PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY

TOPIC AREA B: REVIEWING PAKISTAN`S FOREIGN POLICY WITH

SPECEFIC REFERENCE TO THE STRAINED PAK-US TIES


Introduction

Although Pakistan's Ioreign policy has always been dominated by problems with India as
well as by eIIorts to maximize its own external support, its relationship with the West,
particularly Britain and the United States, is oI major importance. At independence in
1947, Pakistan became a member oI the British Commonwealth oI Nations.
AIter Pakistan's independence by the partitioning oI the British Raj, Pakistan Iollowed a
pro western policy. The Indian government Iollowed a diIIerent, non-aligned policy
stance, which leaned closer to the Soviet Union rather than the United States oI America.
Pakistan was seeking strong alliances to counter its neighbor, India. At this time, India
was neutral and went on to be a part oI Non Aligned Movement. The Iirst government oI
Pakistan was headed by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and it chose the seaport oI
Karachi as its capital. Jinnah became head oI state as governor-general. The government
Iaced many challenges in setting up new economic, judicial, and political structures. It
endeavored to organize the bureaucracy and the armed Iorces, resettle the Mohajirs
(Muslim reIugees Irom India), and establish the distribution and balance oI power in the
provincial and central governments. Undermining these eIIorts were provincial
politicians who oIten deIied the authority oI the central government, and Irequent
communal riots. BeIore the government could surmount these diIIiculties, Jinnah died in
September 1948.
In Ioreign policy, Liaquat Ali Khan established Iriendly relations with the United States
when he visited President Harry S. Truman in 1950. Pakistan`s early Ioreign policy was
one oI nonalignment, with no Iormal commitment to either the United States or the Union
oI Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the two major adversaries in the Cold War. In
1953, however, Pakistan aligned itselI with the United States and accepted military and
economic assistance. Pakistan`s relations with the United States developed against the
backdrop oI the Cold War.
Pakistan's strategic geographic position made it a valuable partner in Western alliance
systems to contain the spread oI communism. In 1954 Pakistan signed a Mutual DeIense
Agreement with the United States and subsequently became a member oI the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and CENTO. These agreements placed Pakistan in
the United States sphere oI inIluence. Pakistan was also used as a base Ior United States
military reconnaissance Ilights over Soviet territory. During the Cold War years, Pakistan
was considered one oI Washington's closest allies in Asia. Pakistan, in return, received
large amounts oI economic and military assistance.
Throughout the Cold War era Pakistan's Ioreign policy was Iocused on security and
territorial integrity. The colonial history oI Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute and the India`s
hostile expansionist policy made Pakistan more prone to its security and territorial
integrity. Out oI these concerns in 1950 the Iirst prime minister oI Pakistan Liaquat Ali
Khan visited US. In 1953 third Governor-General oI Pakistan Mr. Ghulam Muhammad
paid a visit to US and in 1954 US selected Pakistan as its Irontline ally in South Asia
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


against communist threat. Thus, in Feb 1954 a Mutual DeIense Assistance Agreement
was signed. According to which Pakistan will receive assistance, equipment, materials,
and exchange oI technical inIormation Ior deIense. Pakistan received a military assistance
oI $1.5 billion and economic assistance as the giIt oI treaty. Moreover Pakistan joined
SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization) in 1954 and CENTO (Central Treaty
organization) in 1958 to Iurther strengthen Pak-US relations. However during cold war
the strategic concerns oI both the partners somehow remain divergent; Ior Pakistan it
was India while Ior America it was the containment oI Communism.
In 1962 situation somehow changed when Indo-China conIlict arose and US
supported India by providing heavy military assistance to India, that assistance brought
military imbalance in South Asia. Pakistan Ielt betrayed as a member oI SEATO and
CENTO; thereIore it resulted in strained Pak-US relations. Furthermore, during the wars
oI 1965 and 1971 US gave no military assistance to Pakistan being a member oI SEATO
and CENTO. It was the time when Pakistan realized that US can support India against
China but cannot support Pakistan against India thus Pakistan withdrew Irom SEATO in
1972 and CENTO in 1979 and joined Non-Aligned Movement. The United States
embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan remained in place during the Indo-Pakistani War
oI 1971 and was not liIted until 1975, during the administration oI President Gerald R.
Ford.

The evolving relations & Ayub Era 1952-1969

Prospects Ior Pakistan`s relations with US improved aIter Republican Eisenhower came
to power in 1952 in the White House. Pakistan pushed its case as an ally that could
provide support Ior Middle East security and in return it asked Ior military and economic
support Ior its Ilail economy. Unstable domestic politics had led to political and
economic distress while the bureaucratic and military oIIicers were getting stronger in the
country. The Republican government was more receptive oI the Pakistani position and its
claims oI anti communist stand and an available allied state. Pakistan joined with Turkey
as member oI the Middle East DeIense Organization (MEDO) in 1954. This allowed
Pakistan to Iormally seek aid as a regional ally oI the US. In January 1955, Pakistan
joined South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) with a view to adding security to
the East Asian Ilank oI anti communist alignment. However, it was not clear how
Pakistan`s role in both these organizations would actually materialize in the case oI an
actual conIlict. However, Ior the Pakistanis, becoming part oI these alliances allowed the
country to create stronger links with the US administration and seek increasing aid.
In September 1955, Pakistan became a member oI the Baghdad Pact organization which
later became known as CENTO. Turkey, Iran and Iraq were its earlier members with the
US as the backer oI the security arrangement. The role oI this organization was similar to
the earlier MEDO as a northern-tier deIense arrangement against communist inIluence in
the Middle East.
"In the end, neither the Baghdad Pact not SEATO amounted to much militarily.
.Joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO gave Pakistan a strengthened claim on US
resources and, in turn, the US acquired an even larger stake in Pakistan`s well being. As
Pakistan`s president Ayub Khan put it in his biography, 'Friends Not Masters, Pakistan
had become America`s 'most allied ally in Asia.
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


A key development Irom Pakistan`s perspective was the amount oI development and
military aid that started in 1954 and increased to $500 million by 1957 as a result oI
Pakistan`s joining the regional deIense organizations and allying with the USA. During
the second Eisenhower term, the relations between the two countries became even
stronger. Pakistan`s Army ChieI staged a military coup in 1958 and later became the
President oI Pakistan. Field Marshal Ayub Khan had developed strong relations with the
Americans and his era Irom 1958 to 1969 turned out to a strong era oI US- Pakistan
relations. In 1959, Ayub`s government allowed the US to set up an intelligence Iacility in
Badaber, NWFP province and operate U2 surveillance Ilights over the Soviet Union Irom
its Peshawar Airport. This arrangement and the closer relationship oI the Pakistani
government with the US administration allowed it to acquire increasing military
hardware and arms Ior its deIense services. The issue troubling the US was Pakistan`s
closer relations with China. The Indians and Chinese had Iought a war in 1962 in which
China had given India a bloody nose. As a result Pakistan moved to improve and
strengthen its relations with China in order to position itselI as a stronger Ioe Ior India.
However, Pakistan`s growing Iriendship with communist China irked the US who was
Iacing a proxy war against the communists in Vietnam. Pakistan and India Iought a war
in 1965 that was an ill Iated aIIair started by a limited guerilla war in Kashmir that Ayub
started in order to pressurize India to come to the negotiating table over Kashmir.
However, as the war spread, Pakistan could not sustain a long term conIlict and asked Ior
a truce and both Iorces moved back to their previous borders.

Creation of Bangladesh 1969 - 1972

Army ChieI General Yahya took over power Irom President Ayub Khan in March 1969.
The country had been in a pseudo military rule since 1958. Political representation had
been insuIIicient and regional succession movements were strengthening in the country
especially in the eastern Pakistan province oI Bengal. Elections were held in the country
in 1970 with the East Pakistani party Awami League taking a majority in the elections.
The military government did not hand over power to the winning party and in a political
deadlock, unleashed a crackdown
against the East Pakistan population. This led to a limited civil war in 1971 and India
siding with the dissidents launched a war in December 1971. AIter a Iortnight oI Iighting,
the Pakistani Iorces in East Pakistan accepted deIault and the state oI Bangladesh was
established. The US Policy in this debacle was aligned with the military establishment oI
Pakistan due to its earlier links and deIense relationships.
On the other hand, President Nixon used the Pakistani links with China to start a secret
diplomacy with China which culminated with Henry Kissinger`s secret visit to China in
July 1971 while he was visiting Pakistan. The Chinese relationship was vital Ior the US
as it was trying to Iix the mess in its Vietnam policy. With these concerns, the US
administration neglected the internal domestic issues oI Pakistan and allowed the dictator
to have its way in East Pakistan. "The opening to China was an essential element in
Nixon`s strategy oI creating a new global balance oI power. His aim was to bring China
into the Iamily oI nations reversing two decades oI US eIIorts to isolate Beijing and
to use an improved US-Chinese relationship as a lever with Moscow to press Ior US-
Soviet Union.
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


Rather than Iocusing on their domestic problems and working eIIectively to Iind
solutions, the military rulers in Pakistan had been Iocusing in international aIIairs and the
Great Game and considered the close relationship with the US as a guarantee Ior their
own domestic survival. However, this proved to be a Ialse notion and Pakistani military
lost big time in the war with India in 1971. Over 90,000 soldiers were taken as prisoners
oI war by India and East Pakistan declared its independence. With this large deIeat, the
military Iinally gave in and handed over
power in the remaining country oI West Pakistan to ZulIikar Ali Bhutto, who took over
as the Iirst elected Prime Minister oI the country.
America supported Pakistan throughout the war and supplied weapons to West Pakistan
although Congress had passed a bill suspending exporting weapons to the nation. Near
the end oI the war and Iearing Pakistan's deIeat by the joint Iorces oI Mukti Bahini and
Indian Iorces, Nixon ordered the USS Enterprise into the Indian Ocean, although it was
never used Ior actual combat. United States-Pakistani relations preceding the 1971 war
were characterized by poor communication and much conIusion. The administration oI
President Richard M. Nixon was Iorced to Iormulate a public stance on the brutal
crackdown on East Pakistanis by West Pakistani troops that began in March 25, 1971,
and it maintained that the crackdown was essentially an internal aIIair oI Pakistan in
which direct intervention oI outside powers was to be avoided. The Nixon administration
expressed its concern about human rights violations to Pakistan and restricted the Ilow oI
assistance--yet it stopped short oI an open condemnation.
Despite the United States widely publicized "tilt" toward Pakistan during the 1971 war,
Pakistan's new leader, ZulIiqar Ali Bhutto, Ielt betrayed. In his opinion, the United States
could have prevented India Irom intervening in Pakistan's civil war, thereby saving his
country the trauma oI deIeat and dismemberment. Bhutto now strove to lessen Pakistan's
dependence on the United States.

Bhutto Years 1972 - 1977

The Ioreign policy Bhutto envisioned would place Pakistan at the IoreIront oI Islamic
nations. Issues central to the developing world would take precedence in Ioreign aIIairs
over those oI the superpowers. Bhutto called this policy "bilateralism," which implied
neutrality in the Cold War with equal treatment accorded both superpowers. Bhutto's
distancing oI Islamabad Irom Washington and other Western links was accompanied by
Pakistan's renewed bid Ior leadership in the developing world.
Prime Minister Bhutto initially Iocused his attention with normalizing the domestic
situation in the country. The Government oI Pakistan signed a truce with India,
recognized the government oI Bangladesh and eventually the 90,000 prisoners were
returned by India. The major challenge Ior the new government came in May, 1974 when
India executed an underground nuclear test. This Iorced the Pakistanis to also seek a
nuclear weapons program to match India`s capabilities. This became a major cause Ior
concern Ior the US administration. Pakistan started eIIorts to acquire a nuclear Iuel
reprocessing plant Irom France and a heavy water Iacility Irom West Germany. During
Bhutto`s government Pakistan`s Ioreign policy was aligned to seek a balance between its
relations with China, Russia and the USA. Pakistan placed a special emphasis on its
relations with the Arab countries in the Middle East. During Ford and later Jimmy
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


Carter`s administration, sanctions were placed on Pakistan related to export control and
restriction oI aid grants. Prime Minister Bhutto called elections in March 1977 Irom
which he gained a landslide victory. However, the opposition blamed it on massive
rigging and started a public campaign to oust Bhutto. Prime Minister Bhutto claimed in
public rhetoric that the American were behind the opposition movement and wanted to
punish his government Ior its nuclear weapons program and alignment with the Arabs. In
July 1977, the Army seized power in a coup Ior the third time in the country.

ia Years 1977 - 1988

AIter hanging the Iormer Prime Minister, Zia strengthened his hold on the government
and used a cover oI Islamic reIorms to give credibility to his government. Jimmy Carter`s
administration developed closer relations with India while Pakistan was more or less
isolated due to its new military dictators. On the nuclear Iront, General Zia continued the
previous policy oI Bhutto in acquiring and developing capabilities Ior nuclear weapons.
The chilling relations between the US and Pakistan took another a U-turn when the
Soviet Army entered neighboring AIghanistan in December 1979 to support the local
communist government. "Just Iour days aIter the Soviet invasion, On December 29,
1979, Jimmy Carter approved a broader covert action program that instructed the CIA to
provide military weapons and ammunition .Ior the AIghan anticommunist Iighters, who
soon became widely known as 'mujahideen.At Pakistan`s insistence, the CIA
Iunneled all aid through the Pakistani intelligence service ISI, which in turn handed over
supplies to AIghans."
With the Reagan Administration in the White House, the support Ior the covert war in
AIghanistan increased along with the value oI the Pakistani cooperation. Pakistan was
rewarded with a $3.2 billion aid package Ior the next six years. As the AIghan war
progressed more than three million reIugees entered Pakistan. During this period,
Pakistan was considered a valuable ally and the US ignored the increasing developments
on the nuclear Iront as well as the human rights abuses by the Zia regime. The success oI
the AIghan war eIIort was crucial Ior the American Administration as it was bled the
Soviet Government and placed huge pressure in terms oI resources. Fed up with the costs
oI the war and covert operations by the mujahideen, supported by the CIA and the
Pakistani ISI, by 1988, the Russians had had enough and were ready Ior a respectable
evacuation Irom AIghanistan. The useIulness oI Pakistan Ior the USA with respect to
AIghanistan, thus, ended when Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to a retreat in April 1988.
General Zia died in a mysterious plane crash months later in August 1988 and political
elections were held in Pakistan.
In 1979, a group oI Pakistani students burned the American embassy in Islamabad to the
ground killing two Americans.
In the 1980s, Pakistan agreed to pay $658 million Ior 28 F-16 Iighter jets Irom the United
States; however the American congress Iroze the deal citing objections to Pakistani
nuclear ambitions. Under the terms oI the American cancellation, they kept both the
money and the planes, leading to angry claims oI theIt by Pakistanis.
In 1979, Pakistani students, enraged by a radio report claiming that the United States had
bombed the Masjid al-Haram, Islam's holy site at Mecca, stormed the U.S. embassy in
Islamabad, and burned it to the ground. There actually had been a terrorist attack there,
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


but the U.S. was not involved. The diplomats survived by hiding in a reinIorced area,
though Marine Security Guard Steve Crowley and another American was killed in the
attack.
The event started as a small, peaceIul protest against U.S. policies in Cambodia, as well
as suspected U.S. involvement surrounding the military coup d'etat oI ZulIiqar Bhutto in
1977. The protesters shouted anti-American slogans. Although, at Iirst glance it seemed
to be a small protest outside the embassy`s walls, buses later started pulling up Iilled with
Iar-right Jamaat-i- Islami supporters in Iront oI the main gates. Hundreds oI people began
climbing over the walls and trying to pull them down using ropes. According to an
American investigation, aIter a bullet was Iired at the gate`s lock by one rioter ricocheted
and struck protesters, the protestors opened Iire believing that an American marine on the
rooI oI the embassy had Iired Iirst. Who actually Iired Iirst cannot be conIirmed one way
or another. Twenty-year-old Marine Stephen Crowley was struck by a bullet and
transported to the embassy`s secure communication vault along with the rest oI personnel
serving in the embassy. Locked behind steel-reinIorced doors the Americans waited Ior
help to come and rescue them Irom a smoke-Iilled building.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

The Soviet invasion oI AIghanistan in December 1979 highlighted the common interest
oI Pakistan and the United States in peace and stability in South Asia. In 1981, Pakistan
and the United States agreed on a $3.2 billion military and economic assistance program
aimed at helping Pakistan deal with the heightened threat to security in the region and its
economic development needs. With U.S. assistance in the largest covert operation in
history Pakistan armed and supplied anti-Soviet Iighters in AIghanistan, eventually
deIeating the Soviets, who
withdrew in 1988.

Unstable democratic governments 1988 - 1998

AIter the 1988 elections, Benazir Bhutto, the daughter oI Iormer Prime Minister Bhutto,
came into power. Until 1990, the $600 million military and economic aid that had started
aIter the AIghan War eIIort by the US had continued. However, every year, the US
president had to certiIy under the Pressler Amendment, enacted in 1984, that Pakistan did
not possess a nuclear device. "AIter October 1, 1990, passed without certiIication, the
$564 million economic and military aid program approved Ior Iiscal year 1991 was
Irozen. At the time, Pakistan was the third-highest recipient oI US aid; only Israel and
Egypt received more assistance"
At this point the main occupation oI the Pakistan government was to try to create a
Iriendly mujahideen regime in AIghanistan, continue to develop its nuclear and missile
program and support the militant insurgency in Kashmir. Since the US and Pakistani
interests had diverted at this point, with the Soviets retreating Irom AIghanistan and the
US involved in the Middle East, the Pakistanis Ielt isolated by their 'old Iriend and
'ally.
Domestic politics, once again, became unstable and Iour successive governments in
Pakistan were dissolved one aIter another in a matter oI 11 years with the Army, as
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


always, the main power broker among the political stalwarts. Benazir held the Prime
Minister`s oIIice twice Irom 1988-1990 and Irom 1993-1996. Her main opponent, Nawaz
ShariI, held oIIice Irom 1990-1993 and 1996-1999. Gross Iiscal mismanagement,
political instability and US sanctions created large Iiscal deIicits and the governments
borrowed heavily Irom international lenders. The Clinton Administration had a tilt
towards the more democratic Indian government during this time. The Pakistanis
contented that the Pressler Amendment was speciIic to Pakistan and the sanctions were
unjustiIied. Additional sanctions were placed aIter Pakistan acquired M11 missiles and
delivery systems technology Irom China which violated the MTCR regime. By 1996
Pakistan`s AIghan eIIorts were bringing some success and the ISI backed Taliban
government was established in AIghanistan.
The US administration initially welcome the prospects oI peace in the country but later
opposed the Taliban regime based on their extreme Iundamentalist views and gross
violations oI human rights. A new turn oI events unIolded in May 1998 when the new
Indian government tested several nuclear devices. The Clinton Administration put a lot oI
pressure on the Pakistani government to reIrain Irom tit Ior tat nuclear tests. However,
Pakistan government came under intense internal pressure and detonated their nuclear
devices two weeks later. Although a new nuclear deterrent had been established between
India and Pakistan, another wave oI international sanctions Iollowed Irom the
international community. This put Iurther pressure on the already weak political economy
oI Pakistan.
The US had a new interest in AIghanistan by mid 1998 aIter the terrorist attacks on US
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania which killed two hundred people and were carried on
by an organization belonging to Osama Bin Ladin, a Iormer Saudi national living in
AIghanistan. The US administration wanted Pakistan to use its inIluence on the Taliban
to make them handover the culprit over to the US. However, the Taliban reIused and new
animosity started in the region.
In early 1999, Pakistan had a spate oI diplomatic discussion to improve their relations
with India but by mid 1999, a limited war had erupted in Kargil between the two
countries which had been covertly engineered by the Pakistani Army. As India increased
pressure and an escalating war scenario emerged, the US intervened on the request oI
Pakistan and the armies retreated to their pre war positions. The main casualty in the war
turned out to the Pakistani Premier Nawaz ShariI who tried to oust the military
commander but a military executed a coup and the military came into power Ior the
Iourth time led by General MusharraI. The stage was set Ior a very tumultuous situation;
the 1990s was an era oI intense upheaval in Pakistan. Pakistan Iound itselI in a state oI
extremely high insecurity as tensions mounted with India and AIghanistan`s inIighting
continued. Pakistan`s alliance with the U.S was strained due to Iactors such as its support
Ior the Taliban and public distancing oI the Pakistani government Irom the U.S.

usharraf - 9/11 and beyond - partners in the fight against Terrorism

General MusharraI took power at a time when the economic situation oI the country was
in deep trouble. The rupee was sliding, Ioreign reserves had been depleted and rampant
corruption had messed up the inIrastructure oI the country. By year 2000, Pakistan aIter
more than 53 years oI independence was still struggling to Iind a stable political system
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


and an economic inIrastructure that would generate sustainable development and improve
the quality oI liIe Ior its people. From the United States perspective, Pakistan was moving
closer to a 'Iailed state case and its nuclear and missile programs were a constant
concern Ior policy makers in Washington. A Iailing economy could easily lead to another
coup backed by the Islamists and the country could Iall in Iundamentalist hands along
with its arsenal oI nuclear weapons. With this scenario in view, the US administration
more or less supported the MusharraI regime.
9/11 changed the nature oI US Pakistan relations once again. Terrorists supported by
Osam Bin Ladin`s organization had executed successIul attacks in New York and
Washington in September 2001. The US President George Bush asked the world to make
a clear choice to side with the US with the slogan 'you are with us or against us.
President MusharraI`s regime, which was previously a supporter and backer oI the
Taliban regime since its inception, made a U-turn and sided with the US in its war against
terrorism. Siding with the US, MusharraI betted that the decision would result in
improving Ioreign aid and support Irom World Bank and IMF on the one hand and US
support Ior Pakistan`s cause Ior Kashmir on the other.
AIter the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States oI America, Pakistan became a
key ally in the war on terror with the United States. However, US$5 billion earmarked to
train the Pakistani army in counter terrorism were instead spent on unrelated military
purposes. On November 6th, 2001, US President George W. Bush declared his policy:
"You are either with us or against us". President MusharraI later claimed that the U.S.
had made a so-called threat to bomb Pakistan "back to the Stone Age" aIter the
September 11 attacks, iI Pakistan reIused to aid and help America with its war on
terrorism. Pervez MusharraI acknowledges the payments in his book:
'We've captured 689 and handed over 369 to the United States. We've earned bounties
totaling millions oI dollars.
Former President oI Pakistan Pervez MusharraI
On 11th June, 2008, a US airstrike on the AIghan-Pakistani border killed 10 members oI
the paramilitary Frontier Corps. The Pakistani military condemned the airstrike as an act
oI aggression, souring the relations between the two countries. In the November 2008
Mumbai attacks, the United States inIormed Pakistan that it expected Iull cooperation in
the hunt Ior the plotters oI the attacks.
Pakistan helped the US capture several hundred operatives oI the Al- Qiada organization
and allowed the US to execute military operations Irom its land, air and sea bases. In
return Ior its cooperation, there has been some economic revival oI the Pakistani
economy. On the Kashmir Iront, however, not much progress was made since India had
projected Pakistan as a supporter oI terrorism in Kashmir itselI, a label vehemently
denied by the Pakistanis.

Gillani government- 2008 and onwards

Relations between Pakistan and the United States have been cooling recently aIter the
visit oI Pakistani President AsiI Ali Zardari to the United States oI America.
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson addressed senior bureaucrats at the
National Management College and emphasized that the United States will assist
Pakistan`s new democratic government in the areas oI development, stability, and
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


security. The United States Agency Ior International Development (USAID) and the
United Nations World Food Program, in Pakistan, oIIicially announced the signing oI an
agreement valued at $8.4 million to help ease Pakistan's Iood crisis.|6| With relations
between Pakistan and the United States cooling down, it was expected that Pakistan and
the United States could return to being allies again not only in the War on Terror but also
in other possible threats to regional and world peace. It was also hoped by the United
States that Pakistan under the administration oI AsiI Ali Zardari would only strengthen
relations between Pakistan and the United States.
The CIA believes Osama Bin Laden to be hiding in Pakistan. On September 14, 2009,
Iormer president oI Pakistan, Pervez MusharraI, admitted that US Foreign Aid to
Pakistan (which is substantial) was diverted by the country Irom its original
purpose to Iighting the Taliban, to prepare Ior war against neighboring India. The United
States government has responded by stating that they will take these allegations seriously.

ilitary pacts and suspension of aid

There have been six instances during the last 63 years since 1954, when the US military
aid to Pakistan was suspended by Washington under one pretext or the other, though
strings were attached nearly every other time Islamabad Iound Iunding parked under this
head in its coIIers.
Though the US was one oI the Iirst countries to recognize Pakistan as an independent
state in 1947, it took Washington some seven years to dish out its Iirst military assistance
to Islamabad during the Dwight Eisenhower regime. On May 19, 1954, the Mutual
DeIence Assistance Agreement` between the two nations was inked in Karachi.
This pact was helped vastly by the reIusal oI Pakistan`s Iirst Prime Minister Liaquat Ali
Khan to visit Moscow in 1950. Liaquat Ali Khan had toured the US instead to the sheer
delight oI the Americans, resulting in the arrival oI nearly $700 million military aid to
Pakistan between 1954 and 1964. The military aid was dished out in addition to the $2.5
billion given to Pakistan as economic aid.
Hence, iI the widely-expected curbs are imposed on the Iorthcoming $680 million US
military aid to Islamabad, this would not be anything new Ior the Pakistan Army
equipped today with not Iewer than 66 InIantry Brigades, 15 Armored Brigades, 30
Artillery Brigades, eight Air DeIense Brigades and 17 Army Aviation Squadrons
organized under 19 Division Headquarters and 9 Corps Headquarters, making it the
world`s 8th largest armed Iorce.

Here Iollows the chronology oI six US military aid suspensions:

1) The Iirst time when the US suspended its military aid to Pakistan was during the 1965
Pak-India War. Even though the United States suspended military assistance to both the
neighbors at daggers drawn with each other, the suspension oI aid aIIected Pakistan much
more adversely. Gradually, relations improved and arms sales to Pakistan were renewed
in 1975. It is noteworthy that between 1954 and 1965, Pakistan had managed to receive
$50 million in military grants, $19 million in deIense support assistance and $5 million in
cash or commercial purchases.
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY



2) During the 1971 Pakistan-India War, the US again suspended its military aid to
Pakistan, the second time in just six years. In 1972, US President Nixon visited China Ior
the Iirst time, marking the beginning oI a process oI normalization oI the estranged Sino-
American relations. Since the historic visit was Iacilitated by Pakistan, the US resumed
limited Iinancial aid to Pakistan as a reward.`

3) In April 1979, the United States cut oII its military assistance to Pakistan, except Iood
assistance, as required under the Symington Amendment. This time the suspension
resulted due to Washington`s concerns about Pakistan`s nuclear program. It is pertinent
to note that during this period, Pakistan had managed to construct a uranium enrichment
Iacility. In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded AIghanistan. The US oIIered $400
million worth oI military aid, which was however rejected by Pakistan as inadequate. In
1981, the US again oIIered a package oI military aid worth $1.5 billion, which was
accepted. During the Iive years that Iollowed aIter the inIlux oI this aid, the US provided
40 F-16 Iighters, 100 M-48 tanks, 64M-109 155 mm SP howitzers, 40 M-110 203mm SP
howitzers, 75 towed howitzers and 1,005TOW anti-tank missile system, all oI which
enhanced Pakistan`s deIense capability substantially.
The aid rose Irom around $60 million in economic and development assistance in 1979 to
more than $600 million a year in the mid-1980s. In total, the United States gave $2.19
billion in military assistance Irom 1980 till 1990. The military aid was in addition to the
$3.1 billion economic assistance Ior Pakistan.

4) As soon as the Soviets withdrew Irom AIghanistan in 1990, US military aid was again
suspended under the provisions oI the Pressler Amendment. The US imposed curbs on all
economic and military aid to Pakistan. The Larry Pressler-proposed Amendment required
the then US president to certiIy to the Congress that Pakistan did not possess nuclear
weapons. However, in 1995; the Brown Amendment authorized a one-time delivery oI
US military equipment worth $368 million. However, no Iewer than 28 F-16 aircraIt
costing $658 million were not delivered to Pakistan, despite the Iact that Islamabad had
paid Ior them well in advance.

5) The Pak-US relations underwent a severe blow with Pakistan`s nuclear tests and the
ensuing sanctions in 1998. A presidential visit scheduled Ior the Iirst quarter oI 1998 was
postponed and, under the Glenn Amendment, sanctions restricted the provision oI credits,
military sales, economic assistance and loans to Pakistan.

6) The ouster oI premier Nawaz ShariI in 1999 in a military coup led by General Pervez
MusharraI gave the US government another reason to invoke Iresh sanctions under
Section 508 oI the Foreign Appropriations Act, which included restrictions on Ioreign
military Iinancing and economic assistance. The assistance was thus restricted to reIugee
and counter-narcotics assistance only. Aid to Pakistan dropped dramatically Irom 1991 to
2000 to a paltry $429 million in economic Iunding and $5.2 million in military assistance.
Pakistan's partnership in the Baghdad Pact, CENTO and SEATO strengthened relations
between the two nations. At the time, its relationship with the U.S. was so close and
Iriendly that it was called the United States' "most-allied ally" in Asia. The U.S.
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


suspension oI military assistance during the 1965 Pakistan-India war generated a
widespread Ieeling in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally. Even though
the United States suspended military assistance to both countries involved in the conIlict,
the suspension oI aid aIIected Pakistan much more severely. Gradually, relations
improved and arms sales were renewed in 1975. Then, in April 1979, the United States
cut oII economic assistance to Pakistan, except Iood assistance, as required under the
Symington Amendment to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act oI 1961, due to concerns
about Pakistan's nuclear program.

Nuclear weapons

Recognizing national security concerns and accepting Pakistan's assurances that it did not
intend to construct a nuclear weapon, Congress waived restrictions (Symington
Amendment) on military assistance to Pakistan. In March 1986, the two countries agreed
on a second multi-year (FY 198893) $4-billion economic development and security
assistance program. On October 1, 1990, however, the United States suspended all
military assistance and new economic aid to
Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, which required that the President certiIy
annually that Pakistan "does not possess a nuclear explosive device."
India's decision to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998 and Pakistan's matching response
set back U.S. relations in the region, which had seen renewed U.S. Government interest
during the second Clinton Administration. A presidential visit scheduled Ior the Iirst
quarter oI 1998 was postponed and, under the Glenn Amendment, sanctions restricted the
provision oI credits, military sales, economic assistance, and loans to the government. An
intensive dialogue on nuclear
nonproliIeration and security issues between Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad and
Deputy Secretary Talbott was initiated, with discussions Iocusing on CTBT signature and
ratiIication, FMCT negotiations, export controls, and a nuclear restraint regime. The
October 1999 overthrow oI the democratically elected ShariI government triggered an
additional layer oI sanctions under Section 508 oI the Foreign Appropriations Act which
include restrictions on Ioreign military Iinancing and economic assistance. U.S.
Government assistance to Pakistan was limited mainly to reIugee and counter-narcotics
assistance.

Alliance with the United States

Prior to 9/11, Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia, was a key supporter oI the Taliban in
AIghanistan, as part oI their "strategic depth" objective vis-a-vis India, and to try to bring
stability to AIghanistan aIter years oI civil war Iollowing the Soviet withdrawal. The
Taliban, being primarily Sunni and Pushtun, are oI the same ethnic origin as Pakistanis
on the other side oI the AIghan border and were natural allies.
AIter 9/11, Pakistan, led by military dictator General Pervez MusharraI, reversed course
under pressure Irom the United States and joined the "War on Terror" as a US ally.
Having Iailed to convince the Taliban to hand over bin Laden and other members oI Al
Qaeda, Pakistan provided the U.S. a number oI military airports and bases Ior its attack
on AIghanistan, along with other logistical support. Since 2001, Pakistan has arrested
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


over Iive hundred Al-Qaeda members and handed them over to the United States; senior
U.S. oIIicers have been lavish in their praise oI Pakistani eIIorts in public while
expressing their concern that not enough was being done in private. However, General
MusharraI was strongly supported by the Bush administration a common theme
throughout Pakistan's relations with the US has been US support oI military dictators to
the detriment oI democracy in Pakistan.
In return Ior their support, Pakistan had sanctions liIted and has received some 10 billion
dollars in US aid since 2001, primarily military. In June 2004, President Bush designated
Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally, making it eligible, among other things, to purchase
advanced American military technology.
Pakistan has lost thousands oI lives since joining the US' war on terror in the Iorm oI both
soldiers and civilians, and is currently going through a critical period. Suicide bombs are
now commonplace in Pakistan, whereas they were unheard oI prior to 9/11. The Taliban
have been resurgent in recent years in both AIghanistan and Pakistan. Hundreds oI
thousands oI reIugees have been created internally in Pakistan, as they have been Iorced
to Ilee their homes as a result oI Iighting between Pakistani Iorces and the Taliban in the
regions bordering AIghanistan and
Iurther in Swat. In addition, the economy is in an extremely Iragile position.
A key campaign argument oI President Obama's was that the US had made the mistake oI
'putting all our eggs in one basket" in the Iorm oI General MusharraI. MusharraI was
eventually Iorced out oI oIIice under the threat oI impeachment, aIter years oI political
protests by lawyers, civilians and other political parties in Pakistan. With President
Obama coming into oIIice, the US is expected to triple non-military aid to Pakistan to 1.5
billion per year over 10 years, and to tie military aid to progress in the Iight against
militants. The purpose oI the aid is to help strengthen the relatively new democratic
government led by President Zardari and to help strengthen civil institutions and the
general economy in Pakistan, and to put in place an aid program that is broader in scope
than just supporting Pakistan's military.
The United States and Pakistan have experienced several military conIrontations on
the Durand Line. These skirmishes took place between American Iorces deployed
in AIghanistan, and Pakistani troops guarding the border. These incidents ended and
reportedly caused no casualties.
Meanwhile both the countries Iace many complexities in their spiky type oI relations
which is indicated also in oIIicial statements. Latest development is the statement
oI Admiral Mike Mullen who blamed that Pakistani spy agency ISI has links with
Haqqani Network; a dangerous group belongs to AIghan Taliban.
Present U.S.-Pakistan relations are a case study on the diIIiculties oI diplomacy and
policy making in a multi-polar world. The geopolitical signiIicance oI Pakistan in world
aIIairs attracts attention Irom both India and China, making unilateral action impossible
Irom the U.S. All the while, Pakistan remains a key Iactor Ior U.S. success in
AIghanistan. The two countries have attempted to build a strategic partnership since
2009, but there remains a signiIicant trust deIicit which continues to hinder successIul
cooperation in combating common threats. Despite recent setbacks, both Pakistan and the
U.S. continue to seek a productive relationship to deIeat terrorist organizations.
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


As on 8 February 2011, U.S. administration is reported to suspend high level contacts
with Pakistan and may also suspend economical aid. All this happened when Raymond
Davis, an alleged private security contractor, was on an American diplomatic mission in
Pakistan shot dead two Pakistani locals last month in what he said was in selI-deIense
aIter they attempted to rob him. Pakistan acted tough on him despite U.S. demands that
he be Ireed because he enjoys diplomatic immunity.
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson addressed senior bureaucrats at the
National Management College and emphasized that the United States will assist
Pakistan`s new democratic government in the areas oI development, stability, and
security. The United States Agency Ior International Development (USAID) and
the United Nations World Food Program, in Pakistan, oIIicially announced the signing oI
an agreement valued at $8.4 million to help ease Pakistan's crisis.
The CIA had long suspected Osama Bin Laden oI hiding in Pakistan. India and U.S. have
time to time accused Pakistan oI giving saIe-haven to the Taliban. However, Pakistan has
denied these accusations repeatedly.
On 14 September 2009, Iormer President oI Pakistan, Pervez MusharraI, admitted that
U.S. Foreign Aid to Pakistan was diverted by the country Irom its original purpose to
Iighting the Taliban, to prepare Ior war against neighboring India. The United States
government has responded by stating that they will take these allegations
seriously. However Pervez MusharraI also said '"Wherever there is a threat to Pakistan,
we will use it |equipment provided by the U.S.| there. II the threat comes Irom al-Qaeda
or Taliban, it will be used there. II the threat comes Irom India, we will most surely use it
there".
In late 2009, Hillary Clinton made a speech in Pakistan about the war against the
militants where she said "we commend the Pakistani military Ior their courageous Iight,
and we commit to stand shoulder to shoulder with the Pakistani people in your Iight Ior
peace and security."
On December 1, 2009, President Barack Obama in a speech on a policy about Pakistan
said "In the past, we too oIten deIined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those
days are over.... The Pakistani people must know America will remain a strong supporter
oI Pakistan`s security and prosperity long aIter the guns have Iallen silent, so that the
great potential oI its people can be unleashed."
In the aItermath oI the thwarted bombing attempt on a Northwest Airlines Ilight, the U.S.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has issued a new set oI screening
guidelines that includes pat-downs Ior passengers Irom countries oI interest, which
includes Pakistan. In a sign oI widening Iissures between the two allies, Pakistan on
January 21 declined a request by the United States to launch new oIIensives on militants
in 2010. Pakistan say it "can't launch any new oIIensives against militants Ior six months
to a year because it wants to 'stabilize' previous gains made. However the U.S. praises
Pakistan's military eIIort against the militants. Furthermore Pakistan president, in meeting
with the U.S. delegation, had said Pakistan "had suIIered a... loss oI over 35 billion
dollars during the last eight years as a result oI the Iight against militancy." But the
President also said Ior "greater Pak-U.S. cooperation".
In October 2009, the U.S. Congress approved $7.5 billion oI non-military aid to Pakistan
over the next Iive years. In February 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama sought to
increase Iunds to Pakistan to "promote economic and political stability in strategically
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


important regions where the United States has special security interests". Obama also
sought $3.1 billion aid Ior Pakistan to deIeat Al Qaeda Ior 2010.
In February 2010, Anne W. Patterson (U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan) said that the United
States is committed to partnership with Pakistan and Iurther said 'Making this
commitment to Pakistan while the U.S. is still recovering Irom the eIIects oI the global
recession reIlects the strength oI our vision. Yet we have made this commitment, because
we see the success oI Pakistan, its economy, its civil society and its democratic
institutions as important Ior ourselves, Ior this region and Ior the world.
Between 2002 and 2010, Pakistan received approximately 18 billion in military and
economic aid Irom the United States. In February 2010, the Obama administration
requested an additional 3 billion in aid, Ior a total oI 20.7 billion.
In mid February, aIter the capture oI Taliban No.2 leader Abdul Ghani Baradar in
Pakistan the White House 'hails capture oI Taliban leader'. Furthermore White House
Press Secretary Robert Gibbs said that this is a "big success Ior our mutual eIIorts
(Pakistan and United States) in the region" and He praised Pakistan Ior the capture,
saying it is a sign oI increased cooperation with the U.S. in the terror Iight. Furthermore
Capt. John Kirby, spokesman Ior Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman oI the Joint ChieIs oI
StaII, has said 'We also strongly support Pakistani eIIorts to secure the border region,
Kirby added, noting that Pakistan has lost soldiers in that eIIort. Mullen, (President
Barack Obama's senior military adviser) has made strengthening "U.S. military
relationship with Pakistan a top priority". The U.S. and Pakistan have a robust working
relationship that serves the mutual interests oI our people,' Kirby said. "We continue to
build a long-term partnership that strengthens our common security and prosperity."
In March, Richard Holbrooke U.S. special envoy to Pakistan had said U.S.-Pakistani
relations have seen 'signiIicant improvement' under Obama. Furthermore he also said "No
government on earth has received more high-level attention" than Pakistan.
In December 2009, President Obama stated "In the past, we too oIten deIined our
relationship with Pakistan narrowly, those days are over. Moving Iorward, we are
committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a Ioundation oI mutual interests,
mutual respect and mutual trust." and stated that the two countries 'share a common
enemy' in combating Islamic extremism.
The Raymond Davis aIIair substantially deteriorated Pakistan-U.S. relations in early
2011. The attack on U.S. Embassy and at NATO headquarters in Kabul was blamed on
the Haqqani network operating under Pakistan`s spy agency, the ISI. Pakistan reacted by
recalling its Iinance minister who was on a visit to the U.N. Pakistan also tried to
strengthen the relationship with China and Saudi Arabia to counter the U.S threat. The
Chinese government advised Pakistan against any such commitment that may put China's
relationship with U.S and India in jeopardy. U.S reissued the warning urging Pakistan to
act against the Haqqani network or the U.S will take on the threat unilaterally. Islamic
groups in Pakistan issued a Iatwa proclaiming Jihad against the U.S and claimed that U.S
should not be called a Superpower since the title belonged to Allah. This was Iollowed by
Pakistan threatening the U.S with retaliation, iI the U.S went ahead with unilateral action
against the Haqqani network.



PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


The Death of Osama bin Laden

Osama bin Laden, then head oI the militant group Al-Qaeda, was killed in Pakistan on
May 2, 2011, shortly aIter 1 a.m. local time by a United States special Iorces military
unit. The operation, code-named Operation Neptune Spear, was ordered by United States
President Barack Obama and carried out in a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
operation by a team oI United States Navy SEALs Irom the United States Naval Special
WarIare Development Group (also known as DEVGRU or inIormally by its Iormer
name, SEAL Team Six) oI the Joint Special Operations Command, with support Irom
CIA operatives on the ground. The raid on bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad,
Pakistan was launched Irom AIghanistan. AIter the raid, U.S. Iorces took bin Laden's
body to AIghanistan Ior identiIication, then buried it at sea within 24 hours oI his death.
Al-Qaeda conIirmed the death on May 6 with posts made on militant websites, vowing to
avenge the killing. Bin Laden's killing was generally Iavorably received by U.S. public
opinion; was welcomed by the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and a large
number oI governments; but was condemned by some, including Fidel Castro oI
Cuba| and Ismail Haniyeh, the head oI the Hamas administration oI the Gaza Strip. Legal
and ethical aspects oI the killing, such as his not being taken alive despite being unarmed,
were questioned by others, including Amnesty International.
According to Obama administration oIIicials, U.S. oIIicials did not share inIormation
about the raid with the government oI Pakistan until it was over. Chairman oI the Joint
ChieIs oI StaII Michael Mullen called Pakistan's army chieI AshIaq Parvez Kayani at
about 3 a.m. local time to inIorm him oI the Abbottabad Operation.
According to the Pakistani Ioreign ministry, the operation was conducted entirely by the
U.S. Iorces. Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) oIIicials said they were also present
at what they called a joint operation; President AsiI Ali Zardari Ilatly denied
this. Pakistan's Ioreign secretary Salman Bashir later conIirmed that Pakistani military
had scrambled F-16s aIter they became aware oI the attack but that they reached the
compound aIter American helicopters had leIt.
On October 21, US Secretary oI State Hillary Clinton-led heavy delegation concluded its
two-day visit to Pakistan. Probably, the visit was aimed at deIusing the prevailing and
increasing tension between the two capitals. During this visit Director oI CIA ChieI,
David Petraeus and the newly appointed military chieI, General Martin Dempsey
accompanied Clinton. The delegation held meetings with the President, the Prime
Minister, Foreign Minister and Pakistan`s military chieI and ISI ChieI. US Secretary also
talked to senior media anchors, students and people belonging to diIIerent segments oI
civil society. The relations between the two Irontline allies oI war on terror got strained
aIter the conduct oI unilateral action against OBL. Later on, Washington alleged
Pakistani spy agency (ISI) oI supporting Taliban against US-led ISAF Iorces and
launching attack on US embassy and injuring 77 US troops in AIghanistan. American top
levels also threatened that ground operations would be launched against Haqqani network
in Pakistani area in case Islamabad military Iailed to take action against the network. The
political leadership, irrespective oI diIIerences, displayed solidarity against US threat and
in an 'All Parties ConIerence sent a clear message through a unanimous statement,
rejecting US allegations leveled against vital organs, and allowing armed Iorces to
respond to any US misadventure against Pakistan with their Iull strength. US Secretary oI
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


State Hillary Clinton has earlier visited Islamabad on May 27, 2011, under a much
stressed environment and tried to take out the animosity and bridge the gap but despite
her eIIorts trust deIicit could not be removed between two Irontline allies. However, this
time Pakistan`s strong stand not to accept any dictation over Waziristan operation and
reluctance in taking any action against Haqqani network Iorced Americans to back out oI
their propagated stance over the issue. In this connection Hillary Clinton acknowledged
categorically: (i) US has no evidence oI involvement oI ISI in attack on US Embassy, (ii)
US will never launch any ground operation in North Waziristan or on Pakistani soil, (ii)
acknowledged the statement oI ChieI oI Army StaII Gen AshIaq Parvez Kayani in which
he asserted on October 20, 2011, that Pakistan is a country`s that has nuclear weapon
capability and the United States would think '10 times beIore launching a unilateral
attack on Pakistan, (iv) terrorists heavens are located on both sides oI the boundaries,(v)
CIA was also having links with Haqqani network and lastly Pakistan and AIghanistan
stability is essential Ior the regional and global peace. Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani
Khar told a joint press conIerence with the US Secretary oI State that Pakistan is a
sovereign state and any operation in any part oI the country will be carried out aIter
seeking approval Irom the parliament. Pakistan also demanded that US should ask
AIghan government to stop Moulvi Fazal Ullah and other terrorists oI launching attacks
on Pakistani troops and innocent people. In Iact US should know that Pakistani people
have now become very allergic oI listening 'Do more music. During Clinton visit
serious talks converted into big laugh when in the 'Town hall meeting oI Islamabad, a
Pakistani lady told Clinton that the US acted like Pakistan`s mother-in-law. According to
a report a lady Irom Khyber Pakhtunkhwa said, 'We are trying to please you, and every
time you come and visit us you have a new idea and tell us, You are not doing enough
and need to work harder, she said, triggering laughter and applause. I think Clinton just
like an experienced and seasonal diplomat must have read the underline message oI the
lady, which is actually the mindset oI our whole nation regarding America. Thus, now it
is US turn to 'Do more while announcing early schedule oI departure Irom this region,
restoring true democracy in AIghanistan, real stake holders oI AIghan issue be taken into
conIidence, policy oI reconciliation be introduced instead oI using military option.
Moreover, Indian role in AIghanistan needs to be restricted and checked since Pakistan
intelligentsia has conIirmed news that Mossad, RAW and CIA are using AIghan soil Ior
launching clandestine operations in Balochistan, Karachi and rest oI Pakistan. A major
dilemma Ior the US in AIghanistan is to reconcile the conIlicting security interests oI
India and Pakistan. AIghanistan has become a major source oI Iriction because Indian
and Pakistani diIIerences over Pakistan`s western neighbor had never been given due
consideration in any triangular strategic talks series between US, AIghanistan and
Pakistan. The two countries have long competed Ior inIluence in AIghanistan and
Pakistan is deeply suspicious oI a rise in India`s presence aIter the Iall oI the Taliban in
2001. Pakistan has the evidence that India is using AIghanistan as her base to create
problems inside Pakistan, including backing separatists in Balochistan province. In this
connection, AIghanistan President Hamid Karzai is providing shelters to the Indian and
Balochi terrorists. US policy makers, iI serious in establishing peace, should modiIy their
AI-Pak policy in consultation with real stake holders. She must also know that Karazi is
not serious in establishing peace in AIghanistan. The assassination oI Burhanuddin
Rabbani, the head oI AIghanistan`s High Peace Council who was killed on September 20,
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY


2011, in a suicide attack, once again became big question mark to the peace believers.
His murder was very suspicious since it is pointing Iigures towards Presidential Palace oI
Kabul. In this regard President Karzai hurriedly leveled baseless allegations against
Pakistani intelligence agencies and Haqqani network. President Karzai`s statement
showed his Irustration. In Iact, it is an established Iact that any peaceIul solution oI
AIghanistan will end up the 'Karazi rule and Indian role in AIghanistan. ThereIore, the
eIIorts oI Rabbani`s peace solution brought India and Karazi on same Iooting which
probably Iorced RAW and local ruling elite to make a plan to eliminate Rabbani.
Reportedly, AIghan president under the garb oI dialogue process has called Rabbani to be
in Kabul on the particular date, time and place. II US are interested in the stability oI
AIghanistan, then there is a need to transIer the powers to the actual representatives oI
AIghanistan and other regional stakeholders. She must also realize that supporting India
and giving her edge over Pakistan is also a major hindrance in restoring true and strategic
relationship with Islamabad. Now there is a need to evolve some kind oI mechanism that
can put brakes on continuously worsening relations between US and Pakistan. In this
connection US Ioreign oIIice should control her political elite like Senate Armed Services
Chairman Carl Levin, chieI oI intelligence agency and military oIIicials oI alleging and
Iomenting negative propaganda against Pakistan and its institutions like ISI and Armed
Iorces. The people, like Levin should know that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear power
and is not an American state. He must know that Pakistan has suIIered major losses in
GWOT, as its 140,000 troops are engaged in war against terrorists, more than 4,000
soldiers including 63 intelligence personnel have been martyred and more than 35,000
civilian have become victim to the Iorced war in addition to the displacement oI 3.44
million people. Concluding, I would like to say that Hillary Clinton should play a positive
role in establishing good relations between Pakistan and US as aIter all she has been
awarded the title oI 'mother-in-law oI Pakistan.
Allegations against Pakistan
Numerous allegations were made that the government oI Pakistan had shielded bin
Laden. Critics cited the very close proximity oI bin Laden's heavily IortiIied compound
to the Pakistan Military Academy, that the U.S. chose to not notiIy Pakistani authorities
beIore the operation, and the double standards oI Pakistan regarding the perpetrators oI
the 2008 Mumbai attacks. U.S. government Iiles, leaked by Wiki leaks, disclosed that
American diplomats had been told that Pakistani security services were tipping oII bin
Laden every time U.S. Iorces approached. Pakistan`s ISI, also helped smuggle al-Qaeda
militants into AIghanistan to Iight NATO troops. According to the leaked Iiles, in
December 2009, the government oI Tajikistan had also told U.S. oIIicials that many in
Pakistan were aware oI bin Laden's whereabouts.
CIA chieI Leon Panetta said the CIA had ruled out involving Pakistan in the operation,
because it Ieared that "any eIIort to work with the Pakistanis could jeopardize the
mission. They might alert the targets." However, Secretary oI State Hillary Rodham
Clinton stated that "cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the
compound in which he was hiding". Obama echoed her sentiments. John O. Brennan,
Obama's chieI counterterrorism advisor, said that it was inconceivable that bin Laden did
not have support Irom within Pakistan. He Iurther stated: "People have been reIerring to
this as hiding in plain sight. We are looking at how he was able to hide out there Ior so
long."
PAKISTAN NATIUNAL ASSMEBLY




Situation Today

Drone attacks and cross border violations; missing persons; worsening security situation
in the country on account oI the war on terror`; constant demands Irom Pakistan to
accelerate military action against the militants have all marred the Pak-US relations. A
huge percentage oI the country`s population, including some important political
stakeholders, views this association with the US as a liability rather than an alliance.
More speciIically, incidents such as the death oI Osama bin Laden and accusations
against the Pakistani intelligence and security agencies are all taken as blatant attack on
the country`s sovereignty. There is thus, an urgent need to work on the country`s Ioreign
policy in order to correct the lop-sided stand that is currently being taken up.

Through the course oI the debate, the delegates need to Iocus on the Iollowing:

1) IdentiIy and discuss at length the current nature and the Iuture oI the Pak US
relations.
2) Determine the Iactors that strain the Pak US relations and decide upon the
parameters oI the association Ior the Iuture.
3) Debate upon key issues that overshadow the alliance, such as drone attacks,
military aid, and missing persons etc. and devise a strategy to counter them.
4) Take into consideration the aspirations oI the public and the Iact that the country`s
sovereignty is at stake on account oI the war on terror, while devising a Iuture
strategy.
5) Decide upon drawing reasonable lines where necessary, while cooperating with
the US in combating the menace oI terrorism.