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Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh Author(s): Zillur R. Khan Reviewed work(s): Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1976), pp. 102-125 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447587 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 06:03
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LEADERSHIP, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN BANGLADESH

ZILLUR R. KHAN

University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh and University of Dacca, Bangladesh EFOREthe war of liberation, a rapidly growing discontent among the Bengalis against the "internal colonialism"' of the West Pakistani political, economic and military elites gave most Bengali political parties the justification to incorporate political demands for some sort of autonomy in their party manifestos. The question of whether to demand more local autonomy under a western-type federal structure, or to aim at a confederated status, or to demand complete independence for East Pakistan, created the original political divisions between Bengalis. These divisions had certain ramifications in the Bengali policymaking process both before and after the independence of Bangladesh. The majority of those people who were politically conscious expected the central government to concede greater autonomy to East Pakistan as a way of resolving peacefully the disparities between the two parts of the country. On the other hand, conservative Muslims and right-wing politicians, who made up a small but vocal minority, wished East Pakistan to continue as a part of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Another group, comprised mainly of leftist radicals and Maoists, advocated complete independence, which they expected could only be achieved through a prolonged guerrilla warfare. They not only aimed at ending West Pakistani exploitation, but also the exploitation perpetrated by the Bengalis themselves. An aggressive minority within the strongest Bengali party- the Awami Leaguealso wanted complete independence. But the League's charismatic leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, wanted greater political autonomy, not complete independence, for East Pakistan through a Six-Point program he had drawn up and which, he asserted, was designed to establish a more equitable relationship between Islamabad and Dacca. Politically conscious Bengalis, who originally wanted autonomy but not independence, started to support the Awami League's Six-Point program2 as the
B

This term, used in New Left writings (Herbert Marcuse, Angela Davis, Tarik All, among others), connotes a process of domination and exploitation of one ethnic group by another within the same country For a detailed analysis of the exploitation of Bengalis by Pakistanis,see Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), Chap. 2-3; Zillur R. Khan and A. T. R. Rahman, Autonomy and Constitution-Making:The Case of Bangladesh (Dacca: Green Book House Ltd., 1973), Chap. 1 and 3; Stephen R. Lewis, Pakistan: Industrializationand Trade Policies (Oxford University Press, 1970), Chap. 6; Edward S. Mason, Robert Dorfman and Stephen A. Marglin, "Conflict in Pakistan: Backgroundand Prospects" (Cambridge: Harvard University, unpublished, 1971), pp. 1-15; W. H. Morris-Jones, "Pakistan Post-Mortem and the Roots of Bangladesh,"Political Quarterly, 18 (AprilJune, 1972), 190-96; U.S. House of Representatives,Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Hearings: Crisis in East Pakistan, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., May 11, 25, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 27, 29-31. 2 Summaryof Six-Point Programpresentedby Mujib in February,1966: Point 1. The Constitution should provide for a Federation... with supremacyof Legislature directlyelected on the basis of universaladult franchise. Point 2. Federal government shall deal with only two subjects, viz., Defense and Foreign Affairs and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the federating states.... Point 3. (A) Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may be introduced, or (B) One currency for the whole country may be maintained. In this case, effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Point 4. .... the power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units and that the Federal Centre will have no such power... The consolidated

Leadership,Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 103

general election of 1970 aproached. The inaction of the Pakistani military junta during the 1970 calamity (when East Pakistan was struck by a devastating cyclone which left 500,000 to 1,000,000 dead and 3,000,000 to 6,000,000 homeless),3 changed many Bengali minds in favor of the Awami League's brand of autonomy. The result was the landslide victory of Sheikh Mujib and his party which gave him an absolute majority in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.4 The fear of being politically dominated by the new Bengali leadership discouraged many leaders of the West Pakistani parties from using constitutional means to resolve their differences on the question of autonomy for East Pakistan. This was probably the main reason why Z. A. Bhutto, leader of the largest party in West Pakistan, demanded concessions on two points - taxation and foreign trade - of the League's Six-Point program prior to meeting with the Bengali representatives in the first scheduled session of the Constituent Assembly. When he failed to get Mujib to agree to the central government's continuing its power of direct taxation, and absolute control over foreign aid and foreign trade, Bhutto refused to participate in the deliberation of the Assembly. In a show of force, Bhutto threatened the elected members of his party - the Pakistan People's party, which had won the majority of seats in West Pakistan - with "dire consequences" if they dared to attend the first session of the Assembly without him. As well as Bhutto, other West Pakistani leaders put pressure on the Yahya junta to postpone the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly until Mujib agreed to make concessions on his Six-Point program. The immediate effect was a political deadlock during the last part of February and throughout most of March 1971. The so-called "Yahya-Mujib parleys" which took place between March 16-23, raised high hopes among Bengalis about a genuine possibility of a peaceful resolution of political conflicts between the two parts of Pakistan. But their hopes were shattered when, on March 25, the Pakistani military junta tried once and for all to crush the Bengali movement for autonomy.5
Point 5. .... foreign exchange earnings of... East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan government... The Constitution shall empower the unit governments to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in, and enter into agreements with foreign countries. Point 6. ... setting up of a militia or a paramilitary for East Pakistan. U.S. Government sources indicated that Pakistani authorities were shockingly lax in coordinating a relief effort and spent only $4.7 million of a special congressional relief

FederalFund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes...

mittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees, Hearings: Relief Problems in East Pakistan and India, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, June 28, 1971, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 41-47, 50-51, 53-69. 4 Yahya dissolved the Pakistani Parliament in 1969 when he took over from Ayub Khan. The the Legal Framework Order of 1969 - which same year he issued a proclamationwas designed to provide a guideline for the transfer of political power from military to civilian hands. Under this order, a national election was scheduled to choose representatives for a Constitutional Assembly. However, two limitations were imposed on the constitution-making process: the Assembly was obliged to frame a constitution within 120 days; moreover, the new constitution had to be approved by Yahya before its implementation. Because of these restrictions, a number of parties boycotted the 1970 election for the Constitutional Assembly. ' The terror was responsible for a mass exodus of ten million Bengalis into India by November, 1971. Many Bengali scholars were killed and many others had to flee the country in order to escape the military suppression. For a detailed description of military suppression in East Pakistan between March and December, 1971, see M. Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War (New Delhi: S. Chand and Co., 1972), pp. 16581; Zillur R. Khan, Situation in East Pakistan: An Eye-Witness Account (Chicago: Bangladesh Foundation Pamphlet, 1971); K. Choudhury, Genocide in Bangladesh (New Delhi: Orient Longman, Ltd., 1972), pp. 22-67. Statement of Hendrick Van Der Heijden, Economist, Pakistan Division of the World Bank, in Thousand My Lais (Dacca: Society for Human Rights, 1972). Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Bangladesh Documents (New Delhi: Government Printing Press, 1971), Chap. VI & VII (includes testimony of foreign observers).

appropriationof $7.5 million. See U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcom-

104 Western Political Quarterly The military suppression only hardened Bengali resistance against West Pakistani domination. Military coercion also brought unity and consensus among those Bengalis who had previously differed on the issue of independence. Most of them had by now lost all patience with the Yahya regime and began to favor complete independence. But a strong minority of Bengalis, comprised chiefly of conservative Muslims, members of rightist political parties, and a number of personnel from the civil and military services, still adhered to the concept of one Pakistan. It was from this group that the junta received political and administrative support when the civil war broke out. The non-Bengali Muslim settlers, commonly known as the Biharis, made up the other group which gave unqualified support to the policy of Islamabad during this time. Both these groups were viewed as collaborators and later were held responsible by the Bengalis for Pakistani atrocities. The defeat of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan and the consequent creation of Bangladesh saw a surge of public hatred for these groups. Moreover, Bengali political parties which had supported the junta were outlawed and their leaders imprisoned. The Biharis were interned. Political radicalism and violence threatened the newly established government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Open challenge to Mujib by student groups and, later, opposition parties put Mujib's charisma and ideology to the test. Only his overwhelming victory at the polls saved his charismatic leadership for the time being, but the country's chronic food problems, coupled with worldwide shortages of food grains and extremely high prices for oil, made the Prime Minister's task of reconstruction even more difficult. Another devastating flood in 1974, an astronomical increase in food prices (about 400 percent to 500 percent increase in prices of staple food like rice and lentils) and an impending famine (which, according to a recent estimate, could claim two to three million lives without massive international aid) created a tragic and dangerous situation. All these have contributed to the revival of not only the original divisions between the Bengalis, but have also given rise to newer divisions within groups and parties that originally went along with the League's demand for autonomy. The state of national emergency, declared by Mujib on December 28, 1974, underscoredthe magnitude of the domestic crisis in Bangladesh. In the international area, the situation is only slightly better. Political tension in the subcontinent was somewhat relaxed by Mujib's decision to grant a general clemency to those Pakistani military and civil service officials who were held in India on charges of war crimes. Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh and the Mujib-Bhutto meeting at the Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore, Pakistan, in February 1974, paved the way for future negotiation. It also satisfied Peking and, in the absence of a Chinese veto, Bangladesh was admitted into the UN. Nevertheless, a vocal section of the Bengali people, mainly comprising pro-Pakistani conservatives and anti-Indian radicals, continued to hold India responsible for all the ills besetting the new state. This group believes that India will never allow Bangladesh to be self-sufficient. Therefore, India cannot logically allow Bangladesh successfully to carry out such ventures as the recently contracted agreement with seven multi-national corporations (including three American companies) to explore offshore oil. This group has already alleged that India has willfully undermined Bangladesh's international market for jute in order to rejuvenate its own previouslysagging international jute trade. The original divisions between the Bengalis on the issues of secession and independence had serious ramifications in the Bengali army. First of all, it brought about a rigid caste-like differentiation between those who fought in the liberation war and those who, for one reason or another, did not. Among the former, there developed a further division along ideological lines (pro-Moscow v. pro-Washington). In order to keep the military in check, a strong para-militaryforce was raised

Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 105 by the government. This, in turn, led to greater polarization within the regular armed forces. The divisivenesswas aggravated when Mujib tried to use the regular army to enforce laws against corruption, bribery, black-marketingand smuggling. A large number of officers who favored him were alienated when he suddenly ordered the army's anticorruption operation stopped. Evidently, a large number of influential members in the League had been adversely affected by it. Mujib tried to save his party's image, but in the process undermined his own support within the regular army. Within the foregoing framework, this article will attempt to make a detailed analysis of the problems of leadership on which the future of Bangladesh largely depends. For heuristic purposes, the theme of the article has been developed in three stages. The first deals with the political commitments Mujib made as an individual (to restore law and order, to contain the Maoist group, to guarantee rights to ethnic minorities, to oblige Pakistan to recognize Bangladesh, and to proceed with the trials of alleged war criminals) and what constraints and options he had in keeping them. The second stage examines the nature of political opposition Mujib faced and how, through a combination of charisma and a new ideology, his party leaders prepared to meet it. This stage ends with an analysis of the 1973 election. The third stage evaluates the dilemmas of charismatic leadership in Bangladesh, analyzing the ways charisma can be sustained or lost. I After nine months of solitary confinement in a Pakistani prison, Mujib, who had been named head of the provisional government by the rebels, was freed on January 8, 1972,6by the new president of Pakistan, Bhutto . Not only had the great powers put pressure on Bhutto to free Mujib without any preconditions, but the President'sown inner circle in the Pakistan Peoples party impressed upon him the need for such a course so that stability might return more quickly to the subcontinent.7 Two days later, Mujib arrived in Dacca amidst wild rejoicing. His first task was to establish a permanent government for the new state. The following day, he summoned Justice Abu Sayeed Choudhury, son of a former Bengali political leader, to a cabinet meeting and, to the utter surprise of the latter, offered him the presidency of the new republic. Mujib declared that he wanted to stay out of government and to continue only as head of the Awami League party. It is generally believed that this was a mere ruse on his part, and that he realized full well that the Bengali masses would never consent to his absence from the government. Choudhury knew this and insisted that Mujib agree to be prime minister. Mujib acquiesced. On January 12, Justice Choudhury was sworn in as the president, and his first act was to call upon the Sheikh to form a ministry.8 In this way a political vacuum was averted. Choudhury's elevation was not without significance. Unlike his father, he had never actively participated in provincial or national politics and, therefore, Mujib could rely on him to play the role of a constitutional figurehead without posing any threat to his position as prime minister. Moreover, in the post-liberation power struggle Mujib was at pains to find a man who would not be controversial. With his judicial background and accomplishments as the official spokesman for
' New York Times, January 9, 1972. 7Sheikh Mujib's release became a cause taken up by many statesmen and political groups in different countries. See the Times (London), August 5 and 12, 1971; New York Times, 1971; and many other newspapers. Author's interview with President Choudhury in Dacca on August 11, 1972.

Christian Science Monitor, Washington Post, Daily Telegraph (London), August 12,

106 Western Political Quarterly the Bengali cause in the international area, Choudhury seemed the right man. Finally, Mujib knew that because Choudhury had a history of high blood pressure, he would not accept any position which would be physically exacting; the presidency of a parliamentary democracy seemed to be a placid enough post.9 As premier, Mujib immediately began to take steps to restore law and order. His first move in this respect was to ask the guerrillas to surrender their arms to local authorities. He tried to add incentive to his appeal by promising fifty rupees for every weapon surrendered. This scheme worked very well and a great quantity of arms and ammunition was given up. Wherever necessary, Mujib approached guerrilla leaders personally in order to arrange the surrender of arms. A good example was his visit to the chief town of the Tangail district, located sixty miles northwest of Dacca, to attend a ceremony for the surrender of arms by the guerrillas who had been involved in the liberation struggle of the region.10 However, Mujib was not so fortunate in his efforts to persuade a Maoist group, led by two Bengali communists- A. Motin and M. Alauddin - to surrender its arms and to relinquish control of an area it had seized from the Pakistani military during the conflict. Mujib made a number of gestures aimed at bringing one of the party's two leaders, Alauddin, to a conference table with him to iron out the differences between the Awami League's goals and those of the rebel group. It appeared for a time that Alauddin might be receptive to the prime minister's overtures for peace, but such hopes were swept away when some Awami Leaguers visited Atrai and were summarily executed on suspicion of spying for the Mujib government. The incident infuriated Mujib and his followers. The army was ordered into the area and about 50 or 60 members of the party were killed. Two views prevailed about the course of action Mujib should have taken. One justifies his action in crushing the resistance of this particular group, because tolerating it would have encouraged warlordism by other groups, including the Marxists-Leninists. The opposing view maintains that Mujib could have used the Motin-Alauddin group as a lever to put pressure on the vested economic interests to support his moderate socialist program. Moreover, it was held that mere suppression of one Marxist-Leninist group, without fundamental socioeconomic reforms, would not help the political stability of Bangladesh. Many left-leaning Bengalis also believed that Mujib's decision to destroy the Motin-Alauddin stronghold was actually influenced by the Indian government, which suspected a strategic link between the West Bengali Naxalites and the East Bengali Marxist-Leninists -Motin and Alauddin. Another difficulty which Sheikh Mujib faced in his effort to restore normalcy in Bangladesh centered on the question of the Biharis. After being freed by the Pakistanis, Mujib had made an unequivocal commitment that the minorities inside the country would be protected at any cost. However, upon his return to Bangladesh, this commitment was not honored in relation to the Biharis.1 The term "Bihari" is applied generally to all Indian immigrants living in Bangladesh whose original homes were in the provinces of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, the Punjab, and Gujrat. In this sense, the term is not used in a pejorative way. How9 In 1972, President Choudhury mentioned this aspect of his post to the author, but at the same time expressedimpatience and disappointmentwith his actual role in the decisionmaking process. In 1973, he seemed not only tense but disappointed with the performance of the Awami League government. He even mentioned resigning. In November, 1973, Mujib accepted his resignation and appointed him as a roving ambassadorfor Bangladesh. 10 In Mujib's view, the surrenderof arms by 60,000 guerrillas to Mujib at Dacca stadium in February, 1972, marked a very crucial stage of disarmingthe Bengali guerrillas.Source: author's interview with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on July 17, 1973, in Dacca. n Times (London), January 10, 1972. Mujib reiterated his earlier stand of March 7, 1971, that the non-Bengali minority must be protected and given equal rights as citizens.

Leadership,Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 107

ever, the term is also used to refer to those Muslim refugees who fled to Bangladesh from Bihar, where they had lived as a minority, at the time of the partitioning of India in 1947. Although arriving as refugees they soon occupied important positions in business, trade and industry in Bangladesh. This transformation took place mainly for two reasons: they spoke Urdu, the first official language of Pakistan and the one spoken chiefly by the ruling class in West Pakistan, where all power lay and, therefore, they were more readily accepted as Muslim brothers by the West Pakistani power elite. The Biharis soon received all kinds of benefits from the West Pakistani rulers, in the form of jobs in business and industry, low-interest loans from banks for investments, support for trading and industrial enterprises, opportunities for training and, later on, technical and managerial positions in business and industrial enterprises, most of which were owned and controlled by West Pakistanis. In short, the Biharis were soon identified by the bulk of the Bengali population as permanent agents of the West Pakistani vested interests who could never be dislodged from Bangladesh as long as the Pakistani domination continued. This use of the term Bihari did have a pejorative sense. Bengali nationalism was geared primarily to getting rid of West Pakistani exploitation, and the Biharis provided the Bengalis with a constant reminder of that exploitation. When the Bengalis rose in arms in March 1971, the Biharis became a logical target. This led to rioting and murders between the two groups. Apart from attempting to suppress the Bengali nationalist movement, the Pakistani military took it upon themselves to avenge the Bihari killings. The net result was that from a limited communal riot the Bihari-Bengali conflict grew into a massively organized killing of the Bengalis by the whole Pakistani army, in collaboration with the Biharis of Bangladesh. It is quite understandable, therefore, that pockets of Bihari population were compelled to protect themselves against the victorious Bengalis immediately after liberation. In trying to protect themselves, they again became involved in an armed conflict with the post-liberation Bengalis, which led to a further deterioration of their position. Indeed, the Biharis were caught in a vicious cycle from which they seemed to be unable to extricate themselves. Mujib showed restraint when he was confronted with the Bihari resistance in Mohammadpur and Mirpur, two sections of the capital city of Dacca. There the Biharis were all armed with automatic weapons; moreover, some Pakistani soldiers who had not surrendered were hiding among them. It is suspected that the Pakistani soldiers persuaded the Biharis to resist the efforts of the Bangladesh government to enforce its policy of disarming all those who had arms. When the government sent a small contingent of police and soldiers into the area, Pakistani soldiers and Bihari militants murdered them.l2 The Bengali army and the guerrillas, who had not yet surrendered their arms, were very bitter about the incident. To them it was shocking that even after they had gained their freedom, Bengalis were still being killed by Biharis. What they resented most of all was that the Indian regular army was unable to make the Biharis and the Pakistani soldiers surrender their arms and thus allow the Bengalis freedom to move in their capital city. Mujib was left with no alternative other than to order the withdrawal of the Indian army from the two Pakistani-Bihari occupied areas, and to deploy the regular Bangladesh army in those areas with specific orders to make the PakistaniBiharis surrender their arms as early as possible. Resistance was so strong at first that Bangladesh forces were obliged to use mortars and even to lay siege, so that
2

Independent observers declared that at least 100 were killed and several hundred more were injured. New York Times, January 31, 1972. The author verified this report from Bangladesh army officers directly involved in that operation.

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food could not be brought in from the outside; together, the bombardment and the siege forced the Pakistanis and Biharis to surrender.'3 The condition of the Biharis was pathetic. Not only did the Bengalis regard them as collaborators, but even after independence, they had proved themselves to be the supporters of the Pakistanis in open confrontation with the Bangladesh army. The result was that for six months the Biharis could not move about the city freely for fear of reprisals. Since the majority of the Biharis cannot speak fluent, accent-free Bengali, the fear of being detected through language prevented many of them from moving about the city. Indeed, some Biharis showed a significant lack of interest in accepting an independent Bangladesh as their home,l4 looking instead toward West Pakistan or even India, though neither New Delhi nor Islamabad seems interested in having them. Later, as a result of a repatriation agreement between India and Pakistan, signed in August 1973, Islamabad agreed to accept 80,000 Biharis out of an estimated 300,000 living in Bangladesh.15 There was another area in which Mujib had to make a highly sensitive decision. This pertains to the proposed trial of certain Pakistani POWs for war crimes. The matter of war crimes was complicated by a variety of problems. One was that of territorial jurisdiction. Pakistani soldiers had been taken out of Bangladesh into Indian territory and therefore were not under the direct territorial jurisdiction of Bangladesh. In any war crime trials, India would have been directly involved, despite statements made by New Delhi that it would have nothing to do with the question. Moreover, Islamabad threatened that should such trial take place, it would be obliged to bring to trial a number of Bengali military men and civilian administrators in Pakistan against whom treasonable charges could be leveled. Moreover, Bhutto very shrewdly put added pressure on the Bangladesh government to compromise on the question of POWs and trials for war crimes by blocking the entry of Bangladesh into the UN, with the help of a Chinese veto on August 25, 1975.16 Though over 100 countries, including all the major powers except China, accorded recognition to Dacca, Bhutto's clever pro-Islamic diplomacy, in the beginning at least, prevented most Arab countries from extending recognition. At one point, Bhutto even took Pakistan out of the British Commonwealth because of the recognition accorded to Bangladesh by all the other Commonwealth countries. Such pressure discouraged the policy-makers in both Bangladesh and India from a full commitment to implement the decision to try Pakistani soldiers for war crimes. A third aspect of the issue was the problem of war criminals per se. The Nuremberg trials had left a bitter taste in the mouths of international jurists and lawyers. As a result, the big powers would have been hard put to agree even to allow the trials to take place under the auspices of an international body. It seemed quite inevitable, therefore, that compromises had to be made on the question of alleged war criminals. In fact, the process of relaxation of the 3Colonel Khaled Mosharraf told the author that the Pakistanis and Biharis were deprived of food during the siege. A foreign journalist somehow slipped through the cordon and thoroughly investigated the situation; later he told Mosharraf that the colonel was doing almost the same thing to the Pakistani forces as they had done to the Bengalis. 14In 1973, the author interviewed thirty Biharis mainly from two age groups. Without exception those who were over fifty years of age wanted to go to Pakistan. Three interviewees over sixty even said that they would rather be dead than remain in Bangladesh. All those in the younger age groups of 16-18 and 35-40, wanted to go to Pakistan as well. But five in their twenties said that if things were better, they would consider staying. During his visit to Bangladesh in 1975, the author expected a significant change in this attitude, but found the previous attitudinal pattern holding in spite of many Biharis working in different jobs both in government and in the private sector. Those without jobs - majoritybeing women- have taken to street-begging. "5 New York Times, October 20, 1973. See 6 Ibid., August 26, 1972.

Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 109 Bangladesh government's stand in regard to war crimes was already visible when the International Crimes Bill was passed by the Bangladesh Parliament on July 17, 1973. Unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crime cases, the International Crimes Act not only gave the accused the right to cross-examine the witnesses and to examine the documentary evidence of the prosecution at a reasonable time before the trial, but also granted the convicted the right to appeal to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.17 After the repatriation agreement between India and Pakistan in August 1973, the Bangladesh government moderated its position further, when the number of Pakistanis waiting for trial was reduced from 195 to 178. The general clemency given to the Bengali collaborators in December 1973 also signified a change in policy toward the war crime trials. Finally, in February, 1974, following Bhutto's recognition of Bangladesh and Mujib's participation in the Islamic summit conference in Lahore, a general clemency was issued to all Pakistanis charged with
war crimes. II As Mujib had attempted to unify the Bengalis through his personal efforts to restore law and order, contain warlordism, settle the Bihari question, grant clemency to collaborators and Pakistani POWs charged with war crimes, so did he seem to try to generate mass support for and neutralize opposition to his government through political parties, citizen groups, and so forth. During the liberation struggle, Mujib received unquestioned loyalty (though he himself was in a Pakistani jail) from most Bengali political parties and their guerrilla extensions who hlad previously united against the Pakistanis. Though after independence these political groups were rapidly engulfed by internal dissensions and intergroup conflicts, Mujib tried to reunite some of them behind him and his government. Most of these groups fell under the category of branch party, ranging from extreme left to left of the middle. Maoist parties followed a cell party structure. Rightist parties were banned for collaborating with the Pakistanis. The Awami League had become a mass party, without losing its earlier characteristics of a branch party.'8 It held a middle position in the political spectrum. In spite of the power struggle which was going on between different political groups, the leftist parties found common ground in their criticism of the League's policies. They accused the League government of collusion with New Delhi and Moscow to suppress the opposition, particularly those members who were advocating a neutral foreign policy for the country. The Maoist factions even charged that the ruling party was conspiring with the Indian Congress party to liquidate the Maoists on both sides of the borders. The supressions of Maoists at Atrai by Mujib and in West Bengal by Chief Minister S. Ray were cited as examples. The pro-Moscow parties, the National Awami party led by Muzaffar Ahmad, as well as the Bangla Communist party led by Moni Singh, had had certain initial confrontations with the Awami League, but the consistent support of Moscow for India and the Bengali cause turned them into close allies of the League. However, the election of 1973 was to show that this alliance was not to bring any rich dividends to the pro-Moscow parties. As far as the National Awami party, led by M. Bhashani, was concerned, it lacked an efficient organization. Moreover, in spite of Bhashani's popularity
7 Sections 18

16.2 and 21 of International Crimes (Tribunal Act), 1973, respectively. Here, I have followed basically the classificatory system provided by M. Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1955), pp. 63-79. As happened with the Awami League party in Bangladesh, the Congress party in India and the Pakistan People's party in Pakistan, a significant increase in popularity can transform a branch party into a mass party without affecting its previous ideology.

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among the Bengali peasantry and his long-time image as a reform politician, a large part of the political elite had reservations about his ability to organize and direct national development. His critics point out that he had never formed a government nor had he ever been a part of any administration in Bengal. The obvious implication, which was accepted by a major section of the elite, was that Bhashani might be a good opposition leader, but was poor material for national leadership. Moreover, he had been unable to resolve the ideological conflicts within his party that arose between Islamic socialism and secular socialism. Lastly, his ambivalence and political non-decisions in 1972 hurt his party considerably. Ataur Rahman's Bangla Jatio League suffered from certain weaknesses. In the power struggle over the question of who should be the second in command in the Awami League hierarchy, Ataur Rahman lost out to Mujib in 1957. Moreover, he did not have the opportunity to form his own party - as Bhashani had, that same year - because of the military takeover by Ayub Khan. After the coup a number of politicians fell under the new president's Elective Bodies Disqualification Order, Ataur Rahman being one of them. Not until 1964, when the Disqualification Order was revoked, did he have the opportunity to develop his political arm, the Pakistan National League, which later became the Bengal National League or Bangla Jatio League. Unfortunately, both infighting and lack of wide mass support further weakened the party so that by 1972 it was politically unimportant. Yet Ataur Rahman as a politician and national leader continued to enjoy support from his constituents, and this at least allowed him to be elected in 1973, the year of the greatest landslide victory of the Awami League party. In the 1970 national and provincial elections, in which the Awami League scored a tremendous victory, all the leftist opposition parties except Muzaffar's NAP and the Bangla Jatio League boycotted the elections. On the other hand, most of the rightist political groups (e.g., the Muslim League, Jamat-i-Islam, Nizam-i-Islam, Jamat-i-Ulema-i-Islam and the Pakistan Democratic party), contested the elections and, later on, during the liberation struggle, collaborated with the Pakistani military.19 After liberation, the Awami League leadership did not have to face any opposition from them because the rightist pro-Pakistani parties in Bangladesh were disbanded and most of their leaders imprisoned under the Collaborator's Act.20 They were granted clemency by Mujib in December 1973. The leftists strongly resented the fact that clemency did not apply to them.21 This decision is seen by the Bengali leftists as a definite change in the Awami League's domestic as well as foreign policy. They believe that domestic politics will become more and more involved with religious militant conservatives, since Sheikh Mujib and his party can expect support from such groups because of his act of clemency.22 Though the ban on the rightist parties was not lifted, the release of rightist politicians would tend to strengthen the Awami League's efforts to cona detailed analysis of the role and platform of all political parties in the election of 1970, see Zillur R. Khan and A. T. R. Rahman, Autonomy and Constitution-Making: The Case of Bangladesh,pp. 163-200. 20The act was promulgatedby the Bangladeshgovernmentto deal with the local collaborators of the Pakistani junta. Under it, a person suspected of collaboration could be imprisoned without bail. 1Holiday (Dacca), December 9, 1973. The leftist, radical revolutionaryparties are: Jatio Samajtantric Dal (National Socialist party), Purbo Bangla Sarbohara party (East Bengal Communist party), Purbo Banglar Sammobadi Dal- Marxbadi-Leninbadi (Communist Party of East Bengal - Marxist-Leninist), Purba Bangla Communist party- Marxbadi-Leninbadi(East Bengal Communistparty- Marxist-Leninist), and East Pakistan Communist party- Marxist-Leninist (led by Motin and Alauddin). Among these parties, only the JSD (National Socialist party) works as a front organization of the BangladeshCommunistLeague, an undergroundparty. The rest are entirely undergroundparties. 22 Mujib's press statement on December 15, 1973. See Bangladesh Observer,December 16, 1973; also Holiday (Dacca), December 16, 1973.
9 For

Leadership,Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 111 tain leftist opposition in Bangladesh. Moreover, the price of support from the rightists could be in terms of a significant change in foreign policy, that is, from pro-Russian to pro-American. The anti-Hindu, anti-India and pro-American attitude of rightist politicians might give Mujib a greater leverage with India in political and economic bargaining. This could, in time, result in establishing a confederate tie with Pakistan. Ironically, the leftists are also in favor of such a relation with Pakistan because it would tend to reduce dependence on India, and consequently, Indian influence in Bangladesh. In order to insure the Leagure's predominance over other parties, Mujib and his close associates sought to replace the League's old ideology of the Six-Point program with a new one. The Six-Point program had effectively served the League's political goal of ending Pakistani domination and exploitation of Bangladesh. The new ideology of Mujibism or Mujibbad, Mujib's followers claimed, could accomplish for the Bengali nation wvhatthe old Six-Point had before the country was liberated. Mujibism comprised nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism,which were subsequentlyincorporatedin the constitution of Bangladesh as fundamental principles of state polity.23 Mujib describes Mujibism as follows: It is for the philosophers to expound on ideologies, if you think Mujibism is one. I can tell you what I think whether you call it Mujibism or by any other name. First, I believe in democracy; supremacy of the will of the people; government based on the consent of the governed; free thinking, free expressions and other popular freedoms which help blossom human hearts and minds. This is what I mean by democracy and I also know that you can interpret democracy in innumerable ways. Along with my conviction in democracy is my belief that the democratic experience is only possible in a society free of exploitation and that is why I want socialism with democracy. I also believe that all religions in Bangladesh must exist on equal footing and that is what I mean by secularismfreedom of religion. Last but not least, I want the people to draw inspiration from the Bengali culture, language, folklore, mores and the general Bengali environment. Such inspiration will act as the motivating force for the Bengalis to work for the betterment of their golden Bengal and this is, again, what I mean by nationalism.2 The strongest denunciation of Mujib for failure to implement Mujibism came from Bhashani in the post-election period. "Democracy does not only mean freedom, it also means responsibility and commitment on the part of the leaders and the led. In the Awami League government in Bangladesh today, we find freedom not in its real sense, but in its most distorted interpretation- freedom to loot, to plunder and to corrupt."25 The first open challenge to Mujibism occurred in May 1972, when the student political party aligned to the Awami League - the Bangladesh Chatra League--split into a pro-Mujibism group and an anti-Mujibism group. The latter mustered enough support to challenge effectively the pro-Mujibism group in the Dacca University student election in May 1972 (however, due to widespread violation of electoral rules, such as looting of ballot boxes, the election result could not be published), and this factor gave an added significance to the opposition student groups throughout the country. This rebel group openly challenged Muji23Constituent

Press,1972), p. 13. (Dacca:Government Printing ' Author's interview Mujibon July 17, 1973,in Dacca. with ' Author's cited a number on interview with MaulanaBhashani August6, 1973. Bhashani in of cases of politicalkilling,lawlessness corruption which the AwamiLeague and involved.On the veryday of the interview had government been directlyor indirectly homein Santosh(70 milesfromDacca). Fortunately, an attackwasmadeon Bhashani's no harmcameto him.

Assembly of Bangladesh, Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

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bism and claimed that the only way in which the socio-politico-economic conditions in Bangladesh could be improved was to introduce scientific socialism (which emphasizes class struggle and ultimate victory of the working class) instead of experimenting with utopian socialism (which does not incorporate class struggle as the means of securing social justice for the working class) of the Mujib brand. They claimed that unless Bangladesh went all the way with socialism and established a revolutionarygovernment to enforce socialistic goals no real progresswould be possible, and without tangible results the masses would rise against the Mujib government and start a full-fledged revolution to establish scientific socialism. Their claims could have been brushed aside as just talk, but certain incidents which occurred during July 1972 indicated that the anti-Mujib group had come to stay and could probably start a viable political opposition in the country. In the simultaneously held national conferences of the two groups of the Bangladesh Chatra League, Mujib encouraged the pro-Mujib faction by accepting an invitation to open their conference, thereby snubbing the rebels. A few months earlier such a direct denunciation by Mujib could have destroyed the new group, but in July 1972 such a gesture against the rebels did not have the desired effect. The author went to both meetings and was astonished to find that there was almost equal attendance at both. Moreover, a real surprise came when the anti-Mujib leader openly challenged Mujib's leadership and raised slogans to the effect that "Mujib should resign and let a competent leader govern the country." The significance of organized political opposition to Mujib by a student group was that it cleared the way for open criticism of the regime from other opposition parties.26 The students demonstrated that the masses were prepared to listen to critical
voices.

Some left-leaning political commentators suggested that ultimately a united front would emerge under the leadership of Bhashani, the only politician who could possibly come close to challenging the Awami League. It has also been suggested that the Bangla Communist party and the new-born Bangladesh Communist party (Leninist), Sromik Krishak Samajbadi Dal (Laborer-PeasantSocialist party) and the Bangladesh Jatio League (Oli Ahad faction), and their allied organizations in worker and student groups were the possible partners of a Jukta (United) Front against the Awami League.27 But this united front did not materializein the election of 1973. One ominous political trend in the pre-election months was an increased use of violence by the party workers of both the government and the opposition parties.28 Both the Awami League and the opposition parties attempted to fix the

responsibility for the use of violent tactics on one another and their respective international allies. The government claimed that certain parties who were engaged in violence were receiving clandestine support from China and America. On the other hand, the opposition parties held that the violence was the result
For a. good treatment of the Rab-Shiraj student group of BCL (Bangladesh Chatra League), see Holiday (Dacca), July 23 and August 6, 1972. 27The coalition politics worked successfully in 1954 when the opposition parties, including the Awami League, defeated the Muslim League party, which was responsiblefor the creationof Pakistan,in the provincialelection of East Bengal. 28Between February, 1972, and February, 1973, political killings claimed the lives of 700 workers of the government party (A. L.) and 500 workers and supportersof the opposition parties. See Holiday (Dacca), January 7, 1973. The number of such murders decreased considerablyafter the election, but from September 1973 onwards, they rose again. In April 1974, one group of pro-Mujib students rounded up seven students belonging to another pro-Mujib faction and machine-gunnedthem to death in a Dacca university dormitory (Jinnah Hall). Political violence was one of the justifications given by Mujib for his decision to declare a state of emergencyfor the country at large on December 28, 1974. See Bangladesh Observer, December 29, 1974; see also, The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh, Embassy of Bangladesh, Washington, D.C., February1, 1975, p. 1.
2

Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 113 of the government's suppressionof all dissent. They also held that the government suppression was not only supported but also instigated by the Indo-Soviet lobby inside the Bangladesh government. The examples of political repression by the government readily cited by the opposition were: the Atrai incident (mentioned earlier), imprisonment of Major A. Jalil, who, under the pressure of public opinion, was freed and later joined forces with Rab and Shiraj in forming the JSD (Jatio Samajtantrik Dal or National Socialist party), the banning of opposition newspapers such as Ganakantha and Desh Bangla, the burning of the party offices of Muzaffar (NAP) and Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) in Dacca, and police shooting at a group of demonstrators protesting the American bombing of Hanoi. Against this backdrop of political violence, final preparations for the first general election of Bangladesh were made. A number of political analysts and commentators predicted that the election would be postponed indefinitely. A few felt that if the election were held according to the schedule, there would be widespread rigging of votes in favor of the League at the polls. And there were others who believed that the opposition parties would win 30 to 40 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. None of these predictions came true. Mujib and the League won a landslide victory, gaining 292 out of the 300 seats and thus repeating their performance of 1970.29 However, more right-wing parties ran in 1970 and out of the five seats won by the nongovernment parties, four went to rightist parties: Jamaat-i-Islam (1), Nizam-i-Islam (1) and Pakistan Democratic party (2). In 1973 more leftist political parties participated in the election and the rightist parties were excluded because of their association with the Pakistani military junta during the liberation struggle.3 In the 1973 election, five out of eight non-government seats were won by independents, though the three leftist parties31not only polled more votes than the independents but some of their candidates came close to defeating a number of League candidates.32 Though the opposition parties lost, the voting in some constituencies was very close. The election was essentially free. Had the opposition succeeded in resolving their differences and thus presenting a united front to the electorate, they might have secured more seats. The 1970 and 1973 Awami League victories resembled each other in general outcome. Both had been landslide victories for the AL; both victories were largely determined by the personal appeal of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Moreover in both elections the victory surpassedthe expectations of the political commentators. This is particularly true in 1973 when a number of protest marches against high
29In the 1970 election held under the Yahya regime, the Awami League polled 72.68 percent
of the votes; in 1973 it polled 73.1 percent. parties contested the 1970 and 1973 elections in Bangladesh. fact, the 1970 election was boycotted by the leftist parties in protest of the restrictions on election and constitution-making imposed by the Legal Framework Order of Yahya Khan. "The only leftist party that won a seat in the provincial elections of Bangladesh in 1970 was NAP (Wali), of which Professor Muzaffar Ahmad was General-Secretary. After 0 In Excluding Independents and the West

Pakistani-basedNAP (Pakhtoon), BaluchistanUnited Front and Sind Mahaz, fourteen

his ownparty,NAP (M).

the March 25, 1971, Pakistani suppression,Muzaffar left the Wall NAP and started

sSpokesmen call their parties left democratic parties. NAP (M) secured one seat and polled 1,586,441 or 8.6 percent of the total votes cast; Jatio Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) won one seat and polled 1,195,572 or 6.5 percent and NAP (B) polled 1,001,312 or 5.4 percent of the poll. The third opposition seat was won by Mr. Ataur Rahman, a former Awami League chief minister and a major political rival of Mujib, whose party, BJL, polled 61,541 votes or .3 percent of the poll. Source: Bangladesh Observer, March 9 and 10, 1973. Also, First Election to Parliament of Bangladesh, Election Commission, the Peoples' Republic of Bangladesh (Dacca, n.d.; probably 1973).

114 Western Political Quarterly prices and government corruption were organized not only by opposition parties,
but also by some of the pro-AL elements of the student organizations.33 The main reasons behind the failure of opposition parties in the 1973 election can be summed up as follows: first, internal organizational weaknesses and infighting among the opposition parties made it impossible for them to make any dent in AL support. Not only did the opposition parties put up separate candidates in most of the 300 constituencies, but they allowed further fragmentation of their support by letting some of their candidates run simultaneously in two or more constituencies. The opposition parties also suffered from chronic lack of funds. The AL, on the other hand, not only possessed the necessary funds to fight an election, but also had the use of government facilities from the time campaigning began to the time votes were cast. Generally, the identification of the left parties with communism also weakened their strength. Traditionally, Bengalis have looked upon communist ideology as detrimental to their faith. These reasons for failure are reflected in specific party experiences. Bhashani professed Islamic socialism, but he failed to generate sufficient mass support for three reasons: Islamic socialism as an ideology was never clearly defined by either himself or his followers and therefore it confused many; in post-liberation Bangladesh the term "Islamic Socialism" reminded many of Bhutto's "Islamic Socialism" and consequently became suspect by association; the pro-Peking leanings of his party also hurt it at the polls. Professor Muzaffar Ahmad's National Awami party had similar difficulties. Its alignment with Moscow and New Delhi became a liability during the election, when many voters thought the party was too much under foreign influence; lack of any real difference between the Muzaffar NAP platform and the AL platform reduced its appeal to many who were looking for a viable alternative to the AL; finally, the AL leadership, particularly the appeal of Mujib, made the difference. Another left party, JSD (Jatio Shamajtantrik Dal or National Socialist party) was completely identified with Marxism and therefore failed to make sufficient appeal to the voters to pose any real threat to the AL. The reason JSD polled the second highest number of votes among the opposition parties was due chiefly to the personal appeal of its leadership, particularly the liberation hero, Major A. Jalil, who is regarded more as a freedom fighter and a reform-minded nationalist than a communist. On the other hand, the founders of the party, Rab and Shiraj, who were the first to challenge Mujib's policies openly, came to be closely identified with Marxism as a result of their continued espousal of scientific socialism. This group also suffered from their alignment with the Maoist factions. The 1970 and 1973 AL victories differed in one important respect. Whereas organizational difficulties and lack of understanding among the opposition parties were partially responsible for the landslide victory in 1973, Bengali nationalism and anti-West Pakistani sentiments contributed to the party's triumph in 1970. Mujib's personal appeal was a very important factor in the victory of 1970, but it became even more important in 1973 when the AL, as a political party, confronted political reality after liberation and was unable to deal with major problems, such as political violence, the Bihari settlement,34 the prisoner of war issue, repatriation, and rapid inflation. The party depended more heavily on Mujib be33Political commentators critical of the AL suggested that the government took recourse to

pressure tactics in the constituencies where left-wing party candidates made a strong showing. See Holiday, March 11, 1973. It was also rumored that Ataur Rahman won only because he invited foreign journalists to observe polling in his constituency and their presence prevented the Awami League workers from stuffing the ballot boxes. 84Mujib has declared the Biharis who opted for Pakistan as Pakistanis who should be repatriated to Pakistan. The Biharis choosing Bangladesh have been declared bonafide Bengalis with equal rights and privileges.

Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 115 cause its chiefs found that he was not only a unifying force but also a highly flexible leader who knew what the people wanted him to do and when to do it.35 III The result of the 1973 election proved that in spite of the growing opposition to and an increasing distrust of the AL, Mujib's personal popularity was sufficient to carry the party to victory. How could a leader enjoy so much popularity when his own political party was facing so much mass criticism? As the Indians tried to do with Nehru, the Egyptians with Nasser, the Indonesians with Sukarno and the Argentinians with Peron, the Bengalis also tried to separate Mujib from his party in order to resolve this dilemma of leadership. There were many unfortunate consequences to separating a leader from his party. In most democratic systems, the party is an integral part of the political process which converts the needs and the demands of a people into administrative and political actions. The conversion abruptly stops when a leader is unable to discipline and control his followers. Secondly, the charisma and popularity of a political leader ultimately depends on his ability to keep his promises. Failure to keep them might be overlooked once or twice, but repeated failures can lead to disaster. Thirdly, the history of governmental corruption and the arbitrarinessof ruling parties in the Pakistani period, as well as in independent Bangladesh, has bred suspicion, distrust and deep frustration among the people, which has made it that much more difficult for Mujib to salvage the party through instituting a program of drastic reorganization. Even if the party were reorganized, there is no guarantee that it will not come to behave as before. In case of another failure, the people are likely to find it much more difficult to separate the leader from his party. The political infrastructuresand the line of political communications are so underdeveloped that Mujib faced great difficulty in communicating his political decisions to the people in the first place, and having them carried out in the second. This was complicated by the government's decision to disband the village guerrilla resistance groups, which had actively participated in the liberation struggle, without making any alternate provisions to preserve a political infrastructure. It has also contributed to a deeper division and a more acute competition among the ex-resistance groups, who were previously united against the Pakistanis but now started fighting between themselves over control of allocation (relief goods and funds) and distribution (assets of collaborators) of resources. Often this fighting spreads to non-political aspects of village life which further undermines the effectiveness of government policies. The original division, which existed prior to the Pakistani military supression, between the Bengali personnel of the armed forces was renewed by Mujib's preferential treatment of the Rakkhi Bahini, a paramilitarycadre-like group equipped and trained by the Indian military. The Bengali army, which grew out of Bengali units of the Pakistani army, had not only carried on guerrilla warfare throughout the liberation struggle but, very significantly, played a crucial role in iniitially resisting the Pakistani military. In fact, the main purpose behind the raising of the Rakkhi Bahini was to reduce the influence of the Pakistani-trained Bengali armed forces. Mujib is well aware of the feeling among a large number of Bengali officersthat the actual liberation struggle was spearheaded and sustained by themselves and, therefore, they should be given a greater share in the decisionmaking process. A large number of Bengali officers feel that the Indian governThe political developments between February and March 1971 amply prove this point. See Zillur R. Khan, "March Movement of Bangladesh: Bengali Struggle for Political Power," Indian Journal of Political Science, 33 (July-September 1973), 306-11.

116 Western Political Quarterly ment was not fair when it allowed the Indian army to seize Pakistani military hardware as trophies without giving Bengali soldiers their share. Even some pro-Indian Bengali officers showed resentment toward this particular policy, when the Delhi talks between Indian and Bengali military commanders to settle the issue came to help in the liberation struggle can never be overestimated and, therefore, the Bengali and Indian military should work in close cooperation in maintaining the security of the subcontinent. They also feel that the Bengalis should not resent the Indian decision to carry off Pakistani military goods amounting, roughly, to $500 million because Indian aid to Bangladesh came to that amount, if not more. The opposite is argued by pro-Pakistani Bengali army officers, who either fought for Pakistan or avoided the conflict by securing a quick transfer to units in West Pakistan. Many have been retired or transferred to civilian administration. Those who have managed to stay in the regular Bangladesh army cannot expect early or easy promotion. Quite often they have made use of deteriorating economic conditions to buttress their contentions that they were right in opposing the independence movement and that India was at the root of all evils, starting with the guerrilla movement and destruction of the Islamic state of Pakistan, and ending with the pauperization of the Bengali nation. Such officers have not only gained increased support from among the mass of the soldiery, but also have won over many noncommitted officers who, though they had fought against the Pakistanis, were not pro-Indian. In sum, what bothers Mujib most about the regular army is the combination of internal conflict and the army's growing disenchantment with the League government. This combination could become too explosive for the civilian government to handle if the contending factions within the army started drawing active support from different groups which once took up arms against the Pakistanis. Though internal conflicts within the Bangladesh armed forces prevented Mujib from relying too heavily on the regular army, he tried to use it to curb widespread corruption, hoarding, smuggling and political violence. But every time the operation affected his partymen adversely, he ordered it stopped. His decision to stand by his followers, some of whom were allegedly involved in corrupt practices, further alienated those army personnel who were questioning the League government's commitments to social justice. However, the state of emergency, which Mujib declared in December, 1974, would offer him another opportunity to use the armed forces to enforce the hitherto unenforced laws. Should Mujib fail to make full use of the army again, his potential as a mobilizer and unifier could be seriously undermined. In addition to the military, there are substantial religious obstacles to effective enforcement. Even the repressionsof Bengali Muslims by the Pakistani Muslims, who considered the former as inferior converts from Hinduism, failed to reduce the influence of Islam over the Bengali masses. This was amply demonstratedwhen the Mujib government submitted to the popular demand to restore the morning recital of the Quran on Radio Bangladesh. The Mujib government also gave in to demands to prohibit the serving of alcoholic beverages to Bengali Muslims in private clubs. These events indicate that government policies such as birth control and secular measuresin general are likely to face seriousopposition from orthodox Bengali Muslims. This is probably why Mujib, in private interviews, emphasizes the need for family planning, but he never mentions it in mass rallies.
Mujib won an important concession from New Delhi in the India-Bangladesh summit meeting of May 15, 1974. At this meeting he got Mrs. Gandhi to agree to the return of all military hardware taken out of Bangladesh by the Indian army after the surrender of the Pakistani forces. See, for details, Bangladesh Observer, May 16 and 17; Holiday, May 19, 1974; Bangladesh, Embassy of Bangladesh, Washington, D.C., 4, No. 9, May 24, 1974, p. 1.

an impasse in April 1973.36 Most pro-Indian officers, however, feel that Indian

Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 117 If he openly advocates the implementation of population control policies, he might lose the support of the Bengali peasantry,most of whom are conservative Muslims. If, on the other hand, he does nothing to control population (which, increasing at 3 percent annually, is expected to double in 25 years), Mujib will face increasing criticism from that same peasantry as the gap between demand for food and its production widens. As in the Middle East, Islam may not be sufficiently dynamic to provide new interpretations of social events and to help bring about needed social reforms, but it is still a strong enough ideological force to prevent revolutionary changes in Bengali society. Mujib faces serious problems with his own charisma. According to Max Weber, charisma is inherently unstable, but its instability can be overcome by what he defines as "routinization of charisma," a concept which exemplifies the process by which charisma is tranformed from an "extraordinary and purely personal relationship (between leader and followers) into an established authority structure that is no longer necessarily dependent upon personal charismatic qualifications in the incumbent leader."37 This transformation can best be effected by what I. L. Horowitz calls "party charisma," a synthesis "of practical political consideration and symbolically laden personalist authority."38 The role of "party charisma," according to Horowitz, "is... to establish a basis of authority which is at one and the same time personal and legal - one that focuses on the party and not on either the individual or the law as such."39 Charismatic leaders like Nasser and Mujib ostensibly tried to routinize their charisma by strengthening their party, but they always ended up weakening it. For example, periodic reshufflingof cabinets both by Mujib and Nasser weakened the party structure by creating newer divisions. Infighting within the charismat's own party also undermines the process of institutionalization. For example, both Nasser's Arab Socialist Union and Mujib's Awami League have suffered from internal conflict between rival party factions. In both cases, the leader was considered by his party factions as an institution in himself, which did not help the process of routinization. Instead, it widened the division within the party because each faction vied for his support, as happened in the Arab Socialist Union between radical communists and Islamic socialists. In Mujib's Awami League, the division and the resulting conflict between proMoscow social democrats and pro-Washington democrats has lately become more pronounced.40 The problem of institutionalizationof charisma goes beyond the central party structure and the omnipresence of its charismatic leader. At the village level, where 90 percent of the Bengalis live, innovative structureshave been introduced, such as the Panchayat committees,4l in order to provide a firm basis for institutionalization. But their acceptance by the masses and authority they wield have been more a result of the success attained by incumbents through face to face contacts and relationships rather than the loyalty or commitment of the peasantry to an impersonalizedpolitical structure. Like Nasser, Mujib has failed to institutionalize the basic administrative structure. The influential Awami League leader, the
N. Eisenstadt, editor, Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 54-55. Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 231. 89Ibid., p. 232. 40It caused the fall of finance minister M. Tajuddin, who served as prime minister during Mujib's imprisonment in Pakistan and, later, became the leader of pro-Moscow faction within the ruling party. 41 These replaced the basic democracy councils of the Pakistani period. The local bureaucrats, such as circle officers and thana officers, were ordered by Mujib to cooperate with these committees. However, most of the committees are controlled by the members of the Awami League.
7 S.
38

118 Western Political Quarterly

popular village doctor, or the respected Panchayat chairman wield power and authority because of personal, face-to-face relationships that they have developed, and not because of any loyalty to any institution. The major problem with these structural innovations, such as the village branch of the party dominating the village council, has been the continuation of traditional patterns of authority and the correspondingly weak legitimacy of the party. While respect and authority were accorded to leaders like Mujib and Nasser on the basis of their charismatic appeal, the local bureaucracies and the local parties and their incumbents were denied the legitimacy. Like Nasser, Mujib failed to make a transition from traditional to a legal-rational system through the instrumentalities of his charisma. This is evident in his efforts to propagate Bengali nationalist and socialist principles among rural people. These principles received mass acceptance and, therefore, legitimacy because they were regarded as Mujib's express will, and not because they were the basic principles of Mujib's party. As in the Egyptian case, rather than being the vehicle of institutionalization, Mujib's charisma became an institution in itself. The failure of charisma as an institutionalizer has resulted in the shift of responsibility for policy implementation from institutions to the charismat and his close advisors.42 This is when the popular efforts to separate the leader from his party or ideology stop. Even the rural masses, who previously gave their unquestioned loyalty to the leader, start holding him responsible for deteriorating conditions. This creates the need for reinforcement of charisma. Like some charismats - Nasser, Indira Gandhi, Per6n - Mujib sought replenishment of his charisma from his neutral foreign policy in the face of considerable pressure and his diplomatic coup with Iran and the Arab countries, where he received assurances of economic support.43 The 1974 agreements with seven multi-national oil companies for offshore oil exploration, his recent meeting with President Ford, his address to the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress and to the United Nations, served to reinforce somewhat Mujib's rapidly depleting charisma. Usually, however, charisma depletes faster than the leader can replenish it. This is precisely the reason why theorists, such as, among others, Max Weber, Edward Shills, S. N. Eisenstadt, I. L. Horowitz, Jean Lacouture, C. Geerts, David Apter and Ann Ruth Willner,44 have emphasized the process of institutionalization through which the charismatic, unusual, characteristics are transferred from the unique personality or the unstructured group to orderly institutional reality. 4 The most powerful used to be pro-Moscow finance minister Tajuddin who resigned from the cabinet in November, 1974, just before Henry Kissinger paid an official visit to Bangladesh. The coincidence raised speculation in the Bengali press that his ouster was calculated to please the American government. See Holiday (Dacca), November 3, 1974, p. 1. Other close advisors were Syed Nazrul Islam (former Minister for Industries and now, Vice-President), Dr. Kamal Hossain (Foreign Minister), Tufail Ahmed (Political Secretary to Prime Minister), and Ghazi Golam Mostafa (President of the Dacca District Awami League). After declaring a state of emergency, Mujib chose as his close advisors a senior civil servant, A. K. M. Ahsan, and a civil engineer, Major General Majedul Huq. This is seen by the Bengali elite as a new trend of the government's increasing reliance on technocrats. Holiday (Dacca), February 21, 1975. 43 The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh, Press & Information Division, Embassy of Bangladesh,Washington,D.C., November 15, 1974, pp. 1-2. 44Respectively,in Theory of Social and Economic Organization, introduction by Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 358-373; "Charisma,Order and Status," American Sociological Review, 30 (April 1965), 199-203; Tradition, Change and Modernity (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 119-49; Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 231-43; The Demigods: CharismaticLeadership in the Third World (New York: Knopf, 1970), pp. 93-106; "Ideology as a Cultural System," in D. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 62-63; The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); CharismaticPolitical Leadership: A Theory (Princeton: Princeton University, Center of InternationalStudies,monograph,May 1968), pp. 1-48.

Leadership,Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 119 Mujib's inability to build new institutions, to replace the ones destroyed during the liberation struggle, such as a respected bureaucracy whose authority was accepted at every level of society, the viability of opposition parties (the Awami League was one between 1949 and 1954, and between 1958 and 1971), an impartial judiciary, a free enterprise economy, an open education system, has brought about a crisis of confidence in regard to the political leadership. This has led to a critical evaluation of the government's claims of honesty, justice and self-sacrifice. The result has been a revival and intensification of the issues of autonomy (or independence) and socioeconomic justice which originally created divisions between the Bengalis and non-Bengalis (including Pakistanis) and between the Bengalis themselves. Gone are the unity and consensus achieved among Bengalis during and immediately after the liberation struggle in respect with basic national objectives and ways of attaining them. It has given rise to a situation in which public confusion has increased and the chances of social mobilization have correspondingly decreased. No doubt, in the early days of crisis, immediately following independence, the charismatic leadership of Mujib provided badly needed unity and direction for the country. The Bengalis were inspired to maintain law and order in the absence of organized police forces (the Bengali police forces were destroyed by the Pakistani military's preemptive strike on the night of March 25, 1971, when the Pakistani suppression of the Bengalis started). Mujib's charismatic appeal also kept the original division between the Bengalis to a minimum. His preaching of the principles of Bengali nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism raised hopes among the Bengalis, who were expecting to enjoy the fruits of independence. But the rising expectation of the Bengalis only served to aggravate the crisis, when their leadership failed to fulfill them. For example, many expected a better life after the Pakistani exploitation ended. Instead, life after independence became increasingly more difficult. In spite of massive UN aid amounting to $3.8 billion, given between January 1972 and December 1973, the economic condition steadily deteriorated. Though it was not developmental aid or, in other words, it was given on humanitarian grounds for relief and rehabilitation, it released the state's own resources to be used for development. Questions are now being raised by the international donors as well as by the Bengalis themselves on how such aid and the releasedBengali resourceswere used. Questions are also being asked about the problems faced by Mujib and his close advisors in implementing the much espoused principles of Bengali socialism and democracy. In the name of socialism, all banks and industries with capital investment of over 2.5 million Takas (about $300,000) were nationalized. The republic's gross national product decreased at least 10 percent; meanwhile, the population increased about 15 percent.45 As a result of sagging individual incentive and rising cost of material, the government raised the ceiling of allowable capital investment of private industries to 30 million Takas, an increase of over 1,000 percent.46 In addition, the moratorium on nationalization of foreign industries was raised from ten to fifteen years.47However, the government's decision was vague in regard to properties (houses and land in residential areas) and small (and a few middle-sized) industries which were abandoned by the Pakistanis and, later, taken over by Bengalis. By the government's own admission, only 5,000 out of 20,000 abandoned houses have been recovered from illegal possession. Only 139 out of innumerable small and medium industries have been returned to the owners
6 Wall Street Journal, November 26, 1974. 46The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh, Embassy of Bangladesh, Washington, D.C., August 1, 1974, pp. 1-2.

47Ibid., p. 2.

120 Western Political Quarterly or disinvested.48Not only has socialism been unsuccessful in ushering in economic stability, but, in its name, many have increased their private properties. The country's economic policies seem to consist largely of socialist slogans; the dedication, the discipline and organization necessary to run a socialized economy are not there. Just as the failure of the general economy has lately widened the already revived division between the Bengalis, so has the failure of parliamentarydemocracy. First of all, the overwhelming victory of Mujib and his party at the 1973 general election greatly reduced the chances of a balanced growth of parliamentarydemocracy in the country. Out of 300 seats in the Constituent Assembly, Mujib's League had 292, giving the administration the flavor of a one-party government. Moreover, when issues, such as restoration of abandoned properties to their rightful owners and violation of fundamental rights by government, tended to divide the majority, Mujib and his advisors disciplined the deviant members of their party by reminding them that the Assembly was constituted for the purposes of constitution-making and, therefore, it must not be considered as a sovereign deliberating body in the spirit of parliamentary democracy. The printing and press ordinance, the three months ban on strikes, the prohibition of public gathering, the declaration of a state of emergency under which civil rights have been suspended and, finally, the establishment of a single-party system have undermined the spirit of liberal democracy. When the division between the Bengalis was widening on all these issues, Mujib tried to reverse the process by inviting political parties to unite for a common cause of national progress. In 1973, as mentioned earlier, the first alliance took shape between the Awami League party, the National Awami party (Muzaffar) and the Communist party of Bangladesh (CPB).49 The chances of another alliance have greatly increased after the establishment of a one-party system. According to the fourth amendment of the constitution, passed overwhelmingly by the Bangladesh Parliament in January 1975, independents and members of the opposition parties will have to join the National party, headed by Mujib, in order to participate actively in politics (and to retain their seats in the Parliament).5" The opposition parties could never present any real opposition to Mujib and the League. In 1974, NAP (requisitionist), JSD and CPB (Leninist) tried once more to unite against the League under the name of JGU (Jatio Ganomukti Union or National People's Freedom Union) and failed again.51 They had a partial success with a general strike on November 26, 1974, which was first called by the JSD in spite of the government's ban on all strikes, to forge a united mass movement against "a thoroughly corrupt, unworthy, and anti-people repressive regime propped up by hegemonistic India, revisionist Soviet Union and imperialist United States."52 These Marxist parties do not have the necessary mass base, nor are they expected to establish such a base in the foreseeable future, to challenge effectively Mujib's charismatic leadership. Probably,Marxism and Islam will never mix sufficiently to start a class struggle which could ultimately lead to a dictatorship of an Islamic proletarian state.
'Holiday (Dacca), November 24, 1974. All the banks, except two, and all the major industries were owned by Pakistaniswho abandoned them after independence. 4 The alliance was called Gono Oyko Jote (People's Unity group) which established its branchesat the district level. 0The People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh, Embassy of Bangladesh, Washington, D.C., February1, 1975, p. 2. Holiday (Dacca), November 10, 1974. The resignation of Bhashani from the chairmanship of the National Awami party (B) increased the chances of its alliances with the Marxistparties. See ibid., January 12, 1975.
63

Ibid., December 1, 1974.

Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 121 Neither does Mujib's leadership face any immediate challenge from the regular army. It could pose a real threat to him if a workable understanding were to come about between it and the paramilitary forces - Rakkhi Bahini (Securitiy Force). But even if such an unlikely alliance were to take place, other elements, such as the Awami Jubo League (Youth League)53 and Lal Bahini (Worker's Force), could probably have a neutralizing effect. Furthermore, for the time being, Mujib is safe from the internal factions of his party. None of the factions is politically viable enough to challenge him, because they themselves have derived their legitimacy from Mujib, and without him they will disintegrate. This raises a crucial question about the future of Bangladesh. Theorists of charismatic leadership agree that crises of society (lack of unity, order, identity, economic growth, participation, etc.) create situations in which the unusual and extraordinary characteristics of the charismat are desired by people who are sociopsychologically affected by the crisis. The theorists also point out that the charismat restoresnormality by acting as a bridge between aspirationsof the masses and realities of survival. When he fails in this role and the crisis continues, a counter-leadership emerges, which then serves as stabilizer (by establishment of institutions to bring about an ordered relationship between individuals and groups, based on legal-rational considerations). But when a counter-leader fails to emerge, and the people are left with the original charismat, who himself has failed to use his charisma to build integrative institutions, the whole society starts showing signs of dissolution. Bangladesh seems to be passing through this stage, as Argentina, Egypt and Indonesia have passed during the last days of charismats Per6n, Nasser and Sukarno respectively. The need for institutionalization and mobilization has been emphasized by the Bengali planning commission, which was set up under Mujib's orders, as fundamental to meaningful social change. The need for innovation and adjustment, the commission felt, can never be fully met by functionaries of government. The commission concluded that "it is only a political cadre with firm roots in the people and motivated by the new ideology (Mujibism) and willing to live and work among the people as one of them that can mobilize the masses and transform their pattern of behavior."54 But the problem with the development of cadres in a multi-party system is that other parties will also try to develop their own cadres, which may very well lead to open fights between them as happened in Germany in the early 1930s and in Argentina, Bangladesh, Ceylon, India and Pakistan in the early 1970s. A one-party system (as adopted by Mujib by amending the constitution in January 1975) is more likely to establish cadres who might be able to work outside the government and, at the same time, to mobilize support for government policies and their implementation. This would amount to Mujib's assumption of the ultimate responsibility (by abrogating the right of the opposition parties to exist) for Bangladesh. But, like Nasser, Mujib is attracted to, yet fearful of, such responsibility.55 His assumption of absolute authority through his
8 Since Bangladesh has a high percentage of young people (53.1 percent of the total population belongs to an age group 15-24, whereas 17.7 percent of the U.S. population falls under the same age group). Source: U.S. Census of 1970 and Bangladesh Census of 1974. This youth organization, led by Sheikh Mujib's nephew--Sheikh Moni, could become ultimately a source of political strength to Mujib. According to newspaper reports, 100,000 young people have already been recruited as members. Its leaders planned to start a purge in March, 1973, to "eliminate opponents of Mujibbad," but it never began. See Morning News, February 16, 1973. MGovernment of Bangladesh, Planning Commission, First Five Year Plan: Social and Political Perspective, in Morning News, November 28, 1973. " On July 17, 1973, in an interview with the author, Mujib said that he could have become a dictator, but he did not want absolute power and responsibility. See, for a comparison of attitudes of Mujib and Nasser, Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo: Smith, Keynes, and Marshall, 1959), pp. 61-62; see also John

122 Western Political Quarterly

declaration of a state of emergency for the nation in December 1974, is a significant change in his attitude toward administrative centralism and a single-party government.56 Previously, ideological uncertainty and administrative inexperience prevented Mujib from concentrating all authority in his hands or making badly needed delegation of authority to lower hierarchies within his administration as well as in institutions outside it. The result is that power at every level is personalized, leaving the masses very little scope for appeal to institutionalized authority for redress of their grievances. The government planners urge the people to report alleged corruption to the authorities, and not just spread rumors and grumble about it; but they should realize that the people do not want to take risks of reprisals by reporting corruption to officials who are either corrupt themselves or lack the institutional support to press charges against other officials or party-men. Like P. Entelis, "Nasser'sEgypt: The Failure of CharismaticLeadership,"Orbis, 18 (Sum-

mer 1974), 463-64.

5

In an interview on June 28, 1975, in Dacca, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman told the author that divisive activities of the opposition parties, especially the radical parties, compelled him to institute a one-party system of government. Through a centralizedparty (with Mujibism as its ideology) he hopes to bring about another revolutionarychange to the Bengali society. "With a strong chain of command and a careful delegation of authority and responsibility to successive levels of the party organization," asserted Mujib, "I am mobilizing the Bengalis again, not against any external enemies but against internal enemies- corrupt officials, black marketeers, smugglers and perpetrators of political violence. Under my orders (President's Order No. 9) many public officials have been discharged (including one state minister, some middle-level bureaucrats and about 300 lower-level government employees), and now black marketeers and smugglerscan face death by firing squad if found guilty. I believe in extreme measures. Either I shall survive politically if I succeed in improving the economic situations or I shall go down if I fail to bring about improvements." Indeed, by the end of July 1975 prices of staple food, which had soared to 400 to 600 percent between 1970 and 1974, showed signs of decline. Following is the organization structure of the National party called Bangladesh KrishakSramikAwami League (BAKSAL)
Chairman (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was also President Parliamentary Sub-committee Sub-committee in party discipline Secretary-General (M. Mansoor All, of the country) of the republic) who was also the Prime Minister ecretary (A. Razzak)
(15 members)

Secretry (Sheikh Fazbul Huq Moni, Mujib's nephew)

Executive Committee

Secretary (7illur Rahman)

Central Committee (115 members) Five Fronts _Jatio Krishak League (Peasants' Secretary: Phani Majumdar Front) National Council (deliberative body -elects 2/3 of the
of the central

District

Committees & Councils

Thana Committee & Councils Union Councils (Primary Groups) with 5 full members (established has been made in [a distinction the party constitution between full members and applicantmembers] belonging to any government or non-government When membership organization. exceeds 20, than a working committee must be elected. Any Primary Group belonging to the country's armed forces must be directly supervised by the Executive Council of the Central party.)
I 1

_Jatio Mohila League (Women's Front) Secretary: Sajeda Choudhury, M.P. _Jatio Jubo League (Youth Front) Secretary: Tofail Ahmed, M.P.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~members

Jatio Sramik League (Labor Front) Secretary: Yusuf Ali

committee, the party chairman nominates the rest, every five years)

_Jatio Chatra League (Students' Front) Secretary: Sheikh Shahidul Islam (nephew of Mujib)

Mujib also reorganized the country's administrativesystem, dividing the original seventeen districts into sixty districts and putting each under an appointed governor (who has been vested with much greater financial powers than his predecessor--the district magistrate or deputy commissioner). Mujib told the author that this administrative change was designed to end the colonial administrativetradition by destroying the policy-makingpower of the bureaucracy (members of career bureaucracycomprise 13 percent of the governors) and by establishinggrass roots political and administrative institutions in order to generate administrativeresponsivenessto and participation from the masses.

Leadership,Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 123

Nasser, Mujib's temperament training and background prevented delegation and relinquishment of authority, which would allow the development of intermediate organizational structure. Again, like Nasser, he is intricately bound to the thought and temperament of his own society: he has been suspicious, conspiratorial, distrustful, and fearful of relinquishing power. Probably, these traits helped to prevent the transformation of Bangladesh into the prosperous-socialist societySonar Bangla (Golden Bengal) -he had hoped for. Paradoxically, however, while the chances for Mujib to transform charismatic authority into a more permanent institutional authority are slim, it is doubtful whether or not the process of institutionalization can be successfully completed without such a charismat.
POSTSCRIPT

On August 15, 1975, in a pre-dawn coup staged by a handful of middle-level officers of the Bengali army, Mujib, his wife, two married sons and their wives, one minor son and all inhabitants of the house, including other relatives and servants, were killed. The Rakkhi Bahini, a countervailing force carefully raised by Mujib to keep the Pakistani trained Bengali army in constant check, did come to Mujib's defense. But physical distance (Rakkhi Bahini's base is located in Sabhar, about fifteen miles from Dacca, whereas the army base is located about five miles from Mujib's residence), surprise and lack of combat experience were chiefly responsible for the inability of the Bahini to counter the attack of the crack units of the East Bengal regiment of the army against Mujib's home in Dhanmandi. Led by Lt. Colonel Syed Farook Rahman, three Lt. Colonels, six Majors, two Captains and three Lieutenants57 stormed Mujib's residence in the early morning of August 15, 1975 (the day Mujib was to visit Dacca University to formally accept Dacca university teachers as members of the BAKSAL). Though Major General Ziaur Rahman, Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf and other senior army officers were not directly involved in the initial coup, they lent their support afterwards when the assassination of the Bengali charismat failed to generate widespread mass opposition. The question of what prompted the coup d'etat is rather complex. But the chief reason behind the bloody overthrow of the Bengali charismatic leader was his policy to neutralize the army's political power through the establishment of a domestic security force (Rakkhi Bahini). This alienated many ambitious junior officers who were already alarmed by the gradual loss of power which the army once enjoyed during the Pakistani days. Moreover, most senior officers became apprehensive of Mujib's efforts to bring the army completely under the control of his one-party government (the army, navy, air force and security force were each represented by one senior officer in the Central Committe of the party). Another reason, given by the army, for the coup was rampant corruption in Mujib's administration. What the army probably wanted to prevent was a repetition of government wastage of resources through corruption and inefficiency (international aid amounting to $3.8 billion given to Bangladesh between January 1972 and December 1974 was not utilized properly). They wanted to maximize the country's natural resources, particularly in case vast reserves of oil are found in the off-shore area where seven oil companies have been busy drilling (according to experts connected with Petro-Bangla and international oil companies, chances for finding oil
57Lt. Colonels Syed Farook Rahman, Khandakar Abdur Rashid, Shariful Huq, Abdul Aziz

Pasha; Majors Shariful Hossain (Dalim), Shahriar, Bazlul Huda, Rashid Choudhury, Mohiuddin, S.H.M.B. Nur; Captains Khairuzzaman, Abdul Majed; and Lieutenants Musleuddin, Kismet Hashem, and Najmul Ansar fled Bangladesh after the November 3 pro-Mujib coup and were later granted political asylum by Libya.

124 Western Political Quarterly are great). Moreover, the leaders of the coup might have felt that so long as Mujib remained in power full utilization of western technology to tap off-shore oil would not be possible due to possible obstructions from the Indo-Soviet bloc. And if Mujib was removed and firmer alignment established with the PRC, Pakistan, Middle East countries and the U.S.A., there would be a greater possibility of Bangladesh receiving more economic and technological aid to develop its resources.58 The army reasoning was sound, except for certain qualifications.Domestically, the leaders of the coup probably underestimated the effects of Mujib's somewhat depleting charisma on internal political stability. Mujib was holding the country together in spite of massive economic problems. His establishment of political cadres through a one-party system brought about significant involvement from people at grass-roots level. Some of his stern measures against corrupt officials, hoarders, black marketeers and smugglers were having favorable impact on prices of staple commodities. Moreover, with political finesse he helped maintain a delicate balance between the extreme left and extreme right and their strong-arm extensions. Above all, he had genuine love and compassion for the people which were manifested in his contacts with varied individuals and groups. Bengalis were disappointed at the failure of his government but at the same time they appreciated his efforts to forge unity and to maintain peace in the country. They might not be as patient with their new leaders in the army as they were with their charismatic leader, and if the new government falters, groups within the armed forces and armed groups outside might feel tempted to topple the new regime with another bloody coup. (Once the trend of bloody coup is set, a bloodless coup seldom occurs. However, the November 3, 1975, pro-Mujib coup led by Brigadier Khaled Mosharraf and the November 7 counter-coup led by the army chief of staff, Major General Ziaur Rahman, who was ousted by Mosharraf on November 4, occurred without much bloodshed.) Internationally, the new regime would face considerable difficulty in changing Mujib's foreign policy. Flanked between the Indo-Soviet and Chinese blocs, Bangladesh can ill-afford to alienate either. Moreover, tilting too much toward Pakistan could also have adverse effect for the new regime, as it found out when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi pointedly indicated that any drastic change of Bengali foreign policy would adversely affect India's interest. Under pressurefrom India, the new rulers of Bangladesh rescinded the decision to prefix the title of the Republic of Bangladesh with the word Islamic. As far as the Muslim Arab countries are concerned, Mujib's pro-Arab policy had been well received and no change of that policy would be required. Bengali relations with America are not likely to register significant change because Mujib had already started the process of bringing Dacca closer to Washington without jeopardizing its goodwill with Moscow and New Delhi. Therefore, it would be much more difficult for the Bengali army to change Mujib's foreign policy than his domestic policy. But in domestic area the army can accomplish only so much with their tactics of reward and punishment. For tangible results, the army would need institutional support to bring about significant and lasting reforms. But to build institutions is time consuming on the one hand, and frustrating on the other. Few armies could contribute toward the development of sociopolitical institutions without the support of an ideology reinforced by charismatic leadership. Especially, in less developed countries, dedicated charismatic leadership ready to utilize its charismatic power for the establishment of
'The analysis is based on interviews author had in 1973 and 1975 in Bangladesh with Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman, BrigadierKhaled Mosharraf,Colonels Akbar and Sabe-

huddin,and MajorDalim.

Leadership,Parties and Politics in Bangladesh 125 politico-economic infrastructures, becomes a necessity for institution-building processes. The chief problem faced by the Bengali army in the post-Mujib period is the lack of a political leader of Mujib's stature who would be capable of generating massive support for implementation of national and local policies. The major dilemma faced by the Bengali junta is that with Mujib alive they could not have been able to direct politico-administrative energies for optimization of human and material resources of the country, and with Mujib dead they would also be unable to achieve those long-range objectivesof the coup.