsabilit pour la parole slave, sur lthique messianique qui dfinit lortodoxie russe et, finalement, sur la conception de la difficile libert . Il sagit dabord dune thique de la parole authentique qui est propre aux diffrentes cultures slaves. Le nom Slave prcisement signifie la parole ; mais il ne sagit pas uniquement des paroles, certes comprhensibles, dont dpend la communication, il sagit de la vraie parole dans laquelle nous habitons avec notre tre entier et par laquelle nous crons les relations interpersonnelles. Lortodoxie russe, fonde sur les textes prophtiques de la Bible, a dsign les lieus privilgis de lphiphanie de lEternel : lenfant, la femme et le mendiant. Or Levinas labore dmbe la notion de la fminit comme une altrit par excellence et jusquaux derniers textes le philosophe parle du visage qui est la fois le mendiant et le matre. Il signale aussi le rle important des faibles desprit qui radicalisent la caractristique de lenfant parce quils expriment la fois une extrme pauvret desprit et une inteligence originare que vient de lau-del. Le philosophe finalement opte, par les personnages des romans russes, pour une libert bien difficile. Dabord, ses hros renoncent la libert spontane qui peut tre trs gocentrique. Le philoposhe ensuite propose une libert dengagement pour le visage dAutrui. Cette libert na pas besoin dtre explique parce que cest elle qui donne lexplication de notre comportemet thique. Elle est tonante parce quelle nous surprend l o nous ne lattendons pas, est dautant plus difficile quelle exgige la responsabilt exceptionnelle de llu qui se laise dsigner par la prsence de la souffrance de lAutre. Edvard Kova Facult de Philosophie, Universit de Ljubljana, Slovnie

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LEVINAS CLAUDEL : LA RENCONTRE IMPOSSIBLE Certes, ils ne frquentaient pas le mme monde, le philosophe enferm dans son uvre et son enseignement, le pote ambassadeur globe-trotter. Mais la sparation na rien de gographique. Ils auraient en effet pu dialoguer propos des origines religieuses de notre civilisation, gnralement appeles judo-chrtiennes . Et le face face aurait t intressant entre lenfant chri de Dieu , le rouleau convertisseur , Claudel tellement heureux tellement confiant dans son catholicisme quil voulait le faire partager au plus grand nombre, et le reprsentant de lhumanisme juif, Levinas, dfenseur mme dun humanisme de lautre homme en lequel les valeurs chrtiennes pourraient se reconnatre. Mais comment le penseur de lextriorit aurait-il pu sympathiser avec ce catholique littral au point de considrer la femme, parce quelle souvre, comme une offense faite lorbe , qui apprcie dans locan le lien universel, et affirme par la bouche dun de ses hros je ne puis rien accomplir si vous ne me donnez le monde entier . Claudel est une figure parfaite de la totalit , philosophiquement inacceptable pour Levinas, de mme que la conviction paulinienne du pote que le bonheur de lhumanit ne tient qu la conversion des Juifs, lesquels nont peut-tre pas entendu la leon de la shoah. Il sagira donc dexaminer les points de convergence entre le pote et le philosophe, ainsi que ceux, exposs par Levinas dans les trois textes mordants de Difficile libert, qui rendent lentretien infini. Marie-Anne Lescourret Universit Marc Bloch, Strasbourg, France THE DIFFICULTY OF THE UN/FORGIVING Much has been written on the gift, yet how can I know what there is to forgive without grasping the wonder of the unforgivable? One never accepts, gives, or withholds gifts even to oneself wholly alone. The capacity to forgive or withhold forgiveness does not come from another human either. Why would one prefer living with the unforgivable if one could induce amnesia or modify ones brain proteins? Take away difficult unforgiveness, and you create something transhuman. Without the difficulty even death sentence loses its repulsive attractiveness. I discuss, first, the ideal and imperfect conditions that allow for, though cannot legislate forgivingness. Second, I describe what is required by the humanly unforgivable of perpetrators as much as sufferers. Third, I meditate on what the difficulty of the unforgivable reveals about difficult freedom. Forgiveness seems to call upon the most difficult self-change whereby one both retains and reframes oneself and another. Yet withholding forgiveness requires equal if not greater strength of self- and other-relation. When forgiveness is performatively impossible, when perpetrators and sufferers live and die without it, then unforgiveness is a curiously worthwhile difficulty to have even without the statute of limitation. I do not claim that persons can ever become in principle unforgivable and so consigned to hell. I hope instead that regardless of the traumatic infinity lodged in those moral remainders that are not solvable by moral and legal means, ones holding out into the dark ground of the unforgivable might save the ultimate frontier of the human. For one possible illustration, I draw on the recent trial of Kaing Guek Eav Duch, who directed the Tuol Sleng prison during the Khmer Rouge reign and Vann Nath, one of seven survivors. Martin Beck Matutk Arizona State University (USA)

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FROM A CONVERSATION OVERHEARD IN THE UNDERGROUND ANECDOTE, STORY, AGGADA IN DIFFICULT FREEDOM The subject of this presentation is the textual rhetoric of Difficult Freedomits narrative rhetoric and its rhetoric of voice and self-accounting. Specifically, I will consider two moments of recollected voice: the barking of le chien Bobby in the 1975 essay, Name of a Dog; or Natural Rights at the midpoint of the volume, and the epigraphs that introduce Signature, composed at more or less the same time and which represents the volumes terminal essay. Each of these short pieces contains a narrative kernel, a story, cushioned respectively by philosophical and rhetorical discourses in excess of the strictly biographicalor is it the other way around? Each hears a voiceor rather, in each, we can hear a voice: aboyant gaiement in the one, conversation surprise in the other. Rhetorically speaking, I will suggest, they share an elective affinity as each others clandestine companion within the work, which is given to us to construct as the readersor at these particular moments, the listenersof Difficult Freedom. AdamZachary Newton Yeshiva University, New York USA

UNE PERILLEUSE IMPATIENCE LE SENS DE LHISTOIRE DANS DIFFICILE LIBERT Nous nous proposons dinterroger le rapport critique de Levinas la croyance contemporaine au sens de lhistoire tel quil figure dans Difficile Libert, sous cet intitul dabord, mais aussi dans les chapitres de commentaires consacrs au messianisme. Il sagit du rapport trs complexe entre lhistoire universelle et le destin singulier du peuple Juif travers les Empires qui ont tent de lasservir ou de le faire disparatre, mais surtout dans loccident moderne depuis lmancipation (haskala) et aujourdhui travers lentreprise sioniste. La singularit juive (sa folie pour Hegel) a consist toujours marquer un cart par rapport au cours de lhistoire universelle, laquelle serait, sans plus de rflexion, purement et simplement catholique . Dans Difficile Libert, Levinas dgage au contraire le visage de la vraie universalit, ses yeux : le messianisme. Il faut relire ces textes pour suivre largumentation qui mne la clbre thse : le messie, cest moi. Mais il convient, pour y parvenir, de retracer litinraire de pense qui a conduit Levinas, en dissipant lhypocrisie dun messianisme prophtique prch par un bourgeois install , utiliser cette voix messianique mme pour dsenchanter lhistoire universelle. Quelle soit le produit dune thodice ( Leibniz, Kant), dune scularisation ou de la ralisation de lEsprit universel (Hegel), lhistoire manifeste surtout la persistance dune croyance son acm lpoque o parat Difficile Libert. Dans cet ouvrage Levinas retourne contre Hegel et lhistoire universelle laccusation de folie. La Loi de justice na pas comparatre devant le tribunal de lHistoire. Bien au contraire, Levinas nous enjoint de mnager une place pour un tre libre qui juge lhistoire au lieu de se laisser juger par elle. Pour Levinas, le judasme napporte pas aux modernes une doctrine de la fin de lhistoire au bout de laquelle serait le salut pos comme sa conclusion et son telos. Le salut est tout moment possible. Il faut donc dployer toutes les consquences de cette interprtation du messianisme par Levinas. Dautant plus lheure du surlendemain des dialectiques o des penseurs impatients affichent trs tt le faire-part de dcs de lHistoire ou encore, comme Levinas le fit aprs la disparition de lURSS, lorsquon se prend penser mlancoliquement, quil nous faut apprendre vivre un temps sans promesse. Mais nest-ce pas prcisment cela la difficile libert : ne pas senfermer dans un prsent sans issue, ne pas fermer la porte au futur, sans tre dupe dun sens de lhistoire, dune eschatologie plus ou moins chrtienne ? Levinas aura t prcd par lcriture si prcieuse et inoue de Rosenzweig lorsque celui-ci se mesure Hegel. Mais il a su maintenir, pour sa part, lirrductibilit de lthique la politisation de la vrit et de la morale . Isral ne mesure pas sa morale la politique, dit Levinas dans Difficile Libert. Cette thse est rapproche dune autre : il y a un rgime duniversalit, non

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catholique, non scularise qui porte le nom de messianisme. Levinas ne se contente pas de nous mettre en garde contre limpatience messianique, il nous montre ce quil en cote didentifier le messianisme aux idoles politiques de la modernit. Jean-Franois Rey IUFM de Lille/ Universit dArtois, France

DIFFICILE LIBERTE : UN NOUVEAU MONDE

Lintervention se propose de montrer que Levinas, dans Difficile libert invente une nouvelle sensibilit, qui nous installe dans un nouveau monde. Cette sensibilit est requise pour comprendre et entendre luvre ultrieure. Elle est dcrite travers quelques flashes jets sur le livre: la faon dtre attentif aux personnalits autres, la clbration de la connaissance, lexigence deffectivit collective portant sur toute morale, lalternative dElie au romanesque, la vision du judasme comme humanisme concret. En conclusion, on soutient que Levinas apporte la philosophie la plus immanentiste en un sens, quoique cette immanence passe par la transcendance. Jean-Michel Salanskis Universit Paris X Nanterre, France Levinas, Hegel, les Juifs En 1970, Bernard Bourgeois alors Professeur lUniversit de Lyon III publie un livre intitul Hegel Francfort. Judasme, christianisme, hglianisme o se trouve expose la pense hglienne, fortement antijudaque, des annes 1797-1799. Emmanuel Levinas lui rpond en 1971 dans un article significativement intitul Hegel et les Juifs et non Hegel et le judasme o la responsabilit de toute interprtation, le fait quelle touche des personnes, se trouve souligne. Cet article, insr dans la deuxime dition de Difficile libert (1976), dnonce alors la reprise mimtique du langage hglien par luniversitaire lyonnais. Toutefois, travers une telle reprise, cest loubli dun sens plus profond du langage comme adresse, mis en exergue dans le cadre dune phnomnologie qui insiste aussi bien sur lpreuve dune responsabilit non choisie, qui se trouve soulign. Levinas nentend pourtant pas simplement dire que Hegel, o son exgte, disent le vrai mais non pas propos et avec responsabilit, mais quils occultent le sens mme dune responsabilit et dune lection quils ne peuvent au reste quocculter en fonction de leur point de dpart qui est ltre. Finalement, la ngativit hglienne reste encore positivit, tre, affirmation, nergie, et Hegel ignore tout dune pense de lautrement qutre. Telle est la raison pour laquelle la dialectique croit certes pouvoir englober Mose et les Prophtes alors quelle ne surmonte que linterprtation ontologique quelle en donne, ne percevant pas, et ne pouvant pas percevoir, lirrductible quils constituent. Hegel est certes aux yeux de Levinas probablement le plus grand penseur de tous les temps , mais le langage de son systme, dans sa puissance mme puissance dintgration suppose une limitation : une conscience qui nest jamais dfaite de sa posture virile et intentionnelle, qui naccde jamais au sens de lautrement qutre. Hegel nest nullement antismite, rtorque juste titre Bernard Bourgeois dans la Prface la deuxime dition de Hegel Francfort (2000), mais cela ne constitue nullement une rplique aux critiques de Levinas disparu en 1995 et qui ne peut plus rpondre. Car Levinas qui a lu et relu Hegel ne pouvait que le savoir : le litigieux dans cette affaire ntait donc pas l. Rpondons pour Levinas en insistant sur le fait que sa critique portait sur limpossibilit de lhglianisme engober un sens universel de la judit auquel aussi bien ne pouvait accder la pense de ltre qui locculte avec opinitret. Ari Simhon Universit de Rouen, France

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LETHIQUE DE LHERITIER
Cest par lthique que - selon E. Lvinas - toute philosphie doit commencer. Cette thique lvinasienne est expose a plusieures reprises dans ses oeuvres comme une thique de la Face de lautre, de la proximit vulnrable, jusquaux formulations paradoxales sur "lotage pour Autrui". Ainsi, elle est fonde sur la relation personelle irrductible, sur la rencontre et sur la rvlation dune Face qui me parle. Mais la vie de Lvinas lui-meme, son engagement pour le renouveau de la pense talumudique, dont la Difficille libert porte tmoignage, montrent peut-etre un autre fondement pour lthique - et par consquent pour la philosophie. Apres lexprience horrible de la guerre et de la Shoah, ce nest pas une prsence de lAutre qui la guid dans son cheminement - plutot une absence irrparable. Si je lis bien son oeuvre en liaison aves sa propre vie, il me semble quil a dcouvert une autre responsabilit, que je me permets dappeler celle dun hritier. Apres la guerre, il sest senti responsable pour lhritage sculier dune pense prcieuse, en danger imminent de disparaitre. Un hritier unique, car tous les autres ont t tus. A lui seul donc dagir. Cette autre approche aux fondements de lthique est de beaucoup moins courante, sinon absente dans la pense moderne et mrite donc a mon avis une tude approfondie. Lexemple de Lvinas montre bien, quil ne sagit pas dun traditionalisme quelconque: il ne sagit pas dun trsor a perptuer, mais dun appel a entendre et dune ide a reprendre. Et de lautre cot, la situation dun hritier qui devrait sentir tout le poids de cette responsabilit pour un hritage unique - nest-ce pas une situation et une tache tres gnrale de nos jours?

Jan Sokol, Prague

IN THE ABSENCE OF A THEODICY: PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON LEVINAS AND THE HOLOCAUST In August of 1976 Emmanuel Levinas sent me, from Peruggia, Italy, an inscribed copy of the second edition of Difficile Liberte: Essais sur le Judaisme. I had met with Levinas in the fall of 1973 at Johns Hopkins University, where he was a visiting professor. He invited me to translate the first edition of Difficile Liberte into English. Along with a colleague of mine, I translated only To Love the Torah More than God, and added a commentary for the journal Judaism (Spring 79.) I am proposing to elaborate my commentary in the light of what I have learned from studying Levinas in the meanwhile. To Love the Torah More than God is situated at the juncture between the ethical and religious spheres of existence. It also relies upon an understanding of the oral or Talmudic tradition. Furthermore, it presupposes Levinas firsthand encounter with the Nazi horrors. At the same time, it leaves open questions dealing with ultimate explanation or justification as to why these events occurred. Levinas Jewish and philosophical response to the Holocaust was presented for the first time in To Love the Torah More than God. Here, as elsewhere, he has retired or bracketed questions of theodicy. I will also respond to what I believe to be a misreading of Levinas reflection by the editor of the New Republic, Leon Wieseltier, published as A Privation of Providence, in Yosl Rakover Talks to God, by Zvi Kolitz, edited by Paul Badde. Wieseltier, I will argue, thoroughly misunderstands what this means within the context of traditional Judaism. Unlike Levinas, he seems to have a very diminished understanding of the oral tradition within Judaism. At the same time, it is necessary to understand what kind of minimalist theology remains for Levinas in the absence of theodicy. I will argue that Levinas refusal to justify the sufferings of others during the Holocaust is ethically consistent with his understanding of the limits of rationalizing the suffering of others. The notion of theodicy itself must undergo

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reexamination. Levinas position is marked by a critique of ontotheology where the Infinite would be understood on the basis of Being. The most important part of the argument is dedicated to showing that without proceeding in terms of the kind of thinking provided by Levinaswhere ethics is first philosophy we would not be able to understand the relation of suffering to justice and the imperative of freeing philosophy from any future complicity with the horrors of persecution and mass injustice. Richard Sugarman University of Vermont, Burlington, USA

THE LETTER AND THE SOIL. WHY HUMANITY IS NOT A FOREST. The freedom that Levinas aims to defend in Difficult Freedom is irreconcilable with any kind of particularism, of the local spirit, the soil and humanity's rootedness in them. True humanity presupposes an uprootment of all such ties. "Man, Levinas tells his readers, is, after all, not a tree and humanity is not a forest". One should not, in other words, let oneself "be fooled by the peace of the woods", but rather see the war that rages underneath it. For "a tree grows and retains all the earth's sap" and has no difficulty with that sap being taken for itself rather than given to others. A more human humanity, however, does. It presupposes that one "destroys the sacred groves" of paganism and perceives man "outside the situation in which they are placed and let(s) the human face shine in all this nudity", as Judaism does. "The advent of the Scriptures" is therefore quite the opposite of "the subordination of the spirit to a letter" : it is "the substitution of the letter to the soil", the spirit's breaking with its enslavement within the root. In my conference I shall explain these and other passages in terms of their philosophical meaning for Levinas. But in order to do this, we shall not be able to avoid wondering in how far the contrast that Levinas is making here between roots/without roots, the soil/the letter is truly binding. The one possibility that he excludes -whether the soil could not also function as a letterwill be worked out and, to a certain extent, used as an argument against Levinas's too narrow view on the I's ontological description as conatus essendi. It is perhaps not insignificant that Spinoza in Etics III.6 held that, because there nothing in a thing by which it might be destroyed, it will persist in its being unless hindered by a force from outside. But what, we shall ask, if there is such a something : a letter which has inscribed itself on a subject but which it cannot read? Such a letter would imply a kind of rootedness Levinas did not consider : it would differ from the rootedness of a tree in its soil, but it would also withstand the solution of an uprootedness that Levinas opposed to it. Freedom would, in other words, be already difficult and unnatural before the Other arrives to make it more complicated still. Rudi Visker Professor of Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Leuven - Belgium ECHO OF THE OTHERWISE: EROTICS OF TRANSCENDENCE AND OVERCOMING THEOLATRY IN LEVINAS AND WYSCHOGROD The lecture will explore the idea of transcendence and eros in Levinas, particularly as it has been interpreted by Wyschogrod. Building on their work, i will evaluate critically the current attempts on the part of some philosophers to embrace a postmodern negative theology. Ironically, this turn to the apophatic tradition had engendered depictions of transcendence in such a way that unfailingly entail recourse to the theopoetic imagination, the figural iconization of the invisible in anthropomorphic and anthropopathic imagery. Following the lead of Wyschogrod's reading of Levinas, I will argue that the exigency of the momentto subjugate the theistic personification of God and the corresponding egoistic depiction of selfdemands a sweeping and uncompromising purification of the idea of the infinite from all predication, an apophasis of

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apophasis, and the consequent embrace of an eros beyond the contours of an exorbitant ultramateriality. Elliot Wolfson New York University, USA LE VISAGE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE FRANAISE CONTEMPORAINE, DANS DIFFICILE LIBERT Le visage de la philosophie franaise contemporaine, dans Difficile libert, faut-il dire que c'est d'abord une mtaphore pour dsigner la manire rigoureuse, prcise profonde, dont Levinas en dessine le tableau, travers tous les essais du recueil? faut-il y voir plutt le visage concret de quelques figures dont la rencontre marque de manire inoubliable le livre, par exemple et parmi bien d'autres dcisives, celles de Brunschvicg ou de Wahl? faut-il y voir enfin la philosophie franaise mise l'preuve de la question thique, dont Levinas a fait travers le visage la question tout la fois la plus absolue et la plus concrte de la philosophie? Ce sera, pour nous, tout cela la fois, et donc bien loin d'un aspect mineur dans un recueil contingent, un enjeu fondamental dans un livre tous gards admirable et dterminant. Frdric Worms Ecole Normale Suprieure, Paris

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MEMORY AND TESTIMONY : THE HERITAGE OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS France-Ukraine Binational Workshop Mmoire et Tmoignage : Lhritage dEmmanuel Levinas Atelier bi-national franco-ukrainien
Supported by Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and National Academy of Science of Ukraine

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"ISRAL - OU L'HUMANIT DE L'HUMAIN" La singularit juive se laisse-t-elle dire dans le langage de l'universel? La Bible est-elle traduisible en grec? A cette question Levinas apporte, semble-t-il, deux rponses contradictoires. Alors qu'il affirme avec force l'exception du fait juif au point de le dfinir comme un au-del de l'universel, il n'en affirme pas moins sa valeur exemplaire pour l'humanit en gnral. Loin d'tre accidentelle, cette aporie ne cesse en ralit de nourrir sa pense, essentiellement partage entre revendication universaliste et affirmation d'une singularit hors du commun. David Brzis CNRS, France EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND VLADIMIR JANKLVITCH : METAPHYSICS, ETHICS, JUDAISM. The aim of my paper is to deal with the relationship between Emmanuel Levinas and Vladimir Janklvitch (1903-1985), a major representative of French philosophy in the 20th century. His proximity with Levinas is striking. Their thoughts have their roots in the same sources : Russian literature, the philosophy of Bergson. Their lives have been marked by the same historical experiences : Second World War, the Shoah and the creation of the State of Israel. They both saw ethics as the core of philosophy. In their eyes, ethics is neither a science of habits and customs, nor the highest branch of philosophy. Rather, it is the first philosophy . For Janklvitch, as for Levinas, Everyone has rights except me . Nevertheless, they based their conception of ethics on quite different principles. In contrast to Levinas, Janklvitch developed an ethics of love. He saw ipseity the absolute unicity of the I - as the foundation of morality. For him, the other person is not characterized by his-her absolute alterity. Rather, he-she is the similardifferent . My paper addresses three major points of confrontation between Levinas and Janklvitch : Their criticism of ontology and their conception of Being. The difference between an ethics of responsability and an ethics of love. Their approach of Judeity and anti-semitism. Jolle Hansel Israel DIALOGICAL TEMPORALITY Could the dialogue correspond to the temporal theme? Not in the meaning of minutes and hours that two or more people spent talking. As well as not in the meaning of the time that becomes the topic of the conversation of two or more interlocutors. In this presentation, it is intended to show that the time-flowing that is understood as the deepest layer of the subjects consciousness could be constituted by the dialogical contact. The relation between the dialogue and the time is not obvious and needs special arguments. From the point of view of phenomenological philosophy, which positions itself as the analytics of consciousness par excellence, this relation rather belongs to the area of intellectual adventurism, not to the analytics. The dialogical component is situated within timeconsciousness and, therefore, within subjectivity; the contact with the Other starts the temporal dynamics, have not we meet the initial contradictions here? I will try to prove that we have not. The time flows while one moment substitutes another moment. This permanent substitution keeps the time-flowing, makes the time similar to the stream, and provides the tempora of the temporality. But how we can recognize the otherness of the new moment? Its otherness can not be found in the subject who is the same. For the new other moment could appear in the same subject, he or she should negate himself / herself. As to the Emmanuel Levinas, the otherness of a unique and inimitable moment could come to the subject only from

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the outside. That transcendent exteriority belongs to the Other. The dialectical movement that is necessary for the flowing of time for one moment is negated by its own non-being, for it turns into another moment is provided by the social contact. As to Levinas, the subject is not capable to negate himself / herself. So, the dialogue that here is understood in the broadest formal meaning as a contact with the Other is the condition of the time. We could recognize the time dynamics, establish a fact that one moment distinguishes from another one, and forecast its possible difference from the next one, if we pick out the time fragments, observe those singularities to witness their sequences and have a reason to describe the time as the flow. It leads to a question about distinguishing the elements of time and finding the simplest time unit. That elementary unit is an instant. As the geometrical point that has no extent, but establishes the space, the instant has no duration, but establishes the time. Why the instant is so important in the perspective of the development of the dialogical temporalitys theme? The instant is significant, because, as Levinas shows, it is the very gathering of I (lhypostase) before the face of the Other. The contact with the Other creates a sequence of this Imanifestations and establishes the temporal flowing that differs from the relation of time and consciousness described by Edmund Husserl in the scheme of retentions and protentions. The dialogue is the very dynamics of these I-manifestations (accompanied with I-dispersions) while I address the Other and take the Others response to me. In the dialogue we may observe the permanent displacement of the centre: this moment I am intentionally turned to the Other, next moment I become a complaisant passivity accepting intention onto me. The goal of my presentation is to provide a detailed examination of the two key points: 1. the instant is the source point of establishing the dialogical contact; 2. the sequence of the instants as the sequence of the I-manifestations establishes the dialogical time dynamics. Coupable et /ou responsible, Levinas et Dostoevski Larysa Karachevtseva NASU, Ukraine "COUPABLES, NOUS SOMMES TOUS COUPABLES ...." A l'occasion de cette rencontre avec russophones et Russes, il me semble intressant de proposer une interprtation de cette affirmation - on pourrait dire "thse"- tire des Frres Karamazov de Dostoevski, et de voir ce qu'elle signifie dans l'thique lvinassienne". Marie-Anne Lescourret Universit Marc Bloch, Strasbourg, France WHO HAD REVEALED TO MY CHILDREN ANGELS MYSTERY?: WE WILL DO AND WE WILL HEAR IN EMMANUEL LEVINASS TEXTS AND IN JEWISH SOURCES OF THE 16TH-19TH CENTURIES Analyzing the fragment of the Babylonian Talmud (Shabbat 88a) about the act of giving the Torah on the Mount Sinai (The temptation of temptation in the Nine Talmudic Readings), Emmanuel Levinas turns to the problem of doing before hearing that he understands as actualizing without beginning with the possible, a pact with good preceding the alternative of good and evil. This inverse way of acting is marked in the tractate Shabbat as the secret of Ministry Angels, and the whole fragment, where the possibility to act is one of the main topics, continues the Talmudic controversy between angels and people. Hereinafter, Levinas uses this formulation in his own interpretation. Inquiring into the sense of this inversion, Emmanuel Levinas examines the different interpretations of the fragment (e.g. the Martin Bubers translation we will do in order to understand), and, nevertheless, proposes his own reading of this verse. His reading is connected with the overcoming of the temptation of temptation, or the temptation of knowledge and free

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appraisal of the good and evil, which are, according to Levinas, the features of the Western Christian culture. The question about the sources of this interpretation, as well as the sources of the Levinass reading of the Talmud in general, is still open. We should notice that the problem of inversion of doing and knowing concerns the important nerve of the Chassidic-Litvak discussions in Jewish society of the 18th century: the correlation between the Halakha and the Kabbalah, or, in other words, the sense of the action as the fulfillment of commandment in the process of reception of the Torah. R. Hayyim of Volozhin, whose teaching was among significant Jewish sources for Emmanuel Levinass thought, was noticeable participant of these discussions. In my presentation I intend to examine the different interpretations of this problem in Jewish traditional literature, starting with the Tzfat kabbalistic texts and following with its elaboration in Litvak and Chassidic literature of the 18th-19th centuries, including R. Hayyim of Volozhin. By comparing them with the Levinass interpretation, I hope to add yet another layer of understanding of the question of litvak identification of Emmanuel Levinas. Kateryna Malakhova NASU, Ukraine THE THEME OF THE OTHER IN THE POST-SOVIET CONTEXT This presentation studies the peculiarities of reception of Emanuel Levinass philosophy of the Other from a contextual point of view, while taking into consideration philosophys specific features during its development in the 60s-80of the 20th century. The presentations core question is how Levinas was introduced to the leading actors of the post-Soviet philosophys drama of self-consciousness. The presentation intends to show that in Soviet and post-Soviet philosophy and culture, one could find the original trajectory of the movement to the Other that differs from the Western one in many ways, but nevertheless leads to the typologically comparable results. The key factors of that movement are the following: moving away from the monological concept of human activity that characterized the late version of Soviet Marxism; de-ideologization and profound ethical reflection; romantic spirit awoken by the Thaw period; growing intention to the otherness presented in various dimensions of human experience. One should take into account the heuristic significance of Mikhail Bakhtins, Alexey Ukhtomskiys, and Mikhail Prishvins texts published in the sixties-seventies in USSR, and, of course, the latent influence of the 20th centurys European philosophers on Soviet intellectuals. Among the thinkers who initiated the turn to the problem of a dialogue and otherness in the Soviet humanitarian space, we can name Vladimir Bibler, Leonid Batkin, Yuriy Lotman etc. However, there is one Soviet thinker Henrikh Batishchev who deserves our special attention. On his philosophers path he went from being a Marxs follower to finding Christ; from the concept of activity as human essence to the idea of the deep dialogue. After examining the grounds of Marxism philosophy of activity, Batishchev inscribed it in the context that allowed him to compare it with egology of presentation criticized by Levinas. Similar to Levinas (and contrary to Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin), Batishchev insisted on the initial nonsymmetrical relation to the Other. According to him, there are two models of relation between I and the Other. Either I possesses myself pushing aside the Other (compare with conatus essendi in Levinass sense), or I possesses the Other instead of being self-possessed (so called the principle of the other-dominance). According to the Moscow philosopher, it is only in the latter case that a genuine spiritual and moral awakening of the person is possible. Similar to Levinas, Batishchev finds the Other to be both a moral and metaphysical theme. Ethical and pedagogical directions grow naturally from his main philosophical statements. However, contrary to Levinas, Batishchev remained on the ground of ontology. His ethics does not assume the rupture in being-order, but it is inscribed in the world-order and it is subordinated to the boundless dialectic of the Universe. The accumulated experience of addressing the theme of the Other makes current post-Soviet

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philosophy ultimately sensitive to the heritage of Emmanuel Levinas. At the same time, relevant interpretation of Emmanuel Levinass texts in the context of experience based on the overcoming the monological discourse of Marxism is still problematic. It is obvious that the attempts of such interpretation lead to revision or redefining a number of essential principles and definitions that still remain significant for the post-Soviet philosophies in general, and for Ukraines philosophy in particular. Viktor Malakhov NASU, Ukraine

MEETING AND GREETING AS A BEING-HERE OF MORALITY Meeting is an existential event of the openness of a person. To meet somebody means to open the other in his or her being and does not consider him or her as social role or function. On the other hand, to meet means to be self-opened. Certainly, one should intend to understand and empathise with the other person. One is attuned to the world through his or her mood which gives him or her the resoluteness to meet, see, and hear the other person. One could merely pass by the other, without even noticing him or her. It is not that one could not see the other person; one just did not want to stop walking. You could simply give your formal greeting like a password to go further. Actually, you have not met the other person. There is also no real meeting while the interlocutors are only sharing information, instructing each other, or occupied with idle talks. The way one meet people is manifestation of his or her morality. Furthermore, one becomes open, while he or she is speaking, and the way of his or her speaking is the way of his or her openness. Greeting, that could be either verbal or non-verbal, is a key to the conversation that will follow. The way you greet a person shows your attitude. Is your greeting kind and open? Or are you reserved and distant in your greeting, and your words or gestures are entirely neutral? It depends on your attitude to the other person. Dialogue and morality are interrelated. There is no moral attitude, when one does not care about the other persons feelings and thoughts. The dialogue could not start unless you treat people morally. Moral in its origin, dialogue could awake morality of participants and witnesses of the conversation. Greeting as an openness could provoke an openness in the others. Moral attitude can give birth to the moral attitude of the other. One is present here, in the completeness of his or her presence, when one meets and greets the other. Are you prepared to co-exist with the others or you treat them as mere means? It depends on you. You are responsible for everything you bring into the world. Your moral attitude is examined by the face of the other. Would you respond to his or her needs, would you act morally before his or her face? Your morality is how of your being-in-the-world, and this how could be interpreted as your personal world. This how is your trip to the other. You are saying the greeting by all of your existence as your existence is, so as it is here, now and in this moment of meeting. Yevhen Mulyarchuk NASU, Ukraine POLITIQUE DE LAUTRE HOMME : E. Levinas et la philosophie politique On tentera de situer la pense du politique chez Levinas dans ce quil est convenu dappeler aujourdhui philosophie politique , discipline qui se prsente le plus souvent comme une partie qui se prend pour le tout de la philosophie. Sil ny a pas une philosophie politique de Levinas, ni au sens dAristote, ni au sens de Hobbes, ni au sens de Lo Strauss, la pense de Levinas a ouvert une brche en direction dune philosophie de lhumain o il est rejoint, parfois aprs un long

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dtour, par Merleau-Ponty ou par Claude Lefort. En dformalisant la notion de genre humain, Levinas mne jusquau bout leffort pour briser la totalit : vers la multiplicit dtres ininterchangeables. Jean-Franois REY IUFM de Lille/ Universit dArtois, France LEVINAS ET LANTHROPOLOGIE Larticle discute la question de savoir sil y a une anthropologie chez Levinas, cest--dire une connaissance positive de lhomme. Le problme est de savoir sil est compatible avec lorientation gnrale de la pense de Levinas, suivant la perspective dautrement qutre, de proposer une description prise comme vraie de lessence de lhomme. La question se pose parce que les crits de Levinas semblent bien parler de lhomme avec une justesse extraordinaire, plus fidlement que bien dautres. Pour rpondre la question, on essaie dvaluer du point de vue de leur contribution potentielle une anthropologie plusieurs tapes de la pense de Levinas : son ide de lexception lgard de ltre dans les premiers livres (lvasion, lhypostase), sa conception de la sensibilit comme jouissance dans Totalit et infini, sa description de la subjectivit doblation dans Autrement qutre, sa pense de la socit sous langle du tiers dans Autrement qutre encore. On essaie de formuler alors quelques conclusions et de prciser la question anthropologique. Jean-Michel Salanskis Universit Paris X Nanterre, France LEVINAS, LECTEUR DE CHESTOV En 1937, Emmanuel Levinas publie dans la Revue des tudes juives,3 une recension dun livre de Lon Chestov intitul : Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle. Vox clamantis in deserto . 4 Il sagit du seul texte dans lequel Levinas propose une interprtation de ce philosophe dorigine russe, install Paris depuis les annes 1920. Les philosophes russes, tels Berdiaev et Chestov, ont profondment marqu la pense philosophie du XXe sicle en jetant une passerelle entre la premire gnration existentialiste (Nietzsche, Dostoevski, Kierkegaard), et celle de laprsguerre (Jaspers, Sartre, Gabriel Marcel). Les annes trente apparaissent comme un moment charnire. Le paradigme de lexistence finit par cristalliser les aspirations au concret, au ralisme et la spiritualit exprimes par des hommes venus dhorizons diffrents, en rupture avec lidalisme, mais aussi avec les philosophies de Bergson et Brunschvicg, discrdites par la Grande guerre et les violences du XXe sicle. ... La philosophie de Chestov met en question la pertinence de lacte rflexif au profit dune interrogation sur le statut de ltre qui dsire comprendre le vcu de son existence Elle sinterroge sur les fins de la raison humaine, ainsi que sur le sens de lhumanit de lhomme, sur le tlos de toute dmarche rationnelle. Cette critique propre la pense de Chestov prend sens au moment o elle intgre la phnomnologie allemande par la lecture de Husserl, lequel fait dcouvrir luvre de Kierkegaard Chestov. Les Etudes kierkegaardiennes de Jean Wahl (1938) et Kierkegaard et la philosophie de lexistence de Chestov (1936) marquent la rception de Kierkegaard en France. Wahl procde en historien de la philosophie, Chestov interprte le Danois en opposant la philosophie et la religion, Athnes et Jrusalem. Tous deux nous offrent une lecture existentielle de Kierkegaard qui privilgie les rapports de lexistence et de la transcendance.
Emmanuel Levinas, Revue des Etudes juives T.II juillet-dcembre 1937, n3, pp.139-141.) texte repris dans Lintrigue et linfini Paris, Champs, Flammarion, 1994, p.87. 4 Lon Chestov, Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle, traduit du russe par Boris de Schloezer, Paris, Vrin, 1936.
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Cest dans ce contexte que les travaux de Levinas se situent, au mme moment, notamment dans sa thse de 1930, Thorie de lintuition dans la phnomnologie de Husserl.5 Thse qui peut tre considre comme la structure porteuse de la recension de Levinas sur le livre de Chestov, Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle. Le doute de la pense chestovienne lgard de la rationalit moderne est engendr partir dune crise de civilisation et a des fondements historiques aisment dcelables. Il plonge ses racines dans le malheur de lexistence qui suscite en lhomme le dsir dexplication du sens de sa vie et de la fin poursuivie par la raison autonome quant au sens de ce que Levinas appelle lunicit existentielle . Chestov noue des rapports critiques avec la phnomnologie husserlienne sur le thme du sentiment. Ce sont ces aspects nourris dune philosophie existentielle qui se retrouvent prsent dans cette lecture de Chestov par Levinas. Une telle mise en perspective permet de comprendre que Chestov et Levinas se rejoignent tonnamment la faveur dune critique de Husserl bien que selon des acceptions diffrentes- et quils saccordent pour exhiber des lments dordre affectif. Franoise Schwab Paris, France LE PHNOMNE DE CITOYENNET CHEZ EMMANUEL LVINAS ET JEAN-PAUL SARTRE Le courant phnomnologique dispose dj de nombreux travaux thoriques ddis au patrimoine de deux philosophes de sicle pass. Leur uvre est toujours actuelle dans beaucoup de domaines qui font partie de la vie de la socit. Ces penseurs, ce sont Emmanuel Lvinas et Jean-Paul Sartre, reprsentants de lthique et de lesthtique. Leurs doctrines, certes, sont en partie diffrentes dans leurs visions de certaines questions thoriques, pourtant ils staient occups aussi de problmes communs. Nous allons aborder le phnomne de citoyennet chez E. Lvinas et J.- P. Sartre en tant quune esthtique de lopinion public. Dans son thique de lthique Lvinas se basait sur la notion que la citoyennet est lie linterruption du Tiers. Le ou les Tiers font partie de la vie politique, mais linterruption cest lacte de lthique de lthique, donc esthtique, selon Sylvie Plat. La citoyennet est ainsi caractrise par les motions esthtiques de la responsabilit du sujet pour linterruption de lAutre. Le citoyen lvinassien est en plus un sujet, au sens mtaphysique, qui commet une action pathtique en ralisant sa volont par raport un Tiers. Il dborde ses frontires en survivant lexprience du sublime et donne lieu laccomplissment du beau dans la ralit politique. La vie publique se meut ainsi vers tels ou tels idaux esthtiques qui touchent les conditions politiques dans un moment du temps quelconque. Dans le monde actuel les deux positions nous appellent tenir compte du critre du beau comme la forme sublime dun acte moral et donc ne pas faire de mauvais pas dans notre activit au sein du champ politique. Le domaine intellectuel o se dborde la pense sartrienne comprend le phnomne de citoyennet au sens esthtique comme un fait o se rvle laction hroque. Lesthtique des images hroques chez Lvinas et Sartre a caus les changements dans la vie publique et ensuite dans la vie politique. Notamment, la doctrine esthtique de Levinas a favoris lapparition des troubles estudiantins en 1968 en France. E. Lvinas a montr que les jeunes estiment beaucoup lopinion public par rapport eux. Lvinas, en sappuyant sur la conception ontologique sartrienne qui porte sur lesthtique, a dvelopp sa conception de lthique de lthique de la citoyennet. La citoyennet, chez Lvinas, apparat dans une situation o le hroque qui lutte contre le fatum soppose au hroque en tant quune catgorie esthtique lie pathos. La dernire accepte la possibilit pour le hroque de surmonter le fatum ce qui permet dexister malgr le fatum. Selon Lvinas cest la libert hroque qui correspond au hroque dans le domaine de la libert qui est ncessaire pour un tel ou tel espce de la cration. La libert hroque permet de faire preuve de la citoyennet dans de situations politiques qui ne sont pas
5

rdite chez Vrin sous le titre Thorie de lintuition en 2000.

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trs difficiles et qui demandent une volont politique. La libert comme telle agit dans de situations o il faut manifester de la citoyennet pour rsoudre des questions politiques stratgiques parce quelle sert de base lexprience vitale de lhomme. Les ides esthtiques d E. Lvinas et J.- P. Sartre ont servi dun important point dappui en cours de la discussion portant sur la comprhension de la nature de la citoyennet et de notions semblables comme la perception esthtique des doctrines idologiques universellement reconnues. Stryzhnov Mykola NASU, Ukraine LEVINAS ET SKOVORODA DANS LE CONTEXTE DE LA PENSEE PHILOSOPHIQUE EUROPEENNE La comparaison des deux philosophes dans le mme contexte peut paraitre insense: chacun deux appartient son poque, Emmanuel Lvinas (1906-1995) au XX sicle, Hryhorii Skovoroda (1722-1794) au XVIII, et son courant intellectuel. Malgr cette distance temporelle et intellectuelle les deux philosophes de lEurope de lEst sont unis dans leurs rapports complexes avec ce quon peut nommer les philosophies de leurs poques et avec les tendances gnrales de la philosophie moderne le rationalisme et subjectivisme triomphants. Tous les deux, partir du mode dominant de philosopher de leurs temps (Lvinas phnomenologie, Skovoroda deuxime scholastique) et partir des defies de leurs temps fondent la philosophie ouverte linfinie, decouvrent la possibilit de nouer le dialogue avec lautre, qui nappartient pas ce temps-l et brlent la frontire entre la thologie et philosophie. Tous les deux sont les penseurs de l'htronomie humaine et fondent sur celle-ci la libert de lhomme. Lvinas et Skovoroda sont les penseurs de la libert et surtout les penseurs libres. Mais cette libert de pense et la libert en tant que le concept fondamental de leurs penses n'empchent pas que tous les deux se sont retourns vers la tradition biblique en renouant avec la tradition de la mystique mdivale et moderne. Cest ainsi que les deux philosophes deviennent des figures emblmatiques pour les traditions respectives de la philosophie europenne Skovoroda pour la tradition ukranienne, Levinas pour la tradition juive. Une telle renaissance de la tradition biblique sur les tapes si diffrents de lhistoire de la philosophie moderne et dans les traditions si diffrentes de la philosophie europenne pose la question des sources de cette dernire, des sources qui dpassent videmment l'hritage grec et roumain; elle pose enfin la question de lidentit de lEurope elle-mme, fonde sur le concept philosophique, dvelopp par les traditions philosophiques si diffrentes mais si semblables dans ses points cruciales. Chacun de ces deux philosophes, Lvinas et Skovoroda, est le penseur de son temps et, tant enracin dans son sol, dans sa tradition culturelle, tous les deux sont les penseurs europens excellants. Sergiy Yosypenko, NASU, Ukraine

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Cinq rencontres autour de LITINRAIRE DE PENSE DEMMANUEL LEVINAS LIBRAIRIE OMBRES BLANCHES TOULOUSE La pense dEmmanuel Levinas se dploie sur plus de soixante ans, depuis les premiers crits des annes 1930 jusquaux uvres de maturit des annes 1980-1990. Le but de ces rencontres est denvisager luvre de Levinas dans une perspective dynamique, en retraant les principales tapes de son volution et la manire dont sest constitue son thique de la responsabilit infinie pour lautre personne. Les intervenants mettront aussi en lumire les moments marquants de la vie de Levinas qui a su jeter un pont entre des domaines aussi diffrents que la philosophie, le Talmud et la pdagogie. Chacune de ces rencontres correspondra une priode spcifique dans le dveloppement de la pense lvinassienne, et sera centre autour des ouvrages quil a produits. Premire rencontre : les annes davant-guerre : De lvasion ; Quelques rflexions sur la philosophie de lhitlrisme. Dans les annes 1930, Emmanuel Levinas, jeune philosophe brillant et prometteur, contribue largement lintroduction de la phnomnologie en France. Il publie son premier essai philosophique, De lvasion, ainsi quune srie darticles o il met en place un dispositif de lutte contre lhitlrisme. Face un antismitisme dun type entirement nouveau et la menace dune guerre prochaine, Levinas appelle au ralliement de toutes les forces vives de la civilisation europenne : judasme, christianisme, libralisme et marxisme. Il noue galement avec Maurice Blanchot une amiti indfectible qui durera pendant prs de soixante-dix ans et qui trouvera de nombreux chos dans leurs crits. Intervenants : Jolle Hansel (Centre Rassa et Emmanuel Levinas, Jrusalem) et Eric Hoppenot (IUFM de Paris Universit Paris IV) Deuxime rencontre : 1945-1961 : De lexistence lexistant ; Le Temps et lautre. Aprs cinq ans de captivit dans un camp de prisonniers de guerre au cur de lAllemagne nazie, Levinas participe activement au Collge de philosophie, cercle philosophique davant-garde fond par son ami Jean Wahl. Il publie deux ouvrages majeurs, De lexistence lexistant et Le Temps et lautre, o saccomplit le mouvement qui mne de lexistence anonyme et du sujet solitaire la relation avec autrui et la socialit. Il prend la direction de lENIO (Ecole Normale Isralite Orientale), rpondant ainsi un appel historique, aprs Auschwitz . En 1947, il rencontre le mystrieux et gnial Monsieur Chouchani qui lintroduit dans lunivers du Talmud. De cette rencontre natront les Lectures talmudiques. Il est galement tmoin de la cration de lEtat dIsral. Intervenants : Salomon Malka (biographe de Levinas, journaliste, crivain, directeur de Radio Communaut Juive (RCJ)) et David Banon (Universit de Strasbourg). Troisime rencontre : 1961-1974 : Difficile libert et Totalit et Infini Dans cette priode paraissent Totalit et Infini et Difficile libert, ouvrages majeurs et reprsentatifs des deux versants philosophique et phnomnologique, dune part, juif et talmudique, dautre part de luvre lvinassienne. Dans Totalit et Infini, Levinas met en place son thique de la relation avec autrui et avec son visage o se rvle lInfini. Il engage un dbat fcond avec lensemble de la tradition philosophique occidentale, avec Platon, Descartes, Hegel, Bergson, Rosenzweig, Husserl et Heidegger. Dans les essais sur le judasme runis dans Difficile libert, il expose un judasme riche de ses sources et sadressant tous les hommes. Intervenants : Jean-Franois Rey (IUFM, Lille) et Ari Simhon (professeur de philosophie, Rouen).

Quatrime rencontre : 1974-1990 : Autrement qutre ou au-del de lessence ; Dieu et la philosophie . Avec la parution dAutrement qutre ou au-del de lessence (1974), lthique de Levinas se radicalise : la responsabilit infinie pour autrui devient la structure mme de ma subjectivit, de sorte quautrui nest plus en face de moi , mais en moi . Paralllement, Levinas procde une revalorisation du politique, mettant la justice au fondement de la socialit. Cette priode se distingue aussi par la place faite un Dieu qui nest objet ni de savoir, ni de foi, et dont le nom entendu dans sa rsonance thique signifie linfinit de mes obligations envers autrui. Intervenants : Jean-Michel Salanskis (Universit Paris X-Nanterre) et Georges Hansel (Universit de Rouen, mrite). Cinquime rencontre : Lactualit de Levinas. Aujourdhui, luvre de Levinas est largement diffuse de par le monde et est traduite dans plus de vingt langues. Les tudes lvinassiennes sont lun des domaines les plus dynamiques dans le champ des sciences humaines. Bien que lthique de la responsabilit infinie pour lautre personne reste un thme central, dautres perspectives se sont ouvertes, dessinant le profil dun autre Levinas . La dimension esthtique et politique de son uvre, ses incidences sur lhermneutique, lanthropologie, le droit ou lthique mdicale, sont autant de directions prometteuses qui restent explorer. Par-del les cercles acadmiques, la pense de Levinas a touch un vaste public. Elle est en prise avec les grands dbats de socit, avec la lutte contre la pauvret, pour la justice et le respect des droits de l' autre personne . Intervenants : Marie-Anne Lescourret (biographe de Levinas, Universit Marc Bloch, Strasbourg) et Gilles Hanus (directeur des Cahiers dtudes lvinassiennes).

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PROJECTIONS DE FILMS THTRE GARONNE

Proposes et animes par Isy MORGENSZTERN
Ancien directeur de thtre puis responsable des Soires Thmatiques dArte, Isy Morgensztern a fait partie de lquipe qui a cr le journal Libration et du cercle dtudes qui a vu natre les Editions Verdier. Paralllement, il met en place la fin des annes 70 un Centre de Recherches sur les questions religieuses et philosophiques au sein de lUniversit de Toulouse-le-Mirail. Depuis 1995 il est essentiellement producteur et auteur-ralisateur dune quarantaine de films documentaires dont certains prolongent et dveloppent le tourment philosophique de nos annes actuelles : comment produire de ltre-ensemble ? Son dernier film est consacr la famille monothiste ( LAventure Monothiste 2009).

Emmanuel Levinas : Entretien avec Franois Poiri (1988, 2 x 52, ralisation : PierreAndr Boutang).
Emmanuel Levinas prsente Jean-Franois Poirier les principes gnraux de sa rflexion philosophique. L'entretien se droule en deux parties, de part et dautre de la seconde guerre mondiale. Il suit globalement une organisation chronologique, sans que les donnes biographiques et les rfrences historiques accompagnes de documents darchives, prennent pour autant le pas sur le discours philosophique. Ce dernier se dveloppe au gr du montage en plusieurs petites squences, denses mais accessibles un public pas ncessairement form la philosophie. La quintessence de la rflexion philosophique de Lvinas est plus particulirement expose dans la deuxime partie, selon trois grands axes complmentaires : limportance de lthique, limportance de lhermneutique et le retour au prcepte biblique qui, loppos du postulat grec privilgiant lacte de connaissance, fondent lamour du prochain comme une ncessit.

Mark Rothko, 1903-1970, un humaniste abstrait - (2003, 50, ralisation : Isy Morgensztern) suivie dun dbat avec Christopher Rothko, fils du peintre (USA) et Marie- Anne Lescourret (France). (screened also in English version)
Un gant de la peinture, n en 1905 Dvinsk en pays balte puis migr aux Etats-Unis lge de 10 ans et mort, suicid, New York en 1970. Son parcours est intimement li aux peintres qui ont offert aux Etats-Unis leur premire cole picturale denvergure internationale les Expressionnistes Abstraits , mais sa singularit et la puissance dmotion que dgage sa peinture lemportent sur tout effet dcole. Lecteur de Platon et de Nietzsche, questionnant le langage pictural, il confie labstraction une fonction quil pense abandonne par la philosophie : unifier notre regard sur le monde. Ce documentaire retrace sa vie et prsente ses uvres, dont celles, nombreuses qui ont suivi et prcd sa priode abstraite dite classique . Rticent envers leffet magique que comporte toute image (il craignait dtre dcoratif ) proche dans le temps, lespace et lorigine culturelle dEmmanuel Lvinas il peut sembler lgitime de sinterroger cette occasion sur une affinit intellectuelle et esthtique entre son oeuvre et le point de vue dEmmanuel Lvinas sur lArt.

Benny Lvy : La rvolution impossible (2008, 104, ralisation : Isy Morgensztern), suivie dun dbat avec Claude Birman, compagnon de route de Benny Lvy. (English subtitles).
Une gnration a cru tout devoir au marxiste Louis Althusser, ou au philosophe de lautonomie du sujet et de la libert Jean-Paul Sartre, voire pour certains dentre eux Michel Foucault ou au chrtien Maurice Clavel. Il a fallu peine une dizaine dannes aprs Mai 68 pour que certains de ces enfants de Mai , aprs avoir test ces prestigieux penseurs qui ont fait la modernit de laprs-guerre, se tournent vers Emmanuel Levinas. Parmi eux quelques militants du groupe

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dextrme gauche franais, dit maoste , et leur chef, Benny Lvy. Pour ceux-l, la fin de sicle sera lvinassienne ou ne sera pas. Le film raconte de faon chronologique ce chemin collectif puis individuel, avec les tmoignages entre autres dAlain Geismar, dOlivier Rolin, de Tony Lvy, dAntoine de Gaudemar, de Guy Lardreau, de Michel le Bris, de Philippe Gavi, de Claire Etcherelli, de Bernard Henri Lvy, de Catherine Chalier, dAlain Finkielkraut et de Jackie Berroyer. Le passage de tmoin de Sartre Lvinas, et le monde de lEtude en conclusion. Et la prsence tout moment souterraine comme il se doit, de Benny Lvy.

Questions doreille Vladimir Janklvitch, un philosophe de la musique (1999, 52', ralisation : Anne Imbert). Prsentation par Franoise Schwab, historienne.
Rencontre autour de la rflexion de Janklevitch sur la musique, notamment autour du concept dineffable. La musique est pour lui ladverbe de manire de la pense . Elle donc stimulante, perptuellement lie un plaisir, un plaisir de pense, plaisir dinterprter, profondment inscrit dans la vie. Il sagit donc au sein dune structure contrle dune rencontre entre un philosophe, la musique et un acte potique. Indissociable de la vie, nous mettons en place une potique partir de la place quoccupait la musique dans la sienne. Cette prsence est inscrite en permanence tout au long du programme. Jaime que la musique ne soit pas sourde la chanson du vent dans la plaine, et insensible au parfum de la nuit .

Henri Bergson. Les ides et les hommes - (1978, 52, ralisation : Nat Lilenstein). Prsentation par Jolle Hansel, professeur de philosophie.
Henri Bergson (1859-1941), philosophe franais, professeur au Collge de France, prix Nobel de littrature en 1928, est connu du grand public pour son livre sur Le Rire mais on lui doit surtout quatre uvres majeures : Essai sur les donnes immdiates de la conscience, Matire et mmoire, L'volution cratrice et Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion. Sa vie, raconte ici dans un documentaire rare, est celle, classique, dun professeur de philosophie, double dune activit politique peu connue. On mesure mal de nos jours son immense influence sur toute une gnration de jeunes philosophes de lentre-deux guerres dont Emmanuel Levinas, qui reconnat lui devoir beaucoup, en particulier sur la question du Temps humain diffrencier du Temps de la science. Une distinction qui a rendu possible - et fconde lmergence de phnomnologie allemande.

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CINMATHQUE DE TOULOUSE
Les Temps Modernes de Charlie Chaplin
Dans le cadre des manifestations qui se drouleront paralllement au Colloque international "Lectures de Difficile libert" (4-9 juillet 2010), la Cinmathque projettera Les temps modernes. Les grands thmes de ce film sont traits par Levinas dans son ouvrage, notamment dans un essai intitul "Heidegger, Gagarine et nous" (1961). Levinas y fait tat, d'entre de jeu, de la situation qu'illustre la clbre scne de Charlot sur la chane de montage dans Les Temps Modernes : dans un monde domin par la technique, l'homme "aurait perdu son identit pour entrer comme un rouage dans une immense machinerie o tournent choses et tres". La technique "ne menace pas seulement l'identit des personnes. Elle risque de faire clater la plante". Mais tout en rejoignant le souci de justice sociale que Chaplin exprimait en dnonant le chmage et la misre des travailleurs lors de la Grande dpression des annes 1930, Levinas s'en loigne par sa rvaluation de la technique. Contre le culte de la nature et de l'enracinement dont fait preuve un "prestigieux courant de la pense contemporaine" ("Heidegger et les heideggriens"), contre les tendances ractionnaires et sdentaires, Levinas dgage la signification thique de la technique qui libre de l'enchanement un Lieu ou au terroir. C'est ce qu'illustre l'exploit du cosmonaute russe Youri Gagarine qui a fait le tour de la Terre en 1h48 minutes: " Pour une heure, un homme a exist en dehors de tout horizon...dans l'absolu de l'espace homogne."

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