Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Military Rulers Author(s): M. Rashiduzzaman Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol.

18, No. 2 (Feb., 1978), pp. 126-134 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643306 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 06:12
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BANGLADESHIN 1977: DILEMMASOF RULERS THE MILITARY M. Rashiduzzaman

OUTSTANDING EVENTS in 1977 reveal two leading THE half of theyearwas in patterns Bangladesh.On the one hand, the first policy, its stabilityand pragmatist by characterized the government's During this period the militaryregime sought legitimacy confidence. a througha referendum, nationwide election was held for the local launched a wide range of socioeconomic councils,and the government policies. During the second half of the year,on the otherhand, divergeneratedtensionand an abortivecoup shook the gentpolitical forces and introducedelementsof disquiet and instaestablishment military bility.The purpose of this paper is to outline the changingeventsin and the management 1977,the dilemmas of the militarygovernment, relations. of the internaleconomyand international

of Pursuit PoliticalLegitimacy
of In the referendum May 30 therewere more than 99% "yes" votes in supportof General Ziaur Rahman (usually called Zia). It is obvious thatZia wanted to gain political supportforhis government. since he came to power in the wake Zia Although had run the country of bloodymilitary upheavals in November1975,JusticeSyemhad conuntil he resignedearlyin 1977.When tinuedas Bangladesh'sPresident AlZia took over as President,he quickly decided on a referendum. thoughthereis no seriouschallengeto the validityof the referendum, withvery are the critics obviouslysuspiciousof such a massivevictory votes.Accordingto oftencriticalsources,Zia could easily fewnegative voteof confidence havewon 60-70% of thevote.Such an overwhelming of (a) has been attributed severalfactors: participation thebureaucrato cies in mobilizing public support;(b) unqualifiedsupportof a majority of thenewlyelectedUnion Parishad(villagecouncils)leaders; (c) active
126 i 1978 by The Regents of the Universityof California

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help fromthe moderateand rightwing forces; (d) influenceof the officially controlled media; and (e) absence of any othercandidate. The military not go to the people emptyhanded as Zia offered did a 19-point socioeconomic program.Since SheikhMujibur Rahman was killed in a violent coup on August 15, 1975, the countryhas passed through period of uncertainty a withoutnational political institutions or a leader with an aura of legitimacy. The overwhelming confidence vote gave Zia a senseof credibility and legitimacy continueuntil an to electionis held to transfer powerto thepoliticalleaders. Althoughthemilitary rulerscontinueto stickto theirearliercommitment hold electionsin December 1978,many observers to consider thisunlikely a variety reasons.In the pursuitof legitimacy, for of General Zia himself has become a political personality. The military no is longer consideredan impartialbroker above politics. Some observers feel that Zia laid down the foundationof his futurepolitical career the through referendum, it is feltthat he may become a "civilian and leader" in the near future joining some political partyof his choice by and contesting election.Zia appears to have gained a supportbase the the through referendum and his pragmatist policy and if he decides to he enterpolitics, maybe able to provideleadershipforan organization withbroad-based it politicalsupport.Eventually, mightbe theonlyway forZia to stayin office since it will be difficult him to continueas for of President Bangladeshas well as army chiefforan indefinite period. Early in December several membersof the PresidentialAdvisory Council were dropped and new advisorswere recruitedby Zia. One of thenew Advisors EnayetullahKhan, ownerof the influential is weekly and anti-Indianviews.Most Holiday and well knownforhis pro-Peking of the otherrecruits were technocrats.

Local CouncilElections:Rightists' Resurgence

the After national electionspromisedfor1977 werepostponed,the authorities military quickly ordered the election of village and urban municipalcouncils.Early in 1977,the Union Parishad (village council) electionsgeneratedconsiderableinterestin the rural areas. It was a "partyless" electionbut the political affiliations the candidateswere of knownto the local people. Many local leaders who had been generally discredited for their alleged collaborationwith the Pakistan armyin 1971surfaced and took activepart in theseelections.An analysisof the in and chairmen some selectedcouncilsindicate newlyelectedmembers thatabout 77% of themwerepoliticallyaligned to therightand center; about 21% of them were moderatelyleft and about 1% radicals.1 About 47% of themhad had at least some formof associationwith the
1A surveyof 51 selected village councils and 201 members and chairmen was conducted by this writerin the summer of 1977. The study is expected to be completed later in 1978.

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Awami League duringrecentyears.But the surprise the electionwas of theresurgence thoserightist of elements who wereidentified supportas ers of theMuslim League and Ayub Khan's "Basic Democracies"in the to 1960s.According thesurvey, about 23% of the electedvillage leaders claimed to be supporters the Muslim League and other right-wing of parties. Afterthe armed liberation strugglein 1971, many observersbelieved thatrural politicsin Bangladesh had been radicalized and that the rightist forces were completely eliminated.The resurgence such of elementsmay be explained in severalways.First,it reflects failure the of the radicals to seize the opportunity provided by the 1971 armed to struggle establisha firm organizational footholdamong the peasants. election does not offer Second,partyless any clear opportunity the to the villagersto identify political backgroundof the candidatesseeking village council elections. Third, the emergenceof the moderate elementsmay be viewed as a resultof villagers'disillusionment with vioand the inefficiency Awami League government of lence,corruption, in thepost liberationperiod. Finally,thereis the villagers'evidentpreference forpragmaticand experiencedleaders with local ties instead of radicals. General Zia seemed to be willing to use the newlyelected village leadersforhis programand as a political supportbase. Soon aftertheir elections,the Presidentcalled upon them to implementthe 19-point socioeconomic and population control. programforrural development The government arrangedfor a massiveprogramto train the newly and chairmenin management local administration of electedmembers and a family planning campaignin the villages.Seminarsand conferences were held to establishcloser contactbetween the village leaders and groupsof members and the bureaucracy, were sent abroad as part Zia seemed to have won the confidence the rural of theirtraining. of offered themvisibility leaderssince the administration and a commitresources the villages. to mentto transfer Electionsin 78 municipalities were held in Augustand September. A totalof 421 candidatesforchairmanships and 3339 candidatesforthe werecontesting and 867 positionsrespectively.2 postofcommissioners 78 Except for a few minor incidents,the elections were held peacefully and the urban areas were heavilypoliticizedduring the electoralcamthe both theAwami League and Muslim League paign.After elections, made claimsabout the numberof seatstheyhad capturedin the urban councils.Accordingto one report,the Awami League won 25 and the MuslimLeague 17 chairmanships themunicipalcouncils.3 in (The other partiesdid not claimmanyof the newlyelectedurban leaders).In spite of claimsand counterclaims, is difficult ascertainthe real political it to of loyalties theelectedChairmenat thisstage.In thelightof local coun2 The Bangladesh Times, August 14, 1977.

S Holiday, August 21, 1977.

BANGLADESH 129 cil elections,it is believed that both the Awami League and Muslim League will decide to contest mostof the seatsin the forthcoming election,whenever is held. it The notable development the municipal electionswas the vicin in tory themoderate of forces Dacca Municipality wherea youngrightist barrister was elected chairman.Several Awami League membersof the newlyelected municipal council walked out as a protestfor not usinga secret ballot fortheelectionof thechairman.4

Divergent Political Forces

Afterthereferendum, therewere two monthswithoutany significant politicalincidentin Bangladesh.It now appears that the political tensionevidentin August provided the backgroundfor the "insurrection" thatshook the country October. This first in appeared in Dacca when theAwami League decided to observeAugust 15 (the day Mujib was assassinated) a day of mourning.It was fearedthat therewould as be sabotage and violence on that day by pro-Mujib elements. The Awami League move was denounced, and Zia called upon the people to unite againstthoseelementsthatwant to disruptthe country. Various political leadersalso denounced the Awami Leaguers who wanted to stage a comebackin politicsunder the pretextof condemningthe overthrow Mujib. There were clashesbetweenrival groupsat Dacca of University. There werealso reports sporadicviolencein the countryside. of Acof cordingto reliable sources,the followers Mujib and the JSD (Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal) establisheda workingalliance to eliminatetheirpolitical foesin the villages. Some of theirsupporters were arrestedfor in alleged involvement acts of sabotage. Hidden armswere known to have surfaced the hands of "anti-socialelements"who indulged in in and banditry, in The Augustpolitical kidnapping, extortion thevillages. tensionwas heightenedby another incident which involved the refroma public place. Following moval of a statueof a javelin thrower thatincidenta controversy started betweenrival political factions. Several accusationswere made laying the blame at the door of religious groupswho consideredstatuesdepictingthe human formun-Islamic. There was immediate repercussionamong the student groups who Fears were expressedthat the rightwing clashedin Dacca University.5 Islamic forces were gettingthe upper hand and mighteventually turn built in severalplaces during of againstthestatues the freedom fighters the postliberation period. The religiousand rightwing leaders,on the other hand, blamed those who wanted to create a misunderstanding and the Islamic forces. betweenthe government The borderincidentsbetweenthe armyand the pro-Mujib insur4 The Bangladesh Observer,October 31, 1977. 5 The Bangladesh Times, August 29, 1977.

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gentsallegedlyoperatingfromIndian soil substantially declined after the downfallof Mrs. Indira Gandhi. There was a deal between Zia and the new Desai administration wherebyBangladesh had to accept who wantedto returnand New Delhi offered thosepro-Mujibelements thosewho preferred stayin India political asylumbut restricted to their activities. insurgent Bangladesh authoritiescalled upon the returnees to behave,but latersomeof themwereallegedly involvedin theabortive Octoberinsurrection. The summer 1977 also markedthe beginningof a demand fora of united political partyas a coalition of "democraticand nationalistic forces."Ataur Rahman Khan, the leader of the Bangladesh Jatiya League and former Chief Minister, made an appeal to establishsuch a platform witha view to forging national unity.He also appealed to the authoritiesto announce a firmelection date for transferring military power to electedleaders. Severalpolitical leaders supportedKhan and made the same plea. If thismove is successful, mightprovide a cenit trist national platform Bangladeshpolitics. for

TheAbortive Coup and Aftermath

The most dramaticpolitical event of 1977 was the abortivecoup on September30 and October 2 which killed 11 air forceofficers and ten soldiers.Accordingto reports,the abortivecoup startedin Bogra on September30 and the rebels then struck Dacca on October 2. Japaneseterrorists hijacked a JAL plane to Dacca airportfromwhere theybargainedforthe release of theirjailed compatriots Japan and in a six million dollar ransom.Almost the entireBangladesh administration,includingtop air forceofficials, werenegotiating withthe terrorists at Dacca airport.It providedan ideal opportunity the "disgruntled for elements"withinthe armed forcesto stage an insurrection, which was quickly suppressed, however.Total casualties on both sides exceeded 230,accordingto unconfirmed sources. It is not yetclear who were the actual leadersof the attempted insurrection. Initially, the Dacca authoritiesplayed down the incident withoutblamingany political group forthe uprising. fewdays later, A the political dimensionof the attempted coup became clear when two radical parties-the JSD and the pro-MoscowCommunistParty-and the moderateDemocraticLeague were banned for having incited the coup. Three leadersof thesepartieswere also arrested. went on the Zia radio to announce thatall thoseinvolvedin the coup will be triedand severely punished. Later, it was reportedthat about 500 people were tried for alleged complicityand that 92 persons received the death sentence inciting for rebellion. The abortive Octobercoup was no surprise observers Banglato in desh.A politicizedarmylike thatof Bangladeshis susceptibleto coups

BANGLADESH 131 and countercoups.6The liberationlegacy and the upheavals of 1975 left the marksof disunity among the soldiers.Hard core followersof JSD and the Marxists were known to be workingamong the rank and file. Wheneverthereis an insurrection Bangladesh, a number of in officers killed by the Jawans(soldiers).Leftistelements are have sought to radicalizethesoldiers, personalvendettas also at work.When but are the rebels captured the Dacca radio station on October 2, they announced thata revolution the workers, of peasants,students, and people's army was underway. The rhetoric therebelsindicatesthatradiof cals were behind the uprising.Withoutbeing specific, Bangladesh the government blamed "foreign powers"forthe attempted coup, implying thatboth India and SovietUnion were behind therebels.Accordingto one official the report, coup leaders wanted to paralyzethe Bangladesh military killingall the seniorair forceofficers. by Althoughthe abortivecoup was quicklysuppressed, has shaken it the morale of the military Zia administration. is under pressurefrom his colleagues, who fear that such coup attempts mightbecome a periodic feature Bangladesh,threatening stability the country in the of unless drasticsteps are taken to depoliticize the soldiers.This explains -themilitary tribunalsquicklywent into action immediately why after the abortivecoup. Observersin Dacca feel that Zia was under strong pressure take such drasticaction. to It is surprising thatDacca's public lifewas not seriously affected by theupheavalsin the military. The rebelswere wiped out by dawn and the streets were open to the public except for a few restricted areas. Obviously,tensionand a sense of insecurity prevailed,and may prove to be a seriousproblem.The middle class may become sensitive milito which can snowball into a growingsentiment taryindiscipline against continued maritiallaw. Political leaders who want the military out of politicsmay reinforcetheir argumentsfor an early election and the handingoverof powerto them.

International Relations: FarakkaAgreement the

Bangladeshcontinuedto move away fromits dependency relationshipwithIndia in international relations.Foreignpolicywas primarily directedtowardfriendship with the Middle East countries.Zia made a trip to China early in 1977 where he was warmlyreceivedand economicaid was promised. According somereports, to China also provided Bangladeshwith some militaryassistance.Later Zia went to Burma, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.Substantialaid came fromthe Middle East. An official delegation visited Pakistan to explore the possibilitiesof closer cooperation.In the words of an official spokesman,Bangladesh
6 See this writer's "Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraintsand External Fears," Asian Survey,17:9, September 1977, pp. 793-808.

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adhered to the principles of nonalignment, mutual respect for sovereignty, noninterference internal affairsof other countries,and in of peacefulsettlement all disputeswithinthe framework United Naof tions.7 Afterseveralmeetings betweenthe two countries, Bangladesh and on India,came to an agreement the sharingof the Ganges River water. The Farakkaaccordcoversthesharingof the Gangeswaterbetweenthe two countriesduring the dry season extendingover a period of five years,and may later be renewed by the two countries.Nobody has applauded the agreementin Bangladesh, and the typical attitude is "wait and see." If this agreement worksout happily,the relationsbetweenBangladesh and India may improve.However, therewere profrom tests WestBengal implying thattheFarakka accordwas seen there as havingbartered in awaytheBengali interests India. The relationshipbetween the two countriesalso soured afterthe abortivecoup. On October 15, Zia strongly condemnedthe mutinous actsat Bogra and Dacca and blamed the conspirators trying make for to Bangladesha "satellite."8Indian unhappinesswas clear when the governmentexpressed dissatisfaction over "attempts by Dacca to drag Delhi's name into the recentmilitary uprisingin Bogra and Dacca."9 JayaPrakash Narayan, the prominentIndian leader, openly criticized Bangladeshforexecutingthe alleged conspirators large scale arrests and of political dissidents.10 The Soviet Union and Amnesty International also criticizedBangladesh for the trial and execution of the alleged conspirators. Zia touredNepal, India, and Pakistan in December to emphasize ties friendly with the neighbors.The Indian trip was significant a as post-Farakka Agreement relationship betweenthe two countries. There were reportsof political refugeesfromBangladesh seekingshelterin India. Zia wanted that New Delhi should not provide any shelterto the Bangladeshi rebels in Indian soil. Prime Minister Desai talked about friendship and tradebetweenthe two countries.

Socio-EconomicPolicies
The economydid not look so good compared to 1976. A growth rate of 3% is estimatedforthe year comparedto 9.7% duringthe previous year.The decline in the growthrate has been attributed the to shortfallin the agricultural Food grainsproductionin 1977 was sector. estimated be shortby about one million tons fromthe targetof 13 to milliontons.Excessive rain and floodcaused thisdecline.The industrial
7 8

The Bangladesh Times, October 6, 1977. The Bangladesh Times, October 16, 1977. 9 The Statesman(Weekly),Calcutta, October 22, 1977. 10 B.B.C. (Bengali Broadcast), October 29, 1977.

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output increased because of higher production of sugar, fertilizer, cement,paper, and otherproducts. As a result theagricultural of shortfall, pricesof foodgrainstookan upward trendin the springof 1977, but again declined during the harvest season. Large quantitiesof wheat and rice had to be imported to meet the deficit. The government continuedits policy of supplying with such inputs as fertilizers seeds at subsidizedprices to farmers and raise agricultural productivity. The highlights the 1977-1978 budget could be summarizedas of follows:(a) totalrevenueincomeTaka 11,560million (official exchange rate is approximately = Taka 15.50); (b) total expenditureTaka $1 20,960 million including Taka 960 million on revenue expenditure, Taka 11,900million on development, and Taka 400 million for food and works program;(c) an anticipatedgrowth rate of 7%; and (d) agriculturalsectorprojectedto grow by 8%, industrialsectorby 7%,, and others by 9%. The investment climate in the private sector looked favorablefor the first time since 1972 as the government went ahead with its policy of encouragingentrepreneurs both at home and from abroad. There was no indicationof further nationalizationand the NationalInvestment Board opened new industrial unitsforprivateinvestment.About 200 smallerindustries were denationalizedby the governmentand returned theprivatesector. to Although Bangladesh was far from achieving self-sufficiency in food,therewereindicationsof seriousefforts achievethisgoal. Rural to receivedtop priority 1977 and substantialinternational in development aid was promisedto increaseagricultural productivity. The programof Swanirvar (self-reliance) launchedin selectedareas to improveagriwas culturethrough voluntarylabor offered the villagers.Zia was imby pressedby the show piece of thisprogramat Ulashi in Jessoredistrict and urged the villagersto follow the spirit of developmentthrough self-reliance the throughout country. There were positivesignsfor a comprehensive population control programin Bangladesh. The government declared population as has the numberone problemof the country and the familyplanning program has been integratedwith the total developmentefforts the of based multi-sectoral country. Population controlis now a community with a strongrural bias that requires closer participationof program therural administration. Conclusion Of all the eventsin 1977,the abortivecoup will have decisiveimpact on Bangladesh'sfuture.It has shaken the stabilitythat Zia prosinceNovember1975 and on whichhe based mostof vided the country The internalpolitics of Bangladesh has also his claim to legitimacy.

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as been internationalized a result of foreigncriticismof the tough measurestakenagainstthosewho were allegedlyinvolvedin the insurThere are signsof public uneasinessabout military indiscipline rection. and Zia will have to put a lid on the soldiers'scrambleforpower. The in authorities Dacca will have to reviewtheirpolitical strategy military in the lightof what happened in the fall. There are indicationsthat will officers be graduallywithdrawnfrommany civilian posimilitary is tions.How Zia will depoliticizea deeply politicizedmilitary not yet cannot continue inclear. But the widespreadfeelingof uncertainty Two main options seem to be available for the Dacca gendefinitely. the erals: They may bow out of politicsand transfer power to elected on and representatives concentrate building a genuinelyprofessional which would not meddle into politics; or the militarymay military oscillatingbetween an continue to play a political role indefinitely, authoritarian and some kind of "controlleddemocracy." system

M. RASHIDUZZAMAN is Associate Professorof Political Science at Glassboro State College, New Jersey,and Research Associate, Southern Asian Institute, Columbia New York. University,