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First Edition
The Glock 23
Shootout in Miami
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sell the military a modern pistol, but the gun fell short of the
ministry’s stringent specifications. Top generals were running
out of patience.
Glock interrupted. Would it still be possible, he asked the
officers, for another company—his company—to bid on the
pistol contract?
The colonels laughed. In his garage, Gaston Glock made
hinges, curtain rods, and knives. Now he thought he could de-
sign a handgun?
Reserved in manner, Glock, fi ft y, wasn’t known for his
sense of humor. He was a slender man of average height, with
a receding hairline, sloping shoulders, and long arms. A recre-
ational swimmer, he had a sinewy physique and unprepossess-
ing looks. He spoke only as much as was necessary and dressed
conservatively, a sweater beneath his dark suit coat. Glock had
graduated from a technical institute and received training in
mechanical engineering. He worked his way up in manufac-
turing from an entry-level position with a company that made
hand drills. Designing fi rearms was something far beyond his
experience.
Glock asked the colonels to describe the Army’s require-
ments for a new handgun, which they did. “Mr. Glock, in his
credulousness, said it shouldn’t be difficult to make such an
item,” according to an official company account published
years later. “To him, the handgun was simply another accou-
trement that attached to a soldier’s belt, similar to the knife he
already produced.” Or, as Gaston Glock himself put it in an
interview: “That I knew nothing was my advantage.”
Out of prudence and decorum, he sought an audience with
the minister of defense. “I asked him if I was allowed to make
a pistol for the Army,” Glock recounted.
“He said, ‘Yes, why not?’ ” The minister wanted Glock to
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nine-millimeter rounds than the eight that the P-38 could ac-
commodate, and weighed no more than eight hundred grams
(twenty-eight ounces). The weapon should have a consistent
and light trigger pull for fast, accurate firing. It should be
streamlined and easy to holster. Dechant and Hubner recom-
mended a frame width of no more than thirty millimeters (1.2
inches). Crucially, they said, the gun should have no more than
forty parts—far fewer than the industry standard.
Glock asked his guests about grip-to-frame angle. He had
nailed together two pieces of wood as a rough model. The ex-
perts experimented, pointing the model with their eyes open
and closed. The consensus was that an ideal handgun should
point “instinctively,” so that an injured user could fi re even if
he couldn’t see the gun’s sights. The experts settled on an angle
of twenty-two degrees, which Glock later reduced slightly.
Colonel Dechant admonished Glock that his pistol should
be able to withstand extended contact with snow, ice, and
mud. It should fire ten thousand rounds with no more than one
failure per thousand. The figure 40,000 was recorded that eve-
ning, referring to the goal that the ideal pistol should have a
long service life, of forty thousand rounds.
There was much discussion about safety. The P-38 and
most other pistols had external levers that when engaged pre-
vented the weapon from fi ring. Some soldiers and police offi-
cers carried their pistols “cocked and locked,” meaning that
the guns were ready to fi re immediately upon disengagement
of the safety. The problem with this common feature, Dechant
said, was that an alarming number of soldiers and cops forgot
whether their safeties were on or off. That led to confusion and
accidental discharges.
“Those experts which I had consulted at the beginning of
the development are people that had access to all the accident
///
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Wieser did not try to conceal his envy of Gaston Glock’s sub-
sequent fame and wealth. As the Army’s top handgun tester
in the early 1980s, Wieser made many suggestions to improve
the Glock prototype, but he received no pecuniary reward.
No one celebrates his contribution to a revolutionary weapon.
“Mr. Glock conveniently forgot about me,” he said.
His bitterness notwithstanding, Wieser emphasized that
he conducted a fair and objective competition that pitted the
Glock against weapons from Heckler & Koch, Sig Sauer, Be-
retta, Austria’s Steyr, and Fabrique Nationale of Belgium.
Only the Steyr GB pistol held more rounds in its magazine—
eighteen—than the Glock’s seventeen. The Heckler & Koch
P9S and the Sig Sauer P-220 each held nine; the Beretta 92F,
fifteen.
With its plastic frame, the Glock was by far the light-
est model, at 661 grams (23 ounces). The mostly metal H&K
weighed 928 grams (33 ounces). The Steyr was the heaviest at
1,100 grams (39 ounces). Glock produced the simplest hand-
gun, with only thirty-four components. That compared to
fift y-three for the Sig. The Beretta, with seventy parts, and the
H&K, with seventy-seven, had more than twice as many as the
Glock.
All of the guns had slides made from steel; only the Glock’s
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“How was it that Gaston Glock was able to get it right?” the
American fi rearm authority Patrick Sweeney asked in The Gun
Digest Book of the Glock (2008). It is a question that handgun
aficionados have debated for decades. Sweeney offered as sen-
sible an answer as any, and one consistent with Glock’s. “He
got it right,” Sweeney wrote, “because he hadn’t done it before.
One of the largest problems in getting a new design accepted by
an established manufacturer is not just the ‘not invented here’
syndrome, but also the ‘we don’t have the tooling’ syndrome.
Why invent something new when you can simply modify what
you have?”
Glock started with a blank sheet of paper. He listened to his
military customers. He made adjustments they requested. As a
result, he came up with something original—and, as it turned
out, he did so at precisely the right moment.
Within just a few years, another market, far larger and
richer than the Austrian defense sector, would be keen for “a
pistol of the future.” The Miami Shootout of 1986 helped foster
this demand. American police officials wanted a new handgun,
and Glock was there to offer a powerful alternative to the re-
volver. Across the United States, the preferences of local cops
and county deputies have broad commercial consequences. The
American civilian gun-buying population tends to gravitate
toward what the professionals carry. For Glock, that translated
into a bonanza. The Glock 17 gained profit-making momen-
tum in the fashion of a classic American consumer fad—one
that, rather than fade away, kept expanding year after year.
Venerable rivals, chiefly Smith & Wesson, ignored Glock at
fi rst and then scoffed at him. Eventually, they began imitating
the Austrian invader, flooding the market with knockoffs. The
Americans, to this day, haven’t caught up.