Personality and Individual Differences 30 (2001) 561577

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A just and an unjust world: structure and validity of dierent world beliefs
Claudia Dalbert a,*, Isaac M. Lipkus b, Hedvig Sallay c, Irene Goch d
Department of Educational Psychology, FB Educational Sciences, Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg, D-06099, Halle (Saale), Germany b Duke University Medical Center, Box 2949, Durham NC 27710, USA c Institute of Psychology, Lajos Kossuth University of Debrecen, PF. 28, H-4010 Debrecen, Hungary d Department of Educational Psychology, Eberhard-Karls-University of Tubingen, 22-30, D-72070 Tubingen, Germany
Received 10 September 1999; received in revised form 21 February 2000; accepted 15 March 2000
a

Abstract In three studies, we tested the hypothesis that the belief in a just and an unjust world are distinct constructs. The two-factor model was supported through the use of structural equation modeling and the pattern of correlations with religiosity, well-being, and political ideology. Specically, only the belief in a just world correlated positively with religiosity, three indicators of well being (life satisfaction, mood level, and aect), and preferring a well-established political party. A comparison between prisoners and guards revealed further dierences. Prisoners endorsed more strongly the belief in an unjust world, but both guards and prisoners equally endorsed the belief in a just world. We discuss the dierences between the belief in a just and an unjust world, and the implications of believing in an unjust world for social behavior. # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Just world belief; Religiosity; Political attitude; Well-being; Prisoners

1. Introduction For nearly three decades, there has been accumulating support for the belief in the just world hypothesis (Furnham & Procter, 1989; Lerner & Miller, 1978). This hypothesis states that people are motivated to believe that they live in a world where everybody gets what he/she deserves. So powerful is the need to defend this belief that people take action to correct injustices, or

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +49-345-55-23811; fax: +49-345-55-27244. E-mail address: dalbert@paedagogik.uni- halle.de (C. Dalbert). 0191-8869/01/$ - see front matter # 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S0191-8869(00)00055-6

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psychologically restore justice (e.g., victim blaming when no justication is available). This motivation can account for a substantial degree of social reactions to injustice (for a review Dalbert, 1996) and has consequences for subjects' psychological well-being (e.g., Dalbert, 1993; Lipkus, Dalbert & Siegler, 1996). During the last few years, researchers have questioned whether the belief in a just world is a unidimensional or multidimensional construct. For example, these discussions have centered on whether there exists a need to dierentiate the belief in a just vs an unjust world (Furnham & Procter, 1989). An aim of this paper was to systematically investigate distinctions and similarities between the belief in a just and an unjust world. We rst briey discuss why there is need to distinguish between the belief in a just and an unjust world, and the empirical ndings that support these distinctions. Our main emphasis is that future research about precursors and consequences to believing in a just or an unjust world will arise only via the creation of psychometrically sound measures. Unfortunately, there is a lack of developing and rigorously testing new measures of the belief in a just and especially an unjust world. Thus, while we discuss reasons why these two constructs should be studied, this paper will focus heavily at the initial development and testing of a belief in an unjust world scale. 1.1. Reasons to dierentiate and study the belief in a just and unjust world as separate constructs Initial conceptualizations of the belief in a just world assumed the construct was unidimensional, but bipolar, such that the belief in a just and an unjust world existed at opposite ends of the continuum (Rubin & Peplau, 1973, 1975). However, ndings correlating the just and unjust subscales of Rubin & Peplau's (1975) just world scale found correlations near zero (e.g., Furnham, 1985; Furnham & Karani, 1985; Heaven & Connors, 1988), therefore questioning the bipolarity assumption and suggesting further that the just and unjust world are largely independent constructs (Furnham & Procter, 1989). If they are independent or weakly correlated constructs, then there is a need to measure and research these two constructs separately. Given the adequate attention devoted to the study of the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980), we focus primarily on why eorts also should be devoted to researching the belief in an unjust world. The belief in a just world can be seen as indicating a personal contract (Lerner, 1977) between the individual and his/her social world. The more strongly individuals endorse the belief in a just world, the higher the obligatory nature of the personal contract should be. This contract includes the obligation to maintain and act in a just manner. For example, the more people endorse the belief in a just world the more they strive for justice in their own deeds (e.g., Bierho, Klein & Kramp, 1991) and to rectify or rationalize injustices (e.g. Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Schmitt, 1998). Such perspectives engender feelings of trust in one's environment (e.g., the person feels he or she will be treated fairly by others). To summarize, the belief in a just world is a personal disposition, and those who strongly endorse this belief behave in accordance with one's fairness rules, thereby inuencing social behavior as well as everyday functions. Conversely, the belief in an unjust world indicates the tendency to feel free to react in contrast to any fairness rules. Thus, the belief in an unjust world may promote cynicism and behaviors that are motivated by self-interest without feeling obligated to behave in accordance with any fairness rules. If this hypothesis is true, the adaptive consequences of the belief in a just world (e.g. promoting everyday functions or enhancing well-being) should not be observed for the belief

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in an unjust world. On the contrary, the belief in an unjust world should enhance the possibility of unfairness. Before these hypotheses can be tested, a psychometrically sound measure of the belief in an unjust world needs to be developed. We address this issue by rst describing weaknesses in studies looking at the structure of existing just world scales, and then describing patterns of correlates that theoretically should distinguish between the belief in a just and an unjust world. 1.2. Psychometric and validational issues pertaining to measuring the belief in a just and unjust world The rst just world scale was constructed with the assumption that the just world construct is unidimensional, but bipolar, with the belief in a just and unjust world at the opposite ends of a continuum (Rubin & Peplau, 1973, 1975). Therefore, Rubin and Peplau's just world scale (1973, 1975) created two subscales: a belief in a just world (nine items) and unjust world (seven items). However, in addition to having poor psychometric properties (Lipkus, 1991), problems emerged with the bipolarity assumption. In several studies, these two subscales were shown to be relatively independent, with correlations close to zero (e.g., Furnham, 1985; Furnham & Karani, 1985; Heaven & Connors, 1988; Lupfer, Doan & Houston, 1998). Therefore, Furnham and Procter (1989) hypothesized that the belief in a just and an unjust world are not merely opposites, but exist as relatively orthogonal beliefs. The rst problem that arises in discussing the beliefs in a just and an unjust world pertain to the structural nature of these world beliefs. For example, are the beliefs in a just and an unjust world relatively independent dimensions? Or is the just world belief a unidimensional, but bipolar, construct with belief in an unjust world at the opposite pole? Results from Furnham and colleagues suggest that the belief in a just and an unjust world are dierent, relatively independent dimensions. Before accepting these conclusions, several shortcomings should be mentioned. First, a formal test of whether the belief in a just world is a bipolar construct has yet to be conducted using appropriate statistical methods, such as conrmatory factor analyses. Second, although some results support the distinction between a just and an unjust world, the factor structure of the just and unjust world items are not analyzed separately. Third, nonrandom response error may mask the bipolarity of how people respond to scale(s) items. Therefore, to overcome these weaknesses, we conducted two studies that measured the two beliefs together, and explicitly examined the factor structure of the items pertaining to each construct. We hypothesized that the multidimensional two-factor model will most parsimoniously explain the observed data. 1.3. Correlates that can be used to distinguish between the belief in a just and unjust world Distinctions between the belief in a just and an unjust world can be tested using patterns of correlations with three domains: religiosity, aect and well-being, and political preference. The more people believe in a just world, the stronger is their faith in religion (see Furnham & Procter, 1989). The relationship between religiosity and the belief in an unjust world is less clear. Some people ruminate about religion, and struggle with the question whether God is just or not. Therefore, believing in an unjust world may not be indicative of low religiosity.

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Just world beliefs should be related to political ideology. People who believe in a just world do not wish to change the world. Therefore, individuals who endorse more conservative political attitudes and voters of political parties who often come to oce, often have stronger beliefs in a just world (see Dalbert, Montada & Schmitt, 1987; Furnham & Procter, 1989). In Germany, there are three main political parties: the Christian democrats (CDU/CSU), the social democrats (SPD) and liberal democrats (FDP). In addition, at the time the study we report here took place, there were two opposition parties: (1) the ecologically-oriented party `Bundnis 90/Die Grunen' and (2) the PDS, a party being produced out of the former communist party in the former German Democratic Republic. Of import for present purposes, voters of opposition parties are less likely to strongly endorse the belief in a just world. Unfortunately, the relationship between political attitudes and the belief in an unjust world has not been investigated systematically. Therefore, we address whether people who engage in political opposition more strongly endorse the belief in an unjust world. Just world beliefs also may be related to a person's psychological well-being. Recently, the belief in a just world has been viewed as a positive illusion, and this illusion should promote psychological well-being (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Several studies have documented the hypothesized adaptive relationship between the belief in a just world and indicators of well-being. These indicators include global life satisfaction and positive moods (see Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Dalbert, 1993; Lerner & Somers, 1992; Lipkus et al., 1996; Ritter, Benson & Snyder, 1990; see for a review, Dalbert, 1998). The more a person endorses the BJW, the more trusting the individual will be that others will treat him or her fairly. This trust serves: (1) as a resource that can provide the person with condence needed to invest in the future (Hafer, 2000; Zuckerman, 1975); and (2) as a buer in stressful situations such as helping to promote adaptive coping or reducing subjective threat (e.g., Dalbert 1996; Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994). Overall, the benecial eect of believing in a just world on mental health is not predicted to occur for the belief in an unjust world. It is dicult to predict clearly how the belief in an unjust world is related to the three validity correlates discussed above. However, both the belief in a just and an unjust world depicts a world that is more meaningful than the belief that the world is driven by chance. Walster (1966) argued that people need to believe in a meaningful world and to protect themselves against attributions to random events. Epstein (1990) describes the belief in a meaningful world as one of four basic beliefs making-up an important part of personality. Because the beliefs in a just and an unjust world share the common theme that the world is meaningful, they should be correlated. In contrast to the belief in a just world, the belief in an unjust world may indicate the tendency to behave in contrast to any fairness rules and, thereby, promote behavior that is motivated by self-interest. Therefore, the strength of just world beliefs should dier between subjects with divergent justice perspectives. Individuals who have conducted rule-conicting behavior (e.g., have broken the law) should more strongly believe in an unjust world compared to those who show higher compliance with rules of justice. This hypothesis was tested by a comparison between prisoners and their guards. In sum, we examined how three well-documented validity correlates, religiosity, psychological well-being (e.g., life satisfaction, mood states), and political ideology, served to distinguish between the belief in a just and an unjust world. We made the following predictions: The belief

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in a just world should be positively related to: (1) religiosity; (2) voting for a well-established political party; and (3) three indicators of psychological well-being, namely positive mood level, to a stronger actual positive mood state, and greater life satisfaction. If the belief in an unjust world is merely the opposite of believing in a just world, the correlational pattern should be the exact opposite. However, we expected (4) the belief in an unjust world to correlate negatively only with the belief in a just world and (5) voting for an oppositional political party. In a third study we compared prisoners and guards and expected (6) prisoners to more strongly endorse the belief in an unjust world than a just world. 2. Study 1 and 2 We conducted two studies to test systematically the world beliefs' factor structure and to clarify further their validity. Data from both studies were used to test the two-factor model that the belief in a just and unjust world are two separate, albeit, negatively correlated constructs. 2.1. Method study 1 2.1.1. Sample The study was done using introductory psychology students at a German university (EberhardKarls-Universitat Tubingen) during the autumn of 1992. One hundred and eleven students took part in this questionnaire-study. Eighty-one women and 30 men participated (missing values n=1); their age varied between 19 and 49 years (M=25.6; SD=4.6). 2.1.2. Research instruments The belief in a just world was measured using Dalbert et al.'s (1987) six-item belief in a just world scale ( 0X76, rest 0X351), and a German version of Lipkus' (1991) seven-item belief in a just world scale ( 0X65, rest 0X21). Belief in an unjust world ( 0X66, rest 0X33) was measured using a newly developed scale consisting of four items. These 17 items are depicted in Table 1. Religiosity was measured with a six-item scale (Dalbert & Katona-Sallay, 1996) that assessed church attendance, self-rated religiosity, and strength in the belief that religion gives one's life meaning ( 0X93, rest 0X69). The 23 items were distributed randomly in the questionnaire. Items were rated on a 6-point Likert scale with endpoints 1=`totally disagree' and 6=`totally agree'. The items belonging to one scale were averaged to measure each of the three world belief constructs and religiosity. For the structural equation modeling, the odd or even items of each scale were averaged to build two indicators for each variable. If one item value was missing, an average score was computed using the remaining items. Using scale means instead of scale sums oers the advantage that all scale values range between 1 and 6 that can be translated back to scale anchors.

1 Cronbach (1951) shows alpha's dependency on the number of items and introduced rest as an index of homogeneity which is independent of test length. E.g., a test with 16 items with a ``rule of thumb  0X80'' has a rest 0X20.

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2.2. Method study 2 In addition to measuring the unjust and just world beliefs, Study 2 included psychological wellbeing and political preference measures. We expected the belief in a just world to be negatively related to the belief in an unjust world, and positively related to positive mood level, actual positive mood states, life satisfaction, and preferring a well-established political party. 2.2.1. Sample The study was done using introductory psychology students at three German universities (Eberhard-Karls-Universitat Tubingen; Friedrich-Schiller-Universitat Jena; Universitat Ulm) during the summer of 1995. Sixty-two men and 105 women participated for a total of 171 subjects (missing values n=4); their age varied between 19 and 42 years (M=24.6; SD=4.8). 2.2.2. Research instruments The belief in an unjust world was measured using the four-item scale as reported in Study 1; The belief in a just world was measured using Dalbert et al.'s (1987) six-item scale (just world belief:  0X76, rest 0X35; unjust world belief:  0X67, rest 0X34). These 10 items were distributed randomly in the questionnaire. Lipkus' (1991) just world scale was not included in this study.
Table 1 Item-total-correlations and coecient Alpha () for the just world scale and the unjust world scale (Study 1 and 2) Items Global just world scale (Lipkus, 1991; n 111;  0X65, rest 0X21) 1 I feel that people get what they are entitled to have. 2 I feel that a person's eorts are noticed and rewarded. 3 I feel that people earn the rewards and punishments they get. 4 I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on themselves. 5 I feel that people get what they deserve. 6 I feel that rewards and punishmentsa are fairly given. 7 I basically feel that the world is a fair place. General just world scale (Dalbert, Montada & Schmitt, 1987; n 281;  0X74 rest 0X32) 1 I am condent that justice always prevails over injustice. 2 I rmly believe that injustices in all areas of life (e.g., professional, family, politics) are the exception rather than the rule. 3 I think that people try to be fair when making important decisions. 4 I am convinced, in the long run people will be compensated for injustices. 5 I believe that, by and large, people get what they fairly deserve. 6 I think basically the world is a just place. Unjust world scale (n 281;  0X66; rest 0X33) 1 A lot of people suer an unjust fate.b 2 I feel that even important decisions are often unfair. 3 I basically believe the world is an unjust place. 4 I feel that people won't be compensated for injustices too often
a b

rit 0.34 0.25 0.24 0.30 0.63 0.51 0.33 0.64 0.42 0.36 0.41 0.56 0.55 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.47

In the German version the item wording `and punishments' was missing. This item was adopted from Maes (1992).

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Three scales were used to assess two distinct dimensions of trait well being: emotional and cognitive. The rst was the trait well-being scale (see Dalbert, 1992), which measures the emotional dimension of trait well-being. This scale consisted of a German version of Underwood and Froming's mood level scale (1980; see Dalbert, 1992; six item, e.g.: I consider myself a happy person;  0X85, rest 0X49). We also used the Life Satisfaction Scale, that measures the cognitive dimension of the trait well-being (see Dalbert, Montada, Schmitt & Schneider, 1984; seven item, e.g.: I am satised with my life;  0X82, rest 0X39). This scale is comparable to the life satisfaction scale of Diener, Emmons, Larsen and Grin (1985). The 13 items were randomly arranged in the second questionnaire. Items contained in both questionnaires were rated on a sixpoint Likert scale with endpoints 1=`totally disagree' and 6=`totally agree' Positive and negative mood states were measured using a German scale adopted from the Prole of Mood States (McNair, Lorr & Doppleman, 1971; see Dalbert, 1992). Participants were asked to rate how they felt during the last week on six adjectives measuring negative moods (sadness: three items;  0X87, rest 0X69; hopelessness: three items;  0X79, rest 0X56) and six adjectives measuring positive moods ( 0X94, rest 0X72). The adjectives were rated on a 7point Likert scale with endpoints 1=`not at all' to 7=`very strong'. Thus, positive mood level and actual positive mood diered by their response format as well as their time frame: general positive mood level was assessed without specifying a time frame (i.e., trait well-being), while actual positive mood was assessed pertaining to the last week (i.e., prole of mood states). Means were used as scale values. The odd and the even items, respectively, were averaged to build two indicators for each of the following constructs: life satisfaction, mood level and actual positive moods during the last week. At the end of the questionnaire, in addition to obtaining data on age and gender, subjects were asked which party they would vote for if the election of the Federal Government would occur next Sunday. The answer served as an indicator of subjects' political preference. 2.3. Results 2.3.1. Structure of the world beliefs The factor structures of the world beliefs were tested using conrmatory factor analyses using lisrel 8.12 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1994). Structural equation modeling allows the consideration of nonrandom response error, and provides tests of competing alternative models. Specically two competing models were tested. First, the one-factor model depicts a unidimensional, but bipolar construct such that the belief in a just and an unjust world are at opposite poles of the continuum. In the two-factor model, the belief in a just and an unjust world are separate, but correlated factors. The 12-dierences between the one and the two-factor model indicates whether the more restricted one-factor model could reproduce equally well the observed variance-covariance matrix as reproduced by the less restricted two-factor model. If the two-factor model captures the observed variance-covariance-matrix better, the 12-dierences should be signicant. We also tested for response biases using two competing models. First, in the random error model, we assumed the observed scores for each individual to be a linear combination of the latent belief factor and random error; therefore, the error variances were estimated to be uncorrelated. In the correlated error model, we assumed the observed scores for each individual to be a linear combination of the belief factor, systematic response bias, and random error. Green,

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Goldman & Salovey (1993) discuss how an assessment method can result in a systematic response bias that may mask bipolarity. The 12-dierences between a model with random error and a model with correlated error terms of variables assessed with the same method indicates whether the more restricted random error model could reproduce the observed variance-covariance matrix as well as the less restricted correlated error model. If the correlated error model more strongly accounts for the observed variance-covariance-matrix, the 12-dierences should be signicant. If the correlated error terms are signicant then systematic response bias may have masked bipolarity in the two-factor random error model. Consequently, the correlation between the just and the unjust world factor may be higher in the two-factor correlated error model compared to the two-factor random error model (see Green et al., 1993). We started in Study 1 with the one-factor model with random error and tested it against the one-factor model with correlated error. We then tested the two-factor model with random error against that with correlated error. Finally we tested the accepted model for both studies simultaneously. The covariance matrix was analyzed for all models. The error variances for each pair of the following subscales the Dalbert et al. (1987) just world subscales and the unjust world subscales were set to be equal. Factor loadings were constrained from the hypothesized factor only and were xed to be 1. In Study 1 we used the Lipkus scale and the Dalbert et al. scales as dierent measures of the belief in a just world. These measures are subject to dierent sorts of response bias. We expected a consistent response bias to exist for the belief scales of the same method (Lipkus; Dalbert), which may mask bipolarity. The results are depicted in Table 2. We started with the one-factor-random error model. It did not t these data (see Table 2; p ` 0X001). We then compared the one-factor-random error model with the one-factor-correlated error model. We allowed the covariances of the measurement errors of the same method to be estimated and constrained them to be equal within the same method (Lipkus just world; Dalbert just/unjust world). The covariance of the error terms of the Lipkus subscales was not signicant (T 0X60; p b 0X10). Therefore, this error term covariance was xed to 0. The parameters of the resulting model are depicted in Table 2. The error term covariances of the Dalbert et al. subscales were signicant (p ` 0X001). Moreover, the 12-dierence indicates that the correlated error model reproduced the observed data signicantly better than the random error model (12 13X64; p ` 0X001). However, this one-factor-correlated error model continued to show a 1 signicant dierence between the observed and estimated variance-covariance-matrices (p 0X034) suggesting that a better-tting model existed. We then compared the two-factor models with random error and with correlated error (see Table 2). The two factor-random error model reproduced the observed data very well (p 0X280). Within the two-factor-correlated error model, the estimated error covariances were not signicant (p b 0X10). When this model was compared to the two-factor-random error model, the former model did not result in a better t of these data (12=1.64; p b 0X20) 1 Taken collectively, within the two-factor models, the assumption of correlated response error did not result in a better replication of the observed data. However, for the one-factor models, the assumption of correlated response error did result in a better estimation of the observed data. Furthermore, within the random error model, the 12-dierence indicated that the two-factor model had a better t to these data than the one-factor model (12 23X48; p ` 0X001). The same 2 was true within the correlated error model (12 11X48; p ` 0X001). But only the two-factor model 2 suciently t these data. In sum, the two-factor-random error model was the best tting model.

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Table 2 Model parameters for dierent latent factor models for the just and unjust world beliefa Indicator Study 1 (n=111) 1 factor random error model 1 factor correlated error model 2 factor random error model Just 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 Unjust 2 factor correlated error model Just 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 Unjust Study 1 and Study 2 (n=111 and 167) 2 factor random error model Just Unjust

Standardized factor loadings Just Lipkus 1 0.59 0.59 Just Lipkus 2 0.59 0.59 Just Dalbert 1 0.59 0.59 Just Dalbert 2 0.59 0.59 Unjust Dalbert 1 0.59 0.59 Unjust Dalbert 2 0.59 0.59 Interfactor correlation Unjust tcorrelated error 3.15 Goodness of t statistics 12 12 =40.06 (p<0.001) 12 =26.42 (p=0.034) 16 15 GFI 0.89 0.92 RMR 0.11 0.09
a

0.73 0.73

0.71 0.71

0.71 0.71

0.81 0.81

0.59 12 =16.58 (p=0.280) 14 0.95 0.09

0.65 1.23 12 =14.94 (p=0.310) 13 0.96 0.09

0.62 12 =14.04 (p=0.520) 15 0.97 0.12

GFI=goodness of t index; RMR=Root mean square residual.

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In Study 2, only Dalbert et al.'s scale was used to measure the belief in a just world. We compared the accepted two-factor-random error model using Dalbert et al.'s scale for both samples with equality constrains across both samples for all parameter estimates. In other words, the same measurement model (relations between observed scales values and estimated factors), and the same structural model (relations between the estimated factors) were estimated for both samples. The two factor model t the data of both samples equally well (% contribution to total 12: Study 1=54%; Study 2=46%). The estimated latent correlation between beliefs in a just and an unjust world was r 0X62 (see Table 2). Overall, the results of the latent factor analyses supported the hypothesis of two dierent world beliefs. Although the belief in a just and an unjust world were highly correlated, both could not be collapsed under a single factor without signicant loss of information. This held true when correlated error terms were accounted. This suggests that the estimation of a systematic response bias did not signicantly increase the t of the two-factor model. Characteristics of the manifest scales (item-total correlations, ) are depicted in Table 1. 2.4. Validity correlates 2.4.1. World beliefs and religiosity For Study 1, we expected that the belief in a just world would correlate positively with religiosity. We further examined whether the belief in an unjust world would correlate with religiosity. The relationships were tested using a three-factor model, including the accepted twofactor-random error model, and adding a third factor with loadings on both religiosity subscales (odd-, even-items-subscale). The error variances of these two subscales were set to be equal, and factor loadings were constrained from the hypothesized factor only and were xed to be 1. All latent factor correlations were estimated freely. This model ts these data very well (12 35X94; 25 p 0X073; GFI=0.92; RMR=0.11). Besides the signicant correlation between both world beliefs (r 0X59; p ` 0X001), the belief in a just world and religiosity were correlated signicantly (r 0X24; p ` 0X05). However, the belief in an unjust world and religiosity were uncorrelated (r 0X01; p ` 0X60). Therefore, the correlation between belief in an unjust world and religiosity was xed to 0. This constrained model ts these data very well (12 35X95; p 0X093; 26 GFI=0.92; RMR=0.11), and did not produce a signicant dierence compared to the model without this constraint (12 0X01). 1 2.4.2. World beliefs and political preferences There were two main predictions for Study 2. First, we predicted that the belief in a just world would be positively correlated with voting for a well-established party. Second, we predicted that the belief in an unjust world would be negatively correlated with political preferences. Participants mentioned primarily four political parties in response to the election question. These were two well-established parties (CDU/CSU; SPD) and two opposition parties (Bundnis 90/Die Grunen; PDS). Hence, we created two political groupings (established vs oppositional). We then examined, via t-tests, whether the belief in a just and unjust world diered as a function of political group. The results are depicted in Table 3. The political preferences eect was observed only for the belief in a just world. Potential voters of well-established parties more strongly endorsed the belief in a just world than voters of opposition parties. The predicted

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pattern for the relationship between the belief in an unjust world and voting patterns was in the expected mean direction, but was not signicant (p 0X111). To further explore these relationships in more detail, we examined whether the mean belief in a just world and an unjust world diered as a function of specic political group via one-way ANOVAs with party (CDU/CSU; SPD; Bundnis 90/Die Grunen; PDS) as the between-subjects factor. These analyses revealed that voters of the SPD more strongly endorsed the belief in a just world than voters of the Bundnis 90/Die Grunen (see Table 3). Controlled for by multiple regression analysis, subjects' age did not alter the eect of voting for a well-established party on just world belief. Party characteristic (well-established; opposition) was entered in a second step after age, and remained signicant (p 0X002). There were no interactions. 2.4.3. World beliefs and psychological well-being For Study 2, we predicted that the belief in a just world would correlate positively with wellbeing. For all the following models, the covariance matrix was analyzed. The error variances of each pair of subscales were set to be equal, and factor loadings were constrained from the hypothesized factor only and were xed to be 1 (exception: the factor loading on hopelessness was estimated freely). (a) We began with a six factor-random error model encompassing the beliefs in a just and an unjust world, trait mood level, actual negative and positive mood, and life satisfaction. In the random error model, we assumed the observed scores for each individual to be a linear combination of the belief factor and random error; therefore, the error variances were estimated to be uncorrelated. This model resulted in a sucient t of the observed data (12 77X30; p 0X008; 50 GFI=0.93; RMR=0.054) with a high latent correlation between mood level and life satisfaction (r 0X83) and between actual positive and negative mood (r 0X72). (b) Trait mood level and life satisfaction on the one hand, and actual positive and negative mood were measured each

Table 3 Political preferences and dierent world beliefs (Study 2; n 141)a Political party n Just Worldb M Well-established CDU/CSU SPD Opposition Bundnis 90/Die Grunen PDS T (p) F (p)
a

Unjust World SD 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.72 0.73 0.70 M 4.36 4.48 4.28 4.66 4.71 4.45 1.61 (0.111) 1.359 (0.258) SD 0.92 0.92 0.93 1.04 1.00 1.21

41 15 26 100 79/78 21

2.66 2.58y 2.71 2.16 2.16y 2.17y 3.57 (<0.001) 4.296 (0.006)

All scale values ranged between 1 and 6 with 6 indicating stronger positive endorsement of the construct. Means with asterisks and daggers dier at p<0.05 (Schee test) among a column. b Dalbert et al. (1987).

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with a common method and, therefore, they may be subject to a response bias masking further common variance between them (see above). (b1) The estimation of a consistent response pattern of response bias possibly inuencing mood level and life satisfaction (equal covariances of the four error terms) caused estimation problems indicating that this kind of linear combination does not adequately t the data. (b2) The six factor-correlated error model with four error term covariances for the actual mood scales (12 77X25; p 0X006) tted the data equally well as the 49 more restricted 6 factor-random error model (12 0X05; n.s.), the error term covariances were 1 not signicant (T 0X24; p b 0X20), and the latent correlation of actual positive and negative mood was only modestly higher than in the six factor-random error model (r 0X77). (c) A ve factor-correlated error term model with one factor for actual (positive and negative) mood (12 87X96; p 0X003; GFI=0.92; RMR=0.060) tted the data nearly as well as the less 55 restricted six factor random error model (12 10X66; p b 0X05). This result supported the 5 hypothesis that bipolarity of actual mood is masked by correlated measurement error. (d) In addition, collapsing mood level and life satisfaction into one factor resulted in an inadequately tting four factor model (12 =124.14; p<0.001). (f) We, therefore, chose the ve factor-corre60 lated error model as valid (see (c)) and compared it with a model with the following constraints: (1) all covariances between belief in an unjust world and the three well-being factors were xed to be 0; (2) all covariances between belief in a just world and the three well-being factors were set to be equal; and (3) the two covariances between actual mood with life satisfaction and mood level, respectively, were set to be equal. This more restricted model (12 96X59; p 0X003; GFI=0.92; 61 RMR=0.082) tted the data equally as well as the less restricted ve factor-correlated error model (12 8X63; p b 0X25). 7 This model is depicted in Table 4. The belief in a just world showed equally strong relationships with all the well-being factors. Thus, subjects who more strongly endorsed the belief in a just world reported more positive mood and were more satised with their lives. However, belief in an unjust world was uncorrelated with each of these factors. 3. Study 3 We conducted a third study with the aim of comparing the two world beliefs between two groups typically diering in their justice perspectives, prisoners and their guards. We predicted that the prisoners should believe more strongly in an unjust world. 3.1. Method 3.1.1. Sample The study was done in a Hungarian prison. Ninety-ve prisoners and 33 guards participated. Eight prisoners were born before 1951, 21 between 1951 and 1960, 35 between 1961 and 1970, and 28 between 1971 and 1980. Fifty-two prisoners were convicted for the rst time, 40 prisoners were convicted several times. Forty-nine prisoners were convicted of theft, 12 of physical violence, 10 of robbery, and eight of fraud, the remaining 15 prisoners were convicted on several other crimes. The guards' age varied between 23 and 49 years (M 35X9; SD=7.5), and they were working as guards between 2 and 25 years (M 10X6; SD=7.3).

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3.1.2. Research instruments Just and unjust world beliefs were measured with the Hungarian versions of the same questionnaires used in Study 1. These were the Hungarian version of Dalbert et al.'s (1987) six-item belief in a just world scale ( 0X69, rest 0X27) and a Hungarian version of Lipkus' (1991) seven-item belief in a just world scale ( 0X72, rest 0X35). The Hungarian version of the Dalbert et al.'s belief in a just world scale has been successfully used in other studies (see Dalbert & Katona-Sallay, 1996). The belief in an unjust world ( 0X51, rest 0X21) was measured with the four items scale see Table 1. All items were randomly distributed in the questionnaire. Items were rated on a 6-point Likert scale with endpoints 1=`totally disagree' and 6=`totally agree'. The items belonging to one scale were averaged to measure each of the three world belief constructs. If one item value was missing, an average score was computed using the remaining items. 3.2. Results Prisoners' age group did not covary with the three world belief variables (ps b 0X25). Neither guards' age nor the years working in jail correlated with the three world scales (ps b 0X15). For the prisoners as well as for the guards, Dalbert et al.'s (1987) and Lipkus' (1991) just world scales were positively correlated (rs 0X67a0X68). For the guards, the belief in a just world, using either scale, was signicantly negatively correlated with the belief in an unjust world (Dalbert et al.'s scale: r 0X47; Lipkus' scale: r 0X38). For prisoners, both belief in a just world scales were
Table 4 Model parameters for the ve factor model for just and unjust world belief and well being with correlated error variances for actual mood (Study 2; n=167) Indicator Standardized factor loadings Just-Dalbert 1 Just-Dalbert 2 Unjust-Dalbert 1 Unjust-Dalbert 2 Mood level 1 Mood level 2 Life satisfaction 1 Life satisfaction 2 Sadness Hopelessness Positive mood 1 Positive mood 2 tcorrelated error Interfactor covariances (correlations) Just Unjust Mood level Life satisfaction Actual mood Just 1.0 1.0 Unjust Mood level Life satisfaction Actual mood

1.0 1.0

1.0 1.0

1.0 1.0

1.0 0.74 1.0 1.0 5.78

0.51 0.39 0.20 0.20 0.20

(0.63) (0.32) (0.38) (0.24)

0.75

0.72 0.50 (0.81) 0.50 (0.52)

0.54 0.50 (0.61)

1.27

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Table 5 Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of dierent world beliefs for prisoners (n 95) and guards (n 33) in Hungarya Group Just World (Dalbert et al.) M Prisoner Guard T (p)
a

Just World (Lipkus) M 3.15 2.94 0.95 (0.345) SD 1.15 0.90

Unjust World M 4.26 3.70 2.33 (0.021) SD 1.25 0.99

SD 1.22 0.85

3.37 3.23 0.75 (0.458)

All scale values ranged between 1 and 6 with 6 indicating a stronger positive endorsement of the construct.

uncorrelated with the belief in an unjust world scale. Means of the three world scales for prisoners and guards are depicted in Table 5. Additionally, we tested the reliability of the new belief in an unjust world scale separately for prisoners and guards to be sure that the observed mean dierence is not due to a poor scale reliability. The unjust world scale was homogenous for the prisoners ( 0X58, rest 0X26), but not for the guards ( 0X14). A principal component analysis within the group of the guards revealed that Item 1 (see Table 1) loaded on a second factor. Therefore, we reran the analyses with the belief in an unjust world consisting of the remaining three items within the group of guards ( 0X59, rest 0X32). Now, for the guards, the belief in an unjust world was signicantly negatively correlated with the belief in a just world, as measured by the Dalbert et al.'s scale only (r 0X38; Lipkus' scale: r 0X22, p 0X232). As before, the belief in an unjust world diered signicantly between both groups (T 2X48; df=124; p 0X014). Prisoners more strongly endorsed the belief in an unjust world (M 4X26; SD=1.25) than guards (M 3X61; SD=1.26). Taken collectively, both belief in a just world scales did not dier between prisoners and guards. The belief in an unjust world diered signicantly between both groups. Prisoners more strongly endorsed the belief in an unjust world than guards. Mean scores on the Lipkus' just world scale diered between prisoners convicted the rst time or not (p 0X054; Dalbert et al.: p 0X101; unjust: p b 0X60). Prisoners sent to jail for the rst time less strongly believed in a just world (Lipkus, 1991; n 47; M 2X91; SD=1.13) than the other inmates (n 39; M 3X39; SD=1.12). The three world beliefs did not dier as a function of the crime committed (ps b 0X35). However, if theft and physical violence were summarized into one group, and robbery and fraud to another group, a signicant dierence for the belief in an unjust world emerged (T 1X75; p 0X085; r 0X20). The 18 prisoners convicted of robbery and fraud more strongly endorsed the belief in an unjust world (M 4X72; SD=1.02) than the 59 prisoners convicted of theft or physical violence (M 4X14; SD=1.29). 4. Discussion These are the rst series of studies to examine in detail whether there is any empirical support to distinguish the belief in a just and unjust world. As predicted, the overall pattern of results obtained from the structural equation modeling, as well as correlates with other constructs, and the group comparison (Study 3) supported the distinction. A review of the main ndings is discussed below. The evidence from the structural equation models suggests that while the belief systems are correlated, they are best conceptualized as distinct constructs. For example, it was not possible to

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force the two belief systems into one factor without loosing quality of t. This held true when we took into account a possible response bias due to a common assessment method (nonrandom response error). Further evidence for the distinctiveness of these factors is reected in the pattern of correlations with religiosity, mood level, mood states, life satisfaction, and political ideology. The belief in a just world correlated positively with greater religiosity, positive mood level, life satisfaction, positive aect, and with preference for a well-established political party. The belief in an unjust world failed to achieve any signicant relationships with these variables. Thus, while the belief in an unjust world is negatively correlated with the belief in a just world, the consequences of these belief systems do not necessarily produce opposite ndings. The pattern of results support the validity of the belief in a just world, and also support the notion that the belief in an unjust world scale measures a distinct construct. While it is generally a well-accepted psychometric procedure to reverse score questionnaire items to avoid having subjects respond with a specic mindset (yes/no saying, social desirability responding), such a procedure may inadvertently also encourage the utilization of other constructs. For example, Rubin and Peplau (1973, 1975), assumed the reverse scoring of the unjust world items would, in essence, capture a person's just world orientation. However, summing and correlating the just and unjust world items as two separate scales has shown almost zero relationships (e.g., Furnham, 1985; Furnham & Karani, 1985; Heaven & Connors, 1988; Lupfer et al., 1998). This suggests that scales should be designed a-priori to measure the belief in a just and an unjust world. Indeed, in this study we used two promising just world scales (Dalbert et al., 1987; Lipkus, 1991), while creating a reliable belief in an unjust world scale. As our results suggest, additional work is needed to gain a clearer understanding of what the belief in an unjust world means, as well as its potential consequences. One insight is suggested by the results of our third study. The comparison between prisoners and guards was designed to gain further insight into the nature of the two world beliefs. Within both groups, the two belief in a just world scales were signicantly positively correlated. These results were nearly identical to those found among German students and support the scales' validity (cf. O'Quin & Vogler, 1990). Moreover, both belief in a just world scales were independent of subjects' age, number of years guards worked in jail, type of crime committed by the prisoners or whether the subjects were prisoners or guards. Only the belief in a just world, measured by Lipkus' scale (1991), was more strongly endorsed by prisoners sent to jail several times. Overall, this pattern of results indicates that the belief in a just world seems to be a relatively stable belief. Dierences between the two groups are highlighted by the correlations between the belief in a just world and an unjust world. For prisoners, no signicant correlations were observed between the belief in a just and unjust world. The expected negative correlation between the belief in a just and an unjust world held true only for guards. Prisoners compared to guards more strongly endorsed the belief in an unjust world and this dierence cannot be explained by insucient reliability of the unjust world scale. Furthermore, the tendency to endorse the belief in an unjust world was most pronounced for prisoners convicted for more intentional crimes (e.g., robbery or fraud) than prisoners convicted for crimes that may partly mirror the unstable sociopolitical situation in Hungary (e.g., theft or violence). In sum, and as predicted, the belief in an unjust world was especially strong for those individuals breaking more or less intentionally societal rules.

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Caution should be taken when interpreting these ndings based on the cross-sectional nature of these data. It would be worth studying the extent to which the belief in an unjust world is causally related to committing a crime, and to what extent a strong belief in an unjust world is a consequence of conducting a crime. A strong belief in an unjust world can indicate the cancellation of the personal contract (Lerner, 1977) between the individual and society, thus making it easier to conduct a crime. After committing a crime, strengthening one's belief in an unjust world may be a strategy to cope with a bad conscience by justifying one's crime as a necessary action in an unjust society. In sum, these studies are the rst to examine in detail the distinctions and similarities among the belief in a just and an unjust world. These initial promising results suggest that these constructs, while negatively related, have dierent sets of correlates. Future research is needed to further validate the unjust world scale by testing further the antecedents and consequences of the belief in an unjust world, and comparing similarities and dierences between the belief in a just and an unjust world. Acknowledgements Part of this paper was presented at the 40th congress of the German Psychological Society, 1996, in Munich. We thank J.E. Brunner for his help in gathering these data for the second study. References
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