Forensic Investigation For SECP

DILIGENCE
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP

INTO THE KSEEVENTS OF MARCH 2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS
Withdrawal of Regulated COT
Wash Trades
Futures Contracts

November 21, 2006
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE KSE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS
NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PAGE 2 OF 11
STATEMENT OF USE AND SCOPE LIMITATIONS
At the request of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP),
Diligence USA, LLC (Diligence)
1
conducted a forensic examination of certain alleged
manipulative and/or illicit activities related to the stock market events of March 2005, as
transacted on the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). The primary allegations examined
related to the withdrawal of regulated COT (Carry Over Transaction financing, also
known as Carry Over Trade or Badla financing) and in-house Badla, wash trades, and
violations of Clause 3(b) of the Regulations Governing Futures Contracts (exceeding the
Rs 50 million reporting threshold).
This Report of Findings (Report) presents findings and conclusions from the work
completed by Diligence and incorporates facts and information brought to our attention
as of November 21, 2006 on these issues. The Report is intended for the use of the
SECP, pursuant to its Letter of Engagement with Diligence (LOE) and without the
prior consent of the SECP, may not be released or used for any other purposes. Diligence
shall not be responsible for, and hereby expressly disclaims any liability whatsoever
directly or indirectly related to, use of the Report by parties other than the SECP for any
reason or purpose whatsoever.
Diligence was not tasked with examining, and therefore the Report does not
systematically analyze, trading activities and related issues which may have occurred on
the Lahore or Islamabad exchanges during March 2005.
Additionally, please be advised that should new or supplemental information of any kind
come to Diligences attention which, either alone, or in combination with information
previously provided to Diligence, is deemed relevant and material to the findings and
conclusions presented herein, or should Diligence be requested to conduct new or
supplemental forensic analysis related to the findings in the Report or in other related
areas, Diligence reserves the right to revise or amend the Reports findings and
conclusions accordingly.

1
Diligence is a leading provider of investigative, anti-corruption/anti-fraud, forensic accounting, and due
diligence services to Fortune 500 companies, leading financial institutions, law firms, international
organizations, and various domestic and foreign government agencies. Headquartered in Washington, D.C.
with key offices in New York, London, Moscow, Brussels and Hong Kong, Diligence consults with clients
on business intelligence matters, compliance policies/programs, litigation support, and international risk
management strategies. Diligence has an operationally experienced, multi-lingual and international staff
with diverse backgrounds including domestic and international law enforcement, global financial media
investigation and reporting, the World Bank Department of Institutional Integrity (corruption and fraud
investigations unit), the Volcker Committee investigation of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq, and
Big Four accounting and auditing firms.
REPORT OF FINDINGS
REPORT CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PART I. WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT PAGE 1 TO 38
PART II. WASH TRADES PAGE 1 TO 7
PART III. FUTURES CONTRACTS PAGE 1 TO 8
APPENDICES
REPORT OF FINDINGS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In March 2005, the KSE 100 Index experienced a sudden and significant decline. After a
substantial rise in early 2005 to a record high of 10,303 on March 15, 2005 (an intensified
run which lured large numbers of investors into the market and pushed trading to
unprecedented volumes), the KSE 100 then fell precipitously, losing approximately 25%
of its value in only eight trading sessions.
2
Given the considerable investment losses experienced by individual market participants,
strong public reaction ensued in Karachi and elsewhere. Lacking definitive answers,
rumors and theories abounded as to the underlying cause of the sudden rise and fall of the
market in March 2005. Speculation arose in attempts to explain the possible contributing
factors. Expressed possibilities included overambitious day traders and an overheated
futures counter, as well as the manipulation of the financing and equity markets by
various major market players. This last hypothesis has received the most attention, and it
is the main subject of this Report.
The March 2005 market fall was a significant socio-economic event in Pakistan: billions
of rupees in capital market value were created and reversed in a matter of weeks, and
there were widespread accusations of unscrupulous and manipulative behavior. Seeking
answers, politicians and the media in Pakistan called for serious governmental inquiries
to determine both the root causes of the markets decline and whether manipulation or
other wrong-doing had, in fact, contributed to the wide-spread financial losses.
In response, the SECP appointed a Taskforce in April 2005 with terms of reference to
investigate, among other things: the causes of the significant market decline; the role of
various market participants; and certain market manipulation allegations.
3

In its June 2005 report (the Taskforce Report), the Taskforce concluded that the rise
and fall of the stock market in March 2005 was at least partly attributable to a number of
manipulative activities, schemes and market abuses involving unnamed brokers. The
Taskforce Report further suggested that there was an orchestrated scheme to influence
scrip prices involving several brokers, which directly or indirectly conspired to artificially

2
The KSE 100 index rose from 6,220 on Jan. 3, 2005, to 10,303 on Mar. 15, 2005, and fell to 7,708 on
Mar. 28, 2005. Market Overview, Pakistan Press International Information Services Jan. 4, 2005,
Stock Market Report, Pakistan Press International Information Services Mar. 16 and Mar. 29, 2005.
3
Dr. Tariq Hassan "Statement Before the Public Accounts Committee on The Recent Crisis in the Stock
Exchanges & Measures Taken by the Authorities" (Islamabad, Pakistan, Apr. 2, 2005). See SECP website
<www.secp.gov.pk>. SECP Constitutes Task Force To Investigate Stock Market Crises SECP Press
Release, Apr. 2, 2005.
REPORT OF FINDINGS
inflate the market, lock in prices by selling short in Futures, then constrict liquidity--
causing prices to plunge and reaping billions in illicit gains in the process.
4

To summarize the alleged schemes key components:
1. First, certain brokers conspired to use manipulative trading practices to drive scrip
prices up. Through wash trades and misleading statements, they created artificial
euphoria and overly optimistic sentiments drawing additional investors into the
market and driving scrip prices even higher.
2. These brokers liberally supplied increasing volumes of COT for the heightened
demand in trading, which further escalated prices and permitted smaller investors
to take on highly leveraged positions. These brokers later systematically
restricted COT availability, sending share-hungry weak investors to the Futures
counter.
3. As scrip prices rose, the brokers locked in those (inflated) prices by selling
heavily in the March Futures contracts and further complicated the scenario by
selling shares they did not actually own, fully intending to defer the acquisition of
those shares to a later date to benefit from anticipated price declines.
4. At a later stage, these same brokers then adversely influenced the markets
liquidity through additional COT restrictions which had the effect of stalling the
market and sending scrip prices downward. Brokers then purchased the requisite
shares in the Ready Market, at highly discounted prices, to satisfy delivery of
setoff shares in settlement of their March Futures sales contracts and reaping hefty
profits in the process.
5. Finally, in order to prevent massive defaults by buyers stuck with open Futures
contracts, these same brokers persuaded regulators to create special trading
periods and to extend the normal settlement period by three days to allow the
brokers to provide additional COT funding to Futures contract holders.
The Taskforce acknowledged that the enormity of the task of analyzing the various
factors associated with the markets fall in March 2005 necessitated a much longer and
more thorough investigation. Its effort was complicated both by the massive volume of

4
The Taskforce has identified the factors and actions which contributed to the instability in the stock
prices, both as the market went up and as it collapsed. Relying on macro-level information, the Taskforce
Report has described the manner in which some participants appear to have benefited from the
manipulation of market sentiment, prices and liquidity; identifies the key causes of the situation that
developed in March 2005; and explains how the transactions arranged outside the rules of the market
ostensibly to save the market benefited some of the very people who arranged these transactions. Stock
Market Taskforce, Report of the Taskforce: Review of the Stock Market Situation, (Islamabad, Pakistan,
2005) para 7. The Taskforce Report went on to conclude that a pattern emerges in which different scrips
were manipulated and played in different ways by the major brokers to their advantage. para 54. The
markets regulators and KSEs board and management also shared in the blame. paras: 32, 43-48. See also
paras: 13, 16-18, 23, 24, 26, 28-35, 39, 54 and 55.
REPORT OF FINDINGS
data to examine, and by the inherent limitations of this data. Accordingly, the Taskforce
called on the SECP to conduct a follow-on forensic investigation of the most material
alleged abuses.
5

RETENTION OF INDEPENDENT FORENSIC INVESTIGATORS AND SCOPE OF
WORK
Diligence was retained by the SECP in July 2006 to examine in more detail the activities
surrounding the March 2005 events, and specifically, to determine if manipulative
schemes and/or illicit conduct were prevalent and played a key role in the markets
precipitous decline.
Over the past few months, Diligence has conducted an independent examination
6
into the
most noteworthy allegations: 1) restriction and withdrawal of COT (including, to the
extent possible, in-house Badla
7
), 2) wash trades, and 3) violation of the regulations
governing futures contracts. Particular emphasis was placed on the regulated COT issue
because of its perceived importance and the relative availability of reliable data.
In the process of its work, Diligence acquired and examined a multitude of electronic
data records ranging from KSE Ready, Futures and COT transactions, back-office broker
trading records and general ledger information, as well as detailed Central Depository
Corporation of Pakistan (CDC) share balance data. This information, comprising tens
of millions of electronic records, was compiled, reconciled where possible and loaded to
a comprehensive database for analysis. In addition to this expansive repository of
electronic information, Diligence acquired and reviewed an extensive number of
hardcopy documents including analyst reports, news articles and KSE activity reports.
8

5
Ibid. paras: 24 (regarding wash trades), 33 (regarding the manipulation of COT), and 55 (regarding the
sale of scrips in Futures market not yet owned by the seller).
6
The SECP provided general assistance and support to Diligence in our investigation of the matters
covered in this Report. Diligence otherwise acted independently throughout the investigation in fulfilling
its mandate under the terms of the LOE, including data sought and obtained, methodologies applied and the
resulting findings.
7
Comprehensive and accurate data on the quantities and activities of in-house Badla are not reported
publicly by individual brokers or maintained in any form within the public domain. Diligence found
abundant indirect evidence (e.g. press reports) of the existence of this form of unregulated Badla which, to
the extent it exists, is in violation of Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.
8
In the course of its investigation, Diligence requested information (through the SECP in some cases) from
a number of parties, including the SECP itself, KSE, CDC and certain brokers. All such parties cooperated
and provided certain data responsive to Diligences requests. There was insufficient time, in some cases,
however, to independently verify or cross check such data. There were also issues, in certain cases, with
delays in obtaining the data and, as noted above, with the quality of the data - factors that periodically and
adversely impacted the progress of our work.
REPORT OF FINDINGS
Throughout this effort, Diligence gained a true appreciation for the enormity and
difficulty of the Taskforces mandate. Generally, the collection and analysis of historical
information of this nature and magnitude is a difficult task. The data collection and
analysis was further complicated in this case, however, by the inconsistent and often
incomplete nature of the trading-related records and information provided to Diligence.
In particular, the absence of universal client identification codes across all brokers, the
inconsistent use of client codes within individual brokers, the presence and widespread
use of CDC group accounts, and the KSEs failure to preserve the order book records and
critical compliance documents all presented significant obstacles to addressing the
various issues herein. Diligence was not able to analyze, in many respects, the type of
trading-related data that is normally generated and safeguarded by securities market
participants elsewhere.
Accordingly, we support the view that the Taskforce should have been provided with
additional time, resources and expertise to more thoroughly examine these complicated
matters prior to rendering its report. Diligence further takes note of the fact that the SECP
has committed itself in this past year to improving the quality of the reporting process
and has implemented or is moving forward on important regulations aimed at increasing
transparency and accountability in Pakistans capital markets, many of which address the
identified shortcomings and limitations we encountered in the data.
9

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Under the existing circumstances, and on the basis of the evidence examined to date, we
render findings and conclusions that greatly differ, in many respects, with the findings
and conclusions rendered by the Taskforce. Most significantly, we do not find sufficient
evidence to support the paramount scheme of manipulation in the manner put forth by the
Taskforce for the period in question. Nor do we find sufficient evidence to support the
alleged schemes primary element (withdrawal of COT) that was ostensibly responsible
for the fall of market prices. We find no patterns of activity or credible evidence to
support a theory that, during March 2005, certain influential brokers systematically and
manipulatively inflated and then deflated market prices, reaping substantial profits in the
process.

9
For example, the SECP has now required the implementation of Unique Identification Numbers for all
investors. This requirement will enable the three exchanges and the SECP to easily identify the underlying
client behind any stock market transaction, across all brokers. SECP Letter to KSE, LSE and ISA, Aug. 3,
2006. Also, the SECP has suggested that CDC eliminate the use of group accounts for reporting client
holdings at CDC. Individual sub-accounts at CDC will more readily allow for the identification of
beneficial share ownership and the assessment of potential short sale violations. Letter from SECP to
Central Depository Company of Pakistan Limited. Prohibition on Use of Group Account By CDS
Participants. No. 1(6)cdc/pol/1997, 6 Jan. 2005.
REPORT OF FINDINGS
It is important to note however that, as a result of our analyses, we did find prima-facie
evidence of possible wrongdoing by a significant number of brokers in certain areas. We
are of the view, however, that these potential wrongful acts individually or collectively
were not elements of an elaborate scheme to manipulate the volatility of the market, as
alleged by the Taskforce. In all such cases, Diligence has provided its underlying data
and analyses to the SECP for its action as per law.
PART I COT WITHDRAWAL
In Part I of this Report, we present our examination of COT and in-house Badla
activities. Contrary to the Taskforces findings, we found no evidence that regulated
COT was restricted or withdrawn from the market in the weeks prior to the markets fall
as a result of voluntary and manipulative actions of any influential broker. Instead we
find that although there was, in fact, a withdrawal of certain regulated COT during
February and March of 2005, this activity was attributable to two independent factors: (1)
the execution of the SECPs previously planned and announced phase out of COT
funding for certain scrips, which had begun in October 2004; and (2) the temporary
suspension of New COT availability for two heavily-traded scrips, Pakistan State Oil
(PSO) and Pakistan Telecommunications Company Limited (PTC), in connection with
their respective moves to Spot trading to execute announced dividend payments - a
necessary trading practice and normal course of business event.
Moreover, we found that the markets supply of New COT (the value of newly initiated
carry over transactions transacted on the KSE on a given trading day) for the scrips not
subject to a regulated withdrawal or self-imposed temporary suspension increased during
the two weeks immediately prior to the markets fall and remained stable and available
until the markets virtual shut-down beginning March 21
st
.
Trading information on unregulated Badla (in-house Badla) is not readily available
from exchanges or the public domain, but only from individual brokers engaging in such
activities. Even then, data, if any, provided by individual brokers could not be reasonably
or easily independently verified or tested for completeness or accuracy with a sufficient
degree of certainty. Given these and additional time constraints, reliable and verifiable
data related to potential trading levels of in-house Badla was not obtainable. Therefore,
Diligence is unable to provide any conclusive findings in this area.
PART II WASH TRADES
In Part II, we present our examination of potential violations of certain securities
regulations in connection with wash trades within the same broker and between different
brokers. Given the lack of unique client identification codes at that time, an examination
of potential wash trades between different brokers was not possible, contrary to
statements made by the Taskforce. Also contrary to the conclusions reached by the
Taskforce, in our examination of potential wash trades within the same broker, we found
no systemic patterns or evidence to suggest influential brokers had collectively
REPORT OF FINDINGS
orchestrated multiple series of wash trades for purposes of broad-scale market
manipulation.
During the course of our examination, we did however find numerous individual and
isolated incidents of potential violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Ordinance, 1969 (SEO), generally applicable to wash trades. Details on these matters
have been provided to the SECP for its action as per law.
PART III FUTURES CONTRACTS
In Part III, we describe our findings of potential and significant manipulations by brokers
related to violations of Clause 3(b) of the Regulations Governing Futures Contracts
(exceeding the Rs 50 million threshold) and Section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Ordinance. Clause 3(b), during the relevant timeframe of this review, prohibited a broker
from having a net sale position in futures contracts of a particular scrip in excess of Rs 50
million without providing evidence that it held the shares sold above the threshold.
We identified 2,491 instances across 88 brokers with net sales positions in March 2005
futures contracts alone that exceeded the Rs 50 million threshold for a particular scrip.
Collectively, these net sale positions total in the billions of rupees. Many of the cases, if
substantiated as being non-compliant with Clause 3(b), could represent serious violations.
We have provided this information to the SECP, which is pursuing the matter as per law.
Using share data obtained from CDC, we further identified thirteen brokers trading on the
Futures counter in potential breach of Clause 3(b) and Section 17(a) of the SEO. The
more serious potential violations amount to hundreds of millions of rupees in value in
unaccounted for shares and, if substantiated, would represent a serious violation of the
securities regulations.
10
Again the matter has been provided to the SECP for its action as
per law.
Lastly, in addressing the Taskforces primarily central element of its scheme of market
manipulation which is the withdrawal of regulated COT by the same brokers in large
net sale positions in excess of share holdings at CDC we examined the lending of New
COT on COT-eligible scrips by the more influential brokers during the weeks preceding
the markets fall. We found no evidence that the brokers individually or collectively
engaged in a withdrawal of available New COT from these scrips in the market.

10
We caution the reader of the many limitations of the CDC data in making a prima facie case of non-
compliance or violation of securities regulations. These limitations and caveats are described in more
detail in Part III of this Report. Clearly, in substantiating any violation of securities regulations, additional
evidence not collected as part of this analysis will be required.
REPORT OF FINDINGS
MISCELLANEOUS
In addition to the alleged schemes described above, Diligence also attempted to analyze
whether one or more brokers conducted illicit blank Ready Market sales. This scheme
involves selling shares on the Ready Market that the investor does not own and cannot
deliver at the T+3 settlement date.
Unlike Futures positions which can be accumulated and quantified for each discrete
monthly contract, ready positions cannot be quantified on the basis of KSE activity alone.
Reliable and detailed investor-level share balance information is required in order to
determine whether a client has transacted a blank sale on the Ready Market. As discussed
elsewhere in this Report, the use of group accounts at CDC precluded such an analysis
for the period at issue. Without additional verifiable and complete information from
individual brokers, it is not possible to determine whether or not this type of illicit
activity was perpetrated on the market during March 2005.
CLOSING REMARKS
It has been Diligences privilege to work with the SECP on this matter. We are grateful
for the assistance and many courtesies that have been extended to us by individuals and
entities in Karachi and Islamabad during the course of our investigation.
We are sensitive to the fact that many investors may have lost significant sums in the
KSE crash of March 2005. Such an event demands a thorough investigation into the facts
and circumstances underlying the markets movements, to determine if fraud and
manipulation occurred at the expense of those investors. Investors must also recognize,
however, that securities markets everywhere have inherent and individually unique risks
which, without warning or manipulation, may unexpectedly cause the market to rise or
fall as risks, regulations, economic conditions and market sentiments quickly change.
In the time period since March 2005, the capital markets of Pakistan have been awash in
speculation, conspiracy theories, allegations, mis-leading conclusions and unfounded
views as to what and who may have caused the markets rapid rise and decent. We found
this situation to be unnecessarily fueled by rumor and innuendo, and seriously absent of
definitive facts and complete and proper analysis. Had the Taskforce been afforded
additional time and resources to investigate the facts and events of March 2005 further,
perhaps more definitive findings and conclusions would have been reached, and mis-
understandings in the market, would have been diminished.
Diligences objective in this matter was to present an independent and objective expert
analysis of the key market-related events of March 2005. In so doing, we hope our work
helps bring to justice those found guilty of violating securities laws, but more
importantly, helps bring closure to an unfortunate and disruptive episode for Pakistan by
finally putting to an end the unfounded allegations and speculation that have continued to
persist concerning the markets crash and resulting Taskforce Report. We also hope that
REPORT OF FINDINGS
our investigation assists the SECP and others with the on-going process of adding
additional critically-needed elements of transparency, accountability and integrity to
Pakistans capital markets. To that goal, we respectfully present Diligences Report of
Findings to the SECP.
REPORT OF FINDINGS WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT
NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART I - PAGE 1 OF 39
PART I

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.. 3
II. FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF CARRY OVER TRANSACTIONS ON THE
KARACHI STOCK EXCHANGE.. 4
A. IMPORTANCE TRENDS OF COT INVESTMENT
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW COT AVAILABILITY
C. PROPORTION OF COT ACROSS ELIGIBLE SCRIPS AND BROKERS
D. THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF COT PRIOR TO MARCH 16, 2005
III. MANDATED PHASE-OUT OF COT... 11
A. INTRODUCTION
B. EFFECTS OF PHASE-OUT ON MARKET LIQUIDITY
IV. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF COT 15
A. INTRODUCTION
B. EFFECTS OF SUSPENSION ON MARKET LIQUIDITY
V. ACTIVE COT-ELIGIBLE SCRIPS..... 19
A. INTRODUCTION
B. EXAMINATION OF COT ACTIVITY AND TRENDS
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF
REGULATED COT... 29
VII. OTHER FINDINGS........ 33
A. PATTERNS IN FUTURES TRADING
B. COT TRENDS DURING MARKETS DECLINE
GLOSSARY
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
In this Part, we focus on the possible role of regulated COT in the decline of the KSE
during the first quarter of 2005, and respond in certain limited respects to the allegations
and issues put forth by the Taskforce Report on the subject. The analysis addresses the
allegations and issues concerning only the withdrawal of COT financing before the
markets decline. Other possible contributing factors to the events of March 2005 put
forth by the Taskforce Report and others are addressed in other Parts of this Report.
We specifically address below, through analysis of the following three core questions, the
allegations that regulated COT transacted on the KSE open market was intentionally
restricted by COT lenders prior to, and thus precipitated, the markets decline:
1. Was there a substantial withdrawal of funds from the COT market in the period
immediately prior to the markets steep decline?
2. If there was a withdrawal, what was its cause?
3. Is there credible evidence that indicates or suggests that any such withdrawal of
funds was manipulative in nature as part of a scheme to essentially defraud the
market?
The answer to the first core question is yes. Diligence confirmed the findings of the
Taskforce which reported that there was a withdrawal of funds from the COT market in
the weeks and months prior to the markets decline.
In answering the second and third core questions, it is important to note that our forensic
investigation, pursuant to the SECPs request, has gone further and to additional levels of
detail than the previous work of the Taskforce, the SECP itself, and others.TP
1
PT Our
extensive and detailed analysis in this area established that funds were withdrawn from
the COT market. We further identified the reasons for the withdrawal of funds.
Significantly, we have found no credible evidence, as of the date of this Report, which
indicates or suggests that the withdrawal of funds from the regulated COT market was
manipulative in nature. Accordingly, with respect to the regulated COT subject that is the
subject of this Part, there does not appear to be a factual basis for recommending to the
SECP that it should consider legal proceedings against any firm(s) or individual(s) based
on a market manipulation theory.

TP
1
PT The SECP provided general assistance and support to Diligence in our investigation of the matters
covered in this Report. Diligence otherwise acted independently throughout the investigation in fulfilling
its mandate under the terms of the LOE, including data sought and obtained, methodologies applied and the
resulting findings.
The following analysis, glossary and accompanying appendices describe and illustrate in
detail the methodologies used in our forensic examination of millions of trading records
and other data which substantiate these central conclusions.TP
2
PT
II. FORENSIC EXAMINATION OF CARRY OVER
TRANSACTIONS ON THE KARACHI STOCK EXCHANGE
Prior to the introduction of the Continuous Funding System in August 2005, COT was a
primary financing facility used to leverage the purchase of securities in the Pakistani
capital markets. COT, also referred to as carry over trades or regulated Badla
financing, had historically played an integral role in providing liquidity to Pakistans
three capital markets. Seeking a more modern financing alternative with less attendant
risk to participants, the SECP moved in September 2004 to begin the permanent phase-
out of COT as the markets primary leveraging mechanism.TP
3
PT
The significance of the COT mechanism is that its use enabled an investor in the Ready
Market to defer or carry over settlement, and thus defer payment, of a purchase of
scrips to a future date. In essence, COT was a form of repurchase agreement. In
conducting a carry over transaction, the investor sold all or a portion of his/her open
position in eligible scrips to a COT lender with the agreement to repurchase the shares in
a subsequent trading cycle. In exchange, the lender was paid a rate of interest, which
fluctuated based on market conditions and regulations.TP
4
PT
In addition to this regulated market (as established in the Carry Over Transactions
Regulations, 1993), brokers have customarily engaged in unregulated COT lending
through what is commonly referred to as In-house Badla. This practice consists of
financing COT directly and solely between the broker and client, and is not conducted

TP
2
PT A critical analytical point is that the conclusions herein were reached on the basis of available data. We
note that a key set of data under the KSEs control and central to addressing the three core questions no
longer exists, and was therefore not available for review and analysis: the KSEs daily order book of
queued and filled orders for new open market COT for the days before and during the markets steep
decline. The KSE daily order book would provide, theoretically, an indication of whether request orders for
COT were increasingly being left unfilled as the demand for COT increased, indicating a squeeze in
liquidity. KSE representatives have explicitly and consistently stated to Diligence that this data is not
available, except for the single day of Mar. 15, 2005 previously collected by the SECP. Nonetheless, our
findings are conclusive based on other available evidence.
TP
3
PT KSE Continuous Funding System Regulations, 2005; Aug. 22, 2005. See also: Time-Bound Action
Plan for Phasing-Out of Carry-Over Transaction (COT) SECP Directive, Sept. 3, 2004,
No.SMD/SE/2(72)/2003.
TP
4
PT For COT, the borrower had the option of deferring settlement up to ten days. See KSE website:
<www.kse.com.pk>. COT Regulations did not prohibit investors from selling shares they owned in the
COT market that had not been purchased that day on the Ready Market. Interview with SECP staff.
through the stock exchanges. Due to the lack of available and reliable data maintained by
the brokers, Diligence has not been able to examine the activities related to the markets
in-house Badla, and therefore this Part does not include definitive findings concerning the
possible broker activities related to in-house Badla. Additionally, the regulated and
unregulated COT activities on the Lahore or Islamabad exchanges were not included in
the scope of the Diligence LOE.TP
5
PT
For purposes of the analysis herein, it is important for the reader to understand two
critical terms used to describe different types of COT specific to this Part:
New COT: represents the value (in Rupees) of new carry over transactions
transacted on the KSE on a given trading day. New COT is equivalent to Open
Market COT provided on the KSE Daily Unreleased/Open Market COT reports.
Total COT: represents the value (in Rupees) of outstanding carry over
transactions at the end of a given trading day. Total COT is the sum of unreleased
carry over transactions from the previous trading day plus New COT. Total COT
is equivalent to Total COT provided on the KSE Daily Unreleased/Open
Market COT reports.
A. IMPORTANCE AND TRENDS OF COT INVESTMENT
In October 2004, as the regulated COT phase-out began, COT was available on only
twenty-nine of more than 670 scrips traded on the KSE.TP
6
PT Despite this limitation to fewer
than five percent of listed scrips, trading in COT-eligible scrips accounted for the large
majority of the trading activity in the Ready Market.TP
7
PT
In the few months prior to its regulated phase-out, the markets Total COT remained
relatively stable, fluctuating between Rs 22.7 billion and Rs 28.5 billion per day.TP
8
PT
Starting in November 2004, however, Total COT began to increase significantly,
reaching an all-time high of Rs 40.3 billion on February 18, 2005. As shown in Chart 1,

TP
5
PT See: Carry Over Transaction Regulations, Jan. 11 1993. On Sept. 11, 2006, the SECP mandated the
elimination of In-House Badla in an effort to increase the transparency of the COT market. See: In-House
Badla Banned: CFS Cap Enhanced to Rs 55 Billion for KSE: Recorder Report, Business Recorder Sept.
12, 2006. Dilawar Hussain SECP Defers In-House Badla Ban Dawn: The Internet Edition Sept. 21, 2006.
TP
6
PT See Appendix A for list of scrips, by symbol and name, and their respective scheduled phase-out dates.
KSE Transaction Market Data, July 2004 to March 2005.
TP
7
PT Between July and October 2004, for example, more than 90% of total trading activity on the KSE was
represented by trading in COT-eligible scrips. KSE Transaction Market Data; Ready Market, July 2004 to
Oct. 2004.
TP
8
PT The findings as described throughout this Part are generally represented in share values (in Pakistani
Rupees), as opposed to number of shares. Findings will also be described in number of shares in the event
such data reflects a different pattern or trend than share values.
this dramatic rise soon gave way to a precipitous drop of Rs 11.0 billion to Rs 29.0
billion by March 15, 2005 (the day before scrip prices on the KSE began their steep
decline), bringing the daily levels of Total COT back to a level more consistent with its
2004 volumes.TP
9
PT The rapid decline in Total COT in the days prior to the markets drop
was later identified by manyincluding investors, regulators, the SECP Task Force and
the pressas the result of likely market manipulation. The drop in Total COT was
further viewed by many as a primary contributing factor to the markets eventual
collapse.TP
10
PT
Chart 1 Daily Values of Total COT, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period July 1, 2004
to March 15, 2005

TP
9
PT KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, July 2004 to Mar. 2005 Karachi Stock Exchange
website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History, 2004, 2005.
TP
10
PT Taskforce Report, paras: 33 - 35. See also: Dr. Tariq Hassan "Statement Before the National Assembly
Standing Committee on Finance and Revenue: On Actions Taken by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the Recommendations of the Report of the Task Force" (Islamabad, Pakistan Aug. 3,
2005). See: Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan website <www.secp.gov.pk>. See also: Bilal
Mohammad Ali Pullout of Badla financiers blamed for KSE Crises The News International, Mar. 31,
2005. See also: Stock Market Crisis: PM Asks SECP to Investigate Reasons Dawn Mar. 31, 2005. See
also: Amanullah Khan, PM Wants Smiles Back At KSE Pakistan Observer Mar. 31, 2005. See also:
Recent KSE Downslide: PM Orders Inquiry Daily Times Mar. 31, 2005.
20
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Graph Notes: From February 18 to March 15, 2005, available COT declined from an all-time peak of Rs
40.3 billion to Rs 29.0 billiona drop of 28%.
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW COT AVAILABILITY
The significance of New COT is best illustrated by comparing the differing elements of
control of a COT borrower and lender, respectively. Once a COT borrower had initiated
a COT transaction, he or she then had the option to roll-over his or her position on a daily
basis for up to ten trading days. The borrower was thus in temporary control of when to
exercise the scrips repurchase and the related release of his or her debt.TP
11
PT
Conversely, the COT lenders were in total control of the amount of New COT provided
to the open COT market each trading day. This distinction is important and is the basis
for our use of daily New COT transactions as the more suitable metric in examining the
financiers control of and impact on liquidity in the market.

TP
11
PT Karachi Stock Exchange website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT. Historical data related to the daily
aging of unreleased COT was not maintained by the KSE. However, daily levels of New COT averaged
71% of Total COT during the period July 1, 2004 to Mar. 15, 2005, suggesting that most COT was released
after just one trading cycle. KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, July 2004 to February
2005, Karachi Stock Exchange website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History 2004, 2005. See Chart B-
1 in Appendix B.
The daily volume of New COT from July to October 2004 varied from day to day, but
was fairly stable overall, ranging from between Rs 16.0 billion to Rs 24.9 billion
throughout the four-month period. As shown in Chart 2, daily transaction values of New
COT began increasing significantly in November 2004, as trading volumes in the Ready
Market began to rise. In January 2005, for example, the average daily volume of New
COT was Rs 22.7 billion. This rose to Rs 24.4 billion in February 2005, an increase of
7.5%.TP
12
PT
The growing daily values of New COT also brought an increase in its daily volatility. In
December 2004, for example, the daily volume of New COT fluctuated between Rs 17.5
billion and Rs 27.5 billion, dropping as much as Rs 6.0 billion in one day.TP
13
PT The
following month, January 2005, the range of transactions widened as the volumes of New
COT fluctuated between Rs 14.0 billion and Rs 30.1 billion. At this point, the
accentuated peaks and valleys of New COT trading show a cyclical pattern, rising sharply
during the earlier days of the month, followed by relatively rapid and steep downturns
toward the end of the month.TP
14
PT
Despite the dramatic variability of New COT during the above periods, its intra-monthly
cycles and sudden steep declines were not mirrored in the Ready Markets activities. The
Ready Markets trading volumes and prices continued their rapid ascent during these
periods.TP
15
PT
Chart 2 Daily Values of New COT, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period July 1, 2004
to March 15, 2005

TP
12
PT KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, July 2004 to Feb. 2005, Karachi Stock Exchange
TP
13
PT The value of New COT was Rs 27.5 billion and Rs 17.5 billion on Dec. 22, 2004 and Dec. 28, 2004
respectively. Between Dec. 24, 2004 and Dec. 27, 2004 (one trading day), New COT value decreased from
Rs 25.7 billion to Rs 19.7 billion, a drop of Rs 6 billion. KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily
Reports, July 2004 to Feb. 2005, Karachi Stock Exchange website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History,
2004, 2005.
TP
14
PT KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, July 2004 to Feb. 2005, Karachi Stock Exchange
TP
15
PT Even prior to 2005, the steep daily declines in New COT did not seem to have any meaningful negative
influence on trading volumes in the Ready Market. For example, New COT decreased U33%U from Rs 25
billion to Rs 16.6 billion between August 27, 2004 and September 6, 2004, yet trading volumes in the
Ready Market remained unaffected. Similar decreases in New COT were evident during the weeks of
October 14P
th
P, November 29P
th
P and December 27P
th
P, but again with seemingly no negative effect on the
volume of Ready Market trades. See Chart B-2 in Appendix B.
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.

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Graph Notes: Daily investment in New COT was highly variable from day-to-day, and became highly
cyclical month-to-month in the months preceding the March 2005 situation. Increases in New COT were
followed by sharp decreases of 37%, 53% and 52%, respectively, during the months of December 2004 and
January and February 2005.
C. PROPORTION OF COT ACROSS ELIGIBLE SCRIPS AND BROKERS
In addition to being available in only a limited number of the markets total listed scrips,
investment in COT was heavily concentrated across relatively few of the COT-eligible
scrips. Of the twenty-nine scrips eligible for COT between July 2004 and October 2004,
approximately 50% of daily New COT investment was concentrated within five scrips:
OGDC, POL, PSO, PTC and NBP. As the phase out of COT progressed, the collective
proportion of COT exposure held in these five scrips relative to the entire COT market
increased steadily. In fact, by March 2005, the New COT held in these scrips represented
roughly 80% of all daily New COT.TP
16
PT
An analysis of trading data reveals that most of the brokers trading on the KSE
participated in the COT market. Similar to scrips, however, daily transactions of New

TP
16
PT KSE Market Transaction Data July 2004 to Oct. 2004. KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily
Reports, July 2004 to Dec. 2004, Karachi Stock Exchange website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT
History, 2004. SECP Directive, Sept. 3, 2004.
COT on the KSE were heavily concentrated across relatively few brokers.TP
17
PT Of the 138
brokers participating in the COT market on behalf of lenders, six brokers accounted for
approximately 50% of the total value of COT purchases occurring between January 3,
2005 and March 15, 2005. By order of descending New COT values, the six brokers
were: Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd, Arif Habib Securities Limited, Atlas
Capital Markets (Pvt.) Limited, KASB Securities Limited, Orix Investment Bank
Pakistan Ltd., and Akberally Cassim & Sons. Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities and Arif
Habib Securities together represented close to 30% of the total New COT lending market
during that period.TP
18
PT
Brokers representing the borrowers of COT were less concentrated. Of the 142 brokers
participating in COT sale transactions during this same period, 50% were accounted for
by twelve brokers, with one brokerAqeel Karim Dhedhi Securitiesindividually
representing over 15% of the total COT sales market.TP
19
PT
More detailed analyses of broker and scrip-related trading trends and activities in the
weeks prior to the markets decline in March 2005 are provided in later sections of this
Part.
D. THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF COT PRIOR TO MARCH 16,
2005
The daily reduction of Total COT in the time period immediately preceding the markets
sharp decline in mid- to late-March has received considerable attention by regulators, the
Taskforce and others. Many have alleged that the decline in Total COT from February
18, 2005 (its peak) to March 15, 2005 was a leading cause of the markets fall.
Moreover, many have also alleged that the drop in Total COT was due to the
manipulative actions of a few major COT brokers and lenders.TP
20
PT

TP
17
PT KSE Market Transaction Data, July 1, 2004 to Oct. 31, 2004. Of the approximately 200 member
brokers registered with KSE during the period July 1, 2004 to Mar. 15, 2005, 138 brokers representing
COT lenders participated in COT purchase transactions. Similarly, 142 of the 200 brokers representing
COT borrowers participated in COT sale transactions. KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar.
2005.
TP
18
PT Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities Pvt Ltd represented 14.3%. Arif Habib Limited represented 14.0%.
KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. See Charts B-3 and B-4 in Appendix B for a
graphical representation of broker proportions of COT purchase and sale activity.
TP
19
PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. See Charts B-3 and B-4 in Appendix B for a
graphical representation of broker proportions of COT purchase and sale activity. See Tables C-1 and C-2
in Appendix C for a complete listing of the brokers participating in regulated COT sale and purchase
transactions on the KSE open market for the period Jan. 3, 2005 to Mar. 15, 2005.
TP
20
PT Stock Market Taskforce, paras: 7, 28-35, 39, 54, and 55.
Chart 3 Daily Values of Total and New COT, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period
January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005
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Total COT
New COT
Graph Notes: Investment in New and Total COT declined in the period immediately preceding the Ready
Markets steep decline in late March 2005. Total COT declined from its high of Rs 40.4 billion on
February 18, 2005 to Rs 28.9 billion on March 15, 2005. Investment in New COT declined from its high of
Rs 33.3 billion to Rs 13.5 billion on March 15, 2005.
The following sections of this Part specifically address the apparent reduction in Total
COT, and present findings and conclusions that run counter to the general allegations that
have been offered concerning this subject. In Section III, we assess the impact of the
mandated phase-out of COT as prescribed by the SECPs plan finalized in September
2004. In Section IV, we analyze the effects on Total and New COT of the scrips removed
from COT-eligibility by regulation prior to the markets steep decline in March 2005. In
Section V, we analyze the effects on Total and New COT of the scrips temporarily
suspended from COT trading prior to the decline. In Section VI, we analyze the effects
on Total and New COT of the scrips which were not subject to the regulated phase-out or
temporary suspension. Lastly, in Section VII, we present our summary and conclusions
and conclude the Part with a brief mention of other findings, presented in Section VIII.
III. MANDATED PHASE-OUT OF COT
A. INTRODUCTION
COT has long been suspected as having a strong, and not altogether positive, influence on
the equity markets. From a historical perspective, market analysts, securities experts and
others had consistently identified COT/Badla financing as the likely root cause for
previous, pre-2005 occurrences of severe market volatility in the Pakistani capital
markets.TP
21
PT In response, SECP leadership and ranking representatives from the three
domestic exchanges moved during 2004 to establish a plan to phase out COT in favor of
a more contemporary margin-based financing mechanism.TP
22
PT
The SECPs September 2004 final plan contained detailed measures to be undertaken by
the exchanges in implementing the phase-out and articulated a strict schedule for the
phase-out of the twenty-nine scrips then currently participating in COT. The plan
provided for scrips to be phased-out on a weekly basisat the rate of one per weekin
reverse order of their Total COT on August 31, 2004. The scheduled phase-out was to
begin in October 2004 and conclude in June 2005.TP
23
PT
Eighteen of the twenty-nine scrips were phased-out prior to the beginning of the markets
decline in late-March 2005. For purposes of this analysis, we refer to these scrips
collectively as GROUP A.TP
24
PT
B. EFFECTS OF PHASE-OUT ON MARKET LIQUIDITY
1. The Period October 8, 2004 to December 31, 2004

TP
21
PT Previous severe market declines in the Pakistani capital markets occurred in May 2000, Sept. 2001, and
May 2002. See Elliot Blair Smith Pakistans Stocks Sizzle; Reforms Lift Market 56% Since Last Sept.
11 USA Today Sept. 16, 2002: B.07. See also: Pakistan Shares End Lower on Border Tension Concerns
Dow Jones International News May 21, 2002. See also: Karachi Stock Market Crashes Amid Rising
Tension with India BBC Monitoring South Asia Political May 21, 2002. See also: Pakistan Crisis
Looming on Unregulated Badla Deals, Pakistan Press International Sept. 29, 2000. See also: Pakistan
Stocks below 1,500 on liquidity squeeze Reuters News June 23, 2000.
TP
22
PT Chairmans Message by Tariq Hassan, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. See
SEP website http://www.secp.gov.pk/Chairman/Message.htm. See also: Coordination Meeting Between
SEC and Stock Exchanges, SECP Press Release Apr. 15, 2004. See also: Leading Commercial Banks
Offer Support for Margin Financing Mechanisms SECP Press Release, June 17, 2004. Margin financing
had been introduced as a method of leveraged financing for securities transactions in order to reduce the
risk that borrowers would default on payment for purchased shares. In contrast to the COT financing
system, which allowed market participants to purchase shares in advance of securing financing, the margin
financing system would require prospective stock purchasers to secure financing prior to purchasing shares
in the Ready Market. This refined financing process was designed to prevent settlement crises from
persisting due to lack of available Badla financing to market players -- a trend that appears to be
historically repetitive, as described in the press reports.
TP
23
PT SECP Directive Sept. 3, 2004. The phase-out schedule is included for reference purposes in Appendix
A.
TP
24
PT See Appendix D for a list of the scrips included in GROUP A.
Three months into the scheduled phase-out, seven of the twenty-nine COT-eligible scrips
had been phased out. The effects of the phase-out of the first seven scrips on the liquidity
of the COT market were negligible, as the initial scrips in the phase-out plan represented
proportionately the smallest investments of COT.TP
25
PT
2. The Period of January 1, 2005 to February 18, 2005
As mandated by the SECP, COT eligibility for seven additional scrips was phased out
between January 1, 2005 and February 18, 2005. The collective impact of these seven
scrips was almost Rs 5 billion, and represented about 13% of the markets Total COT at
the beginning of this six-week period.TP
26
PT However, the UnetU effect of their phase-out on
the markets Total COT again proved negligible, as Total COT for COT-eligible scrips,
despite being fewer in number, continued its steep climb to its February 18 peak, as
shown in Chart 3. The net gain in COT values during this period was achieved despite
the withdrawal of almost Rs 5 billion from the seven phased-out scrips, indicating that
new investment in COT for the scrips not yet affected by the phase-out significantly
outpaced the COT withdrawn because of the phase-out.TP
27
PT

TP
25
PT SECP Directive, Sept. 3, 2004. The phase-out schedule is included for reference purposes in Appendix
D.
TP
26
PT Values and percentages quoted are based on Total COT volumes in these scrips on Jan. 3, 2005, and are
provided for reference in Appendix D.
TP
27
PT KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. Karachi Stock Exchange
website: <www.kse.com.pk> Path: COT History, 2005.
3. The Period of February 19, 2005 to March 18, 2005
The withdrawal of Total COT from the four scrips phased-out between February 19 and
March 18, 2005, had a similar impact on liquidity as the withdrawals from the previously
phased-out seven scrips: approximately Rs 5 billion was eliminated. However, this later
withdrawal of liquidity, although similar in size, was achieved through the phase-out of a
smaller number of scrips in a shorter period of time. Consistent with the original intent
of the phase-out plan, the investment of COT being phased-out each week was steadily
increasing.TP
28
PT
In contrast to the earlier periods, however, the cumulative effect of the scrips phased-out
during the period from February 19 to March 18, 2005, ultimately had a significant
negative impact on Total COT during that period. The level of New COT transactions
for the remaining few COT-eligible scrips did not keep pace withand did not offset
the COT withdrawn by the phase-outs. Total COT actually declined sharply in all scrips
during the latter half of February 2005. Although COT transaction volumes began rising
again during the first half of March, they did not rise fast enough to offset the amount of
COT withdrawn from the COT market by the scrips being phased-out.
4. Conclusion
Collectively, the Total COT of the scrips phased-out from COT eligibility from January
to March 18, 2005, amounted to Rs 10 billion, or 28% of the market.TP
29
PT Despite some
increases in New COT in the remaining COT-active scrips, and possible increases in in-
house Badla, the removal of a large number of scrips from COT eligibility by March 18,
2005 clearly had a negative effect on the overall available liquidity in the market and may
well have been a major contributor to the markets instability.
The critical finding is that the withdrawal of liquidity, in this instance, was the result of
Uexternal regulatory forces unrelated to voluntary broker and/or COT lender actionU. This
withdrawal was mandated by SECP and KSE regulations, developed through a
collaborative effort that was highly publicized to market participants, including brokers,
lenders and the investing public through coverage in consumer and financial trade media.
Accordingly, the withdrawal of COT for these scrips cannot be attributed to the voluntary
or manipulative actions of any broker or lender.

TP
28
PT Values and percentages quoted are based on Total COT volumes in these scrips on Feb. 18, 2005, and
are provided for reference in Appendix D. MCB was phased-out effective Mar. 18, 2005, which falls three
days after the beginning of the stock markets decline. However, given its relatively low levels of COT
investment during its final week of eligibility (primarily due to trading Spot), MCB is included within the
group of scrips classified as being phased-out before the markets decline for purposes of this analysis.
TP
29
PT See Appendix D.
Chart 4 Daily Values of Total and New COT for Group A Scrips (Scrips Phased-
Out), KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 18, 2005
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5
1
/
2
9
/
0
5
1
/
3
1
/
0
5
2
/
2
/
0
5
2
/
4
/
0
5
2
/
6
/
0
5
2
/
8
/
0
5
2
/
1
0
/
0
5
2
/
1
2
/
0
5
2
/
1
4
/
0
5
2
/
1
6
/
0
5
2
/
1
8
/
0
5
2
/
2
0
/
0
5
2
/
2
2
/
0
5
2
/
2
4
/
0
5
2
/
2
6
/
0
5
2
/
2
8
/
0
5
3
/
2
/
0
5
3
/
4
/
0
5
3
/
6
/
0
5
3
/
8
/
0
5
3
/
1
0
/
0
5
3
/
1
2
/
0
5
3
/
1
4
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/
1
6
/
0
5
3
/
1
8
/
0
5
B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Total COT
New COT
WCCL
DSFL
PGF
FFC
PICIC
SSGC
NML
LUCK
SNGP
ACBL
MCB
Total Value Phased-Out
Rs. 10 billion
Graph Notes: The scheduled phase-out of certain scrips in the February 18 to March 18, 2005 timeframe
removed over Rs 5 billion from the COT market and had a significant negative effect on overall market
liquidity.
IV. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF COT
A. INTRODUCTION
In the two weeks prior to the decline of the KSE in March 2005, two scrips that were
subject to relatively high volumes of COT activity each had their eligibility for New COT
voluntarily and temporarily suspended for a period of five trading days. Weeks earlier,
the boards of both Pakistan State Oil (PSO) and Pakistan Telecommunications Company
Limited (PTC) had announced the payment of dividends, given the strong financial
performance of the respective companies.TP
30
PT Consequently, both scrips moved to trading

TP
30
PT In the last week of February 2005, the boards of both PSO and PTC approved the issuance of dividend
payments. For PSO, the Board announced an interim cash dividend of Rs 11 per share translating into cash
payout of Rs 1.9 billion to its shareholders, a dividend that was Rs 4 per share more than the prior year
period. Pakistan State Oil pay Rs 1.9 Billion All-Time High Interim Dividend Pakistan Press
International Information Services, Feb. 22, 2005. PTCs board had recommended an unusual interim
dividend payment at the rate pf Rs 2 per share. Pakistan Shares End Higher; Telecom, Energy Stks Gain,
Dow Jones Asian Equities Report Feb. 15, 2005.
on a Spot (T+1) basis in the Ready Market to facilitate the closing of their share transfer
books.TP
31
PT Their suspension from the New COT market, although temporary and
according to normal practice, was significant in both timing and volume, and thereby
became one of a set of independent circumstances that potentially contributed to the
uncertainties in the capital markets during this critical period prior to the decline. For
purposes of this analysis, we collectively refer to the PSO and PTC scrips as GROUP B.
B. EFFECTS OF SUSPENSION ON MARKET LIQUIDITY
Historically, both PSO and PTC had been heavily traded stocks on the Karachi Stock
Exchange. This trend increased in 2005 as investor interest in the shares grew with
repeated reports of possible privatization, the heavily promoted sale of stakes in the
companies to foreign entities, and general positive news surrounding the two companies.
1. Pakistan State Oil (PSO)
A strong outlook for PSO coupled with privatization interests sparked very heavy trading
volumes of the scrip in the Ready and COT markets in the early months of 2005.TP
32
PT In
January, for example, the average daily value of Total COT for PSO was Rs 5.7 billion,
representing 15.9% of the average daily volumes of the total market. These strong
volumes continued in February, resulting in PSO having the heaviest average daily
investment in Total COT of any single scrip. Clearly, COT availability in PSO was
significant to the liquidity of the overall market.

TP
31
PT The KSE trading procedures defines Spot/T+1 transactions as the following: For about 5 days before
the closure of shares transfer book notified by the company, transactions are settled on T+1 basis. See:
Karachi Stock Exchange website <www.kse.com.pk/kse4/phps/trading/php>. In-line with Spot trading
relating to book closure and payment of dividends to shareholders, the CDC procedures state that spot
trading is necessary, "in order to enable them to distribute the benefits accruing as a result of the corporate
actions to each beneficial owner according to his entitlement." See: CDC Operating Procedures Feb. 15,
2005 Central Depository Company Chapter 5: Handling of Corporate Actions 5.1: Book Closure.
Similarly, the rationale of the NCSS procedures, as provided by the National Clearing Company of
Pakistan Limited, states that the purpose of the Balance Order T+1 settlement cycle, shall be used for
settlement of exchange trades and non-exchange transaction in a security in which book closure has been
announced by the issuer for ascertaining the names of the holders who are entitled to dividend... National
Clearing Company of Pakistan Limited, NCSS Procedures Amended based on 32P
nd
P Board Meeting. PSO
and PTC both submitted the required C/A-1 Annexure to notify the CDC of Spot trading in advance of the
trading. See: Abdul Hameed to Aftab Diwan, Letter to CDC Mar. 2, 2005. See also: Ahmed Ali Jafri to
Aftab Diwan, Letter to CDC Feb. 22, 2005.
TP
32
PT Pakistan Shares End Higher; Telecom, Energy Stks Gain, Dow Jones Asian Equities Report Feb. 15,
2005. Pakistan State Oil improves on record profit by 23% The Pakistan Newswire Feb. 21, 2005.
Pakistan PSO 1H Net PKR2.61 B Vs. PKR2.12 B Last Yr Dow Jones Emerging Markets Report Feb. 21,
2005. PSO Improves on Record Profit by 23% Frontier Star Feb. 21, 2005. Pakistan State Oil pay Rs
1.9 Billion All-Time High Interim Dividend Pakistan Press International Information Services Feb. 22,
2005. Pakistan Shares End Higher; Telecom, Energy Stks Gain, Dow Jones Asian Equities Report Feb.
15, 2005. Fresh EOIs Invited for Privatization of PSO by March 4 The Pakistan Newswire Jan. 13, 2005.
PSO moved to trading Spot on March 10, 2005, thus temporarily suspending its
participation in the New COT market for five trading days until March 17P
th
P. As shown in
Chart 5, the impact of the temporary suspension of PSO reduced the level of Total COT
in the market by approximately Rs 4 billion, or 12%.TP
33
PT
2. Pakistan Telecommunications Company Limited (PTC)
Similar to the high trading volumes experienced by PSO, heavy trading volumes in shares
of PTC were attributed to the looming privatization interests as the government
committed to sell a 26% stake in the nation's leading telecomm provider, coupled with
the fact that high-earnings expectations were anticipated by market analysts for the
company.TP
34
PT
Trading volumes in PTC in both the Ready and COT markets were also relatively heavy
in the first months of 2005. In January 2005, the average daily value of Total COT was
Rs 3.2 billion, increasing in February to Rs 4.9 billion per day, or about 13% of the total
market. These volumes ranked PTC as the fourth heaviest in Total COT of all COT-
eligible scrips.TP
35
PT
PTC moved to trading Spot on March 15, 2005, and temporarily suspended its
participation in the COT market for five trading days. It resumed participation in COT
on March 22P
nd
P, during the middle of the markets freefall. As shown in Chart 6, the
impact of the temporary suspension of PTC from the New COT market reduced the level
of Total COT in the market by about Rs 3 billion, or 10%.TP
36
PT
3. Combined Impact on COT Market
Undoubtedly, the temporary suspension of COT for both PSO and PTC during the
approximate same time period had a substantial impact on the COT market as a whole,
and may well have been a major contributor to the markets instability. Their combined
temporary suspension reduced the level of Total COT in the market by about Rs 7 billion,
or slightly more than 21%. An additional noteworthy fact is that this suspension of newly
available COT occurred at a time when each week, scrips with larger and more
significant levels of COT were exiting the COT market because of regulatory mandate.

TP
33
PT KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, Jan. 2005 -- Mar. 2005. Karachi Stock Exchange
TP
34
PT Privatization Affairs Telecommunications International Edition Dec. 2004. VSNL Interested in
PTCL Privatization World Markets Analysis, Jan. 10, 2005. Pakistan Shares End at Record High; PTCL
Leads Gainers, Dow Jones Asia Equities Report Jan. 26, 2005. Pakistan Shares End Up; PTCL, Pakistan
State Oil Lead Dow Jones Asia Equities Report Jan. 10, 2005.
TP
35
PT Ibid.
TP
36
PT Ibid.
Chart 5 Daily Values of Total and New COT in PSO, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the
Period March 1 to March 15, 2005
-
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
3
/
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/
2
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3
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
5
R
s
.

B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Total PSO COT
New PSO COT
Graph Notes: The move to spot trading on March 10P
th
P temporarily suspended trading in COT for PSO.
This had an immediate downward affect of about Rs 4 billion on the levels of liquidity in the market.
Chart 6 Daily Values of Total and New COT in PTC, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the
-
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
3
/
1
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
2
/
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3
/
7
/
2
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/
2
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/
9
/
2
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2
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0
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1
1
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3
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/
2
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/
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/
2
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2
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3
/
2
1
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2
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2
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/
2
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3
/
2
3
/
2
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3
/
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/
2
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3
/
2
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/
2
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3
/
2
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/
2
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3
/
2
7
/
2
0
0
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3
/
2
8
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
2
9
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
3
0
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
5
R
s
.

B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Total PTC COT
New PTC COT
Graph Notes: The move to spot trading on March 15P
th
P temporarily suspended trading in COT for PTC.
This had an immediate downward affect of about Rs 3 billion on the levels of liquidity in the market.
4. Conclusion
Similar to the group of scrips subject to the COT phase-out prior to mid-March 2005, we
find that the temporary suspension of New COT trading for PSO and PTC was not due to
voluntary or manipulative pull-out of COT by lenders. In fact, this COT suspension was,
in both cases, a company-directed suspension for administrative reasons in the normal
course of business.TP
37
PT No actions of any broker and/or COT lender can be attributed to
the temporary suspension of New COT for PSO and PTC for this period, nor could
anyone have foreseen the unfortunate timing of such suspensions in terms of overall
liquidity conditions existing at the time.
V. ACTIVE COT-ELIGIBLE SCRIPS
A. INTRODUCTION
Nine scrips eligible for COT fall outside of our analytical GROUPS A and B. Unlike the
other scrips, these were not subject to any regulated or company-directed withdrawal or
phase-out of COT prior to the markets steep decline. For ease of reference, we refer to
these scrips collectively as GROUP C.TP
38
PT
Entering 2005, the scrips within GROUP C represented the majority of the markets total
investment in regulated COT. As shown on Chart 7, Total COT in the nine scrips totaled
Rs 19.7 billion on January 3, 2005, which represented 54% of the total market. Not
surprisingly, the proportion of this groups Total COT relative to the overall market
increased as COT eligibility in scrips outside of this group was phased-out, or
temporarily suspended. On March 15, 2005, for example, at the time when both PSO and
PTC were trading Spot, the percentage of Total COT represented by the nine scrips of
GROUP C ballooned to 81% (or Rs 23.6 billion) of the markets Rs 29.0 billion.TP
39
PT
The nine scrips within GROUP C also generally accounted for a significant portion of
daily trading volumes on the Ready Market. Between January 3, 2005 and March 15,
2005, trading in these scrips represented 49% of the total value of shares traded on the
KSE, and as shown in Chart 7, played a large role in dictating the overall daily

TP
37
PT For example, see Taskforce Report (June 2005), paras 28 and 54.
TP
38
PT The nine scrips comprising GROUP C represented the final nine COT-eligible scrips to be phased out as
according to the SECPs phase-out schedule. They are: BOP, DGKC, FFBL, HUBC, ICI, MLCF, NBP,
OGDC and POL. SECP Directive, Sept. 3, 2004. See Appendix A.
TP
39
PT KSE Unreleased/Open Market COT Daily Reports, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. Karachi Stock Exchange
movements of the market. Clearly, the importance of these scrips to the markets overall
sentiments and daily movements was significant.TP
40
PT
Chart 7 Daily Values of Total COT for Entire Market and Group C Scrips, KSE,
In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005
-
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1
/
3
/
2
0
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5
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/
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2
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2
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2
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/
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/
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/
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0
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/
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/
2
0
0
5
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/
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/
2
0
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/
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/
2
0
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3
/
1
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/
2
0
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5
3
/
1
2
/
2
0
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5
3
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
5
R
s
.

B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Total COT Investment
in all scrips
in Group C scrips
Graph Notes: Total COT for Group C scrips increased in the weeks prior to the markets decline while
Total COT for the market decreased (due to the withdrawal/suspension of COT for scrips being phased-out
or going Spot)., demonstrating that the decline was not attributable to the scrips within Group C.
B. EXAMINATION OF COT ACTIVITY AND TRENDS
Our analysis included an examination of the daily values of New and Total COT of the
scrips within GROUP C for evidence of any contraction of the availability of COT in the
weeks leading up to the markets decline. As none of the scrips within GROUP C were
scheduled for phase-out until after March 15P
th
P, evidence of a decrease in COT investment
within these scrips prior to that date might suggest a possible intentional pull-back of
liquidity in the regulated COT market.

TP
40
PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005. Worthy of note is that OGDC, a member of
GROUP C, was the heavyweight of the KSE 100, representing on some days more than 50% of its day-to-
day movement. KSE 100 Daily Data.
1. Contribution to Total Investment in COT
As shown in Chart 8, Total COT for the scrips within GROUP C, in general, rose steadily
from January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005, moving from Rs 19.7 billion to Rs 23.7 billion,
an increase of 19.8%. More noteworthy is that during this period, while the markets
overall value of Total COT declined, Total COT in GROUP C scrips slightly UincreasedU,
from Rs 22.4 billion to Rs 23.6 billion.TP
41
PT
2. Daily Availability of New COT
An examination of daily transactions in New COT shows similar results. Focusing
specifically on the period from March 1 to March 15, 2005, we found that:
The daily transactions of New COT for GROUP C, as shown in Chart 8, UincreasedU
as a whole, moving from Rs 9.7 billion on March 1 to Rs 13.4 billion on March
15, an increase of almost Rs 4 billion.TP
42
PT
The level of daily transactions of New COT for four of the five trading days prior
to the markets decline on March 16P
th
P experienced trading volumes in excess of
the average daily trading volume of New COT for the group over the preceding
six week period.TP
43
PT
As shown in Chart 9, investment in New COT for each of the individual scrips
within GROUP C generally followed the trend of the group as a whole. By March
15, the day before the market began its decline, all nine scrips were experiencing
higher daily volumes (in Rupees) of New COT than at the beginning of the
month. Moreover, the daily volume of New COT for eight of the nine scrips on
March 15P
th
P was at or higher than the average daily level of New COT for the prior
two weeks in March 2005.TP
44
PT
Accordingly, we found no indication that the availability of New COT for any of these
scrips, on the whole, was withdrawn from the market. These findings refute the
allegation and commonly-held perception that COT was voluntarily withdrawn from the

TP
41
PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 2005 to Mar. 2005.
TP
42
PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 to Mar. 15, 2005.
TP
43
PT Daily transactions of New COT for GROUP C scrips were Rs 13.1 billion on March 9P
th
P, Rs 13.3 billion
on March 10P
th
P, Rs 11.6 billion on March 11P
th
P, Rs 13.6 billion on March 14P
th
P, and Rs 13.4 billion on March
15P
th
P. The average level of New COT transactions from Feb. 1, 2005 to Mar, 15, 2005 was Rs 12.7 billion.
KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 to Mar. 15, 2005.
TP
44
PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 to Mar. 15, 2005.
market by brokers and/or COT lenders in the days immediately prior to the markets
fall.TP
45
PT
Chart 8 Daily Values of Total and New COT in Group C Scrips, KSE, In Rupees Billions,
For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005
-
5
10
15
20
25
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/
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.

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s
In Group C scrips
New COT Investment
In Group C scrips
Graph Notes: Total investment in New and Total COT for Group C scrips actually UincreasedU during the
week immediately preceding March 16, 2005, the start of the markets decline. Investment in New COT
increased from Rs 10.5 billion to Rs 13.4 billion between March 7 and March 15, 2005.

TP
45
PT We note the possibility that one or more individual lenders may have pulled back from the COT market
between Mar. 1 and Mar. 15, 2005, however, the COT trend levels indicate that any departure was replaced
by COT from new lenders or from a greater participation by existing lenders.
Chart 9 Daily Values of New COT for Group C Scrips, By Scrip, KSE, In Rupees Billions,
For the Period March 1 to March 15, 2005
-
1
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s
.

B
i
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l
i
o
n
s
BOP
DGKC
FFBL
HUBC
ICI
MLCF
NBP
OGDC
POL
Graph Notes: Each individual scrip included in Group C experienced increasing levels of investment in
New COT during the two weeks preceding March 15, 2005.
3. Variability and Cyclicality of New COT
As described earlier in this Part, the volume of daily transactions in New COT during
2004 and early 2005 was highly cyclical and experienced wide variations in relatively
short time spans. Frequent downward trends in daily transactions of New COT over
multiple daily trading periods were not uncommon. Yet a comparison of daily
transactional volumes of New COT to Ready Market trades shows that any downward
trends that may be present from time to time did not appear to directly or negatively
influence the daily trading volumes of the same scrips.TP
46
PT
As shown in Chart 8, New COT for the scrips comprising GROUP C continued a cyclical
pattern during early 2005 until the markets decline in mid-March 2005. For example,
daily New COT in January ranged from a high of Rs 15.6 on January 6P
th
P to a low of Rs
6.2 billion on January 31P
st
P, a fluctuation of Rs 9.4 billion, or 60% from the months high.
Similarly, daily New COT in February ranged from a low of Rs 7.3 billion on February
1P
st
P to a high of Rs 17.9 billion on February 14P
th
P, a change of Rs 10.6 billion, and again,
approximately a 60% fluctuation. Nonetheless, despite the severe fluctuations, daily

TP
46
PT See Chart B-2 in Appendix B comparing daily levels of New COT investment to Ready Market trading
volumes (in share values). KSE Market Transaction Data, July 2004 to Mar. 2005.
trading volumes of these scrips on the Ready Market remained high and continued to
increase, as shown in Chart 10.
Chart 10 Daily Values of Ready Market Trades Compared to New COT for Group C
Scrips, KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005
-
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
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R
s
.

B
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n
s
Ready Market Investment
in Group C scrips
New COT Investment
In Group C scrips
Graph Notes: Despite fluctuations in New COT for Group C scrips, total Ready Market transactions for
these same scrips remained high and continued to increase up until March 15, 2005.
4. Trends in Broker-Initiated Levels of COT Investment
The absence of any noticeable withdrawal of funds in the New COT market largely
eliminates the need to further analyze the data. Nevertheless, given the turmoil and
rumors surrounding the markets decline, we examined the COT trading activities at the
broker level to determine who, if any, may have voluntarily withdrawn sizeable funds
from the COT market in the weeks prior to the market decline.TP
47
PT
As shown in Chart 11, the daily purchases of New COT by the eleven brokers with the
largest trading volumes in the COT market did not generally decrease between March 1
and March 15. Collectively, these eleven brokers represented a large majority of the total
purchases of New COT during this period, any one of which traded daily in substantial

TP
47
PT Because the total levels of investment in New COT did not generally decline within Group C scrips in
the two weeks prior to March 16, 2005, any substantial withdrawal of investment funds from regulated
COT market by a broker (or brokers) would have been replaced by new funds from another broker (or
brokers). Nevertheless, an examination of New COT activity at the broker level during this period might
possibly uncover attempts, albeit unsuccessful, by one or more brokers to manipulate the market.
volumes of COT. Yet the data shows no indication of a substantial withdrawal of funds
by any of these major brokers during this period.TP
48
PT
In addition, we conducted a limited examination of the client-level trading data acquired
from the two largest brokers trading in the COT marketAqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities
(Pvt.) Ltd (AKD) and Arif Habib Securities Limited (AHS)to identify, where
possible, the underlying source of funds of New COT.TP
49
PT The analysis was conducted to
determine whether COT funding was concentrated among a relatively few lenders and
whether the brokers themselves provided a meaningful portion of total funds lent.
The data shows that for the period March 1 to March 15, 2005, funds provided for New
COT through the two largest providers were heavily concentrated among relatively few
lenders. In the case of AKD, over 80% of its New COT purchases were provided by only
seven lenders.TP
50
PT Two of the seven clients were major banks accounting for 50% of the
total purchases. In the case of AHS, a total of thirteen banks or mutual funds comprised
80% of AHSs total COT purchased.TP
51
PT In cases where clients are concentrated, the risk
of manipulation is mitigated by the fact that the large majority of the lenders were
regulated third-party banks, mutual funds or other financial institutions that are seemingly
independent of the brokers and subject to separate financial and regulatory controls.TP
52
PT

TP
48
PT The eleven largest brokers were determined based on Total COT values for the period Mar. 1, 2005 to
Mar. 15, 2005. We note the unusual, one-day temporary drop in New COT purchase transactions by Aqeel
Karim Dhedhi Securities, yet this decrease appears spread across a number of individual financiers and is
mitigated by the increase in New COT from March 4 to March 15, 2005. See: KSE Market Transaction
Data Mar. 1 2005 to Mar. 15 2005.
TP
49
PT AKD and AHS accounted for 19.8% and 10.2%, respectively, (collectively 30%) of the New COT
investment purchased for GROUP C scrips during the period March 1 to March 15, 2005. KSE Market
Transaction Data, Mar. 1 Mar. 15, 2005.
TP
50
PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 Mar. 15, 2005. Trading data, Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities,
Mar. 1 Mar. 15, 2005.
TP
51
PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 1 Mar. 15, 2005. Arif Habib Securities Client Listing, Mar. 1
Mar. 15, 2005.
TP
52
PT We note that on Feb. 26, 2005, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) issued a circular through their Banking
Policy Department, capping the amount of Badla lending by each of the nations banks and Development
Finance Institutions (DFIs) falling under the regulatory authority of SBP. This restriction was a measure
used in coordination with the phase-out plan of COT. The circular explicitly stated that COT exposure for
all banks and DFIs should not exceed, in any scrip, their respective COT exposures in the corresponding
scrips as of Feb. 25, 2005. Although the effects of this directive have not been quantified, the possibility
exists that this bank regulation also played a role in limiting the availability of COT that might have been
made available for the remaining COT-eligible scrips. See: BPD Circular No. 5 of 2005 Replacement of
COT with Margin Financing Muhammad Ashraf Khan, Sr. Joint Director.
Chart 11 Daily Purchases of New COT for Group C Scrips, By Brokers Representing
Lenders, KSE, In Rupees Millions, For the Period March 1 to March 15, 2005
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
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/
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R
s
.

M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
AKD AHSL KASB Atlas Capital
First Capital Orix Darson Securities Elixir Securities
Standard Capital Jahangir Siddiqui Motiwala Securities
Graph Notes: The top brokers through which COT was provided generally experienced slight UincreasesU in
New COT during the first two weeks of March 2005.
For each broker examined, it did not appear that proprietary accounts or broker-
controlled banks or mutual funds played a significant part in providing regulated COT
financing. In our view, this reduces the brokers control and influence in the short-term
over the supply or withdrawal of COT investment funds.TP
53
PT
5. Comment on COT Investment at Lahore Stock Exchange
Although the focus of this Part is entirely on certain events impacting COT investment on
the KSE, we also briefly analyzed, for comparison purposes, the trends of New COT on
the Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE) in the nine COT-eligible scrips comprising GROUP C
during the first two weeks of March 2005. As shown in Chart 12, our analysis shows the

TP
53
PT The identification of underlying lenders was based entirely on client-level data obtained from the
brokers. We did not perform any confirmation procedures to validate the data or client names including
reviewing underlying transaction documentation such as confirmation slips or trade tickets. On July 28,
2006 the SECP implemented regulations requiring Pakistans three exchanges to ensure that brokers
identify, via the use of a Unique Identification Number, the identity of the individual behind a stock market
transaction. SECP letter to KSE, LSE and ISE, Aug. 3, 2006.
same upward trend in New COT at the LSE as found at the KSE, indicating the absence
of a systemic and voluntary withdrawal of COT for these active scrips.TP
54
PT
Chart 12 Daily Purchases of New COT for Group C Scrips, Lahore Stock Exchange, In
Rupees Billions, For the Period March 1 to March 15, 2005
-
1
2
3
4
5
6
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s
.

B
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s
Graph Notes: Consistent with the KSE, investment in New COT on the LSE for Group C scrips also
increased during the first two weeks of March 2005.
6. In-House Badla
A major remaining issue area concerning whether or not COT funds were withdrawn as
part of a scheme to possibly manipulate the market is the possible role of unregulated in-
house Badla. Although no accurate, authoritative market size estimates exist, various
news articles and market experts surmise that the in-house market may have approached
volumes (of amounts loaned) as large, if not much larger than the regulated market
itself.TP
55
PT

TP
54
PT LSE Market Transaction Data, Jan. 3 Mar. 15, 2005, LSE Website <www.lahorestock.com>.
Interestingly, daily trading in New COT for Group C scrips on LSE, as shown in Chart 12, did not
experience the high variability from day-to-day as reflected in the COT trading on the KSE.
TP
55
PT "KSE Big Fish Vying to Arm Speculators" The International News:
<www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=24865>; Interview with SECP Staff. Recent events demonstrate the
difficulty in ascertaining the full amount of the markets outstanding in-house Badla. For example, in
conjunction with the recent new regulations to ban in-house Badla, brokers were required by the SECP to
report the outstanding balances of in-house Badla. In October 2006, 45 brokers reported a total of Rs 9
Diligence has not been able to obtain any useful public or other data or information from
the market or independent third parties regarding the quantities and activities of in-house
Badla existing in the days and weeks prior to the markets decline in March 2005.
Diligence has learned from Pakistani auditors and accountants familiar with in-house
broker financing activities and the recording of those activities in a brokers books and
records, that quality, accurate and reliable figures on in-house Badla on a daily basis are
not readily available and indistinguishable in the books from the brokers regulated COT.
It would therefore be extremely difficult and very costly to extract and reconcile this
financing source, and would also be virtually impossible to quantify or to verify its
accuracy or completeness on such a wide scale.
From a high-level analytical perspective, we note that a variety of issues effectively
preclude a normal detailed forensic review of this information. First, since this market is
by definition, in-house, there is no central KSE or other exchange repository of
transactional information from which to access and analyze regularly recorded
information. There is no data existing in a uniform format in a professionally designed
and operated control environment to establish reliable data trends and findings. To
undertake a comprehensive review of the possible role of in-house Badla would therefore
require the acquisition, loading and analysis of disparate data types and records from each
and every broker (and/or possibly involved third parties) providing in-house Badla.
Second, assuming the unlikely ability to acquire this core data, it is further unlikely that
there would be any control totals or other mechanisms for use in corroborating the
accuracy and completeness of whatever data was provided by the brokers (and/or
possibly involved third parties). Any resulting analysis would therefore be suspect,
because of the questions surrounding whether or not the data was appropriate, accurate
and complete.TP
56
PT
In summary, this market lacks transparency and accountability. Therefore, assuming the
amounts of in-house Badla involved are in fact substantial, as posited by media and
market experts, any possible broker manipulation of scrip-related financing would have
been more likely to occur, if at all, in this unregulated and opaque financing environment
than in the regulated COT market.

billion of in-house Badla to the SECP (SECP Information). In the same article, in-house Badla was
estimated as high as Rs 90 billion (Dawn, Nov. 18, 2006, pg 9)
TP
56
PT Interview of and statements by independent financial statement auditors familiar with the accounting,
record keeping and financial statement reporting of in-house Badla.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF
REGULATED COT
In summary, our findings support the observations of the Taskforce and others on a
central point: there was a significant decrease in overall investment in the regulated COT
market (concerning the KSE) in the days and weeks prior to the markets March 2005
decline. Whether the decline in COT played a key role in the markets rapid descent, as
alleged by the Taskforce and others, was not the subject of this Report, although certainly
one cannot dismiss the importance of its possible impact.
Our findings, however, do not support the assertion that the withdrawal of COT was the
product of a manipulative scheme by brokers and COT lenders to propel the market into a
pronounced freefall to reap illicit gains on possibly illegal short positions. Conversely,
we find that the withdrawals were directly linked to identifiable and quantifiable
regulatory and/or self-imposed (by certain companies) factors. We do not find credible
evidence that the withdrawal of funds from the regulated COT market was engineered by
certain brokers or other financial participants, or was otherwise manipulative in nature.
The substantial data collected and analyzed as part of this effort leads to two fundamental
conclusions concerning the withdrawal of funds from the COT market:
1) The net drop in Total COT investment from its peak on February 18 to just prior
to the markets decline on March 16 of Rs 12 billion was entirely attributable to
the withdrawal of COT investment from i) the scrips phased-out of COT
eligibility and ii) the two scrips temporarily moving to Spot and suspending their
COT eligibility (See Sections IV and V); and
2) The level of New COT for the scrips not subject to a regulated or self-imposed
withdrawal for this same February and March period was cyclical (essentially
consistent with historical patterns) and, more significantly, did not appear to
adversely impact Ready Market trading as the daily trading volumes of these
scrips on the Ready Market for this period remained high and continued to
increase. (See Section VI).
Finally, although this Part does not probe the question of what precisely caused the
market decline, we note and cannot ignore a convergence of multiple independent and
identifiable events within a short time frame prior to the Ready Markets decline that
individually and collectively restricted the availability of COT and strongly influenced
market sentiments. We also note the strong influence likely played by the skyrocketing
trades and record open and precarious positions in the Futures markets.
1. Summary and Conclusions Presented Graphically
Presented below are additional graphical representations of our findings and conclusions
related to the withdrawal of regulated COT from the KSE market.
In Chart 13, we present a side-by-side comparison of the daily levels of Total COT for
each of the featured analytical groups: GROUP A, GROUP B and GROUP C. As shown in
the chart, the daily levels of Total COT for GROUPS A and B, the scrips for which COT
was phased-out or temporarily suspended, declined leading up to the weeks preceding the
markets steep decline. Conversely, Total COT for GROUP C, scrips which continued to
be eligible for and actively trading in COT, generally increased during the same time
period.
In Chart 14, we present the same data of Total COT by analytical groups, but the data is
displayed in a format that illustrates the relative proportions of the markets Total COT
that are represented by the three analytical groups. As shown in the chart, Total COT of
GROUP C represents the largest portion of the markets Total COT, and is thus an
influential factor of the markets total liquidity. For this group we found no indications
of COT being withdrawn prior to the markets decline. Also reflected in the chart is the
underlying basis for the decrease in the aggregate level of Total COT, which we found
was entirely attributable to the mandated or temporary phase-out of COT by the scrips in
GROUPS A and B.
Charts 15 and 16 follow the same formats as Charts 13 and 14, respectively, except that
the data in Charts 15 and 16 represent investment in UNewU COT (not Total COT) across
the three analytical groups. Although the data set changes for these two charts, the
patterns are similar. As shown in the charts, New COT for GROUPS A and B decline, as a
result of their respective regulated or self-imposed withdrawal from the COT market,
whereas New COT for GROUP C increases, refuting the allegations that there was a
coordinated scheme to withdraw regulated financing from the market.
Chart 13 Daily Values of Total COT Comparing Scrip Groups A, B and C Side-by-Side,
KSE, In Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005
-
5
10
15
20
25
30
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2
0
0
5
3
/
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
4
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
6
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
8
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
6
/
2
0
0
5
R
s
.

B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
All Other Scrips
PSO/PTCL
Phased-out Scrips
Chart 14 Daily Values of Total Outstanding COT Divided Into Scrip Groups A, B and C,
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1
/
3
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
5
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
7
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
9
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
1
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
3
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
5
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
7
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
9
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
1
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
3
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
5
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
7
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
9
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
4
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
6
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
8
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
2
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
6
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
8
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
0
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
2
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
4
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
6
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
8
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
4
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
6
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
8
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
5
R
s
.

B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Phased-out Scrips
PSO/PTCL
All other scrips
Chart 15 Daily Values of New COT Comparing Scrip Groups A, B and C Side-by-Side,
-
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1
/
3
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
5
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
7
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
9
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
1
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
3
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
5
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
7
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
9
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
1
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
3
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
5
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
7
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
9
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
4
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
6
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
8
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
2
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
6
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
8
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
0
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
2
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
4
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
6
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
8
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
4
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
6
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
8
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
6
/
2
0
0
5
R
s
.

B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
All Other Scrips
PSO/PTCL
Phased-out Scrips
Chart 16 Daily Values of New COT Divided Into Scrip Groups A, B and C, KSE, In
Rupees Billions, For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1
/
3
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
5
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
7
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
9
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
1
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
3
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
5
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
7
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
1
9
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
1
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
3
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
5
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
7
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
2
9
/
2
0
0
5
1
/
3
1
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
4
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
6
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
8
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
2
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
6
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
1
8
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
0
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
2
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
4
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
6
/
2
0
0
5
2
/
2
8
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
4
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
6
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
8
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
5
R
s
.

B
i
lli
o
n
s
Phased-out
Scrips
PSO/PTCL
All Other Scrips
VII. OTHER FINDINGS
In the course of our on-going forensic investigation, we examined millions of trading and
transactional records and events across the Ready, Futures and COT markets. Although
outside of the central focus of this Part, we present certain findings and trends in this
concluding section that we believe are relevant to the general subject of market liquidity.
A. TRADING PATTERNS IN FUTURES MARKET
In the months leading up to the KSE 100s peak on March 15, 2005, trading volumes in
the KSEs Futures Market rapidly accelerated. As shown in Chart 17, by March 10, 2005
(just a few days before the markets decline), trading volumes at the Futures counter,
which historically have been a fraction of the volumes in the Ready Market, shot past the
trading volumes in the Ready Market and reached unprecedented levels. What exactly
caused this abnormal shift of interest to the Futures Market has yet to be definitively
investigated, but some have attributed the shift to the decrease in available COT in the
Ready Market due to the COT phase-out, and the lack of a sufficient alternative in margin
financing, as weak investors sought more purchase opportunities in a rapidly rising
market.
Also noteworthy is the heightened and unparalleled level of open positions in the Futures
Market, as shown in Chart 18. With the extraordinary levels of leverage in the COT
markets, the combined leverage in the markets in the days immediately preceding the
steep decline can not be dismissed or ignored, and may have played a critical role in the
markets instability at that time.
Chart 17 Daily Trade Volumes in Ready and Futures Market, KSE, In Rupees Billions,
For the Period October 1, 2004 to March 24, 2005
-
20
40
60
80
100
120
7
/
5
/
0
4
7
/
1
2
/
0
4
7
/
1
9
/
0
4
7
/
2
6
/
0
4
8
/
2
/
0
4
8
/
9
/
0
4
8
/
1
6
/
0
4
8
/
2
3
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0
4
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/
3
0
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9
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/
2
7
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0
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1
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4
1
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1
1
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4
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8
/
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1
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5
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1
1
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1
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4
1
1
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8
/
0
4
1
1
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1
5
/
0
4
1
1
/
2
2
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0
4
1
1
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2
9
/
0
4
1
2
/
6
/
0
4
1
2
/
1
3
/
0
4
1
2
/
2
0
/
0
4
1
2
/
2
7
/
0
4
1
/
3
/
0
5
1
/
1
0
/
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5
1
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/
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1
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1
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2
1
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3
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4
/
0
5
B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Ready Market
Futures
Market

Chart 18 Daily Totals of Open Futures Positions, KSE, For the Period October 1, 2004 to
March 24, 2005
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1
-
O
c
t
-
0
4
8
-
O
c
t
-
0
4
1
5
-
O
c
t
-
0
4
2
2
-
O
c
t
-
0
4
2
9
-
O
c
t
-
0
4
5
-
N
o
v
-
0
4
1
9
-
N
o
v
-
0
4
2
6
-
N
o
v
-
0
4
3
0
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N
o
v
-
0
4
3
-
D
e
c
-
0
4
1
0
-
D
e
c
-
0
4
1
7
-
D
e
c
-
0
4
2
4
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D
e
c
-
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4
3
1
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D
e
c
-
0
4
7
-
J
a
n
-
0
5
1
4
-
J
a
n
-
0
5
1
9
-
J
a
n
-
0
5
2
8
-
J
a
n
-
0
5
4
-
F
e
b
-
0
5
1
1
-
F
e
b
-
0
5
1
8
-
F
e
b
-
0
5
2
5
-
F
e
b
-
0
5
2
8
-
F
e
b
-
0
5
1
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
2
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
3
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
7
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
8
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
9
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
1
0
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
1
1
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
1
4
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
1
5
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
1
6
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
1
7
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
1
8
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
2
1
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
2
2
-
M
a
r
-
0
5
2
3
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M
a
r
-
0
5
2
4
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M
a
r
-
0
5
I
n

M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s

o
f

S
h
a
r
e
s
PKR 0
PKR 10
PKR 20
PKR 30
PKR 40
PKR 50
PKR 60
PKR 70
PKR 80
PKR 90
R
s
.

B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Quantity VALUE
B. COT TRENDS DURING MARKETS DECLINE
Earlier in this Part, we noted that New COT for actively trading COT-eligible scrips
(scrips that had not been phased-out or temporarily moved to trading Spot) generally
increased during the two weeks preceding March 16P
th
P. We also described how all major
brokers representing the purchasers of New COT, individually and as a group, followed
the same pattern of slightly increasing COT funding over the same two-week period. We
did not identify any one broker or group of brokers acting in concert contrary to this
general market trend during this period.
We also performed a limited review of the COT market patterns between March 16 and
March 24, the period immediately following the KSE 100s peak, and a period of
precarious turnover and price instability in the markets. The purchase transaction data by
the largest brokers in the COT market are shown in Chart 19. The data shows that the
largest brokers transacting COT purchases appeared to follow the same general trends of
the overall market. The data does not indicate or suggest that any one broker or group of
brokers appeared to have manipulated the COT market or acted in concert contrary to the
general market trend.TP
57
PT
The percentage of New COT lending as compared to the volume of trading in the Ready
Market is shown in Chart 20. Although New COT declined that week, this appears to be
a function of demand, as trading volumes in the Ready Market declined similarly during
the same period. There appears to be no indication that the amount of New COT UrelativeU
UtoU trading volumes in the Ready Market declined, but rather, it remained steady.
As previously noted, the KSE did not systematically retain information related to orders
placed on the exchange. Because order information provides details on bid and offer
volumes and prices, it is an accurate gauge of the supply and demand forces that drive the
ultimate executed trades. In reference to the COT analysis above, COT order information
would have been instrumental in our ability to determine whether decreases in New COT
during the period March 16 to March 24 were a result of a decrease in financier supply
or, alternatively, were a function of a decrease in demand related to the general downturn
in the market.

TP
57
PT KSE Market Transaction Data, Mar. 16, 2005 Mar. 24, 2005.
Chart 19 Daily Values of New COT Purchases By Top Brokers, Representing Lenders,
KSE, In Rupees Millions, For the Period March 16 to March 24, 2005
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3
/
1
6
/
0
5
3
/
1
7
/
0
5
3
/
1
8
/
0
5
3
/
1
9
/
0
5
3
/
2
0
/
0
5
3
/
2
1
/
0
5
3
/
2
2
/
0
5
3
/
2
3
/
0
5
3
/
2
4
/
0
5
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Atlas Capital AKD Multiline
AHSL First Capital Orix
Darson Elixir Standard Capital
KASB Escorts Bank First Equity Modaraba
Graph Notes: New COT provided through the largest brokers showed generally uniform decreasing trends
consistent with the general market downturn.
Chart 20 Daily Percentage of New COT Purchases to Volume of Trading in Ready
Market by Scrip Group, In Rupees Millions, For the Period March 1 to March 18, 2005
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
3
/
1
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
3
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
4
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
5
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
6
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
7
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
8
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
9
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
0
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
1
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
2
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
3
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
4
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
5
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
6
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
7
/
2
0
0
5
3
/
1
8
/
2
0
0
5
PHASED-OUT OTHER OGDC/POL
Graph Notes: New COT as a percentage of volume of trading in the Ready Market remained steady during
the critical days immediately following the KSE 100s peak on March 15P
th
P.
GLOSSARY
Book Closure Period of completing and closing business journals, ledgers, and
other accounting records (including the transfer of revenue and
expense accounts) at the end of a period in preparation of a
corporate action such as a payment of dividend, issuance of bonus
shares, stock split, merger, acquisition, etc.
COT Carry Over Transaction (also known as Carry Over Trade or
Badla financing) was a financing mechanism providing investors
and market participants in the Pakistani securities markets with
funding to leverage their investments. COT enabled investors to
carry over their positions in the market without taking delivery,
thus deferring settlement. COT was replaced with the Continuous
Funding System in August 2005.
New COT: As used in this Part represents the value (in
Rupees) of new carry over transactions transacted on the KSE
on a given trading day. New COT is equivalent to Open
Market COT provided on the KSE Daily Unreleased/Open
Market COT reports.
Total COT: As used in this Part, Total COT represents the
value (in Rupees) of outstanding carry over transactions at the
end of a given trading day. Total COT is the sum of unreleased
carry over transactions from the previous trading day plus New
COT. Total COT is equivalent to Total COT provided on the
KSE Daily Unreleased/Open Market COT reports.
COT-Eligible Scrip A scrip in which COT funding was a permitted, viable method for
leveraging trades.
COT Borrower An investor who borrows COT funding from a COT lender at the
agreed COT rate in order to leverage his/her position in the market.
The COT borrower is represented as the Seller in the COT
market transaction data records, as he/she is temporary selling
his/her Ready Market position in a given scrip to the COT lender
for purposes of collateral.
COT Lender The provider of COT funding who agrees to make the funding
available at the prevailing COT rate. This lender can be a bank,
development financial institution, non-bank financial institution, a
broker, etc. A COT lender can also be an individual who decides to
invest his money in the COT market in order to realize profits
afforded by the COT rate. A lender makes financing available on
the COT market through a broker. The COT lender is represented
as the Buyer in the COT market transaction data records as
he/she is temporarily buying, for purposes of collateral, the
Ready Market scrip shares which are the subject of the COT
financing.
In-House/Unregulated
COT Funding COT funding made available to investors directly by a broker
through an unregulated transaction. These off exchange
transactions are not transparent to the market and are not recorded
or controlled by any exchange. In contrast to regulated COT, rates
are not capped for in-house/unregulated COT funding.
KSE Karachi Stock Exchange
KSE 100 Index A securities market indicator for the Karachi Stock Exchange,
(similar to the Dow Jones Industrial Index of the New York Stock
Exchange) that aggregates the overall daily performance of 100
selected scrips.
KSE Market
Transaction Data A complete record of all individual trades executed on either the
Ready or COT markets for a given trading day.
KSE Unreleased/
Open Market COT
Daily Reports Daily reports produced by the KSE that define the daily values of
Unreleased COT (COT carried over and not released), Open
Market COT (our New COT), and Total COT (our Total COT) for
each COT-eligible scrip on a given trading day.
Ready Market The KSEs T+3 trading market.
Regulated COT
Market The COT market in which transactions consist of investors buying
and selling COT funding at a regulated COT rate. Transactions in
this market were transparent and subject to exchange recording and
control and were regulated by the Carry Over Transactions
Regulations, 1993.
Scrip Equivalent to a share or shares of an issuers stock.
SECP Taskforce The group of individuals commissioned on April 2, 2005 by the
SECP to determine the causes underlying the securities market
downturn in Pakistan in March 2005. The Task Force was chaired
by Justice (Retd.) Saleem Akhtar, and also included members Dr.
Mohammad Zubair Khan, Shahid Hafiz Kardar, and Sultan Allana.
The Task Force issued its report to the SECP in June 2005.
Spot Trading (T+1) Trading of securities in which settlement occurs within one day of
the trade - usually associated with an issuer corporate action, such
as a dividend payment.
FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS WASH TRADES
NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART II - PAGE 1 OF 8
PART II
Wash Trades

I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
A wash trade is defined as a purchase and sale of a security either simultaneously or
within a short period of time by a single investor or by two or more parties conspiring to
create artificial market activity in order to profit from a rise in the securitys price.
1
We
understand that the SECP takes the position that wash trades are a direct violation of
Section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.
The Taskforce identified the prolific use of wash trades as a critical component in the
overall scheme perpetrated by certain brokers to pump the market prior to its
precipitous decline. Specifically, the Taskforce concluded:
1) The analysis of stock market data helped identify a number of potential cases of
market abuse where players had undertaken wash trades; either for the same
client or a series of common clients across brokers to pump the market.
Analysis shows that the brokers and their clients largely dealt with each other in
groups or sub groups at both broker and client level.
2
2) Large volumes were also traded between clients of the same brokerages and
there were numerous instances of the same client or house account of a broker
being both buyer and seller, in violation of rules, raising concerns about the
sanctity of these transactions.
3

The Taskforce called for its identified wash trade abuses to be further investigated by the
SECP. As described in detail below, Diligence undertook several steps in response to the
Taskforces request, namely reviewing:
1) The KSE trading data for intra-broker wash trading activities, or wash trades by
same clients within one broker.
2) The KSE trading data for inter-broker wash trading activities, or wash trades by
same clients across more than one broker.
3) The client-level detailed trading data for a sample of four large-volume brokers
suspected of participating in excessive wash trading, to determine if any
additional illegal wash trading had occurred.

1
Barrons- Dictionary of Investment Terms John Downs and Jordan Elliott Goodman, 6
th
Edition New
York: Barrons, 2003. The Taskforce defined a wash trade similarly as an illegal stock trading practice
whereby an investor simultaneously buys and sells shares in a company through two different brokers.
Such a trade enhances the activity in the stock, giving the impression of active trading without any change
in beneficial ownership, a clear violation of Section 17 of the SEO, 1969. Taskforce Report, fn 10.
2
Taskforce Report, para 23.
3
Ibid., para 24.
II. REVIEW OF TASKFORCE FINDINGS
A. INTRA-BROKER WASH TRADES
The taskforce relied exclusively on client codes represented in KSE trading data to
identify purported intra-broker wash trades included as Appendix VIII to its report.
4
To
confirm the accuracy of the methodology employed by the Taskforce, we compared the
client codes represented in the KSE trading data for several large brokers to the client
information from the brokers back-office trading data and identified a number of
instances in which certain trades were inappropriately categorized as wash trades by the
Taskforce. The following is one such example:
Row 10 of Taskforce Appendix VIII indicates that client 013758 at broker 128 (KASB
Securities) transacted wash trades of 250,000 shares of OGDC during March 2005.
Based on our review of the KSE data, these 250,000 shares were made up of four distinct
trades, the details of which are listed below in Chart 1.
Chart 1 - KSE data for select purported Wash trades identified by Taskforce
Ticket # Date Broker Buyer Seller Scrip Shares Value
91452669 09-Mar-05 128 013758 013758 OGDC-MAR 50,000 8,050,000
91452959 09-Mar-05 128 013758 013758 OGDC-MAR 50,000 8,050,000
91470891 09-Mar-05 128 013758 013758 OGDC-MAR 50,000 8,042,500
92329569 14-Mar-05 128 013758 013758 OGDC-MAR 100,000 17,950,000
In our review of trade data acquired directly from KASB, we noted that the underlying
parties to these transactions were in fact not the same individuals and that the transactions
were therefore not wash trades. Chart 2 below includes details obtained directly from
KASB trading data.

4
Diligence must note that although the Taskforce, paragraph 23 of its report, described the trades in
Appendix VIII as where the investor simultaneously buys and sells shares in a company through two
different brokers (emphasis added), the trades presented in Appendix VIII are purported wash trades of the
same client within the same broker. We have included Apprendix VIII from the Taskforce Report for
reference following the Appendices for Part II.
Chart 2- KASB Trade Data on the Same Four Trades
Ticket # Buy or Sell Client Shares Client Name
91452669 B 02333 50,000 [redacted]
91452669 S 03758 50,000 [redacted]
91452959 S 03758 50,000 [redacted]
91452959 B 02334 50,000 [redacted]
91470891 B 03866 50,000 [redacted]
91470891 S 03758 50,000 [redacted]
92329569 B 04182 100,000 [redacted]
92329569 S 03758 100,000 [redacted]
During the course of our investigation, we determined that the client codes contained in
the KSEs trading data are at times incomplete and inconsistent, making it difficult to
identify with certainty and accuracy the investors underlying the market transactions.
This limitation of the KSE data, as demonstrated by the example above, calls into
question the Taskforces reliance on the KSE datas client codes as prima facie to
characterize the trades identified in Appendix VIII as wash trades.
Until just recently, brokers were not required to use a unique client code identifying
system to consistently and accurately track client information of this kind. Therefore, the
client codes submitted by brokers to the exchange through the trading system, and
consequently the data provided to us by the KSE, cannot be relied upon, without
substantial additional corroboration, for purposes of precisely identifying investors.
During the second half of 2005, we understand that the SECP issued Show Cause Notices
to all of the brokers with trades listed on Appendix VIII, requesting responses to wash
trade allegations as originally put forth by the Taskforce. We reviewed certain minutes
of the SECP adjudication hearings related to a sample of the Show Cause Notices, and in
particular we reviewed the minutes related to the hearing concerning possible wash trade
abuses involving KASB.
5
We noted that the explanations provided by KASB, and
accepted by SECP, for the type of trade detailed in the example above conformed with
our conclusion that the Taskforce had erred in asserting that all trades included in its
Appendix VIII were wash trades. However, the SECP concluded, and many brokers
agreed, that certain trades identified by the Taskforce were in fact trades in which the
buyer and seller were one in the same. It appears, based on conclusions reached by SECP

5
Minutes of Hearing in the Matter of Show Cause Notice dated 23 Aug 2005 issued to KASB (7 Sep
2005).
adjudicators however, that a preponderance of these trades may have been placed
inadvertently without manipulative intent.
6
B. INTER-BROKER WASH TRADES
In further support of its conclusions on wash trades, the Taskforce presented an analysis
of inter-trading between several top brokers. The graphical analysis
7
details the
trading relationships in shares of OGDC, on a broker-level, between seven brokers.
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear to Diligence why the Taskforce used a diagram of
partial trades of scrip between different clients among different brokers as a graphical
representation of large volumes of wash trades. Investors trading on the KSE must use a
broker to effect a stock market transaction. That any number of brokers, particularly the
larger ones, have a significant amount of trading activity between one another is not
surprising, is not indicative of wash trading, and is, in fact, quite normal and expected.
Further, that certain trades between individual investors occur within the same broker is
also to be expected, particularly within brokers that count thousands of investing clients.
Additionally, we find three significant flaws in the Taskforces analysis. First, the
Taskforce report highlighted the fact that for these seven brokers, there appeared to be a
correlation in the amount of shares purchased and sold. This analysis was remiss in that
it did not take into account the actual underlying clients involved in these trades. In the
case of Akeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (AKD) trading with Muhamad Anas Kapadia
(MAK) for example, close to 500 AKD clients accounted for the OGDC trades
between these two brokers. To believe that AKD and MAK conspired to perpetrate fraud
would require one to believe that the 500 clients at AKD may have also conspired with
MAK clients to enter into wash trades of 3.7 million shares.
8
In our opinion, this

6
The SECP informed Diligence that based on information gleaned from their adjudication of the Show
Cause Notices the majority of the trades characterized by the Taskforce as wash trades were not ultimately
considered wash trades by the SECP.
7
Taskforce Report, page 14.
8
For example, the chart in paragraph 24 of the Taskforce report notes that Akeel Karim Dhedhi Securities
(AKD) and Muhamad Anas Kapadia (MAK) traded Rs. 3.7 million shares of OGDC with each other during
the month of March 2005. We reviewed the KSE data and noted that AKD clients purchased 3.7 million
shares of OGDC from MAK clients and MAK clients purchased 3.4 million shares of OGDC from AKD
clients during the month of March 2005. While the similarity in these two figures might elicit curiosity, a
closer look at the KSE data (for which AKD client codes where found to be fairly reliable) shows that 254
separate AKD clients bought OGDC shares from MAK and conversely 244 AKD clients sold OGDC
shares to MAK. Only 89 AKD clients both bought from and sold shares to MAK, leaving 409 AKD
clients that could not have perpetrated any wash trades (unless perhaps through a complicated scheme of
collusion). Of the 89 clients that did overlap, we reviewed details related to the largest one, client 1080
which is AKDs proprietary in-house trading account. We noted that client AKD #1080 purchased 569,100
shares from at least seven different clients at MAK (note that the KSE data shows a blank MAK client code
for 453,400 shares out of the 569,000). On the sale side, AKD #1080 sold 455,100 shares to at least 13
clients (similarly, the KSE MAK data shows a blank MAK client code for 210,000 shares out the 455,100).
scenario would be very unlikely. It is impossible to reach such a conclusion without a
detailed review of the underlying clients and the trading patterns among them.
Second, successfully executed wash trades serve the purpose of temporarily hyping the
market and raising stock prices within a very short period time (measured in minutes).
Therefore, wash trade analyses must be performed on an exceptionally granular level,
preferably on a trade by trade basis. We believe that the analysis of summary trading
data aggregated over a period of one month is not representative of individual client
trading behavior and cannot accurately identify potential wash trades.
Third, the absence of a universal identification coding system for investors renders it
virtually impossible from using only KSE data to identify the same clients across
different brokers. Without a universal identification coding system in place, in order to
effectively and completely analyze wash trades within and across brokers in light of the
limitations in the KSE data, one would need to review and compare the detailed back-
office trading data of each and every broker to accurately identify the underlying clients,
as many investors have accounts at numerous brokers.
9
This approach is complicated and
would require the collection and examination of back-office trading data from an
extraordinarily large number of brokerages to be meaningful. Even then, due to
inconsistencies in names and spellings, and the requirement to manually confirm that
clients across different brokers are one and the same through additional verification such
as addresses or identification numbers would render virtually impossible the formation of
any reliable conclusions on the potential wash trades between brokers.
10
Based on the above, we believe that the conclusions drawn by the Taskforce relating to
inter-broker wash trades were premature and were not based on sound empirical
evidence. We believe that any successful analysis of wash trades would have had to have
been performed at the client level and on an individual trade level to have been effective.

Only one of the clients at MAK both bought from and sold shares to AKD #1080 (1,000 shares purchased
and 10,000 shares sold).
9
The implementation of Universal Identification Codes for clients in 2006 provided the SECP with
statistics as to the number of accounts clients hold across different brokers. According to the data, 16% of
investors, or 22,414 investors, maintained investment accounts at more than one broker. Sixty-eight
investors held accounts at more than ten brokers.
10
The implementation of Universal Identification Codes for clients will alleviate this data limitation and
greatly enhance the ability to track same client trades across different brokers.
C. WASH TRADE ANALYSIS OF FOUR LARGE BROKERS
1. Identification of Potential Wash trades
As a result of the significant KSE data limitations discussed above, Diligence was unable
to systematically analyze potential inter-broker wash trades. We did, however, review
back-office trading data of four of the larger brokers to identify potential intra-broker
wash trades within each of these brokers.
11
Our analysis differed from that of the
Taskforce, focusing on all scrips traded on the KSE
12
.
2. Analysis of Potential Wash trades
We identified a number of instances, at all four brokers, in which the same underlying
client appears to have been both the purchaser and seller on the same market trade. Part
II-Appendices A through D detail these potential wash trades, by scrip and by day. To
assess whether these identified trades were truly wash trades, we attempted to answer the
following two questions:
1) Were the trade volumes large enough to potentially impact scrip price?
2) Were the trades followed by additional non-wash trades by the same investor
through which he/she could have profited from a price increase?
In answer to question 1), we compared the value of each potential wash trade to that
days total trading activity for the same client and scrip, as well as total trading activity
for that scrip on the entire KSE. We identified several instances for which the wash trade
appeared to be material to total trading activity for the same scrip. In the majority of
cases, however, the size of the wash trade represented only a very small fraction of that
clients total trades for the day, and often less than one percent of the scrips total KSE
market activity. The following examples relate to two of the brokers reviewed:
For one broker, we identified 63 trades for which the buyer and seller were the
same. Of those 63 trades, only 5 trades were large enough to represent more than
3% of total market trading activity for that scrip on that day.
For another broker, we identified 37 trades for which the buyer and seller were
the same. Of those 37 trades, only one trade, of a very thinly-traded scrip,
accounted for more than 3% of total market turnover.

11
We reviewed four of the larger brokers engaging in potential wash trades based solely on KSE
transaction data.
12
The Taskforces analysis examined potential wash trades on just the heaviest traded scrips within the
KSE100. Diligences analysis focuses on all scrips traded on the KSE by the broker under review.
In answer to question 2, we analyzed the subsequent trading activity of each client
involved in a potential wash trade. This review was designed to identify instances where
a client transacting a wash trade may have benefited from a price increase through a sale
transaction subsequent to the wash trade. We identified several such March cases which
may have resulted in illicit gain, two examples of which we include below.
13
We have
referred all potential material cases of wash trading to the SECP for action as per law.
An institutional client at a large broker engaged in significant wash trades of the
same scrip for three consecutive days. One particular day saw a total of 15 wash
trades, spread over 4 trading hours. Between and around those various wash
trades, the institutional client also engaged in significant sales of the same scrip to
other market participants. Throughout the course of these 4 trading hours, the
scrips trading price increased from Rs. 81.8 to close at Rs. 89.
A large broker entered into 9 significant wash trades during one day of a typically
thinly-traded scrip. These trades were placed through the brokers own
proprietary trading account. In addition to these wash trades, the broker entered
into sale transactions of over 1.6 million shares of the same scrip on the same day.
The scrips share price increased from Rs. 31 to Rs. 33 during this trading day.
In summary, we did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that pervasive wash trade
abuses, whether alone or in combination with other potential abuses, were perpetrated
within the context of a conspiracy to hype and manipulate the market during March 2005,
as put forth by the Taskforce. Diligence also does not believe that the methodologies used
by the Taskforce in reviewing this wash trade area were sound or fact based, and we
respectfully disagree with the resulting Taskforce Reports conclusions and suggestions
on wash trades. There may have been isolated cases where violations of Section 17(a)
occurred, and Diligence has referred all potential material cases of wash trading to the
SECP for action as per law.

13
To preserve the process integrity of the SECP's possible enforcement of these cases, we have not
included information as to the identity of the brokers and clients involved in these cases.
REPORT OF FINDINGS FUTURES CONTRACTS
NOVEMBER 21, 2006 PART III - PAGE 1 OF 8
PART III
Futures Contracts

I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
In its report, the Taskforce alleged that some brokers, in the weeks preceding the
markets decline, executed a large amount of sales of March 2005 Futures contracts that
resulted in having net sale positions in excess of same scrip shares held at CDC or
recently purchased in the Ready Market. Such activity, referred to in Western markets as
naked short sales, results in illegal profits for manipulative investors who reap the
difference between the contractually agreed upon future sale price and the lower price
paid for shares purchased at or near delivery date. Net sale positions of this type in
excess of Rs 50 million are in violation of the Regulations Governing Futures Contracts
of the Karachi Stock Exchange (Guarantee) Limited, Clause 3(b) and possibly Section
17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969.
The Taskforce further alleged that the brokers obtaining the large naked short sale
positions in Futures contracts were the same brokers responsible for the markets steep
decline by way of their intentional reduction of regulated COT lending. The Taskforce
inferred that the motive for the brokers manipulative actions was to sell in Futures at
very high prices as the market was rising, then to purchase the shares later in the Ready
Market at discounted prices to effectuate delivery at settlement.
From the Taskforce Report:
1) The Sellers in the March Futures contract were of two types: (i) those that were
holding shares that they had sold in the futures and locked in their arbitrage
profits(ii) the other sellers of the March contract, in clear violation of KSE rules
(although not easily enforceable due to group accounts), may not have held the
shares that they had sold in the future, but had planned to buy these after the
market fell. The latter category of sellers could have played a role in bringing
prices down in the ready market by pulling out Badla financing.
1
(emphasis
added)
2) It is possible that the Badla providers who were reducing their lending in specific
scrips after March 08, had been selling actively in the ready market and were
holding sell positions (i.e., selling) in the March futures contract in the same
scrips
2
3) This environment [reduction of Badla] made it possible for investors to buy these
stocks cheaply compared to their prices in the first week of March. This could
have enabled investors who had sold these two scrips in the future to pick up
stocks at much lower prices [from the Ready Market] thereby making large
capital gains. The holding back of Badla by financiers who had earlier sold in the

1
Taskforce Report, para 39.
2
Ibid., para 33.
future market at a high price suggests that these brokers could have been involved
in such a manipulation.
3
The Taskforce called for these apparent abuses to be further investigated by the SECP.
As described in detail below, Diligence undertook several steps in response to the
Taskforces request to examine the trading activities of brokers selling in the Futures
market, namely:
1) Identifying any instances of brokers in net sales positions in excess of the Rs 50
million threshold of Clause 3(b) in March 2005 Futures contracts, thus triggering
a need for the broker to satisfy the KSE that the shares sold were indeed held or
recently purchased by the broker as directed in Clause 3(b).
2) For the brokers holding the largest net sales positions in March 2005 Futures
contracts, comparing the brokers net sales positions to the shares reported held
by the broker in its accounts at CDC. A short-fall in shares held of greater than
Rs 50 million might be found to be a potential violation of Clause 3(b) and
Section 17(a).
3) Quantifying and examining the lending of New COT for COT-eligible scrips by
the markets more influential brokers for the period March 1 to March 18, 2005,
to determine whether New COT for those scrips was reduced by these brokers,
which could be a potential violation of Section 17(a).
Based on our analysis, we found numerous incidents in which brokers, subject to
additional factual and legal analysis, may be in significant violation of the securities
regulations. We are not, however, of the opinion that the potential violations were an
intentional and integral part of a larger scheme to inflate, and then crash the market, as
alleged by the Taskforce and others. Rather, these potential violations, if substantiated,
are more likely to be individual isolated instances designed to take advantage of and to
abuse regulatory loopholes and lack of oversight in order to profit from, at that time,
overly optimistic sentiments in a highly volatile market.

3
Ibid., para 55.
II. FINDINGS
A. IDENTIFICATION OF BROKERS WITH NET SALES POSITIONS
OVER CLAUSE 3(B) THRESHOLD
Clause 3(b) seeks to limit the risk of naked short selling in the Pakistani markets by
brokers.
4
The regulation states:
No member shall have a sale position in a particular scrip of more than Rs
50 million, unless the actual shares sold over and above the aforesaid limit
are deposited with the exchange or the broker gives documentary evidence
that the shares are lying in CDC or with some bank or DFI, to the
satisfaction of the KSE management. For the purposes of establishing such
sale position, net buy position in T+3 shall be net off from net sale position
in Futures Counter.
Based on our interpretation of the statute, brokers with aggregate net sales positions (on a
broker rather than individual client level) in a particular scrip in excess of Rs 50 million
are required to either: (1) deposit with the KSE the shares exceeding the Rs 50 million
threshold, or (2) provide the KSE documentary evidence that the shares are recorded at
CDC.
5
Using detailed KSE data of trading activities in the Futures and Ready Market, our
examination identified, for March 2005 futures contracts, all instances in which a broker
trading a particular scrip appeared to have exceeded the Rs 50 million threshold. To
calculate the brokers net sale position in a particular scrip, we aggregated the share value
of the brokers cumulative net sale position on a daily basis in March 2005 futures
contracts.
6

4
It is important to note that Clause 3(b) is ambiguous in terms of whether it is intended to apply at the
broker or the client level. We believe that its plain meaning supports application at the broker level, for a
particular scrip, but note that the clauses precise interpretation has not yet been tested in Pakistani courts.
5
We understand from SECP that the CDC is the only allowable depository in which to register ownership
of shares is the CDC, in spite of the language in Clause 3(b) pertaining to the deposit of shares at
institutions other than CDC.
6
Cumulative balances of net open futures positions were calculated based on actual daily trading values of
the scrips on the day purchased. For the purposes of this calculation, shares held were not revalued on a
daily basis based on new price movements. Also, for purposes of this analysis, net buy positions in T+3
were not netted from the cumulative net futures position as is provided for in Clause 3(b). In most cases,
we found the brokers net T+3 position immaterial to the analysis and to the identification of potential
violators of Clause 3(b). Nonetheless, consideration of a brokers net T+3 position, if any, may impact the
precise quantification of the potential violation.
We identified a total of 2,491 instances of brokers whose open net sales positions in
March 2005 Futures contracts for a particular scrip, on a particular day, exceeded the Rs
50 million threshold of Clause 3(b).
7
These 2,491 cases were spread out between 88
brokers and across 24 futures-eligible scrips. Part III Appendix B lists these 2,491
instances.
Consistent with Clause 3(b), these brokers were required, at the time their positions
exceeded the Rs 50 million threshold, to deposit with the KSE the shares representing the
excess amount over the threshold, or provide documentation to KSE that the shares were
recorded at CDC. Accordingly, and for purposes of our follow-on analysis of potential
Clause 3(b) violations, we have provided our list of brokers to the SECP for further
action as per law.
B. EXAMINATION OF NET SALES POSITIONS OF LARGER VOLUME
BROKERS FOR VIOLATIONS OF CLAUSE 3(B) AND SECTION 17(A)
Section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance (1969) prohibits the use of any
scheme, act or practice calculated to act as a fraud upon the market. The participation in
naked short sales to a significant degree may be construed as a violation of Section 17(a):
Prohibition of fraudulent acts, etc--- No person shall, for the purpose of inducing,
dissuading, effecting, preventing, or in any manner influencing or turning to his
advantage, the sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly, --
(a) employ any device, scheme, artifice, or engage in any act, practice or course
of business which operates or is intended or calculated to operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person
We examined further the net open sales positions in March 2005 Futures contracts of the
thirteen brokers with the largest net sales positions across multiple scrips. In order to
conduct this analysis, we collected account information from CDC detailing the
quantities of shares held by each of the brokers for each of the scrips traded.
On a broker level basis for each individual trading day of March 2005 Futures contracts,
we compared the open net position of each of the thirteen brokers by scrip to the
aggregate balance of same scrip shares recorded in the brokers accounts at CDC.
8
The

7
An instance, for purposes of this analysis, represents each day a broker exceeds the threshold for a
particular scrip. This definition may not necessarily represent the same number of separate actionable
events as may be defined under the securities regulations. For the purposes of this calculation, shares were
not revalued on a daily basis based on daily closing share price. Revaluing futures positions on a daily
basis based on closing share price may impact the amounts calculated.
8
Under regulations in force at March 2005, brokers were allowed to open and maintain shares in several
accounts at CDC: main account, house account, group account and client accounts. For this analysis, the
results of this analysis for each of the thirteen brokers analyzed is summarized in Chart
III-1 below, and is also provided in Part III-Appendix A. These results support the
inferences raised by the Taskforce in relation to these activities.
Chart III-1: Sample of Thirteen Brokers With Net Futures Sales Positions Greater
Than Value of Same Scrip Shares Held at CDC
9
Broker
BOP DGKC FABL FFBL FFC ICI NBP NML OGDC PGF POL PPL PSO PTC SNGP
Atlas Cap'l X X X X X
AKD X X X X
BMA X X X
AHSL X X X X X X X X X X X
Orix Inv't X X X X X X X X
Elxir Sec X X X X X X
KASB X X X
Taurus X X X X
A. Jabbar X X X X
Escorts Inv X X X X
Siddiqui X X X X
A. Cassim X X X X X X X X
Motiwala X X X X X X X X
Scrip
As Marked With an X
We found that each one of the thirteen brokers, for at least one trading day within one
scrip, had net futures sales balances of Rs 50 million greater than the value of their
respective holdings at CDC. Most noteworthy are those brokers whose apparent shortfall
in shares at CDC amounted to hundreds of millions of rupees and was prolific across
several scrips for an extended period of time. If substantiated, these trading positions
could be significant violations of Clause 3(b) and Section 17(a). For example:
10
By March 15, 2005, Broker AHSLs net sales positions in March 2005 futures
for seven scrips were in excess, in material amounts, of its share holdings at CDC.
The brokers net sales position in PSO March futures, for example, was slightly
over Rs 1 billion more than the aggregate share value of PSO scrip recorded in the
brokers accounts at CDC. The brokers net sales position in PTC March futures,
for example, was Rs 551 million more than the aggregate share value of PTC scrip
recorded in the broker accounts at CDC.
Beginning in the four trading days prior to and including March 15, 2005, Broker
AKD accumulated net sales in PTC futures of Rs. 750 million in excess of the
brokers holdings of the scrip as recorded in its accounts at CDC.

share amounts in all of the brokers various accounts were aggregated together. As of April 1, 2005 the
SECP moved to prohibit the use of group accounts at CDC. Letter from SECP to Central Depository
Company of Pakistan Limited. Prohibition on Use of Group Account By CDS Participants. No.
1(6)cdc/pol/1997, 6 Jan. 2005.
9
We emphasize that the brokers on this list have not been proven at this stage to have violated the
securities laws, but rather are under inquiry by the SECP for potential misconduct.
10
See schedules of detailed analysis for each of the thirteen brokers in Part III-Appendix A
Broker MMM, as of March 15, 2005, had net sales positions for seven scrips in
excess of the brokers share holdings at CDC. Noteworthy is that on March 16,
2005, the total number of shares held in the brokers accounts at CDC (the vast
majority was in its group account) dropped from 4.8 million to just 175,000. Yet
its cumulative net sales position in FABL futures remained at or near 5 million
shares until the end of the trading month.
11
We have referred to the SECP for further action as per law all instances for which the
brokers net sales position exceeded its share amounts recorded at CDC. We note that in
performing this analysis, we encountered several limitations in the use of CDC data as
the basis for prima facie evidence of violations of either Clause 3(b) or Section 17(a).
Use of CDC data is hampered by a number of limitations including: (1) CDC is a national
depository and shares held at CDC may be trading on an exchange other than KSE; (2) a
broker in a net futures trading position appearing to be in excess of shares held at CDC
may have the shares in another members account at CDC, in which case there may be no
violation of Clause 3(b); (3) there are short timing delays between trade date and
settlement date that may impact the precise date at which the violation occurred, as well
as the precise quantification of the amount; and (4) shares at CDC that are pledged or
recently sold may not be so identified as unavailable for consideration in the share
threshold analysis element of Clause 3(b).
C. NEW COT ACTIVITY OF LARGER BROKERS APPEARING TO BE
OVER CLAUSE 3(B) THRESHOLD
The Taskforce alleged that the brokers obtaining large naked short sale positions in
Futures contracts were some of the same brokers responsible for the markets steep
decline, as a direct result of their reduction of lending in the regulated COT market. Such
activities could be violations of Section 17(a), and as such, the Taskforce called for a
further forensic investigation into these allegations.
12
In our examination of these allegations, we analyzed the amount of New COT provided
to the market during the first two weeks of March 2005 by the same thirteen brokers

11
Interestingly, per a review of the KSE trading records, this broker transacted no sales in FABL in the
Ready market on the KSE between the trading days of March 14 to March 17, inclusive. It is unclear to us
why the brokers CDC-registered shares would have decreased drastically, other than the possibility that
the broker may have transacted significant sales of the scrip on another stock exchange, or sold them off-
market to another broker or client. This example highlights certain caveats and qualifications noted
elsewhere in the Report concerning data availability and scope of work.
12
Taskforce Report, paras: 33, 39 and 55 (as quoted at beginning of Part III).
identified in Section B above.
13
Chart III-2 below shows that the New COT provided by
these brokers remained relatively stable through March 15 or, in some cases, actually
increased. Consistent with our findings in Part I of this Report, we find no evidence to
support the Taskforces allegations that brokers influential to the market and trading in
significant naked short sale positions purposefully restricted COT lending to profit from
their sales positions.
Chart III-2 Daily Purchases of New COT for Sample of Thirteen Brokers For the
-
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AKD BMA Capital AHSL
Orix Inv. Bank Elixir Securities KASB Sec. Ltd.
Tauru Sec. Ltd. Escorts Inv Bank Abdul Jabbar Khanani
Jahangir Siddiqui Akberally Cassim Motiwala
Atlas Inv. Bank

13
As presented in Part I of this Report, New COT represents the value (in Rupees) of newly initiated carry
over transactions transacted on the KSE on a given trading day. New COT is equivalent to Open Market
COT provided on the KSE Daily Unreleased/Open Market COT reports.
PART I - APPENDICES
NOVEMBER 21, 2006
SECP FORENSIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE EVENTS OF MARCH 2005
REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF REGULATED COT
OCTOBER 16, 2006 (DRAFT 12OCT; 6PM) APPENDICES - PAGE 1 OF 16
APPENDIX A SECP COT SCRIP PHASE-OUT SCHEDULE
Phased-Out w.e.f. Scrip # Symbol
October 8, 2004 1 SEPCO
Southern Electric Power Company
Ltd.
October 22, 2004 2 BSBF
BSJS Balanced Fund
November 5, 2004 3 PICB
PICIC Commercial Bank
November 19, 2004 4 TELE
Telecard Ltd.
December 3, 2004 5 FABL
Faysal Bank
December 17, 2004 6 UNBL
Union Bank
December 31, 2004 7 ENGRO
Engro Chemical
January 7, 2005 8 WCCL
World Communications Ltd.
January 14, 2005 9 DSFL
Dewan Salman Fiber Ltd.
January 21, 2005 10 PGF
PICIC Growth Fund
January 28, 2005 11 FFC
Fauji Fertilizer
February 4, 2005 12 PICIC
Pakistan Industrial Credit &
Investment Corp.
February 11, 2005 13 SSGC
Sui Southern Gas Co.
February 18, 2005 14 NML
Nishat Mills Ltd.
February 25, 2005 15 LUCK
Lucky Cement
March 4, 2005 16 SNGP
Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd.
March 11, 2005 17 ACBL
Askari Commercial Bank
March 18, 2005 18 MCB
Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd.
March 25, 2005 19 MLCF
Maple Leaf Cement
April 1, 2005 20 ICI
ICI Pakistan
April 8, 2005 21 FFBL
Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim
April 15, 2005 22 BOP
Bank of Punjab
April 22, 2005 23 PTC
Pakistan Telecommunication
Company Ltd.
April 29, 2005 24 HUBCO
Hub Power Co.
May 6, 2005 25 NBP
National Bank of Pakistan Ltd.
May 13, 2005 26 POL
Pakistan Oil Fields Ltd.
May 20, 2005 27 DGKC
D.G. Khan Cement Company Ltd.
May 27, 2005 28 OGDC
Oil and Gas Development Corp.
June 3, 2005 29 PSO
Pakistan State Oil
APPENDIX B TRENDS IN THE TRADING DATA FOR
READY AND COT MARKETS, KARACHI STOCK
EXCHANGE
Chart B-1 Percent of Daily Values of New COT to Daily Values of Total COT,
KSE, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
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EXCHANGE
Chart B-2 Daily Trading Values for Ready Market and New COT, KSE, In
Rupees Billions, For the Period July 1, 2004 to March 15, 2005
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120
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B
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New COT
Value
Total Ready
Market Value
EXCHANGE
Chart B-3 New COT by Brokers Representing COT Lenders, KSE, In Rupees
Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005
All Other
(118 brokers)
Rs. 533.0
49%
Orix
Rs. 51.8, 5%
KASB
Rs. 67.8, 6%
Akberally Cassim, Rs.
49.8 , 5%
Atlas
Rs. 76.7, 7%
AHSL
Rs. 152.0, 14%
AKD
Rs. 156.0 , 14%
(In Rupee Billions)
EXCHANGE
Chart B-4 New COT by Brokers Representing COT Borrowers, KSE, In Rupees
Billions, For the Period January 3, 2005 to March 15, 2005
DJM
Rs. 32.1 , 3%
Motiwala
Securities
Rs. 29.7 , 3%
Abdul Jabbar
Khanani
Rs. 29.6 , 3%
All other (124 Brokers)
Rs. 539.8 , 49%
AHSL
Rs. 27.8 , 3%
Munir Khanani
Securities
Rs. 19.9 , 2%
First National
Rs. 33.8 , 3%
First Capital
Rs. 37.1 , 3%
KASB
Rs. 38.4 , 4%
Darson Securities
Rs. 33.8 , 3%
Standard Capital
Rs. 39.3 , 4%
Mohammed Hussain
Adhi
Rs. 56.1 , 5%
AKD
Rs.169.9 , 15%
(In Rupee Billions)
APPENDIX C LISTS OF BROKERS PARTICIPATING IN
COT OPEN MARKET, KARACHI STOCK EXCHANGE
Table C-1 Daily Transactions of New COT of Brokers Representing COT Lenders
( Purchase Transactions), For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd

155,999,610,853 14.35% 14.35%
Arif Habib Limited

151,999,873,872 13.98% 28.33%
Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd.

76,654,870,388 7.05% 35.38%
KASB Securities Ltd.

67,849,093,332 6.24% 41.62%
Orix Investment Bank (Pak) Ltd.

51,808,542,777 4.77% 46.39%
Akberally Cassim & Sons

49,812,885,151 4.58% 50.97%
First CapitaL Equities Ltd.

43,023,078,851 3.96% 54.93%
Darson Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

35,843,278,553 3.30% 58.22%
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

35,482,319,978 3.26% 61.49%
Standard Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

32,148,257,691 2.96% 64.44%
Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets

26,529,163,203 2.44% 66.88%
Invest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd.

21,152,926,383 1.95% 68.83%
Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd.

20,537,995,259 1.89% 70.72%
Escorts Investment Bank Ltd.

20,290,117,464 1.87% 72.59%
BMA Capital Management Limited

18,181,436,841 1.67% 74.26%
First Equity Modaraba

16,927,631,037 1.56% 75.82%
Security Investment Bank Ltd.

16,649,447,864 1.53% 77.35%
Multiline Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

16,366,883,918 1.51% 78.85%
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

14,202,481,185 1.31% 80.16%
Taurus Securities Limited

13,879,981,466 1.28% 81.44%
Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd.

13,048,361,791 1.20% 82.64%
Live Securities (Private) Ltd.

12,777,515,485 1.18% 83.81%
Capital One Equities Limited.

11,409,045,950 1.05% 84.86%
Aziz Fidahusein & Co. (Private) Ltd.

10,727,998,360 0.99% 85.85%
Noman Abid & Company Ltd.

10,122,753,452 0.93% 86.78%
Prudential Securities Limited

9,523,131,437 0.88% 87.65%
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
FDM Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd

9,291,597,008 0.85% 88.51%
Intermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

8,297,089,153 0.76% 89.27%
Mohammed Hussain Adhi

7,847,869,662 0.72% 89.99%
First National Equities Ltd.

7,180,519,874 0.66% 90.65%
Ali Husain Rajabali Limited

6,674,810,202 0.61% 91.27%
Alfalah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

6,246,504,625 0.57% 91.84%
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

5,563,467,441 0.51% 92.35%
Time Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

4,775,946,784 0.44% 92.79%
Tewfiq Mohammed Amin Fikree

4,495,868,019 0.41% 93.21%
We Financial Services Ltd.

4,456,364,189 0.41% 93.62%
Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

4,276,861,066 0.39% 94.01%
Aba Ali Habib

4,175,699,533 0.38% 94.40%
Invisor Securities (Private) Ltd.

3,871,487,388 0.36% 94.75%
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

3,784,586,917 0.35% 95.10%
Ali Hassnain Yousuf Ali

3,450,856,510 0.32% 95.42%
Mohammed Saad Maniar

3,349,035,952 0.31% 95.72%
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

3,331,720,710 0.31% 96.03%
AMZ Securities (Pvt) Limited

3,295,244,941 0.30% 96.33%
Asian Securities Limited

3,163,763,454 0.29% 96.63%
Concordia Securities (Pvt) Ltd.

2,804,816,040 0.26% 96.88%
Kausar Abbas Bhayani

2,204,490,946 0.20% 97.09%
AMPLE Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

2,186,032,765 0.20% 97.29%
Fortune Securities Limited

2,073,066,731 0.19% 97.48%
Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

1,984,621,318 0.18% 97.66%
I. I. Kodvavi Securities ( Private ) Ltd

1,909,611,573 0.18% 97.84%
Ismail Abdul Shakoor

1,754,538,137 0.16% 98.00%
Dalal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

1,560,438,833 0.14% 98.14%
HH Misbah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

1,547,416,113 0.14% 98.28%
Siddik Moti

1,531,510,477 0.14% 98.42%
Mohammed Junaid Memon

1,462,954,147 0.13% 98.56%
Pak Meezan Securities (Pvt.)Ltd

1,270,204,977 0.12% 98.68%
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
H. M. Idrees H. Adam

1,237,729,199 0.11% 98.79%
Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Ltd.

1,194,020,819 0.11% 98.90%
Saao Capital (Private) Ltd.

1,070,573,563 0.10% 99.00%
B & B Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

909,306,041 0.08% 99.08%
Dawood Mohammed

899,815,501 0.08% 99.16%
ACE Securities ( Private ) Ltd.

702,620,119 0.06% 99.23%
Abbasi Securities (SMC-PVT) Ltd

671,530,858 0.06% 99.29%
Akhai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

621,706,261 0.06% 99.35%
Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura

601,616,193 0.06% 99.40%
Prime Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

578,224,250 0.05% 99.46%
Abdul Jabbar Khanani

567,834,751 0.05% 99.51%
Khatoon Hajiani

561,040,201 0.05% 99.56%
Cliktrade Limited

471,501,319 0.04% 99.60%
Eastern Capital Ltd.

406,062,403 0.04% 99.64%
Altaf Adam

338,324,836 0.03% 99.67%
Mohammed Farooq H. Abdullah

308,297,877 0.03% 99.70%
Abdul Kadir Yusuf

307,698,712 0.03% 99.73%
Friendly Securities ( Private ) Ltd.

283,119,763 0.03% 99.75%
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt) Ltd.

273,537,759 0.03% 99.78%
Mohammed Siddique Suleman

205,126,656 0.02% 99.80%
Mohammed Tariq Moti

182,490,410 0.02% 99.82%
Zillion Capital Securi. (Pvt.) Ltd

170,093,967 0.02% 99.83%
Salman Services (Pvt) Limited

135,097,888 0.01% 99.84%
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Ltd.

134,596,230 0.01% 99.86%
Muhammad Shahid Durvesh

105,068,013 0.01% 99.87%
Shahid Ali Habib Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

103,327,077 0.01% 99.88%
Zafar Moti Capital Sec. (Pvt.)Ltd

101,569,296 0.01% 99.88%
Amin Siddiq Parekh Sec.(Pvt.)Lt

90,697,895 0.01% 99.89%
M. Munir Khanani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

86,263,966 0.01% 99.90%
Malik Khan Awan

78,103,023 0.01% 99.91%
Moosa Noor Mohammed Shahzada & Co.

77,561,398 0.01% 99.91%
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
KAI Securities (Private) Ltd.

74,238,324 0.01% 99.92%
Abdul Majeed Zakaria

56,168,045 0.01% 99.93%
Mohammed Anaf Kapadia

53,978,204 0.00% 99.93%
Mohammed Anas Kapadia

52,342,975 0.00% 99.94%
Muhammad Hussain A. Karim

50,616,010 0.00% 99.94%
Al-Asar Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

50,063,626 0.00% 99.95%
Alfa Adhi Securities ( Pvt.) Ltd.

48,430,555 0.00% 99.95%
A. Sattar Motiwala Sec.(Pvt.) Ltd

48,269,096 0.00% 99.95%
A. Latif Noorani

44,920,800 0.00% 99.96%
Javed Omer Vohra & Company Ltd.

41,705,180 0.00% 99.96%
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

40,563,909 0.00% 99.97%
Oriental Securities (Private) Ltd

37,806,738 0.00% 99.97%
MARS Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

36,944,841 0.00% 99.97%
Yacoob Habib

36,061,372 0.00% 99.98%
Haji Ghani Haji Usman

35,713,530 0.00% 99.98%
Mohammed Ayub Younus Adhi

30,769,205 0.00% 99.98%
Mohammed Ashfaq Hussain

29,564,623 0.00% 99.99%
A. Sattar Dawood Adhi

28,099,748 0.00% 99.99%
AAG Securities (Private) Ltd.

26,904,336 0.00% 99.99%
Haroon Suleman

17,317,517 0.00% 99.99%
M. Nisar M. Usman Ashrafi

15,862,307 0.00% 99.99%
A.R. Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

13,489,750 0.00% 100.00%
Muhammad Nadeem Abdul Ghaffar

9,643,252 0.00% 100.00%
Finex Securities Limited

9,234,638 0.00% 100.00%
Bawa Securities ( Pvt. ) Ltd.

7,946,680 0.00% 100.00%
MAC Securities (Private) Ltd.

6,287,090 0.00% 100.00%
Marfani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

5,313,671 0.00% 100.00%
Continental Capital Management (Pvt) Ltd

5,180,019 0.00% 100.00%
M.R.A Securities ( Pvt ) Ltd.

4,635,625 0.00% 100.00%
Mohammed Anis Ismail

1,411,250 0.00% 100.00%
Apex Capital Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd.

1,264,389 0.00% 100.00%
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
Aziz Moosa Khanani

998,035 0.00% 100.00%
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel

970,209 0.00% 100.00%
Iqbal Usman Kodv. Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd

763,750 0.00% 100.00%
Salim M. Sozer

379,500 0.00% 100.00%
Al-Mal Securities & Services Ltd.

206,052 0.00% 100.00%
Tahir Shafique

105,100 0.00% 100.00%
TOTAL

1,087,166,404,217
Table C-2 Daily Transactions of New COT of Brokers Representing COT
Borrowers (Sell Transactions), For the Period January 3 to March 15, 2005
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd

169,579,911,117 15.60% 15.60%
Mohammed Hussain Adhi

56,064,138,222 5.16% 20.76%
Standard Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

39,318,916,154 3.62% 24.37%
KASB Securities Ltd.

38,427,031,707 3.53% 27.91%
First CapitaL Equities Ltd.

37,076,941,916 3.41% 31.32%
Darson Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

33,830,704,243 3.11% 34.43%
First National Equities Ltd.

33,828,891,135 3.11% 37.54%
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

32,156,307,754 2.96% 40.50%
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

29,732,768,029 2.73% 43.23%
Abdul Jabbar Khanani

29,581,740,098 2.72% 45.95%
Arif Habib Limited

27,811,869,351 2.56% 48.51%
M. Munir Khanani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

19,911,742,114 1.83% 50.34%
Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd.

18,731,357,480 1.72% 52.07%
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

18,071,682,667 1.66% 53.73%
Mohammed Anas Kapadia

17,780,665,353 1.64% 55.36%
Multiline Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

16,912,840,439 1.56% 56.92%
Live Securities (Private) Ltd.

16,399,671,480 1.51% 58.43%
Ismail Abdul Shakoor

15,208,589,513 1.40% 59.83%
SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd

14,885,744,597 1.37% 61.20%
Prudential Securities Limited

12,899,157,561 1.19% 62.38%
FDM Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd

11,799,841,418 1.09% 63.47%
Yacoob Habib

11,239,447,543 1.03% 64.50%
Intermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

11,150,859,822 1.03% 65.53%
Fortune Securities Limited

11,116,575,959 1.02% 66.55%
Friendly Securities ( Private ) Ltd.

10,984,697,198 1.01% 67.56%
A.R. Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

10,847,918,280 1.00% 68.56%
Zillion Capital Securi. (Pvt.) Ltd

10,436,229,929 0.96% 69.52%
I. I. Kodvavi Securities ( Private ) Ltd

10,132,905,075 0.93% 70.45%
First Equity Modaraba

10,016,863,530 0.92% 71.37%
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
Muhammad Nadeem Abdul Ghaffar

9,846,763,419 0.91% 72.28%
Time Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

9,092,099,540 0.84% 73.11%
Dalal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

8,815,793,992 0.81% 73.93%
Taurus Securities Limited

8,378,534,774 0.77% 74.70%
Mohammed Anaf Kapadia

7,550,514,387 0.69% 75.39%
Bawa Securities ( Pvt. ) Ltd.

7,515,833,287 0.69% 76.08%
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt) Ltd.

7,323,409,800 0.67% 76.76%
Aba Ali Habib

7,281,180,323 0.67% 77.43%
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

6,986,929,176 0.64% 78.07%
Muhammad Hussain A. Karim

6,491,215,222 0.60% 78.66%
Prime Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

6,466,062,150 0.59% 79.26%
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Ltd.

6,314,174,235 0.58% 79.84%
KAI Securities (Private) Ltd.

6,309,486,770 0.58% 80.42%
Haji Ghani Haji Usman

5,753,894,293 0.53% 80.95%
AMPLE Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

5,666,309,929 0.52% 81.47%
M. Nisar M. Usman Ashrafi

5,475,501,976 0.50% 81.97%
Moosa Noor Mohammed Shahzada & Co.

5,443,372,522 0.50% 82.48%
Muhammad Javed Surmawala

5,358,318,865 0.49% 82.97%
Azee Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

5,334,000,570 0.49% 83.46%
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

5,285,766,901 0.49% 83.95%
Bagasra Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

5,220,538,549 0.48% 84.43%
ACE Securities ( Private ) Ltd.

5,196,738,449 0.48% 84.90%
Shahid Ali Habib Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

5,092,846,699 0.47% 85.37%
Siddik Moti

5,016,516,038 0.46% 85.83%
MAC Securities (Private) Ltd.

4,877,072,393 0.45% 86.28%
M.R.A Securities ( Pvt ) Ltd.

4,443,975,167 0.41% 86.69%
Pak Meezan Securities (Pvt.)Ltd

4,428,418,666 0.41% 87.10%
HH Misbah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

4,369,732,566 0.40% 87.50%
Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

4,318,932,737 0.40% 87.90%
Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Ltd.

4,115,833,784 0.38% 88.28%
Mohammed Ayub Younus Adhi

4,063,459,169 0.37% 88.65%
Eastern Capital Ltd.

3,991,196,588 0.37% 89.02%
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
Concordia Securities (Pvt) Ltd.

3,923,839,401 0.36% 89.38%
Kausar Abbas Bhayani

3,772,337,373 0.35% 89.72%
We Financial Services Ltd.

3,738,812,436 0.34% 90.07%
Khatoon Hajiani

3,734,461,996 0.34% 90.41%
Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd.

3,723,274,116 0.34% 90.75%
Invest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd.

3,563,547,108 0.33% 91.08%
Zafar Moti Capital Sec. (Pvt.)Ltd

3,537,399,699 0.33% 91.41%
Iqbal Usman Kodv. Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd

3,481,940,378 0.32% 91.73%
Aziz Fidahusein & Co. (Private) Ltd.

3,467,072,797 0.32% 92.05%
Continental Capital Management (Pvt) Ltd

3,308,552,896 0.30% 92.35%
Saao Capital (Private) Ltd.

3,243,264,093 0.30% 92.65%
Mohammed Siddique Suleman

3,170,173,622 0.29% 92.94%
Invisor Securities (Private) Ltd.

3,073,279,944 0.28% 93.22%
Escorts Investment Bank Ltd.

2,906,712,055 0.27% 93.49%
Al-Asar Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

2,892,094,322 0.27% 93.76%
Orix Investment Bank (Pak) Ltd.

2,851,824,272 0.26% 94.02%
MARS Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

2,750,332,524 0.25% 94.27%
Cliktrade Limited

2,662,620,509 0.24% 94.52%
Javed Omer Vohra & Company Ltd.

2,611,880,665 0.24% 94.76%
Haroon Suleman

2,609,339,539 0.24% 95.00%
Capital One Equities Limited.

2,516,101,373 0.23% 95.23%
B & B Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

2,310,980,921 0.21% 95.44%
A. Latif Noorani

2,310,569,124 0.21% 95.65%
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

2,232,006,732 0.21% 95.86%
Mohammed Anis Ismail

2,052,800,384 0.19% 96.05%
Ali Husain Rajabali Limited

1,971,106,123 0.18% 96.23%
Ashfaq Zakaria Ghory

1,965,222,746 0.18% 96.41%
A. Sattar Motiwala Sec.(Pvt.) Ltd

1,885,375,605 0.17% 96.58%
Salman Services (Pvt) Limited

1,813,922,874 0.17% 96.75%
AAG Securities (Private) Ltd.

1,812,041,967 0.17% 96.92%
Mohammed Ashfaq Hussain

1,678,443,685 0.15% 97.07%
AMZ Securities (Pvt) Limited

1,640,580,755 0.15% 97.22%
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
Muhammad Shahid Durvesh

1,611,860,921 0.15% 97.37%
Mohammed Tariq Moti

1,518,680,714 0.14% 97.51%
Mohammed Saad Maniar

1,488,464,363 0.14% 97.65%
Mohammed Farooq H. Abdullah

1,425,566,211 0.13% 97.78%
Alfa Adhi Securities ( Pvt.) Ltd.

1,356,306,906 0.12% 97.90%
Finex Securities Limited

1,316,288,367 0.12% 98.02%
Zohra w/o M. Siddiq Mayari

1,303,230,468 0.12% 98.14%
Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura

1,285,730,475 0.12% 98.26%
Ali Hassnain Yousuf Ali

1,283,365,480 0.12% 98.38%
Oriental Securities (Private) Ltd

1,228,658,689 0.11% 98.49%
Akberally Cassim & Sons

1,221,461,074 0.11% 98.61%
Malik Khan Awan

1,214,882,806 0.11% 98.72%
A. Sattar Dawood Adhi

1,036,625,745 0.10% 98.81%
Al-Mal Securities & Services Ltd.

1,008,071,041 0.09% 98.91%
Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd.

974,322,729 0.09% 99.00%
Lakhani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

972,659,128 0.09% 99.08%
Apex Capital Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd.

880,586,503 0.08% 99.17%
Marfani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

842,217,555 0.08% 99.24%
Mohammed Tariq Vohra

840,264,477 0.08% 99.32%
Amin Siddiq Parekh Sec.(Pvt.)Lt

795,968,970 0.07% 99.39%
Abdul Majeed Zakaria

790,430,039 0.07% 99.47%
BMA Capital Management Limited

754,108,006 0.07% 99.54%
Abdul Kadir Yusuf

584,856,617 0.05% 99.59%
Ghulam Mohammed Ismail

550,054,103 0.05% 99.64%
Mohammed Junaid Memon

485,634,172 0.04% 99.69%
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel

485,477,940 0.04% 99.73%
Akhai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

473,378,930 0.04% 99.77%
Irfan Mazhar Securities (Pvt.)Ltd

472,942,750 0.04% 99.82%
Noman Abid & Company Ltd.

428,023,093 0.04% 99.86%
Altaf Adam

301,563,307 0.03% 99.88%
Aziz Moosa Khanani

254,822,729 0.02% 99.91%
H. M. Idrees H. Adam

185,970,583 0.02% 99.92%
Broker Name
Traded Value (in
Rupees)
% of
total
Cumulative
%
Abbasi Securities (SMC-PVT) Ltd

176,624,082 0.02% 99.94%
Zaitoon M. A. Shakoor

174,172,304 0.02% 99.96%
Asian Securities Limited

108,190,643 0.01% 99.97%
Salim M. Sozer

86,401,218 0.01% 99.97%
Arif H. Yousuf Saya

85,467,256 0.01% 99.98%
Mohammed Hussain Ismail

55,700,100 0.01% 99.99%
Dawood Mohammed

51,524,195 0.00% 99.99%
Sakarwala Capital Sec.(Pvt.) Ltd

30,646,460 0.00% 100.00%
Memon Securities (Private) Ltd.

25,006,275 0.00% 100.00%
Alfalah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd.

19,969,840 0.00% 100.00%
Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets

7,882,300 0.00% 100.00%
TOTAL

1,087,166,404,217
APPENDIX D LIST OF SCRIPS COMPRISING GROUP A
(I.E., SCRIPS PHASED-OUT OF COT AS OF MARCH 18,
2005)
To Be Phased-Out
w.e.f.
Scrip # Symbol Value of
Total COT
(in millions)
Value Date
October 8, 2004 1 SEPCO Rs. 20.4 August 31, 2004
October 22, 2004 2 BSBF Rs .62.2 August 31, 2004
November 5, 2004 3 PICB Rs. 88.0 August 31, 2004
November 19, 2004 4 TELE Rs. 115.5 August 31, 2004
December 3, 2004 5 FABL Rs. 129.7 August 31, 2004
December 17, 2004 6 UNBL Rs. 165.6 August 31, 2004
December 31, 2004 7 ENGRO Rs. 186.6 August 31, 2004
Subtotal RS. 768.0

January 7, 2005 8 WCCL Rs.25.3 January 3, 2005
January 14, 2005 9 DSFL Rs. 304.8 January 3, 2005
January 21, 2005 10 PGF Rs. 930.1 January 1, 2005
January 28, 2005 11 FFC Rs. 635.0 January 3, 2005
February 4, 2005 12 PICIC Rs. 909.0 January 3, 2005
February 11, 2005 13 SSGC Rs. 601.7 January 3, 2005
February 18, 2005 14 NML Rs. 1,462.4 January 3, 2005
Subtotal Rs. 4,868.3

February 25, 2005 15 LUCK Rs. 957.5 February 18, 2005
March 4, 2005 16 SNGP Rs. 2,208.0 February 18, 2005
March 11, 2005 17 ACBL Rs. 611.6 February 18, 2005
March 18, 2005 18 MCB Rs. 1,388.8 February 18, 2005
Subtotal Rs. 5,165.9
PART II - APPENDICES
Wash Trades
NOVEMBER 21, 2006

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.
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1
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7
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4
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8
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4
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6
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1
2
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5
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M
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r
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6
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7
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7
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9

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5
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3
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1
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H
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7
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.
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4
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9
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2
2
6
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8
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5
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9
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1
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5
.
2
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4
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E
N
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6
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5
.
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5
8
8
J
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1
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5
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.
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6
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.
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3
8
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9
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.
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6
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7
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5
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7
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7
.
3
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3
6
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4
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3
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2
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r
-
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,
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7
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5
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5
9
,
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.
6
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7
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5
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8
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D
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9
7
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5
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.
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5
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.
4
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7
2
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8
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N
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1
7
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5
NOVEMBER 21, 2006
APPENDIX VIII FROM
TASKFORCE REPORT JUNE
2005 WASH TRADES
REPRODUCED FOR
REFERENCE
Name of Member BRY SLR
BUYER
CLIENT
SELLER
CLIENT TRADE QTY No Trades Scrip
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 154 154 1,348,800 16 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 1,335,000 35 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 960,000 13 PTC-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 154 154 500,000 6 PTC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 435,000 9 PTC-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 154 154 400,000 3 NBP-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 11 11 382,500 7 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 346,300 27 PSO-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 11 11 300,000 3 PTC-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013758 013758 250,000 4 OGDC-FWD
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 SA SA 250,000 3 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 216,900 6 OGDC-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 200,000 1 PTC-FWD
Arif Habib Securities Limited 50 50 0003 0003 200,000 2 POL-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 AFTAB AFTAB 175,000 4 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 155,000 7 OGDC-FWD
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1512 1512 145,000 6 POL-REG
Multiline Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 49 49 01 01 129,500 4 OGDC-REG
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1196 1196 128,000 1 PTC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 801 801 114,500 2 PTC-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 801 801 114,300 3 NBP-REG
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 189 189 113,900 3 OGDC-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 110,700 52 OGDC-REG
Arif Habib Securities Limited 50 50 0007 0007 100,000 1 OGDC-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 100,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Live Securities (Private) Limited 43 43 1044 1044 100,000 1 PTC-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 100,000 1 NBP-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 003 003 100,000 1 OGDC-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 0121 0121 100,000 1 OGDC-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 101 101 100,000 3 PSO-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 012364 012364 96,300 2 OGDC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 96,000 12 NBP-FWD
MRA Securities (Private) Limited 194 194 01 01 95,000 1 PTC-REG
Ismail Abdul Shakoor 74 74 44 44 94,500 2 PTC-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 1823 1823 94,000 1 OGDC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 89,900 1 NBP-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 B13 B13 85,000 1 OGDC-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 154 154 75,000 2 POL-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 67,500 9 OGDC-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 112 112 66,600 1 NBP-REG
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AR14 AR14 66,500 1 PTC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 61,000 9 PSO-FWD
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 2202 2202 61,000 3 OGDC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 54,100 8 NBP-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 52,900 2 OGDC-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013758 013758 50,000 1 NBP-FWD
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 35 35 50,000 1 PTC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 109 109 49,500 2 PTC-FWD
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 189 189 49,500 2 PTC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 214 214 47,500 1 OGDC-FWD
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 46,500 2 PTC-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 46,300 19 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 376 376 44,000 4 PTC-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 AFTAB AFTAB 43,500 3 OGDC-FWD
Sakarwala Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 10 10 IK IK 43,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 43,000 3 OGDC-FWD
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 114 114 41,400 1 OGDC-REG
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 35 35 40,500 1 PTC-FWD
Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 19 19 1186 1186 38,000 1 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 36,500 13 PSO-FWD
Prime Securities (Private) Limited 184 184 R R 36,500 1 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 801 801 35,200 2 OGDC-REG
Ghulam Mohammed Ismail 131 131 G1 G1 35,000 1 PSO-FWD
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 33,000 26 PSO-FWD
Al - Asar Securities (Private) Limited 34 34 SM1 SM1 26,500 2 NBP-REG
A. R. Securities (Private) Limited 75 75 454 454 26,000 2 PTC-REG
Salim M. Sozer 121 121 CO CO 25,200 2 NBP-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 25,000 3 OGDC-FWD
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 H45 H45 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
ACE Securities (Private) Limited 67 67 2 2 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110520 110520 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
S. C. Securities (Private) Limited 112 112 772 772 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 07002 07002 25,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets Limited 149 149 900 900 25,000 1 POL-FWD
Fortune Securities Limited 46 46 14E 14E 25,000 1 PTC-FWD
Yousuf Ibrahim 89 89 J15 J15 25,000 1 PTC-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 25,000 1 OGDC-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 201 201 24,000 1 OGDC-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 018 018 22,500 2 OGDC-FWD
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 21,300 9 POL-REG
Pak Meezan Securities (Pvt.) Limited 161 161 017001 017001 20,500 1 OGDC-FWD
S. C. Securities (Private) Limited 112 112 711 711 20,500 1 OGDC-FWD
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 013600 013600 20,000 2 POL-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 19,500 2 OGDC-FWD
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 19,100 4 OGDC-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110520 110520 19,000 1 PTC-REG
S. C. Securities (Private) Limited 112 112 711 711 18,500 1 POL-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 17,800 6 PSO-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 11 11 17,600 1 POL-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 I I 17,300 3 OGDC-REG
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 447 447 17,000 3 OGDC-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 P P 16,500 14 OGDC-REG
Yousuf Ibrahim 89 89 HH HH 16,000 1 PTC-FWD
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 17 17 15,000 1 OGDC-FWD
AMZ Securities ( Pvt) Limited 167 167 50 50 15,000 1 POL-FWD
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110407 110407 15,000 1 PTC-REG
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 14,500 4 PTC-REG
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 18001 18001 14,000 8 NBP-FWD
Sakarwala Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 10 10 130001 130001 14,000 1 PTC-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 018 018 13,600 1 OGDC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 13,500 4 NBP-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 801 801 13,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 514 514 12,500 1 NBP-FWD
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 12,500 2 PSO-FWD
Arif Habib Securities Limited 50 50 0001 0001 12,500 3 POL-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 11,000 2 POL-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 10,500 2 PTC-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 10,500 3 PTC-REG
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 RSS RSS 10,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 22 22 10,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 10,000 5 OGDC-REG
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 447 447 10,000 1 PTC-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 M01 M01 10,000 1 PTC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 223 223 10,000 1 PTC-REG
Javed Omer Vohra & Co. Ltd. 151 151 65 65 9,500 1 NBP-FWD
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 31 31 9,500 1 PSO-REG
Alfa Adhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 21 21 679 679 9,000 1 OGDC-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 9,000 6 OGDC-REG
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 9,000 3 OGDC-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 9,000 4 OGDC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 9/1 9/1 8,900 1 PSO-REG
Capital One Equities Limited 150 150 AA AA 8,900 1 PSO-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 8,500 6 PSO-REG
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 157 157 8,400 3 NBP-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 370 370 8,000 7 POL-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 8,000 3 PTC-REG
Abdul Majeed Zakaria 40 40 A19 A19 7,500 1 OGDC-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 I I 7,500 1 NBP-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 P P 7,500 7 PTC-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 L L 7,000 2 OGDC-FWD
A. R. Securities (Private) Limited 75 75 454 454 6,800 1 OGDC-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 22 22 6,200 1 NBP-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 16 16 6,000 2 POL-FWD
Finex Securities Limited 44 44 1103 1103 6,000 2 PTC-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 8C 8C 6,000 1 PTC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 95 95 5,900 9 OGDC-REG
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 420 420 5,800 3 OGDC-REG
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 5,700 8 PSO-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110296 110296 5,500 2 PSO-FWD
Orix Investment Bank Pakistan Limited 77 77 0068 0068 5,100 1 PSO-REG
Elixir Securities Pakistan (Private) Limited 100 100 N683 N683 5,000 1 NBP-FWD
Concordia Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 85 85 T10 T10 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 5 5 5,000 2 OGDC-FWD
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 930 930 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 I I 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 5MK 5MK 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Yousuf Ibrahim 89 89 HH HH 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Zaitoon M. A. Shakoor 25 25 YK YZ34 YK YZ34 5,000 1 OGDC-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 5,000 1 POL-FWD
Finex Securities Limited 44 44 1103 1103 5,000 2 PTC-FWD
Ismail Abdul Shakoor 74 74 NAR NAR 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Limited 18 18 SS SS 5,000 10 PTC-FWD
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Muhammad Junaid Memon 170 170 01/RANA 01/RANA 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Prime Securities (Private) Limited 184 184 4112 4112 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Zahoor Abdul Ghaffar 156 156 D D 5,000 1 PTC-FWD
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 5,000 1 NBP-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 33 33 5,000 1 OGDC-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110915 110915 5,000 1 OGDC-REG
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 329 329 5,000 1 PSO-REG
First Equity Modaraba 181 181 5 5 5,000 1 PSO-REG
AAG Securities (Pvt) Limited 118 118 05N 05N 5,000 1 PTC-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 A044 A044 5,000 1 PTC-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 4,700 2 NBP-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 5C 5C 4,500 1 OGDC-FWD
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 4,500 1 POL-FWD
Muhammad Anaf Kapadia 152 152 38 38 4,500 1 POL-FWD
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110664 110664 4,500 1 PSO-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 5 5 4,500 1 PSO-FWD
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 145 145 2038 2038 4,500 2 PTC-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 4,500 3 PTC-REG
HH Misbah Securities (Private) Limited 37 37 W45 W45 4,500 1 PTC-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 4,400 8 POL-REG
Live Securities (Private) Limited 43 43 S31 S31 4,200 1 NBP-REG
Noman Abid & Company Limited 12 12 2005 2005 4,000 2 NBP-FWD
Elixir Securities Pakistan (Private) Limited 100 100 I108 I108 4,000 1 PTC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 95 95 3,800 13 NBP-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 CF CF 3,500 3 OGDC-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 112 112 3,500 1 OGDC-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 CMS CMS 3,500 2 NBP-REG
Muhammad Anaf Kapadia 152 152 SD1 SD1 3,500 1 PSO-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 3,500 5 PTC-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 3,300 2 POL-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 3,300 3 PSO-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 415 415 3,100 3 POL-REG
Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Limited 88 88 30/251 30/251 3,000 1 NBP-FWD
Muhammad Farooq Haji Abdullah 93 93 FD FD 3,000 2 NBP-FWD
A. Sattar Dawood Adhi 55 55 Z Z 3,000 1 POL-FWD
Apex Capital Securities (Private) Limited 188 188 G29 G29 3,000 1 PTC-FWD
Muhammed Siddiq Suleman 191 191 DSK DSK 3,000 1 NBP-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 B B 3,000 1 OGDC-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 L L 3,000 1 POL-REG
Zillion Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 47 47 720 720 3,000 1 POL-REG
Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets Limited 149 149 2600 2600 3,000 1 PSO-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 J J 3,000 2 PTC-REG
Mr. Muhammad Shahid Durvesh 24 24 G31 G31 3,000 1 PTC-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 2,900 3 POL-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 351 351 2,900 28 POL-REG
I. I. Kodvavi Securities (Private) Limited 169 169 100 100 2,600 2 POL-REG
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 20 20 2,500 1 NBP-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 QB QB 2,500 1 OGDC-FWD
SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 187 187 80040 80040 2,500 1 OGDC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 K K 2,500 1 POL-FWD
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 G1 G1 2,500 1 PSO-FWD
Sakarwala Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 10 10 IK IK 2,500 2 PSO-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 HR1 HR1 2,500 1 PTC-FWD
Friendly Securities ( Pvt.) Limited 163 163 UN UN 2,500 1 NBP-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 305 305 2,500 2 NBP-REG
Muhammad Anaf Kapadia 152 152 38 38 2,500 1 NBP-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 12 12 2,500 1 POL-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 R49 R49 2,500 1 PSO-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 2202 2202 2,500 1 PTC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 95 95 2,400 1 PSO-REG
Muhammad Anaf Kapadia 152 152 SD1 SD1 2,100 1 POL-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 CF CF 2,000 1 NBP-FWD
I. I. Kodvavi Securities (Private) Limited 169 169 318 318 2,000 1 NBP-FWD
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Limited 18 18 SS SS 2,000 4 NBP-FWD
Amin Siddique Parekh Securities (Pvt) Limited 166 166 F12 F12 2,000 1 OGDC-FWD
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 574 574 2,000 1 OGDC-FWD
MAC Securities (Private) Limited 106 106 111 111 2,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 2,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 472 472 2,000 1 POL-FWD
Amin Siddique Parekh Securities (Pvt) Limited 166 166 F12 F12 2,000 2 POL-FWD
M. S. Securities (Private) Limited 105 105 574 574 2,000 2 POL-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 15074 15074 2,000 2 POL-FWD
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 2824 2824 2,000 1 POL-FWD
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 140 140 2,000 1 PSO-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 2,000 1 PSO-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 2,000 4 PSO-FWD
Noman Abid & Company Limited 12 12 961 961 2,000 1 PSO-FWD
Yousuf Ibrahim 89 89 HH HH 2,000 1 PSO-FWD
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 145 145 2038 2038 2,000 1 PTC-FWD
Aziz Fidahusein & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. 87 87 1ARK 1ARK 2,000 1 OGDC-REG
Zafar Moti Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 32 32 W390 W390 2,000 1 OGDC-REG
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 2,000 3 POL-REG
Muhammad Nadeem A. Ghaffar 153 153 L01 L01 2,000 1 POL-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 G G 2,000 3 PSO-REG
Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets Limited 149 149 3630 3630 2,000 1 PSO-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 2,000 1 PSO-REG
Global Securities Pakistan Limited 101 101 HA HA 2,000 1 PTC-REG
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Limited 18 18 SS SS 2,000 4 PTC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 112 112 2,000 1 PTC-REG
Arif Habib Securities Limited 50 50 0022 0022 1,900 1 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 351 351 1,900 15 PSO-REG
Muhammad Hussain Abdul Karim 53 53 HI HI 1,900 1 PSO-REG
Siddiq Moti 111 111 A491 A491 1,800 1 POL-REG
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 A A 1,700 1 NBP-REG
Eastern Capital Ltd. 7 7 S/ISL45 S/ISL45 1,700 1 PSO-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 M01 M01 1,500 1 OGDC-FWD
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 5 5 1,500 1 POL-FWD
Siddiq Moti 111 111 H1 H1 1,500 1 POL-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 15074 15074 1,500 1 PSO-FWD
Altaf Adam 1 1 952 952 1,500 2 NBP-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 1,500 1 POL-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 304 304 1,500 11 PSO-REG
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AR276 AR276 1,500 1 PSO-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 1,500 2 PTC-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 D03 D03 1,300 1 OGDC-REG
MRA Securities (Private) Limited 194 194 01 01 1,300 2 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 791 791 1,200 1 OGDC-REG
Salim M. Sozer 121 121 CO CO 1,200 1 POL-REG
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 1,200 12 PSO-REG
Atlas Investment Bank Limited 17 17 201 201 1,100 1 NBP-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 65 65 1,100 1 NBP-REG
Ismail Iqbal Securities (Pvt.) Limited 18 18 SS SS 1,100 8 PSO-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 4210 4210 1,100 2 PSO-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 26 26 1,000 1 NBP-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 1,000 1 NBP-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 1,000 2 NBP-FWD
Altaf Adam 1 1 951 951 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 MS MS 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Ismail Abdul Shakoor 74 74 JSQ JSQ 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Mohammed Saad Maniar 96 96 L034 L034 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Moosa, Noor Mohammed, Shahzada & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd.104 104 0450 0450 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 20 20 1,000 1 OGDC-FWD
Azee Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 108 108 5564 5564 1,000 1 POL-FWD
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110296 110296 1,000 2 POL-FWD
HH Misbah Securities (Private) Limited 37 37 E1 E1 1,000 1 POL-FWD
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 RZ RZ 1,000 1 POL-FWD
Muhammad Hussain Abdul Karim 53 53 JA JA 1,000 1 POL-FWD
SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 187 187 07 07 1,000 1 POL-FWD
Sikandar Esmail Ahmed Bagasrawala 140 140 24126 24126 1,000 1 POL-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 1,000 2 POL-FWD
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 12 12 1,000 1 PSO-FWD
FDM Capital Securities (Private) Limited 94 94 U38 U38 1,000 1 PSO-FWD
Khawaja Amir Ishaq 119 119 G14 G14 1,000 1 PSO-FWD
MRA Securities (Private) Limited 194 194 01 01 1,000 1 PSO-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 1,000 2 PSO-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 213 213 1,000 2 PSO-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 SS SS 1,000 1 PTC-FWD
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 ECM ECM 1,000 1 PTC-FWD
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 1,000 1 PTC-FWD
Altaf Adam 1 1 917 917 1,000 1 NBP-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 1,000 1 NBP-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 9/42 9/42 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 2430 2430 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 A044 A044 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Malik Khan Awan 137 137 005006 005006 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 8C 8C 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Zillion Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 47 47 720 720 1,000 1 OGDC-REG
Amanullah Haji Mohammed Marfani 73 73 AHAD AHAD 1,000 2 POL-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 A044 A044 1,000 1 POL-REG
First National Equities Limited 175 175 J J 1,000 2 POL-REG
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 6 6 1,000 2 POL-REG
MAC Securities (Private) Limited 106 106 J69 J69 1,000 1 PSO-REG
Noman Abid & Company Limited 12 12 1085 1085 1,000 1 PSO-REG
Abbasi Securities (SMC-Pvt.) Limited 61 61 956 956 1,000 1 PTC-REG
Malik Khan Awan 137 137 2057 2057 1,000 1 PTC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 113 113 1,000 2 PTC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 18 18 900 1 OGDC-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110296 110296 700 2 POL-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 700 7 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 376 376 600 2 NBP-REG
Escorts Investment Bank Limited 138 138 901 901 600 1 OGDC-REG
Aba Ali Habib 162 162 372 372 600 1 POL-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 D03 D03 600 1 POL-REG
Multiline Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 49 49 01 01 600 2 POL-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 P P 600 2 POL-REG
A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt.) Limited 178 178 11 11 600 1 PSO-REG
Ample Securities (Pvt.) Limited 171 171 Q3 Q3 500 1 NBP-FWD
Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets Limited 149 149 3986 3986 500 1 NBP-FWD
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AF1 AF1 500 1 NBP-FWD
Altaf Adam 1 1 9 9 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 6 6 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Khawaja Amir Ishaq 119 119 T4 T4 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 MP41 MP41 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 15074 15074 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Orix Investment Bank Pakistan Limited 77 77 0072 0072 500 1 OGDC-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 113 113 500 1 OGDC-FWD
AAG Securities (Pvt) Limited 118 118 14S 14S 500 1 POL-FWD
Amanullah Haji Mohammed Marfani 73 73 6016 6016 500 1 POL-FWD
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 9/2 9/2 500 1 POL-FWD
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 110361 110361 500 1 POL-FWD
Haji Ghani Haji Usman 28 28 153 153 500 1 POL-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 500 1 POL-FWD
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 112 112 500 1 POL-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 Y Y 500 1 POL-FWD
Zaitoon M. A. Shakoor 25 25 YK YZ91 YK YZ91 500 1 POL-FWD
Rafi Securities (Private) Limited 159 159 680 680 500 1 PSO-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 Y Y 500 1 PSO-FWD
First National Equities Limited 175 175 CF CF 500 1 PTC-FWD
Memon Securities (Private) Limited 92 92 49 19 49 19 500 1 PTC-FWD
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 AFTAB AFTAB 500 1 PTC-FWD
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 500 1 PTC-FWD
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 546172 546172 500 1 PTC-FWD
Sakarwala Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 10 10 IK IK 500 1 PTC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 71 71 500 1 PTC-FWD
Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Limited 196 196 J J 500 1 PTC-FWD
Abdul Aziz Tayub Patel 116 116 330 330 500 1 NBP-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 8C 8C 500 1 NBP-REG
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AF1 AF1 500 1 NBP-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 5/39 5/39 500 1 OGDC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 303 303 500 1 OGDC-REG
Muhammad Anas Kapadia 68 68 AF1 AF1 500 1 OGDC-REG
Rafi Securities (Private) Limited 159 159 221 221 500 1 OGDC-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 101 101 500 1 POL-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 8C 8C 500 1 POL-REG
Time Securities (Private) Limited 36 36 09011 09011 500 1 POL-REG
Zafar Moti Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 32 32 305 305 500 1 POL-REG
Al - Asar Securities (Private) Limited 34 34 A A 500 1 PSO-REG
Mars Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 48 48 X205 X205 500 1 PSO-REG
Mohammed Hussain Adhi 98 98 72 72 500 1 PSO-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 475 475 500 1 PSO-REG
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 145 145 2042 2042 500 1 PTC-REG
DJM Securities (Pvt.) Limited 16 16 6 6 500 1 PTC-REG
Khawaja Amir Ishaq 119 119 AWJ AWJ 500 1 PTC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 311 311 500 1 PTC-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 354 354 500 1 PTC-REG
Muhammad Munir Muhammad Ahmed Khanani 84 84 A82 A82 500 1 PTC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 500 1 PTC-REG
Zafar Moti Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 32 32 W390 W390 500 1 PTC-REG
Abdul Jabbar Khanani 134 134 H1 H1 400 1 POL-REG
Darson Securities (Private) Limited 90 90 606 606 400 1 PSO-REG
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 1 1 400 1 PSO-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 305 305 400 2 PSO-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 1823 1823 300 2 POL-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 311 311 300 3 PSO-REG
Siddiq Moti 111 111 I I 300 1 PSO-REG
Taurus Securities Limited 129 129 P P 300 1 PSO-REG
FDM Capital Securities (Private) Limited 94 94 U94 U94 200 1 OGDC-REG
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 200 2 OGDC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 95 95 200 2 POL-REG
Finex Securities Limited 44 44 1103 1103 200 1 POL-REG
Fortune Securities Limited 46 46 B B 200 2 POL-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 109 109 200 1 POL-REG
Muhammad Javed Surmawala 35 35 1539 1539 200 1 POL-REG
Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 6 6 9226 9226 200 2 POL-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 200 2 POL-REG
First Captial Equities Limited 57 57 111191 111191 200 1 PSO-REG
Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 145 145 66/2 66/2 100 1 NBP-REG
Moosani Securities (Pvt) Limited 158 158 304 304 100 1 NBP-REG
Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Limited 64 64 559001 559001 100 1 NBP-REG
KASB Securities Limited 128 128 116654 116654 100 1 OGDC-REG
Noman Abid & Company Limited 12 12 1240 1240 100 1 OGDC-REG
Rafi Securities (Private) Limited 159 159 411 411 100 1 OGDC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 100 1 OGDC-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 113 113 100 1 OGDC-REG
Bawa Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 54 54 5/39 5/39 100 1 POL-REG
Eastern Capital Ltd. 7 7 S/1 S/1 100 1 POL-REG
ACE Securities (Private) Limited 67 67 3214 3214 100 1 PSO-REG
Fortune Securities Limited 46 46 B B 100 1 PSO-REG
Invest Capital & Securities (Pvt) Ltd. 97 97 5 5 100 1 PSO-REG
Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. 198 198 2202 2202 100 1 PSO-REG
Sohail Raza Moosani 143 143 103 103 100 1 PSO-REG
NOVEMBER 21, 2006
PART III APPENDICES
FUTURES CONTRACTS
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REPORT OF FINDINGS
Appendix B - List of Brokers with Net Futures Positions
Greater than Rs. 50 million in March Contracts
Broker
Code Broker Name Scrip Date
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
006 Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 10-Mar-05 (54,431,600)
006 Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 11-Mar-05 (61,263,675)
006 Sherman Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 08-Mar-05 (197,390,670)
012 Noman Abid & Company Ltd. BOP 24-Feb-05 (51,155,440)
012 Noman Abid & Company Ltd. BOP 25-Feb-05 (51,109,220)
012 Noman Abid & Company Ltd. PGF 09-Mar-05 (72,123,060)
012 Noman Abid & Company Ltd. PPL 21-Feb-05 (168,461,915)
012 Noman Abid & Company Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (481,142,370)
November 21, 2006 PART III APPENDICES - PAGE 1 OF 50
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
012 Noman Abid & Company Ltd. PSO 02-Mar-05 (95,592,740)
012 Noman Abid & Company Ltd. SSGC 22-Feb-05 (68,770,125)
012 Noman Abid & Company Ltd. SSGC 01-Mar-05 (84,357,145)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. C 15-Mar-05 (97,616,425)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NBP 07-Mar-05 (88,108,255)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NML 09-Mar-05 (111,187,865)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 24-Feb-05 (56,674,845)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 28-Feb-05 (82,003,660)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 10-Mar-05 (101,761,535)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PGF 01-Mar-05 (52,546,940)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. POL 28-Feb-05 (50,755,280)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. POL 02-Mar-05 (52,535,705)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (89,538,290)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 15-Mar-05 (1,062,397,590)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 24-Feb-05 (142,757,680)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 25-Feb-05 (144,571,785)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 09-Mar-05 (53,338,720)
016 DJM Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 08-Mar-05 (55,426,750)
017 Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd. NML 03-Mar-05 (80,361,590)
017 Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 03-Mar-05 (52,705,720)
017 Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd. POL 03-Mar-05 (70,258,350)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
017 Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 24-Feb-05 (163,733,600)
017 Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (191,177,455)
017 Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 03-Mar-05 (97,320,705)
017 Atlas Capital Markets (Pvt.) Ltd. SNGP 03-Mar-05 (59,181,210)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
018 smail qbal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NML 23-Feb-05 (100,784,870)
018 smail qbal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NML 01-Mar-05 (99,735,695)
018 smail qbal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. POL 02-Mar-05 (71,525,085)
018 smail qbal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 02-Mar-05 (122,990,680)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
018 smail qbal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 03-Mar-05 (55,556,200)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd NBP 22-Feb-05 (117,128,420)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd NBP 02-Mar-05 (160,813,225)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd NML 25-Feb-05 (55,556,720)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd NML 28-Feb-05 (56,771,260)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd OGDC 24-Feb-05 (60,957,775)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd OGDC 01-Mar-05 (84,280,870)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd OGDC 14-Mar-05 (1,051,663,645)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd POL 03-Mar-05 (50,272,055)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd PPL 22-Feb-05 (133,602,060)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd PPL 02-Mar-05 (1,167,143,170)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd PPL 10-Mar-05 (360,185,345)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd PSO 07-Mar-05 (73,393,345)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd PTC 23-Feb-05 (59,030,000)
019 Aqeel Karim Dhedhi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd PTC 01-Mar-05 (197,564,185)
022 BMA Capital Management Limited OGDC 04-Mar-05 (74,209,725)
022 BMA Capital Management Limited PTC 04-Mar-05 (70,985,055)
024 Muhammad Shahid Durvesh PTC 07-Mar-05 (58,373,585)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
024 Muhammad Shahid Durvesh PTC 09-Mar-05 (64,329,205)
028 Haji Ghani Haji Usman PPL 24-Feb-05 (81,032,230)
028 Haji Ghani Haji Usman PSO 03-Mar-05 (107,012,415)
028 Haji Ghani Haji Usman PTC 07-Mar-05 (61,204,400)
043 Live Securities (Private) Ltd. OGDC 07-Mar-05 (65,548,170)
043 Live Securities (Private) Ltd. PSO 02-Mar-05 (227,269,245)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
043 Live Securities (Private) Ltd. PTC 09-Mar-05 (68,182,830)
043 Live Securities (Private) Ltd. SNGP 22-Mar-05 (69,968,490)
044 Finex Securities Limited PSO 04-Mar-05 (55,803,645)
045 Kausar Abbas Bhayani LUCK 25-Feb-05 (50,550,700)
045 Kausar Abbas Bhayani LUCK 03-Mar-05 (50,804,450)
045 Kausar Abbas Bhayani OGDC 24-Feb-05 (79,573,430)
045 Kausar Abbas Bhayani OGDC 02-Mar-05 (78,416,355)
045 Kausar Abbas Bhayani OGDC 07-Mar-05 (67,212,105)
045 Kausar Abbas Bhayani PTC 07-Mar-05 (122,018,980)
047 Zillion Capital Securi. (Pvt.) Ltd OGDC 16-Mar-05 (96,556,365)
047 Zillion Capital Securi. (Pvt.) Ltd PSO 11-Mar-05 (73,707,500)
049 Multiline Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 04-Mar-05 (126,883,675)
050 Arif Habib Limited ACBL 22-Feb-05 (50,719,805)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
050 Arif Habib Limited ACBL 01-Mar-05 (86,759,460)
050 Arif Habib Limited ENGRO 14-Mar-05 (61,151,170)
050 Arif Habib Limited FFBL 28-Feb-05 (53,049,830)
050 Arif Habib Limited FFBL 03-Mar-05 (53,377,830)
050 Arif Habib Limited FFC 21-Feb-05 (56,630,675)
050 Arif Habib Limited FFC 01-Mar-05 (169,039,695)
050 Arif Habib Limited FFc 21-Mar-05 (567,225,295)
050 Arif Habib Limited C 15-Mar-05 (80,309,410)
050 Arif Habib Limited NBP 24-Feb-05 (68,411,340)
050 Arif Habib Limited NBP 01-Mar-05 (234,430,465)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
050 Arif Habib Limited NBP 18-Mar-05 (1,030,608,065)
050 Arif Habib Limited NBP 21-Mar-05 (1,015,275,965)
050 Arif Habib Limited NML 22-Feb-05 (169,707,510)
050 Arif Habib Limited NML 01-Mar-05 (405,082,515)
050 Arif Habib Limited OGDC 22-Feb-05 (70,360,800)
050 Arif Habib Limited OGDC 01-Mar-05 (282,270,660)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
050 Arif Habib Limited POL 02-Mar-05 (69,448,260)
050 Arif Habib Limited PPL 24-Feb-05 (92,702,230)
050 Arif Habib Limited PPL 01-Mar-05 (328,045,610)
050 Arif Habib Limited PSO 24-Feb-05 (250,585,260)
050 Arif Habib Limited PSO 01-Mar-05 (253,307,395)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
050 Arif Habib Limited PSO 15-Mar-05 (1,393,810,640)
050 Arif Habib Limited PTC 23-Feb-05 (89,727,430)
050 Arif Habib Limited PTC 01-Mar-05 (563,019,995)
050 Arif Habib Limited PTC 11-Mar-05 (1,413,226,395)
050 Arif Habib Limited SNGP 01-Mar-05 (71,985,935)
052 M. Nisar M. Usman Ashrafi PTC 09-Mar-05 (261,309,320)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
057 First CapitaL Equities Ltd. NML 28-Feb-05 (53,185,850)
057 First CapitaL Equities Ltd. NML 03-Mar-05 (64,042,430)
057 First CapitaL Equities Ltd. OGDC 09-Mar-05 (194,370,130)
057 First CapitaL Equities Ltd. PPL 09-Mar-05 (107,677,230)
057 First CapitaL Equities Ltd. PPL 10-Mar-05 (148,819,355)
057 First CapitaL Equities Ltd. PSO 04-Mar-05 (139,641,540)
057 First CapitaL Equities Ltd. PTC 14-Mar-05 (223,765,775)
057 First CapitaL Equities Ltd. SNGP 09-Mar-05 (64,835,775)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
062 We Financial Services Ltd. OGDC 24-Feb-05 (81,942,050)
062 We Financial Services Ltd. PSO 22-Feb-05 (95,414,040)
062 We Financial Services Ltd. PSO 23-Feb-05 (90,128,455)
062 We Financial Services Ltd. PTC 07-Mar-05 (59,288,390)
064 Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Ltd. PSO 28-Feb-05 (84,411,335)
064 Munaf Sattar Securities (Private) Ltd. PSO 01-Mar-05 (100,178,675)
066 qbal Usman Kodv. Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd MCB 28-Feb-05 (56,564,515)
066 qbal Usman Kodv. Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd MCB 01-Mar-05 (56,238,590)
066 qbal Usman Kodv. Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd PSO 01-Mar-05 (149,933,065)
066 qbal Usman Kodv. Sec. (Pvt.) Ltd PTC 07-Mar-05 (173,973,105)
067 ACE Securities ( Private ) Ltd. NML 04-Mar-05 (58,458,050)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
067 ACE Securities ( Private ) Ltd. PPL 18-Mar-05 (55,815,200)
067 ACE Securities ( Private ) Ltd. PSO 21-Mar-05 (54,186,500)
068 Mohammed Anas Kapadia OGDC 28-Feb-05 (59,673,175)
068 Mohammed Anas Kapadia PPL 08-Mar-05 (87,286,385)
068 Mohammed Anas Kapadia PSO 10-Mar-05 (105,859,360)
068 Mohammed Anas Kapadia PTC 02-Mar-05 (56,508,305)
069 nvisor Securities (Private) Ltd. PPL 03-Mar-05 (50,900,260)
069 nvisor Securities (Private) Ltd. PTC 28-Feb-05 (52,016,705)
069 nvisor Securities (Private) Ltd. PTC 02-Mar-05 (52,052,505)
069 nvisor Securities (Private) Ltd. PTC 04-Mar-05 (51,829,555)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor BOP 07-Mar-05 (58,856,290)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor C 23-Feb-05 (70,419,320)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor C 01-Mar-05 (59,758,665)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor PGF 22-Feb-05 (62,402,095)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor POL 17-Mar-05 (53,490,720)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor PPL 07-Mar-05 (86,261,545)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor PSO 25-Feb-05 (60,974,290)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor PSO 02-Mar-05 (222,772,405)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor PTC 25-Feb-05 (50,366,850)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor PTC 28-Feb-05 (88,619,200)
074 smail Abdul Shakoor PTC 01-Mar-05 (74,345,575)
075 A.R. Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 15-Mar-05 (141,896,495)
075 A.R. Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 16-Mar-05 (81,181,685)
075 A.R. Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 17-Mar-05 (113,774,585)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. NBP 03-Mar-05 (71,152,910)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. OGDC 22-Feb-05 (52,039,280)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. OGDC 01-Mar-05 (311,218,090)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. POL 23-Feb-05 (238,774,675)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. POL 01-Mar-05 (265,158,385)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. PPL 21-Feb-05 (54,420,300)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. PPL 24-Feb-05 (1,133,988,355)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (976,021,480)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. PPL 02-Mar-05 (1,013,802,505)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. PTC 23-Feb-05 (94,041,120)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. PTC 01-Mar-05 (98,737,365)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. SNGP 02-Mar-05 (57,506,455)
077 Orix nvestment Bank (Pak) Ltd. SNGP 03-Mar-05 (57,873,955)
079 rfan Mazhar Securities (Pvt.)Ltd NBP 14-Mar-05 (55,710,635)
079 rfan Mazhar Securities (Pvt.)Ltd NBP 16-Mar-05 (52,500,460)
082 Zohra w/o M. Siddiq Mayari PTC 18-Mar-05 (54,960,475)
084 M. Munir Khanani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 16-Mar-05 (254,668,695)
084 M. Munir Khanani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 16-Mar-05 (316,088,435)
084 M. Munir Khanani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 04-Mar-05 (59,246,590)
084 M. Munir Khanani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 17-Mar-05 (53,768,340)
085 Concordia Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PPL 15-Mar-05 (74,866,925)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
085 Concordia Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PTC 08-Mar-05 (71,074,615)
085 Concordia Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PTC 09-Mar-05 (60,718,095)
087 Aziz Fidahusein & Co. (Private) Ltd. NBP 14-Mar-05 (66,357,935)
087 Aziz Fidahusein & Co. (Private) Ltd. PPL 22-Feb-05 (91,121,010)
087 Aziz Fidahusein & Co. (Private) Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (67,008,925)
088 Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Ltd. BOP 15-Mar-05 (64,844,240)
088 Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Ltd. SNGP 04-Mar-05 (53,437,705)
088 Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Ltd. SSGC 25-Feb-05 (56,931,845)
088 Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Ltd. SSGC 28-Feb-05 (56,334,170)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
088 Fawad Yusuf Securities (Private) Ltd. SSGC 01-Mar-05 (61,239,120)
090 Darson Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 22-Mar-05 (72,267,740)
090 Darson Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 24-Mar-05 (61,362,425)
090 Darson Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 25-Mar-05 (56,693,935)
091 ntermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NML 10-Mar-05 (53,111,090)
091 ntermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 15-Mar-05 (51,674,145)
091 ntermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 16-Mar-05 (282,043,970)
091 ntermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 10-Mar-05 (136,576,685)
091 ntermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 01-Mar-05 (64,677,085)
091 ntermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 07-Mar-05 (106,475,020)
091 ntermarket Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 09-Mar-05 (105,542,890)
094 FDM Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd OGDC 01-Mar-05 (54,131,805)
094 FDM Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd PPL 04-Mar-05 (58,564,610)
094 FDM Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd PSO 04-Mar-05 (51,173,485)
094 FDM Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd PSO 08-Mar-05 (85,188,085)
094 FDM Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd PTC 07-Mar-05 (308,974,750)
096 Mohammed Saad Maniar PSO 04-Mar-05 (69,170,270)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. ACBL 22-Feb-05 (69,368,245)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. ACBL 01-Mar-05 (79,045,610)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. OGDC 01-Mar-05 (57,666,500)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. POL 03-Mar-05 (87,370,120)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PPL 21-Feb-05 (261,103,785)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (750,644,400)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PSO 23-Feb-05 (189,241,610)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PSO 01-Mar-05 (269,598,135)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PTC 02-Mar-05 (92,161,200)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. UNBL 23-Feb-05 (50,823,730)
097 nvest Capital and Securities (Pvt) Ltd. UNBL 01-Mar-05 (56,798,580)
098 Mohammed Hussain Adhi PSO 28-Feb-05 (67,485,725)
098 Mohammed Hussain Adhi PSO 01-Mar-05 (70,964,285)
098 Mohammed Hussain Adhi PTC 10-Mar-05 (133,434,075)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
100 Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. DGKC 15-Mar-05 (66,679,315)
100 Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. FFBL 14-Mar-05 (62,736,275)
100 Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 23-Feb-05 (90,318,615)
100 Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 01-Mar-05 (88,848,225)
100 Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 24-Feb-05 (138,824,835)
100 Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (282,119,845)
100 Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 03-Mar-05 (176,033,190)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
100 Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 22-Feb-05 (54,403,640)
100 Elixir Securities Pak. (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 08-Mar-05 (133,627,235)
101 Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd. PPL 22-Feb-05 (121,929,245)
101 Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (120,629,920)
101 Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd. PSO 02-Mar-05 (144,158,880)
101 Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd. PTC 18-Mar-05 (86,844,235)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
101 Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd. PTC 21-Mar-05 (93,757,885)
101 Global Securities ( Pakistan ) Ltd. SNGP 04-Mar-05 (65,526,575)
106 MAC Securities (Private) Ltd. PTC 07-Mar-05 (57,761,635)
107 Ali Hassnain Yousuf Ali PPL 21-Feb-05 (53,476,485)
107 Ali Hassnain Yousuf Ali PPL 01-Mar-05 (76,506,375)
108 Azee Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 14-Mar-05 (92,630,980)
108 Azee Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 07-Mar-05 (107,222,800)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
109 Dalal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NBP 14-Mar-05 (76,096,070)
109 Dalal Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 08-Mar-05 (67,089,650)
111 Siddik Moti PSO 01-Mar-05 (55,522,360)
112 Standard Capital Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 11-Mar-05 (156,115,980)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. ENGRO 23-Feb-05 (59,144,965)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. ENGRO 02-Mar-05 (83,280,375)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. HUBC 25-Feb-05 (51,836,850)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. HUBC 28-Feb-05 (63,835,725)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. HUBC 02-Mar-05 (69,091,000)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. LUCK 24-Feb-05 (53,144,600)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. LUCK 02-Mar-05 (104,790,145)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NBP 24-Feb-05 (60,296,665)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NBP 02-Mar-05 (88,457,790)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NBP 14-Mar-05 (137,120,215)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 22-Feb-05 (105,420,710)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 23-Feb-05 (119,210,100)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 03-Mar-05 (138,132,600)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 11-Mar-05 (122,321,375)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. POL 23-Feb-05 (122,930,030)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. POL 04-Mar-05 (110,018,645)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 21-Feb-05 (90,035,490)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 11-Mar-05 (254,041,275)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 16-Mar-05 (151,376,525)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 23-Feb-05 (113,330,185)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 03-Mar-05 (130,892,605)
114 Amin Tai Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 08-Mar-05 (89,247,055)
120 Alfalah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 14-Mar-05 (53,800,350)
120 Alfalah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 09-Mar-05 (88,401,850)
120 Alfalah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 10-Mar-05 (86,838,250)
120 Alfalah Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 25-Feb-05 (141,691,435)
122 Mohammed Ashfaq Hussain PTC 14-Mar-05 (77,617,550)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura BOP 22-Feb-05 (80,897,435)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura BOP 07-Mar-05 (78,842,160)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura DSFL 23-Feb-05 (54,612,370)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura DSFL 01-Mar-05 (87,637,665)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura MCB 28-Feb-05 (64,543,145)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura MCB 08-Mar-05 (58,680,695)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura NML 21-Feb-05 (144,754,140)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura NML 28-Feb-05 (145,333,890)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura NML 01-Mar-05 (135,778,305)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura PCC 23-Feb-05 (51,332,075)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura PCC 24-Feb-05 (52,662,075)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura PCC 08-Mar-05 (55,022,500)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura PPL 24-Feb-05 (51,576,400)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura PPL 09-Mar-05 (61,964,200)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura PSO 21-Feb-05 (200,779,665)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura PSO 01-Mar-05 (235,677,190)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura PTC 08-Mar-05 (60,069,005)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura SSGC 28-Feb-05 (52,330,355)
125 Bilquis Saleem Ghazipura SSGC 01-Mar-05 (52,452,555)
127 H. M. drees H. Adam DSFL 14-Mar-05 (53,312,385)
127 H. M. drees H. Adam OGDC 09-Mar-05 (58,407,170)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. OGDC 01-Mar-05 (52,266,705)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. OGDC 04-Mar-05 (76,042,530)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. POL 23-Feb-05 (68,858,225)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. POL 01-Mar-05 (67,823,820)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. PPL 25-Feb-05 (216,292,350)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. PPL 28-Feb-05 (287,747,300)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (418,013,300)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. PSO 02-Mar-05 (89,352,745)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. PTC 25-Feb-05 (94,261,985)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. PTC 28-Feb-05 (130,886,335)
128 KASB Securities Ltd. PTC 01-Mar-05 (344,363,885)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
129 Taurus Securities Limited OGDC 21-Feb-05 (149,004,905)
129 Taurus Securities Limited OGDC 01-Mar-05 (152,903,950)
129 Taurus Securities Limited PSO 22-Feb-05 (200,769,120)
129 Taurus Securities Limited PTC 22-Feb-05 (53,207,195)
129 Taurus Securities Limited PTC 24-Feb-05 (89,060,445)
129 Taurus Securities Limited PTC 01-Mar-05 (87,332,945)
131 Ghulam Mohammed smail POL 23-Feb-05 (55,395,070)
131 Ghulam Mohammed smail POL 24-Feb-05 (50,384,620)
131 Ghulam Mohammed smail PSO 01-Mar-05 (144,225,800)
131 Ghulam Mohammed smail PTC 08-Mar-05 (99,801,460)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
134 Abdul Jabbar Khanani FFC 14-Mar-05 (58,180,350)
134 Abdul Jabbar Khanani FFc 17-Mar-05 (58,060,875)
134 Abdul Jabbar Khanani NBP 15-Mar-05 (92,695,795)
134 Abdul Jabbar Khanani OGDC 14-Mar-05 (63,210,955)
134 Abdul Jabbar Khanani PPL 15-Mar-05 (160,037,940)
134 Abdul Jabbar Khanani PSO 14-Mar-05 (164,152,550)
134 Abdul Jabbar Khanani PTC 07-Mar-05 (112,209,130)
135 Yacoob Habib MCB 28-Feb-05 (129,387,150)
135 Yacoob Habib MCB 01-Mar-05 (101,857,375)
135 Yacoob Habib OGDC 16-Mar-05 (228,661,855)
135 Yacoob Habib PPL 02-Mar-05 (176,647,415)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
135 Yacoob Habib PSO 02-Mar-05 (54,128,985)
135 Yacoob Habib PTC 11-Mar-05 (52,797,260)
138 Escorts nvestment Bank Ltd. OGDC 02-Mar-05 (71,424,245)
138 Escorts nvestment Bank Ltd. POL 22-Feb-05 (56,448,515)
138 Escorts nvestment Bank Ltd. POL 02-Mar-05 (187,212,885)
138 Escorts nvestment Bank Ltd. PPL 24-Feb-05 (61,275,940)
138 Escorts nvestment Bank Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (90,994,005)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
138 Escorts nvestment Bank Ltd. PSO 15-Mar-05 (103,042,805)
138 Escorts nvestment Bank Ltd. PTC 02-Mar-05 (86,338,980)
139 Asian Securities Limited FFBL 10-Mar-05 (68,855,740)
139 Asian Securities Limited NBP 07-Mar-05 (50,530,425)
140 Bagasra Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. POL 03-Mar-05 (75,604,615)
141 Cliktrade Limited NBP 10-Mar-05 (91,855,050)
141 Cliktrade Limited PTC 07-Mar-05 (55,272,835)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
143 Saao Capital (Private) Ltd. DGKC 14-Mar-05 (50,711,570)
143 Saao Capital (Private) Ltd. OGDC 03-Mar-05 (50,855,900)
143 Saao Capital (Private) Ltd. PSO 01-Mar-05 (84,005,275)
143 Saao Capital (Private) Ltd. PTC 04-Mar-05 (52,071,175)
143 Saao Capital (Private) Ltd. PTC 07-Mar-05 (63,119,260)
144 Sultan Gulamhusein Dattoo OGDC 15-Mar-05 (58,553,845)
144 Sultan Gulamhusein Dattoo PSO 02-Mar-05 (88,149,800)
144 Sultan Gulamhusein Dattoo PTC 15-Mar-05 (54,745,750)
145 Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 24-Feb-05 (56,049,915)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
145 Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 01-Mar-05 (51,622,500)
145 Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. SNGP 15-Mar-05 (50,510,785)
145 Adam Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. SNGP 16-Mar-05 (54,516,335)
146 Jan Mohd. A. Latif Nini & Sons(Pvt.) Ltd OGDC 07-Mar-05 (53,115,015)
146 Jan Mohd. A. Latif Nini & Sons(Pvt.) Ltd OGDC 15-Mar-05 (57,083,665)
146 Jan Mohd. A. Latif Nini & Sons(Pvt.) Ltd PTC 11-Mar-05 (89,130,950)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets BOP 22-Feb-05 (51,565,240)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets BOP 02-Mar-05 (101,620,620)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets FFC 08-Mar-05 (52,435,760)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets FFC 09-Mar-05 (57,339,635)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets NBP 03-Mar-05 (68,306,600)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets NML 23-Feb-05 (51,451,275)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets NML 01-Mar-05 (83,074,950)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets OGDC 01-Mar-05 (60,025,175)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets POL 01-Mar-05 (65,975,200)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets PPL 22-Feb-05 (71,997,825)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets PPL 01-Mar-05 (450,065,965)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets PSO 21-Feb-05 (68,819,170)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets PSO 28-Feb-05 (93,660,295)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets PSO 01-Mar-05 (92,769,765)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
149 Jahangir Siddiqui Cap. Markets PTC 18-Mar-05 (59,765,485)
150 Capital One Equities Limited. NML 23-Feb-05 (50,693,730)
150 Capital One Equities Limited. NML 28-Feb-05 (50,293,295)
150 Capital One Equities Limited. NML 10-Mar-05 (50,183,915)
150 Capital One Equities Limited. PSO 09-Mar-05 (91,077,975)
150 Capital One Equities Limited. PTC 23-Feb-05 (152,234,120)
150 Capital One Equities Limited. PTC 01-Mar-05 (117,999,865)
151 Javed Omer Vohra & Company Ltd. PTC 10-Mar-05 (249,460,165)
152 Mohammed Anaf Kapadia PPL 11-Mar-05 (55,350,380)
152 Mohammed Anaf Kapadia PTC 16-Mar-05 (61,852,815)
153 Muhammad Nadeem Abdul Ghaffar OGDC 11-Mar-05 (66,257,005)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
153 Muhammad Nadeem Abdul Ghaffar POL 15-Mar-05 (104,487,415)
153 Muhammad Nadeem Abdul Ghaffar PPL 15-Mar-05 (236,624,410)
153 Muhammad Nadeem Abdul Ghaffar PSO 01-Mar-05 (86,015,995)
155 B & B Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 24-Feb-05 (94,709,700)
155 B & B Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 08-Mar-05 (57,512,615)
155 B & B Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 10-Mar-05 (61,477,865)
155 B & B Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 03-Mar-05 (50,766,345)
158 Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NML 25-Feb-05 (80,133,850)
158 Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NML 28-Feb-05 (80,383,990)
158 Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NML 01-Mar-05 (64,519,415)
158 Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 02-Mar-05 (69,904,785)
158 Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 23-Feb-05 (149,698,515)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
158 Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (138,451,000)
158 Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 09-Mar-05 (106,803,115)
158 Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 04-Mar-05 (98,631,320)
158 Moosani Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 07-Mar-05 (99,119,660)
159 Rafi Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 10-Mar-05 (109,795,995)
161 Pak Meezan Securities (Pvt.)Ltd PTC 08-Mar-05 (168,448,210)
162 Aba Ali Habib BOP 07-Mar-05 (57,866,750)
162 Aba Ali Habib DGKC 07-Mar-05 (64,656,835)
162 Aba Ali Habib DGKC 14-Mar-05 (58,654,660)
162 Aba Ali Habib NBP 01-Mar-05 (59,729,150)
162 Aba Ali Habib OGDC 03-Mar-05 (58,930,790)
162 Aba Ali Habib OGDC 04-Mar-05 (113,505,965)
162 Aba Ali Habib POL 03-Mar-05 (71,198,525)
162 Aba Ali Habib PSO 01-Mar-05 (77,025,710)
162 Aba Ali Habib PTC 08-Mar-05 (58,890,220)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
167 AMZ Securities (Pvt) Limited POL 10-Mar-05 (54,048,795)
167 AMZ Securities (Pvt) Limited PPL 25-Feb-05 (60,611,960)
167 AMZ Securities (Pvt) Limited PPL 28-Feb-05 (55,966,960)
167 AMZ Securities (Pvt) Limited PPL 09-Mar-05 (51,283,510)
167 AMZ Securities (Pvt) Limited PTC 07-Mar-05 (64,385,330)
169 . . Kodvavi Securities ( Private ) Ltd PPL 24-Feb-05 (67,176,425)
169 . . Kodvavi Securities ( Private ) Ltd PPL 04-Mar-05 (60,077,610)
169 . . Kodvavi Securities ( Private ) Ltd PTC 09-Mar-05 (70,203,040)
170 Mohammed Junaid Memon MCB 18-Mar-05 (52,319,400)
170 Mohammed Junaid Memon MCB 21-Mar-05 (55,040,615)
170 Mohammed Junaid Memon NML 04-Mar-05 (50,532,260)
170 Mohammed Junaid Memon SNGP 22-Feb-05 (53,452,135)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
171 AMPLE Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 22-Feb-05 (59,266,555)
171 AMPLE Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 15-Mar-05 (73,510,820)
175 First National Equities Ltd. BOP 08-Mar-05 (124,755,555)
175 First National Equities Ltd. OGDC 08-Mar-05 (211,497,815)
175 First National Equities Ltd. PPL 22-Feb-05 (64,847,665)
175 First National Equities Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (988,702,190)
175 First National Equities Ltd. PSO 02-Mar-05 (206,857,705)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
175 First National Equities Ltd. PTC 22-Feb-05 (102,298,270)
175 First National Equities Ltd. PTC 01-Mar-05 (65,503,795)
178 A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt) Ltd. OGDC 07-Mar-05 (59,598,675)
178 A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PPL 07-Mar-05 (72,835,060)
178 A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PSO 16-Mar-05 (69,734,500)
178 A.H.K.D. Securities (Pvt) Ltd. PTC 10-Mar-05 (54,310,300)
179 Continental Capital Management (Pvt) Ltd PTC 07-Mar-05 (68,117,695)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
181 First Equity Modaraba PPL 02-Mar-05 (77,702,035)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons BOP 28-Feb-05 (58,215,420)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons BOP 11-Mar-05 (65,229,345)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons DGKC 07-Mar-05 (89,091,200)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons FFBL 01-Mar-05 (74,636,375)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons HUBC 23-Feb-05 (71,343,820)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons HUBC 28-Feb-05 (76,793,870)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons HUBC 01-Mar-05 (98,056,445)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons NML 24-Feb-05 (104,989,030)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons NML 01-Mar-05 (203,825,665)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons OGDC 04-Mar-05 (53,426,025)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons PCC 02-Mar-05 (52,890,455)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons PCC 03-Mar-05 (55,525,705)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons POL 02-Mar-05 (86,713,060)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons PSO 23-Feb-05 (83,244,510)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons PSO 01-Mar-05 (266,101,010)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons PTC 28-Feb-05 (59,199,620)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons PTC 02-Mar-05 (59,342,520)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons SNGP 23-Feb-05 (68,344,000)
182 Akberally Cassim & Sons SNGP 01-Mar-05 (151,945,855)
187 SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd ENGRO 23-Feb-05 (52,715,400)
187 SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd ENGRO 01-Mar-05 (50,967,150)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
187 SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd POL 23-Feb-05 (54,006,695)
187 SAZ Capital Securities (Pvt.)Ltd PTC 18-Mar-05 (106,929,335)
194 M.R.A Securities ( Pvt ) Ltd. PTC 07-Mar-05 (67,163,160)
196 Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 16-Mar-05 (67,940,730)
196 Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PGF 23-Feb-05 (64,555,345)
196 Worldwide Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PGF 01-Mar-05 (81,099,665)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. BOP 24-Mar-05 (50,085,420)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. FABL 22-Feb-05 (65,463,750)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. FABL 01-Mar-05 (266,453,270)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. NBP 04-Mar-05 (80,309,720)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 21-Feb-05 (62,331,955)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. OGDC 01-Mar-05 (153,574,320)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. POL 24-Feb-05 (96,162,050)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. POL 01-Mar-05 (128,909,905)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 22-Feb-05 (69,233,100)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PPL 01-Mar-05 (174,449,945)
5(32572)),1',1*6
Broker
Cumulative Futures
Sale Position (in
rupees)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PSO 16-Mar-05 (90,572,800)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 23-Feb-05 (128,304,440)
198 Motiwala Securities (Pvt.) Ltd. PTC 09-Mar-05 (113,806,950)
200 Ali Husain Rajabali Limited OGDC 11-Mar-05 (125,239,825)
200 Ali Husain Rajabali Limited PPL 09-Mar-05 (58,064,485)
200 Ali Husain Rajabali Limited SNGP 04-Mar-05 (51,761,685)

Forensic Investigation For SECP

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Forensic Investigation For SECP

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FORENSIC INVESTIGATION FOR THE SECP

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