Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Paper presented at 60th Annual Conference Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, University of Essex, 10-12 September 2010.
Fellow of the Council for Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES), who acknowledges the assistance.
ABSTRACT
The researchs aim is to analyze the effect of institutional and political competition variables on the fragmentation of subnational party systems. Since the states use the same open-list proportional representation system, with the possibility of coalition and electoral districts with magnitude (M) ranging 24-94 in state elections, and 8-70 in the national elections, the study compares the effect of variables electoral district magnitude (M), political competition, electoral volatility, and combined effect of coalitions on the effective number of parties (N) both in transversal and longitudinal perspective. The database was compiled from electoral data from the last five brazilian state and national elections between 1990 and 2006 in 27 states.
the necessary level1. In settings where parties are cohesive, transfers within coalitions does not seem to be problematic, how Desposato (2007) show.
Take the above representation as a hypothetical example of contest between candidates of two parties: A and B. A voter who to vote for the candidate A2, near the extreme left, you can see their vote transferred to the candidate A3, more rightist than your competitor from another party (B1), for example. Furthermore, the vow not involved allows voters to vote for candidates of a majority in a caption, and other proportionate. In Brazil, few voters who vote for parties. In general, vote for candidates regardless of the party they represent. Part of these incentives were present in previous democratic experience, however, the number of political parties was much lower than that observed today. Given this observation, we can ask what factors influenced the transition from a moderately fragmented party system (Melo, 2007) to a more fragmented systems in the world? The goal of this research is to identify the variables that phenomenon based on electoral data from the states. In general, the analysis is restricted to the Chamber of Deputies (Nicolau, 1996) despite the fact that the parties have their own electoral dynamics in the states. Although they use, under the constitutional imperative, institutional arrangements similar to the Union, state legislatures are unicameral.
NATIONAL LEVEL INSTITUTIONS BICAMERAL LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE
Fernando Limongi and Jairo Nicolau suggest the possibility of maintaining the coalition with the proportional distribution proportionately among the parties in the coalition as a way to prevent candidates from one party to be elected with the votes of other members of the coalition. See LIMONGI, F.; NICOLAU, J. Quatro pontos para uma reforma poltica. Revista Repblica, So Paulo, p. 100 - 105.
UNICAMERAL LEGISLATIVE
EXECUTIVE
Regarding the choice of representatives, the main relevant difference between the states is the electoral districts magnitude. Both elections to the Chamber of Deputies as the election for the state parliaments (assemblies), the number of seats varies with the population of each state. However, the constitution requires a minimum representation of eight and maximum of 70 deputies by state device that increases the disparity between the actual representation and the ideal representation of each state. For the state elections, the districts range between 24 and 96 representatives. The district magnitudes at the state level corresponds to three times the representation of the state at the Chamber of Deputies until it reaches the number of thirty-six deputies. Reached this level, "will be increased by as many as there are federal deputies over twelve" (CF, art.27; see table below)
States grouped by District Magnitude 1990-2006, (Chamber of Deputies; State Assemblies) Lowest
Acre (8; 24) Amap (8; 24) Distrito Federal (8; 24) Mato Grosso do Sul (8; 24) Rio Grande do Norte (8; 24) Rondnia (8; 24) Roraima (8; 24) Sergipe (8; 24) Tocantins (8; 24) Amazonas (8; 25) Alagoas (9; 27) Mato Grosso (10; 28) Esprito Santo (10; 30) Piaui (12; 30) Paraba (12; 37) Santa Catarina (16; 40) Gois (17; 41) Par (17; 41) Maranho (18; 42) Cear (22; 46) Pernambuco (25; 49) Paran (30; 54) Rio Grande do Sul (31;55) Total: Chamber of Deputies: 513; Assemblies: 1.065 Fonte: CORPI/Cmara dos Deputados;TSE Bahia (39; 63) Rio de Janeiro (46; 70) Minas Gerais (53; 77) So Paulo (70; 94)
Higest
Considering that in Brazil, the states are the electoral districts in both the national and local elections, and that these have different magnitudes for different levels, you can compare, for
example, the effect of magnitude on party fragmentation. If the magnitude is an important variable for the formatting of the party system, legislatures should be more fragmented than the states' representation in the House of Representatives. The next session will describe the database used in the research. Then I discuss the centrality of the magnitude of electoral districts as a key determinant of party fragmentation, with the backdrop of the states. Finally, the preliminary findings and the researchs next steps.
Database
The database contains the latest election results in five brazilian national and state elections held between 1990 and 2006 in 26 states and the Federal District, totaling 270 observations. Since not all parties are important electorally and in view of the possibility of comparability of the study, used the effective number of parties (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) to measure party fragmentation. For these data, I used the data of Leex and Nicolau (see references). I also use the Index of Competitiveness and electoral volatility in the states have been calculated according to data from Leex. Data on coalitions are partially available. No information for the elections of 1990 and 1994 in the Superior Electoral Court. An alternative way of getting that information would go to court regional and / or secondary sources such as local newspapers.
in terms of institutional engineering that seeks to increase the proportion of parliamentary representation, or conversely, to focus the parliamentary party system in the scenario" (1994, p.338) That is, districts of high magnitude electoral systems tend to form more fragmented. Understood this way, the fragmentation of party depends on the size of electoral districts. For Rae (1967), the effect of the electoral system on the party system, as it made by Duverger, takes a secondary position. The mechanical effect of the number of districts is more relevant to the extent that "the proportion and number of parties grow as it grows the district magnitude." (P.337) Bennoit, in turn, points out that Duverger's Law has been duly tested in majoritarian systems, however, the consequence of the rules on plurality systems have received little attention (2001, p.203). In other words, the proportionality found in Duverger's Law is a consequence of district magnitude in proportional electoral systems. Hypothesis A1: The higher the threshold of exclusion, less party fragmentation. The assumption A1, as shown, enables the analysis of the effect of the magnitude of electoral districts on party fragmentation. However, the Brazilian electoral system has an intervening variable that should be taken into consideration.
Effective number of parties vs. Magnitude
State Assemblies, 1998-2006 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 20 50 60 70 Magnitude N (1998) N (2002) 30 40 80 90 100 Effective number of parties Effective number of parties Chamber of Deputies, 1998-2006
11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 0
N (2006)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Magnitude
N (1998)
N (2002)
N (2006)
In Brazil, however, we found considerable variation both longitudinal and transversal with respect to the conduct of party systems in the states. Districts of high magnitude, such as Rio Grande do Sul, have less fragmented party systems than other lesser magnitude. States with the minimum threshold (8, 24), present or fragmented party systems so that more states with M above the median. The most plausible explanation for this behavior seems to be the dynamics of competition in the states. As emphasized in the first session, the parties can gather as much as majoritarian elections in proportional. Once affiliated, the votes of the coalition are added together and calculated the ratio partisan, the seats are distributed among the strongest candidates in the list, regardless of party affiliation and performance of the parties. The coalition functions as a vapor barrier to overcome the limitation imposed by the electoral quotient. Machado (2002) noted that most of the candidates is elected by coalitions and in the districts of low, parties tend to coalesce frequently. This may be one explanation for the high fragmentation in the electoral districts of low, as shown by Bohn (2009, p.19).
A1A Hypothesis: The parties tend to form coalitions to be less in the districts of large magnitude. District magnitude, the second hypothesis A1 A, is the crucial information in the seam of the coalition states. The parties use this feature to make their electoral strategies and try to elect more representatives. If the hypothesis A1 A confirmed, then the parties tend to gather more on elections to the Chamber of Deputies to the Legislative Assembly. The national and state elections are held simultaneously under the same electoral rules. Thus, it eliminates the effect of the application to the Executive, since the candidates for state government and the presidency are the same, and the effects of the socio-economic and governmental crises. Given that the electoral districts are smaller in national elections and coalitions may be different for the Chamber of Deputies and for the Assembly in the same election, we can compare the behavior of parties at both levels.
In Brazil, the party funding is public, while the campaign is exclusively private. The electoral justice distributes party fund follows: 1% of the amount is distributed equally among all parties legally existing and the remaining 99% is distributed proportionally among the parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies. In addition to financial transfers, the parties receive institutional incentives otherwise. Free insertion on television chain periodically and during the campaign (HPGE) is pointing for some researchers as a decisive factor for the strategy coligacionista.
Governance Hypothesis. Parties met together in statewide elections tend to coalesce is also in proportion. Need to create an indicator of coalition to characterize the preferred coalitions between parties. Political Situation Calculus. The parties tend to gather more on the elections for the House of Representatives that the elections to the legislatures, since the threshold is higher than in national elections. Simultaneous elections, the same context. The next research steps are to map the coalitions at both levels in order to identify, through network analysis, recurring patterns of coalition and which parties benefit from this mechanism and to observe whether the coalition made in proportional elections are congruent with the majoritarian.
Preliminary Conclusions
Brazilian party subsystems have great variety in terms of fragmentation and, although the magnitude of electoral districts is a relevant variable for understanding the problem, singularities of the brazilian electoral legislation and the possibility of coalitions in proportional seem to decisively influence the fragmentation of party subsystems. The next steps of the research consists precisely in trying to establish patterns of party coalition aiming to examine to what extent and which parties benefit from this feature as well as the congruence of the coalition.
References
Bohn, S. 2009. Should identical electoral systems generate identical party systems? evidences from Brazil. Paper presented at Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. Melo, C.R. 2007. Nem tanto ao mar, nem tanto a terra: elementos para a analise do sistema partidrio brasileiro. in Melo, C.R. & Saez, M.A. A democracia brasileira: balano e perspectivas para o sculo 21. Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG. Desposato, S. 2007. Reforma poltica brasileira: o que precisa ser consertado, o que no precisa fazer e o que fazer in Nicolau, J. & Power, T. Instituies representativas no Brasil: balano e reforma. Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, p.123-153.
Mainwaring, Scott. 2001. Politicians, parties, and electoral systems: Brazil in comparative perspective. Comparative Politics, vol.24, no. 1, p.21-43. Nicolau, J. 1996. Multipartidarismo e democracia: um estudo sobre o sistema partidrio brasileiro (1985-94). Rio de Janeiro: FGV. Tavares, J.A.G. 1994. Sistemas eleitorais nas democracias contemporneas: teoria, instituies, estratgia. Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumar.
Database
Nicolau, J. Dados eleitorais do Brasil (1982-06). http://jaironicolau.iuperj.br/banco2004.html Santos, W.G. dos. Almanaque de dados eleitorais: Brasil e outros pases. http://www.ucam.edu.br/leex/ Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. Resultados eleitorais de 1998, 2002 e 2006. http://www.tse.gov.br/internet/eleicoes