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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-4327 December 15, 1950 PRICE STABILIZATION CORPORATION, PHILIPPINE WHEAT FLOUR BOARD, MANUEL S. RUSTIA, ERNESTO Y. SIBAL, and OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE FLOUR INSTITUTE, INC., petitioners, vs. OSCAR CASTELO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch A, and CHINESE FLOUR IMPORTERS ASSOCIATION, MANILA, PHILIPPINES, respondents. Hilarion U. Jarencio for the petitioners Price Stabilization Corporation and Philippine Wheat Flour Board. Manuel O. Chan for other petitioners. FERIA, J.: Petition for certiorari denied. Lower court had jurisdiction to issue the special order of execution complained of. Section 2 Rule 39 provides that before the expiration of the time appeal, execution may issue, at the discretion of court, on motion of the prevailing party but before the perfection of the appeal. The parties were notified of the decision on the 13th and 14th of November, and the time within which to appeal is 15 days from notice of judgment in a mandamus case (sec. 17, Rule 41). The lower court issued, on November 22, 1950, a special order of execution of the judgment after hearing both parties under said section 2, Rule 39. Without necessity of discussing whether the approval or order of transmittal by the lower court of the original record to the Supreme Court, which may be consideration as equivalent to the approval of a Record on Appeal in an ordinary civil action, is necessary for the perfection of the appeal in certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto, it is obvious that the mere filing of the notice of appeal and appeal bond is not sufficient, because the appeal bond must be approved by the court as expressly required by section 5 and 9 of Rule 41, the approval thereof being one of the requisites for the perfection of an appeal. In case of cash bond, mere deposit of the amount of sixty pesos (P60) with the clerk of the court is not sufficient. Notice of such deposit must be served upon the adverse party, and the approval of the court is required, not only to inform the court that the deposit was at date within the period fixed by law, but to inform and enable the adverse party to object to the amount of the bond so deposited, in order that the court may decide whether to approve the bond or fix different amount. Section 5 of Rule 41, provides that "the appeal bond shall be in the amount of P60 unless the court shall fix a different amount or unless a supersedeas bond is filled. The appeal bond shall be approved by the court, and is conditioned for the payment of costs which the appellate court may award against the appellant." For instance, if the appeal is clearly without merit,

and the appellate court may probably impose triple costs upon the appellant, The lower court may require a higher amount of appeal bond. And section 9, Rule 41, in consonance with the above quoted provision of section 5, provides that "upon the filling of the notice appeal and the approval of the appeal bond and the record on appeal, the appeal is deemed perfected and trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, and to approve compromises offered by the parties prior to the transmittal of the record on appellate court." To hold that, present case, the mere filing of the notice of appeal, and the filing or deposit of cash bond with the clerk of court has automatically deprived the trial court of its jurisdiction over this case, would be to practically nullify the discretionary power granted said court by section 2, Rule 39, to order, upon good reasons the execution of its judgement before the expiration of the time to appeal; because in all cases the judgment debtor may, on the very day the judgment is rendered or notified to him, file of appeal and deposit of P60 as cash bond with the clerk of court. It is true that in the minute resolution on the motion for reconsideration filed in Lopez vs. Lopez, et al. (77 Phil., 133), it was held that "the filing of cash bond on time in the amount required by the court requires no express approval of cash bond was not in issue in the motion for reconsideration in that case, for one of the premises of said minute resolution was: "taking into consideration that the second ground alleged in the motion to dismiss dated June 11, 1946, filed in the court below, was failure to file appeal bond, and not failure to have the appeal bond already filed approved alleged in the motion to dismiss filed with his court." Besides said resolution is not applicable to the present case because here the court did not require the appellant to put up a cash bond of sixty pesos, the cash bond having been deposited by the appellant without notifying the adverse party thereof and submitted it to the court for approval. It is common sense that if that the court would have required that the amount of sixty pesos deposited by the appellant as appeal bond as expressly stated in said resolution, and that amount is deposited, no express approval thereof is necessary because the court can not disapprove what thereof what is done in the compliance with its own order. There is absolutely no previous ruling of this court in support of the dissenters' theory, which obviously incorrect. It can not be argued, in support of dissenters contention, that "there is nothing in the filing of a cash bond that may prevent the appellee form demanding and the court from requiring a greater amount of bond for such discretion is expressly vested in the court by Rules." Because if an appeal cash bond is deemed filed, and court loses its jurisdiction over the cases according to the dissenters' theory, form the time it is deposited with the clerk of the court without necessity of notifying the adverse party thereof and submitting it to the court of approval, the adverse party would have no opportunity to object to the appeal cash bond and the court to demand a greater amount. No, before the filing or deposit of the appeal bond, because

the adverse party and the court could not tell beforehand whether or not it will be filed or deposited; no, at the very time of its being filed or deposited, for not being notified or informed thereof they were not supposed to know anything about it; and so after it has been filed or deposited since the court had already lost its jurisdiction over the case, and therefore neither the adverse party could object to the cash bond to the cash bond nor the lower court demand the increase of the amount thereof. And if the dissenters means to hold that after the filing or deposit of the appeal bond the court had still jurisdiction to order the increase of the amount thereof, they have to admit that lower court had also still jurisdiction to issue the special order of execution on November 22, nine (9) days (not 20) after the petitioners were notified of the judgment on November 13 and 14 as notified of the judgment on November 13 and 14 as above-stated, contrary to the dissenters' theory. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Jugo., concur. MORAN, C.J., dissenting. In the instant mandamus case an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance has been perfected by filing a notice of appeal and depositing P60 as cash bond. A cash appeal bond needs no approval of the court because, as we have held in a reasoned resolution, "only a personal itself or the sureties may not be sufficient, while the filling of cash bond on time in the amount required by the court requires no express approval, because it cannot be disapproved." (Lopez vs. Lopez et al., 77 Phil., 133.) It is upon the strength of this ruling that this dissent is predicated with a view to procuring stability in our jurisprudence. This ruling is now being brushed aside upon the allegation that it in an obiter dictum when in the fact it was one of the reason given by this court for denying the motion for reconsideration presented in the case. And it is the amount of the cash bond has been fixed by the court, a limitation that has no foundation in logic. There is no difference between a cash bond in an amount required by the court and a bond in an amount fixed by the Rules in so far as the necessity for judicial approval is concerned, for in both cases the money is deposited in court and therefore no question of sufficiency or insufficiency of document or sureties is involved.lawphil.net It is said that approval is necessary when the cash bond is in the Rules, so that the court may exercise its discretion in requiring a greater amount of bond under Rule 41, section 5. But there is nothing in the filing of a cash bond that may prevent the appellee from claiming and the court from requiring a greater amount of bond, for such discretion is expressly vested in the court by the Rules. In other words, a cash bond in the amount fixed by the Rules needs no judicial approval but is always subject to the discretion of the court of the court of requiring a greater amount of bond. In the instant case, no such requirement has never been made by the court. No objection has ever been made to sufficiency of the bond. In fact the bond has never been disapproved. And it is certainly hard to maintain that the court of first instance has still jurisdiction over the case.

The argument that approval is necessary so that the court may determine whether or not the bond has been filed on time is applicable to both cash bond in an amount fixed by the Rules and cash bond in an amount fixed by the court, and if judicial approval is unnecessary in the second case, as the majority maintains, there is no reason why judicial approval is necessary in the first. The truth, however is that the power to approve or disapprove directed to the sufficiency or insufficiency of a bond must be excluded from the record in the same way that a pleading which is filed out of time must be stricken from the record regardless of its sufficiency or insufficiency. It is true that Rule 41, section 5 provides that "appeal bond shall be approved by the court." But in a unanimous ruling by this court, an exception has been made of cash bonds upon grounds which the legal profession may believe to have on accepted by the court only after mature deliberation. This unanimous ruling must have been noted by inferior courts and practitioners, and it cannot easily be disregarded now by this court. In our opinion, the respondent should be required to answer and the writ of preliminary injunction issued. No writ of execution may be issued by the lower court as it has lost jurisdiction. Paras, Reyes, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 81374 April 30, 1991 JOSE R. BAUTISTA, SEVERINO GABUYO and NORTH EASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioners vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, Department of Labor and Employment, Manila, HON. REGIONAL DIRECTOR, Regional Office No. 2, Department of Labor and Employment, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, DAVID R. MEDINA, in his capacity as Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Isabela, RODEO BAUTISTA, DOMINGO CABAUATAN, LINO MALENAB, HERNANDO NATIVIDAD and ALFREDO JIMENEZ, Respondents. CRUZ, J.: It has not escaped the attention of the Court that when a party runs out of arguments, or never had any to begin with, it usually pleads a denial of due process. The plea may impress at first glance, what with all its plaintive invocation of the Bill of Rights, but it does not often succeed upon closer examination. The petition at bar is a case in point.
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This dispute arose on December 15, 1984, when the herein private respondents filed a complaint against Northeastern College, Inc., where they were employed as janitors, and Jose R. Bautista and Severino Gabuyo as its President and Cashier, respectively. The charge was violation of Articles 113 and 116 of the Labor Code prohibiting unauthorized deduction from the wages of workers.
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The said articles are reproduced as follows:

Art. 113. Wage Deduction. - No employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his employees, except:
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(a) In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;
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(b) For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to checkoff has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and
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(c) In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor.
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Art. 116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. - It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the worker's consent. After investigation, Assistant Regional Director Pedro P. Pelaez of Regional Office No. 2, Ministry of Labor and Employment, found the deductions to be illegal. Nevertheless, he disallowed reimbursement of the amounts deducted, holding that the same were used to pay legitimate obligations of the private respondents to the school canteen and Director Villano. The case was dismissed in an Order dated January 14, 1985.
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In a letter dated January 25, 1985, the private respondents appealed this order to the Ministry of Labor and Employment and claimed that they had already settled their personal obligations with their supposed creditors. They also questioned the disallowance of their claimed reimbursements despite the finding that the deductions made were illegal.
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In an Order dated January 6, 1986, Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. affirmed the illegality of the deductions and, accordingly, directed the petitioners to reimburse the private respondents the amounts deducted from their salaries.
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On September 30, 1987, Regional Office No. 2 issued a Writ of Execution addressed to respondent Deputy Provincial Sheriff David R. Medina directing him to secure from the petitioners the full reimbursement of the illegal deductions, the amount of which was to be ascertained from petitioner Gabuyo.
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However, the writ was returned unsatisfied for the reason that neither the private respondents nor the petitioners could determine the exact amount to be paid.

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On December 7, 1987, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued, this time fixing the amounts to be paid each of the private respondents, thus: 1. Lino Malenab P23,893.30
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2. Hernando Natividad P23,085.43 3. Rodeo Bautista P23,705.25


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4. Domingo Cabauatan P16,079.65 5. Alfredo Jimenez P21,850.00

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On December 22, 1987, the petitioners filed an Exception to the Alias Writ of Execution with Regional Office No. 2. They contended that the said writ was null and void as it proceeded from an invalid order issued pursuant to an appeal filed out of time and without notice to the petitioners.
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In another Order dated December 29, 1987, Regional Office No. 2 dismissed the petitioners' Exception to the Alias Writ of Execution and directed respondent Deputy Sheriff of Isabela to proceed with its enforcement. Conformably, he seized several typewriters, electric fans, calculators and various office equipment from the petitioners for payment of the judgment debt.
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On January 22, 1988, the petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the Order of the DOLE dated January 6, 1986, the Writ of Execution dated Sept. 30, 1987, and the Alias Writ of Execution dated December 7, 1987. On their motion, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on February 8, 1988, against the implementation of the Alias Writ of Execution.
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The petitioners contend that the Department of Labor never acquired jurisdiction over them because they were not served with summons or otherwise notified of the case filed against them. They also argue that no hearing was conducted on the private respondents' charges in violation of the requirements of due process.
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We do not agree.

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The record shows that the private respondents gave a copy of their complaint to the petitioners, serving this at the office of Jose R. Bautista, where it was received by Roger Bautista, Executive Assistant to the President. 1Such service was valid and binding, having been made on a person in charge of the office.
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As we held in Adamson Ozanam Educational Institution, Inc. vs. Adamson University Faculty and Employees Association: 2 Section 4, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the rules of the NLRC, provides as follows: Sec. 4. Personal Service. Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or attorney's residence, if known, with a person of sufficient discretion to receive the same. (Emphasis supplied) Under the foregoing rule, service of papers should be delivered personally to the party or attorney or by leaving it at his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof . . ..

Even without such service, the petitioners cannot deny that they were furnished with a copy of the Order dated January 6, 1986, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 00293, 3 a copy of the letter-appeal dated January 25, 1985, as evidenced by the receipt of the same by Roger Bautista, 4 and a copy of the writ of execution, as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return. 5
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The Court notes that the only reaction of the petitioners to these processes was an indifferent silence. Given the opportunity to object, they forfeited it with their implied acquiescence to the orders they are now assailing. Surely, they cannot now complain they were denied due process, when they were actually given the opportunity to be heard, which is all due process requires.
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Moreover, it is not true that they were denied this opportunity in the investigation conducted by the Regional Office No. 2 on December 19, 1984. Severino Gabuyo was interviewed then and even explained the records of the company and the reason for the protested deductions. It is true that no formal hearing was conducted, but as we have held Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners' allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 6
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Moreover, since the proceeding was not judicial but merely administrative, the rigid requirements of procedural laws were not strictly enforceable. It is settled that While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. However, the standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored. 7 xxx xxx xxx
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It is of course also sound and settled rule that administrative agencies performing quasijudicial functions are unfettered by the rigid technicalities of procedure observed in the courts of law, and this is so that disputes brought before such bodies may be resolved in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner possible. 8
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Given all these circumstances, we feel that the lack of summons upon the petitioners is not sufficient justification for annulling the acts of the public respondents.
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We agree with the Solicitor General that the invocation of due process was only an afterthoughts on the part of the petitioners, who obviously had not earlier realized the extent of their liability. It was only when the amounts of reimbursement were computed and revealed to be not insignificant that the petitioners were aroused from their lethargy and decided to spring into action. But it was too late. whatever their reason for oversleeping then, it avails them naught at this time.
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We hold that the challenged orders were validly promulgated. The petitioners were not denied due process when, having the opportunity to challenge them, they chose not to do

so. The requisites of notice and hearing have been satisfied. Due process is only for the vigilant, not those who, having the right to be heard, choose to be silent, only to complain later that they have not been heard. The Court is not moved by crocodile tears or by those who piously invoke the name of due process in vain to excuse their own inattention.
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WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. The temporary restraining order dated February 8, 1988, is LIFTED. It is so ordered. Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1 Rollo, p. 91.
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2 179 SCRA 279.

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3 Rollo, p. 40; Annex "G," Petition.

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4 Rollo, p. 92; Annex "B," Comment of Private Respondents. 5 Rollo, p. 43; Annex "I" Petition.

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6 Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Achacoso, 161 SCRA 732. 7 Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores 152 SCRA 237.

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8 Rizal Workers Union vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431.

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